NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Jnoulherlitd Dl.tlo.ur. 5ub|KIrlirtnol SaneHoni
Diversity But Ultle
Old Wine In New Bottles
The Conservative Ideologue
The Sniici Nattanalut
Thr Parly Reformer
Other Nationalism In
The Spectrum of Soviet Dissent
t'rnmlwv ItUttl-mii o/ IniflliMfnrr Um IK?
Problems nf human rljthh In thc Soviet Union cow an nlrrmcly hmodof heterogeneous Interests. Three major grouping are discernible In Soviet dissent, overlapping hut also carrying within them serious Internal conflicts In broadest terms, there ore thr intellectuals, the nationalists, and the religious believers.
Russians are the most visible nf the Intellectual dissidents and contribute thc bulk of thethe officially unpuhlishablc works that reach the West. The crosscurrents within Rus-ion intellectual dissidence have come to be symbolized by three men who disagree hotlt on substunce ond on tactics. Andrey Sakharov and Alekvandr Solzhcnitsyn are heirs tn the two conflict In* mainstreams currenth century Russianof the westward lookingand Snlzhenltsyn nf thr Inward-looking Slavophiles. Sakhornv Is attracted by Western democrntlr processes; SoJi-Jicnirsyn places the goal nf the spirtual and moml regeneration nf tlie Russian. Ukrainian, and Relorusslnn peoples ahead of the pursuit of political freedom. The thirdfor reform of the "socialistidding it of the "distortions" Imposed by Stulln. The three men hove differed sharply In public, nnd Western expressions nf Interest In one may deeply disturb unolher who sees his own goats thereby threatened.
The full range of political positions visible In tamizdat Is. of course, far broader than these three.ussian Socialists. Social Democrats. All-Russian Social Christians. Russian Patriots. Democrats. Neo-Kadets.the political tag* swirl. It I* noteworthy, however, that culls for violence ore rare and thnt acts nf violence that con be attributed with any degree of certainty to Pusslan Intellectual dissidentsen even niter.
The majorf Intellectual dissent are extreme expressions of morr moderote ond more generally held views in thc central party apparatus nnd nmnng Moscow's establishment Intellectuals. There are important differences In degree between lhe dissidents and their Internal audiences, but
commonossible. When foreign InlertM is ciprcsscd in par cuuvr nr
ever. this communication becomes more difficult Iwcuiisr
"ouhidrn" arr involved and hraiiite the whole Hiiicalithin the regimr tnid* In shiftefensively cmservulive dlrectinn.
Sukhurnv and Medveslev share the traditional weakness of Russiun Intellectuals; they lack grass-rootsatural popular uudlence in Ihe Russian worker and peasant, hut since his expulsione has In their eyesstigma of trying to Impede relaxation of International tensions
Thc grassroots support that lhe Intellectual dissidents lock Is visible, though difficult lo quantify, for both nationalist and religious dissent. Very Utile nationalist tamlzdal is separatist; most of ll consists of protests against particular aclions of authorities and nf special Interest pressures. This Insistence on separate interests precludes any real unity among nationalistut each group, like the Intellectual dissidents, can "talklnmestlc audience.
There hasoticeable revival In nationalist feelings among the peoples of the Soviet Union; It Is symptomatic of the waning of Marxist-Leninist elan and has been fostered by the relative relaxation In Ihe political atmosphere since Stalin's death. Moreover, native cll.es have emerged In lheon-Russian republics during this period, and these local cadres now draw on their own pasts to Infuse Communismational hue. For these audiences too, however. Intervention by an "outsider" complicates
onsiderable extent, religious dissent overlaps with nationalist dissent. Each of Ihe major republics Is Identified wllh an established religious faith, and protests, for example, from Lithuanian Catholics against individual acts of oppression may be as much Lithuanian notionalist as Catholic. In addition, however, there Is evidence of conflicts within these established churches between Ihe churchsee themselves forced to work with governmentdissident believers who feel the hierarchies hove "collaborated" loo much. Western Inlerest In these dissidents undercuts the efforts and positions of lhe established churches.
The Evangelical Christian Baptist Church constitutes the major exception tn this mix nf nationalist and religious Inlrresls. Its congregations are scattered throughout Ihe Soviet Union and are reported to be especially strong In lhe prison camps. It loo suffers from Internal conflict and has split Into two groups, one working within the frnmewnrk of Soviet laws and regulations and one working underground.
There Is little in this picture to suggest that Soviet dissent is more than an embarrassment to the regime, but one lhat It must live wllh. To attempt to do more thnn muffle these voices In the short term would he tn riskomestic witchhunt that couldross the fine line between the dissidents and their audiences within the regime, tn soy nothing of damaging the Soviet Union's International Image.
The Spectrum of Soviet Dissent
apparently endlessmm ond women risksychiatric word, or csllcrief public declaration of conscience. Sinyavsky and Daniel. Ginzburg and Galnmlinv. Krusln and Yaklr. Crlgorenko. Rokovtky. Ginzburg nnd Orlnv.protesters rise In the surface und are skimmed nff by Sovlw authorities. Thousand! of pieces ofliterallythe nfflciully un-puhllshuhlc clrcultitr In typescript, some In multiple copies like chain letters, some Inew. Three mnjor grouping* are dlwcrnlblc. overlapping hut also carrying within them serious internalintellectuals, notionalists, ond rrliglnus believer*.
The Dissident Intellectuals
Meal visible because of their access In Western correspondents are the dissident Russian intrllrc-luuls. In recent years, Ihe crosscurrents among thrin hnve come to be symbolized by Ihrce men who lutve on nccaslnn agreed, but are by no means united In theirSukharnv, Alcksundr Solzhenitsyn. and Roy Mcdvcdcv.
Summaries of political positions eon at best be no more than caricatures. The men themselves ore obviously far more complei. and the varied positions hrld by more or less like-minded Soviet Intellectuals arc multitudinous. The following b, therefore, offered with apologies for someoversimplification.
Sokhornv ond his "oppositeolzhenitsyn, ore heirs to tne two conflicting mulnstreomi currenth centry Russianof the westwardInternationalists and Solzhenitsyn of Ihe Inward-looking Slavophiles.hysicist und member of the Academy of Sciencesolds at his central belief the overriding need of mankind In the nuclear nge for Intellectual freedom. Initially moved by the potential dan-gen he saw for mankind In nucirar bomb tests, he has broadened his arguments to Include
proposal*oviet bill of rights ond the Introduction of Western democratic processes und cooperation with Ihe West In Ihe Soviet economic system and foreign policy. Whether through discretion or conviction, he has not suggested that the "socialist system" Itself Is wrong, but mulntolns that It needs to be democratized.
An dm/ Sofchorov
His has been the one consistent voice raisedatter of principle In ease after cose of individual Soviets of all nationalities andcolorations who have been Incause of their personul Iwllcfs. For example.n the early stagesove of arrests of Ukrainian dissidents, leaders of the groupconsidered organizing a committee to
pmtrM U l'.nlii iii.ii .irrtsl They (llH'lllltl, llOW-
rvrr, llmtu committee would not lieirtunr" Ihtuum1 ihc urresicd wnmun's hus-luml hud ihhx Iwcti connected wiih uthrrrfitrrInstead, ihey referred her case to Sukhumv In Moscow. The latter protested her trial In Kiev. Her fellow Ukrainian dissidents who luul feared to defend her were themselves arrested thr following, month, and Sakharov duly protested their arrest* at well.
Where Sakharov places his faith in the mind of man. Solzhenitsyn's care Is for his spirit. He Is concerned with lhe need for the spiritual and moral regeneration of "Russia" or. moreof the Russian. Ukrainian, and Belorussian peoples. The "language of politics" seems tonexpressive" und thc pursuit nf politicalas the first nnd mulnmlscalculu-
he Wanton ilnnocrutie model has little uptHjl for him. und he hus suggested lhat uiithoriluriunhui. which he sees as huving served Hnttla well throughout lis history, mightore upproprlutc model If only some higher spiritual vulues could he found to hind those In uuthorlly. In his view. "Russia" must detach itself fmm the distractions of the International arena and turn Inward to find splrltuul repen-tunce and heul Its soul. Once this spiritual regeneration has been accomplished, he predicts that the outgoing Russian character will reussert itself, and "wc shall undoubtedly want to help poor and backward peoples and succeed In doing so. But not out of political self-lnteresl."
Solzhenllsyn turns to the ancient traditions of Russia, but Medvedev turns back toefore "Marxlst-Lenlnlst socialism" wasby Stalin. To ell minute the uutliorltnrinn-
ism mul bmnuurutinit Ion for which he Illumes
Putting un end hi Russian chauvinism und Ruulfkitttnn, which, he wains, wily rsiii-crhutc* other rutinnallsm.
Stimulation of genuine (lemocrucy within the purty. Including the possibility ofurlety of tendencies ond groups within the purty.
Tolrrutlon of various currents outside the party, even If this leads to formation of other political parties.
Transformation of the Supreme Soviet und lowei ImkIIcs Into real political decision* making bodies that would hold longer sessions and election reformshoice of candidates.
Ensuring the genuine Independence of the judiciary.
Freedom of speech and the press, ubolltion of censorship.
Recognition of the right to Information.
Freedom tolace of residence und to Iruvel both Inside Ihe USSR and abroad.
Ending "excessive" Inequality of
Retaining centralized planning for large enterprises but with an Injection of real worker Influence through the trade unions.
Smaller enterprises to be run as
As In the cose of Sakharov. Intellectual freedom was the catnlytt that moved Medvedev toward dissent, and In fact, the two men were early collaborators when they Joined4 an ultimately successful attempt lo break theof Stalin's protege. Troflm Lyscnko. on Soviet biological research. Medvedev also shares witheluctance to abjuremtuthema to Solzhenitsyn. but he seems less convinced thun Sakharov that the Soviet"mharked onmuch lo leurn from the "capitalist" societies of the West.
The support grnrruted for the generul positions of Sukhomv. Solzhenitsyn. and Medvedev is reflected in very broad terms In serialized mmlzilnl that has reached the West.
Chmnlclr of Current Event. (Sakharov) was "published" every Iwo months from8 untilhen the Committee for State Security (KCR) broke up the "publishing" ring. It 1ms uppcared sporadically since then us new editors hove picked up the task. It has, by and large, been marked by allegiance to the cause of human rights and. In particular, to the right to freedom of opinion ond Information. It has carefully catalogued the fates of Individual dissenters and the development of umlzdat ind has summarized political discussions that might not otherwise have been disseminated.
Vccheas named after Ihe old Russian popular assembly and appeared14 when quarrels within the group producing It interrupted Its appearance. In contrust to the clandestine production resorted to by the producers of the other series, the production In Moscow of Ver/ie was aopen process, and the name of its chief editor, Vladimir Oilpov, appeared on theIt carried articles on philosophical,and religious themes, eschewed political questions, and was marked by strong Russian nationalism and Slavophilism. Some of Its editors and contributors were linked In other forumsairly virulent strain of anti-Semitism, and this contributed to Ihe final breakup of the group.
Political Diary (Medvedev) begannd at leostssues hodublished" when one of Its recipients1 handedf Ihemestern contact. Wi do not know whether the series has continued. The Internal evidence In those issues that have reached the West suggests strongly that Its producers and Its readership were to be found among reform-minded party officials In fairly responsible positions.
Diversily Bui Little Violence
Of course, neither these three men nor the serialized tamtzrlat represents the full range of political positions visible in tamlzdat. Neo-Stnlinists. Russian Socialists. Social Democrats. All-Russian Social Christians. Russian Pntriots.
Democrats, Nco-Kudcts,the polltl-cul togs nvlri. Il It noteworthy, however, thai cull* for violence have been tare and thai acts of violence thul cun Iv attributed with uny degree of ccrtulnty to Russlun intellectual dissidents huve been even rarer.
One such caseeningradIhe All-Russian Socialwas avowedly dedicated to the armed overthrow of the regime. Foundedts links extended to such disparate places as Moscow. Tomsk In Slheria. and Slaullal In Lithuania. It was uncovered by the KGBndembers received prison sentences ranging fromonths loears.
No official announcement has been made concerning the results of the authorities'of the bomb explosions In the Moscow subway In early January and the fire in Moscow's Hotel Rosslya the following month. Moscow dissident circles reportedly believe that the real culprits have been identified as young menown outside Moscow lhat was. like many outlying areas, suffering from an acute shortage of food products. The young men had been accustomed lo come lo Moscow every weekend tn stock up. The bombs were allegedly an expression of resentment over their loss of access to Moscow food stores, some of which had been closed on Sunday's since the poor harvest5 began to affect food supplies.
Whatever the final mulls nf their Investigation may he. Sovietcontrast lo their handling of7 trials of the All-Russian Socialdetermined tn minimize both the fire and the bombings. Sakharov's early somewhat pankky charge thot Ihe bombsprovocation" by Ihe authorities to give them an excuse loroad crackdown was sharply denied, and Sakharov was warned againstsuch charges. Now. three months after the bomb explosions, there Is little evidence of tightened security mensures In Moscow.
A Soviet weekly newspaper has recentlyan article on the Hotel Rosslya Rre. the first extended discussion In the Soviet media of the event. The meusures to be taken, by implication Inepetition of theand loss of life. Include the Installation of additional flreflghtlng equipment and fire ularms. construction of smoke-free stairwells.
wider use of fire resistantnd more Intensive fire drill training of hotel personnel. There Is ro hint thul the authorities believe that the fire was unythlng other ihun uccldental.
Old Wine In New Botllci
Intellectual dissent In the Soviet Union isunction of the stance of the leadership, not of the Ideas expressed. Atd Party Congress1onument be erected to theof Stalin'sroposal thai was warmly seconded by the second secretary of the Moscow city parly committer Plans for the particular memorial were quietly shelved when Khrushchev was ousted. Last fall,nlngrad Intellectuals became "dissidents" when lliey tried toovement to erectcmorlul.
In the political "thow" that followed Stalin's deathange of nonconformity emerged similar lo lhat now being expressed by the dissidents. It was phrased more discreetly but nonetheless unmistakably in official publications by respected members of the intellectualThere was harsh public criticism of the authors, and chief editors of offending journal? were removed, but Khrmhchev himselfencouraged the ferment, using itolitical weapon against hi) more conservative col leagues.
Novelists, poets, ond artists led the way (Ycvtushenko. Vozncsensky. and Lyublmnv, foristoriansital role In Khrushchev's destruction of Stalinist shibboleths. Economic quarrels ranged frombermon's proposals for market socialism to V. M. Glushkov'i vision of totally centralized planning and management by computer. The newly established discipline ofnew that it is still not possible toigher degree Inlong-held tenets of Marxlsm-Lenlnlsm on tne basis of Its pragmatic research.
Quarrels among the "hard" scientists and technologists have had less direct politicalOne knowledgeable former participant in the ferment has warned that they have been so alienated hy required courses in Marxism-leninism that they are naively apolitical and vulnerable to the appeal of centralists who promise order and efficiency In return for tight political controls. Nevertheless. Sakharov sprang
(nun till* cornmunity, unci umunK tin* signers eif the eurl)ro'est petitions In the regime were Internal tonally respected names from these fields.
With the rpmovol of Khrushchev's often arbitrary authorityiscretion Indecreased, and such rellahle newspapers as Pravda and Red Star began airing remarkably unconventional Ideas from members of the party establlihment. By the fallome Soviet leaders had hud enough, and after hard fighting In theid was put on the ferment.
Inatirists Andrey Sinyavsky and Yulleceived prison sentences for "defaming" the Soviet Union through the mouths of iheir fictional characters. The shock of the trial and sentences to party officials and intellectuuls alike was enormous. Publicwas relmposed. and dissent In Its current form was born. It Is essentially an appeal to like-minded people at home and abroad.
Its first appearance took the form of petitions addressed to the leadership. They wereoften statesmanlike, and signed by respected figures In the arts and the Academy of Sciences. These were leaked to the Western news media, which publicized them widely abroad and replayed them Into the Soviet Union. The authorities'carefully controlledof official pressures, firings, and arrests of juniordosed off the flow ofonconformist energies were diverted to utmlzdat and to personal declarations of conscience that use Western correspondents in Moscowounding board.
Not surprisingly, given their differingSakharov, Solzhenitsyn. andto different elements In theThese elements cannot lieon the basis of divergent policypositions revealed In the years offerment.rough
political spectrumw-sirT-Tniw-j' for the central party apparatus and MoscowIt should be emphasized thai this spectnim can only be posited for the Moscow areu Regional party officials and intellectuals deul with different problems from different perspectives aid cannot be ussumed to follow the Moscow pattern.
truin, like ihe political beliefs of the dissidents, can only Ik* presented In simplified terms. Theamong the positions are not. In fact, as sharp as they look, and the descriptions 'hat follow are stereotypeswho conform to them can be found, but most people do not run true ro the stereotypes. Mors'- Important, the Irade-offs Inherent in the Soviet political process demand that the higher an Individual rises In the hierarchy, the less consistently he can adhere to any one set of beliefs. Nevertheless, the spectrum does broadly represent the divergent tendencies visible among party officials and Intellectuals.
The Contervalice Ideologue
At one end Is the conservative Ideologue. His view of both foreign and domestic affairs Is through the prism of Marxist-Leninist (and often Stalinist) writ. The International Interests of the USSR seem to him to lietrong International Communist movement that Is defined by loyalty tn the Ideas of th? founders and led by Ihe Communist Party of the Soviet Union.and "capitalism" are an ever present threat, not only ideologically but also physically. The conservative Ideologueswallow detente since lt promises benefits for the homeland ofut he Is deeply troubled by the threat of slackened vigilance In Soviet defenses (both Ideological and military) it poses ond by the complications It raises In Eastern Europe and imong foreign Communist parties. With each development In International affairs he rewelghs his conflicting priorities.
In domestic affairs, strong central partythe "dictatorship of thend ideological purity ere his watchwords.in Its domestic sense of Russian or Armenian national feeling. Is highly offensive. Theof economic for politicaleconomic Incentives rather than theof medals und titles for the laborto him lo threaten the parly's goal of social engineering. Politburo member and partySuslov is oftenrototype, although there is evidence of his flexibility when the occasion demands. S. P. Trapeznikov. head of the CPSU Central Committee's Department of Science and Educational Institutions, and I, I. Kos'alcnko. chief of the Japanese Sector of the
Dcpurttnrnt. arc examples of (lie conservative Ideologue.
The Ideologue's dreamnew Soviet man" has not muterlullzed.oviet nationalist does siem lo he emerging, bred In the unifying experience of World Warnd encouraged by thc growth of the Soviet Union to great power stains. Heationalist In foreign uffalrs but an Internationalist at home. Like the conservitivc, hp Is deeply concerned alxuit control andi'rul sees domesticthr sense of Armcnlun or Georgiandeeply disruptive. Kr lacks the conservative's Ideological inhibitions, however, and instead of social engineering, he emphasizes "rationalization" of the system and manageriale is imlte willing to use the skills of thc social scientists, especially economists ond sociologists, however much they may Implicitly challenge thc conclusions reached by Marx and Lenin.
In foreign affairs, he alsoalnncc sheet, hut his priorities are different from those of the conservativeoviet policy in the Middle East that does little to advance the cause of the "working class" In thc Arab countries but docs advance Soviet Influence In thc area poses no problems for him. Detente, on the other hand, requires that he weigh thcacquisition of Westernwith the West on common goals against those of competition with the West In the International arena. Aleksandr Shelepin, dropped fromllthuroas an example of thc Soviet nationalist. Grlgoryboss of the Leningradwell be another, although the geographic limitations of his power base may tempt himreat Russlun variant of Soviet nationalism.
The Party Reformer
Like the conservative ideologue, the party reformer Is an Internationalist,ense of unity with forelgr Communists and the "working class" abroad, but he also feels that some effort must be made to learn from the hiitory of the pastears. Whatever the future may hold, he Is nnt convinced that "Imperialism" andsm" present an Imminent threat, and he finds detente appealing because Itess
stressful period when attention can Ik-to learning from past mistakes ond Improving the "socialist lysUm."
Many of these mistakes seem to him lo have sprung from the watchwords of the centralists In his view, strong central control has led to Intolerance of competing Ideas ond rejection nf cx|ierlment nnd change. He Is not muchIn learning from Westernut he finds other models of "socialism" worth looking into. He understood8 Prague "spring" and keeps an Interested eye on such experiments us Yugoslavia's worker participation In Industrial management. He shares the conser* vatlvc's distrust of domestic nationalism, but Is more tolerant of Its manifestations, seeing them as rooted in the mistakes of tooystem.
A. M.areer apparatchik who rose to he chief editor of Pracda. fits this pattern. While he was able to do so. he collected around himself others of the same mind, most noiabk Kcndor Biirlotsky. who followed him to Pracda and thence Into sociological research. Aleksandr Rovln. formerly In the Central Committee npparatu* and now an "Observer" for hvestta. Is another; Alckscy Bclyakov. former first deputy chief of the International Department and more recently deputy dirrctor of thc International Institute for Pence In Vienna, is yet another.
The fine line between dissidents and thc establishment among these party reformers is illustrated by the publicly exp*csscd community of Interest between Lenormer national level Komsomol secretary nnd Pracda correspondent (where. Incidentally, he coouth-ored articles withnd Vladimir Cherny. first secretary of the Tambov oblast party committee.2 article. Karplnsky quoted at length0 speech by Cherny onImportance of worker self-management from both the economic end sociological points of view ta bolster his own arguments In that direction.
Kurplruky repnrtedlv collected around himself like-minded people, oescrihed as "partyond propagondisti" His group come to the attention of the KGB5 because of their well-advanced plans toaml-dof periodical aimed at further developing Marxism, discussing concrete prohlc.ns. nnci offeringnnssvers tn ideological opponents such as
Sol/lienltvyn Some were expelled from thc party, others given sharpund all were cither demoted to Insignificantor exiled from Moscow. Perhaps fortuliously. Cherny's performance us oblust first secretary was the subject of criticism InCentral Committee decree shortly thereafter. Nevertheless, he was promoted from candidate to full member of the Central Committee at the party congress the following year.
Coral flu man Vorianfi
Both the party reformer and the broad Soviet nationalist have Great Russian counterparts whoignificant role at the center and must beart of the domestic audience of the dissidents. These Great Russians differ sharply from the Soviel nationalists however. In their willingness lo use the Russian language. Russian traditions, and Russian ethnicity In achieving their Internal goals. From their points of view, such tactics make good political sense; other nationalities as well or better educated than theexample, those of the Baltictoo small lo exert leadership at the national level, while the Central Asians, whose birth rate greolly exceedi that of the Russians, still have tooevel of education.
At least in domestic matters, former Politburo member Gcnuady Voronov. who was dropped From the leudcrshlpitted thc pattern of thc Great Russian reformer In his Interest in the "links" system In agriculture. In their equivalent In"wildIn his quiet encouragement of restoration of Russian historical monuments. Including churches. His foreign policy views were never clearly defined. On that score, however, former minister of the petroleum Industry Shashln, who died thte spring, made no bones nlxiut his opposition to the alienation of Russia's natural resources, whatever the benefit to his Industry In equipment
The intellectual dissidents are drawn from this spectrum, and the major currents of Intellectual dissent aie extreme expressions of more moderate and more generally held views. There are Important differences In degree between the dissidents and their internal audiences, but communication Is possible.
Obviously none of thc major dissidents would hnjie for sympathy from the conservativeSakharov speaks to Ihc party reformers. Depending on their degree of ulicnutlon In the current political climate, they ure eitheror dlsturl>cd by his public appeals to foreign authority, and not all of them would follow him ull the way In his proposals for dunocratlr "Ion. Medvedev speuks even more directly tn them, unil both men speak, somewhat less clearly, to the Soviet nationalists. The latteretter flow of Information to the policymakers and belter application of Intellectual skills In the Interests ofo the extent thai the nationalists realize thut Intellectual freedom Is essential to the developmentcsc skills. Sakharov and Medvedev find an audience among them.
Both Sakharov und Mrdvet'ev suffer from the historical weakness of Russian Intellectuals; they lack popular support. To the Soviet worker andfearful oi war and concerned with earning apr'nclpledare too abstruse to be meunlngful. Toextent thut cither man can be credibly. If unjustly, portrayed by his opponents as an "instigator ofe Is vulnerabletrong popular backlash.
Solzhenitsyn's appeal Is to the two Great Russiannnd nationalists. His emphasis on enduring Russian traditionstrong chord among them. He has very real limitations, however. His call for "higher values" Is Idealistic enough to be heard by the reformers, but Ihey are antagonized by his visibly strong belief In the Russian Orthodox Church as thc source of these values and by his flat rejection ofis belief in the appropriateness of authoritarianismodel fo: Russia appeals to the nationalists, but his mysticism conflicts wllh their desire fornlikeand Medvedev. he hasopularRussian worker and peasant. Since his expulsionowever, hebeen cut off from them because they ate generally outside the .unnlsdal circuit nml hrcuusc In their eye* he bears the stigman who tries lo impede lhe relaxation of International Visions.
Differences Over Tactics
Compounding their differences over substance, sharp differences have arisen amonghree
iiu'ii over luetics.mmediately ufler.Secretary Arczhnrv's visit In tin*kharuv anda rare display nfnn an ontiphonal scilr* nf "interviews" wilh Western correspondents,ihc West nf the dangers of aiinuccoinpunled by significant changes in tin* Snvirt system, Sakfiarov, In piirtlcohir, urged that the US Congress withhold most favored nation status und trade credits from the Soviet Union until thai country allottedfor nil uppllcants.
Confronted by this appeul to foreign authority, the twolements In ihe Internal political spectrum coalesced, and the regime respondedublic letter-writing campaign condemning both men. pressures on iheir families and friends, and public veiled threats of reprisal. This was accompaniedeneral tightening up In internal discipline.
Popular criticism of the two may nol. In fact, huve been too difficult tn organize. Brezhnev, his enthusiasm for detente cresting, at this point was portraying this policy as bringing not only peace but prosperity for the Soviet economy.olt for higher moral values andrincipled stand on freedom of emigration could not have arousedopulation fearful of war and hopingigher standard of living.
Shortly afterward. Medvedevong iamlzdal article on "the problem of democratization and ihe problem ofoting with distress lhat In the more conservative Internal political climate, dissidents under"begin to express more and more extreme views mid put forward less and less constructive proposals, guided more by emotions than by considerations of politicalhere can he little doubt that he was expressing the views of the party reformers who saw In the more cnnsrrviilite domesticetback tn their hopes for reform. This Mnrch. Westernof concern over human rights In the Soviet Union und Sakharov'1 appeal to Westernbecame the subject nf an even shorpcr exchange between the Iwo men.
Mcdvedevs tactics In renching his foreignEast and West European Communistconsiderably from Ihose of the other Iwo. lie eschews the sprctacu-
ul lo foreign governments but munagt's nonetheless to reach outside the Soviet Union For example, last December an Italian Communist Parly delegation reportedly paiduiet visit In hi* Moscow apartment, presented him wllh an Italian edition of one nf his works, andontract for the publication of another by un Italian Communist publishing hsMise. There has been no Soviet outcry against him, despite ihe Soviel Union's continuing efforts to damp down Eurocommunism.
In contrast to the intellectual dissidents' lack of grass-roots support, mass appeal is visible, though difficult to quantify, for both nationalist and religious dissent. Indeed. Soviet nationality lawsertain extent encourage the continuing importance of nationalism In the Soviet Union, as does the political structure of the country.
The Soviet Union recognizes the existence of moreationalities within lis borders. Each Soviel citizen, on reaching maturity, assumes Ihe nationality of his parents and carries that nationality on all his official documents for the rest of hb life. The child of two Russians whose forebears have lived In the Ukraine for two or three generations Isussian; ihe childixed-nationality marriage may select Ihe nationality of either parent.
The Soviel political structure Is organizederms of nationalities, with Ihe major ethnic groups represented In theepublics, and smaller ones accorded "their own" pmvli.res. Russians represent approximately half the total population of the Soviet Union, and the Great Russian strain in samlzdai Is visible not only in Solzhenitsyn but also In the titles chosen by small dissidentof Patriots of Russia, the All-Russian Social Chrlitlon Union. Russian Socialists.
A vivid picture of nationalist resentment is presented In "Separation orn essay by Igorormer ally of Sakharov who has moved from the tatter's Internationalism to Russian nationalism and now lives In the West. He quotes Central Asians who say: "Just unit until the Chinese come: they'll show vimi what'sis long listarges of Russian oppression leveled by olherprovides eloquent evidence of the disruptive
Impuct of mdlonallsm on dissident attempts In achieve unity. HU "solution" In his essay, however, seems likely lo fun Ihe flumes, fie contends that Ihe Russians were themselves Ihe first victims of the "hegemony In our country of socialistot Its carriers, and thai all the peoples of the Soviet Union share the guilt for ItsRussian Nihilists, theBorotblsts, the Latvlun Riflemen, nnd many others."
Other Nationalism In Samitdat
In the samtzdat reaching Ihe West, materials of Russian provenance art predominant. Of the remainder, most of thc material from dissidents of other nationalities consists of protests against particular actions nf authorities; the political essay, comparatively common In Russian samtzdat, is rarely met In thc non-Russian variety.
Appropriately, the next largest groupIn this literature Is Ukrainian. There has been some effort at cooperation between the two groups; prominent Ukrainian dMdents have publicly supported dissident groups andoutside the Ukraine, and Sakharov's support for the embattled Ukrainian dissidents has already been noted. Nevertheless. Ukrainian nationalism proved disruptive to dissident unity whenerialized Ukrainian samtzdat publication modeled after the Russian Chronicle of Current Events embarkeduarrel wllh "the Democratic Movement" about Its right to speak on behalf of "the Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine, and thc Baltic lands,"
A number of samtzdat documents concern the Crimean Tatars, deported to Uzbekistan In World War II. They were formally rehabilitated In the de-Stallnlzatlon period but have not been allowed lo return to the Crimea. They have achieved remarkably high visibility In view of their relatively smallapproximatelyillionlarge part because of the efforts of formerrigorenko. Their cause Is highly specialized, however, and the disruption that would be Involved In returning them to their homes, occupied by others since thc, limits their appeal In the dissident movement. An even smaller national group well represented In samtzdat In the West ore theurkic people from southern Georgia also deported to Central Asia. Their
demands are similar tnof the Crimeanto return lo their homeland In the Adzhurlun Autonomous Republic In Georgia.
There is also fragmentary Armenian samtzdat calling for an Independent Armenia. Theof lamtzdal documents from the Baltic countries concern religious protest ami Individual petitions against religious oppression ofIn Estonia and Latvia nnd Catholics In Lithuania. In contrast to the representation of Ihe Crimean Tatars and the Mcskhctians, there Is remarkably little samtzdat in the West from Central Asians.
Other Nationalist Audiences
Despite the paucity of other nationalist samtzdat reaching thc West, there Is evidenceevival In nationalist feelings among lhe peoples of the USSR which, to varying degrees, has affected all the major ethnic minorities as well as Ihe Great Russians. This nationalist mood Is symptomatic of the waning of Marxist-Leninist Ideological elan and has been fostered by Ihe relative relaxation In Ihc political rtmospherc since Stalin's death.
Moreover, native elites have emerged In thcon-Russian republics during thisnd Ihe mlc of the Russians and other Slavs In directly running the affairs of thc republics has In most cases diminished accordingly. Where Russian culture and language, the culture and language of Lenin, once provided the only model for Communists In the minority areas, local cadres now draw on their own posts toational hue.
The extent to which local Interestsart In the policies of regional leaders varies from republic to republic depending on numerous factors, among them the degree of nationalist sentiment among Ihe people. Ihe situation within thc local party leadership Itself, and thecontrol over the local population. Where public- acceptance of Soviet rule Isor instance, local officials arc too concerned with maintaining control and too dependent on Moscow to consider encouraging nationalist sentiment. Officials In Ihe western Ukraine, for example, are considerably harsher In theirof expressions of Ukrainian nationalism than are those In the eastern part of the republic. For others, nationalist sentiment has been a
templing source of political power. And for those who have found themselves at odds with Moscow's politics andexample, former Ukrainian party boss Pctrtemptation to use this sentiment has. onproved irresistible. On the other hand, leaders in those regions that have benefited most from Moscow's economic policies have been more cautious in encouraging nationalbt i
stuay whs unamaKcn in rne cany iy7os to determine how the rising generation of the intelligentsia viewed the nationality problem in the IIndividuab from the various republics who were then working at thelevel In Academy of Sciences Institutes were sampled. The surveyeneral decline, at least among young intellectuals. In the level of anti-Russian sentiment among the minorityThe sampling was. of course, done among young people who had already Joined the system, and these results were to be expected. More surprising was the acknowledgement by those sampled that Important Interests of the minority nationalities might be better served by surrendering some cultural identity In exchange for the advantages represented by the collective national power of thc USSR.
as onomment by
anore Azerbaydzhanls live in Iran than In the Azerbaydzhan Republic of the USSR. It would be in the parochial interests of those Azerbaydzhanls living In the USSR to consolidate their nationality by annexing those areas of northern Iran Inhabited by Azerbaydzhanls. The small Soviet republic of Azerbaydzhan does not possess the strength to accomplish this unilaterally. The larger and more powerful USSR does have that strength, at least hypolhetlcally. which increases the attraction of membership in the Soviet Union for Soviet Azerbaydzhanis. The researchers concluded that this type of logic appeared responsible for the evolving change In perspective on the nationality issue. (Ironically, this "dangerous" study was impounded by the party Central Committee apparatusajor shakeup of sociological research)
The same type of consideration may well obtain in Armenia.90 two smull nationalist groups were tried In Yerevan for
agitating for Armenian independence Thc trial attracted very little attention from thc Armenian population. In an earlier display of Armenian nationalism, an Armenian party first secretary had authorized thc erectiononument to the two million victims of5 massacre of Armenians by the Turks. The errant secretary was removed from office, but Ihe monument stilloignant reminder of the fate of helpless Armenians.
Little Georgian samlzdat is available in thc West. Nevertheless. Georgia for the past five years hasroubled republic.2 the local party first secretary, who had held thc position forears, became increasinglyin the exposure of widespread corruption In his bailiwick and retiredloud. Hiseorgian by birth who had headed thc republic Ministry of Internal Affairs, had the look of "an honest cop" appointed to clean out the corruption endemic under his predecessor.
Since his installation, there have been rumors and reports of violence. The opera house in Tbilisi wos burnednd this winter seven men were convicted of arson. The Georgian press accounts of the trial provided no motivation; the reports we have received concerning this and other violence have referred solely to resentment over the disruption of lucrativeevertheless, theremall-scale scandal at the Georgian Writers' Congress last spring over thc publicly expressed resistance to the use of Russian rather than Georgian In academic work. From the fragmentary evidence. It is difficult to tell how much Georgian national pride has become entangled with resentment of enforced honesty. It Is noteworthy, however, that the speeches delivered In Georgia by thc party first secretary have focused almost exclusively on economic problems, with little or no reference lo the dangers of nationalism.
Thc language problem has cooled In thc past year, however, and Moscow shows no signs of alarm concerning Its control. The Georgian party first secretary Is clearly under political pressure from the Kremlin to put his house In order, but there Is nothing lo Indicate that thc Georgian authorities cannot contain, if not prevent,acts of violence.
of llir dissidents in ihr USSR want to stay in tlwif homelands umlrr changed conditions. Jewish and Germanarc unique in having "homelands" outside the Soviet Unionin. of the intellrclualforthe Jewish and German causes under the principle of lhe right of all peoples to emigrate if ihey wish. The treatment of these two nationalities as separate causes arouses little support cither from dissidents or from the domestic audience.
Under Soviet law, Jewseparate nationality. An area in the Sovietst was designated by Stalin os "the Jewishut his scheme aroused little enthusiasm among Soviet Jews. While the province party first secreturyewish name, the area hus no populur Identity asnd Soviet Jew* remain scattered throughout the republics.
Jrwish consciousness in the Soviet Union was markedly heightened by7 SU Day War, and Jewish tamlzdat made its first appearance the following year. Most of it is concerned with Individual charges of discrimination, often in connection with thc expression of thc wish to emigrate to Israel.
This heightened Jewish consciousness and the attraction for Jews erertedoreign country has stimulated the strain of anti-Semitism and xenophobia characteristic of the Veene group. For example. In2 shakcup of sociologists, the researchers were publicly accused of being under the Influence of "Westernharge that carried echoes of the anti-Semitic "ant[cosmopolitanism" campaign of (he. The sociologist In charge of the research program, thc important parly reformer A. M. Rumyantsev, reportedly was secretly accused of lack of vigilance In having employed Soviet Jews as researchers who. In turn, had allegedly allowed their research to be usedover for an Israeli espionage network. He was replaced as dlrecto-of the research, and the Institute was purged nf party reformers. In public, however, this latent anti-Semitism haa, for the most part, been limited lo sporadic press attacks onThc subject of Jewish emigration will be treated at greater lengtheparate memorandum.)
Ofillion Soviet citizens Identifiedlng ol Cerman origin, the great majority are descendants of ihe Germans who settled on the
Volga In the ISth century. In the prewar years, theyhe equivalent of un ethnic republic in thai area. All of them were deported to Central Asiuhortly after the German attack on thc Soviet Union. In the Khrushchev years they were "rehabilitated" and agitated for the recs-tablishment of their ethnic enclave on the Volga. When it became apparent after Khru-hchev's ouster thc tide hod turned against them,gan to agitate to leave the Soviet Union.
Some of these Volga Germans hove married citizens of modern Germany, and the distinction lietwcen the two groups has become blurred. The Soviet Union and the Federa. Republic of Germany concluded an accord thatrotocol on emigrationhe number of emigrants0 when It rose as relations with West Ccrmany improved. It has ebbed and flowed since that time as hopesolga homeland rose and fell and os the Soviet authorities have lightened or relaxed restrictions on exit permits for reasons of foreign policy. For example, in the three weeks before2 West Cerman national election. Ihe gates were opened, andthnic Germans were allowed to leave the Soviet Union. Last year0 emigrated to West Ccrmany. Cerman tamlzdat began to appear2 as the success of Jews In emigrating began to be evident, and lastroup seeking to emigraterief protest In Red Square. Like thc Jewish dissidents, the cause of Cerman applicants for emigration lacks broad appeal among other Soviet dissidents and from Ihe domestic audience.
In thc total volume of Russian Intellectual tamlzdat,spousal of lhe Russian Orthodox Church Is somewhat idiosyncratic, although the moral-religious issue In theseruns deep. Most contributors discuss the religious questionore general sense. The gist of the argument Is usually thai lheregime has removed traditional Christian values as the dominant value system of the society withoutiable alternative, therebyoral vacuum. Many authors argue that MurxIsm-LcninLsm must heut beyond this negative goal, discussions dissolve into nonspecific "Christian" references.
onsiderable extent, more specificdbtcnt ovrrlapi with nationalist dissent. Despite the yean of Ideological agitation and regime pressures against religion, each of the major republics is Identified wllh an established religious faith. The largest of ihese arc the Slavic-based Russian Orthodox Church and Islam in the eastern Caucasus and Central Asia. As noted earlier. Solzhenitsyn's attachment tn Russian Orthodoxy Is testimony to his Great Russian nationalism as well as to his religious faith.
The situation is somewhat complicated in the Ukraine, where, historically, the Ukrainian Uniate (Byzantine Catholic) Church was strong in the western areas and the Russian Orthodox Church in the eastern ones.6 the Uniate Church was forcibly merged with the Russian Orthodox Church. Since then, the Uniate rites have been practiced underground, and the official Ukrainian church has been the Russian Orthodox Church.
No significant body of Islamic samtzdal is known In the West, although It may well exist In Islamic religious centers abroad. The Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church is the most notable representative In tamlzdat of the other established religions In the Soviet Union. Begunt is modeled after ihe Chronicle of Current Events, detailing Individual acts of religious oppression. Protests from Estoniantvian Lutherans are not serialized, but like the Lithuanian Catholic protests ihey represent both nationalist und religious dissent.
In addition to protests against government actions, there is some evidence in religious dissent of conflicts within established churches. For example. In theoung Russian Orthodox priest In Moscow come Into conflict with the Orthodox hierarchy through hissermons: he was flnt barred fromand then transferred away from Moscow. His supporters appealed to the World Council of Churches, accusing the Orthodox Patriarch and hierarchy of acquiescence In the Soviet regime's repression of religious life. Their protests are also beginning to appear in tamlzdat in Ihe West.
The charges of economic corruption In Georgia In the earlyhal led to the forced
retirement of the republic parly secretary also involved ehaiges by religious dissidents ofwithin the Georgian Orthodox hierarchy. Frugments of this quarrel also appear In tamlzdat. The latest Issue of the Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church carries charges against "coltaborationisl" clergy. Including Ihe president of the Kaunas Theological Seminary.
An International Church
The Evangelical Christian Baptist Churchajor exception to this mixture of nationalist and religious interest. Formed4 by Evangelical Christians and Baptists, it was joined5 by Pentecostal* and6 by Mennonltes. An All-Union Council ofChristian Baptists serves as its administrative body, and Its congregations ore scattered throughout the Soviet Union, reportedly with special strength In Ihe prison camps.
Mirroring the split in state churches between the churchsee themselves forced to work wilh governmentdissident belleven, the "Inilslallvnikl" or Action Group Evangelical Christian Baptists split off from the Atl-Union Council1 over the issue of military service, as well as acceptance of the regime's ban on missionary work and religious training for youth. Soviet authorities refused to register the Initsiativnfkl. who were thus forced to work underground.
The Inltsialivniki appeare the primary contributors to religious samtzdat ond agitation for permission to emigrate. The first such attempt, which was abortive, was mode3roup of aboutrom Siberia pushed their way Into the US embassy in Moscow to ask for protection and assistance. This winter an entire congregationelegation to Moscow with their applications to emigrate.
Jews, as noted, earlier, ore also scattered throughout the Soviet Union, and like the other established religions, have their problems with official pressures. Jewish dlssldence. however. Is focused primarily on emigration rolher than on impediments to the practice of 'he Jewish religion In the Soviet Union.
Attempts tn quantify religious believers In the Soviet Union usually founder on Ihe definition of religious adherence. In the last census, the Soviet
illion. Soviet authorities usually ctiuu.tr religious believers aloercent of uttult city dwellers undoercent of ruralotal ofoillion people. Westernutes are higher, ranging fromillion Orthodoxillion Catholics.oillion Moslems, amiillion Protestants and sectarians
Soviet dlsstdence Is heterogeneous andfragmented. Despite Its breadth, there Is little to suggest ihnt it offers more than an embarrassment In terms of Its challenge to ihe regime, but It Is an embarrassment that the authorities must live with.
The intellectual dissidents are deeply divided on both goals and tactics and. Indeed, are not even united on the negative goal of opposition to Ihr "socialisthey are. for the most part, arguing, not plotting, and calls for violence are rare. Moreover, they lack popular appeal; their arguments do not bear directly enough on the concerns of the workers and peasants to engender mass support.
Nationalist dissenl Is. by Itsurther divisive clement. Separatism, that Is.from the Soviet Union. Istrong theme. Most nationalist dissidents promote ways to advance the special Interestsiven nationality within the Soviet system. Dissent that argues for one, however, excludes the Interests of the otherajor and dozens of minor nationalities, exacerhatlng old rivalries.
Religious distent, like nationalist dissent, is -kirilciilurlst und essentially divisive. Withexception, the major religious faiths are Identified wllh specific nationalities Both nationalism and religious faith can generate the emotionalappear that the Intellectual dissidents lack, but because of iheir concentration in specific republics and provinces, they are relatively easy for (he authorities to channel, adjusting official pressures locally or regionally as the occasion demands.
The two exceptions to the geographicnf religious faiths ore the Evangelical Christian Baptists and the Jews. The former lack Ihe emotional appeal of national identification. The latter labor under the historically strong strain of anti-Semitism in the Slavic areas.
The enduring strength of Soviet dissent lies in the continuum of views, differing importantly in Intensity but not In direction, between the dissidents and their various Internalndividuals stepping over the fine line between the "establishment" and dissenl feed theflow of personal declaration ofThe authorities can and sporadically do increase (he personal risks Involved Inthe bounds. To attempt Io do more would beiskomestic witch hunt that could quickly threaten the "oudlervces'1 tn theIntellectuals and party apparatus In Moscow, the national republics, and the established churches. Memories of the destruction wrought In the bloody Stalin years. Iroth to the life of the country ond to the Soviet Union's Image abroad, are still fresh, and no leader has yet appeared In Moscow who eager
to take this risk.
BLANK PAGEOriginal document.