An Inter-Office Projection Based on Quantitative Methods
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Jnaulhoilndo Criminal SoncHsm
Proem* Report No. 20
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS Anffice Projection Bated on Quantitative Methods
This pro|cct consist* of three quantitive approaches to Sino-Sovieteam nf analysts, drawn from various components of the CIA and concerned with different aspects of Chinese and Soviet affairs, exomlnesontinuing basis nil relevant Intelligence Items. The first part of this project It to consider the effect nf this evidence on the possibility of one or another level of Slno-Sovlet hostilities. The analysts' numerical assessments of the likelihood of such hostilities, calculated occordlnt; to the Bayesian formula of probabilities, ore presented in the graph on. The second pert of the project Is an application of the same Bayesian technique tn scennrlos nf improved relations. The third pert of this projecthart of Slnn-Snviet tensions, based upon subjective overall evaluation by the participants- Progress reports are publishederiodic basis by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis.
The major event during this two-month period was the return lo Peking of Deputy Foreign Minister llkhev. head of the Soviet delegation to the border talks litemoviet media continued to avoidhend nn thv other side, some reduction was noted In the volume (though not the Irnel of Chinese criticism of the Soviet Union
The probability of any farm nf hostilities remains quite low In the nest sis month* (srehe possibility of various forms nf reconciliation Incrrnvd significantly from the Soviet side, but the Chinese appeur adamantly npnosrd The iiver.ilI level nf tension rrmalned obmit the same.
Itrftutar readers of this publication will notice change In the title and graphic* Thevhift In the focus nf the project Inward the possibility nf improved rrlutlons.
flainst Chinese ]0
atratask) c* nuclear target* wtOim eh month*.
OCT NOV JAN
.The Soviets win launchlocalized cross-border attack, with limited objectives, on alarger than9ithin six month*.
*!da willsvei of activity sulfident toevolt by one or mora minority group* near the border wtthtn Ux month*.
Theillross-border attack, withcala larger9tthtn aut month*.
f It 'is*
will ba an aftorti;'aloWfXjantiy Irnprovaotation*wttninrr*>nit* I'
will ba an aftort toa maatkyg otwrtMn ii month*
TtwWW bo an aftort tooint atatamant about mutual ratatWna wnhlnatatji j
ITEMS OF EVIDENCE CONSIDERED IN THE REVISIONANUARYi
I. Hmd of the Soviet delegation for border talks withlichev. returned to Peking onovember after an IB-month absence. He was greeted by his counterpart, Yu Chan. Border talks were resumed onovember. (Press.
Soviet ntMetals In Peking ployed down his return, callingoutine contactlonghe Soviet embassy
in Peking toldotlicial that Mno-Soviet bordc: talks hod struck a
sour note even before rney started. He said that when IHcheVi plane stopped over at Child Instead of Irkutsk, the Chineseequest to reroute the flight, delaying Ilichev for two hours. The counselor said that Ilichev did not bring to Peking any new proposab. and what the Soviets really want to do at the talks Is to determine China's attitude toward the USSR after Mao's death.
High-ranking Chinese officials expressed the view that the returneceptive tactic to lead the US and Eastern Europe to believeeconciliation Is still
Chinese diplomats in Moscow were skeptical
lh.il Ilichev brought anyvlrt nffen I
Soviet media continue the moratorium on direct polemics with China Instituted after Mao's deathep. Soviet radio broadcasts to China, however, continued to Initiate veiled criticism of Peking's positions In the Sino-Soviet dispute. (Various FBIS.
Since the death of Mao Tse-tung Mv* volume of Pekln* media criticism of the Soviet Union has been reduced. However, routine lesel Chinese commentaries continue to frequently attack Soviet domestic tnd foreign policies. And authoritative Chinese spokesmen have occasionally, rebuked the Soviets for "dreaming" th.it Mao's death would resulthange In Peking's hostility toward the Soviet Union (FBIS Trends throughout the period.
n private statements to foreign journalists. In the first week of November. Chinese officials reiterated China's willingness to "maintain" normal slatr-to-statr relations but haveard line nn conditions for Improvement.ov.
OnovemberLl Feng-lln. Flnt Secretary of the PRC emhossy In Moscow.
there lhat the Chinese wan! better state-to-slate rela-
iney have "never" hiddenthere hot been no sign that Ihe Soviets ore serious about Improvement and thut Includes Tlkhvlnskly
oviet ForeignChinalreyrv onecemberMoscow on China's diplomacy. He sold that It is based on
remise thut the other side must tin something in ruder thai relations nun Ix-cmc
mifnwl.n* In rrlalloni wilh thr Stivlrt Union, he suld. where they seton the border: with Jopun. where ihey Insist on Japanese' hegemony" language; and with Ihe US. where Ihey put forthTaiwan. But ihc Chinese "do not take account" of what China shouldorder toelationship of Irue mutuality of benefits. Thisorie-stdrd "chauvinistic" opproech, Klreyev concluded
eking Radio broadcast In Russian to the USSR on New Year's eve encouraged the "peoples of the Soviet Union" lo advance In "the struggle against the fascist dictatorship of Brezhnev's revisionistPeking Radio.ec.
eputy Premier LI Hslen-nlen.peech on IS Novemberanquetvbillng President of (he Central African Republic, declared: "Buiwhile continuing to slander and ihrealen China, has kept creatingof relaxation of telalloni. This Is wishful thinking andsupplied) Sovirt Ambassador Tulitlkov and diplomats from Moscow'sallies had walked out of ihe banquet hall earlier after LI hud"wildly nmhillnus" and "criminal" actions In Africa.ov.
arty Chairman Hua Kuo-feng.5 December speech, declared that. "The Imperlnlists, ami Ihe soclal-lmperlutists In particular, pinned their hopeshe possibilityiolent turmoil In China after Ihe pawing of Chairman Mao; their bones hove now com* to nnihlng. They also dreamed of the emergenceertain force that would aller the revolutionary line and ortentat'on Chai*man Mao had defined fortheir dream, lou. hat now beenPeking NCNA English. 28
apanese delegation was told by Chinese provincial officials that Soviet border violations were still frequent and that there hoduch violations Iwtwrrn January and6 The Chinese alsn sold lhat5 there had beenases of Russian border violations and attacks agulnst Chinese living along the border In Hrilnngklang. In addition they asserted (but the Soviet* are constantly holding maneuvers along the border" Soviet divisions are deployed.YODO,ec.l
ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES USED IN THIS PROJECT.
The graph onhows (he average of analysts' estimates of Ihe likelihood of hostilities; the Bayrslan method of calculation is used. This method, ase,eries of appraisals of inuring intelligence made Independently by individual analysts. Every participant weighs each new piece of relevant data in terras of the hypotheses shown, which, for the purpose of this exercise, are considered to be mutually exclusive. Simple mathematical calculations, applying the new evidence to tbe analysts' previous estimates, then yield updated estimates, which serve as the basis for the chart,
The chart onn extension of the same Baytslan technique to scenarios
Tbe chart ons an ongoing measurement of the level of Sino-Soviet tensions. It isayeslan analysis: no sr-ciflc hypotheses are posed and no prior mathematical calculations are made ci the basis of prior estimates Instead, at the start and nt bimonthly Intervals, each of thr participantsosition on the scaleo represent his best Judgment of the current general state of tensions between Moscow and Peking. (The points.ndave been designated as reference points, as explained on themall shifts from the analysts' Initial positions may not prove to be meaningful, but abrupt or sustained movement In the lines will be significant.
The measurement of the degree of general tension should be considered as complementaryindependentestimates of the likelihood of hostilities. Taken together, the two approaches ensui" continuing examination of the probabilities of conflict and of the overall state of relations between the USSR and China.
The terms of new evidence considered each period are Identified by the participants themselves, consolidated by ORPA and then resubmitted to all the analysts for tlielrIn terms of ihe Baves hypotheses and as factors bearing on the general state of