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The Yugoslav Military Elite (U)

A. Ross Johnson, with the assistance of Jeanette A. Koch

A report prepared for



The Yugoslav Military Elite (U)

A. Ross Johnson, with the assistance of Jeanette A. Koch

A report prepared for





The research described in this report was sponsored by Ihe Office of Polilical Research and the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, under Contract No.R.

Reports of The Rand Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of Rand research.

Published by The Rand Corporation



This publication contains INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, as indicated below

Rind Publication No.

um id byv fcjntr)

Ross Johnson

ih* lulho'ilv o' (CPknil

| Source)


DIA, Department of State

ol Intelligence Inlitfnutinn and location in publication:

Intelligence information concerning Yugoslav military affairs and personalities is contained throughout thi* report.

without proper Limitations on uw bv Rdnd:

ionals not immigrant alien* may have access to intelligence information

to support the contract not be discussed with or urce agency) with-

Thk Rand publication obtains inielligence under which this report was prepared.evealed to any outside individual or agency (except the out the permission of the client.

Questions regarding the proper use of intelligence information in Rand publics! should be referred to ihe Rand Intelligence Facility.



Yugoslavia faces the Tito succession. Future developments in that country will affect importantly the interests of the Unitedrisis situation in post-Tito Yugoslavia could developuropean and international crisis of grave proportions. Themilitary is certain toey role in post-Tito Yugoslavia. This Report analyzes the Yugoslav military by focusing on itsgroupits elite. The Report combines dynamic statistical analysis of the transformation of the Yugoslav military elite with traditional analysis of its historical development. It was prepared for the Office of Political Research and the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, to fill the gap that had resulted from the absence of any USG or academic analysis of the Yugoslav military elite. It aims to provide such an analysis helpful to USG policymakers who deal with Yugoslavia and USG analysts responsible for ongoing assessments of developments in that country.

The present Report, focused on the key individuals in the Yugoslav military, is intended to complement an in-house study by the Office

of Political Research that deals with the political role of the

Yugoslav military as an institution.

An in-house study hy the Office of Strategic Research, CIA, examines the current organization and capabilities of the Yugoslav armed forces. Together, these three studies provide the policymaker and analystomprehensive overview of the Yugoslav military on the eve of the Tito succession.


The current Yugoslav military elite, although aging. Isyoung and unchallenged to be in place when Tito passes from the Yugoslav political scene. It is comprised of the Partisangeneration; the postwar military generation will not rise to the top for another fiveyears. The present elite is relatively well prepared to dofend Yugoslavia against external and internal threats. It is dominated by professional commanders of the Partisan generation. Peasant youth at the outbreak of World War II, they joined Tito's Partisan movement at its outset as their first adult activity. They then joined the Party, mobilizedlatform of national independence and unity, not support for the USSR or Communist revolution. Since World Kar II, they have been professionallywith Yugoslavia's defense, principally against the Soviet threat.

Assimilating the changing values of the Communist Party, the military elite has developed strong loyalty to the Yugoslav Communist political system, and it stands ready to defend that system, as well as the Yugoslav state, against domestic as well as foreign challengers. The military elite is more active in Party politics and government affairsecadlf ago. It desires more discipline in Yugoslav life within the present Party-dominated "self-management" system, buteturn to Soviet-style rule.

In contrast to other Yugoslav elites, the military elite hasfundamentally cohesive, notwithstanding internal disputesdefense policy, the national question, and There is no evidence of intra-nilitary cleavage onissues; in particular, there is no evidence of .

sentimentesire to realign Yugoslavia with the USSR).

The military elite constitutes one of the strongest "all-Yugoslav" centripetal forces. It has successfully adapted itself to the looser federal political system and greater self-affirmation of thenational groups while protecting the military institution against

nationalist inroads and excessive decentralization. The Military el ita has become mulr all major national groups (except Albanians) are proportionally represented in its ranks. Key regional command posts, are again staffed by "native sons" from the respective regions, just as they were during the Partisan Kar. hmcnt of regional territorial defense commands influenced by regional political authorities, part of theystem of "total nationalas further "territorialized" the military elite. Consequently, the Armed forces of Yugoslavia evidently are perceivedjoint armed force" by most of^Yugoslavia's national groups (Croats and Albanians being significant exceptions).

Whatever the shape of post-Tito Yugoslavia, the military elite willey role. If no succession crisis occurs, the elite will continue to participate in the political process but concentrate on the external, principally Soviet threat. Should the post-Tito purtod be more troubled, the elite could be expected to be much more actlvo in domestic political affairs, actingnifying factor. In the more extreme eventuality of internal disintegration, the role of the military elite would become paramount. In case of localized conflict, the elite could be expected to respond effectively to orders froa Belgradeegional capital to restore order. But in case of contageous conflict leading to civil war and national breakdown, the unity and effectiveness of the military elite would be suspect. Resilient in situations short of major crises precisely because iteflection of the political and social system, it would probably lack the unity and purposefulness necessary to reconstitute political authorityisintegrating Yugoslavia.

Should the Soviet Union intervene militarily in post-Titoin circumstances other than this "worst case" domestic scenario, the military elite can be expected toetermined resistance effort. In that event, as in the case of immediate Soviet military threat, the elite can be expected to look to the West for armaments and other forms of military assistance.


Forces of Yugoslavia


Party of Yugoslavia

Secretariat of National Defense

Military Academy


(Counterintelligence Service)

Colonel General

of Communists of Yugoslavia

(official name of the Communist Party

Assistance Advisory Group


Liberation Army

Liberation War

Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia

(mass political organization)

Defense Forces

People's Army




















il ix



mm t

is 53





The Tito succession will be Yugoslavia's most serious challenge since the conflict with Stalin It will have importantramifications- The countryrucial strategicin Europe on the boundary between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. of Yugoslavia into the Soviet sphere following Tito's departure wouldignificant shift in the Europeanbalance in favor of the USSR. Soviet military action against Yugoslavia wouldajor international crisis, since Yugoslav resistance would be likely; Yugoslavia would probably requestassistance of some kind;onflict might spill over into other areas of Europe. The likelihood of Soviet military intervention in Yugoslavia and the prospects for success of more indirectof Soviet policy are related directly to the degree of internal cohesion in post-Tito Yugoslavia. These policy premises suggest the importance of understanding the evolving Yugoslav system and its likely future development in both non-crisis and crisis situations.

This Report analyzes the Yugoslav militaryelativelyelement of the Yugoslav system. The study assumes that themilitary willolitically significant factor in post-Tito indeed, today the Yugoslav People's Array (YI'AJ plays anpolitical role. The army is the strongest all-Yugoslav institutionountry rife with regional and ethnic divisions.2 tts domestic political weight has increased in the past five years- It will play an important role in the post-Tito political constellation in the absence

ueveloped in Johnson and (Full citations of publications referenced in footnotes are given in the Bibliography.)

escribes Yugoslavia's complex multinational Throughout this Report, common Yugoslav issues and institutions centered iu Belgrade are referred to ashile "national" refers to characteristics of the constituent ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats,f Yugoslavia, and "republican" refers to the constituent republics (Serbia, Croatia,f the Yugoslav state.

of internal turmoil. In tho event (unlikely, perhaps, hut certainly thinkable) of severe internal strife, no less than tn rhc contingencyharply increased Soviet threat, the cohesion of the Yugoslav military may well be decisive for the continued iiiti-grily andof the Yugoslav state.

The study reported here analyzes the Yugoslav military byon its most influential individuals, that is. its leadership group or elite (the term which will be utilized hereafter). The study was undertakenioneering effort to fill the gap created by theof any governmental or academic analysis of the Yugoslav military elite. Study objectives includedrofile of the Yugoslav military olite that could complement available biographies of individual officers; protecting the outlook, or set of attitudes on issues, of that elite; analyzing tensions within the Yugoslav Militaryand considering the resulting implications for the role of the Yugoslav military elite in the post-Tito period. This study examines secondarily the military as nn institution with particular organizational and political characteristics conditioning the net Ion* of the individuals operating within it. It does not assay the military capabilities of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia (AFY).*

Section IIuamury review of the evolving role of the VP* in postwar Yugoslavia. It provides background for the elite analysis In the subsequent sections.

Section IIIrofile of the Yugoslav military elite, namely, an analysis of collective attributes including age. nationality and regional origin, education, Party exiwrience, and military career data. This profile is based on systematic analysis of all available datathe backgroundey officers judged to comprise theelite (as ofS).2 Toenchmark against which to judge recent changes in this profile, an "historical" profile is drawn

The method, definitions, and data utilized in this study arein Appendix A. . Government studies dealing with other aspects of the Yugoslav military arc listed in the rreface and Bibliography

^Important personnel changes since this cut-off date are noted, but not incorporated in the statistical analysis.

of the characteristicsounterpart eliteomprisedey officers. (The choices opposed to other years, for the purposes of comparison is explained in Knowledge of group characteristics does not suffice to permit predictions of the actions of the members of the respective group in various future situations. It does improve our understanding of predispositional factors that willthe behavior of individual actors in specific future circumstances. Gaps in data blur somewhat this profile of the current Yugoslav military elite; ituggestive profile, not the conclusive portrait that studyore accessible military group can provide.1 In thisas in others, it is not the sufficiency of the data for rigorous empirical analysis, but rather the need for more knowledge about the militaryritical element of the Yugoslav political system that motivated this study. Further analysis, qualification, andof the data utilized in Section III are contained in Appendix C.

Section IV provides an estimate of the "outlook" or attitudes about issues of the Yugoslav military elite. Since systematic atti-tudinal data on the Yugoslav military is inaccessible, the Reportthe fragmentary evidence available2 andudgment (in which the subjective component is necessarily high) about the attitude of the Yugoslav military elite.

nalyzes cleavages and affinity groups within themilitary. This study assumed at the outset that the Yugoslav military isonolith and that knowledge of the existence, extent, and nature of internal divisions and affinity groups would improve our ability to anticipate the future cohesion and behavior of the Yugoslav military. The Report reviews evidence of intra-military conflict on military and nonmilitary issues for the past ten years, in order to draw conclusions about the nature of disputed issues and the identity,

An example of the latter ishich analyzedsurveys of South Vietnamese armed forces personnel records.

Key interna] military opinion polls are partially reconstructed in Appendix D.

ions, and allies of niajor prot afcon ists. Personal associations are assessed on the basis of career jnd particularly organizational proxinity. with emphasis (suspected jt the hii and confirmed Incases by the analysis) on the continued importance of personalforged during the Partisan War,

Section VIthe preceding analysis and discusses iapli-jutions for the behavior of the Yugoslav Miliaryariety of future circumstances.




The YPA was the founding instrument of Communist Yugoslavia. Originally known as the People's Liberation Army, it was created by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia1 to fight what Tito and his subordinates in the CPY leadership conceivedual war for both national liberation from Axis occupation and for social revolution. Tito fully recognised the overwhelming attractiveness to Yugoslavs of the cause of liberation (as opposed to revolution) and skillfully exploited that appeal in developing the Partisan movement; the Party downplayed both its control of the Partisans and its revolutionary social objectives.2 The PLA developed initially from "proletarian brigades" organized after1 and staffed in good measure by Yugoslavs who had fled the cities in the face of German occupation, while the proletarian brigades had relatively high inter-regional mobility, they were not the model for the PLA;2 Tito decided against attempting to establish such unitside scale and subsequently emphasized regionally-based units. S, the PLA had grownorce ofoldiers organized inivisions and four armies.

Rapid growth and internal stratification of the PLA conditioned the evolution of its officer corps. The military organizers of the Partisan Movement were theprewar Communists who had served in tho International Brigades of the Spanish Civilho

dominated the major PLA commands, including all four Array commands

This Section is provided as background for the elite-focused analysis in subsequent Sections of the Report; it skims the surfacetill largelyyear history of the Yugoslav military. It draws in part onhe Political Pole of the Yugoslav

2At the end1 Tito briefly embraced (but then abandoned) the notion of emphasizing revolutionary "class" aims and Party control of the Partisan movement.

3Ales* Bebler has described how he implemented in Slovenia guerrilla warfare experience gained in Spain (Vjeenik,.

S. Twenty-nineecame Partisan generals. Prewarofficersignificant role only in Ihe . in5 foraer naval officers occupied all leading naval posts innd the Partisan Air Force." Most wartime officers lacked previousexperience and were elevated froa the ranks of the Partisans. Like other revolutionary armies, the PLA initially lacked hierarchical differentiation; ranks were introduced only

National equality was emphasized in the development of the Partisan army; the Party's slogan of "brotherhood andignifyingboth to Serb hegemony of Interwar Yugoslavia and the national fratricide of World War ll, was another key to the Partisans'part from the proletarian brigades, whose special status has been noted, the PLA was until4 comprised of regional units commanded principally by officers of the respective region and national group,lo regional commands, and utilizing the respective regional language or dialect for command.4 The only demographic anomaly occurred in Croatia; there the Partisans' major initial support came from the Serb minority concentrated in Lika and Slavonia that was the objectolicy of physical extermination by the Axis satellite "Independent State of Croatia."S

The CPY organized the PLA; it maintained its influence over the expanding PLA through multiple channels. The PLA's Supreme Command, organized by Titoas coterminous with the Party Politburo. Regional commands were organizedimilar basis. Party activists were appointed to the posts of political commissars ut all levels of the PLA and shared responsibility with unit commandershe familiar "dual command" principle characteristic of (and modeled after) the Soviet army in the immediate prewar period. Utilizing political commissars to maintain political control over the expanding PLA, the Party feared "militarization" of the Partyfear understandable in view of the fact that The Party grew in size0 members1embers5 (with0 of1 contingent surviving the war). To protect the autonomy of Party cells in military units, Party secretaries were secretly appointed; nominally they occupied the function of deputy commissar. The commissar and the Party secretary were in turn subordinated to yet another channel of Party control. Party Central Committee emissaries were dispatched first to brigades (usually three emissaries) and ino5 emissaries) toPolitical Section" that was considered an integral part of the Central Committee. It was this Political Section, working with the commissar, the Party secretary, and the youth organization secretary, that served as the linkage for transmittal of political directives to military units. The Political Sections were maintained until the end


5 and the consolidation of the Communist regime in Yugoslavia, the PLA (now called first the "Yugoslav Army" and then the "Yugoslav People'sas transformedevolutionary Partisan armyore conventional professional fighting force. Strict Partyof the Army was maintained through political channels: unified Party-political organs in the YPA were subordinated to its Political Administration that was (as in other Communist countriesection

of the Party Central Committee. The Political Administration wa*headed by Party Secretary Vukmanovic-Tcmpo (who was also military prosecutor and head ofhe counterintelligence service). Coamiissars continued to exist in all military units; the commissar was generally more powerful than the commander. The command hierarchy itself was dominated by Tito, who was both Supreme Commander andecretary of Defense.

Once the VPA hod suppressed the remaining domestic opposition to Communist rule, it became preoccupied with external security. Concernestern threat was soon matched by apprehension about Soviel intentions. Tito had successfully insisted to Stalin4 that none of the Soviet forces that had helped to liberate parts of Fastcrn Yugoslavia remain after the war. But Yugoslavia quickly becameon the USSR for military training and equipment; Soviet military advisors were posted to Yugoslavia in large numhers; most Yugoslav senior officers went to the USSR for training; and Yugoslavia looked to the USSR for assistance in modernising the YPA. Friction developed between Soviet and Yugoslav military personnel, however, and7 Tito had come to view these incidents as partoviet effort to gain control of the YPA- In7 Tito publiclyefiant stand on the issue of the independence of the YPAhe first issue so confronted in the developing general conflict with Stalin.1

Following the outbreak of open conflict with Stalinugoslaviaeal and present danger of external intervention. Kith Soviet renunciation9 of the Soviet-Yugoslav friendship treaty, the staging of troop maneuvers in neighboring satellite countries,eries of border incidents, Yugoslavia lived in the shadow of Soviet military invasion. The YPA was redeployed and enlarged to meet the Soviet threat. omestic arms industry was established in the interior of the country. ugoslavia was devotinguarter of national income to defense, and the YPA had been expandedalf-million men. . military assistance program was formally begun3 and provided grant aid worth three-fourthsillion


dollars Defense preparations were solely in tho hands of the YPA. Doctrinally and organizationally, it emphasized conventional defense more than the Partisan operations of World War IX,

As the YPA expanded in the, the prerogatives and authority of its coouBanders were strengthened. Surfacing of the Stalin-Tito conflict led to several high-level pro-Soviet defections within the Military (to he discussednd these touched off an intensive political search for possible "Cominformists"ro-Soviet elements) within the YPA that strengthened the hand of political officers. But as early as9 the formal authority of tho commanderthe commissar was elevated somewhat. The major change in thisoccurred inonsequence of the Sixth Party Congress directives to remove the Partyirect command role in Yugoslav society. This general political imperative to redefine the Party's role in the military was doubtloss reinforced by the militaryof more authority for the command hierarchy, given the extent and nature of the YPA buildup that was underway. Inhe Main Political Administrationarty Central Committee section) was abolished, as was the position of commissar at all lavels. The political organs of the YPA were now subordinated to commanders up and down the military hierarchy; the military Party organization, too, was strongly influenced by the commanders, for their deputies for political affairs also assumed tho post of Party secretary.onsequence, then, of the intersection of political and military developments--the Sixth Party Congress that redefined the role of the Party in Yugoslav life and the massive conventional military buildup in the face of the Sovietand institutional autonomy were emphasized in the YPA, more so than in many other Yugoslav institutions.


Following Stalin's death3 and Khrushchev's conciliatory visit to Belgradeoviet-Yugoslav relations improved and in


thegain became warm. In Yugoslav eyes, the Soviet threat receded; defense spending was therefore reduced, and the YPA greatly limited in site, so that8 Yugoslavia devoted lessercent of national income to defense and the YPA had been reduced toen.1 Early retirement of YPA officers was encouraged0 officers had retired including ?Sno officer* andeneralsfl alone. (Social tensions inevitably resulted and some of tho retired officers, lamenting the loss of their former material and social position, actively opposed Party policies of the time). In, Yugoslavia again became dependent on the USSR for advanced weaponry (although it accepted these armaments on terms compatible with its, and resumed exchange of official military delegations with the Soviet bloc. During this period, military ties with Western countries lapsed. At times, particularly in connection with? Middle Fast war. the Yugoslav military seemed to be more concernedotential military threat from the West than from the East.

The Soviet-ted invasion of Czechoslovakia in8 reawakened Yugoslavia to the reality of the Soviet threat. While the resulting crisLs atmosphere (that included widespread mobilization) relaxedew weeks, the shock of Czechoslovakia caused Yugoslavia to take its defense more seriously. enewed massive conventional military buildup was out of the question for several reasons: pressing economic difficulties; the more decentralized political system of the; and the military inadequacy of whatever conventional force Yugoslavia might organize to meet the threat presented by the massive and highly mobile Soviet military establishment. Recmbracing the concept of ti "nation in arms" and reemphasizinR the Partisan heritage, Yugoslavia developed its present system of opntcnarodna odbrtxna or "total national defense."


The primary organizational consequence of the adoption of "total national defense" was the establishment on republican lines of territorial


3For detailed analysis see.; The Political Pole

of the Yugoslav

defense forces as units of citizen-soldiers. The TDF has since developedorce of over ono million men (with auxiliaries) that is financedepublican and local basis. The TDF isof small factory-defense units, company-size local units, and larger, well-equipped mobile units intended for useepublic. TDF units are subordinated to local and republican defense commands; at each level TDF commanders are responsible both to local political authorities and to the superior TDF command. TDF units fall under YPA command only when engaged in joint tactical operations. On the other hand, should an ontirc republic be overrun by the enemy, tho republican defense command would assume control of all military units on its territory.

Implementation of total national defense has thusrofound change in the role of the YPA, which has lost its monopoly of responsibility for defonsc and is now nominally (although not de facto) one of two co-equul components of tho newly-named Armed Forces of Yugoslavia. The YPA is no longer tha Yugoslav military institution, but is now complemented by tho larger TDF. On the other hand, Yugoslavia has not accepted for the YPA the Swiss modelrofessional training corpsingle militia of citizen-soldiers; the active YPA must be able on its own both to resist limited incursion and to delay massive attack long enough for the country to carry out total mobilization; in the latter case it would stilley rolo. Specific changes in YPA organization have resulted, including further manpowerharp lowering of YPA reserve levels (and virtual abolishment of the YPA's inactivend transfer of many support and logistic functions to the TDF or civilian sector.

The relationship of the YPA to the TDF hasynamic one. Established at the height of republican self-assertiveness in Yugoslavia, the regional character of the TDF was originally emphasized at the expense of YPA influence, even though TDF commands were from the outset staffed exclusively by YPA reserve or (in soma casos) active officers. Host importantly, the TDF chain of command originally extended directly from the Supreme Commander to the republican commands, bypassing the

Federal Defense Secretariat and the Yl'A General Staff. , asrepublican rights were curtailed at the expense of greater federal authority in the political system generally, more emphasis was placed on the role of the TDF as partunified defenseow the General Staff was inserted into the TDF chain of command, and this was symptomatic of greater influence of the VPA oveT the development of the TDF at all levels. Thi* influence notwithstanding, the TDF remains politically responsive to local and republican political authorities, who continue to nominate candidates for TDF command posts1and whose right to organize and direct national defense in their respective territories has been legitimized in the new Yugoslav constitution Their involvement in defense nuttersignificant return to the Partisan heritage and dilution of the exclusive responsibility for defense that the YPA bore 5

Total national defense is officially described in Yugoslaviaystem of defense against any and all enemies. In fact,8 the principal threat preoccupation of the YPA and TDF has been the Soviet Union--notwithstanding the continuation of military relations with the USSR and its allies2 and concern with other, particularly subversive and terrorist, threats from the Kest. Yugoslav military doctrine is preoccupied with the threatudden massive armored and airborne invasion that corresponds only to Soviet doctrine and capabllities-The territorial disposition of YPA unitsreoccupation with the Soviet threat.1 More fundamentally, the entire system of total national defense was developed in its present form in response to Soviet militaryinvasion ofas the only previous post-wur expansion of Yugoslav military capabilities was undertaken in response to Stalin's threats.

'ihe National Defense,tipulates that the Commander-in-Chief appoints republican defense commanders uponby the republics.

8 exchange of military delegations with western countries has complemented exchange with Soviet bloc countries resumedugoslavia continues to depend on the Soviet Union for advanced heavy weaponry; its efforts to diversify its arms purchases have not meteady response from Kestern governments.

Yugoolairia: Perception nf tho Threat and Nationwide


YPA'* preoccupation with external security over the past thirty years conditioned its role in the Yugoslav political systom. Following the Communist consolidation of powerhe YPAore conventional military establishment; "professionaliration"the revolutionary multinational army into an exclusivist, supranational "Yugoslav" institution that was almost hermetically sealed off from the rest of Yugoslav society. To be sure, the YPAey instrument by which conscript youths were socialized into the values of the Yugoslav Communist system. The YPA continued to cultivate its heritage as tho founding instrument of that system. Yet for two decades it remained outside the mainstream of Yugoslav Party-political life.

In the. Party reformers feared that the isolation of the military coulduture "militaristic" threat to the wide-ranging economic and political reforms introduced in Yugoslavia in the. They sought with considerable success to dilute the exclusiveness of the military establishment. The Party forced on the YPA an "opening to society" (as the process was termed in Yugoslavia) Military matters,ublic taboo, began to be discussed in the media. Tho Federal Assembly began to debate, not just rubber stamp, the defonse budget. The Party organization in the YPA was reorganized to limit the authority over it of the command echelon that had dominated the Party bodies in the military since the abolishment of commissarso encourage horizontal contacts with nonmilitary, territorial Party organizations; and to permit greater participation by the military rank-and-file. The purpose of these measures was (in the wordsolitical officer) to effect "the real and not formalin the army |of the] democratic and self-management achievements of our society."'

The lowering of barriers between the military and other elements of Yugoslav society was reinforced by the upsurge of forces of national and regional self-affirmation that spawned the set of reforms that increased decentralization and pluralism in Yugoslavia in the second


half of. Under pressure from republican Party organizations, the YPA adopted the goal of fully proportional national representation in its officer corps (in which, for historical reasons, Serbs and Montenegrins hadisproportionately large role). Republican political authorities outside Serbia and Montenegro sought to enroll more of their youth in military academies (and encouraged theof new officers' training schools in their respective republics for this purpose). The YPA accepted the principle ofercentage of conscripts on the territory of their native republic; formerly it hadolicy of almost exclusively cross-regional postings. Earlier, Serbian (more precisely, the Belgrade dialect of Serbian written jn theroatian alphabet) had been used almost exclusively in the YPA, as in other federal institutions; nowfor linguistic and cultural national expression within the YPA were enhanced. The necessitynitary language for command and traininghe Belgrade dialect of Serbian) was brought into question.1 Most significant of all, the YPA was complemented8 by the republican-based territorial defense forces; the latter greatly increased contact between YPA officers and other Yugoslavs and contributed to the breakdown of the former isolation of the YPA.

This significant dilution of the YPA's exclusivist and supranational character in theotwithstanding, the militaryremained the strongest and most reliable all-Yugoslav political institution. In the protracted confrontation with Croatian nationalism (and the republican Party leadership in Zagreb that sought to harness it) inito turned to the military for support. He organized an unusual series of consultations with senior military figures to buttress his antinationalist remarks of the time. And in

These national issues were prominently discussed In the military Party organization in9 (Prua. They were systematically analyzed0 document of the military Party organization, publishedupplement to Narodna armija.

Tito restated what was never in question but which had not been made explicit forthe YPA played an internal political, as well as external security role in Yugoslavia and would be utilized, if events so dictated, toationalist or other domestic challenge to the integrity of the Yugoslav state and the maintenance of LCY rule.

In the atmosphere of domestic seni-crisis generated by the Party center's confrontation with Croatian nationalism1 and the crackdown on the Serbian Party leadership (accused of being toohe following year, the civil-military relationshipas desirable by the I'arty was modified andense reversed. In the, Party reformers hoped the "opening to society" would reintegrate an isolated and more conservative military establishment into the mainstreamliberalizing" Yugoslav political system. involvement in politics indeed further increased. But in the, the Party leadership reemphasized the Internal political as well as external security role of the YPAoyalist, orthodox institution providing an antidote to permissive nationalism and "liberalism" and,ore fundamental level, as the custodian and ultimate guarantor of the Yugoslav state and Communist system. In Tito's words ofour army is also called upon to defend the achievements of our revolution within the country, should that become necessary." He subsequently "It is no longer sufficient for our army to be familiar with mili tary affairs. It must also be familiar with political affairs and develop ments. Ic must participate in (them)." Many other high-level calls for military participation in politics ensued. For example, addressing an army Party conference. Party Executive Bureau Secretary Mirko Popovic called on YPA officers to be politically active in the communities in which they were stationed. As such appeals Indicate, the military


Speech of January 8,roadcast by Radioanjug,

was called on by Tito and the Party toore active political role; it did not inject itself into the political process.

Military involvement in political affairs has in fact Increased in the first half ofalbeit not to the extent some observers have suggested). mall groupolitical generals" has recmcrged for the first time since the, although (as described in Appendix C) they occupy almost exclusively security-related posts. The appointment of generals to such posts reflected the Tito loader-ship's heightened concern with terrorist and subversive threats to Yugoslavia in the. ew military figures were called upon for other services, both technical and political. MC Dragislav Radisavljevic was put in charge of the civilian airline, to improve its Army General Kosta Nadj, then semi-retired. was installed as head of the veterans' union4 as part of an effort by the Party to dampon the pressure that had emanated from purts of the veterans' organliation for "stronger measures" against nationalists and "liberals" and for more centralisteneral increase in tho political weight of the military was effected at the Tenth Party Congresshen the Central Committee (abolished as such at the Ninth Congressas reconstituted and tho military Parry organization

Described in. General Nadj's appointment was accompaniedajor reshuffle of the leadership of the veterans' organization, ln isolated cases, recently retired senior officers had joined forces with the veterans in urging more conservative policies on the Party. ey case ln this regard will bo discussed in Section V. Such cases do not demonstrate (as has been suggested) that the veterans' organizationandmaiden of the military establishment. Tho veterans' organizationignificant political force within the Yugoslav Communist system in its own right; local and even republican-level veterans' organizations have at times advocated quito unorthodox (usuallybut sometimes "liberal" andolicies. But the political weight of the veterans' organization is to be explained by its significant numbers of prominent "first fighters" who constituted the cream of the postwar political elite but who were subsequently shunted off onto the political sidelines. It is not ties with the current militarythat explain the role of the veterans' organization; that organization has notolitical surrogate for tho YPA in recent years.


allocatedeats on it (equivalent to thoserovincial Partyalthough less than thellocated to the republican Party But, as will be discussed, this greater military weight in central Party councils did not translate itselfilitary presence in nonniilitary Party bodies at the republican and local levels; claims to this role were voiced by some military Party officials2 but soon dropped.

The YPA has reacted to the challenge of the forces of national affirmation in the same way as have other Yugoslav institutionsxtreme nationalist demands have been decisively rejected, but opportunities for national self-expressionontext of respect for the integrity of Yugoslav institutions have been expanded. The calls of extreme nationalistsor radicalof the YPA into single-nation units with national languages of command have been silenced. But efforts continue to correct thenational representation in the officer corpscodified in4 Constitution, that the republican Party organizations continue to insist on.1 Officer candidates are assured of greater opportunities to be posted to their native regions.2 for linguistic self-expression in the military have expanded. The principlenitary language of command and training has been successfully defended, but more scope has been granted (at least in theory) for the use of Croatian along with Serbian military terminology.^

The more prominent role of the YPA in the has allowed the military establishment, as noted earlier, to defeat the challenges to the YPA's institutional autonomy and primary role in the Yugoslav

HTflf Illustrative of the republican Party stands on the issue arc statements of the head of the Kosovo provincial Party organization (Tanjug,nd the Croatian Party Executive Committee (Tanjug,)

roatia in thejesnik, May

4 National Defense Law formally defines the language of command and training as "Serbocroatian or Croatoserbian."

defense system raised by some of the stronger advocates of territorial defense forces Calls from the republican leveleto right over YPA regional postings and counlerposing the TPF to the YPA have been decisively rejected. The YPA hasore active role In pre-induetion military training, further solidifying its monopoly over all military education.

The military establishment has also blunted an incipient challenge froa within. In the wake of the political campaignguinst "nationalism" andome military Party organizations,mentioned previously, made short-lived claims to influence outside the armed forces. Simultaneously the military Party organizationore active stance within the YPA, in some cases opposing political to professional military concernsanner challenging commanders' prerogatives. S this tendency had been reversed; the proceedings of theS military Party organization conferencereoccupation with military-technical tasks. The chief Party in the army has stressed repeatedly that the military Partyinvolvement in operational concerns is Halted and supportive of the command echelon.2

In summary, after World War II the YPA quickly evolved from aPartisan armyrofessional military establishment. Created by the Communist Party, the YPA has remained effectivelyto overall Party control. But the nature of that control has changed;3 it has been exercised "fromhrough the command echelon, rather than through commissars posted to each level of the Throughout the postwar period, the YPA has been preoccupied with external security, primarily the real or potential Soviet threat; the intensity of Yugoslav defense preparations has varied in the postwar period proportionate to the Soviet threat. Since, the YPA hns again become involved in domestic Party-political life, not on its own initiative but at the insistance of Party leaders and Tito himself. The

Harodna armija, .

2C0 Dfemail Sarac, addressing the conference of the military Party organization, Narodria amrija.Sarac, in Total national Defense in Theory and..


The institutional history of the YPA sketched in the preceeding Sectionontext for analyzing the Yugoslav military elite. This Sectionrofile of5 elite and the6 elite. The profile includes age. Party membership, national and regional affinity, oriRins and education. Partisan War experience, postwar mililary career, top level career patterns, occupancy of selected posts, and political involvement. As explained in the(and more fully inhis profile is derived from systematic analysis of all available biographic data on officers judged to comprise the respective2S, including S7 of6 cohort). Analysis, qualification, and documentation of the data arc contained in Appendix C-

Age.he military elite has aged nearly as much as the intervening number of calendar years, and more so than thepolitical elite. The known median age ofS eliten contrast, the median age of6 elite

Party Membership. Communist Party membershiprerequisite for advancement within the military establishment. The presentelite contains significantly fewer prewar "internationaland more "Partisan Communists" than6 elite. About5 percent of the present military elite joined the Party during World War II, and almost all of these1he remainingercent were prewar Party members. Thirty percent of6 elite were prewar Party members, while aboutercent joined the Party during World war II, principally at the outset of the war.

National and Regional Affinity. As indicated in Fig.he major Yugoslav national groups are approximately proportionally represented in the current military elite. The Serbian proportion of5 elite has declinedevel slightly short of Serbs*ercent share in the populationhole; 6 Serbs wore slightly overepresented. Croats remain slightly overrepresentcd, and Montenegrins remain strongly

over-represented. The Slav Muslim representation in theelite has increased somewhat6 nnd now approximates Slav Muslims' proportion of the total population. Ihorv has beenacedonian representation in the military elite, ercent6ercentevel slightly higher than Macedonians' share iu the Yugoslav population. Slovenes remainin the military eliteevel approximating theirion of the total population. Albanians and Hungarians remain grossly

undcrrepresentcd. Prl&anietoff fro* rceion* of Yugoslavia other than Serbia proper--conl inue toi-.proport ional ly large role in the military elite, although their relative numbers

All the national groups other than Serbs and Montenegrins are much less well represented in the total officer corps than in the military elite. The percentage of Croats and Slovenes in the officer corps has declined over the postwar period, while the percentage share of other national groups has risen.

Origins and Education. Most Yugoslav military elite members were sons of peasant families. In terms of militaryignificant "Partisanirat ion" of the military elite has occurred. Ten percent had some experience (other than as conscripts) in the prewar military; one so-called "Spaniard" fought in the International Brigades of the Spanish Civil War. uarter of6 elite had prewar militaryere "Spaniards." The trend in military education has been toward greater indigenous training. Nineteen percent ofS elite had some foreign military training, while J2 percent of the counterpart eliteti had such foreign training. The elite has traveled abroad extensively on official business.

Partisan Kar Experience. Tho current Yugoslav military elite, like its counterpart Is comprised primarily of "firsthose who entered the Partisan movement at its inception1 and subsequently became the elite of postwar Yugoslavia. They hold the "Partisanhe politically prestigious sign of an early Partisan. Eighty-five percent of the current elite were recruited into the Party through the Partisan movement; the corresponding figure

for6 elite wasercent, reflecting the larger proportion of prewar Communists.

"Commanders" and "commissars" {as career types) were generally mutually exclusive Partisan career paths. They constituted roughly equal proportions of6 elite; both remain strongly represented in the current elite (the precise relationship is indeterminant). On balance,5 elite saw less senior service in the Partisan War than did6 elite; nearlyercent of the latter group held positions above the divisional level, while the corresponding figure for the current elite is aboutercent.

Yugoslav military elite members fought the Partisan War primarily in their respective nativo regions of Yugoslavia. The significant exceptions were the Montenegrins, who fought throughout the country.

Postwar Military Career. 6 elite was dominated bywith "mixed commanders-political officers" second, and "politicaloor third. The same rank5 elite (the relative weights are indeterminant).

For most of the postwar period, non-native regional postings were far more common than native regional postings for key members of the regular military. s indicated in Fig.his pattern has been reversed; home regional postings again outnumber non-native regional postings, just as they did during World War II. Theof key territorial defense officials to the military elite8 (not reflected in Fig.einforces the trend toward native regional postings. This trend is salient at the military region and subregion headquarters level;ercent of the respective subgroup of5 elite serve at home (including all but one of the military regionalhile the corresponding percentage for6 elite wasercent. Data on divisional headquarters postings, while too sparse to permit definite conclusions, point in the same direction.

Top level Career Patterns. Commanders dominate the very top of the military establishment; presently the only incumbents with career histories as exclusively political officers are the head of the security (counterintelligence) service, Dane Cuic (an appointment that introduced new blood into that service after the Miskovic affair,

described invan Dolnicar. the assistant secretary of defense for liaison, whose influence has declined since the; and bzemail Sarac, head of the military Party organization. The federal defense secretary, Nikola Ljubic'ic, and his deputy, MiloS Sumonja, had personal connections with Tito prior to their appointments. The selection of Stane Potocar as the present chief of the general staff was evidently influenced by his Slovene national identity. The third-ranking military man, Djoko Jovanic,artisan commander evidently brought into the defense secretariat toecurity establishment viewed asby the political and military leadership but that had threatened to. turn against its masters. All other nonpolitical posts have been filled by commanders whose careers consisted of steady progress up the command ladder, with command of military schools an important rung. atter-day commander is in charge of political affairs in the military, while the chief personnel officer is the formerchief. Among this group, there were four exceptionstandard six years minimum time in grade for promotion beyond major general; all were for political officers.

At the military region command level, four ofad exclusively command careers; one combined intelligence and command postsey spot on Tito's staff, and two had more political career histories. Of the letter, one wasinority (Slav Muslim) nationality; the other has since been replacedrofessional commander. Hith one exception, all are native sons of the respective region. The appointmentroatian Serb as Zagreb military region commander flaunted Croatian national feolings; in contrast, the appointmentacedonian to the Skopje militarycommand was evidently intended to assuage Macedonian national feelings. The only exceptions at this leveltandard six years minimum time in grade wereolitical officereitoerinority nationality.

Occupancy of Selected Posts. The position of Party Secretary at the military region level has been devalued over the past decade; when the post was last coterminous with political officer,

Jovanic was dismissed ins explained in

itieutenant colonel general slot; subsequently itajor general slot; today itolonel slot. The position of political officer at the military region level has remained acolonel general post.

Territorial defense posts have Keen upgraded since they. Some of theefense secretaries are now lieutenant colonel generals, whereas formerly they were all major generals. Half of the republican defense commanders are now lieutenant colonel generals, who have strong regional ties. Hie posts of chief-of-staff of the republican defense staff arc occupied by major generals from the respective republic with recent divisional or regimental level command experience.

Political involvement. As indicated in Sectionroup of political generals reemerged in Yugoslavia in the; thesearty Executive Committee Secretary, the Federal Secretory of Internal Affairs, the Public Prosecutor, and the Director of Civilian Aviation. All arc concerned ln thvir nonmilitary posts with defense and security-related matters.

The present Party Central Committeearger percentage of military representativesenhan at any time in the postwar period. Fifteen of the seventeen "military" CC seats are allocated to the military Party organization; the remainder are occupied by mill* tary men included in republican Party delegations. This group ofrepresentatives on the Central Committee is comprised primarily of professional commanders and generals occupying government positions, not political officers. At tho republican Party level, however, military participation reached its peak9 and has subsequently declined. Other fragmentary indicators point to an expanded but not large role for military men in contemporary political institutions: seven military men arc federal assembly delegates; S4 are delegates to republican and provincial assemblies.

'General officer ranks, in descending order, arc: General of the Army; Colonel General; Lieutenant Colonel General; Major General.



The preceding Section hasrofile of collective background attributes of the Yugoslav Military elite. This Section provides an estimate (necessarily partial, since it is based on very limitedabout the outlook, or attitudes on issues, of that elite.

Members of the present Yugoslav military elite, like almost all of their contemporaries, were mobilized into the Partisans during Korld War IIlatform of patriotic "liberation." More so than itsof ten years ago (which stillignificant number of prewarhe current military elite was recruited aspeasant youth first to the Partisan movement and then to the Party12 on national/patriotic grounds. Chief of the General Staff Stane Potocar has testified that these were his motives inthe Partisans1 In the subsequentears, as the future military leaders advanced in their primarily command-oriented military careers, they have assimilated the changing values of the Party whileierce loyalty to the Yugoslav state and its unique Communist political system. Granting the influence of more recent experiences on the military elite, appraisal of its outlook today must acknowledge the lasting impact of initial politicization as recruitment to the Party during national catastrophe in the cause of patriotism and Yugoslav integrity.

External Security Concerns

S, the officers comprising the current military elite were occupied professionally with the external security of the new Communist state. Initially inoculated with the Party's perceptionostile and threatening West, they soon experienced directly the

oreigners came [and] acted as if they owned the place. They could decree what we were allowed to do and what we could not . .ational pride asserted Itself. There was something else that grievedreat deal. Our country fell apart as if it had never existed- everhance toingle shot." with CG Stane Potocar, Vecvr,)


high-handed behavior of the Soviet military advisors that sothe senior military and political leadership at the time. In tho conflict between Tito and Stalin that broke outhe officer corps remained generally loyal to Tito, intensive Soviet efforts at subornation notwithstanding. Syraptomatica11y, Yugosluv officers undergoing military training in the USSR8 returned without exception to Yugoslavia. Yet, as noted in Sen. ion V, ew high-level defections did occur. And therackdown on "Cominformists" (those suspected of harboring sympathies toward Moscow) included military officers.1

he members of the present Yugoslav military elite experienced the crisis atmosphere of imminent Soviet militaryypically, as division commanders with the rank of colonel or major general. Initiation of the American military assistance program2umber of Yugoslav officers to. military. Waryepetition of their bad experience with the Soviets, the Yugoslavs Insisted on arrangements that. military influence on the YPA; the small MAAC permitted In Belgrade generally had to limit Its dealings with the YPAounterpart Staff. Nonetheless, in the, the MAAG did have somewhat broader access to the Yugoslav military; several hundred Yugoslav officers, including nine identified merbcrs of the present military elite, received advanced training. militarynd the YPA was moderni-ed witheriod when Yugoslavia felt an active threat ofinterv*nrion. On balance,. military assistance program to Yugoslavia probablyodestly positive influence on the attitude of Yugoslav officers toward the United States.

ln the heated atmosphere of the time, as Yugoslav leaders have subsequently admitted, many unfounded charges of "Cominformism" were Leveled. Intelligence importing included such charges, some of topical relevance. CGnder Secretary of National Defense, was reportedly arrested8 on suspicion of "Cominformism." This seems unlikely (or else Jovanic1 must have been fully9 he waswith the sensitive task (as first editor of rhr military journal Vojno delo) of purifying Yugoslav military doctrine of Soviel influences. See Vojno dele. No.

2DIA7Confident tallt.

In, improvement of Soviet-Yugoslav relations resulteduch reduced perception by Yugoslavs, including presumably the military, of an active military threat to Yugoslavia from the East. Yet resumption of active contacts with the Soviet military was by and large confined to the top of the military structureolite" that has substantially been replaced.

s pointed out in Section II. the present military elite has been preoccupied primarily with the Sovietresumption of military contacts with Soviet bloc countries1 and purchase of advanced Soviet weapons notwithstanding. Theindicators of this perception noted in SectionII--Yugoslav military doctrine and forcesupported by somereporting and other private comments of Yugoslav military figures to Westerners.1 There is no evidence that this threatis disputed within the YPA, although differences have probably occurred on the tactics of dealing with the Soviet military {see

To be sure, Yugoslav generals, like other Yugoslav leaders, are not concerned exclusively with threats to Yugoslavia from the East. They are concerned with present emigre terrorist threats to the country from the West; with potentially more substantial future threats related to territorial disputes with their Western neighbors; and with the specter of intervention by either Great Power to deny control of Yugoslavia to the other. The outlook of Yugoslav generals is notto that of defense officials in Sweden or Switzerland; theybe imputederception that the West has purely benigntoward Yugoslavia and its Communist system. The fact remains that the only active military threat that the Yugoslav military elite has ever facedirectlynd indirectly8as been from the Soviet Union. Predominant concern with the Soviet military

uhicld's comments on the Soviet threat to former Assistant Secretary of Itefense Ellsworth (American Embassy Belgradeonfidential/Lxecutive

threat evidently characterizes the outlook of the Yugoslav military today. There is no indication of "pro-Soviet" sentimentesire to realign Yugoslavia with the USSRJ among the present Yugoslav military elite or the officer corpshole. None of the intra-military conflicts of the past decade (traced in Section v) involved relations with the USSR (or thendeed, not since thepro-Soviet" Yugoslav military officer been identified.1


External security concerns have preoccupied the Yugoslav military elite over the past thirty years; it has become involved in domestic political affairs only in the last decade. Tlie isolation of the YPA from the mainstream of Yugoslav political life inndnoted in Section II) meant the insulation of the officer corps from internal issues. The "opening to society" forced on the military by Party reformers6 dramatically increased interaction between military officers and other Yugoslav social and political groups. As noted earlier, officers began to participate in the affairs of local communities in which they were stationed. of the Party apparatus in the military, aimed in part atto reintegration of the Army with the rest of Yugoslav society, went unchallenged; one indicator of its acceptance by the officer corps was the reported results of an internal Army opinion pollhich indicated overwhelming supportarger role for the military Party organization.2

Intelligence reports (like public analyses inside and outside of Yugoslavia) have sometimes included the appellation "pro-Soviet" (just as the term Reports ascribing both orientationsumber of individuals in the present military elite were reviewed in the course of this study. In the absence of details of attitudes on specific issues, or other additional evidence, the analyst mustthese appellations-2

"See Appendix D.

As the military institution was reintegrated into public life, the military leadership accepted the program of socioeconomic and political reforms, including greater affirmation of national rights, adopted by the Party leadership in the latter half of. The

'see Appendix D.

2The poll results grouped Slovene officers with Montenegrin and Serbian officers as most concerned with nationalism; (but Slovone officers most concerned with economicroatian and Macedonian officers were loast concerned.

A document of tho military Party organization (publishedupplement to Narodna arm'.ja. referred to "individual" misunderstandings of the reform measures and took issue with the following unorthodox views within the military: that "state capital" should not be returned to the economyconomic liberalization should not proceedhat devolution of greater powers to the republics weakened the Yugoslav federation; that no language reformore use of languages other than Serbian) in the Army was needed; that "we are all Yugoslavs"hat national self-affirmation of individual ethnic groups was nothat republican territorial defense headquarters were unnecessary.

reforms were supported by top leadors in public statements and by the Party organization in the Arayeries of conferences. That this public support was not pro forma, but reflected broad acceptance of the reforms among tho military, qualified by reservations about increased nationalism, was indicated by the reported results of an internal opinion poll of1 This poll (conducted at the height of the movement for greateraffirmation in Croatia) indicated less than five percent of the sample clearly opposed to the main lines of the reform (and its components of political decentralization to the republics and greater national affirmation inut the majority concerned with the degree of prominence the "national question" was then receiving. Seventy-two percent of the "higher officers" thought the national question had been overemphasized in the public discussion of thed percent considered "nationalism and chauvinism" the greatest single present danger to Yugoslavia." 1 poll thusualifiedly "loyalist" majority within the military (whose apprehensions about the rise of nationalismarbinger of the shift in Party policy ininority undercurrent of opinion at odds with Party policy, then and subsequently, on tho basic direction of reforms. The existence of an undercurrent of dissent advocating "hard-line" and neo-centrist policies is further corroborated by critiques of such unorthodox views leveled at the time by top military leaders. There is no indication that this latter current was

cantly stronger in the military than in other Yugoslav groups.

Subsequent developments (outlined in Section V) and retrospective comments by Yugoslav military lenders critical of nationalism in the YPA indicated the existence of an opposite and even weakerof dissident "nationalist" viewpoints.

Kceaphasis on the custodial role of the military in the domesticncouraged the expression of the concern felt

earlier within the military about the negative security implications of the rise of nationalism and, more broadly, the lack of discipline in Yugoslav society at the turn of the Apprehension about tho negative impact of these developments was indicated in numerousby military leaders to the effect that lack of discipline in Yugoslav society was sapping the country's defense strength. Concern of the military elite on this score was reinforcedhreat to the institutional integrity of the YPA itself from extreme nationalist elemonts in the Party. The military leaders' concerns on these matters were expressed frankly in the fall2 by Defense Secretary Ljubicid. who emphasized the need for "more order, personal and social and equity" in Yugoslavia and reiteratedfter Tito had dropped the subjectthe fact of the YPA's domestic as well as external security role. But it is important to note that in this atmosphere of domestic semi-crisis no military figureomestic role for the military independent of the Party. In his frank statement just cited, Ljubi2iC placed unusual emphasis on the role of the Party, affirming that the Armyart of the self-management system and the Party (emphasis added)." Under Secretary of Defense Jovanic"imilar retrospective claim about his own efforts in the Croatian crisishich, he said.

For example, an opinion poll of the Croatian population at large9 indicated five percent believed that "socialism was possible without self-management" (an unorthodox view implying acceptanceentralized Communist system). See. 8S.

For example, the statement of military Party Secretary Sarac, Borba.

^Speech ofo the Army Party organization, Vojno delo. No. 3 (key points omitted in general media coverage).

were directed toward strengthening the role of the Croatian Party organiiatIon.

, as noted in Section II, the military elite has continued to adapt itself to the greator self-assertion of Yugoslavia's constituent national groups. In terms of outlook, the apex of the military leadership may still think of itself as an all-Yugoslav grouping that can function without regard to its nationalut even if supranational impulses survive, the Yugoslav military elite is clearly aware of the sensitivity of the national issue. It ison such military matters as regional posting policies by the multinational federalized political system of which itart. Today it acts as if greater scope for national affirmation within the YPA were essential to the functioning of the military institution. Moreover, it recognizes the crucial symbolic importance for the functioning of the Yugoslav political system of respect for national affirmation within the YPA.

The "hardline" dissident political undercurrents within the YPA at the turn ofere related to and in many cases doubtless derived from reservations held by minority elements of the officer corps about theystem of total national defense, with its major emphasis on the role of territorial defense forces. What evidence there is, including the reported results of internal YPA opinion polls, indicates overwhelming acceptance of the system of "total national defense'; the polls and the critical comments of senior military figures suggest again the existence of "technocratic"tatusnd "nationalist"avoring--at thearmies) undercurrents within the officer corps? But the available evidence indicates full backing for the system of total national defense by the military eliteop-lovcl intramilitary dispute over the desirability and efficacy of relying heavily on territorial defense forces (outlined in Section V) had been resolved by Tito.

^Harodna armija, July 1,s argued in.

General Loncarevic', addressing the Serbian Party Central Committee, Tanjug,oll results in Nafodna amija, December

It is testimony to the continued influence of ihc Partisan past, the

flexibility ofook nf the YPA senior officer corps, and the YJ'A's responsiveness to Patty policy and Tito personally that the Yugoslav military evidently adapted to the system of total national defense without auch friction.

In sun, the outlook of the Yugoslav military elite remains strongly influenced by elite members' first adult experiences in the cause of maintaining an integral Yugoslav state. Assimilating the changing values of the Party, they have developed aloyalty to the Yugoslav state and tho Yugoslav Communist political system. The military elite remains principally concerned with the external, primarily Soviet, threat to Yugoslavia. Following the domestic political turmoil, it has reemphasized its mission to protect, as servant of the Party, the integrity of the Yugoslav Communist system and Yugoslav state against domestic as well as external challenges. The military elite recognizes the crucialof respecting national rights within the YPA for the functioning of both the military institution and the political system of which

itart. It is committedroadly-based system of "total national defense" that hasymbiotic relationship between the military institution and Yugoslav societyhole.

It is in these terms, insofar as one can judge, that the Yugoslav military elite contemplates the future.


Throughout its postwar history, the Yugoslav militaryhas appeared toemarkably cohesive institution adapting to Yugoslavia's rapidly changing internal and external environmenttrauma. But since the military haslosed institution, it is possible that stability hasurface phenomenon masking internal cleavages. It may be recalledew top-level military men. most prominently the wartime chief-of-staff, General Arso Jovanovid,eputy head of the political administration. General Branko PetricJ-OVic, did oppose Tito In8 confrontation with Stalin; Jovanovic was shot attempting to flee the country along with Pet rice-vie" and one of the latter's subordinates. Colonel Vlado Dapcevic. While no otherof such dramatic opposition within the military have come to light, there is enough evidence, albeit fragmentary, to indicate the presence beneath the surface of repeated controversies on matters of issue and personalitythe norm, it is assumed, of any institution.

This Section draws on the evidence available in public andreports to review the major controversies within the Yugoslavelite that have come to light in the last decade. Reported personal associations have been checked against career background information for any indication of common wartime service or postwar posting patterns. The aim ts not to reconstruct complete histories of the disputes, but rather to highlight salient personalities, organirations, and issues that have influenced the development of the military elite. Six such controversies will he reviewed.

The Hilojevif Affair

G Miloje Milojevic was removed from his post as commander of the Belgrade military region, retired from active service, undfrom the Party. The cause of his disgrace was plausibly reported to haveSerbian nationalist" attitude that, inter alia, led him to accuse Defense Secretary Gosnjak of discriminating against Serbs in appointments to senior military posts and allocating defense-related

economic resources among the various Yugoslav republics.1 Milojcvif* was linked in reports of the time with General Krcacic' (long-time senior Party official in the Army) and Party Secretary Knnkovic himself; no further confirmation of these associations has been found. What is clear is that MilojevU fell from grace; he disappeared from public view, was inaccessible to foreign military figures who had known him during World War II, and was later included in some of the lists of putative dissident "conservatives" within the military.

The Gotnjak and Hamovic Controversies

In the fallrmy General Ivan Gosnjak gave up theState Secretary of Defense he had held Illsa normal function of his agend his long tenure;of positions"atchword of Yugoslav political life. Nonetheless, Gosnjak was evidently on the losing sidedebate within the military establishment6 on the properand organization appropriate to Yugoslavia's. Gosnjak evidently opposed abandonmentargearmy and stricter separation of Party from military positionsthe YPA advocated by his opponents. Yet he evidently avoideddebate be turnedonfrontation, and7 he shiftedstatus without disgrace. Gosnjak was reportedly inthe falls if to deny such allegations, Tito made abeing seen with him in latethereafter on in-

active status, Gosnjak formally retired with full honors4 at

The withdrawal from active service of CG Rade Hamovic, Chief of the General Staff under Gosnjak1roceeded less auspiciously. Having sided with the proponentsmaller standing army and stricter separation of Party and military posts, Hamovic was nevertheless replaced

'tmbassy,onfidential. NOFORN.


"EmbassyH, Secret.

as Chief of the General Staff by Milos Sumonja in the falle was appointed Inspectorransfer that say be viewedormal consequence of completing his six-year term in the context of the day, when rotation of leading personnel was strictly observed. It is possible, however, that llanovitf's position was weakened6onsequence of the "Xilojovic! affair." It is also possible, in view of his reported viewshat Hamovif's transfer7 was related to opposition to territorial defense forces, theof which had been suggested in the contextow-key public discussionew national defense law.

Impetus for the establishment of territorial defense forces appears to have come primarily from the Croatian Party leadership and Croatian generals; at the end7 the Croatian Premier hinted aterritorialear earlier Army General Ivan Ruka-vina, then commander of the Zagreb military region,ublicto this effect. By one informed account, the Rukavina proposal setubterranean debute within the defense and politicalon the proper organization of the defense system. In tho

fallG Anteeteran commander who was then the Secretary of the military Party organization,oredoctrine of "dynamic defense"ounterproposal to the Rukavina initiative. The debate continued8 and was apparently resolved only by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which led to top-level acceptance of territorial forces, as part of the "total national defense" system.

'savka Dobcevic-Kucar, interviewed in tiarodna arnija,nterview of General Rukavina in Vjeenik,


Whatever the motivation for7 transfer, in the fall8 he was unceremoniously removed from his post as Inspector General and retired; he was plausibly reported to have opposed the adoption of the system of "total national defense"eeting of the

National Defense Council. Assuming this was indeed the issue, Hamovic's opposition must hove been strong; unlike Gosnjak. hedisappeared completely froa public view.

The Military in Croatia; Target of Nationalists

. as noted earlier, the republican Party leadership in Croatia first led and then increasingly became captivesroatian nationalist movement, one section of which tookhauvinist, anti-Serb tone. The swelling Croatian nationalist movement demanded, inter alia, greater prerogatives for Croats in defense matters. Croatian leaders were concerned about the influence of the still Serb-dominated regular military in Croatia; thishad worsened, in their view, with the replacement of General Ivan Rufcavina by General Djoko Jovanic as head of the Zagreb military regionovanicerb from Croatia, whereas Rukavinaroat aho had occupied the Zagreb command Extreme nationalists raised demandsroatian national army.2

Croat leaders were also concerned with the negative influence on Party politics in Croatia of "conservative" retired generals; on this latter score they received support from Tito himself. In1 Tito publicly condemned (unnamed) "retired generals" foreeting with senior military leaders later in the month, he reportedly singled out Generals MllojeviJ andlong with several ethers, for censure. Tito's criticism notwithstanding, "conservative" retired officers,Generals Nikolaosip Antolkovii. and Rado Bulat, continued their political opposition to the Croatian Party leadership; they were joined In CG Radojicn Nenezic (not yet


^Accounts of these developments are contained inhe Political Role of the Xugoalav

'Vito speech of May 8.s broadcast by Radio Belgrade.


officially retired). These fonuer military figures acted through orsupport from some local veterans organizations and were opposed

hy other local veterans groups, as the Croatian republican veterans organization split between supporters and opponents of the more liberal and nationalist policies of the Croatian Party leadership. The split was primarily (although not exclusively) along national, Serb-Croat lines; it was personified in conflict between the president of the republican veterans organization, Ivan Siblroat) and its vicePero Carerb from Croatia).1

Djokohe commander of the Zagreb military region.

became centrally involved in the Croatian political events. Jovanic was, aserb from Croatia who had maintained strong ties with his native Lika region, in which he hadrincipal organizer of the Partisan movement Publicly endorsing the cause of republican self-affirmation, Jovanic: nonethelesstrong public stand in defense of the Serbian minority in Croatia, thus entering the political lists on behalf of the Croatian Serbs who saw the Croatian national movementirect threat to the Serbs of that republic.2 One of his recently retired subordinates. Rade Bulat,uch stronger stand (andesult was expelled from the Croatian Party Central Committee by its leadership for Serbian nationalism).

It was in this context that the Party leadership in Zagreb sought to have Jovanic replaced by his chief-of-staff, Jankoroat. Bobetko enlisted himself sufficiently in the Croatian cause to besuspended from active duty by Tito when ho cracked down on the Croatian Party leadership inubsequently he was separated from the military, expelled from the Party, and disappeared from public view. Only one other general, VIado Mutak (then in the Splitregion headquarters) is known to have incurred similarly severe

penalties,umber of other officers were expelled from the Party for Croat nationalist attitudes.1 The Croatian republican defense command, thoroughly politicizedas likewise purged.

The Hitkovic Affair3

CC Ivan Milkovic was appointed Tito's special advisor for security affairs in the fall in evident response to top-level concern with external and internal threats to the Yugoslavitical system, particularly from emigre groups. Miskovic was the logical candidate for thisareer military counterintelligence officer, he had headed the military counterintelligence service (KOS)3 (he had been deputy head. Ite had served Tito well6 in monitoring the activities of Party Secretary Rankovic, who was purged that year for opposition to the reforms of the. As Tito's security advisor, Miskovlc amassed great power. Although he vacated his position as head of KOS, his continued influence over that service was assured; Miskovic's successor, Stijepan Domankusic, had long been his protege. Like Mis'kovit, Domankusicroat from Slavonia (Eastern Croatia) who served with him in the political section of the Sixth Corps4 and who subsequentlyareer in KOS, culminating in his appointment8 (porhaps earlier) as Miskovic's deputy. MiSkovic in fact supervised the entire security establishment, filtered information reaching Tito, and increasingly controlled access to Tito by the latter's trusted associates. He utilized his positionlatform from which to lobby for influence in his native Slavonia

'rhe ranks of the extreme nationalists included one retired general officer, Franjo Tudjmait, who was subsequently imprisoned. Mutak wasby emigre sources to have been imprisoned (Hrvataki alao, Winnepeg, JulyS). In the Split military region, six officers were expelled from the Party andeprimanded for nationalist sentiments [Borba,; no comparable figures for the Zagreb military region are available.

2Mate Bilobrk replaced Srecko Manola as territorial defense commander in Zagreb; his subordinate in Zadar. Major General Livas, was likewise ousted (Radio Zagrob,; the republican Defense Council was reshuffled.

econstruction and interpretation is contained in The Political Bolei of the Yugoslavp.


among veterans. including retired officers, Party officials, and active officers.

roots in Slavonia wereroat bom in Pula (on the Croatiane hadoaauinist youth leader in Slaionia

on the eve of World War II and an organizer of the Partisanin the region. He spent most of the war in that region

ommissar, occupying political posts with the Sixth Corps and the Third Army at the end of the war. Miskovic's continued ties with the Slavonian region inere indicated by hisof the regionelegate to the Federal Assembly and his publication in Slavonski Brod (the regional center) of several studies of the Partisan movement in Slavonia.

MiskoviC's political "platform" is obscure; Judging by his career, his public statements, and his associates, he advocated greater vigilcnce against external, particularly eaigre threats2firmer hand" internally to protect the existing system against its many real or imagined enemies.

Miskovic's political demise inas sudden. Tito removed him from his position, and the catalyst was evidently Intervention with Tito not by the senior Party leaders whose access to Tito Miskovic was restricting, but from the senior military leadership. Miskovic's "out

of channels" lobbying among regular military personnel was probably the final straw for Ljubific and other senior military leaders, who saw in

His'koviC the spectereversion to theituation, when KOS assisted the commissars in dominating the command structure of theestablishment.' Miskovic left his post unannounced, has not been publicly mentioned since, and was last reportedstudy group" infense Secretariatevice, presumably, for keeping him out of the way yet under control.

'Details arc cited in The Political Role of the Yugoslav

2His public statements1 were sometimes sharply anti-Western, yet prior to that year he had made equally "anti-Soviet"and no sympathies toward Moscow can be assumed.

3One source claims the top military leadership appealed in aTito for Miskovic's removal (EmbassyLit II

Following Miskovic's dismissal. the Military and the Croatian Party leadership attempted to repair Che damage lie had dom1 in Slavonia. Defenseuhicic and Chief of the General Staff Potocarpecial trip to the Osijek garrison in the summer as described in Appendix C, counterintelligencewere concentrated in the handseteran commander and his protege within the Defense Secretariat itself, an arrangementdesigned to provide an institutional barrier against another top official with security responsibilities getting out ofs had happened with Miskovic and, earlier, with Party Secretary Aleksandar Rankovic. The Croatian Party leadershiptrong public attack against dissident conservative elements at the end of June; privately, it intensified its efforts to neutralize the group of retired Military officers in Croatia that had opposed the Croatianupsurge1 from positions that were conservative in the Yugoslav political environment3 as well As indicated in the following subsection, this group, joinedew active general officers, had evidently sympathircd with and perhaps actively aligned themselves with Miskovic.

Opposition of the Slavonian Generals: Postscript to the Miskovic Affair

hree senior general officers, LCG Mirko Bulovic, CG Radojica Nenezic. and CG Otmar Kreacic, were, accordingumber of reports, removed from their military positions and expelled from the LCY for oppositional activities. Bulovlc. the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence prioras at the time Commander of the Ground Forces Command and Staff School in Belgrade. Nenezic's last major line post had been command of the Skopje military region priorhat year he had transferred to the Defeilse Secretariat where heember of the Officer Promotion Board9 and reported in theerai-retired,reacic, the most prominent of the three, had been Under Secretary of Defense with responsibility for political affairs and security (hence, Miskovic's superior) and chief Party official in the Army in the. 5 he reportedly clashedse Secretary Gosnjak and transferred to thu Party

Secretariat, whore he had responsibilities for personnel policy under Rankovic. 8 he had returned to the Defense Secretariat and3 was still there, semi-retired but in good standing.'

It is established that the three generals incurred severe sanctions; none has been mentioned publicly (or privately to Westerners) by official Yugoslav sources since The precise reason for theiris, however, less clear. They were alleged in various reports to havepro-Soviet" line, to have criticized Tito's wife for her role in officer promotions, and to have criticized DefenseLjubicic and Army Party Secretary Sarac for mishandling the


is no further evidence corroborating the

two accounts; the third is most plausible, for the three generals had ties with Miskovic derived from their common past in Slavonia.erb and native of Slavonia,artisan commissarin Slavonia).2 Nenezic cameontenegrin family that had moved to Slavonia; he fought in the area during World Warartisan commander, was promoted to chlef-of-staff of the Sixth Corps4 and commander ofh Division (forerunner of the Osijek garrison) at the end of the war. In theenezic was active in Slavonian politics;s recounted earlier in this Section, he joined forces with several retired general officers in opposing the Croatian national revival from "conservative" positions. This activity resulted in his being publicly criticized in Croatia in1 for his "political behavior" in Osijek.3 roat, had lived in Osijek prior to World War II and had spent the last part of the war in Slavonia, serving as Political Commissar ofh Division and the Sixth Corps.

Heilitarv decoration in

"His Partisan career could not be traced

Inhen, Kreacic was Commissar of the Sixth Corps, Miskovic and Domankufiic were among his subordinates, and Nenezic was chief-of-staff. Miskovic, Nenezic, and Kreacic are all known to have beenactive in Slavonia in the. The career paths of Bulovic and MiSkovic had converged repeatedly; Bulovic evidently begun his postwar career in KOS. was at the High Military Academy with Miskovicnd00 was in the intelligence section of the General Staff, heading that section as Assistant Chief-of-Staff5ost In which he would have had constant contact with Miskovic). ommon past and common reservations about the political reforms of theUs. Bulovic, Kreacic. and Nenezic evidently rallied, helatedly, to Miskovic's defense. However, the timing and objective of their action remain unexplained.

The Military in Croatia: Target of Conservatives

The disgrace of the Slavonian generals was apparently part and parcelampaign mounted from both Belgrade and Zagreb4 to slop the meddling with the regular military Sn Croatia by "conservative" politicians and retired military officers, who utilized the republican veterans organization as their institutional base. The reports about this campaign point to Pero Car as the most prominent politican As noted earlier in this section, following Tito's crackdown on the Croatian Party leadership in the fall1 Car assumedof the republican veterans organization. He was reportedly an associate of Generalinkage traceable, again, to Slavonia; Car also served under Kreac'ic as assistant commissar ofh Division at the end of the war. Several of the retired officers politically prominent1 were linked with Car in reports of attempts tothe regular military.

tar made the strongest public attack on nationalist penetration of the military in Croatia, Vjtttmik,



Protection of the regular military stationed in Croatia against such "conservative" outside influences was in the interest of theroatian Party leadership, which was engagederies of political skirmishes with this dissident element. As noted in Section II and earlier in thisconservative'" political current surfaced in the political turmoil; its principal exponents were officials (including retired generals) deprived of their positions prior9 acting through local organizations of the veterans organization, in particular in the Slavonian region of Croatia (especially the local organization innd in Vojvodina.

Thearty leadership in Zagreb sought to contain this political current that was deviant both because it was morethan the orthodox policies of consolidation of the day and because it developed autonomously, outside Party channels. The Osijek veterans organization was criticized by the Croatian Party Central Committee In3 for advocating "hardline" policies; in May its embattled president, Bosko Kajganic, was expelled fron the Party for "factionalism" and accused of tolerating Serb nationalism; in June the Croatian Party mobilized the Croatian reserve officersand its president. Reserve CC Milan Kuprescanin, criticized the "hardliners." Enjoying continued support from the republicanorganization headed by Car, the Osijek veteran organization leadership held out untillthough Miskovic had been removed in the spring, the Osijek veterans may have received support from the "Slavonian generals." One member of the Osijek veterans leadership was reserve MG Rade Knezevic,Slavonian general."1 Then in3 the Croatian Party succeeded in forcing the removal of the entire Osijek veterans organization

Knezevic fought the Partisan Mar in Slavonia and wasime acting commander ofh Division.

from numerous Yugoslav press accounts.

Ins noted in Section II, Croatia's senior political figure, Vladimir Bakaric. was instrumental ineneral political counteroffensive against the "conservative" political element in Yugoslavia; Croatian Party leader .lure Bilic explicitly accused the "faction" of exerting pressure through parts of the veteranstocentralist state"firm hand" policy. The "conservative" political current was successfully contained; and there have been no further reports of "conservative" activism in Croatia targeted against the military. On the other hand (many reportedto the contrary notwithstanding) Car has managed to retain his post as head of the Croatian veterans organization.

The stake of the Croatian Party leadership in stopping theamong the regular military by "conservative" elements in Croatia was matched by the interest of the high command in terminating this "outside" meddling in military affairs. Ljubicic reportedlypecial tour through Croatia sometime after Miskovic's ouster for this purpose.

Containing the "conservative" element in Croatia that had lobbied among the regular military along with other groups, the Croatian Party leadership sought to improve relations with the regional militaryin Zagreb. For that leadership, demonstrably improved Party-military relations in Zagreb would have the effect of further"conservative" elements from seeking to influence the regularin Croatia.2 eries of meetings between the top Croatian Party leadership and the Zagreb military region command (headed by Jovanic untilhen he was replaced by LCC Dusan Corkovic, another Serb from Croatia) were publicized. These meetings wereemonstration that the earlier mutual antipathy between


ht is important to note that the Osijekrincipal target of this lobbying, was subordinated to the military regionin Sarajevo, not Zagreb.

the Party and the amy in Zagreb had been eliminated. In fact, tensions remained; the Croatian Party leadership had reportedly not included Corkovic on its list of candidates for Jovanic's replacement and was unhappy with his appointment. There is some evidence of subsequent conflict between the Party and the military in Zagreb on other issues. Nonetheless, the visible tension between the two Institutions that had existed1 was overcome. Moreover, joint efforts were made to reduce the hostility many Croats felt toward the regular military stationed in Croatia, which they regarded as Serb dominated. In4 Croatian Party leader Dusan Dragosavacroatian Serb) and General Corkovic metumber of prominent inactive or retired Croatian generals who had been kept at arms length1 for putative identification with the Croatian nationalist cuuse1 and reportedly invited them to involve themselves again in military affairs. Among them were Army General Ivan Rukavina (one of the "fathers" of the territorial defense system) and CG Srecko Manola, former commander of the Croatian nefense Headquarters, who had beenin2 for identifying himself too closely with the Croatian nationalist cause.

Recapitulation of Intra-Elite Disputes

Several points emerge from this review of known cases ofcleavages within the Yugoslav military establishment in the past decade. Opposition to prevailing policies or leaders has been on internal grounds; there is no known case in this period (indeed none since the! where foreign policy issues, and in particular the attitude toward Moscow, haveasis for contention within the Yugoslav military elite. There is no indication of pro-Soviet sentiment within the military elite, evenringe phenomenon.

'Radio Belgrade,

2This judgment is based on consideration of all available evidence,pate of Intelligence reports in themputingumber of senior Yugoslav officers. Iho appellation "pro-Sovier" is, as indicated innommon bugabear in public and private Yugoslav political discourse and, taken alone, an insufficient Indicator of pro-Soviet sympathies. In these

Ihe cases reviewed indicate differences of view on military issues related to the proper organization of defense and on political issues related to the contours of the political systemhole. National differences haveole, explicitly in the Milosevic affair and explicitly and implicitly in the Croatian-related cases since the. Intramilitary institutional cleavages were prominent in the Miskovic and related cases,hreat from the counterintelligence service to top military (and Party) leaders was blunted. The role of World War II tiesasis for personal loyalties is confirmed in the latter cases. Also evident in thoseere efforts toconservative" faction; thishreat to,olicy succored by, the apex of the military establishment. Extreme "conservatives" among politicians, veterans, and retired officers in Croatia, in particular, have been challengers to. not political surrogates of. the military establishment. Most important, the cleavages have been contained with relative ease. Beneath the surface, the Yugoslav military, like any group, has experienced internal divisions, but these have not undor-mined fundamental cohesion.

reports, "pro-Soviet" is one of many terms of opprobium describing the sane set of individuals. In the cases of the "Slavonian generals" (Bulovic, KreaCic', and Nenezic) and the "conservative" retired generals privately criticized by Titohere are alternative explanations for the behavior of the individuals in question.

Differences in the tactics of dealing with the Soviets (as the United States) presumably do arise within the Yugoslav military leadership. Such differences reportedly occurred over the ovorflight rights extended to the USSH during3 Middle East War. just ast Egyptian request. (Canadian Embassyonfidential);ome senior officers opposed the arrangements made. Moreumber of top-level military leader* were reliably reported to have opposed Tito's effort1 andto suppress public discussion of contentious issues in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

It may be speculated that similar diverging viewpoints exLst over the naval repair facilitlos utilized by the Soviets in recent years (but offered on the same terms to other countries). Differences may also exist over the tactics of dealing with Soviet requests (reportedly renewed during Brezhnev's6 visit to Yugoslavia) for permanent base and overflight rights, although there is no evidence of this. (On the other hand, reports that earlier Defense Secretary LJubicic favored "base" rights for the Soviet Navy are incredible, given context and subsequent developments}

Intra-llite Groupings

This review of past cleavages within the Yugoslav military provides some indication of the likely nature of present and future personal groupings. Such groupings may again coalesce ongrounds, although there is no evidence of this at present. Moreover, the likelihood of intra-elite differentiation on this basis would seem to be reduced by the professional commanders' domination of the military institutions. For example, the emergencerouping of "political officers" or "security officers" lobbying for particular policies within the military does not seem likely.

On the other hand, association of military elite members on the basis of common nationality and common Partisan War experienceboth together) is certain to continue. The "Slavonians" were presumably eliminated as an active intra-elite grouping with the purge of Generals Miskovic. Bulovic, Kreacic, and Nenezic.1 But the "Lika Serbs" from central Croatia (complementedew Croats from that region) remained an active grouping. This grouping included Milos Sumonja, Deputy Defense Secretary; Djoko Jovanic, DifensoDusan Pekic, Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Ground Forces; Ilija Radakovic, Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Operations; Stevan Ilic, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff forSimo Mikasinovic, Assistant Chief of Staff for Organization and Mobilization; Dusan Corkovic, commander of the Zagreb military region; ond Veljko Miladinovlc, Party Secretary in the FSND. Two Croats should be added to this list of Croatian Serbs: Dane Cuic, head of the military security service; and Marko Rapo, Tito's military assistant. All fought the Partisan War in their native region of Croatia; Cuic was, as noted earlier, Jovanic's political commissar at the end of the war; Jovanic and Radakovic had personal ties

The only remnining members of5 elite having identifiable ties with Slavonia are Milan Joka, assistant commander in the Belgrade military region, and Djako Puac. commander of the Belgrade garrison.


"More precisely, Serbs from the Lika, Kordun, and Baranje areas of central and southwest Croatia.

'Jovanic interview, Nai'odrvs armija, July 1,

and Sumonja and Hikasinovic fought in th* same units throughout the war- It is noteworthy that Pekic, Radakovie,c constitute the present operational top command of the ground forces. There is clear evidence that the "Lika Serbs" are an active grouping; its members travel frequently hack to Lika for ceremonial occasions and meet together In Belgrade.'

Other groupings based on common nationality and Partisan War service seem likely, although there is no evidence of currentamong their members- The "Slovenians" nnd the "Macedonians" are probably active groupings. The "Slovenians" in the military elite included Stane Potocar. Chief of the General Staff; Assistant Defense Sscretary Ivan Dolnicar; Franc Tavcar, commander of the Ljubljana military region; Jnnko Sekernik, Deputy Chief of the General Staff; Rudolf Hribernik, Slovene republican defense headquarters commander; and Michael Butara, republican defense secretary. All fought the Partisan War in Slovenia; Potocar and Hribernik served together in the 3lst division; while Dolnicar, Sekernik. and Butara servedinh division. Subsequently, Sekernik and Tavcar served under Potocar in the Ljubljana military region command prior to their elevation to their present positions.

The "Macedonians" included Dane Petkovski, Assistant Oefensofor political affairs; Vasko Karangelskl, commander of the Skopje military region9 (who died in; and Boro Causev. Macedonian republican defense hoadquarters commander. All fought in the Partisan War in Macedonia; Petkovski and Causev served together in the SOth division. In the postwar period both were prominent in the Macedonian republican Party organization.

The "Likahend the "Macedonians" are the clearest cases of nationally-based subgroups of the military elite with ties based on common native regional service in the Partisan War.

One megting of Lika veterans living in Belgrade that included Jovanic and Sumonja was described in Narodna arvija,Byovanic. Mikasinovic, and Rapo bad retired or been transferred.

service in the same units during the War, and seme postwar career intersections. Although the evidence is less clear, it seems likely that other similarly nationally-based groupings exist. Typically, such groupings link members of the defense secretariat and general staff in Belgrade, members of the respective military regional command, and members of the respective republican defense (TDF1.

Other groupings probably exist within the Yugoslav military elitepatronage" basis, not necessarily involving common nationality. Analysis of postwar posting patterns of the current military elite for evidence of positional associations suggested the existence of two such groups. Defense Secretary Ljubicic and Deputy Defense Secretary Sumonja owe their present positions to wartime and postwar personal ties with Tito, as explained in Appendix C, and can be considered membersTito grouping." Branko Maraula, Assistant Defense Secretary and Navy commander, served under Suaonja in the Split military region innd followed Sumonja to Belgrade.

There was indicationJovanic patronage grouping" quite apart froa Jovanic's role among the "Lika Serbs." The grouping included Jovanic asane Cuic, head of the military security service; Diemail Sarac, chief Party Secretary in the YPA; and Asim Hodzic, the Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Intelligence. As pointed out earlier, Cuic,roat, had ties with Jovanic extending back to comoon region of birth and Partisan War service in the 6th Division.lav Muslim from Bosnia, served as Jovanic's political assistant in the Zagreb military region, where he was actively Involved with Jovanic in the political turmoil in Croatia at


the time. Sarac served as Jovanic's political assistant in Zagreb prior to Hodzic; he hadubordinate of Jovanic in the Zagreb military region in thes well. Cuic and Hodzic assumed their present positions following Jovanic's transfer to Belgrade iven Jovanic's responsibilities for security and intelligence matters in the FSND, It is clear that Cuic and Hodzic reported directly to him; there was also some indication that Jovanicuperior of

Sarac for some purpose as well. Moreover. Jovanic had at various times

in the postwar period been coaaanding officeruaber of other members of the current senior military leadership. These personal tics, taken together with the indications of Jovanic's influence among the "Lika Serbs" grouping, suggested Jovanic's importance within the military elite. His evident ouster as Undersecretary of Defense in7 and pending retirement is therefore of great significance; while the circumstances remain unexplained, it may bo speculated that Jovanic's rapidly accumulated powershreat to members of other intra-elite groupings and to Defense Secretary Ljubicic hiaself.

m OlUKJXXti* at-




The present Yugoslav military elite is dominated by the "late Partisan" generation: the prewar Communists who learned guerrillain the Spanish Civil Mar and who constituted the nucleus andof the Partisan movement have passed from the scene, while the postwar Yugoslav military generation has yet to rise to the top. divisional commandersey role in the "late Partisan" Theyubsetroader Yugoslav elite the members of which, primarily of peasant background, joined the Partisan movement at its inception12 as their first adult activity and survived the war. roup they are older than their counterparts of ten years ago; they have continued their careers beyond the former mandatory retirement age of SS. Natural rejuvenation of the military elite has thus not yet been achieved,ajor discontinuity lies aheadut only five to ten years hencewhen the postwar military generation will move into the key military positions.1

The "late Partisan" generation in military terms is simultaneously the "Partisan Communist" generation politically. Prewar Communists now numberercent of the elite; no postwar Communist has been Most of the present elite entered first the Partisan movement and then the Communist Party; they were mobilized not on the platform of solidarity with the Soviet Union or Corcunist revolution but under

the banner of national independence and unity.

The military elite is thoroughly indigenous in terms ofeducation. Tlie elite of ten years ago stillignificant proportion of Soviet-trained (and Western-trained) officers, although Yugoslavia had moved quickly8 to counter the influence of Soviet training by establishing its own Higher Military Academy and requiring even general officers to undergo retraining. Today aroundercent of the military elite have had exclusively domestic military training.

Biographic data on members of the "postwar generation" are poor or nonexistent.


"Commanders'* and "commissars" Iijye tended to he mutually exclusive career types in Yugoslavia, as elsewhere. Both are in evidence in the military elite, but professionaln1 clearly dominant. Thishe culminationrend the origins uf which can be traced backhen supremacy of commanders was institutionalised through replacement of the position of cominl (who hail been coequal to the commander) with the position of assistant commander foraffairs, subordinate to the commander. Among two key substrata ofenior officials and military region coamwtnders, the role of the professional commanders has further increased in the past ten years. 3 the military security establishment (KOSj has been placed under stricter command authority.

At the same time there hastriking relative decline in the status of Parly secretaries in the militaryis commanders. Prior6 the assistant commanders for political affairs wereParty secretaries.6 the functions were separated; the Party organization in the Army was reorganized with the avowed purpose of increasing the influence of Party organizations in the Army on thetructure, which had theretofore dominated Party bodies in the military. Iron the point of view of the proponents of the reforms, this would haveounterweight to the professional militaryto reformist currents in the Partyhole. In fact, the opposite occurred; the Party organization in the Army (withull-time officials) is more responsive than ever to the professional command stratum- This relationship explains the unfolding of the "campaigns" in Party work in the Army;rief period2 in which Party organization* in the Army attempted to expand their authority, their focus has subsequently narrowed to professional concerns, where dominant influence of commanders is unchallenged.

The Yugoslav military elite is multinational nd more so than in the past. Yugoslav national groups other than Serbs and continue to be underrepresentcd in the officer corpshole. In the case of Croats and Slovenes, represents!ion has worsened since the immediate postwar period, and thisource of articulated concern to the respective republican Party officials. At the apex ofrurc:* vmrf-fl: ranrtt rhc silltuit




group stillisproportionate role, particularly in Croatia.

Posting patterns, too, reflect the impact of the national question on the Yugoslav armed forces. Since the, there haswing back toward the World War II pattern of predominantly native regional postings. The demands for more native regional service put forward by national forces since theave in part been quietly

fulfilled. This altered posting pattern is striking at the military regional level.

Another key development in the adaptation of the defense system to the less centralized Yugoslav political system of theas the organization of territorial defense forces and establishment of republican defense headquarters The first commanders of the republican defense headquarters were generally senior butor retired generals with strong regional ties. That pattern has not changed; although the regular military's influence over thedefense forces increasedhe republican political authorities continue to influence defense headquarters personnel selection.

The YPA remains the strongest all-Yugoslav institution. Itretains the mission ofense of "Yugoslavism" on the part of the conscript youth passing through its ranks- Yet, the YPA has not remained isolated from the forces of nationalso evident in Yugoslavia since the. The Yugoslav military elite is more truly an all-Yugoslav force, in the sense that it is more multinational, than in the past. It is simultaneously more

o. .

n terns of regional posting patterns, thanbeen since World War II. In the Yugoslav context,trength,eakness; they are an indicationbehavior that increases, rather than reduces, thepotential of the Yugoslav Billfar* establishment.

Participation of the military elite in political affairs has increased sincebut not approached (lie level of the immediate postwar period). In theroup of "political generals" reemcrged. at Party urging and not as an autonomous military initiative, all of whom are concerned in their civilian posts with defense and security matters. Greater military involvement in political affairs is indicated by theercent share of Party Central Committee scats held by military menhe highest percentage of any postwar Central Committee. At the federal level, the "opening to society" that Party reformers urged on the military ha* been implemented in the period of political consolidation1 and has had the contrary effect (from the reformers* point of view) of increasing military influence over other sectors of the political system. On the other hand, at the republican Party level, military participation reached its peak9 and has subsequently declined. The intermingling of nonmilitary and military Party organizations at republican and lower levels that was initiated in theas ended, and this focuses tho political involvement of the military on the federal level. [Military region commands have influenced regional Party policies on security-related matters.) At the federal level, the military Party organization has now formallytatus

equivalent to thatrovince.

Thf Outlook or mental set of Ih* Yugoslav miliL.iry elite remain-strongly influenced by elite members' first adult experiences asyouth mobilized to the Partisan movement and the Party12 in the cause of national survival. Assimilating the changing values of the Party, they have developed strong loyalty to thestate and unique Communist political system. Since World War tl members of the military elite have been professionally concerned with Yugoslavia's defense. The military elite is suspicious of hostile

designs on Yugoslavia from East and West but remains principallywith the Soviet threat.

The military elite's self-perception of its mission to protect, as servant of the Party, the integrity of the political system and state against internal as well as external challenges was reinforced by the domestic political turmoil Its attitude

is summed up in oft-stated concern that lack of discipline in society was sapping the country's defense strength and in the appeal, articulated by the Defense Secretary, for "more order, personal and social responsibility, and equity." Its "conservative" outlook falls well within the limits of Yugoslav Communist political orthodoxy; it has advocated greater discipline within the present Party-directed "self-management" system,eturn to Soviet-style rule. (Extreme "conservatives" on the fringe of the military havehallenge to,olitical surrogate of, the top militaryt has been more critical of nationalist outbursts than many other Yugoslav groups, but it has granted the crucial importance of greater respect for national rights within the military for effective functioning of both the military institutions and the political system. The military elite is committed to the broadly-based system of "total national defense" that precludes sharp separation between the regular military and the rest of Yugoslav societv.

The Yugoslav military elite has remained fundamentally cohesive, in contrast to other influential Yugoslav elites. There is evidence of differences of views among the elite in the past decade on military issues related to the proper defense system and on political issues. National differences haveole. IntTa-military institutional cleavage- developedesultid for greater power involving the counterintelligence service. These internal cleavages have been contained with relative case. There is no known case of intra-military cleavages on foreign policy issues; in particular there is no indication of pro-Soviet sentiment, evenarginal phenomenon. Personal intra-ellte groupings of present and future relevance include national-based groupingsLika Serbs," nd "Macedonians" most clearlynd patronage groupings.

Implications for the Future

The current Yugoslav military elite, although aging, is sufficiently young and unchallenged to be in plate when Tito passes from the Yugoslav political scene, lt is relatively well prepared to indeed defend Yugoslavia against external and internal threats. The military elite has been dominated by commanders, not political officers, since the. Its members are committed to maintaining the integrity of the Yugoslav state- They have been professionally concerned for thirty years with the defense of Yugoslavia against external threats. They have experienced the Soviet threat at first hand, directly in thend indirectly They arc concerned with the Soviet threat today.

The military elite constitutes one of the strongest "all-Yugoslav" centripetal forces in the political system, supporting the unique Communist Party-influenced "sclf-management" political system. This is true not because the elite has defended stubbornly the status quo but because it hasarefully-controlled series of adjustments to Yugoslav political realities, especially the looser federal system and greater self-affirmation of the constituent national groups, while protecting the military institution against excessive decentralization and nationalism. Consequently, the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia evidently are today perceivedjoint armed force" by most of Yugoslavia's national groups. The exceptions are the Croats and probably the Albanians. Continued domination of the YPA in Croatia by Croatian Serbs (and the disproportionately large role of these Croatian Serbs among the Serh cohort in the military elite) is the element of truththe otherwise falsely-held view of many Croats that Serbs still dominate the Yugoslav military elite. Although less evidence isit appears that continued Serb domination of the YPA in Kosovo is also worrisome to the Yugoslav Albanians; the issue is less acute, however, since no major command is located in Kosovo and fewer YPA units arc stationed there. These exceptions are disturbing, however, for Croatia and Kosovo are the two regions of the country in which instability or civil strife is most likely in the post-Tito period.



The shape of post-Tito Yugoslavia cannot be predicted, but possible (if not necessarily likely) developments in post-Tito Yugoslavia can be exploredypology of "alternative future Yugoslavias." Four suchovelopedill bo indicated; in each of these possible future situations, the military elite will play an important and perhaps crucial role:

Yugoslavia. Fn the case of an internallyin which no successionist crisis is created byand the successionist political institutions function,elite will continue toarticipant in thebut will concentrate on external security concerns. Itto likely callsollective post-Tito politicalto participate in the political process, while respectingof the political leadership. It will continueore federalized military establishment. major change in the international situation, the militaryremain primarily concerned with the Soviet threat.

Yugoslavia. Should the successionistfail, rampant decentralization occur, nationalistand political stalemates occur, the military elite willupon by elements of the political elite to activelya unifying force in the political process. In the absence offrom the Party center, the military elite would inject itselfpolitical procoss, in an autonomous manner heretofore eschewed,name of the Party in order to encourage greater unity. Thewill again find itself subjected to the same pressures fromthat it encounteredn Croatia,eplay ofthe events of that time is likely: differentiation of TDF andand some limited division within the YPA on national grounds.

But the military olito would probablv remain cohesive enough to be able to functionajor centripetal force, dividing its attention between this task nnd the external threat.

Developed in Johnson and

3. intcc.rating Yugoslavia.

this more extreme eventuality.

by nationalist violence, the role of the miliary elite would become paramount; acting in the name of the Party to preserve the integrity of the Yugoslav state and the Communist political system, it would in fact become the dominant element of the Party. ocalized civil conflict, in which regional authorities, unable to contain the violence easily, appealed to Belgrade, the military elite could be expected to respond effectively to orders from the top political leadership to restore order and contain the inevitable disaffection on national grounds within its own ranks. In the case of contagious conflict, with domestic strife turning into civil war and leading to secessionist attempts by one or more of the republics, the military leadership would, left without central political direction, act on its own to attempt to restore order and reconstitute Yugoslaviaore centralised basts. But in these dire circumstances its effectiveness and integrity would be suspect, ln such circumstances, YPA intervention could itselfessy civil war, involving clashes between TOY and YPA units and desertions from the latter. It is doubtful whether the Yugoslav military elite could withstand that extreme challenge. Resilient in situations short of major crisis precisely because it iseflection of the Yugoslav political and social system than in the past, it would probably lack the unity and purposefulness necessary to employ the degree of repression that would be necessary to restore order and reconstitute some semblance of political authorityugoslavia that was disintegrating. In the only circumstance inilitary seizure of power in Yugoslavia is likely (and would doubtless be desired as stabilizing by the Unitedhe Yugoslav military elite is unlikely to he able to actnit. It is in such circumstances,reakdown of the "all-Yugoslav institutions including the military, that multiple appeals from various groups to East and West for outside assistance should be anticipated.

4. Invaded or Garrison Yugoslavia. The Soviet threat to Yugoslavia after Tito Kill be inversely proportional to the degree of internal cohesion. Nonetheless, Soviet military interventionohesive Yugoslavia is not unthinkable. In an Invaded Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav military elite can be expected to implement and direct the determined resistance effort embodied in the doctrine of "total nationaln that event, as in the eventarrison Yugoslavia subjected to protracted high-level Soviet military throat, the military elite can be expected to look again to the Nest for armaments and other forms of military assistance.


Thi* study has had three principal objectives:

torofile of the Yugoslav Military elite that could complement available biographies of key individual officers;

to project the outlook, or set of attitudes on Issues, of the Yugoslav military elite;

5. to describe and analyze internal divisions within the Yugoslav military.

Brief comments follow on the approach utilized in this study in pursuit of each of these objectives.

I. As noted in the Introduction, the profile of the Yugoslavelito formulated in this study is proffered, notredictor of the behavior of the Yugoslav military in specific present or futurebut hs an illuminator of some of the predispositional factors that will condition that behavior. Construction ofrofile permits an answer to key questions including: the particular military "generation" comprising the present military elite; the degree of implementation of the national "key" (proportional nationalat the upper levels of tho military; the degree to which "regionalization" of the military (meaning more postings to native regions) has progressed; career differences, if any, between commanders of the republican territorial defense forces and top officers of the YPA; the relationship between professional commanders and political officers (in terms of career types) within the upper levels of the Yugoslav military; the role and relative power of Party Secretaries in the Army.

While an analytical snapshot of the current Yugoslav military elite is helpful, more valuable stillynamic analysis indicating the extont of changes in respective group characteristics over time. Ideally, the analyst would like to compare the current elite profile


with the comparable profile of any earlier time. In practice, since the study could not compile informationomparable military loader-ship group by yearumber of years, only one such point of reference was established: the Yugoslav military elite That year was chosen for comparison since it was the final year of the "neo-centralist" period in Yugoslavia. 6 Party Secretary Aleksandar Rankovic was ousted from the Party leadership for blocking implementation of far-reaching economic and political reform; substantial decentralization and some pluralization of the Yugoslav political system followed. s noted in Section!', the military, too, was affected by the forces of reform and national affirmation. The YPA's'earlier isolation from other sectors of Yugoslav society was roduced. ajor personnel changes occurred in the Secretariat of National Defense.

2. The most successful "elite studies" have correlated attitudinal information with key background attributes, primarily education and cureer; Edinger ond Searing's work on West European eliteslassic in this regard. This study is constrained severely by the unavailability of systematic attitudinal data for the Yugoslav military. Elite surveys are regularly conducted in Yugoslavia (some have involved Westernand results published, but these have not embraced thehe PSND Political Department has conducted extensive and evidently technically sophisticated opinion polling of both the officer corps and conscripts; some fragmentary results of these classified or internal-use studies have been published.5 While this Report utilizes these poll results in making an estimato of the outlook of the Yugoslav military elite, it perforce draws more heavily on other, indirect andless satisfactory indicators: the known experience of the Yugoslavas an institution and as the collection of individuals that have comprised the officer corps; published psychohistorical and political statements of individual generals; the few reported impressions of Western

2See Barton, et

3For details, see) and Appendix D.

'See the Sgctipn on CliU analysis, especially I



Interlocutor* of Yugoslavnd occasional intelligence reports on the attitudes of particular individuals.

3. This study explores the existence of tensions within themilitary and their linkages to particular individuals or groups. It is assumed that better understanding of the nature of disputes and tensions and the existence of affinity groups within the military establishment in recent years will permit more accurate appraisal of the present and future cohesion and behavior of the Yugoslav military elite.

In tho absence of empirical analysis, the "military" cannot be assumed tonitary entity. It must be subjected to "the same search for internal factions, ethnic splits, generational gaps, functionally-based divisions, and hierarchically-based conflicts" as have political parties and bureaucracies.2 losed society, analysis of possible internal groupings within the military can permit more accurateabout attitudes and policy positions and disputes on matters of issue and personality than ad hoc analysis of an individual leader's statements or behavior.

Including first-hand impressions, reported in yugoslav military and political issuesh: rip

2Kelleher. ed. .Ibid,.


This study emulates prior examinations of cleavages in otherelites. Studies of the Chinese Communist military, for example, have usefully examined intramilitary conflict in terms of tensionrevolutionary and professional military values; lasting patterns of personal and organizational affiliation; affiliation by service sector; and other hierarchical or functional sources offfinity groups are not easily identified: even in open societiesassociations are difficult to map; as an analystelatively accessible elite has noted, "constellutions of intra-elite linkages remain among the most inaccessible of social facts and the mostto assess once verified." This study has, perforce, searched


for affinity groups on the basis of proximity of career postings and of personal associations forged during the Partisan War. Theof continuing relevance of such wartime tiesost-revolutionary army receives some confirmation from the Communist Chinese and other



"Elite"ultiplicity of meanings in the literature on elite analysis. This study defines as the "Yugoslav military elite" the occupants of what are judged to be the key positions in the Yugoslav military establishment, as well as the few military occupants of high-level Party and government positions. Tho positions selected are listed in Tablehey include key officials in the Federal Secretariat of National Defense, the YPA General Staff, the service commands, military region (oblaat) and subregion (podruoje) commands, divisional commands, republican defense commands, the secretaries of the military Party organizations at the military district level and above; and military members of the Party Executive Committee and the (government) Federal Executive Council.

lite" analyzed in this study is comprised of the Identifiable occupants of the specified set of positions on Septemhorhelite" is comprised of analogous occupants as of lite" is comprisedfficers; their breakdown by service affiliation: Groundiravy, 3. Two are Army Generals,re Colonel Generals,re Lieutenant Colonel Generals,re Major Generals, andre Colonels.lite" is comprised ofround Force officers,ir Force officers,avalotal. ere Army Generals,olonel Generals,ieutenant Colonel Generals,ajoretired or inactive,olonels. The two "elites" are only roughly comparable; some key positions changed6ost importantly, republican defense commands wereseveral

For example,. xix.

occupants of comparable positions could not be identified for one of tha respective years. The military elite defined in this study on positional grounds constitutes approximatelyercent of the general officer corps.' lite" containsoldovers fromlito" anddditions; this relationship suggests an average annual circulation ofhrough the "elite."

Additionally, biographic files were compiled onther individuals prominent prior6 who figured in controversies or personalinvolving members of the later elite groups. These individuals can beegment of an earlier,lite." For some analytical purposes of the study, the totalndividuals on whom data were collected is used; they arc termed the total "postwar elite sample."

The assumptionositional definition of the Yugoslav military elite is supported (or at least not contradicted) by the absence of indications ofonpositional sources of power and influence within the military. Tho "elite" defined here thus excludes Army Generals, Colonel Generals, and Lieutenant Colonel Generals presently inactive, even if not formally retired; it is common practice for many of these senior officers to occupy advisory and "research" positions in the Federal Secretariat of National Defense at the end of their careers. In no case, however, is there indication that such individuals who have been "kicked upstairs" remain prominent within the military; on the contrary, thereumber of accounts of how such senior generals have been "put out to pasture."

The "military elite" defined on positional grounds56 as inclusive and notample nonetheless contains somesome key occupants could not be identified; while the selection of positionsatter of judgment. Specifically, tho "elite" defined here may overvalue the role of the republican defenseprecise rolois republican defense commanders

'Accepting as accurate and characteristic for recent years the count of the British Military Attache7 (DIAonfidential).

remainsundervaluing the role of generals occupying "junior" (and thus often not identifiable) General Staff slots. In. addition, as noted In Appendix C, the posts of Party Secretary at the military region level had been so devaluedS that their continued inclusion in the "military elite" can be questioned.


This study required compilationomprehensive data base on key Yugoslav military individuals. The first task was to identify the occupants of the specified set oflaborious task that pointed up the inadequate attention to personalities in existing order-of-battle intelligence files and publications. Once the individuals comprising the military elite had been identified, compilation of data on them involved integration of fragmentary and sometimes conflicting items of information. Government biographic intelligence files and published Yugoslav sources. USG biographic resources consulted include the biographic files of

East European Ground Forces uraer Battle Office, DIA; the Defense Attache Office, American Embassy, Belgrade; the Office of East European Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; and the Office of NATO and European Affairs, Office of International Security Affairs, DoD. Yugoslav sources include Ko js Ko (Who's70 editions; Vojna encyclopedia (Militaryirst and second editions; and miscellaneous books and articles. Published DIA biographies and older NIS biographies of Yugoslav generals were of assistance; however they exist formall number of Individuals of interest and are basod on incomplete (and in some respects inaccurate) information. Many gaps and doubtless some errors remain in the biographic files created for the purposes of this study. Nonetheless, the resulting data base on 1B6 individualsignificant improvement over the Information available in any of the existing partial collections and indicates what is presently known about the Yugoslav military elite to. Government. The data baseumber of systematic errors and omissions in. Government biographic



and order of battle file*. Compilation of this data baseajor derivative product of the study.

The quantitative portion of these biographic files was computerized so as to permit both aggregate analysis and full retrieval of all individual data. ist of the attributes, collected and computed, in the individual files is given in Tabic 2. Postings wereormat developed in the course of this study from analysis of postwar order of battle information that expresses the hierarchical interrelationships of each division, military suhregionnd region (oblaat). This format permits examination of the hierarchical relationship of individuals over time. omputerized oosltionalfile of individuals was developed to assist in exploring these relationships.

The data base created in the course of this study has beento thef

These problems arc described and some recommendations made for improvements in biographic intelligence collection, storage, and analysis eparate Rand publication. Suggested Improvements in Biographic Intelligence Resourcesy A. Ross Johnson,ecret.

Table 1


a? of September Las uf December Si)

Top Political Positions


Secretary. Executive Committee and President of Defense Commission

Federal Secretary of InternalFederal Executive Council

Chief Prosecutor

Director, Civilian Aviation Directorate

Military Positions

Chief, Military Cabinet of Supreme Commander Personal Assistant to Supreme Commander Federal Secretary of National Defense Personal Assistant, Federal Secretary of

National Defense Federal Under Secretary of National Defense Deputy Federal Secretary of National Defense Assistant Federal Secretaries of National Defense Chief, General Staff Inspector General Deputy Inspector General Chief of Procurement Director, Scientific Council Chief, Military Security Service

Chief, Military Cabinet of Supremo Commander

Personal Assistant to Supreme Commander State Secretary of National Defense Personal Assistant, State Secretary of National Defense

Assistant State Secretaries of

National Defense Chief, General Staff Chief of Procurement Chief, Military Security Service

Deputy Chief of Staff, Protocol Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Assistant Chief of Staff, Mobilization

and Organization Assistant Chiof of Staff, Training Deputy Chief of Staff, Ground Forces Assistant Chief of Staff, Supplies Assistant Chief of Staff, Finance Chief, Materials Office Chief, Territorial Defense and Civil

Defense Office Chief, Personnel Office Deputy Assistant Chiefs of Staff Deputy Commander, YAF Chief of Staff, YAF Commander, Zagreb Air Corps Comnander, Air Defense Assistant Commander, Political, YAF Deputy Commander, Navy Assistant Commander, Political, Navy Commander, Frontier Guards

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, Frontier Guards

Assistant Commander, Political, Frontier Guards

Regional Military 1

Commander, Belgrade Military Region

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

Assistant Commander, Political Commander, 4th Tito Guards Division, Belgrade Commander, Belgrade Garrison Commander, 8th Infantry Division, Novi Sad Commander, Nis Military Region

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

Assistant Commander, Political

Chief of Protocol

Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Assistant Chief of Staff, Mobilization

and Organization Assistant Chief of Staff, Training Chief, Materials Office Chief, Ground Forces Office Chief, Supplies Office Chief, Finance Office Chief, Personnel Office Deputy Assistant Chiefs of Staff Deputy Commander, YAF Chief of Staff, YAF Assistant Commander, Political, YAF Commander, Air Defense Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff,


Assistant Commander, Political, Navy

Commander, Belgrade Military Region

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff Assistant Commander, Political

Commander, 4th Tito Guards Division, Belgrade

Commander, Armored Division, Kragujevac

Commander, Belgrade Podrucije

Commander, Novi Sad Podrucje

Commander, Kragujevac Podrud'je

Commander, Nis Podrucje

Commander,roletarian Infantry Division Commander, Skopje Military Region

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff,

Assistant Commander, Politicalh Infantry Division, Kumanovoh Infantry Division, Bitola Commander, Split Military Region

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

Assistant Commander, Political Commander. Zagreb Mi 1itary Region

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

Assistant Commander, Political Commander, 6th Infantry Division Commander,h Infantry Division, Varazdin Commander, Ljubljana Military Region

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

Assistant Commander, Political Commander, 1st Infantry Division, Postojna Commander, Sarajevo Military Region

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

Assistant Commander. Politicalh Infantry Division, Tuzla Commander. Titograd PodruSje

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

Assistant Commander, Political

Commander,roletarian Infantry Division Commander. Pristina Podrucjeh Infantry Division, Pristina Commander, Skopje Military Region

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

Assistant Commander, Politicalh Armored Division, Skopje Commander, Skopje Podrucje

Commander.h Infantry Division, Kumanovo Commander, Bitola PodruSje Commander. Split Military Region

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

Assistant Commander, Political Commander, Sibenlk PodruSje Commander,h Infantry Division, Knin Commander. Zagreb Military Region

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff ;

Assistant Commander, Political Commander, h Armored Division, Sisak Commander, Zagreb podrucje Commander, 6th Infantry Division, Karlovac Commander,h Infantry Division, Varazdin Commander, Rijeka PodruSje Commander, Osijek PodruSje

h Infantry Division, Slav Pozega Commander, Ljubljana PodruSje Commander, 1st Infantry Division, Postojna Commander, Sarajevo Military Region

Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

Assistant Commander, Political Commander, Sarajevo PodruSje Commander, Banja Luka PodruSje Commandor,h Infantry Division, Tuzla Commander, Mostar PodruSje Commander, Titograd PodruSje

For each republic andeach republic:

Commander. Defense Headquarters Chief of Staff, Defense Headquarters


Party Positions in the Military

of Committee, Conference of LYC/YPA Secretary of Secretariat

and Air Defense Forces


Military Region

Military Region

Military Region

Military Region

Military Region

Military Region

Military Region

Military Podrucje

Secretary of Committee, Conference of LCY/YPA Secretary, FSND

Secretary, Air and Air Defense Forces Secretary, Frontier Guards Secretary, Belgrade Military Region

Secretary. Skopje MilitarySplit Military

Secretary. Sarajevo Military Region Secretary, Zagreb Military Region

President, Federal Committee, Veterans Organization President, Federal Committee, Reserve Officers

Organization Chairman. Standing Commission for Defense, SAWPY President, Coordination Committee for Total National

Defense and Sclf-Protoction, SAWPY Commander, Higher Military Academy Commander, National Defense School Commander, Command and Staff School Commander, High Military-Political School

President, Federal Committee. Veterans Organi zation

President. Federal Committee, Reserve Officers Organization

Military Academy

Defense School

and Staff School

Military-Political School

Table 2


Collected Attributes

Date of birth


Region of birth

Occupation of father

Final prewar occupation

Civilian education

Military education

Foreign travel

Military service

Branch of service

Prewar military experience

Holder of Partisan Medallion1

Year of entry into Communist Party

Type of publications

Partisan war career type


Postwar career type

Computed Attributes

Age5 Age6

Count of wartime command positions Count of wartime political positions Count of postwar command positions Count ot" postwar political positions

Countolitical positions .

Countolitical positions Count of postwar military school positions Regional location of postings, byount of wartime regional postings Count of postwar regional postings Level of postings, byount of postwar level of postings

Reports and rumors Reports and rumors

Other Data in Non-Computerized Files Reports and rumors about career

Appendix It


Yugoslaviaosaic of national-ethnic groups, which fall into two categories: (II "peoples"outh Slav national groupspredominantly within Yugoslavia;nationalities"ormerly called nationalhose co-nationals are predominantly located outside Yugoslavia. The first category is comprised of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians,ately -- Slav Muslims. The second category includes Hungarians, Albanians, Turks, Slovaks, Romanians, and other smaller groups. Formerly quite distinct, the two categories have blurred ln recent years. The percentage breakdown of the Yugoslav population into "peoples" and "nationalities" is indicated in Fig. 2.

This multinational condition is not expressed In compact regional settlement of the various national groups but involves theirwithout assimilotion, like oil and water, throughout most of the constituent units of the Yugoslav federation, the six republics, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia. Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, and the two provinces, Kosovo and Vujvodina, into which part of the Serbian republic is subdivided. Slovenia is the only republic that is virtually homogeneous nationally;ercent of its population is Slovene. The population of Croatia isercent Croat andercent Serb. The Serbs are neither dispersed evenly throughout Croatia nor concentrated in one section of the republic; most are located in Slavonia (eastern Croatia) and Lika (centralhere they arc the majority element inocalities (communes). Serbs arerepresented in the Croatian Party, constituting almostercent of the membership.

Bosnia-Hercegovina was resurrectedepublic5 to put an end to Serb-Croat conflict over the allegiance of its inhabitants. Its population isercent Muslim,ercent Serb, andercent Croat. Theroduct of the Ottoman Empire with few national traitsere originally the Party's best candidate for developing a




e "j










!OUhCf: 1 ccnwi data

Fig. 2 -notional eomoosition of Yugoslavia (in pcicentugci)

new "Yugoslav" national consciousness. Today, the Slav Muslims have constituted themselves as the sixth "people" of Yugoslavia. The three national elements are intermingled throughout Bosnla-Hercegovina.

Serbia proper (minus the provinces) is nearly as homogeneous nationally as Slovenia0 percent Serb. Vdjvodina province, the traditional seat of Serbian culture, is thoroughly multinational,are majority of S6 percent Serbs, alongercent Croats,ercent Hungarians, and IS percent smaller nationalities. These groups are intermingled throughout the province. Kosovo province, containing the legendary last battlefield of the medieval Serbian state,ajority Albanian population ofercent (constituting nearly half of all Albanians). Serbs account forercent and are dispersed throughout most of the province.

The population of Macedonia isercent Macedonianeople who first constituted themselvesational group in postwar Yugoslaviandercent Albanian, concentrated In the northwest. Montenegro isercent Montenegrin. While Montenegrins haveconsidered themselves to be Serbs, many now regard themselvesistinct national group. Montenegro3 percent Muslimercent Albanian minority population.

ndresent the national composition of each republic and province and the distribution of nationaly republic and province. he total Yugoslav population5 million.

Table 3


(In percentages)



Slav26 Other

2 Other

0 Albanians






5 Other



74 Other

1 census Jala.

Tabic 4


Republic/ Province



rce gov ina


1 census data.


Appendix C


This appendix analyzes and documents the findings, summarized in Section III. of aggregate analysis of key biographic attributes of the Yugoslav military elite. The principal subject of the analysis islite" (as explained in the Introduction, the occupantsey military positions as of September. Comparisons are drawn withlite" (the occupantsey positions as of the end7 of these individuals remained inlite"). Additionally.for some purposes the subject of analysis is the total of 1S6 individuals, termed the "postwar eliteor which biographic files were compiled, hhen available, fragmentary published Yugoslav data on general officers and on the officer corpshole is also utilized. In the case of collateral political positions, systematic biographic information was not available, so

positional and aggregate indicators from published Yugoslav sources

have been utilized exclusively.

Thereerious absence of even rudimentary biographicon aboutercent oflite." These "unknowns" are principally division commanders. Party secretaries at the military district level, third echelon leaders, and republican defense officials

A breakdown of the military elite by date of birth is given in Table 5. The known median age of5 elite3 percent of the known dates of birth occurred8 In contrast, the median age of6 eliteS; sixty-one percent of known dates of birth occurred6' By this calculation the median age ofS elite has increased almost as much6

The average age of the general officer corps3ccording to an3 USC study. (Area Handbook for) The median age of the officer corpshole7 wasrp.


as the Intervening number of calendar years. Tlieercent) probably offset only partially thishe missing cases are individuals who entered the eliteet the available evidence indicates they are SO-ycar olds,year olds. entative conclusion is that the military elite is aging (impressiunistically, more so than the political elitehole, with the exceptionew key top positions)ecade ago the military and political elitesimilar age structure.1

2. Party Membership

'Barton, et al.

4 percent of all officers,ercent of all junior officers and career civilians in the Army,ercent of allwere Party members. IPrva)

JSixty percentroup ofey military figures analyzed9 were prewar Communists . Fifty percent of the general officer corps3 were prewar Communists. {Area)

Barton, et.. ITie sampleopinionmakers" excluding thecal figures.

A breakdown by year of entry into the Party forlite" andlite" is given in Although information is lacking on the Party status ofembers oft is certain that all arc LCY members.^ Ofases of known dates of entry into there prewar Communists, whileoined during World War II. Of the latter group,oined the Party at the outset of the Partisan War, 1 It may be assumed that most of the missing dates of entry into the Party occurred during World War II; based on this assumption the relative percentages of prewar and wartime Party members arendercent respectively. Byflite" were prewar Communists;ercent joined the Party during World War II (all but five1issing cases).5 In comparison, onlyercent of the political-economic elite8 joined the Party during the war; IS percent were prewar members and the remainder postwar members. The present military elite contains significantly fewer prewar "Communist Internationalists" and more "Partisan Party" members than its counterpart of nine years ago;


the proportion of "Partisans" in Party membership terms greatly exceeds that of the political elite.

and Region of Birth

ists the national composition oflite" andlite." Table 8 gives these data in percentages, as well as published Yugoslav data on all general officers, the officer corps, and the Yugoslav populationhole for selected years. The Serbian share of5 military elite has declinedevel slightly short of Serbs'ercent share in the populationhole;erbs were slightly overreprescntcd. Croats remain slightly overrepresentated in5ontenegrins remain strongly overrepresented. The Muslim national representation in the military elite has increased significantly,ercent6ercentS, almost equal to the share in the population at large. More striking has been the increase in Macedonian representation, from two percent6 to seven percentarger than the Macedonian proportion of the population at large. Slovenes constituted seven percent of the eliteoday they constitute nine percent, slightly more than the percentage of Slovenes in the population at large. Kosovo Albanians remain grossly underrepresented. with one representative (Ethem Recica, whose promotion to Major General2 was celebrated with some fanfare as the first promotion to general officer rankugoslav Albanian). Hungarians remain unrepresented; the "other" listing refers to Army General Kosta Nadj, of Hungarian extraction, who is the sole leading military figure to insist that heYugoslav" only.

The national groups other than Serbs and Montenegrins are much less well represented in the officer corpshole. Significantly, the percentage share of Croats and Slovenes has declinod over the postwar period,while the percentage share of the other national groups has risen.

'According to an unverified countroatian emigre, ercent of the officers promoted to Colonel General rank0$ were Croats. .)

Table 8







my Party















Approximation. Missing cases in first column allocated proportionately asroats, andSerb* and Montenegrins together7 percent of the officer corps; breakdown is estimated. Discrepancies in addition due to rounding. cInclude* Hungarians and Albanians.

wa*ecognlied national grouphis was the percentage of the "undeclared" group, mainly Slav Muslims.


(ll Derived from data in Nlti. This source give* the following rank order (only) of the nationality of generals occupying "leading positions" in the Defenie Secretariat: Serb, Croat, Muslim, Slovene, Macedonian. These calculations differ slightly from those made by

[2] . citing data in the FSND Personnel Administration. Similar figures are given in..

[3] Official census data.

[4] Prva..

Republican defenseerritorial defense command personnel, are necessarily all natives of their respective republics. TheiT national composition In each republic evidently approximates the respective lntrarepublican national breakdown, where this is significant. The goal of proportional national balance in the territorial defense "officer corps"he active, retired, and reserve YPA officers who provide the cadre for the TDF, is evidently being approached. In the province of Kosovo, for example.ercent of the TDF "officer corps" is Albanian andercent Serb, as compared to respective shares of Albanians and Serbs in the total population of Kosovo ofndercent, respectively.1

Cross-tabulation of nationality by region of origin for military elite members is contained in Table 9. Of principal significance is the identification of the large number of pviocmi Serbserbs bom outside of Serbia propern Croatia, Bosnia, and8 identified Serbs born outside of Serbia proper androa Serbia propers compared toespectively,ranting the uncertainties of missing information, it appears that there has been some reduction in the relative proportion of priaani Serbs in the military eliteut that this group continues toisproportionately large role in the apex of the Yugoslav military establishment.

Examination of the nationality of the total "postwar elite sample" for the three military services confirms the commonsense supposition that the naval officers included are almost all of Croat origin.

4. Origins and Education

Social background information on the military elite is generally missing; it is presumed that most came from peasant families, although cany have identifiable nonpeasant backgrounds. Information on pre-Norld War II occupations is sparse; again, most were presumably involved


Toble 9


(Count5 Elite in lop of each square))

(Count6 Elite in bottom of each square in parentheses)


v yy yyy










in agriculture,umber of nonagricultural occupations are represented. Of theembers ofS elite whose prewarcan beereerved in the prewar railltnry in someereere teachers or professional men; and two were minor officials. Communist activists, and workers, respectively. Corresponding figures for6ithnown caseseretudents;rewareachers or professionalinor officials;ommunist activists. At the end of thebar,ercent of the individuals in the officer corpsholeere officially considered to have been peasants;ercent workers;ercent2 percent formerand four percent artisans.

Information on "civilian" education is limited. Compared to the Yugoslav populationelatively large proportion of the military elite appears to have had some education beyond the primary school level. Ofnown cases from5 some secondary or trade school training; ad university-level training. Corresponding figures for6nown cases) weret the secondary/trade school level andt the university level.

5. Military Background, Training, and Travel

Ten percent ofS military elite had prewar military(other than conscriptneemains, along with six prewar junior officers and three prewar NCOs. Thisa significant "Partisanization" of the military elitet that time. ercent had corresponding prewar militaryss prewar officers,s prewar NCOs.

p., citing data in the archives of theHistory Institute. Percentages rounded.

Prewar Yugoslav Communists who fought in International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War. Ofey military figures analyzed0 percent were "Spaniards." (Area)

Indigenous training has been the trend in military education. Twenty percent of6 elite had some training in Soviet niIftnry schools,ercent. military schools, while the rest were trained solely at home. Contrasting figures for5 elite are: ith Soviet trainingercent. training. Host of these are known to have attended the Higher Military Academy as well; the vast majority attended only the HMA and more advanced Yugoslav military schools.

Mejchers of the Yugoslav military elite have traveled extensively abroad in the course of their official duties. One-half of6 elite are known to have traveled abroaduarter of them having undertaken more thanorresponding figures for6 elite were three-fourths and one-half, respectively.

6. Partisan (World War II) Service

Today, no officer is eligible for promotion above rank of major without completion of an advanced military school, generally the command and staff school of his respective service, then the School of National Defense (as the War College has been renamed); (ni1c, March)

2As compared to the officer corpshole,ercent of which was made up of postwar officersf, March 7..

3The breakdown of the Partisan officer corps5hole by year of entry into the movement is as follows: ercent;080 percent;ercent, figures rounded).

Information is lacking on the Partisan careershird of5 elite, but it is assumed that almost all or all of the elitefought in the Partisan movement during World War II.' Of the known cases, all butntered the Partisan war at its outset, This pattern characterized6 elite; innown cases (out) the future YPA officer joined the Partisan war1 Military elite members who joined the Partisan movement1 and remained active during the war received the politically prestigious Partisan Medallion Correlating data on year of

entry into the Partisan movement and year of joining theercent of5 elite joined first the Partisans and

then the Party; the corresponding figure for6 elite was 70

Partisan war "dominant career type" can be specified forffficers in5 elite;ere commanders,ommissars or Party representatives, six held both positions, and two were in other kinds of posts. nown cases of6 elite,ere commanders,ere commissars, eight occupied both positions, and five were primarily in other posts. While gaps in informationgeneralization about possible differences in the Partisan career type of5 elite as opposed to6 elite, it is clear thatand "commissar" were generally mutually exclusive Partisan career paths and that both remain strongly represented in5 elite. They constituted roughly equal proportions of6 elite.

Comparison of level of postings at the end of World War II, as summarized in Table io, suggests that5 elite on balance saw less "senior" service in the Partisan war than did6 elite. (It is assumed that the missing cases in5 elite saw service5 at the divisional level or below.)

Members of the Yugoslav military elite fought the Partisan war predominantly, although not exclusively, "atn their respective native regions of Yugoslavia. This conclusiononsistent with the regionally-based organizational structure of the Partisans suggested by analysis of known regional postings of the "postwar

In this usage, the individual isure "dominant career type" if he had no more than one recorded wartime positionifferent nature. For example, an individual with three recorded command positions and one political position isf two political positions are recorded, he is con-

Tabic 10


level of Posting lite

Main Partisan


Regional Partisan



Brigade and

elite sample"ndicates the percentage

of native regional postings for each year25 (as well as for the postwar period). The significant exceptions to the pattern were the Montenegrins (nnd at the outset of the war, when there was no fighting in Serbia, the Serbs). Conversely, the region in which most "outsiders" fought was Bosnia-Herccgovina (where key Partisan battles were waged prior.

7. Postwar Careers

(a) Career Types. Tablel splays the postwar career patterns of the Yugoslav militarynalysis of dominant career type

The recorded regional postings during World War II of5 elite or6 elite separately are too few for analysis- It is assumed that neither of the specified "elites" would differ frost the Partisan Movementhole in this regard. The proletarian brigades were the exception to native-region based combat; eight of the proletarian brigades spent between S7 andercent of their time, respectively, fighting during the war outside their home regions.)

pure" career type is defined as permitting one exception to the respective career type in all known positional data. For example an officer withnown yearly postings as commander, one known yearly



of Regional Postings

of Regions

Native Regions



posting as political officer,ears unknown, iscoanander" for the purposes of this analysis. As noted in Section II, connissars existed in all units3 as full-time Party positions,,sinultaneously serving as Party secretaries;2 commissars were replaced by assistant commanders for political affairs, who were directly responsible to the commanders, not the Partyfor political affairs, but who nevertheless continued to serve as Party secretaries


indicates that6 military elite was dominated by commanders, with mixed, commander-political officers second, and politicaloor third. 5 military elite is characterised by the SHme rank ordering, although information gaps preclude aanalysis with6 elite in this regard. (Indication of dominant career type is lacking for the holders ofolitical positions, and one other position) Analysis of the postwar elite sampletronger relationship betweenommand posts andolitical postsndolitical posts, suggesting that many commissars shifted to command channels after the institution ofwas abolished

(b) Regional Postings. Tableontains data on native regional postings by year for the entire postwar period (along with wartime data). Although the limited number of known regional postings and uncertainties regarding comparability of the counts from year to year necessitate caution in drawing definitive conclusions, this table docs suggest tho existence of four distinct postwar periods in regional posting patterns: ho, when the Partisan pattern of predominantly "native" regional postings washe early

, when hoiae regional postings became almost thehe end ofnd, when non-native regional postings still exceeded home regional postings, butesser extent than in,heeriod, when home postings again exceeded foreign postings (approaching the ratio Note that this comparison of regional postings appliesto the regular YPA and excludes republican defense officials who, irrespective of their active, inactive, or retired YPA status are necessarily "natives" of tho respective republics. Since the positions of republican defense commanders and chiefs of staff did not existheir inclusion in5 elite makes the pattern of home postings more pronounced. Simultaneously, average posting lengths have increased; new officers are now assured of no more than six physical relocations in the course of their entire career, an innovation intended to make the military profession more appealing to the youth by reducing economic hardship and increasing home regional postings.'

This swing in regional posting patterns is apparent, moreat the military region and subregion headquarters levels. Sixty-three percent of the respective subgroup ofS elite for which data are available serve at home. Commanders of the respective regions and subregion account for many of the home postings; all but onehe exception being Brunoommander of tho Nis military region, whoroat born in Croatia. erb from Croatia is commander of the Zagreb region.) Below theof commander, non-native regional postings still seem to outnumber home postings (although the missing cases preclude definitiveon this). At the divisional commander level, three commanders whose native region is established serve at home, and one elsewhere (but the native region of one is unknown and three have not beenidentified).




In contrast,ercent of the relevant subgroup of6 elite at the military region and suhregion level served atFour of the five regions6 were commanded by "natives" (hut theseosnian Sorb in Sarajevoroatian Serb in Split). At the divisional level, two division ccmmwnders were "natives" and nine served in other regions (with the origins of one unknown and several division commanders not definitely identified).

(c) Career patterns. Career pattern* of two subsections of5 military elite, senior Defense Secretariat and General Stnff officials and military region commanders, have been examined. This subsection reviews, for each group, relevant individual career attributes and the resulting career pattern. This pattern illuminates the composition and characteristics of the subgroup, suggests major factors that seem to explain the promotion of one individual instead of another, highlights the impact of unusual influences, andetter basis for predicting future promotions.

Senior Officials of the Defense Secretariat and Genera1 Staff.

The Federal Secretary of National Defense,uj>ii[lc

was appointed'areer of exclusively "command"during and after World War II. He was named cowaander of the Frontier Guardf the War Collegend of themilitary region He was promoted to Major General6 and spent eight years each in the grades of Major Generalieutenant Colonel Generalnd Colonel General (CG) prior to his promotion to General of the Army It should be noted that his posting as commander of the War Collegetepping stone,ypath, in his career. His promotion to Federal Secretary7 bypassed numerous CCs with more seniority and higher posts in the defense establishment; his elevation was widely and plausiblyat the time as due to special ties with Tito originating from World War II (when Ljubicic served as the chief of Tito's headquarters guard).2 Ljubic'ic's political importance prior to his appointment was

'Ages in this Section are as

Ljubicic! was interviewed on this wartlmn experience in Front,

indicated by his election to the LCY Central Committee 9 he was included in the Party Presidium; heember of4 Central Committee.

The present Deputy Secretary of National Defense, mhos' Sumonja, was appointed Sumonja, too,artime and postwar career of "command" posts, interrupted importantly by duty as head of Tito's military cabinet3 umonja was appointed commander of the Split military region; his appointment as Chief of the General Staff7 reportedly (and plausibly) owed much to his long association with Tito. He was promoted to MG7 and served eight years as MG and seven years as LCG prior to promotion to CGeart attack9 led to his elevation to the lesspost of Deputy Secretary of National Defense.

Djoko .Jovanic was appointed to the newly created post of Under Secretary of National Defense Jovanic's military career consisted exclusively of command posts; he was appointed Assistant Chief of the General Staff foration and Mobilisationascommander of the Zagreb military regionnd4 was appointed Under Secretary of Defense. G by the end of World War II, he servedears as LCG prior to his promotion to CG9 (at. An archetypalovanic was the commanding officerumber of the other members of the top military leadership; these Include the present Chief of the General Staff, the Party Secretary in the YPA, and two of the assistant defense secretaries. erb from Croatia, he retained strong lies with his native region of Lika; heey organizer of the Partisan movement in Lika and was commander of the Sixth Proletarian Division, based in the area. Jovanic displayed strong political instincts, in keeping with his prewar Communist activism Herequent public speaker in Lika in. Ins commander of the Zagreb military region, he publicly and decisively

defended the Serb minority in Croatia against what the Serbs saw as the rising Croat nationalist threat.' Vet he remained aloof from Croatian Party affairs. He did not become the source of controversy in Croatian politics that one of his subordinates. LCC Wade Bulat. became; Bulat,erb from Croatia, had been prominent in the Croatian Party organisation since the. Jovanic: wasin4 Party Central Committee.

The appointment of Jovanico the new position of Under Secretary (with direct responsibilities fur security, intelligence, and personnel policy) can be viewed as an indication of both the seriousness with which the Yugoslav leadership viewed external and internal threats to the country in thend of theirto place these mattersuccessor to General Ivan Miskovic* acceptable to the professional military, the commanders. (MiskoviC was the career counterintelligence officer who served as Tito's security affairs advisor1J; the "MiskoviC affair" is summarized in Yet Jovanic" was removed from this key post in7 for unknown reasons; it may be speculated that he, too, concentrated security responsibilities in his hands sufficiently to threaten Ljubicic.

The present Chief of the General Staff. Stane Potocar (age SM alsoareer history of exclusively command posts. 5 he was appointed chief of staff of the Sarajevo military region;e became commander of that region; e was transferred to command the military region in his native Slovenia. e was appointed Chief of the General Staff, an appointment reportedly (and plausibly) linked with his nationality (since Ljubicic" and Sumonja were Serbs, while Croats held other prominent senior military posts).2 His performance in theilitary exercises1 (the first large-scale exercises held since) evidently demonstrated his military capabilities.5 He was promoted to Major General3 and

'Speech of

2DIA Biographic Dataonfidential.

Potocar acknowledged that the maneuvers (in which he commanded the "blue" forces)ole in his promotion. Interview in

served seven years in that grade andears as LCG prior to promotion to CG Me was elected to4 Party Central Committee.

The senior Yugoslav military officials below these top fourprimary political responsibilities in the military generally reached their present posts through steady progression from one command position to another. Knver Cemalovic" (ageommander of the Air Force and Air Defense Corps land an Assistant Federal Secretary of Defense,ommissar during World War II, but in the postwar period hecommand positions culminating in command of the Ploce He was appointed deputy commander of the Air Force Promoted to MGe served six years in that grade and eight as LCG prior to promotion to CG

The present Commander of the Navy (and corresponding AssistantDefenseranko Mamula,ixed careerartime commissar, his postwar career embraced major command,and intelligence posts in the Navy. He was appointed head of Naval Intelligencehief political officer of the Split military rajion4 (serving under Sumonja for severalnd assistant chief of the Navy He was promoted to Rear Admiral0 and served five years in that grade and eight years as Vice Admiral prior to his promotion to Admiral

The post of Assistant Federal Secretary of Defense for Rearbeen occupied2 by Pctar Matig. Matic" had aPartisan career, but spent the postwar yearspositions culminating in command of the War College inappointment to the post of Assistant Chief of the GeneralOperations Promoted to Major Generaleyears as MG and nine years as LCG prior to promotion to CG Prominent in the Vojvodina Party organization earlier, hein4 LCY Central Committee but dropped fromParty bodies; his political visibility declined as his


The post of Assistant Federal Secretary of Defense for Militaryhas been occupied1 by Dusan Vujatovic*, who spent the Partisan warommissar and held some political posts in the early

postwar period, but sinceias progressed to higher command positions;5 he was appointed commander ofh Armored Division; and9 named headection in the General Staff. Promoted to Major General ie spent seven years in that grade prior to promotion to LCG0 (and was promoted to CG.

The present deputy chiefs of the general staff arenko Sekarnjk, who has protocol and territorial defensein the General Staff, served under Potocar in thearid this association plausibly explains his transfer Promoted to Major Generale spentas MG and eight years as LCG prior Lo promotion to CG inPekicas appointed the first Deputy Chief of

the General Staff for Ground Forces (an elevation of status of the ground forces command) artime commander and cosoissar, Pekic held exclusively command posts in the postwar period,appointment as commander of the Armor Schoolilitarynd Assistant Chief of the General Staff lor 1 he was appointed Deputy Inspector-General. Promoted to Major Generale served seven years in that grade and six as LCG prior to promotion to CGhe post of Inspector-General, createderved initially i hannel for easing prominent military leaders out of the limelight. / The present incumbent, Dus'an Korac, does not completely fit that pattern. artime commissar, Korac* occupied primarily political posts in the postwar period, serving85 as political officer of the Zagreb military region. 7 he was appointed Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Organization and Mobilization;0 he was the (on professional grdunds, unlikely) first incumbent of the newly-established post of Assistant Chief of the General Staff

for Ground Forcesost he retained for only one year). Promoted to Major Generale spentears in that grade andears as LCC prior to promotion to CG

The career paths of the principal political officers in themilitary at present have been more varied. Ivan Polnicar, Assistant Federal Secretary of Defense with liaison functions, advanced his career on the basis of "commissar" posts. 1 he was appointed commander of the Air Force academy, from which he was elevated7 to the post of Assistant Federal Secretary of Defense for Political Affairs. His prominence at that time was indicated by his membership on the LCY Presidium9 (one of three militaryis appointment was foreshadowed by his membership on4 LCY Central Committee. 9 he was transferred to his present Assistantpost and was prominently involved in establishment of thedefense system. His meteoric career is demonstrated in hisrecord: ew major generale was promoted to LCG7 and, after only three years, to CG Thereafter, Dolnicar's prominence waned, evidently due to conflict with Ivan Miskovic, anderiod his responsibilities were limited to civil defense.' Although Dolnicar's visibility increased after Miskovic's ouster, and he wasSecretary of the National Defense Council (the key government body responsible to the state Presidency for defenseiswasrime indicator was his absence from4 LCY Central Committee.

Dolnicar's former post. Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, was filled1 by Dane Petkovski. Petkovski held bothand command posts in his career butolid record of command positions prior4 he was appointed commander of the 6th Division;ilitary subregion;f the infantry section of the General Staff. While filling these command positions, he continued torominent role in the Party organization in his native Macedonia, andesultember of the LCY Central

Tlie relationship between Miskovic and Dolnic'ar was perceptively analyzed by the Canadian military attache (DIA IK onfident ial).



Committees4 Promoted to Major General e served only four years in that grade and six yearsG prior to promotion to CG

The ?os; of Assistant Secretary for Personnel has been occupied4areer intelligence officer, Radovan Vo^vfldic, who hadommissar (and regional Party secrctaryl during World War II. Prior to his present appointment, vojvodic" served as Assistant Chief of The General Staff for Intelligence; his present importance is indicated by his membership onV Central Committee. ajor generale spent eight years in that grade prior to promotion to LCG1 (and was promoted to CG.

The present head of the Military Security Service'rofessional "commissar." Dane CuiCas appointed to this postis career as political officer culminated in his appointment asofficer of the Belgrade military region e transferred to the personnel section of the Defense Secretariat. ajor Generale spent eight years in that grade prior to promotion to LCG1 (and was promoted to CG. His appointment broke the postwar domination of career counterintelligence officers over the securityhange, as explained in Section V, occasioned by the Miskovic" affair. The most plausible explanation for the appointment of Cuic. lies in personal ties with Djoko Jovanic;

Cuic was Jovanic's -political commissar in the Sixth Proletarianat the end of World War II.

The chief Party official in the armedemail Sarac, assumed his position as Secretary of the military Party organizationuslim Slav, he has occupied exclusively political positions during and since the war. 6 he was appointed chief political officer of the Zagreb military region, where he served under Jovanic;9 heto Belgrade to head the political department and became an secretary of defense. D he also headed the newly-established department of territorial and civil defense;1 he became chief Party secretary in the armed forces and, exember of the federal Party Presidium. He sits on4 Party Central Committee.

Promoted to MC-e was elevated to LCG0 (and wasto CG in.

In recapitulation, commanders dominate the apex of the Yugoslav military establishment; the only pure political officers are the head of the security service (an appointment introducing new blood into that service, after the Miskoviche now less influential Assistant Secretary for Liaison, Dolnicar, and the secretary of the military Party organization. The Federal Secretary and his deputy had personal connections with Tito prior to their appointment; in contrast, "minority" national affiliation was evidently important in the promotion of the present Chief of the General Staff. The number three man in the military establishment5artisan commander evidently brought in toecurity establishment that was viewed as essential by the political and military leadership but that had threatened to turn against its masters- All other nonpolitical and nonsecurity posts have been filled by "commanders" who progressed upcommand" ladder; command Of military schools served as an

important rung. tter-day "commander" is in charge of political affairs in the military. The chief personnel officer is the former intelligence chief. At the senior level, the average time in grade as major generalears; as lieutenant colonelears. There were four exceptions to what seems to emergeule

of six years minimum time in grade; all were for political officers (however,promotions from this group to CG rank56 occurrod

after five years).

Mi 1itary Region Commanders

As the preceding discussion indicates, the senior posts in the Yugoslav military have in recent years been filled by occupants of military region command posts, and it is to the military region level that one should look first for future successors to those senior officials.

command, replacing Djoko JovanW. istory of exclusively command posts during and after World War II, Corkovic was namedofh armored divisionf the armor section of the


general staffnd head of the ground forces Promoted to MGe spent eight years in that grade and six as LCG (prior to his promotion to CG inS). erb from Croatia, he was reportedly not on the list of nominees of the Croatian Party leadership (all of whom were Croats) to replace Jovanic".

Mirko Jovanovic"as appointed commander of the Belgrade military region9 (and was replaced in the fall. More e held political posts during World War II and through. He served as divisional commander in the, become chief-of-staff of the Skopje regionommander of that regionnd moved to Belgrade His promotions were unusuallyew Major Generalie spent only fouT years in that grade and five years as LCG prior to promotion to CG He was included in4 Central Committee. Heerb froa Serbia proper.

Rabatja KadeniC, commander of the Sarajevo ailitary region, had, likeore "political" career path. Occupying both command and political posts during and after World War II, Kadcnir" served in the Skopje region command 1 he was made chief-of-staff of the Belgrade region;4 he transferred to Sarajevo as commander. ew Major Generale spent eight years in grade prior to his promotion to LCG9 (and was promoted to CG. He Is the first commander of the Sarajevo region of Muslim nationality (the largest national group in Bosnia-Hercogovlna).

Vasko Kiinmngelskias appointed commander of the Skopje military region9artime and postwar career of exclusively command positions. ajor Generale spent only three years in that grade and six as LCG prior to his promotion to CG Ahis appointment was plausibly reported to have been intended to assuage national feelings inis rapid promotion rate may be interpreted in the same light. (Karaangelski died in)

Jovanovic* was replaced by LCG Petar Gracamn,erb from Serbia, who joined the Partisans1 and subsequently advanced alongcommander" career path.



Franc Tavcaras appointed commander of the Ljubljanaregionucceeding Potocar. lovene, he held politicalnd command positions during World War II, but since the war he has

exclusively command positions;e was appointed c

the Engineering School Center. On inactive status,0 he moved to Ljubljanaeputy to Potocar. ajor Generale spent seven years in that grade and nine as LCG prior to

promotion to CG He was included in4 LCY Central


The cownander of the Nis military region3 hasroat from Croatia. artime commander, Vuletifattache and intelligence posts after the warS, when hecommander of the 8th (Varaldin) Division. 0 heto head Tito's military cabinet;3 he moved to Nis*. Generale spent seven years in that positionpromotion to LCG Sumo reports linked his departure from military cabinet3 with the Miskovic affair (but Vuletlc nonetheless promoted to CG in

In recapitulation, of the seven incumbents of the full military regions four had exclusively command careers, one combined intelligence and command postsey position on Tito's staff, and two had more political career histories. Of the latter, one was ofational group with very few representatives in thehe other has since been replaced. With the exception ofll are native sons of the region in which the military region

is located; Vuletic's appointment to Si" can be virwcd1 political counterweight to tbe command of the Zagreb Military region by Croatian Serbs, first Jovanic and then Corkovic. Croatian Party recoamenda-tions (and popular feelings of Croats) were disregarded in Corkovi^'s appointment. This can be viewed alternatively as the consequenceefusal by Tito to let national distinctionsiven republic play moreole than professional qualifications in promotion, orore punative policy dictated from Belgrade favoring the continued predominance of Croatian Serbs in military posts in Croatiaounter to Croatian nationalism. In contrast to the Croatlun case, Karaangel-ski's earlier appointment to Skopje was evidently Intended lu assuage Macedonian national feelings. At the military region level, thenuaber of years spent by the present occupants as major general; the sane figure applies to tenure as lieutenant colonel generals. The only exceptions to the six year ainiaua rule were Jovanovic. whose "political" career has been noted, and k'araangelski, memberminority" nationality.

Promotions of the present incumbents of senior and military district command posts do not conform to the norm (suggested by one foreign attache) of two years in an appropriately high "slot" and eight years -ni in mum time in grade prior to promotion.2 The existenceierarchy of "slots" keyed to ranks is confirmed by Yugoslav sources; promotion requires prior advancement to that slot. However, six years, rather than eight, appears to be (with allowance for exceptions) the minimum time in grade.

(d) Occupancy of Selected Posts. Comparison of the rank of occupancy of certain positions65 may point

There is soae indication (or ateeling on the part of Croats) that "packing" of defense posts in the city of Zagreb itself with Croatian Serbs Is deliberate policy. See The Political Role of the Yugoslavp..

^Analysis of the former Canadian military attache in Belgrade, DIAonfidential.

to structural changes in the military establishment. Political and republican defense positions will be considered here. The position of Party secretary at tho military region level has been devalued fter the post of Party secretary was separated from the post of assistant commander for political affairs at the military region level (as throughout thet wasajor General slot. As lateive of the seven military region Party secretaries had ranks higher than colonel. hen the Party secretaries at the military region level were the assistant commanders for political affairs, all were Lieutenant Colonel Generals. In contrast,5 these Party secretary posts were all filled by colonels (with the exceptionajor General in the Belgradedistrict). wo military region Party secretaries were included in the respective republican Party Central Committee;hree; butone. The post of assistant commander foraffairs at the military region level appears to remain aColonel General post; the identified occupants all have that rank.

On the other hand, an upgrading appears to have occurred inof occupancy of republican defense posts. herepublican defense secretaries were ail Major Generals; inleast two were Lieutenant Colonel Generals, an evidentimportant,5 the commanders of the republican defense(posts createdncluded four ColonelLieutenant Colonel General, and three Major Generals. Thisthe breakout Now as then, the commandersge or older and have strong regional

(e) Collateral Political Activities. ystematicof the collateral political positions occupied by members of

This pattern contradicts the conclusion, drawn by some observers, that placement of younger officers less tied to particular republics in the top territorial defense postsehicle for enhancing the regular military's influence over the republican defense staffs. This erroneous conclusion may have resulted from confusion of the post of commander of the respective republican defense headquarters with the post of chief of staff. The latter are (iudoins from three identified) Major Generals from the respective republic with recent division- or regimental-level command experience.

5 military elite and6 military elite proved impractical, other indicators of the nature of and changes in involvement of the military in politics are available. The number of military men in top political posts is one such indicator. he only quasi-military manenior political post was CG Milutin Moraca, and he retired from regular service prior to assuming the dutiesember of the Federal Executive Council he government executiveoday, in contrast, one of the Party Executive Committee Secretaries is CG Ivan Kukoc; the Federal Secretary of Internal Affairs is CG Franjo Herljevic; the Public Prosecutor is MG Vuko Gozzc-Gucctic; and LCG Ljuoisa Curgus heads the Directorate of Civilian Aviation. MG Dragoslav Radisavljevic was appointed Director of JAT, the civilian airline (however, for most of its postwar history JAT has been headedilitary man). Only Gozze-Gucetic is known to have formally retired.

Membership of military officers on the Party Central Committee is another indicator of political involvement. Table IS indicates the proportion of mililary members on postwar Party Central Committees.

Table 13


Percentage of

CC Membership

Tenth Congress)

Ninth Congress

The present Central Committeearger proportion of military members than at any time in the postwar period; this increase is all the more significant since, as indicated in Section II,f the presentilitary seats are allocated to the Array Party organization (the remaining military men being included in the Central Committee representations from individual republics and provinces). In

comparative terms, the military representation on the Yugoslav Central Committee is now greater than in the USSR and Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe,.although much less than in the PRC and Cuba of the Five of the military seats on the Central Committee are occupied by top defense secretariat officials; three are held by military region commanders; two are held by generals politically prominent outside the army; three arc held by political officers; and only two are held by full-time military-Party officials, one of whom is the Secretary of the military-Party organization. (The positions of two individuals remain unidentified.)

In contrast to more military involvement in the federal Party Central Committee, at the republican level military representation on Party Central Committees reached its peak9 and hasdeclined. Tableisplays the proportion of militaryon postwar republican and provincial Central Committees. These data indicate that the policies of theimed atthe barriers between the Army and the rest of Yugoslav society did lead to greater lateral ties between the Army and the republican Party organizations. Moreover, the military contingent on the republican Central Committees included some of the Army Party secretaries for the respective military regions. On the other hand, the further increaseole for military men in the federal Party Central Committee after the political turbulenceas been accompanied by aof military representation on the republican Central Committees.

Additional (albeit fragmentary) indicators of military participation in politicsreater (hut not overwhelming) role played by military men in contemporary Yugoslav political institutions. The new

The proportion of military representatives on the Central Committees of other Communist countries for selected recent years is as follows:) ercent;)ercent;ercent;ercent;ercent;ercent;ercent;ercent. ; Beck andJ; Haue Zurcher Zeitung,

i !


i I


electoral system introduced4 provided that military units and organizations be separately included in the new system of multiple indirect representation; the issue of such separate representationubject of controversy during the preparation of the new electoral system. Byocal YPA "delegations" had been chosenotal0ercent of whom were Party members); these delegations elected seven military delegates to the Federal Assembly;o republican and provincial assemblies (anf eight per republic oro local assemblies." By way4 the then much larger federal assembly included eight military men; only five military officers were among the delegates to all the republican assemblies. More precise data were supplied for the Skopje military region ercent of the officers and civilian officials in the military Party organization were reportedly active in nonmilitary organs; two hundred and ninety-five were selected for the "delegations" of military units, whileere included in the "delegations" of other, nonmilitary local entities; oneolegatc to the Federal Assembly; four were delegates to the republican assembly;ere delegates to communal assemblies;ere active inbodies of "social-politicalrimarily the Socialist Alliance and the veterans organization.4 In the Air Force,ercent of the officers were reportedly active in leadership organs oforganizations. "*

Corresponding data for the period prior to the political turbulencere not available; isolated bits of information do suggest

4 Constitution revamped Yugoslavia's electoral system,direct with indirect multiple representationetwork of locally-chosen "delegations" who in turn elect "delegates" to multi-came ral representative assemblies at the local, republican, and federal levels. escription is given in

lka?odna amija,

Data derived fromepublinkeNaiYxinaanjug, December

that the greater involvement of the military in nonmilit.aryevident at the federal and republican Party levels0 was reflected at lower level Party organs as well.

9 Army Communists were included in nonmilitary Party organs at all levels,ilitary Partyn the Zagreb military region were reportedly included in nonmilitary Party



Survey research within the Yugoslav military is, as noted In Appendix A, highly developed. Although the results of this research are generally classified, from time to time fragmentary data are published in Yugoslavia. However selective and politically motivated, these published results shed additional light on attitudes within the military.

This Appendix reconstructs, to the extent possible froareporting, the results of two key polls of the officer corps. All of the polls were conducted by the Center for Andragogical, Psychological, and Sociological Research of the FSND. Each of the following subsections indicates the nature of the poll; lists actual or reconstructed questionsiewtions reconstructed fromarc enclosed In brackets) nnd available breakdown of responses; and adds any other information about the results.

Survey of Military Party Members on Army Party Organization8 Information on poll: The sample size9 were officers andere conscripts.

Question 1

(How great is the influence oi tha Party oo life and work in the Army'J

Influence could be

Influence is very strong

About three quarters of the respondents are not completely satisfied with the influence of tha Party in YPA-

f those who find LCY influence insufficient are soldiers.

Respondents with lower rank (NCOs, lieutenants,relikely Co answer that Party influence Is very strong than arc those of higher rank (majors. It. colonels, colonels).

Source: Vjesnlk, Janu.iry

Conscript respondents of peasant origin and agricultural experience are most likely Lo Sec Party influence as very strong, while soldiers from urban milieuseast satisfied withvaluate as too limited| Party influence.


[Did the reorganization ofY in the Army bring ahoutof the content of Party work in your

So change - f the officers No opinion - f thef the NCOs


|Did the reorganization of the LCY in the Army bring about anof the socio-political activities of NCOs and officers in local communities outside the Array?"

f tho officers

f the NCOs

f the officers

Don't know - f the officers

Question 4

[To what extent is the work of the Party ln the Army Influenced by the military hierarchy?)

Partiallyf the officers

f thef the soldiers Strongly influenced f the officers

f thef the soldiers Overallf the respondents believe that the military hierarchy partially or strongly influences the work of the Party.


Quest Lon 5

[How Independent iB the Party oraanlzation in yourotally independent - f the conscripts Partially or strongly influenced by the

Military hierarchy - f thef the conscripts with highest educational level believe that the Party in the YPA is not totally independent.

Question 6

[What is the effect of military aubordination on theof relations in Partyegative - bOX of tha officers

f tha NCOs

f tha aoldiera

Question 7

[Military subordination is an obstruction to democratic processes in che Party.]

f the officers

f the NCOaf the soldiers

Question 8

| What aspects of the work of the of the LCY ln the YPA should be given

the greatest attention on the eve of the IX Congress of the LCY?)

Pull realization of the role of tho

LCY inf the officers

the NCOs

the total sample

Ideological preparation of the LCY

in thethe officers

f the NCOs

f the total sample

Increased efforLs to combat and defeat

bureaucratic and conservative concepts- - f the officers

f thef the total sample

Intra-party relations and increased

struggle of f the officers

f che NCOs

f the total E che officers

f thef the local sample

Question 9

|What aspects of the development of the Army should be given the greatest attention in the preparation for the IX Congress of theducation oE personnel and theoE commanders that are also



military preparedness-




General Survey of Officer Attitudes,1

Information about poll: This survey was conducted anonymously betweennd1 andtandard representative sample of military personnel with the rank of sergeant and above. All ranks and nationalities were proportionally represented in the sample.

Source: NIK,


Quest Ion 1

[Will the constitutional amendments create favorable conditions for strengthening tha Influence of the working class in all sociales - o

Rank and nationality do not significantly influence responses.

f tbe sergeants and sergeants first class have no opinion.

Question 2

(What impact would the strengthening of republican statehood have on the development ofositive -


Negative - 1

Rank and nationality do not significantly Influence responses.

Question 3

[What Impact would the strengthening of republican statehood have on the development of nationalositive egative o

Positive responses increase proportionally with rank. Nationality does not significantly influence responses.

The constitutional changes1 codified the substantialof political power from tbe federal to the republican level.

"Republican statehood"ey tarm utilized by the proponents of greater republican-level powers.

Question 4

[What impact would the strengthening of republican statehood have on Yugoslav unity?)

Very positive &


So 2OX

Nationality does not influence responses. Question 3

[What impact would the strengthening of republican statehood have on the defense capabilities of Yugoslavia?]

Positive - arge majority

Negative - 42

Respondents of the Croatian and Macedonian nationalities are somewhat more positive.


[In your opinion what emphasis should be given to the class factor and what to the national factor in the further development of social relations in ouroth factors should be given

f the officers

The class factor should have

Of noncoms

high-rank officers Preference for emphasis on class factor increases proportionally with rank, while the reverse is true regarding the national factor.

Attention to the relative weight of "class" and "national" factors was central to theolitical debate in Yugoslavia; the "national" factor was stressed by the strongest proponents of national and republican rights.

Respondents of the Montenegrin and Slovenian nationalities wouldlass emphasisuch higher degree than others: Montenegrins - lovenians -

Question 7

[In your opinion was the national problem adequately dealt with in the discussion on) constitutional amendments?!

The national problem was overemphasized in the discussion


f respondents

Ofhigh-rank officers

The national problem was not adequately emphasized In the discussion

- %

Among the officersmall majority believes that the national problem was overemphasized. The reverse is true about NCOs.

Respondents of the Slovenian, Montenegrin, and Serbian nationality, as well as those listed aselieve that Che national problem has been overemphasized somewhat more than the other nationalities.

quest ion 8

|Wh,it effect would the proposed constitutional ammendmentsave on the unity and brotherhood of ourositive - o opinion -

% of sergeants major respond in the positive.

The percentage of positive responses of Croatians and Macedonians is somewhat larger than those of the other nationalities.

Question 9

[In your opinion what arc the most important factors chat unite the Yugoslav peoples?]

Tin* respondents were asked to choose three out of elevenanswers.

here than bOZ Indicated the following factor* as contributing

nuit to unltv:

The People's Liberation War

Socialism and self-management

Common defense and security

The league of Communists of Yugoslavia

Young officers and NCOs tend to arrows the unifying character of tha PHI more, while officers of higher rank give priority to socialism nnd self-management and common defense und security.

f the responders list the ethnic simllnrlty of thepeoples as one of the three most Important unifying factors.

ist economic interests as one of the three major factors of unity. The economic interests factor is sixth mom important overal1.

Among respondents who list the PLU as the most factor, the Macedonians and the Serbs are the most numerous, while Muslims are the least numerous.

Question 10

(From time to time one hears about dangers that threatensocialist community. Which, ln your opinion, ispresent

The respondents could choose among tha following five, answers:

Unitarian hegemonism2

Nationalism and chauvinism

Extt-rnal aggression

Unsolved economic problems

Subversive and espionage activities of the external and

Internal enemy

Nationalism and chauvinism was chosen as the greatest danger. of respondents.

ff high-rankf allf NCOS

This percentage is four times larger than the number of rer spondents who listed foreign aggression as the main danger.

Nationality does not significantly influence responses.

Officers of Slovenian nationality stress the danger stemming from unsolved economic problems more than other officers-

Question 11

[What are the major weaknesses in our society? ]

Increasing social differentiation and negative developments in socio-economic life


f colonels

56% of sergeants The tendency to regard Increasing social differentiation as

the major weakness increases with rank of the respondents.

Unemploymentajor weakness takes second place overall.

The choice of private sector growthajor weakness Is considerably more pronounced anong the sergeants than it is among the colonels.

Question 12

[What, are the major strengths of the Yugoslav socialistesponses included the following rank order:

and unity - unanimous choice as roost impor-

tant asset.

Sovereignty and Independence

Personal freedom and security

<4) ianageaent and pay according to work.


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