NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
Soviet Military Policy in the Third World
Secret
;-:
HISIORICAi KT/IW PFJXWAH ot
the Central Intelligence Agency.
6 SOVIET MILITARY POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following intelligent orgonizaiiont portlcipoled in Ihe preparation ol Iho Eiiimale:
The Central lolcll.genco Agency, lhe Intelligence O'ganiioliom ol the Department) ol Stole, Defense, Treoiury. and ihe Notional Security Agency.
Concurring:
The Deputy io the Director ol Central Inlell.gence lor the Intelligence Community, Vice Chairman
The Oepvty Orertor ol CeM.ol In-eltge-ce representing lhe Central tr-en-gence Agency
Thc Director ot Intelligence and Reieorch repreicming the Deportment olDirector.
Theononoi Servrty Agency
The Deputy Anirtonl Adminiiliolor (or Notional Secority, Energy Reieorth
Iheirector, 'ederol krre,nveslieaion
AbifoMngi
The Special Atiisranl lo lhe Secretory lei Notional Security, DepoMment ol Ihe Treosvy
Alio Partkipohng;
The Asiiilonl Chief ol Slall lor Inlelligence. Deporimenl ol the Army
The Direc'or olle licence.l the Ma.y
Morr>ol StoH,Deportrnem ol Ihe Air fore*
NOFOR NWOCONTRACT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
rage
KEY 1
I. INTRODUCTION 6
II. INSTRUMENTS OF POWER 8
A. Military Aid 8
Soviet Arms Ei 8
Air Delivery II
11
II Aid to Insurgencies 15
C Soviet Military Fotces Deployed in Third World17
To Protect Marilirne Interests
To Demonstrate Soviet Support to Third World
To Inhibit Western Military Initiatives
v:. Defenses of ihr .
Use of Naval and Air Facilities Overseas19
Mediterranean 19
Indian19
Atlantic20
Marine and Fishing Fleet20
F Additional Soviel Forces Capable o( Deplosinent to (he Third World
risis20
Air Defense
Airborne21
NavalSI
Army21
Airlift21
Aeroflot22
C Other22
Overflights and22
Capabilities Against Significant Opposition22
III THE USSR AND ITS THIRD WORLD CL1KNTS 22
A Middle
Palestine Liberation Organization
Libya
NOFORSMOCON TRACT
lirOCCG
rabian
frica
Angola
Mozambique
Cuinea-Bissau and tlie Cape Verde bland*
Taiuaoia
Somalia
Mali
The Gambia and Senegal
Equatorial Cuinea and Congo
Kenya
Nigeria
Collective Seen
C Alia
SB
31
122 32
32
4
5
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Southeast Alia
am
lac*
Singapore
Other Countilei
Support (or Liberation Croup*
I) Latin America .
Cuba
Other Countries
IV. FUTURE TRENDS
A Military Aid ..
B.ce Developments, and
Force Trends
C Geographic Emphasis
SOVIET MILITARY POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD
KEY JUDGMENTS
A. Tlie Soviets perceive the Third Worldrimary arena for the USSR's competition with the West and with China. Existing political constellations and ongoing Soviet programs suggest the following area priorities
Middle East will remain thc major focus of Soviet military activities in the Third World. As long as Soviet relations with Egypt remain sour. Syria will continue to be the largest recipient of Soviet military aid in thc area. Moscow will probably emphasize efforts in other ArabLibya, and Akf-ria
Africa is the area of greatest current potential for the USSH. Thc Soviets will doubtless be alert to opportunities to exploil troubles there even though they will have little ability to control or even predict developments.
other areas. India. Somalia, and Cuba will continue to be the focal points of Soviet military policy. Moscow apparently intends to go on looking for new clients, but the Soviets do not seem to expect any major changes in Asia or Latin America in the immediate future.
li As they have been expanding their activities in the Third Wotld. Ihe Soviets haveeduction in Western militaiy presence and influence there. The Soviels have given their highest priority to areas of
strategic importance such as the Middle East but have also taken advantage of opportunities to use their military activities to weaken the West in areas as far flung as Cuba and Angola While the Soviets continue to support the spread of Communism, the ideology of potential clients has not generally hampered the developmentilitary relationship, pragmatism and opportunism will be the Soviet guide in seeking new military relations.
C Thereumber of factors which inhibit growth of Soviet miliiary presence in the Third World:
intense nationalism of most Third World counlries makes them determined not to grant more than minimal use of facilities for Soviet forces.
powers have emerged which are loath to see any outside powerominant role,
Soviets are vulnerable lo thc vicissitudes of the Third World politics, changes in domestic regimes, and reversals in the attitudes of local leaders.
Soviets have been able to make only limited advances in competing with Western cultural, political, and economic Influence.
continued presence of US and otber Western military forces in the Third World remains an inhibition on Soviet militaiy
aclivilies.
major setbacks in Indonesia. Egypt, and thc Sudan,are convinced that their efforts in the Third Worldincreased Moscow's pieslige and influence in woridhave contributed lo Soviet national securily The motivationmilitary activity is an aspect of ils overall compelitionWest, expressed in the Third World in eflorls to weakeneconomic, and political positions while strengthening thoseUSSR Competition with China in this same arena reinforcesGiven Soviet persistence, it is extremely unlikely thatsiibacks would cause ihe USSR to reverse course.
achieve lhcir objectives the Sovietsariety ofin Third World countries Military aid has beeninstrument, and its use is likely to increase. Over the lastMoscow has signedillion worth of armstwo llrirds of ih.il amount was negotiated in the last five years.have little interest in reaching agreements to restrainTheir efforts to expand their influence rest so heavily on this
instrument that they would regard restrictions on military aid as drastically curtailing their opportunities.
recent years, thc Soviets have been exporting mote ofand best conventional equipment. Air defense missileswill continue to be among Moscow's best'sellingsophisticated weapons will require Third World clientsmore heavily on Moscow for spares, credits, and advisers topersonnel.
Soviets continue to regard insurgencies as instrumentstheir position, and will support such groups as the PLOmovements in southern Africa. Wc believe that Moscowcontinue to act more boldly than in yeais past in supportmovements. Moscow's confidence has been bolstered byperception of Western disinclination to counter Sovietthe Third World, its tested experience in supporting Cuban forcesand its improved miliiary capabilities. Soviet aid. often smallterms, canecisive effect in unstable situations suchSoviet-Cuban cooperation inationalthere may be repeated if suitable opportunities arise,when both countries judge such activity to be in their interest.
H The Soviels deploy military forces to thc Thirdnaval andshare in potential wartime missions andariety of political and military roles by demonstrating Soviet support to third World countries. Barring serious long-term crises or other unusual circumstances. Soviet general purpose naval deployments will probably not increase greatly in numbers but will grow significantly in capabilities. But Soviet air deployments to distant areas will often require overflight and staging privileges which the USSR may find difficult and sometimes impossible to obtain.
I. As Moscow's military presence in distant areas has increased. Soviet needs for supporting facilities have risen. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to seek access .to facilities primarily in thc Mediterranean andesser extent in West Africa and the Indian
Ocean.
the Mediterranean, we believe that Soviet prospects for gaining access to facilities comparable to those they lost in Egypt
arc dim.
In the Atlantic, lhe Soviets probably hope to obtain port and air facilities in Angolaedge against further troubles in Guinea.
(he asset* they have in Somalia, the Soviets have less pressing requirements for additional facilities in the Indian Ocean but will continue looking.
J. In Third World crises Soviet forces have been used to provide assistance to the USSR's clients The most extensive recent effort was in Egypt0 when the Soviets deployed,eriod of months, aircraft and surface-to-air missiles manned by Soviet pilots and missile crews operating under their own command and control network. The Soviets have also endeavored to inhibit possible US actions andisible symbol of Soviet support by interpositioning naval forces. Nevertheless. Moscow will be careful to avoid actions which riskirect military confrontation with the US.
K Thc Soviets have other military forces which could be employed in the Third World. Allhough Soviet ground, airborne, and amphibious forces are designed primarily for operations near thc USSR. Iheir training, coupled with the diversity and quality of their equipment, givesapacity to act in crisis situations The Soviets have neverilitary campaign in the Third World but. should they decide to intervene rapidly on the ground, the Soviets could send airborne units or small naval infantrs contingents Much larger ground forces could be moved by the Soviet merchant marine if there were enough time and no opposition.
L Over lhc next decade, force Improvements will continue to enhance Soviet capabilities to assist clients by supplementing local defenses. The USSR will be able to make more credible demonstrations ol force and the Soviet navy will have (tetter capabilities fot interposition The Soviets will also improve their capabilities for direct assault Rut beyond the range of land-ba<ed air support. Soviet capabilities will still be deficient to carry out an amphibious assault against determined opposition by sizable aimed forces The Soviets will face thc same problems as today of limited air cover and assault lift and vulnerable lines of communicalions.
M. Although Soviet capabilities for direct assault will remain limited, that will not keep Moscow from continuing its efforts to cultivate militaiy relations with Third World countries and to support insurgencies Soviel involvement in conflicts in the Third World is likely to take the form of interpositioning naval forces, participation of advisers in combat, and the introduction of air defense units tolient.
SESfiET
I. INTRODUCTION
I. Soviet leaden in then lifetime have Seen an impressive growld In Soviet miliiary power and influence in world affairs. They can remember vividly the Soviet Union's weakness, isolation and insecurity in Ihe years before World War II. As their military power grew in the postwar period, the Soviets began to use their military resources not only for defense of the USSR bul also to seek positions of influence In Ihe Thud World In thehe Soviets saw In military as well as economic and diplomatic relations with less developedeans of breaking the "capitalist rnciiclcinenl ol the USSR and of ending Western monopoly of Third World resources. Despite setbacks Ihe Soviets have continued to eipand their activities, which they believe have contributed to the erosion of Western influence and power In lhe Third World, and Iu the building up uf their own.
the same lime as the Soviets have been expanding iheir activities in Ihe Thiid World thry haveeduction of the Western military presence< the lastears Great Britain haswhat used toorldwide network of colonicsandful of militaiy buses, the Portuguese and the Dutch have dismantled their overseas empires, and the French haveded rule in most of their former territories The US has withdtawn fiom Indochina and col hack its bases abroad andesser degree lis commitments Recently, the Soviet' saw their cooperaiion with Cuba in Angola succeed without callingiliiary confrontation
decline in pro-Western attitudes in the Third World over the past two decades has lesultedegree ol recepliiily to Soviet militaiy Initiatives Soviel support for the anti-colonial, anti-Western positions of many Thud World leaders has also encouraged tl<ein lo turn to lhe USSR for military assistance. Tn esplint Ihc opportunities created by these Irendi lhe Soviets use military aid. adviserseployed militaiy presence, diplomatic support, and aid to liberation movements
In support ol li delatione believe lhat Mills* will probably continue lo act more bnWI* Ihan in ycais past Moscow's confidence
lia* been bolstered.by its cunent perception of Western disinclination lo counter Soviet activities In the Third World, ils tested experiences in supporting Cuban forces in Africa, and it* improved military capabilities
-In local conflicts, the Soviets are also willing to back theirto Ihc point of involving limited numbers of Soviel personnel in thehave been careful lo avoid actions
which would risk precipitating direct military confrontation with the US
esult of their efforts lhe Soviets have expanded military relations in areas formerly tied to the West and now use mililatv facilities in Cuba. Guinea, and Somalia But the USSR has gained substantial influence inandful of less-drseloped countries Thereumber of factors which inhibit an expanded Soviel presence in llie Third
-The intense nationalism of most Third World countries has made them determined not to giant mote thanf facilities foi Soviet milttjivven in exchange for largr amounts of aid The Soviets have been forced to operate wiilnn the constraints Imposed by le-guncs sensitized, in part b> the Soviets' own propaganda, lo any hints of foreign irjterlrrrnce ur inter will inn in lhcir affairs
--Regional powers hue emerged which are loath lo sec an) outside powerominant role These ins-hide such diverse countries as Iran India, and Vietnam Moreover, regionalin Africa. Southeast Asia, and lattin
have druourajed member nations fiom eselusive or even Hose lies with the Soviet*
I he Soviets havr proven vulnerable to change* of
regime at in Indonesia and Ghana. They have ulu) proven unable tu tlissuudr polilical leaden who.Iheu own rea*oni. reversed their previous dependence cm Soviet support, ai President Sadat did in Egypt Soviet efforts to manipulate lhe internal politics of Thi'd World countries have ullen failed
Soviets have been able lo make only limited advances in competing with Western cultural, political, and economic influence. Soviet markets cannot absorb the bulk of Third World eiports. and these countries are well aware that Soviet products are generally interior. They have not prevented the continued reliance of manyon Western military support. Thus the Soviets have often been unable to build on the foothold created by their military activities and aid lo ctpand Ihcir influence in other fields
lhe continued presence of US and othet Western military forces in Third World areasurb on the activity of Soviet lorces. Weslern forces are generally more powerful, more diveisified. and more capable of rapidlhan those of llie Soviets in then areas
Anotherct or in Soviet policy toward Ihe Third World ts competition with China, primarily inlulhcm Africa and Southeast Asia. The Sovietsontinuing need to assert llieir leadership of Ihe international Communist movement and ihey believe they should protect their interests in almost every area in which ihe Chinese have or are er peeled to have influence Tbe Soviets have supported more liberation movements provided mote arms, and have deployed morC military forces lo Third Wortd areas lhan thc ChunC Ihinu't inability tn provide large amounts of military aid ne to depluv fours to distant areav hai given the Soviets an advantage Tlse disruptions of the Cultural Revolution also weakened lhe Chinese nulilai* aid program Nonetheless. Ihe Chinese have sucmsfullv competed with the Sovietsew countries, such as Tanzania, and they willource of concern to Soviet leaders
earch for wider influence In world politics has lieen highly opportunistic
the Sovieis conlinuc lo support lhe spread nf Communism, lhe ideology of potential client* ha* mil generally hampered the developmentilitary relationship The basis of Moscow'* policy in the Third World since thes lieen toleration of nonalignment Th* teslMttcnlul client has lieen willingness lowiih the USSH and not Mar ml otlhodnsy Indeed, Moscow has tnoie than once courted Thud World leaders who believed thai the hest place for Incal communists was in jail To be vine.
il-.ii
riv
Ihe Sovietselalionshiplient couniry they generally encourage It lo adopt Soviet views and Soviel slyl* institutions
-Geographically, lhe Soviets have given their highest priority to. clients in areai of strategic importance to tlie USSR such as lhc Middle East and Soulh Asia Moscow has not. however, confuted its efforts lo any parlicular area and lhe USSR has taken advantage of opportunities In far flung locations from Cuba to Angola. The level of Soviel investment may not always be an indication of expected payoffs The Soviets probablyigher rate of returnuch smaller investment in southern Africa lhan Ibey do from Iheu continued heavy spending in Arab countries
-Hope ol economic gain has not been the primary driving fotcc In Soviet expansionism After World War II the Soviet! did not go Into lhe Third World specifically in search of resources or trade, nor didspect iheir ventures to show ecooornir profits per se On the contrary, Moscow ha* spent heavily in its efforts to busvert hr lew. the Soviets are becoming more interesled In some resource* of Third World areas and in earning hard currency in arms vales
lhe Soviets nlll continue Iheir effort* lo support IflMM ami pnilrcl their intereit* in distant areasIn guarantee their air and vea lire of munieation. to protect vital import! and llieir ng fleet, end to improve the lupport id their taryonly for peacetime operations but invent ofSoviets will continue loi .ii.with client states lot arrets to ports anlii Ids. overflight and staging lights, ^nd orherlege
Aswtanf Chief of Slaff. Intelligence.
I of the Air force, belieiei lhal lhc 'in presented inw'i the increased propensity of the Soviet 'tike International risks and the growing
Sot lei iunfuix.it In id iiliilitt, lo profeit military power In the Third World. The ttattmenit and actions of lhe Soviel leaden reflect their belief that ike intenianoaal "correlation of ferret" eteertu fatwi the if. ono* the obfectivei of lhe USSH Soelel behavior Men lhe3u uur denwnitiatet tliat Motcou: is uniting to retVel from an ever ri pending choice of conflict options The Soviet concept of "imperialism" liewt Weslrrn economic relationship! wllh the Third World as Incoming incicaitnglu vulnerable. The growth In Sovietand strategic copabilltiet offers tht USSB an opportunity to manipulate those vulnerabihtiei to lit oan advantage
II. INSTRUMENTS OF POWER
h* USSRariety of military resources it0 support ill policies In thc Third World
matt extensive use of Soviel military assets in Ihe Third World has been in thc provision of military assistance Soviet aid includes eo,uip-ment. technicians and advisers, and training of military personnel in the I'SSR The Soviet* provide assistance to guerrilla movements us well as to governments.
naval presence in distant areas has been nved to demonstrate Soviet support for client count lies and to discourage outside intervention Al lhe same time, Soviet miliiary me ol facilities hi Third Worldobtained follow -ins; Soviet militaryimprovecapabilities against the US
Finally, lhc Soviets have forces: III tb< I'SSR which could Ik* used to Intervene inocal siMiflict
A. Military Aid
ilitary assistance has played some rote In must of the relationships which the USSR has established
with less developed countries and hasrucial dement inost important links to the Third World. Over thc lasl ten years. Soviet arms agreements with all Third World counlries have totaled around SIS3 billion (see Table I) Uf this
imover twice as much has been withvt Third World countriesillion! asruiimiKiisiillion) Moreover. Soviet arms agreements during the first half of this decade
illion) wcie almost twice lhe level ol theillion) Deliver lei have also tncieascd sharply, running aboulillions opposed toillion in the previous five year period (see Table II) Mure ihan half ul the aims deliveries in the lasl five years have been to the Middle East1
It As these figures suggest, there isime lag between conctusion of an agreement and coin pie-linn of deliveries Moreover, some recipients have ranee led contracts or simply nut drawn down the agreed amount wilhin the time specified In lbs* agreement, often complaining of drlaved deliveries, inadequate supply of spaie parts, etc In other cases, the Soviets themselves have canceled the ariangcment fot polilical reasons
II Normally credits for Soviet military aid have been extended un lenient terms, (spirallyercent annual Inlrrest with eight to ten yean to tepjy Despite the leniency of llie repayment terms, the Soviel leadrnhtp hasreference for extending the grace period or levchrduling the debt of hard-pressed clients lather than excusing the debts outnghlew cases cash down payments have been required. Iru.ieasirigly, the Soviet leadcnliip has required cash pasment for mililars goods
H Sower Aram Exports In recent years, the Soviet* luve lieenmore of their lalest and besi eipiipinent; at limes Ihevurcd of Moscow's Third World clientele compete with Warsaw Pact countries and even with Soviet forces lor lhe distribution uf some of theost modem cufivrnlmnalanely of factors have ciintdbutrd to lhe change:
the military needs ol Third World customers such as the Arab eountries have nsrn sharply;
clients want sujirusticated gear for thr presligr it affords, even though Iheir furees cannot absorb II.
1 Tit* oliTiiiled valunSo'iel agrrentriili and dcilveiln rind
hii Estimate iml Hi ireompan-ini tables and amwin me minimum liguiei dnivrd bv uiing Ihr ajMregatr valurv tit Sovl'i md- puccO ol aiwuirnti known.by pdeing lha main*!
drtrtf-nf tbiough inilugou* pntn nnlrd in ihr- Bum agirrmenlthe I'SSB unito.iel trade price-'
doiriiirvrnt rutin pmuuetion emu in ihr USSB oi value inS market
IAHII. I
ARMS ACHUMI'h WITH lilt THIRD WORLD MM
L
%5
II
16
MBKAtU
SEfRET
TABLE 11
SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE THIRD WORLDS
IMUltm US Cotton)
Middle tjn
tpjTV1 .
(ran
L'*1
Lebanon
Libya
Syna
f mm (Adf
YtrriFnil) AU*.
Binrib
n
Sn Lanka
ia
It
Li" n .
Ninth
Ninthm
iMa
tlgtMia
i'ii !
Cameroon
<-imr.il Afrrt-jri He;
1 'hj)l
p>
l^iLijiinul Guinea
, j
h:im
11
.
Mil/
1JtlM -
l
IrtiKn Antwu
V111
s
. 1-
)
some atea* lhc Soviets must compete with the technologyestern markets;
Soviets have welcomed the chance to test new equipment on thehen Egypt and Syria
Interceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missiles have been among the military hardware most sought aftei by Third World clients Because of their complexity, these systems requlir more training than most other weapons This has provided the Soviets with an opportunity to send large numbers of advisers abroad and for training Third World militaryin the USSH Air defense systems have been sent, for example, lo Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, India. Iraq. Libya, Norlh Korea. North Vietnam. Somalia, and Syria, and most of Ihem have had their air defense personnel trained In Ihe USSH. Export of air defense systems has brought (he USSH into the closest relations with clients involved in localSoviet personnel associated with alt defenses have engaged in combat activity In North Vietnam. North Korea. North Yemen. Syna. and Egvpt
Arms deliveries to Third World .bents thus far haveide range of non-nuclear weapons Indeed, the USSR etported let fighters as earlynd was lhe lust eaporlei ot supersonic jetItissile patrol) ami sell-propelledgunsIn recent sears FROCs and Scudcertainly equipped with eiiDveiiliiiiulbeen delivered to Middle Fast counlries However, in order to keep some of Ihcli must siipliMiealrd electronics fromrh 'It'll [hip irTMporu systems with less than lhcir best electronics Because the Soviets draw upon an arsenal of weapons created
IH-lli : iin: rd .
fur Soviethanges inn Soviet eiports Perhaps the greatest improvement in Soviet eipmts ha* been in tactical fighteis vslmh now havr capabilities for ground attackiuihlv heretofore lacking In Soviet aucrall
tTrfiiarry When Soviet policy requires,pMKfSSS can be rapid During the pail ten yearsh.tvean increasing propensity toasmeans ol getting high-priorityto clients quickly, thus demons!ratingand ability lo help when needed
ver Ihe past ten years, the Soviets have gained increased eiperirnce in overseas airlift. The most notable of Ihese operations induded:
7 Arab-Israeli war. Ihe Sovietslights in four weeks to resupply Arab forces
Soviets airlifted supplies lo Nigeria in theo support lhat government In its civil wat against Biafra.
0 "War ofilitary Transport Aviation (VTA) was Instrumental bl the buildup and support of Soviet and Egyptian air defense units In addition to personnel, ammunition, and SAMs. Ihe Soviets piobably also transposed fighters and missile launchers
0 lhe Soviets attempted tu stage an airlift tu Peru lo provide disaster relief. It arrived late and suffered the loss of anock
lodo-Pakistani warbe Sovietsmall airlift to India (via Egvpt and South Yemeni
the3 war in the Middle Easi wis inhe Soviets mountedlights, followed bsore flights during the remaindei of the month3 operation demonstratedbility to act quickly and effect is dsrisis situation near the USSR While this aulifl was theensive ever attempted by llie Soviets, it used only half of V'TVs auoaft and virtually none ol Aeroflothe Soviet national airline
The most recent demonstration of Soviet overseas airlift capabilities hasngola. From lale5 throughore thanTA aircraft cnnducted nearlyound Inp flights to ddive* weapons and supplies to MPLA forcei in Angola Fifty-five of the flight* were made bynd the iiin.iindrr bvhe latter staged through llnngiiiv. Algeria. Mali, and Guinea and ultimately unloaded either ai Draz/aville in Congo or Ijiaiida itself, while (hesually made two enroutv stops Moreover, concurrently with the Ango Ion ntrhft.alsoound trip missions to South leroen
.-Wiivrrr Ssrviet personnel accompany most deliveries ol miblats equipment (tee Tablehey assemble and set up equipment, train local personnel.
in
soviet and East European* military technicians in third world countries
Tolal Middle
f*ypi
(Aden) ..
(Sana)..
A>ia
India
Pakistan
Sfi Lanka
Soutluwl aim
Vietnam
Chad .
Ctfllpq
LiliMWiilCiiin
Guinea
Mofjmbuiur
Nigeria .
S'JlijTl
Tanzania.
bmhw
.ili IT *
.
Cuto
L0
- *
N.A.
5
83
J-
0
;
o no
10
n:
^1
N
: J-
n
13
VIM
O
5
VI
330
i
650
O5
jj .CO
:o
sm
hail Kuiopwn lechniciam are atimaletf ti>ni lo' aboutercent ol Ihe total and. mm* often
lh:in nnf. are iilaricd uftder Sto irl aecounl
eiliinatn oferiodrntre Soviel lechnicloju In Norlh
Kuiea an- noi included
oinn Southfatt Am*
4 Ely Hie endnlyoviel lechrnciaat remaned in the country
hetrd wifh equipment applied after ihe oulbieaV or thi October
Atiilniiinml Syviei miliuryere inuociared *iihdetiverta to AngoUtechnician; in Angola arewaj not an oiaMbhed gCAtmmc-ni
StaflRET
and generally work clmcty wiih and attempt lo influence lhe miliiary of lhe host country.
he result* of ihe Soviel advisory effort have noi always been successful While the military personnel of client states probably realize that the training and eiperlise offered by the Soviets, especially inweaponry, are indispensable, there have been frictions. Sonic Third World military personnel have charged that Soviet advisers often are arrogant or indifferent, have involved themselves in local political activities, or have been slow in providing the full range of training lequircd for thc musl sophisticated equipment
The total number of Soviet and East European advisers in the third World has declined over thc past five yeais because of withdrawals from North Vietnam and Ihe eipuls*on from Egypt. Fhe*here they have increased. The countries that show the mostincreases are Iraq. Somalia. Libya, and Sytia
Soviet training of Third World militaryin the USSB is also increasinghe number uf counlries sending personnel to the USSR has aboul trebled, and the number ol personnel being trained there has alsoarge increase lowe Table IV] Much of ihe training in the USSH is on advanced weaponry However, these training per loth also enable the Soviets to emphasize Soviet military doctrine and to promote some affinity wiih the potential leaden of Third Wnrldof which have miliiary regimes While there
t:r.iintiiB.
arc friction! connects* part related to lhe olher rigors of lifehese programs pro' make their influence
B Aid to Insurgencies
he Soviet* coniinue to regard insurgencies ru instruments lo advance their position In the Third World Over ihe pas:ears, however, the USSB has developed eatensive retailors* with established govern-menls which can do more loi Ihe Soviet Union than insurgents whose prospeds for power are uncertain Nevertheless. Ihe importance of Soviet assistance lo revolutionary movement* in unliable areas has been underscored by the civil wat in Angola and Ihe prospects for further trouble In sub-Sahaian Africa While iheir assistance lo Angola was small in absolute
terms, rtecisive impact in an unstable
situation
n its relations with Ihr West, the Soviet Union has sought to separate its support for Insurgencies in the Third World from its policy of seeking East-West detente. The Soviets argue there is no contradiction between the two. and seek lo dampen or minimize Western reaction to theirn Its dealings with the Thud World Moscow has benefited from its assertion thai national liber nl ion struggleorm of "ius(nd from ils identification of Soviet communism with antieoloniallun
hile the Soviets prefer fo support left-leaning radi'.'jl movements. Ihey do not follow any rigorous ideological standards in granting aid to insurgents Instead, pragmatism and opportunism prevail The Soviets do not insist on lotal conirol of the guerrilla movements they support They comldei It sufficient lhal the Insuigentsommon Interest wiih them in weakening ihe positionocal government and diluting Western or Chinese influence and presence Broad Sonet objectives are thus often served with only marginal control or participationovement
nitial investment* in guerrillatend to be small and spread rather widely. Minimal at inception, such aid may developace and scope conditionedroad range ofthe most important of which has been lhe USSR's assessmentovement's chances for
success 2S I'h.
ch-irac!eristic Soviet pattern of arms supportuerrilla movement is first Indirect and then duect The Soviets have usually chosen to trv lo correal their direct involvement during the early stages of an insurgency by supplying the gueriillas throughourwrsc*ovement subsequently demonstrate* cohesiveness and shows promise.may risk, incrt-nung its visibility anil becume directly involved
uring the advanced stage* of an insurgency Soviet shipments of military equipment
ic thin
countries ml alive* ovemen ts igola was if Guinea neasingly
ted
These shipments are
svmpall
gove hipmr.
TABLE IV
MILIUM TERSONStl FROM THIRDN TRIES IN
Tilt5
u*
TO
*
lAdnO
ritwrt iSmuJ
Ui
11 ,
MO
Itl
.
It -
Bnuti
.
*
16
uiphi'tk-dtcdwere delivered lo portsnd Tanzania by Soviet ships, and picked up there In guerrilla reprcsentalive*
C. Soviet Miliiary Forcei Deployed in Third World Areas
"JO Soviet militarynaval andimplement military aid in the pursuit uf Soviet pnbeytive* in llie Third World These forcei contribute to the defeme of the USSR, andariety of political and militaiy lolei. such as showing off Soviet military, might through port visits, asserting Soviet lights on the high seas, protecting maritime interests, demonslialIng support ol their Third Worldnd inhibiting Western militaiy initiatives.'
The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Atsislanf Chief of Staff foi Intelligence, Department jtfrmry. the Director of Saval Intelligence. Department rrf the S'avy. and the snufani Chief of Staff, hitctltgriicr. Depattment of the .Kir Pone,oviett deployed navel forces also provide them aith the capability to threaten shipping lo Western countries which ere highly dependent on imimrti of Thud World lesoureei inch as oil and other critical materialt The Soeni. art unlikely to use force to interdict trade into do so would in cite retaliation and nik ofthe very existenceoviet rape Jji fifty couldsychology-<al facto' in crisis itfiiuliuni. ccen '/ fhe SovieU make no direct threat.
he Dcixittinenl of State end lhe Cential Intelligence Agency believe thai, fn Mr obwnceirect Vowel threat, any implicit nik to Westernposed by' forces in Third World areas nt/uld not significantly effect Western response)risis Duringnergy crisis, far example, developed countntx heavily dependent on overseas resources were far more lesponsice to the polictcs of Third World product's ihan to Soviet tenons Although uvif.n, countnet would take Sg*mI forcei mw accountutuit crisis, they probably would regard tht Sotted ai deterred from active interference with their shipping bolh by the presence of sisahlf Western nouif forces and by the danger of escalation
oviet tVavalndd
. 'i o
o Protect Maritime Interests Soviet merchant vessels and fishing ships have from time to time violated other countries terntortal waters, and there have been incidents between Soviet crews and foreign national* in polls These tncsdrnts are rare and have generally been resolved through diplomatic channels When StivielsseU were detained by localrumple, in Ghana9 and in Libya inaval ships supplemented diplomatic initiatives by taking up positions offshore
o Dernoniffofr Sonet Support to Third World Cuiiiit'ics The Soviet navy has been used in low-risk situations to showto client states:
In lhe springhr Soviets made prolonged port culls at Mogadiscio to demonsiiate support to the Sonuli regime, then under threat of being nverlhrown
he Sovietsaval presence off the coast of Cuinea to demonstrate backing for President Sekoo Toure against an altack on Conakry In the ensuing sears, the Soviet nasal presence there tookermanent character
lhe other hand, thr Soviet* are awareof their naval units in the Thirdetpme Moscow to undesirable risks atn Octuberoviet ship* inand Mesa Matiuh in Egypt put out toto avoid becoming Involved in thehostilities belween Egypt and Israel
Inhibit "eiiem Military Initiativesof trillion the Soviels have endeavoredUS actionoviet client andtl visible symbol of Soviet concernnaval fotces
the7 Arah-lsraeli war. the Soviets increased the number ofsurface ship in the Mediterranean from two to five and used them lo trad one British and two
US carriers
the Jordanian mu* in Septemberoviet deptoyinents to lhe Mediterranean increased, and their ship* took up positions In tkwe proiimity lo those ol the US
uring the lndo-Pakistani wai. Ihe US and USSH deployed additional naval
Operation* ol SovietNaval Form*
Outside*
to Ihrcean Following ihe arrival of Ihe USS hnlrtpfite. four Soviet cruise mittilc-cquipped unlti reached ihr scene Th* Sovteii maintained surveillance of both US and British tihv.iI forces.
During thc Arab-Israeli war Inhe Soviets doubled iheir forces in lhc MedilerranranIncreased surveillance oi the US Suth FlM In effect, ihis gave notice that the risk*irect US intervention In support of Israel hud risen Soviet warships alio could have provided protection lo Soviet merchant ship* sailing Iu KgvptUn aod Syrian ports
back up lhe Cuban intervention in5 andhe Soviets augmented their naval combatants off the wmI coatl of Africa. This augmentationuided mW-aie cruiser supported by increased ocean surveillance from satelliles andlying from Conakry and. Soviet capabilities to Interposition naval forces dc|ieml upon availability of ship* In nearby wateri and the time required for rcinloNrinrfil
In Mediterranean, the SovieU now maintain about ajor surface combatants and len
submarine* In the Indian Ocean thev usually have three or four major surface combatants and one submanne- FJsewhere. one Ot two warships are onest Afrka.arying number of warships und submarine! an; normally underway in the Atlantic anil Pacific in Iranslt
Surface ships in the Mediterranean can be quickly reinforced from the Black Sea (lhe Soviets file contingencyn accordance with lhe Mont rem Convention to pan thr Turkishubmarine reinforcement from Ihe Northern Fleet to the Mediterranean takes substanliallyten days at aMovements frinn the Pacific Piatt lo lhe northern Indian Ocean lake even more llme-
3ft To Strengthen Defentet of lhe USSfl. Military involvemrnl in the Third World also contribute* to ihe USSR's clforts to slrengthcn it* overall military position Sincehe Soviet navy has eKlended its operations from nearby coastal waters into ocean areas This facilitates their anticarrier andtASW} missions *
I leIv-iIih'oJ bv thtcsiein navalcarrien in puiilculoruted
4
he SovieU have soughtperate iheu ASW,ircralt from Third World countries In recentthey have conducted only reconnaissance missions. Primars targets of Soviel surveillance are US aircraft carrien in tlieir Iranut lanes to and from operating areas. US earners are also teconnoitcted by aircralt flying from the USSH and by oceansatellites Despite the improvements inlabilities, the Sovicls probably consider the fleslbil-ii> and timeliness of forward-based reconnaissance aircraft to be valuable in monitoring US naval operations. We eipect that ihey will continue to attempt to expand air operations from Third World facilities.
D. 5oviet Use of Novol and Air
Fee ififiess their presence in distant areas and their needs for support have risen, the Soviets have sought access lo foreign shore facilities for logistics purposes, mayor repairs, communicalions, and support of aiicraft deployments. The Soviets use communicationsin the Middle East. Cuba, and Somalia. These facilities supplement improvements in command and control the Soviets have made throughsatelliles. aiiborne command posts, andand control ships The Soviet navy's mos-es inward greater use nf foreign facilities have been cautious, and at Ihis time Soviet surface ship deployments probably could be sustained essentially al current levels without access to lorcign facilities
41. Mediterranean The Soviets establishedubmarine base in Albania8 but were expelled1 ampaign Iu obtain access lo facilities in Egvpl bore fruitesult uf Soviel aid during7 Aiab-lsracli war8 Nasser granted Ihe Soviets exclusive use and control of portions of facilities in Egyptian porti for major ship repairs and replenishment, and in Egyptian airfields to station and operate naval reconnaissance and ASW aircraft The Sovieis also stationed missile strike aircrafl in Egypt, but Ihese were never operated over the Mediterranean andeventually turned over lo the Egyptians 2 Sadat terminated these air activities and restricted Sovirl use of Egyptian naval facilities- By6 he ended all Soviet use of Egyptian potts and anchorages.the Soviets can only use Egyptian airfields for airlifts to Egypt and other countries
I Indian Ocean Soviel naval units roulinely receive logistic support atn Somalia, andesser degree al Umm Oasr and Basra in Iraq and at Aden in South Yemen Only tn Somalia have the Soviets comlfueled facilities for their own use At Berhera they have built barracks and arelay facility for their nelusive use They haveissile-handling and support facilityappaiently wdl service 5ty* missiles lor lhe Somali navy but In Ihe future is eipecled lo handle more modem cruise missiles lor the Soviet navy The facility could also sen ice and stock surface-to-an andmissiles as svell as other types of naval ordnance Thev have broughtloating dry-dock which substantially increases Soviet naval repair eapabililies rinally they could have access to the POL siorag- facility alhose capacity the Soviets have doubled
The Soviets are building, albcll slowly, an airstrip at Berbera which, when completed, will be capable of supporting all types uf Soviet aiicrafi The Soviets sic also improving several other fields in Somalia whkh then aircraft could use The Soviets havr occasionally used Somali airfields at Hargcisa and Mogadiscio and the airfield al Aden in South Yemen to operateSW andircraft over the Indian Ocean In the Soviets began deployingear
Praspecu ImMod ilea
Shortire. fo. fuilhtl detail!
ieJkI
rcowniar wince aircraft In Somalia These aircraft can cover all shipping lanes from lhe Cape of Cood Hope In Hie Strait* nl Malacca
Tin- Soviets may increase lhe frequencyof Mich deployments II ihey dodifficulties in obtaining overflightThey could also deploy naval si uke aircraftallcr llie aulield at Bcrlieij isthe Sovicis could send suchrisis In operale from lhe fieldsand
lie Soviets are aware of lhe desire of some littoral countriescurtail great power presence, and IWrhnes hjs puhlidy denied lhat the USSR has ur wants lo have any base in the Indian Ocean While the Sov I'd have given sympathetic public Iteaimentthe idea idIndianeacehere isindication that Moscow will abandon its facility in Berbera Of yield on the principle of freedom of navigation in thr Irtdnn Ocean
tlantic. The Soviet use of pott and al> facilities in Ihe Atlantic has centered on Cuba and Cuinea Periodic and of len simultaneous (rcunnaissancc flights byear aircraft from Havana and Conakry
permit the Sc-vim to monitor some shipping as well as Western naval operations, particularly in US carrier
Imnait lanes
m
Conakry However, so far at is known, combatants have nut refueled at Conakry
XI Weontinued Soviet military presence mi Wesl Africa Thiough6 the Soviets bail madeeployment* ufear aircraft to Conakry lor reconnaissance operations The Guineani balled Soslet ail operations at Conakry in6 but the flight* resumed in September The Soviels would wish Ui hedge against the permanent loss of asvev. to Cuinean facihlies Thus, we expect lhal they still seek In improve relations with other central West African slates thai might give them access toshore facilities
E Merchont Morine ond Fishing Fleet
he Soviets base used their merchant fleet to deliver military aid as well as to provide logistic viippnrl for forces in distant areas It could also be uved to cans ground forcesriendly port. The merchanl fleet hashipstuns or more. The USSR has )utt begun toleet of roll-on/roll-off vessel* whose ability to Inad and discharge wheeled and Hacked vehicles rapidlv make them particularly useful for military support
he Urge Sonet fishing fleet does not routinely conduct rrcoi ma usance or make contact reports. Ithowever, be usedrisis to assist Soviet nasal intelligence reporting Soviel fithmg support vr-wd) havr feplemshed Soviet intelligence ships operating ofl the coast ol the US.
F. Additional Soviet Forces Copoble of Deployment to the Third Worldrisis
n addition to the navy, the Soviets have other military foices which hove been ar could be used in crisis in distant areas Soviet ground, airborne, and amphibious force* are designed to operale primarily in thc contiguous areas of thr Eurasian land mass Although llie Soviets have not desrloped assault forces comparableS Marine Amphibiou* Force, Soviet trainingide variety of climatic conditions) coupled wllh the diversity and quality of thru equipment, give*apacity to send forces iu distant areas in crisis situations
5-'> Air Orfrtut. Ail detente units manned by Soviet forces have been Ihe mainstay of Soviet direct military
,nsol vemc.it abroad; llicy were sent lo Northorthgyptmil) The moil extensive recent ellort was in Egypt during0 "War ofhen llie Soviet) deployed,eriod nl moot In. aircraft and surface-to-air missiles manned Im Soviet pilot* and mittlle crroi open ling under iheir own command aod eonliol netoorb. Thb formaiMilanrc has proven In lie highly responsive In client needs
oviet capabilities lo respond quickly with ait defense units in an overseas crisis heretofore have been limited by lhe Soviet practice of transporting their tighterhip oi airlift The advent of longer-range fighters gives theapability Iu fens lighter aircraft to distant areas. However, lhc Soviets base never flown figliler aircrafl long distances overwalcr
itbome Should the Soviets decide lo Intervene rapidly on thr ground in lhe Thud World, selected units from any of the seven operational airborne divisions would be the most likely forces loployed initially These.divisions are maiRtainedigh state of readiness and. because of their small sizf and lightweight equipment, have relatively good strategic mobility They are also receiving new air-droppablr amphibious combat vehicles and increased numbers of artillery, slinuldrr-ftied surface-to-air-rnissiles, and antitank missiles These will considerably increase their lactical mobility and firepower,their until auk capabilities Nevertheless-liabilities of Soviet (likeirborne divisions to stand up to minor opposition are limited Compared i" lib modern lank und mrehamred foices, they still base estrernely limited firepower, armor proletiinn. and tactical mobility
avaloviet naval infantry now numbers0 men. ofrc assault elements dispelled among the (our fleets Although lightlyoviel naval infantry unil would compare favocabl* with most Third World ground units of similar sire Soviet natal infantry lacks organic air support andurasian operation would be supported by Soviet tactical aviationhird World intervention, the use of naval infantry forces probably woultllimited, most likely as aof force orhore party lo protect evacuation of Soviet personnel For example, it would take at least five days for lhe Soviets to sealift the
Black Sea naval infantry regimentenyrian pint. Small contingents are usually deployed nn Soviet amphibious ships in the Mediterranean and at times in the Atlantic and Indian oceans: any naval infaiitiy at sea in the eastern Mediterranean could reach Syria or Egyptay or two.
i,oviet decision, to send siilistantial ground forceshird World area svouldajor seulift operation. For example, for thc Sovicls to send motorized title or lank divisions to the Middle Easi wouldinimum of two weeks Im the first division to be assembled, moved lo Black Sea pons, loaded, transited to the Mcdilcrrancan.ff loadedyrian porl. Deployment of largerthe equivalent of two combined arms armies totaling alrequire tisii to three months The USSR could divert sufficient merchant shipping to accomplish this task 5
M'lifl Capabilities. The Soviets haveused Miliiary Transport Aviation to deliverylems of military equipment and erner-gentso client foices The VTA can also (ii-pliv.ii.-ilfoii-ei overseas
VTA cuirently hasub transport aircraft in its inventory. Prior to the introduction of theock in, the Sovieis had no Capabilities for long-range strategic lift Since then. VTA has received aroundnd alwuiandid aircraft. Over the lasl five years. VTA's capacity has been raisedonsotal0 tons The rise in numbcis of Candids ;whicli are comparable lo Ihcs} will significantly enhance VTA's capability to cairs large cargoes und increased numbers of troops over long distances. Thes the only Soviet aircraft which can carry oulsiicdas medium tanks Production of this aircrafl has stopped and Soviet heavy lift capacity will be limitedoi loss-on is produced.
y diverting all of iheir military airlift capacity, ihe Soviets could airlift only thc assault elements of two airborne divisions (or one division with all its combat equipment)ingle lift and transport ihem. say, io Syria within three to five days Such a
M iddtelilnry Bali ic-ection t. for lurllioi drmih olCdjubililv in
ir.l'ivrnrie Middle hall
i
rapid deployment could preclude VTA Irom airlifting other forces oreployment could also be made to Southeast Asia or Africa with refueling stops. For example. Ihe Soviets could ferry forces to southern Africa by staging through Algiers and Conakry. The assault elements of an airborne division could be deployed to Angolaew days, but would arrive with only Ihc most basic supplies of ammunition, medical supplies, and food
erojht. Aeroflotubstantial reserve which potentially triples the Soviet capability Iu airlift Iroops. Aeroflot could augment VTA's cargo capacity byercent, but Aeroflot planes cannot carry outsizcd cargo While Aerollot is noito VTA. the Minister of Civil Aviation, who directs Aeroflol. has the rank of Marshal of Aviation, must air crews are air force reservists, and the fleet could be quickly militarized During the semiannual rotations of Soviet conscripts in Eastern Europe. Aeroflot has made morelightsdav period without any apparent disruption uf Us normal services These flights could have carried moreen in each direction Beginning ineroflotlown by Soviet crews airlifted Cuban Iroops and materiel to Angola. These (lights have continued and now appear to be used for returning sick and wounded Cuban troops and possibly for troop rotations.
G. Other limitations
verflights and Staging The need to obtain overflight or staging privileges complicates airlift operations. Although the Soviets regularly overfly neighboring countriesariety of military-relatedruns*ion to overfly key countries, such as Iran. Turkey, and even Yugoslavia, is neither aulo-malic noi assured. Permission to stage military flightshird country, which implies support of Soviet action, is even more uncertain.
t>'> Capabilities Against Significant Opposition Beyond (he range of Soviet land-based air or of air supportocal ally. Soviet intervention forces are vulnerable lo interdiction cither in the air or at sea Their capabilities to directly Intervene ashore against well-armed Third World countries, such as Algeria or South Africa, suffer Irom lack of air defense, close air support, and amphibious forces capable of establishing andarge beachheadTOL aircraft carried aboard Ihc Soviet Kiev-class
ASW aircraft carrier, which became operational this year, could provide limited seaborne air support. Evidence on Ihit subsonic aircraft is sparse, but it is apparently designed for air defense and antiship missionsmall number of aircraft wouldis with helicoptershenrelical maiimum offTOLs were aboard) Available in limited numbers, these aircraft would be only marginally effective in support of ground operations
III. THE USSR AND ITS THIRD WORID CLIENTS
GO. Moscow's primary instrument of military policy Iu lhc Third Wurld has been military assistance. Over tbe pastear* Moscow ha* delivered military equipmentotal of someess developed countries. Huwevcr.ew have becnwilling to rely heavily on the USSR, and the lion's70lhe deliveries has been to six countries: Egypt. Syria. India, Iraq, Cuba, and North Vietnam.
eaviest investment has been in thc Middle East. Despite their mistrust of Moscow, Arab countries proved eager lo have Soviet weapons because of their confrontations with Israel and each other The largest flow of Soviet weapons continues to be toddle East despite the cut-off of supplies to Egypt.
ub-Saharan Africa is thc area which has the greatest potential lor new Soviet gains. Here, Soviet support of national liberation movements will he especially important
ndia and Cuba continue to be major ledpients of Soviet militaiy assistance, bul we do noi expect Moscow will find major new clients in cither Asia or Latin America in the next five years.
A. Middle Eoit
Despite recent setbacks, the USSR possessesfffect the military balance and thus lo influence the level of regional tension. The USSR is providing large quantilies of military equipment toSyria, Iraq. Libya, and Algeria. Military aid and Ihe USSR's capabilily to piojecl miliiary power into Ihe area strengthen* Moscow's credentials as an Arab ally and counterweight to US influence
Egypt. The deep military involvement which developed between the Soviet Union and Egypt in
Middle East
iuil elementsattern which could be repealed in Soviet relations with other clients Nasser mistrusted both Soviet and Egyptian communists, but he badly needed Sovietto leplacr equipment lost in7 wat andhen he needed air defense equipment and personnel against Israeli deep penetration raid*
From Moscow's standpoint. Egypt wasenough so that Nasser wa* willing lo pay for Soviet equipment in terms of military facilities, at ihr same time. Egypt was not to weak at to be beyond help and wasiable partner
Egypt wa* an eipensive client. Efyptian needs were ones which the Soviets could meet, litis was especially true0 when Egypt needed air ilt'fens*ield which tbe Soviet! bad long emphasized in Iheir own military programs Moreover,Egypt (is in Vietnam, provision of air defense bad the political virtue of putting Moscow in tlx- position of helping lolient country
t In -
graduallyubstantia) Egypt In conduct Ihree mayor missions Wuh Soviet equipment came Soviet utlvtsen and Icchnitians whose function was tu help thc Egyptians improve theit force* Soviet personnel operated SAMs for the Egyptian* and Soviet piloti flew air defense and rerun nm stance missions. The Soviets also used Egyptian ports
and airfields lo support their naval ships and aircraft, which operated agalmt NATO forte* in lhe Mediterranean
the Soviet-Egyptian military1-gtpi became increavinglsthe USSH not only for new equipment butspares and replacements necessary to keepacquired equipment usable Sadat'stn rape! the bulk of Soviet military personneland his final closure of Egyptian ports tothis year were difficult decisions: he had loloeakening of Egypt'sas the price of getting rid of the Sov'ietvpiobably hope lhat Sadat will fallwith Egypt will improve, but theynot eipect lo regain their former militaryEgypt
Since the souringyria has been the largestSoviet militaiy aid. Thrillion of arm*delivcied from the end ofot only replaced Syria's war lossesenabled il lo expand and upgrude its airforces Their areovietm thc country, and President Asad tsu continuing supply ul sophisticatedSyria, however, has pcrmlrntly refusedj frlendthip pact with the USSR and differ*over the proper approachiddle East
se^T
peace agreement. Serious dilfcrrnccs over Syrian. iIk- Palestine Lil>ciation Organization'uiiin. have reportedly led Moscow to thrratcn lo suthhold new arms agreements,iving agiccmcntitnntinucd
uite lhe leclin in SovielKgyptian relations2 lhe Suvii is have made increasing uie ol Syrian poet, iilarls Tailm.llies replenish sub-(lunnn and minor coinl* alongside auiiliaiy ships Syrian putts lack thefound in Egypt aod ale notoi the uie of Alexandria The
however, aieajor role in lhe
construct inn nf several new commercial dockingli<>usc facilities in Latakia aimed at doublinglunitrd berthing eapaeilv Svria'ssystem Irail.and air) is alsoii improtrnienti with Soviet assistance.
alcilinc Liberation Organization IfLOl The Soviets have tiained Palestinians in the USSR and pro. ided the PLO with limited quantities of small arms, funneled prirnaids through Svria Inhe Soviets repnrlcdlyArafat that ihey ssould supply the weapons and equipment necessaryl to or and expand commando operalions inside
Israeli -
7li Direct shipinenti appainitlv werel ssr do not know the amount of arms involved In addition to small arms Ihc PLO has mschineguns.m antitank guns, and somermored personnel carnerv Must of Ihese weapons aie nf Sosiet manufacture, but the majotilv of ihem were supplied lliruugh third counlrles. principally Syria
(untilnd more recently through Iraq.
Egypt, and Libya
Soviets are cleaily distressed by Ihethe Pales!imans in Lebanon While theya fairly steady public stand in favor ofand criticized Syrian intervention, thedone nothing that might seriouslyrelations with Damascus
Soviets arc distrustful of Arafat,about the PLO's organizational discipline, and have
urged moderation in lhe conflict in la-banonIhey regard tlie PLOikely enlre into the Arab-Israeli settlement process They probablyany future Palestinian stale, squeeiedoillle Israeluspicious Jordan,ogical
future recipient ofseful client in lhe area
ibya The Soviet-Libyan relationship is marked by suspicion on boih sides, and ll is unlikely lhat llie Sosiet* arr counting on rapid progresslose coordination of policies NrseithelesJ. they signed an agreement for more0 million worth ol anus4 Libya has receivedScud missiles, and the first of several Ou II missile patrol boats The Soviets have increased the numbernseis there tu. Ihes arc training Libyan personnel In aircraft and SAM operations and maintenance bui these advisersnd probably will not be integrated into ground force laclical units
HQ The Lihsuns have received more equipment thenan absorb lor example, they have stockpiledoviet lanks President Oadhafi probably hopes thai possession of weapons such as these sslll give hint visible trappings of powereverage in Aiab politics He probably wants to build up an "arsenal of aims forab countries in lhe even!ew Arab-Israeli war However, If the equipment is not properly mainlaiitcd,ew yean il will begin lo deteriorate Qadhafi uses Soviet-supplied small aims to support lerrorist and guerrilla groupsumber of countries and maintains training coup, for them In Libya.
Bl We base examined lhe question ol whether ihe Soin-ti might iisr equipment in Libyan stockpiles in the eventoviet intervention to support Arab countries againsi (he Israelis. How Ihe volatile O'dbafiewroposaloot point
Whatever hrs teaction, the Soviets would face serious
problems
cquipmenl Is not likely to be maintained at Soviet standards
-fluid be major gaps in the Inventory of crucial supportprime movers, lank tianspurtcrs. artillery, engineer, communicationstoSoviet ground divisions.
sllrs near Tripoli areiles from the Suet Canal, and forces starting even from Benghazi would have lo coveriles to the Canal area, mainlyingle road
Jf-ri
I
fcis facilities fair logistical support and sulnctubli- to interdiction.
use of alrlllt lo move supplies from LibyailcKude Soviet capabilities to resupply lheIrom the USSRtiilV
In view of these problems, we believe it highly unlikely lhal lhe pretrnl Soviet-Libyan aims arrange-uaiit<oviet prepositioning of material for tltrii*
Si Afgersa5 Algeria sought new Sosiet armaments as il headedonfrontation with Morocco Mossuss appaientK sselnimed lhetntst in.'h Algiers, which bad hitii cooling MoscostOO million military aid agreement ssitb Algeriu In older to get weapons to Algeria quickly. Moscow persuaded Libya lo send material fioiu its mvoiKoiy by promising to replacethe Libyans gave the Algerians By the end of thai sear the Soviets had lhe additional incentive of Kiiaranlceing Algerian cssoperalion In allowing the Sosiet airlift to Angola to stage through Algerian jrihildi
SS. The Susiels almost ten. understand that itgiriasing some Sosiet supplied arms lo equip the l'i.Inarm Knot guerrillas in lhe former Spanish Sahara Moscow ha* publicly favored Algeria**of self determination in ihe dispute, but the Soviets have noi olbcially endorsed lhe Front We base no confirmation ol Moroccan inspired reports of Sosiet personnel In Spanish Sahara or of Soviet aims shipments directls lo thc Polisario
o'f.ii" The Sovietsodest military sales and I'uining program ss ilh Morocco
; flie siit'Io'" One/ of Hall.iarrmnu of lhe Sir lew ueiei ll>o< large tutflplJn ofmottntln Syte and lien.r'uii. arr gitaity in rrrrn of local
11 a ihr an-llily of Arab filial to tmptoy Thor
reioveeitwNf In awlobU lo SotUi ooopi ond tight ti oi aa dtftnui'i in inra/ ihtti nitan In K> tnMi-vrii >Wifesri Afu iwfiapprao rouwrK sol* anwftuoUmlotIv of taahhtkmr mtitttirvi onfd* of Wmmw fortfoiW urqiftpewmo-vuvraon mrth ooid-ttd Saawind wlfpiopiBtdmi and mtWV-.e'lin tomld haor o
ODmrtoulog.
and ennonctdi-iMir* of iKt SatSrU id dtnutyatrry ofidilat>lruul eirejnli aWi.fif iar ine (lain, ll commUmrnlro morn
Sal
Soviet diplomats, largely because of Moscow's Interest in obtaining Moinccan phosphalei and fishing tights, have tried Iu prevent further deterioration In relations In privately stressing Moscow's neutrality in lhe Sahara conflict and describing Morocco! takeover of Ihr Spanish Saharaait accompli that Algeria will base to accept This has not. however, allayed Rabat's ssrspHVons
'my Despite frictions in Soviet-Iraqi relations midltrmpts lo diversify its sources of arms supply. Soviet deliveries lo Iraq have run0 million annually In Ihe past two years and substantial debt cues are likely lo continue Moscow has sent some nl its mostllindcis.nd SA-fe Unlike Syria, Isnssever. Iraq has lurried increaunglv to Western nqipliers thus reducing its dependence on the USSRargest purchases ui the past two yean have been from Fiance and West Cerman*
The Soviets hate intermit lent Ivepair shipasrah which has serviced Soviel naval sessels in addition to Warning Iraqn in ship repairs Tbe Soviets are unhkely to increase then use of Iraqi potts In the confines of thc Persian Culf us long as the* can tels on Bribera.port whose appeourlies are less restricted
'o'i Although Tehran relies on Ihc West fnr all of its sophisticated weapons, it has putchased0 million worth of Soviet arms and support equipment, such as trucks, armored personehicles and equipment, and artillery for Hi ground lorcesespite these agreements. Iran is workiiig to eliminate any Soviet naval presence fmm llie Persian Cull, is committed to the defeat of leftist iniiirgencses in thc area, anduilding up its aimed foices in an effort lo become the dominant regional power
Pi'iiinitifoesult of theuse of tbeir complex of suppori facilitiesthey will push less lo increase their usein Iraq and South Yemen (PDHY) overlerm
are trying lo legitimizewith Fenian Culf states In thcncreasingly actise foreign policy inMoscow is continuing to give miliiaryspecially lo Kuwait and theWhile (he Soviets would welcome- -and may
f
ET
SEWET
been attemptingittle chance for the moment lhal a
revolutionary government Sv mpat hrtic to MOSCOW
will emerge in lhe area
he USSH has providedercent of Aden's tutal arms import*8 Despite this Soviet military aid. ihr PDRY hai not gianled Moscow
expanded use uf the port nl Aden So far Ihe main Ih-neff thai pnrl to the Soviets has been the supply of water, allhough ship (eproviMoning and lorne refueling are known to have occurred Aden has served alsotaging base for Soviet airlifts of military supphei tu India. Somalia, and East Africa In5 Moscow mounted an airlift to Aden, evidently lo support Yemeni forces helping thr Dhofarhile there is liltle reliable information on the subtest, we believe tliat the USSR was the principal source of arms, through thr PDRY. for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman
orth Yemen's relations wllh iht USSR aie not aas they once were, and the government would prefer to limit its involvement with Moscow Now that the Saudi military aid program appears to be undei way. it seems unlikely that Sana will lake up any Soviet offers
B. Africa
n absolute terms. Soviet military did lo sub-Sah.inn Abicu is quite small Total Soviet militaty deliveries to all ol the area for Ihe pailear* amount tohan lhe USSR gave Indonesia in Sukarno's heydav Bul becauselorces tn lhe underdeveloped countries of sub-Salman Africa aie small and poorly equipped, limited amount* of Soviet militaiy assistance canignificant impact Soviet military assistance helped bring lo power Soviet'supported factions in some of thc former Portuguese colonies and has helped looviet military romples In Somalia and the use of facilities in Guinea Because the military is frequently lhe mosl important clemenl in African polities. Soviei military aid has helped the USSRompete with both lhc West and China for influence in Africa
ngota Moscow's assistance to the Popular Movement lor thr Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola dales back to ihe earlyhen lhe MPLA suffered setbacks in
he Soviets initiated an air and seallfl Irom Ihe USSR to help lis client and in6
began providing an airlift for Cuban forces between
i ulij ind Angol .
hr Soviets evidently bdicvr lhat the victoryoviet-supported national liberation movement has increased Soviet prestige in thr Third World The Soviets probably hope lhataCuban presence will probably remain for somealso assist the USSR In providing Soviets an entice to other national liberation movements in southerna* SWaPO In6 the Sovietsiealy of friendship and coopeia lion tu eonsohdate iheir political position In addition, thev iruv hope lo obtain access to port and air lacilllies as an alternative to those In Cuinea.
ozambique Although noi a* extensive as thai of lhe Chinese. Soviet aid In the form of military equipment, training, and fund* assisted the Moram-bique Liberation Front (FRELIMOl to come to power when Mozambique achieved independenee tnRLLIMO will piobably continue to receive substantial financial and military aid both from Ihe USSR and the PRC Mozambique provides training and buw areas for gunrdla operations against the white minority government of Rhodesia, an activityhich the Soviet* have given bulb military and political support Presideril Machel kept ihe Soviels al arm's length immediately afterbut has bren friendlier to them recently Agreements have bren reached lo train Mozambique officers in llie USSB possibly in preparation for deliveries of military equipment
and lhe Cope Verdeto the independence of these territories inMoscow gave strong backing to theirparty, the African Party for thePortuguese Guinea and the Cape Verdeprovided arm* and trainingandermanent naval presenceio discourage Portugueserebel sancluaries in Guinea Cubanswiih the Soviets in supporting thc PAlGC.aid was instrumental in assisting guerrillaslo power
Moscow is the major sourceand military training and has providedaid to these impoverished countries as well.
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have been unconfirmed report* lhal Moscowasked (or military privilege* in Guinea-Bissau and Ihe Cape Verde Islands, bul neither governmeni has giuntcd any and both have said that they do not intend to allow foreign bates on theii territories
9H Tfir.mmc During lhe past two year* Moscow ha* expanded its ties with Dai es Salaam New arm*
first ilncfl thepul lhe total value of Soviet military aidar wiih the Chinese Soviet interest* in Tanzania are more ihan mere rivalry with the PRC.roximity to Mozambique and Rhodesia offers thc Soviets channels tu unti-Rhudesian liberation groups that traditionallyen based in Tanzania
anzania was also the locus of the most extensive PRC activity in Africa, notably thc recently completed Tin/am railway project Priorad bren the principal supplier ol military aiMitaiice and -vdl probably remain (he major donoreconomic aid During the past few years some billion has developed lielwcen China and Tanzania overilitary assistance Inoscow hasncreased It* military aid and lusilitary advisors mission there.
oniofia Beset by economic troubles and engagedraditional cunon with Ethiopia, tbe Siad governmeni has welcomed Soviet economic and miliiary assistance and has afforded thcigh degree of military and political Influence Tu support Ihe construction and operation of their facilities and the miliiary aid piog'am in Somalia, lhe Soviets hate tripled lhe size ot their presence there3 There aie now an est mmonet military technicians in thr country, and this number probably will increase further
he Soviets svill probably encoutage Somalia to avoid the risk ol war wiih Ethiopia by confining Somali actions in Eritrea to insurgency andMoscow has not interfered with Somalia's support of lhe insurgency in the French Territory of ihe Afar* and Issas, which Mogadiscio wants to annex afler the French depart Thc Sonet* mayventually to gain access lo the naval bate at Djibouti
aotliii'i'olre SMI.6nd tmplicaiionv ofn ihrri live NeM Veil of So
Girineer. Mmcow's influence In Conakry has been strong since Guinea's independenceut the Soviet* did not gam access lo military lacililiei there until after the abortive Portuguese attack0 Iu recent years, the Soviets haveermanent naval presence off Conakry and used lhe lan! In addition Ihey have used the airfield at timakrv forear deployments Guinea has receivedillion in Soviet aims and eipiipment over tlie last ten years as well as military training and economic assistance
Conakry served as the purl ol entry for Soviet anus tu insurgents in Guinea-Bissau before lhal country won its itidrpeiirlence from Portugal, and lasl sear Guinea, along with Algeria, servedtaging area for Soviet airlifts to Angola
n the past, llie Guineans asked loievenloaval laeilils on Tamara Island For their part. Ihe Soviets reportedly sought eontiol of port ions of the base The CullHsHH esenlually rejected the Soviet terms.
ali Mali* first Presided I. Modibo Keita, welcomed Sosiel assistance in order lo lessen Mall's dependence on Fiance and to rnliance hb credentialsadical socialist African leader The regime which overthrew' him8 improved relations with Franceother Western countries, but has continued to seek militart assistance Irom lhe USSH and ihe aimy officers who aie now Mali* political leaders are alrinnl lotallv dependent on the USSR for military equipment and training
boutoviet advisers provide annor, artillery, and pararhute iraining and all Mali's pilots are Soviet-trained Soviet personnrl maintain Mali's civilian as well as military airerafl and all depend entirely on lhe USSR for spare parts The Soviets have improved Mali* air force base at Mopti and arc now surveying other Malian airfield* Moscow has signed militaty agreements with Malihe Soviet* occasionally used Malian airfields tu stage atrni supply flights dunng the Angola crtsn. and Mali would probably grant Moscow transit privileges for the support of other southern African liberation groups
he Gambia and Senegal After respondingamequest for small arms shipments, lhc Soviets demonstrated some interest in expanding military cooperation But the Gambia turned down a
Sosict offrr uf military advisers. President Senghor ol iieighhuetng Stocks! deeply distrusts Soviel Intentions loward Weal Africa, and Soviet involvement inlias nourished hit suspicions
Equatorial Guinea and Congo- The Soviets have ir unitedly(ailed toof naval (aeilities in both countiies. Moscow delivered three patrol cralt to Equatorial Cuinea5 and pmhabls will increase the number of advisers there Brazzaville is reported to be discontented with the way Soviet aid projects are being Implemented and lhe amount of Soviel assistance given in contrast with that given by the Chinese Some Congolese students returning home after training in Ihe USSH are disillusioned, and Soviet fishing off Ihe Congo rankles lhal country. Nonetheless. Brazzaville allowed the Soviets to use Fotntc Noire to channel supplies lo African liberation group. In Angola and southern Africa
Sudan. The Soviel Union began supplying arms0 andajor armaments agreement7 aflrr the SU-Oay War The Numasri governmeni has returnedore balanced prthey in East-West iclattons following the defeat of ihe communist coup1 Since then Soviet influence has declined, especially aflcr the aboitive coup ofdvisers are still present, and the Soviets recently delivered some old let lightersift Nevertheless. Khartoum has turned once more to the UK and to Egypt for most of its assistance The PRC. whileow profile, is also furnishing assistance in both miliiary and economic fields
Uganda3 the Soviets began sending advanced military equipment to Uganda. Including tanksquadron ofighters, and Soviet instructors Despite Soviet wariness toward President Aminemporary break in Matrons Inhe Soviets apparently still see Ugandaarget ol opportunity, and there have been reports that they areew miliiary assistance agreement
Kenya. Neither the USSR nor the PRC has much current influence In Kenya. The Soviets have offered arms and made approaches in connection with repair of iheir fishing vesseb Nairobi, however, continues to address its arms requests to the UK and the US andolicy by which the US Navy
has access to Mombasa lor replenishment and recreational purposes
Soviet relations with Nigeriahigh point during tlse Brafran rebellion, butevidently declined to help lhe USSRaubfl to Angola Nevertheless, the USSRsupply some military aid to Nigeria
C. Asio
South Asia Ihe USSR has devoted most ofin India because of its location, size,and because tbe Soviets regard it asto China Inetback5 wiih theegime less sympathetic to Moscow
sees the communisticloiy for Soviet interests, as well asfor lhc US Nevertheless thr USSR hasa viable ot leading position there
Securiiu. The USSR has persistedan Asian collective securily systemdefining il Inhe Soviets-level lb-marches to generate support for asuggesting that it might be analogousin Security and CrjoperalionThe results of these efforts to conveneweie unilurmly negative, as theanticipated. Nevertheless, theycontinue to plusj lor Asian collectiveorder to assert their credentials as an Asianbecause itseful device fur testingtoward the USSR. Moreover, despiteto the contrary, tbe proposal is andesire, designed to force Peking eithera leading Soviet role in Asia or loand bellicose At the same lime,pledges of national independencecooperation (hat are part ofropaganda counter tothat Moscow- seeks hegemony over Asia
ndia Over the yean lhe Soviets have become imreasingly interested in India The mutual interests of the two countries underlay| treaty and led Ihe Soviets to give strong support to Newthe deploymenl of major romhalanti to thein .it fi--r1 Allhough India has been lhc recipient of karge amounts of Soviet military aid. this assistance
OPY AVAILABLE
has not been bi central tu iti relationship with the USSR us was (he case Ul Syria and Egypt. Moreover. India has been determined to protect its independence from Moscow and has effectively turned back Soviet overturn [or regular access to Indian air and naval facilities.
5 India has imported almost IM billion worth of arms from thend Moscusv has become India's primary source of high-performance jet aircraft, submarines, destroyer escorts, landing ships, and guided-missile patrol boatsalso has provided0 million in plants, machinery, and raw materials to help expand India's arms industry The bulk has been used to develop facilities to produce military equipment under Soviet license,1 icl fighters, and Atoll alr-to-air missiles, and to build naval facilities al Vishakha-patnam.
US The USSR hasubstantial amount nf technical assistance lo supplement its arms-supply programorendian military personnel, mostly Irom the navy and air force, have undergone training in the USSR, but thc Indians have sought to hold down the number of people involvedosiet military technicians were in India5 Soviet miliiary technicians generally are employed lo assemble Soviet equipment shipped to India and tu train Indian personnel in its use aod maintenance In recent years Nes* Delhi has required that most of thc training be conducted in India, ostensibly lo redsue lhe coil uf sending personnel to the USSR, wliich was eslimatcd to have been more lhan Si million (tnniiullv during lhe
aspires to self-sufficiency Inbut is likely to remain dependentsuppliers for sophisticated equipmentalmost certainly will remain one offoreign suppliers of sophisticatedespiie the delays India has hadspare parts from the Soviet Union,feels lhat Ihe West has proven to besource in time of abas and that it haspayment terms as liberal as those of
Kabul has relied almoston Soviet sources for ils armaments over theyears and hasillion worthassistance. Kabul also hasoviet
milituty advisers and technicians lo Instruct Afghan personnel in maintenance of equipment.
number of unconfirmed Pakistanireports have suggested Soviet involvementAfghanistan in the (raining and equippingtribal guerrillaj.o evidencethese reports and some are known to
Pfllliion. In thehe USSR signed arms contractsillion with Pakistan. Moscow believed that an arms aid program might eventually undercut Chinese and Western Influence and lessen Islamabad's hostility toward India llow-rser. New Delhi objected. Inoscow bussed in Indian pressure and stopped arms shipments after deliveringillion worth of cquipmenl Moscow void someillion worth ofelicopter spare partsut il is not expected to resume significant shipments of arms
Baiigladnh When the state of Bangladesh was formed inhe USSR was quick to offer assistance in establishing an air fotec, providingIC'2ls as well as several helicopters and transport aircraft. The Soviet navy undertook the clearing ol mines and wreck* from the port of Chitlagongengalis have gone to the USSR for training2
The overthiow of the Muhb govfrnmrnl inollowed by additional coups in Novem-her. jarred Moscow Moscow felt that Mujlb offered Ihe besr prospect fortable government ihat was fiirndly lo both India and thc USSR Moscow is worried that the political Instabilityilaltitude of the new leaders mighl give Peking oppoitu nl lies to enhance Its influence, and Is trying la stay on good terms with General Zia't regime
Sovlhtatl AM The USSR has persistently tried to improve its position In Southeast Asia The general Soviet approach has been lo promote norma! state- lo- si ate relations, lo expand its economicand to fan suspicions of Peking Thr Soviets havene lime or another approached neady every country in the area wiih specific suggestions lor stieiiglhcning bilateral tics.
Vietnam It has been Hanoi'i policy to balance ill relations with Moscow and Peking The USSH was
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quick lo provide lhe Vietnamese and Laotianwith economic assistance needed to begin teconstruction following their receni victories At the same time. Hanoi has had problems with Peking, including conflicting territorial claims and possible rivalry fur regional Influence. The Soviets appear to enjoy better relations with Hanoi than do the Chinese, but this will nut buy them much because Vietnam cannot afford lo go too far in provoking Peking and will seek tu preserve its freedom of maneuver. Soviel military assistance has declined, but It continues to bc Important lo Hanoi since Iherc is no indigenous industry capable of producing major items of
here is no reliable evidence that the Soviets have sought military facilities in Vietnam.the Vietnamese arc concerned with Chinas reaction and delermined to avoid the, establishment of any foreign miliiary presence on lhcir territory. Wc believe they would reject any Soviet overtures for regular military use of air and port facilities.
aos. The Soviet presenceos has been steadily increasing since the departure of most Americans in latehe Soviets have been careful not to reveal the size of their presence, but it is estimated atubstantial increase from ihc fewerresent before the L'S citodus. in5 ihe Soviets mounted an alilifl from Hanoi and Bangkok to Vientiane to help make up for goods shortages in Laos caused bv lhc closure of thc land border with Thailand
repair workrowing number of Soviet naval support ships and commercial vessels; it is not used, however, for repairing Ihese ships in mid-deployment. Repair of Soviet vessels in Singapore relieves pressure on the busy facilities on theacific Coast Recently. Singapore has abo granted Soviet noncom-batauls access to the Sembawang Shipyard whichsed by US warships.
Other Countries. Thc Soviets have no military agreements with Cambodia. Thailand or Burma, and the Indonesians have shown no interest in cooperating with Soviet schemes to stem PRC Influence in Southeast Asia. While Philippine President Marcos desires to balance his relations with Peking and Moscow, he continues to believe that thc USSR needs him mure than he needs it. Thc small independent island nations of the southwest Pacific have been the focus of some recent Soviet diplomatic initiatives. So far, these efforts have been directed at the acquisition of facilities for thc Soviet fishing fleet, but in the lungei term efforts may be made to include Soviet naval visits
Support for Liberation Croups Moscow may 1st: symp;ilhelie to further rcvolotionary changes in Southeast Asia, but will probably have fewloeaningful role The Chinese will continue lo lake advantage of their proximity to influence guerrilla movements and the Vietnamese haveurfeit of weapons that ihey would have little need of Soviel assistance to supplyl.'.
Vientiane's derision lo permil an increase in the Soviet ptesence mayesire to strengtheniusiliunli Peking as well as its need for technical assistance Ihe Lan continue to maintain intimate iclations withietnamese troops ar* stationed inany shift toward the Soviets would prabably reflectpproval The Vietnamese eorwtder that theyroprietary interest in Ijoi and therefore would piobably not wanthinese or Soviet challenge to their position
ingapore The Soviel Union's relationships with Singapore are essentially commercial in nature8 Soviet naval auxiliaries and naval-associated ships have stripped ateppel Shipyard for replenishment while transiting to and from the Indian Ocean The shipyard has handled
D. Latin America
atin America docs no! now rank high in Ihe scheme of Soviet foreign policy priorities. To bc sure, thc Soviets seek gteater influence In lhe affairs of the region, but they arc realistic about their prospects, and Cuirent Soviet policies for the regionragmatic and opportunistic approach lhat does no! anticipate early dramatic gains The Soviet goals in thc near term are to weaken links between Latin America and thc US by encouraging anti-Imperialism and nonalignment.
I'M. Cuba Cuba musl be counted as the USSR's niaior success in the region. Alter2 missile crisis, the Soviets continued their military aid and iheir support of the economy tolose relation- ihip with the Cuban government.
Latin America
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Soviet military mission ofenstationed in Cuba. Ofassigned lo advise their Cubanoperating and maintaining Soviet suppliedand iu trlated training activities,those areas where the most advanced technologyie. the alt force, surface-to-air missilenetworks, and certain naval units.also work closely with Cuba'swhich were organized with extensiveand training and which collaborate within intelligence operations abroad
0 the Soviets acquired the facilities at Cicnfiiegos but Soviet use of ihem has beenby the US-Soviet understanding regarding Soviet basing. In addition, Soviel personnel operate Soviet communications and intelligence collection facilities in the Havana area, including SICINT and radar tracking of US military movements
In years past Moscow was obviouslybvffort to export resolutiontin America Shut theastro hasolicy of rcslrnlnt and selectivity in his support ol revolutionary groups in Latin Ametica, hut al the same time he has been Increasingly willing to encourage and support promising national liberation movements in other parts of the world The Angolan conflict afforded an occasion lor dose Soviel Cubanupport of an insurgent movement, with ibeironcert. Thii collaboration may be repeated il suitable opportunities arise, bui it will not he automatic. Moscow and Havana will each want to be sure that such an undertaking furthers its own interests.
Other iinnimu. The virtual monopolybv thr LS as an arms supplier in the Western Hemisphere after World War II hat declinedesult ol restrictive US arms policies and deterioration in political telations But ihe bulk ol IjIui American arms purchases Irom non-US suppliers has gone to Western0 andalin American countries had already received or contracted for more thanillion worth of arms from -European countries
Soviets' efforts to get arms clients inin addition lo Cuba have had noIn Pern, ahhough they have approachedSouth American countries 2 and
he Soviets delivered or agreed to deliver overillion worth of armslhan half of Peru's total arms purchases In that period To gain entry to the Peruvian market as elsewhere, Moscow provided quick delivery dates, generous credits at low rutes of inlcrest, and discounted some Items of equipment al well below world market prices Peru's expected purchase ofircraft (probably the export version of theighter-bomber)rice lag0 million.
purchases do not necessarily setfor other Latin American buyers, andunlikely lhat Ihe USSH will become asupplier in thb hemisphere Lalinare used to dealing with the West andunsure of both thc qualily and reliability ofand spare parts arrangementsLatins remain wary of Soviel political aimsbe fealous of their own interests when decidingpurchases Nevertheless, the Soviets arebe perslstrnl in seeking arms customers inAnd lhc Latin Americans mayoffers or seek to use them to extractthe US
failure to prevail in Chiles caulious approach to the suppori ofin Latin American governments.concert with thc Cubans the Soviets arecontacts with Latin American radical groupsurging them lo form broad leftist frontsguidance Tbe Soviets are abotrain some Lalin Americans in guerrillahoping thai, in time, changingprovide suitable opportunities for Insurgency.meantime, carefully cultivated state-to-stateeconomic, commercial, andleceise top priority in lhe Soviet policyAmerica
IV. FUTURE TRENDS
Soviets are evidently convincedin lhe Third World over lhe pastearsincreased Moscow's prestige andin svorid affairs and thai ihis has contributednational security. The most compellingof determination lo press on has beenin the face of major setbacks,ypt. Ghana, and Sudan Given it is extremely unlikely that any future
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would cause Ihem lo tevene eoune. In fid.
ui opportunities lor the use ol military resources in the Third World present themselves, the Soviets will almost certainly respond
A. Militory Aid
lte culling edge o( Soviet militaryIn Third Work! counlries will coniinue to be thc provision of military assistance. There is no evidence lhal the Soviets are developing weapon systems designed for the export trade only. Rather, the Sovieti seem likely to continue to export systems which were developed for Soviet forces The Soviets willariety of weapons for export
For some recipienls. older but still serviceable Soviet equipment will be appropriate In sub Saharan Africa,4 lank isormidable weapon
air dclense systems wrll probably remain In high demand Clients who feai air attack can obtain comprehensive. high-ieshnology airMoreover, the defensive character of SAM systems makes it easy- to justify their purchase
most favored clients are likely to gel more substantial offensive capabilities bom such weapons as newer models of tactical aircraft with greater range and pas.load, scll-piopelled guns, and FROCs and Scuds
The clients who receive sophisticated and expensive weapons will perforce find themselves in closer rrlations with the USSR on thiee counts debts will be higher despite discounts and eiedit terms, more Soviet technicians will be required, and reliance on the USSRspares will be greater
n making policy on military aid. the Soviets are only partly reactive to US and other countries' military aid programs In some areas they will, of course, react to American salesountryt oddslient of theirs. In olher areas, the Soviets will take advantage of situalions In which the US cannot or will not make sales In still other cases they will be alert lo opportunities to break into new-markets, regardless nf what the US does In any ease, we believe that ihey will be blile disposed to reach agreements for rnutoal great-power restraint Inassistance. Their efforts to expand their influence rest so heavily on this insttument that they would
regard such restraints as drastically curtailing their overall opportunities in the Third World.
aploymants, Force Developments, and Capabilities
he USSR will continue to deploy air and naval forces to tbe Third Worid. as well ai to improve the forces which might be used In distant operations.
Vpfoynirrris Following the rapid growth of Sonel naval presence in Third World areas4outine deployments of Soviet general purpose naval forces haverend toward stabilization, Despite Irmpoiary increases In the intervening years for unusualclearing operations in Bangladesh, reaction to Ihe Arab-Israeli War. and mines weeping operations tn Ihe Cull ofship daystj will probably amount to onlyercent more than the total0 Although the numbers of Soviet ships deployed wdl probably not increase substantially, their quality and combat capabilities will continue to Improve
taging for long-range maritimeaircraft promises lo be the most important benefit the Soviets receive from iheir overseasDespile improvements in ocean leconnaissance satelliles. seagoing intelligence collectors, and ground intercept capabilities in the USSR, the Soviets will rely heavily on reconnaissance aircraft and will continue to seek facilities from which to operate them The force of Soviet reconnaissance, patrol, and strike aircraft will drop slightly In total numbers, but the overall force will be qualitatively improved* through thc addition of Rackfire and other new model; projected over Ihe next decade
Force Trend* Moscow has never conducted an assault operationistant area, and Soviet involvement in crises and conflicts in the Third World has taken the form of Soviet assistancelient. Nevertheless, modernization program* over thc next ten years will improve the forces which could be used to Intervene in distant areas, even though most of this modernization is being carried out primaniy for other military purposes
Airborne divisions will rtmain (lie same inincluding one training division. They will gradually improve their fire power and mobility, but will retain iheii preseni combat limitations. The total number of Soviei transport aircraft will decline
t
stightly0 and remain relatively stablehe total lift capability will rile during the remainder ofith the continued deployment of6 Candid.
ISO. New transportwhich there is no present cs-idciice ofbe iu use in
of theock stopped after onlyere delivered to VTA and thc Soviets mayequirementollow-on long range heavy transport capable of carrying outslzcd cargoollow-on could be in service in the, although there is no evidence lhat such an aircraft is under construction.
mainstay of Soviet military transportis Iheedium assault % transport which entered service in thehile there is no evidenceollow-on aircraft, the Soviets could decide to develop one.
If these aircraft appear. Ihe Soviets would increase their capability to lift airborne troops by about half over thc next ten yeais.
clual and potential developments in naval forces include improvements in underwayand amphibious lift capabilities
So'iets are continuing lo construct large underway replenishment ships. Six of these ships have become operational0 and at least two more are under const motion.
isarge ship under construction in Kaliningrad that appears to be an amphibious unitew class. Itamp for roll-on/roll-off cargo handling and clam-shell bow doors.
Five ilopucha-class amphibious ships have been built for the Soviel navy in Poland, and construction of additional units is expected to amount to at least two per year. The Ropucha is smaller than its predecessor, the Alligator, but unlike earlier Soviet amphibious ships, these units appear to provide troop quarters adequate for long periods at sea.
Soviets have been active in developing air cushion vehicles for naval application. ACVs are not now available for Soviet operations in distant areas because there are no ships to carry them into an assault It is possible, however, that a
large ship now being built for the Soviet merchant marine In Finland could be employed to carry ACVs.
the most significant forcessould be in the development of carriermight reduce Ihc principalairSoviet capabilities for combatareas
Kiev-class catricr is in operation,itting out,hird Is under construction and expected to be in service in the.
-Wc expect there svill be anTOL aircraft for use on the Kiev In lheuch an aircraft ss-ould have greater ordnance-carrying capability and greater in-flightthan theorger.
Within thc next five to ten years, these bnprosements svill enable the Soviets to better assist their allies and clients, particularly by supplementing local defenses. Soviet ships will be able to make more credible demonstrations of force and better Iheir capabilities for interposition The Soviets will also improve their capabilities foi ditect assault But beyond the range of land-based air support, thc Soviets svould be unable lo carry out an amphibious assault against determined opposition by sizable armed forces
A nesv class of aircraft carrier, with catapult and arresting gear to handle larger numbers of high-perfiiriuiince aircrafl. svouldundamental improvement in Soviet capabilities to support an assaultistanl area There is no evidence that thc Soviets arc working onarrier. If lhe Soviets sverc toarrier of Ihis type, lhe first unit could noi be available before tbe, liven then, one new carrier would be able to provideimited amount of air covei. and problems of insufficient assault bit and vulnerable lines of communication would still remain
though the Soviets' capabilitieswe believe their active intervention inWorld is likely lo continue to take the formaid. interposition of naval forces,air defenses of selected clientsthey already have substantial militaryrather than by direct armed assault.the growth in Soviet eapabililies will be noticed
hy Third World states and may enhance Soviel efforts in influence evenn distant areas
C. Geographic Emphasis
Soviets will almost certainly continueaccess lo overseai faciUties lo support
lhcir ships and aircraft Moscow is likely to pursue itsur access in thc fashion il has displayed In theand Increasingly frequent visits of dups or aiicraft followed by acquisition of facilities for cs elusive Soviet use where possible. Strong efforts along Ihese lines will continue to be made In the Mediterranean andesser extent in West Africa and the Indian Ocean
polilical constellations andprograms suggest thc following area priorities:
Africa is Ihe area of greatest current potential for Ihe USSR. The Soviets will doubtless be alert to opportunities to exploit troubles even though they wdl have little ability to eontiol or even prediel developments Moreover, the Soviets are providing lhe arms and the trrinlng {with Cuban assistance) to increase insurgent activities, and they stand ready to react to developingt ions.
Middle East will nevertheless remain the major focus of Soviet military activities In the Third World. As long as Soviet relations: remain sour, Syria will remain the major recipient of Soviet miliiary aid, and Moscow will probably emphasize military exports lo olher ArabLibya, and Algeria
olher areas. India, Somalia, and Cuba will coniinue to be the focal points of Soviet military policy Moscow apparently Intends to go on looking for new clients, bul the Soviets do not seem lo expect any major changes in Asia'm America In Ihc immediate future
ISH While Soviet interests In major areas are likely to cnduir. present relations wiih Individual counlries can change abruptly The relationships the Soviets have established ure subject lo Ihe vicissitudes of politics in the Third World, and Moscow has seen suhsiantial gains swept away overnight Despite such setbacks, lhe Soviets will remain persistent and highly opportunistic in developing new clients. To the extent thai the Soviets have Increased the use of airlift to speed their assistance to clients In need. Moscow is able toew military relationship more quickly now than in Ihe past.
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