Intelligence Memorandum
WorU Trends and Developments
Secret
RP
Fibnjar, 7
NATIONAl SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorlied OlKlanire Subject Io Crfmiml Sanctfora
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICE OF REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
WORLD TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
7
SECRET
PREFACE
The purpose of this memorandum is to putomparatively short but comprehensive view of the world scene as It appears today.roject Inevitably Involves generalizations and perspectives with which all may not agree, and Includes material familiar to some but not to others.
Thehapter, an overview,ay of thinking about recent world events and provides theense of continuity. Among other things, it suggests that
deliberate provocationonflict leadingtruggle for national survival is remote, but crises which could escalate to that point are conceivable,
the upwelling of human desires and demands and the willingness of people to take high risks to satisfy their desires and demands are major sociopolitical dynamics of the world of today,
the sociopolitical forces which have brought the world to its present state of uncertainty end turbulence are far more likely to persist than subside.
the US by itself is less able than ever to provide solutions to the problems these forces give rise to, but solutions will not be found in most instances without the US. and
the tendency* of peaceful coexistence to drift periodically into competitive tests of preeminence means thator isolation are luxuries that world events are unlikely to allow.
Thc Introductory essay andrrglonnl sections that follow ore more problem than progress oriented, but that Is not meant to Imply that disaster Is Imminent or that opportunities no longer exist.
This memorandum was written in the Office of RegionalAnalysis and coordinated In substance within theIntelligence. Comments on the memorandumholeRPA.
Comments on the regional sections should be addressed tospective authors.
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CONTENTS
The Global Scene
The Form at
Strain* In the
The Recent Experience
The Agendo for
The Dilemmas of Soviel Foreign Policy
Soviet Worries About the
The Imperatives Behind
The Competitive Sources of Sovlet-US
The Soviet Approach lo Peking
The Continuing Chinese Challenge to Soviet Interests
The Internal Dimension
Eastern Eu*ope
The Economic Oul
The Soviets
Poland
The Yugoslav Problem: When Tito Goes
Relations with Mmcnw
F.twt
The United States
Middle EiK
SECRET
Latin America
w
4
THE GLOBAL SCENE
Forces at Work
The world today Is fundamentally one of rapidly buildinghese come for the most part from the more and more Importunate demands that societies put on their public authorities. In responding to these demands, public authorities still must reconcile conflicts of Interests and allocate scarce resources between the present and the future. When the conflicts are too great and the resources too few. public policyroblem of diverting or restraining the publics' wants.
Thc driving force of egalltarlonlim generates many of theseutr-sharc society In which highustained by high rates of economic growth remains the guiding objective of the advanced Industrial countries. Despite the questions raised by thc environmentalists and neo-Malthusians. only minor concessions have so far been made to the doctrines of limited growih. The pauses that govern* mcnts periodically have to call for are cyclical adjustments, not basic changes of goal.
Among the developing countries, only few focus on ugrarian development, and thc predominant mode! remains the Western one. Most of their governments ure unwilling to slow the nidi toward industrialisation to absorb the social and environmental lessons of thrtr predecessors. The pressures of expanding and more acquisitive populations are tooattractions of status associated with development are too
The problems of the Communist world are basically the some. Thc philosophy, thc methods, ond the levers of control ore different, but the tough problems nevertheless are how to allocate resources and ovoid Inflation, how to restrain consumption withoutriots In the streets, and how to divert from the total product what Is wanted for public investment and national defense.
The quest for secure access to scarce resources at predictable prices Is one of the more obvious consequences of tbe universal ond Increasing demandfnirrrhe dozen richest countries vie with null other for the huge proportion of the world's
production of basic commodities that they consume. At the moment, fossil fuels are the most valued of those commodities; In the future it may be food or nibble water.
In rrder to buy. the buyers of course also compete to sell. And the range of marketable commodities steadilyInclude more and moreweapons, technology, and professional services.
A most striking phenomenon of the, however. Is the emergence of the less developed countries us an aggressive factor In theasting Impact of the oil embargo Is the radical shift in terms of trade that has made the producing countries the formidable ha-gulncrs they have become In the future sharing out of the global product. Despite the deep conflicts of Interest In the third world lietween oil and non-oil states, the embargo in effect provided the decisive push that made the transfer of wealth from North to South the critical issue it has since become.
The driveore equitable sharing ofds and services has Its social and politicalrowing ethnic consciousness Is one of them. The leveling of economic differences in some modern societies fus tended to accentuate the Importance attached tu racial, religious, or cultural distinctions. In others, ethnic assertIvenns is the outlet for economic and social grievances that public authorities have not redressed. In either case, until these drives find outlet in constitutional reform, local autonomy, separation, or even Independence, they challenge the existing political stnicture andthe International system based upon it.
The demand for recognition and enhancement of national status Is another reflection of the drive for equity. Except for Africa, "want of nationalhave about run their course, but resistance toanother nation or by someas much alive as ever. Such feelings have contributed deep emotion toeconomic Issues; they account for the slow progress of rcelonal systems like the European Communities (EC) and for most of the Issues that the North Atlantic Treatv Organisation (NATO)
seatfr
with; ond they are at the hnttnm of the USSR'i continuing worries In Eastern Europe.
That the most basic of human aspirations are seekingmore actively and universally than at any time In modernnot of course mean that people, as Individuals, are more free. The gains scored by pluralism In one arearift toward authoritarian rule In another. The frequent governmental answer tofrom below Ii the denial of Individualoften defended as the price of sustaining collective Identity abroad.
Strain* In the Syitem
Kneed with populations Increasingly disinclined to quiescence, political Institutions appear more and more ut hay This seems 'rue around the world and at most political levels.
The national governments, to which publics still primarily direct their demands, feel leu In control than ever of the necessary means. Partly thisroblem of venue. On the one hand, national institutions may be too remote and aloof from day-to-day problem* that need to be addressedower level. On the other, problems that extend beyond national border* require dlpleinacy orforce. But the weakness of nationalIsuestion c" how securely the seats of power are occupied. The Western democracies are often hard put lo accommodate the kinds of political realignments that occur today; the rigidly controlledtenure of leadership frequentlyon royalty, ambition, and alignment! in the securitywith even greater difficulty.
Since World War II. most of the efforts to deal with problems of venue with regional systems have fullered, and some of them haveovernments strong rnough tnegree of Jurisdiction to regional authorities have often declined tn accept Hie need to do so; the weak ones fear any diminution of sovereign Integrity. Only the EC wields meaningful Influence on public policies andtabilizing impact on the regionhole Rut even the Community Is an unpredictable quantity, and L'S presence ond support will have much to do with whether It will achieve its goals
IVhrthrf NATO, the Warsaw Pwet.Council In Muliinliiiwr tCEMAiulnnolUmulln ul ilclinitron
If the record of International organization isleak. It is only marginally so, mid uguln the outlook dr-prndsn Washington. Anmonetary system busedombination of automatic mechunlsms and coordination ofpolicies has given waysystem" much more dependent on thethe prospects of achieving such coordlnitloi do not appear good. The traditional self-enforcing rule* of free trad* have given wmy lo tnpanding official Intervention, and the effort to find new way* to regulate it has only Just begun.
echanism, the UNenerally conceded to beerilous *tate. however useful it* role may beebating forum,ramework for negotiation. But as the East-West conflict reduced the UN's security role to its present modest dimensions, so too do North-South differences thieatcn further to diminish the world organization, not only In traditional areas of competence hut alsoew areas" *uchaw of the Sea where It Is the consensus lhat the UN shouldital role.
ew year* ngn bipnlorlsm was expected to give way to miilllpolarlsmiversity of power lias emerged. The weight lhat the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) wields in the world's affairs was not clearly foreseen, nor was it expected that the shifting alliances nf convrnicrice among the less developed countries (LDCs) would become one of th*edium-size powers have proliferated, but they have not become the "center" of anything, and as they acquire significant arsenals of advanced weaponry. It I* far from certain whether Iheytabilizing or destabilizing Influence.
The ambiguity of power relationships Is also due lo the diffmion of power within the two "centers" that remain authentic. It i* still true that nothing truly vital con be decided In the Western camp either against or without the L'S. But when at odds with it* allies. Washingtonw rrvefiilly calculate the price of extracting consent.h* price nor the effectiveness ol the available leverage Is easy to judge.
Although the constraint* on Ihe USSR are different and probably fewer. Soviet calculation* are also more complicated. The emergence In Easlrrn Europe of another Dubcek almost certainly wouldsooner orsame reaction from Moscow that It didui the pressures to tolerate more from It* clients and forperhaps to find other means ofalso there. Like the US. lhe
Soviet Union mini more and more find that pursuit olerpetual problem of balancing competing Interests and of reassessing the adequacy of the means to the chosen goal.
The Recent Experience
A balance sheet of the past year, however one calculates specific gains and losses, omplythat the forces at work have lost none of their potency In the year's two most dynamic events (Angola and Lebanon) many of ihcm seemed operative at the same time.
Although perhaps not so dear at the outset. In retrospect certain lessons of Angola are clear;
ihe West remains heavily burdened by the Irgocles of colonialism and racism, and the penalties for any appearance ol continuedwith them are high.
the leaden of national liberation movements have no compunction about alliances with those who have no particular attachment to the ideas if notional liberation or Individual freedoms.
whatever Its commitment lo detente and polidrs of restraint, the Soviet Unionorld power, highly competitive and quick to capitalize on any opportunities lhal develop abroad, and
in some drcumstances. the projection o( American powerxtremely difficult.
Inawn In the East-Writ compdltion, Angola wrved lo raise the specter for Africahole. The most immediate area of concern Is. followed closely by Namibia and by the tncrrasingly blller dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia In the Horn of Africa. Even In South Africa, Ihe Sowrto riots and ihrir uflermalh have rolled to new highs the powlhillty of black-while turmoil that couldestabilising Impact throughout Africa Moreover, ndther the African leader* nor the mit*ide power* exercise effective control over ihe wind* of change now gaining momentum. Meanwhile, even in thmr African stole* lhal have an affinity for the West, there clearly are dctlnllr limits lo what lhat allach-menlhile willing tn cooperate with ihe Weil, there will be little sentiment for years lo come to look to Western models for solutions lo Internal problems.
fT
The civil war in Ixb-imma poignant reminder of the realities of ihe Middle Eail
country was virtually destroyed because Us virulent ethnic and religious hostilities were Ignited by the Arab-Israel Issue that dominr.trs all else In the area.
a the hapless Palestinians were shown, for the seond time, that Arab support stops short when It becomesthreat to Arab regimes.
Ihc Israelis were given further cause to wonder about the viabilityulllcullural staleegion of endemic religious, sodal. ami nationalistic conflicts, and
Arab rivalries again were shown to be never far below every new proclamation of solidarity.
Whether the developments of the past year In Ixbarmn have set the stage for more hopeful moves toward an Arab-Israelirguable. Because of the outcome In Lebanon, the Palestinianree agent than ever before. For the moment,ad. and Husayn are more In harmony. The Saudis are using their economic leverage,illingness to restrain their OPEC partners, in orderesumption of negotiations. Mostall tbethestrongly feeling the pressures to ease three decades of tension and attend to ihe economic and social problrrm at home
But the obstaclesettlement are formidable. A* *hown In7 by the not* the pressures thai pudi Sadat to tryegotiated settlement couldrove strong enough lo bring himd likewise has his problems, and not all the Saudi leuder* are committed lo the current line. From what we know of their respective positions, ihe Arab and Uracil government* are still for opart on who! would hehe election* scheduled forr evrn the mere fact of having lo lakefor any agreement, could bring forth Uracil leaders muchnclined to compeomne. Any agreement that survives will surely require Moscow's ocqiiic*cence.
Il iv not likely that Mmcow hos fell compen*uted for II* lows In ihe Middle East by Its gains In touthrrn Africa. On balance. Iheearaveroubling demoo*trat!on for the USSR lhat there are limit*welt o* opportunilir*aucrthm of Soviet power and lhalo!
SEC1CT
and political turmoil so
immune Ui the sociul wide*pmid ir ,lt- world.
Apart from Africa, the USSR scorrd no gab* abroad. Trudr negotiation* with tlic US rrmuincil In ubeyunce: the Strategic Arms Limitations Tulks (SALT) stayed Muck on diad center. Became of it* intervention in Angola, I's unimpressive performance under the Helsinki agreements, and the uncertainties in thets strategic airm, Moscow saw- Its commitment lo detente sharply questioned. Whatever expectations the USSR may have had from Ihe change of guard in Peking, ihe PRC has remainedto Moscow's gesture* China has continued to compete for influence in Alrica and elsewhere in the third world, and even pursued Its efforts to stir up disaffection In Eastern Europe
Its European bailiwick In particular must have given the Soviet Union new cause for concern. In the woke of the serious disturbance* In Poland last June. Moscow felt it prudent to ball out the Cierek government with substantialissension among the Czech intelligentsia has reached Us highest pointnd therebeen similar signs of disaffection in East Germany. Although Moscow succeededean of effort in cajoling the East anduropean fraternal parties in meet In East Berlin, the cheekier refected the preeminence of ihe Soviet party.
On the home front, Moscow seemed mostly to tread water, (he malor gain being Ihe belter harvest.h Parly Congress of February and6 was unproductive. The turnover In Central Committee mrmbcnhlp was one of the smallest in Ihe party's history, and the problem of Ihe aging leadenhlpesult remains.year-oldInthe country's problems. Bui he offered no new departures, and the promised long-term economic plan and new con*tilution have yet to appear.
In contrast wllh the quiescent Soviet Union, the problems lhat rigid leadership and Ideologicalhuvr in coming lo grip* with the requirement*apidly modernizing *odetyurbulent year in China. It l* apparent that, in the struggleoalition of career party cadre and military leader* ba* for nower the revolutionary left.ense, the outmmc I* the ascendance of one sfciV of Mao who. In hi* own ambivalence, could appreciate ihe need for lioth
The Chinese revolution hj* Mm*ew phase, although the implication* of thai may not lie readily apparent. On the home front, the prominence of personalities like Mao and Chou In ihe setting of national priorities should give way to the conflictuior Interestdeology may give ground to pragmatism.olicy if not In rhetoric: and life for ihe ordinary Chinese may become less drab. Abroad. Peking is likely lo increase efforts to obtain access to technology from thelthough tliere may he some adjustments In the triangular relationship with Moscow and Wadilnglon. Peking will continue to consider the Soviet Union the principal threat and the US the principal ccunlr-balance to ihot thnat.
if the Chinese "experiment"o lishopeful, ihe one In India Iso. The Gandhi government ha* madeeconomic progres* during the year: the increase In the rate of population growth has stabilized: favorable weather resulted in better crops: and hrcamv of the greater availability of agricultural raw material* and government-en forced labor discipline, Industriallso gained. But the price paid in political term* haseavy one. The lough birth control measures have alienated segments of the population; the governmentis more personalized than ever; the opposition rs in disarray, and the outcome of the parliamentary elections in March will be heavily Influenced by the government's control of ihe media and access to ample funds. The Prime Minister's testy response to her critics abroad colon (he country's relationship wllh the West
The overall'sesvhere in South Asia do not appear much more promising. The problems of poverty, ethnic and religious hostilities, and official corruption are basically the same in all the*'1 coun'ries. Each hai an ingrained suspicion of the othen. Their foreign policies of maneuver among the third world. China, the USSR, and the West are as much concerned with obtaining the external support and sophlstiealed armaments ihey fear they may need against one another a* with fir ding access to Ihe more critically iteeded development aid
Farther to the east, the rmich greater potential for drvrlopnrent mostly remains to be realized.regime* in Indochina have only begun to cope with the prohlem* of reconstruction andewlhat hu*been vastlvin Cambodia by ihe rad'..Jsurgery the regime opted for. Among thelate* of thethealaysia, and
MC
surface stability lhat currenll* prevails has brm achieved by ilKTrailngly juUxritlcint of ihem sharelnplng countries dependent on extractiveethnic, religious, and insurgent movements pose more or leu serious threats tn national unity as well. It Is unclear whether the halting efforts in the Auod ition of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to work together that wrre Inspired by fear of both China and Vietnam will be helped or hindered by the growing rivalry between the two.
Similar croucurrents predomlnale In Latineven though the general milieu Is radically different. With the cllapse of Isabel Perec'sIn the <pr1ng6 and 'ts replacement by the triumvirate, the trend toward militaryf theovcmmenti innd South America are now authentically civilian. Some of the milltar* regimes are social refermist In character. But Ij one degree or another, they are also nprcuivc: electorates are largely disenfranchised, the media are cowed, and lhe trade unions curbed. In Argentina, Brazil. Paraguay. Uruguay, and Chile, bask human rights are frequently violated. And white the opposition ranges from the terrorist left 'hrough the Communists to the indigenous fascists on the right, it often also includes the democratic middle.
Apart from coping withjccived enemies, much ofhat the Latin Americanand mHilar*done at home ,ii the past year was done in the name of economic stability ond development. Dealing with the problems ofundercapitalization, and single-resourcehas been maue even more difficult by the burdens of foreign debt, huge budgetary deficits, and still raging Inflation Control* end restraints have aggravated unemployment. While leaders like Brazil's Cclscl still push an aggressive mixture of state capitalism und private enterprise as the route In deselopment. other* like Guyana's Burnhom and Jamaica'* Manley are moving more and more toward experiment* with authoritarian socialism.
Without the suVstontlal military presence In theirbe nation* of Latin America would perhap. he still more antagonistic In the West. But even so. they hove not been strongly supportive of Washington's mpjor objective"-.
Argentina end Brazil remain important hoioVnits agnlnst signature of the Non-Proliferation Treatytrosllla's contracted purchaseuel reprocessing plant from Germany liasc'l-
IT
(known test of whether the world's requirement for nuclear energy can be accommodated without the attendant risks of proliferation. The mllltNry-oom--nated regime* In the Andean region have embarked on an arms race which, while picayune by Middle East standards, ts destabilizing In thetln America generally has contributed drive and sometimes leadership lo lhe demandsew International Economic Order.
Whether, the Industrialized free world *ouW have found the "will" to attend to thc winds from theut for lhe oil embargo Is questionable. In any case,strong-arm tactic* at one and lhe same time vastly Increased the preuure* to respond, seriously complicated thend made far more
difficult the adjustment lo new economic and
political realities already on the way.
Characteristically perhaps. Japan has mode that adjustment with thelerity. It assured <t* continued bcccu to oil supplies with the necessary kowtowshr producers, bilateral offers of aid. and cautious association with the consumers In the International Energy Agency The required tramfei posments were found by increasing eiports to the Middle East and the Communist world In midyear, domestic demand began to sag. and consequent Japanese trade surpluses in US and European market* aroused It* Western competitors. White moving to stlmutate domestic consumption over the short term. Tokyo Isower rate of gmwih that will diminish both the problems of inflation and Japan's demandternal resource*.
Having been nidely reminded of It* economic vulnerability by lhe oil embargo and having been forced lo adjust II* regional posture by abrupt US shifts In the. Japan Is not keen for radical new departures in foreign policy. Rather. It wifl continue to nccenttiote lhe regional status quo and work for the sort of open International economy that its Interests as an Island trading state demand. Its belated ratification of Iheore cooperative attitude Inward nvcrtlignts and hate rights, and its ohvlom reluctanceee any reduction In the American presence In South Korea areeaffiima-tion of It* security tie* with Ihe US. Tokvn will continue to pursue relations with Peking and Mn-icow cauttomly tn avoid entanglements in their dispute and also lo buttress Its preeminent tie* with Washington.
Among the drveloprsl countries, the Implications of the OPEC era have therefore come to focus in
SECMET
EunitK where inflation,sslon. slow growth, unil puvmcnt* deficits have aggravated politkal *iliiutmm that ulrcuily ranged from the problematic to the precarious The range of economic nr.ikew he great: from the least (Germany) to the mostut In betwetn are such keys the UK. France, andall of which Investment lags. Inflation ranges fromoercent, and labor Is Incmungly restless under austerity policies and restraints. The gap between the belter and worse off In the ECerious obstacle to the goal* of economic and monetaiy union. They are unified enough thut Ihey cannot Insulate themselves from each other's problems, hut not sufficiently united toeliable way to address them together.
That many West European countries arene stage or another of serious und potentially radical -mid and political upheavals adds to theIn threeGreece. Spain, andgovernments are attempting to foster pluralistic systems after authoritarian regimes that had lastedoears. The questions of when, how. and to what extent strugglinglements should be supported have come up again und again.
Italy has yet to come to grips with lost June's rlections. the collapse of the alignment of center forces that had governed for most of the pulwar period, and the alternative now offered by thc Communists with their attractive and professedly responsible leaders. The rebirth of the French left promises to test the constitution that, designed by and for dt Gaulle, makes no provision forisemhly and President of opposing views. Even in Britain, the projected "devolution" of authority to Smttlsh and Welsh assemblies may eventually rnt-ll fundamental rhanges in British political life.
Like lhe Japanese, most Eumpeaiis would probablyeriod for Introspection, but ihey are unlikely to enjoy thut luxury. Relations with the East are far ton inlnislve.iler- the US. they find the Soviet prue'lee of detente both hopeful ami distressing. The management of those relations Is likely tn become even more complicated In the fi'Mire as the tlrs between Eastern and Western Europe are extended, delicate transition* in new leader* are accomplished (peacefully ornd the Soviet hold In Eastern Euro|ie perhaps liecome* les* than complete. Among the West European* themselves, the perennialwill Intensify between the desirability of maintainingouur.or. front In their approach to the
and the uttruclKin* of iniliv idu.il commercial and politicul udvunluge by going It alone.
The Europeans uho have no escape from their Atlanticor does the vast majority wish for one. The brief and scarcely wholehearted flirtationEuropean Euiope" In theame abruptly to an end with the oil embargo,l since the postwar recovery havefeelings of dependency seemed more complete.
This makes the relationship more difficult, not less. The Europeans feel more directly threatened by any shift In the US strategic posiuro ory compromise contemplated In SALT They are extremelytoany possibility that Washington will be trmplrd to feel that the security It provide* should be "paid for" by Europe with concessions In other areas. Theyietter balance of responsibilities within NATO highly desirable, huteasure ofin thc USfor example, the arms standardization effort in the European Program Croup. Europe thinks itself Washington's single most important interlocutor.it often lacks the single voice, ond when multiple bilateral* ore suhvt'tulctl. those left mil are deeply offended.
Western Europe is profoundlymore so than anyIhe complex of North-South Issues. There are numerous reason* for this: its preeminent role In world trior; It* greateron external resources and vulnerability to their cutoff: the ex-colonlalroximity to tho Middle East that directly Involves its security: and therade and associative ties with the Mediterranean, former colonial, and Commonwealth countries that link them to the EC
Europe thus brings to these issue* specialut, when It can getoint of view that is often nt odds with Washington. It I* witling to concede mure in traderganlzed markets and commodity agreements, government-to-government uld of one kind or another, and new IntemutloialIf nnl> cosmetic In purpose.
These difference* will lie very much with us in the next fewhe Conference on Internntloiial Economic Cooperation lhat recessed In December lo ullim the new administration time f'ir review is expected lo reconvenealks are also scheduled to begin In Murch In the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)und lo stabilize raw mulerlul*nd there are several other forums In which .he North-South ksur* will lie
urlthe stabilization fund,C* want the Industrialized countries to increase ild, provide debt relief. Improve market acceu. guarantee transfers of technology, etc. There are degree* of intransigence among the LDCs on theseut unanimity Is also lacking on the Western side. Unless some accommodation can be found, however, the accumulating tension* lead to recalcitrance when other issues that require internationalterrorism, non-proliferation, theup for decision.
The Agenda for Tomorrow
The world situation today Is thus one In which the relative absence of armed conflicteceptive appearance of tranquility. The realities Instead are societies in various stages of rapid and often violent change, governments that barely keep ahead of or try to resist the pressures from below, and fnternatinnnl economic, political, and security systems that are prone to periodic breakdowns.
High among the questions of obvious concern to governments around the world are the scope and nature itf the future US role in the world, hi the immesiiate aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate there was widespread belief abroad that the US was headedrolonged period of Introspection, perhaps even isolationism. Over theears that point of view ha* receded, but many uncertainties remain.
In reassessing their world role a* well as that of the US.imple, al! governments must wonder whether their objectives abroad are more likely to be attained by international cooperation, increasedon bulance-of-power diplomacy, or by some combination of the two. It is almost universally acknowledged that In the past three decodes, the high
hopes once held for an cwornpa-skng "world system"on badly disappointed and only in the past sear or so has interest in international "engineering" seemed to revive.
If that interesthere are the familiar problems: rationalization of organizations that have prolix-rated with questionable effectiveness since World Warore equitable distribution of influence and responsibility within them, and more effective enforcement powers. There ere also the difficulties of how to limit the memberrhlp of special purpose organizations, how much emphasis to put on regionalnd how to relote these to the whole. If Ihe suhject mutter Is eco lomic. there is the problem of blending state and frrc market systems and how much can be left to self-regulating
But if ihe emphasis settles on careful calculations of how- lolobal balance, ihe questions are of another sort. In much of the world thaiimportant tn the USo preeminent power or obvious interlocutor, the kinds of power lo be "balanced" have 'ueeome both diffuve and diverse, and the intcrincking of political, economic, and security interest* Is increasingly comple<(.
But the overriding Issue is whether some new concept of an acceptable relationship with the Soviet Union will emerge from the uncertainties of the past fewurther advance* of "Eurocommunism" in the next year, the continued disporitv of force* between East andn Central Europe, another unexpected assertion of Soviet power such as the one In Angola, disaffection and perhaps less than peaceful transitions of authority in the Soviet camp,ew drive lo turn back the strategic arm* race wouldood dea1 to accommodate without Hearerof thedetente.
THE DILEMMAS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
Moscow' surveys ihc foreign policy issues to be dealt with in the coming year, it has two leading concerns. One is how to get the bilateral relationship with Washington, which sagged badlyoving again. The other is how to begin to make progress with the new leadership in Peking. These two central problems are closely interrelated In Soviet thinking; they have some impact on almost all other aspects of Soviet policy abroad. Meanwhile, the problem of improving the Soviet position In this triangle is further complicated by Moscow'sdetermination to press its competitive interests against those of Washington and Peking in all parts of the world.
Soviet Worries About the Triangle
Last year, the Soviets showed considerableover reports in the Western press that the US might consider selling arms to China. The Soviet press quickly castigated "certain circles" in the US for desiring to contribute toilitarization, and Soviet diplomats buttonholed their US counterparts to determine the accuracy of these reports. This reaction indicates the degree of Soviet nervousness about the Washington-Peking relationship, evenear6 when little bilateral progress was made In Sino-US relations. Soviet leaders have for years worried that the US and others might gain leverage from Moscow's difficulties with China to drive harder bargains with Moscow elsewhere In the world, and have asserted Ihrlr belief that the US-China relationship makes the Chinese more recalcitrant toward the USSH.
The Imperatives Behind Detente
Soviet detente policy toward the US and the West Is motivated by other factors besides concern about China. When this policy began to take firm shapet was influenced, among other things, by strategic arms developments which made SALT talks appear potentiallyeightened realization of Soviet needs for Western technology and capital, the prospect of useful negotiationsew West
German Govern mcnt. and the growth of Brezhnev's personal authority and canfidencc. which made new ventures politically feasible.
Superimposed on this, however, was the drastic worsening of Sino-Soviet relations9 and ihe accompanying Soviet fear of Sino-US rapprochement. The increasingly hostile force to its east made it imperative for Moscow to get its house in order to (he west, above all to head off possible Sino-USto the detriment of Soviet Interest.
Soviet efforts to prevent this eventuality have continued ever since and have grown in intensity since the US relationship with China emergedhe Soviets havethe limits imposed by their othergive the US reasons to continue to see its relations with Moscow as more important lhan those with Peking. To this end. the Soviets have attached special importance toeb of bilateral contacts and negotiations that the Chinese cannot or will not match and that the US must view as central to its national interests.
The heart of this effort Is, of course, the SALT and other disarmament negotiations, which are of enor-mouse importance in their own right. At the same time, the Soviets assign great significance to economic ties, where they believe they have much more to offer US business community than do the Chinese. Theyreater need for specific US high-technology items, and they have sought large US capital Investments, which the Chinese haveven the emergenceontinuing long-term Sovietfor US grain, although politically embarrassing, has its advantages In Moscow's view. While sensitive to the possibility that the US might seek to use this dependence as leverage on the USSR, the Soviets see the Issue as simultaneously building leverage for themselves, by creating another Important USwith an interest In seeing thethe bilateral
The Soviets, meanwhile, also hope that Sovlet-US dealings will continue to complicate Sino-US rela-
SI
tiim* They clearly believe that Slno-US progress on arr.i* control and other nutters causes dlssa'bfaction toward Washington and Pekingtherefore servesrake on Sino-US relations. Their analysis of President5 visit to China seemed to be that It was not very fruitful, and they probably gave much of the credithis to their own successes up to that lime in dealing with the US.
The Soviet assessment that Peking Is discomfited by progress In Soviet-US negotiations is correct. Chinese media right now are Joyfully broadcasting the paucity
of Soviet foreign policy and disarmament successny movementroad range of Issues with the US thisonthus
be doubly satisfying for Moscow.
The Competitive Sources of Soviet-US Friction
Nevertheless, the Soviet motives for seekingrelations with the US are In constant conflict with other forces driving Soviet policy. In the case of SALT, the desire for agreement must be reconciled with tbe imperatives of an immense Soviet strategic wer pons program and the stilt ambiguous motives and ambitions which underlie lhat program. More broadly, Moscow perceives Its Influence In most of the world as necessarily Inversely proportional to US influence, and the Soviet effort to build an eidusive relationship with Washington therefore coeilstselt need to struggle against the US In many arenas. This deeply felt competitive urge to continue to press against US Interests around the world Isat odds wllh the parallel urge for more harmonious bilateralaccounts for at least some of the malaise In the Sovlet-US relationship last year.
The most notable case In point, of course, was the Soviet-Cuba', intervention Inarge-scale injcctlon of powerurrogate armed, supplied, and transported wllh Soviet assistanceivil war In an area hlthertn remote from Soviel Interests. That Intervention served to culalyse In ihe Westrood reexamination of the Soviet Interpretation of detente le the eyes of some Soviets, however, Moscow's .nvnlvemenl may have been rationalized a* consistent wllh past US behavior toward Ihem In the Middlehere the Soviets have seen their once-sliable presence dramatically cut beck In recent years, and they believe that the machinations of US diplomacy, working In conjunction wllh Egypt and theoil-prodiicing stales. Iinve hrought this about
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The Involvement of the Soviets in Angola may therrfore have been, at least Inesponse to their loss of Innucoce In the Middle East. Frustratedombination of local trends and US inillatlves lo the north, they saw an opportunity loosition In Angola and took It. They rightly calculated that. In the wake of ihe Vietnam experience, the US would not Intervene. The victory of the Marxist faction they supported had the added advantage of putting themetter position lo compete with the Chinese among the Independent African states and black nationalist movements In the area. The Soviets thusarch on both adversaries, although they probably misjudged the extent of the negative effect on Sovlet-US relations
Subsequently, despite die damage that Angola caused their relations wllh Washin-ton. the Soviets have publicly asserted their right In principle to do the same thing again,uitable occasion recur. In practice, because of differing local dreumstanees. an opportunity toomparable role elsewhere may not arise for some time. But the Soviets make no bones about their hostility to Initiatives likely to Improve US Influence in black Africa. They see such development as harmful lo their efforts to expand their Influence from the Angola political base through support of African nationalism. They therefore vehementlyand sought publicly and privately to undermine ihe US-sponsored peace talks on Rhodesia. They undoubtedlyarallel with past successful efforts by US diplomacy to shut them out In the Middle East, and they are determined lo prevent this If they can.
The sharpness of the conflict between US and Soviet Interests In Africa suggests lhat events there will continue to cause friction In Ihe bilateral relationship over the coming year. On the other hand, despite Moscow's deep resentment over what has happened lo its position In the Mlddh East. Soviet policy Is constrained there both by awareness of the greater risk* Involved and by (he force of unfavorable local clrcum*lances. Conscious ol (heir limited Influence wllh Ihe Arab "confrontation" slates, the Soviets are likely over Ihe near term to follow the lend of the emerging Arab consensus on both the conditions for future negotiation* and their substance. They will alsotrong Involvement wllh such anti-settlement forces as Libya and Iraqeans of reminding alt concorn'd that theyorce to be reckoned withotential source of disruption of any arrangement* In which they do not participate. Rut the ihrmt of Soviel policy this year will continue
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be toenewal ol the Ceneva Middle East conference, as the main vehicle through which they hope toole comparable to that of the United States. In the meantime, they will remain alert for any opportunity to Improve their retr^vnskey to iheir lost position In the Arabthe Egyptian-US relationship falter. Moscow probably hopes that the new USin its fint year will not be able lo prevent this from happening.
The third area with great potential for hindering improvement in Ihe Soviet-USthe Soviet-Chinese one asEastern Europe. Change could occur especially quickly during the next year in Poland orPoland being the more volatile. The Clerek government narrowlyerious crisis last year, and economic dissatisfaction could result in worker disruptions as severe as those6he death or disability of President Tito could alsoestabilizing effect in Yugoslavia.
An adventuristic Soviet reaction lo either of ihese contingencies in the coming year would seriously complicate relations with both the US and China. As evidenced by their reaction lo the Soviet-ledIn Chechoslovakiaheee their own security threatened when these force against neighboring Communist states. They would presumably again lead the outcry againstove, setting back whatever chance Moscow might have for easing the relationship with Peking. Mean-white, the effect on US and Western public opinion would abviously be substantial.
Superimposed on all else In the Sovlet-US bilateral relationship in the post year has been the Impasse on trude und SALT. No progress was made toward reviving the bilateral trodeto Moscowariety ofthe Soviets had rejected5 because of the Stevenson Amendment on credit restriction* and the earlierAmendment tying emigration policies lo most-favored-nation (MFN) status When the SALT negotiations failed toreakthrough last March, the impetus of4 Vladivostok accord likewise seemed to evaporate. Soviet leaden have since felt that election year USre an olwtacie to bilateral prognd expressed their unhapplness over US campaign rhetoric to American visitor? such a* Governor Mirriman. EPA head Russell Train, and Secretary Simon Since the election. Soviet spokesmen such as Arbatov have Indicated their desire
esture toward the USSR from the new-admin 1st rot Ion on the trade and MFN issue. At the same time, they have repeatedly signaled their wish (or an early resumptionie SALT negotlalions. but here, ton. Insist lhat the ball remains In the US court.
The Soviet Approach to Pcldng
Moscow's attempts lo deal with the Peking comer of the triangle have been frustrated from the slart. Ever sincearmed clashes along the Ussurl Riverhe Sovirli have worked atialogue. They have punucd this avenue by doggedly Insisting on their readiness to talk, while simultaneously building their military muscle along the border and working hard lo combai and limit Chinese influence wherever possible in the world. In short, they have sought by carrot and stick Io convince Peking that it is In its own best interests to negotiate and compromise.
Unlike their dealings with the US. however, these efforts haveears remained stuck in drad center.ariety of reasons, partly Idrulogical, partly historical, bul mainly based on hard calculations of national interest, the Chinese have flatly refused thus far Io compromise or even to moderate Iheirhostility. Among other things, the Chinese are well aware thai Moscow urgently wishes lo paper over (Is differences with Peking in order to strengthen the Soviet hand In dealing with the US and othen. The Chinese have so far seen it in their interest to disappoint this Soviet ambition.
As SALT Is to the US relationship, so the Sino-Soviet border negotiations, whichonth before SALT, are crucial Io the Sino-SovielUnlike SALT, hosvever. the border talks have thus for proved sterile, foundering primarily on Ihe Chines demand for prior Soviel withdrawal from all disputed territory. Other aspects of the relationship have been similarly discouraging, except possibly for trade, which has Increased modestly In.
Mao Tse-Iung's death gave the Sovici* their first fainl hopeecade for some break In this Impasse. It had long been an article of faith among Moscow'sa correctthere was no hope ol improvement while Chairman Mun was olive. They still J'nve no confidence Ihnt the post-Mao leader* will toon change their stance, but hope lhal In time China's view of Us own best Interests will shift. Meanwhile, the Soviets have fell that the change in admlnisliatlons In Washington made the moment propiiinu* lo tryreakthnmgh with Peking The
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new CS administration will rniulrr time to develop Its policies. Moscow reasons, and ihus should provide the USSR wiih in interval to work to improve relations with China without US interference.
The Soviets have accordingly taken several steps to signal their desireresh start. They haveanti-Chinese polemics, sent the first porty-to-party messages to Pekingecade and hurried their border negotiating team back to Peking to start another round of border talks. Although they have openly taken comfort from the purge of the radicals in Peking whom they viewed as Mao's spiritual heirs, they have not yetositive response to their gestures from the new Chinese leaders, who claim, instead, that these are empty gestures designed to worry the US.
Moscow is nevertheless likely to continue for some time its efforts toew and productive dialogue, despite the initial rebuffs. Theesigned acceptance of its vulnerable position in the Sino-Smict-US triangle. The Soviets will continue to hope that ongoing turmoil In the Chinese leadership may eventually bring to the fore figures more inclined to compromise. They will meanwhile seek token or cosmetic actions from Peking which they can hold out lo the Weil a* proof that Sino-Soviet erUtktm are improving. One such minimal Chinese gesture wouldeturn to Moscow of the Chinese ambassador, who has been absent line*6
The Continuing Chinese Challenge to Soviet Intcrviti
As In the case of their dual relationship with the US. however, thc Soviets must also simultaneouslytoierce, competitive struggle with Peking, seeking lo limit and undrrmlne Chinese areas of Influent while preventing the Chinese from dumaglng theirs. This was most recently demonstrated In the wake nf Brerhnev'i visits to Bucharest and Belgrade last November. It Is Indicative of the Chineseof the SovielIn each capital, shortly after Brezhnev departed, the former Chinese foreign minister Chi Peng-fei arrived. In Bucharest, he cummenilerl Romania's "revolutionary ipirit of defying brutend In Belgrade he landed traditional Yugmhiv vigilance againstl tbe sameisiting Romanian delegation to China was being lauded Innd shepherded uliout by Yuchief Chinese ilelegute to the Slno-Sovlrt borderwlm, if uuy (uogress was lielng made In the talks,
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should have been in Peking negotiating with the
Soviets.
Thbavlor Is no doubt resented by Mriscow. which recognize* it as Ihe harassment th* Chinese intend It to he.arger scaie. iteminder of Peking's constant encouragement of Incoordination within Moscow's East European empire. By providing an alternative 'n the Communist world for independent-minded East European forces. Chinaisruptive Influence quite different from the ever-present economic and Ideological attractions of the US 'ind the West that areonstant concern to Moscow.
The Internal Dimension
In sum, with new sets of leader* In bothand Peking at th* beginningb* Soviet leaders are likely to continue familiar policies with greater urgency. They will push particularly hard for action on SALT and economic relations with the US. and try to get aseading as possible of the new admlnbtration's intentions In these areas. Toward China they witl show restraint while continuing to seek some progress on thai side of the triangle. If no Improvement Is made, they will simply settle back and wait their next chance.
All of this, of course,ontinuation of the present leadership In Moscow, which is by no means assured. It is true that Brezhnev'sn lb* leadership today seems secure. His heallh appears better than Itear ago. and he give* no Indication that he Intend* lo relinquish his position an" time soon Yet Brezhnev and the other senior mem ben of the Politburo have now all reached an age which greatly Increases the chances of rapid attrition. Brezhnevh birthday in December. Kirilenko, Brezhnev's polilicol deputy, also turnedarlierremiernd parly ibeoretldon Suslovll except Kirilenko an* In varying slate* of poor health. The issue i* thus not merely the matter of Brezhnev's succession, but lite necessity of rejuvenating the entire top ranks of lhe leadership.
Thecertain to complicate the conduct of Soviet policy, at least temporarily, but i* seems unlikely that the basic directions of Soviet foreign policy will soon be seriously affected. Detente has evolvedonsensu*lend of diverse Institutional and personalbe troublemaker* in thesuch a* Shelepin and
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hImi were li-mptcd for! political end* to challenge tin- brood consensus fruitfully hove Inert wiit led out, Those who have rrmuined have leafo work together fairly smoothly, to resolve theirnd to compnunlve when necessary.
While Brtvhnev ha* betome theigorous proponent of detente era) Iv now credited with Initiating authoritative party literature carefully stresses that Brezhnev's formulation of foreign policy i*n the collective wisdom and lhat all shade* uf opinion are taken Into account.he Inirgcooingf Brezhnev serves not only to enshrine the legitimacy of his personal leadership, hut hi* policies as well. It would, therefore, be awkwardew leadership lo veek lo change course rod lea Iquickly.
Nevertheless, (he concept of drtente a* propounded by Ihe Soviet leadership Is sufficiently elastic and umhiguou* to encompns* differing viewpoints and to allow considerable shifts in emphasis with changingew leadership In Moscow couldew focus lo ihe concept of detente.
This Is particularly possible In regard to those competitive area* of the relationship with the US where Ihe Soviet* hove done poorly, such as Ihe Middle East, ami which have thereforeoliticalrequent response made to Soviet public lecturers In Moscow and Leningrad has been the observation that. In effect, detente is fine, but why did the Soviet Union let the Imperialists take Ivack the Middle East? The best evidence we hove had of an open challenge to Brezhnevoreign policy Issue has been on Middle East policy, in ihe aftermath oft the Instigation of then Politburo member Shelepin. Hints of differences between Brezhnev and certain nlherPodgornyy and the late Marshalcontinued to surfaced from time to time, usually over the extent of cooperation wllh the US In the Middle East and the number of risks In competing wllh Ihehift In the Politburo balance created by the succession process could therefore conceivably bring atarginal change In the Soviet competitive responserisis situation,n the Middle East.
The eslrnt thai foreign policy will in foci be affected by ihe changing of Ihe old guard will be determined largely by ihn rate and order of Ihe members' departure from the political scene. Il I* this
ll probubly determine both the smoothness of Ihe transition and the shape of the future leadership
The departure of the seniorhe Pol..turn In rapid succession wouldhake the decisionmaking mechanism. The chancesitter power struggle would vastly increase, and with it. the likelihood lhat policy Issues would become Involved. On the other hand, if changes at ihe top arp spread mil, the dinnersore orderly transfer of power would be Improved.
If. for Instance, Suslov Is the first to die or be forced by disability lo leave. Brezhnev would have perhaps his best opportunity yet lo restructure the leadership lo his own liking and to push his own policies more vigorously. Suslov has long been the guardian of the concept of collectivity. While overtly In favor of detente, he has for many yean been an ideologically motivated spokesman for caution In punulngwith ihe US. The Influence he has come lo wield would not be readily tramfcTrableike-thinking newcomer.
Brezhnev clearly hopes to continue in his party post long enough to ensure some control over the sirecession process and guarantee an honorable place for himself In the historyI* health seems to bo the key tn whether he will succeed.
The Soviet system ho* yet toransfer ofithout intense political struggle andnd Brezhnev's sudden demise would severely test the maturity of leadership ond the greater rrgu la rl ration of political life lhat has developed. Kirilenko nppenn most likely to succeed Brezhnev, at leastacit understanding among his senior collrngues on this moy possibly have been reached during one of Brezhnev's Illnesses in the lost few yean. Such an understanding may not endure, however.ong delayed.
Even If the mechanics ofransition were accomplished smoothly, the change would probably usher In an era of greater Instability al Ihe lop. The discipline that Brezhnev's preeminence has Imposed on political life would be weakened. There I* the possibility that Infighting would lie carried into the foreign policy area, aod that there mighteversion to the situation prevailing In the middle and laleore Brezhnev consolidated hi* posi-Hon. Policy disagreements were then more openly-aired in public, anil some political leaden used their Institutional (lowerKGBe case nf
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ut tempt lo (llH'rrtllt thr* policies of their rivals. The resultreaternoviet Intention*
Moreover, there Ii the added difficulty that the duties of the general secretary are not clearly defined ami responsibility for foreign policy is not autornatl-rally inherited with party Irodrrship Khruvbcbev knew little about foreign policy when he assumed this position It tookears lo gain recognition at home and abroadorld itat-sman. and he succeeded In solidifying this status only by assuming the premiership along with his party post.
Brerhnev was prevented from doing this by agreement among the leaders, following Khnishchev's ouster that ptrclodcd the two toppostsbeing combined In one man.umber of
remier Kmygln wns the prlnclpul spokesman for foreignBrezhnev gradually wrested this authority from Kosygln by espousing the detenle policies he himself had once questioned, and arguing for the primacy of the patty in ull policyecent article bysenior party worker Justifying Brezhnev's leading mle In foreign policy makes it dear, however, that the controversy on this question Is not over.
Kirilenko. If he does succeed Brezhnev, may have an easier time picking up tbe rein* than his predecessors did. But he. loo. will have lo establish hts supremacy In the conduct of foreign affairs. Thus, in addition to the other Inevitable problemsew leadership will face, there will be the added confusion caused by uncertainty as to where top authority for foreign policy resides.
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sujooia
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WESTERN EUROPE
EASTERN EUROPE
event- of lhe past year orparticular the instability In Poland last summer and the growing prospect of leadership change In Yugoslavia andonce again underscored the fact that neitherears of Soviet hegemony nor the prrsence ofoviet divisions has altered the underlying rralllles In Eastern Europe. Nationalism and ethno-centrismultural heritage whose bias drivrs the East European countries toward the West still thwartdesireuffer of loyal and stable states on Its western flank.
The spirit of rationalism helps keep the Poles, thend the others from identifying their interests with those of the USSR. Iteader like Ceausrscu, who runs an exceedingly tight ship atetain his own power. It creates formidable problems for leaders In East Germany, who are striving to convince their people that theirongruent with their sense of national Identity Elhnoctnlrism is at the heart of the political problem in Yugoslavia. Even in Czechoslovakia, one o! the more conservative and stable of the Warsaw Pact states, tensions und rivalry between the Czechs ami Slovuktoroblem for Ihe regime
The ulhire of lhe West ts as strong as ever In Eastern Europe The Inin Curtain metaphor ha* lost much of its meaning, notcuuse Moscow under Rrezh* tiev has not uttempted looviet-style inlcrnul order Ml these countries but also because of tbe requirements of modern technology that have pushed Eastern Europe toward the West. The ideotikgymplicit In Western popularltimately subversiventnlst prevepts and. more lo the point,olitical order that puis Us rmphasl* on unquestioning discipline and obedience.
KM European governments have droll withfrom thr Westariety of ways In Oecbmlovaklu. Romania, and East Germany they have tried to impute strict limits, nml hence the Baal Berlin government was compelled to eslle the singer Wolf Riermann last year when he slrpoed over the line Inlo open -miltlcul commentary. All the East
European regimes have tried to meet the challenge ol the West by attempting to strengthen their Ideological bases. Some, but not all, of thb renewed attention to Marxist Ideology has been in"response to prodding by the USSR. The problem is that tbe ideology, never very strongommitted Intellectual elite, has lost much of Its vigor even for that group.
The development of Eurocommunism will alsohallenge to the East European regimes. Torof leaders like Berllnguer. Carillo. and Mart hats will raise questions about thcongruence of Communist precept* and uuthorltarlan political order, louder* like Kadar ond Honcckrr have as .nuch reason to fight the heretical (non-lenlnistl Ideas of Western Communist leaders as does Brezhnev. But Ihey are workingifferent political and cultural environment and their burden will be that much heavier.
Eear of Western ideas andtrays an underlying unslety about political authority thatears of rule has not eliminated. In'*s. the mailed fist was by and large Ihr answer to tbe question of who was in charge und by what right. But In the last decode, lhe governments of Eastern Europe have become economiceep people well fed and well clothed, ond they will not make trouble Political hegemony will follow in due course The East European leaden, however, won confronted thr same problem* as leaders of other political penuuslons In other part* of the world. Proml*es tbnt ore mode, and not kept,rescription for trouble, a* the Polish government found out lust June, when worker* rtpressed their unhapplnessighhanded Increase In price* In the only way they know how: by riot and usUilnge
The Economic Outlook
Poland Is riot the only country In Eastern Europeerirnccd economic difficulties last year, and the prospect is for more of the samehe East European countriesbeen grappling with tighter economic cooslruinlt imposes! by Western inflation
SE
ami recession, higher price* for Soviet nil and row materialand *evcrul ycer* nf hudin' IEuropean consumer has frit, and will continue to feci, the impact of these problems.
Agricultural difficulties have most directly affectrd consumers, causing shortages of meat, fruit, and vrgetaltles in almost all of the East European countries, although none so severely as In Poland. Some regimes, trying to keep down Western trade deficits, hove trimmed imports of consumer goods, tried to maintain food exports even In the face of domestic shortages, and been reluctant to buy more food than absolutely necessary to cover the most acute problems
Eastern Europearge trade deficit with tbe developed Westlthough below the recordillion recordedespite higher prices for Western Importsecession-Induced drop in Western demand for East European goods, these states have continued lo buy large quantities of Western technology and Industrial materials. They have also been compelled by their own problems In agriculture to increase purchases of Westerncommodities.
Western trade deficits and the deterioration in their terms of trode with Ihe USSR have prompted most of the regimes tn Increase export goals and lo cut back planned rotes of improvement In the standard of living for the current Five-Year. Actual slowdowns in Improvements in the standards of living could easily be greater than planned, as was the case In Hungary
The Soviets helped create the tougher economic en vim,,men! In which tbe East Europeans must operate.oseow sharply Increased the price It charged East Europeans for oil and other raw materials, and prices also wenl up6me lime, the Soviets have been reluctant to moke long-term commitments for key row materials, especially oil. and have become more Insistent about gelling quality East European products. They have required the East Europeans to participate in Soviel development projects In return for guaranteed supplies of raw materials. Moscow's attituden part, from It* own economicauhoul Its future supplies of oil and rawpartlyingering feeling thut the East Kumpcons have not been doing tlielr share. The fad (Iinl several East Eurnjieun countriesigher standard of living lhan the USSR may help rrinfiuer the latter view.
IT
^conomic policies have contributed tn (he East Europeans' Increasing trade deficit with the West. To offset higher Soviel prices for rawhe East Europeans will be under pressure lo divert eastward some quality goods datrd for sale in the West.
The economic outlook for ihe region depends very much on factor* outside the East Europeans' control. An economic upturn Inest would certainly stimulate East European exports, helping to reduce (rode deficits. But il would also make It more expensive to get further deht finandng and new Western credits.
Improved agricultural produdion would relieve some pressure, ond the region,ears of had weather, may gel lucky. Recent reverse* have had tbe salutary effed of drawing more attention and investment to agricultural problems Some regimes have pushed aside Ideological obstacles andermissive line on private agricultural produdion. Supplies of all-Important meat products will not be replenished quickly, however, because of earlier sloughlenng of young animals.
Such Improvemenls may not mrun much for the consumer, beyond tuklng the edge off shortages. With an eye tosvurd the many demands on resources, economic planners will continue In be temptedut comers In the consumer sector In order lo meet trade commitments or Io maintain economic growih. There are still strong economic pressures lo raise prices of Ka'ic foodstuffs.
The Soviets hove taken some step* to soften Ihe blow of higher raw materialoviet oil prices have not risen ahmplly lo leveb In theominal Soviet oil prices were about one-third lower lhan Western prices. According In the pricing formula adoptedoviet nil prices are slated tn Increase sharply next yenr and move much closer to world levels. But Moscow might havr second thoughts about putting the formulas Into practice If the East European economies are In terlous trouble by next year.
Prices of East Europeon exports were oho raised Innot nearly enough to offset Soviet pricesome East European machinery may lie getting preferential price treatment. The Soviets apparently have also offered at least several count rir* long-term livan* to cover trade deficits; nl lime* lliey have Iieen lenient about the lerms of East Kurojienn Investment In Soviel raw material projects.
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fad Is that Moscow cannot afford to place Its economic relationsurely commercial basis. If the Sovk-ts press too hard, Ihey run the risk of promoting economic hardships In Eastern Europe thol cun easily degenerate Into political Instability, This Is the last thins: Moscow wants. And that Is why Moscow felt compelled last fall to givearge loan and additional quantities of oil and gram to help Clerek out of his economic and political bind. Moreover, the Soviets can also rationnllzc that, upoint, the economic dependence of Eastern Europe does give them some political leverage they would not otherwise enjoy. The problem for Moscow is to establish the proper balance between economic and political equities.
Thc Soviets
Soviet interests in Eastern Europe are unchanged: the region is atuffer against the West and an advanced post of Soviet might and Influence in Europe. The East Europeans, with certain notable exceptions are helpful In promoting Soviet foreign policy Interests.
The Soviets would like un Eastern Europe that was as one with theeries of nominally Independent states that ordered their Internal and external uffalrt In ways that were pleasing to Moscow. Rut Moscow has few If any Illusions, and It knows, from bitter experience, that thereontradiction between subservience to Moscow and internalstability. While Csrechoslovakla8 proved that Moscow could be pushed too far. by and large the Soviet leudcrshlp under Brezhnev has opted for stability In Eastern Europe at the expense of ideological purity. In the cose of Romania tin Soviets haveivisive and mlschlefmuklng voice In the Wuruiw Pud and on the International scene, secure in the knowledge that Ceausescu brooks no Interference nt home.
Ry the standards ofs und', Moscow has shown considerable forltearnnce und flexibility. Because Iteed to perpetuate the Idea thut it leads the International Communist movement, Moscoweeting ofparlies last year that. In effect, concluded that there Is no leaderuropeanorld Communist movement. Moscow, of course. Inter tried to set tbe rrconl straight uniluterally. hut the point Is that the Soviets did not Insist on ramming their views down the throats of Ceausescu or Tito tor Berllngurr or CarllhO. The Soviets have attempted to guard
ugainst encroachments from the West by involving their Warsaw Pad allies in new coordinatingthe summit-level political consultative meeting of the Warsaw Pad that convened In Bucharest last November Is the most noteworthy example. For starters, the Sovids clearly hope toetter fix on thc relationships that their East European allies have with the West. We know from dandestlne reports, for example, that they have been particularly concerned about East Berlin In this regard. They alsoeed to remind the East Europeanthc party funrtlonaries below thetheir obligations to the USSR and, most Important, toelter grip on what exactly Is happening internally In the countries. For Moscow this Is an unending process, but as Brezhnev once said In another context, the Soviets have an unlimited supply of patience.
What Is missing from Moscow's attention to these problems is any sense of alarm or new direction. In his report toh Party Congressor. Brezhnev saiday went by that the Politburo did not concern Itself with Eastern Europe: but then he wrnt on to all but Ignore it. The events Inew months later must have put Eastern Europe back on the front burner. Moscow's reiteration of its support for Clerek after his display of weakness and Us promises of economic assistance give evidence of cnnlluiiity In the Kremlin's approach. Even while Moscow has taken advantage of economicto strengthen Itsmost notable case Is that of Ceausescu. who has been on his best behavioris Moscow for the last 6USSR Is not moving in any vigorous way tu circumscribe Its allies' economic ties wiih the West. Moscow knows that these countries, and hence the USSR, need the West If they are to keep their economies and their Internal situations in some kind of order.
Polond
The coming year will be as difficult for the Polish leadership nshe heady, optimistic public mood that characterized the early year* of this decade bus given way to angry questioning by the Polish people of why their expectationselter life have been disappointed. The primary goal of party leader Clerek7 will be to keep the lid on.
He cun do little else for there are no short-term solutions to the problems that sparked theupplies of consumer goods will continue to fall short of demand. Reserves have been juggled and extra quantities of consumer goodsen Imported to
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take the edge oil frustration* Tlir regime was able lo pul rn>nightbe stores at Chrivtmai to case the grumbling. The supply situation fur tin- rest ol Ihe winter and Ihr pre-Easter season rrmalii* uncertain. Polish offidab have admittrd that II will lake atean lo bring the economy out af the doldrums und have told Ihe public that meatmost sensitiveat best equal last year's level.
The leadership has hesitantly taken measures tn encourage private farmers and craftsmen lo expand their activities. More Investment funds will be diverted to the production of consumer goods. These policies, even If conscientlnusly implemented, will not bear milt for several years.
The Polish leadership must struggle this year to find the motivational and organlratioual means tothe economic malaise. Much of the dramatic economic progress0 has been due to extensive imports nf Westernractice that cannot continue Ivcaiise nf Poland's critical hulance-of-payment.Hence, the emphasis will lie on finding ways to use Ihe resources already on hand more etTiclenlly. This makes economic sense, but the rresent mood of the people and the conservative nature of the Polish party andbureaucracy make It highly unlikely that there will lie much progress ihis year in getting the Polish worker to work harder. The economy's growth will not mutch that of the past several years.
So fur there has been little political fallout from the June disturbances and the continuing economic woes. Clerek uppeurs to be In control. Several of his reputed critics were demoted In December, and he has Indicated thai despite the setbacks, his overall conception for ihe Polish economy. Including rapid development, remains In force. Moreover. Glerek has signaled that he does noteturniarsiier political line domestically. Indeed, thereaction to ihe summer disturbance* has been remarkablyumber of worker* arrested lor *a! iilage during the June disturbance* have been rrlrawil. ami the regime ha* not moves! fiarrfiilly to put an endie public criticismroup of intellectual* cullingihe Workers' Defense Ij-ngue. Glerek'* pewit Ion ha* lieen *trenglhenetl by tin-hoall went out of their way lo make clear that, tlie problem* of Poland(Jlerek I* 'till In Moscow's good grace* How long he will remainepend* on whut happens In Poland this year. Il also dejiend* on who, If unylmdy.
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the Soviets can find belter uble to walk thei ween what Moscow* wants and what the Polish licople can live with.
The Yugoslav Problemt When Tito Goes
Tito will soone seems to Ise In reasonably geiod health, but he may well pass from the scene with llltle or no warning. Last year, weundestlne report that his mental faculties may be slipping. Preparations for the succession arcEmphasis has been put on tightening internal security against any challenges to the new leadership or attempts bythey pro-Western orexacerbate Internal problems. TheArmy has come to the fore in this effort. Military men huve been moving into top Join throughout ihe internal security apparatus, and ihe army has been given new authority in Internal security affairs. An am.yded "vigilance campaign" goes hand in handodernization of Its forcesenewed emphasis on the capability of Yugoslav dvilions In help defend the country from attack.
A nine-member presidency has long beento provide continuity in state affairs after Tito's eleath or incapacitation. But little has been done to clarify w'ho will take over the real power center, the Communist Party.
Staneyear-old Slovene who heads the powerful party executive committee, now appears to be the front-runner. Dolanc Is younger than most top Yugoslav leaders, and If he wins mil. It will lake him some lime In consolidate his power. Those who oppose Dolimc's ambitions will try tn prevent him from assuming all the power that Tito enjoys, even if they cannot keep him from the lop position.
The regime Is planning Importunt organIzntlonid and personnel changes this year vhlch promise lo lest the powers of Dolanc and the others. According to oneave receivedugoslav source, Tito Is Inlent emmall collective at ihe lop of the parly. There will to be strong competition for apimlnlment to this new body ami In the large personnel "nilutlon" thai Is also In the work*.
Relations with Moscow
The prospecteadership change in Yugoslavia um s'ery much on Brezhnev's mind when he visited Yugoslavia lost Noveml*er. The Soviel* do not like Dolanc, am! according to somehey made that plain during the visit. Soviel hostility evidently
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storm from thc fuct (hoi Dolanc play* on dccp-*eatrd Yugoslav (cart of Soviet intention* in order tneputationouder who tolk* tough to thc Kremlin. A* far a* wc know. Mo-cow is not hacking any single alternative candidate. Nevertheless, there are several men In thc forces opposed toParty Secretary Jure Blllc and Foreign Ministerwould appear to lie to the Kremlin's liking.
Brezhnev hasarm relationship with Tata, and it looks ns If the Soviet lender tried to trade on that relationship while he could. We have clumicstinc evidence he pushed hard for Increased access to Yugoslav potts by Soviet naval ships and for blanket overflight rights. He also suggested thnt Tito permit the formationugoslav-Sovlrt friendship society and send Yugoslav delegates to Ideological conferences in the East Most of our information indicates Tito turned Brezhnev down on all counts. Brezhnev In turn evidently failed to promise Increased supplies of the cool. oil. and natural gns necessary to th- Yugoslav economy over the nest few sears. Yugoslav dependence on Soviet energy, trade, and credits, however, probably will remain limited.
Few believe that theill try to bring Yugoslavia back Into lhe fold by force of arms after Tito dies. Hut the Soviets will work hard, short of open Intervention, to being leaders to power In Yugoslavia sympathetic to tbe USSR and Its needs ard desires. One danger Is that internal Instability in Yugoslavia ami the revival nf the ethnic-based rivalries of the past will give Moscow more to work with, andretext for overt intervention. Another danger Is that over time. Moscow might perceive Yugoslavia to be slipping Westward In Its orientation, and feel compelled tn move forcefully to right the buliince. Both tendencies will be reinforced by economic strains. These could leadlowdown In growth, aggravating Internal rivalries They could also leadard currency debt that would mortgage future exports to Western and Arab OPEC markets.
East Germany
The coming year I* shaping upifficult one for the East Germans. The economy, the most efficient ami productive In Eastern Europe, has troubles not unlike those elsewhere In the region. Under normallower economic pace could be nciiHnniodated with relatively little political fallout. Clearly the economic problem* are not as severe as tin we In Poland, nor are the Fnst German people as
quick us the Pole* to express their economicBut the East Cerman leader* are feeling pressure* from other quarters, and it is lo those prevsures that they have been re*ponding and will respond In lhe coming month*.
Thc Honecker regime I* convinced that the West Germans are reneging on the political bargain thut was struck In thehen Ostpollllkthe political catchword for thelietwren thc twohe East Germans charge that Bonn is still trying to promote ties with West Berlin, that some of its politicians are still paying at least lip service to the distant goaleunited Ocrrnnny. und thnt It is trying to appeal to thc East Germuns over the head of their government. The Helsinki Final Act hasomplication, making it more difficult lo contain dissident* and quarantine the East German people. In the old days, an outspoken critic such as Wolf Blermann. were he to exist at all. would have been dealt with quietly and efficiently, and few In the West, or In East Germany itself, would have been the wiser.
l^ist year, the Honecker government suppressed Its misgivings ahout what It regardedougher line in Bonn No doubt al Soviet urging, the East German regime not only kept relations wiih West Germany on an even keel but Increased the emigration rate to help Schmidt beat Kohl, whom the East Germans regarded as less ucceptuble lhan the Chuncellor. But with Schmidt safely elected, the East Germans now feel free lo get tougher nt home, to make It more difficult for the West Germans In make contact with and appeal to the East Cerman people, and to strenghlhen the Idea nf lhe East German state by incorporating East Berlin more dosclv Into the German Democratic Republic.
A certuln amount of tension between Ihe two Germanlei has already arisenesult of East Berlin'*elation* are likely to get more acrimonious ns tbe sear proceeds, particularly as the Helgnide meeting of the European Securityappnmches and attention toc*ut neither *lileeturn lo the atmosphere of the postwar period, and the Soviel* in particular, are likely to rein In Honecker If he seems to lie threatening Moscow's detenle policy.
The United Slates
The basic factor* that ilelermlne the nature nf the political relationship lietwren the US and the East
European countries arc unlikely to change substantial-ly over the next year. Thc proximity of the USSR ami Its ureal Influence on the policies of all East European stales except Yugoslavia. Romania, and Albania; Ihe existence of Communist governments In each of these states; and the repression of political alternatives continue to be the major elements affecting and constraining the region's relations with the US.
The East European regimes with the exception of Albania will try to Improve bilateral relations with Washington. They will seek specific objectives in their dealings with the US such as MFN agreements. In the case of Yugoslavia and Romania, they will try to balance their relations with Moscow with closer tics with Washington.
The political relationships between Individual East European states and the US and their particular problems can be briefly characterized as follows.
Yugoslav political relations with the US hove been troubled particularly by third worldwith the developed countries and by deep-seated suspicions that Yugoslav emigre activities In tbe US amountonspiracy of "pressures" against Yugoslavia. Thesecombined with the Tito regime's desire to quash pro-Westernmoke themedia at times more anti-US than those of the Warsaw Pact countries. There have, however, recently been signs that Belgrade may try toore positive tone with the new US
The lloxha regime In Albania is goingrnuWed reassessment of Its declining relationship with China, but It has shown no signs lhat It Is moderating Its hostile stand against either the US or the USSR. As Tirana sorts out Its foreign policy options, lt appears to be relying on ils traditional Isolationist position rather than opening up lit Ihe outside world.
The Romunlansspecial political relationship" with Washington because this sets it apart from Moscow's other allies. Despite heavy Soviel pressure, ihr Romaniansrn willing ul times tn break ranks and cooperate closely with the US on International issues. Ceausescu has Indicated he wishes to broaden this relationship, despite Romania's recentto play up lo the Soviets.
Sofia has been unwilling to struy from Moscow's foreign policy line in its relations with Washington. The Bulgarians have nevertheless indicated that they would like to resolve several outstanding political problems, presumably In hopes of receiving MFN privileges should the Soviet line shift. Although Sofia's emigration policies do not seem to pose muchroblem, the Bulgarians have nevertheless refused to give public assurances of free emigration.
The Hungarians are eager for MFN trading status and are determined to retrieve thc Crown of St. Stephen, which has been In US hands since WoHd War II. Relations have Improved steadilyhen Cardinal Mindszenty left his asylum in the US Embassy in Bu'lapest.
itter over the collapseilateral claims agreements4 and the continued US retention of gold confiscated during World War II. While Prague also desires MFN status, it must realize that already poor relations will not he helped by Its recent harsh treatment of dissenters.
On the economic side. East European trade wllh thc US Is small, hut growingimited way. Should thc US grant MFN status to all of 'Sc East European countries, trade would probably Increase. Thefor growth ore limited, however, by the Inability of most East European countries to produce and market targe quantities of goods that are attractive to thc US market, largely because of these export limitations, Poland, which along wllh Yugoslavia and Romania has MFN status, conductsercent of Its foreign trade (or aboutercent of Its trade with nun-Soviet bloc countries outside the USSR and Eastern Europe) wllh the US.
The East European couniries would welcome the greater flexibility provided themomplele normalization of trading relations with tbe US. The East Europeans hove been finding that, as they develop more competitive products, these goods are more susceptible to local, nontorlff trade harriers, whether In the US or the EC. Barriers raised by the EC. especially to East European agricultural products, could prompt several of the East European countries to shift some trade away from their long-time commorient partners In Western Europe.
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With' the moderate Arah states setting the course of Arab policy. Soviet Influence in the area has continued to dwindle. The Egyptians officially aim-gated their friendship treaty with the USSR last March end denied Moscow the use of Alexandria's port facilities. Soviet pressure on the Syrians not to take on the Palestinians not only raised hackles In Damascus, hut weakened the Soviets' standing with the Palestinians.
The Soviets are worried that they will again he excluded fromeace talks and that the US will score unother breakthrough, furtherthe Soviet position in the area. They ure therefore pushingeconvened Geneva Conference in which, as cochalrman. they wouldtrong role. Simultaneously they are Increasing their Involvement with the regimesettlement. Iraq and Ubya.ay of demonstrating thut they cannot be ignored.
Their ability to Influence Ihe direction or result of peace negotiations nevertheless remains marginal. They will not urge concessions on the Arabs for feur of alienating their radical clients; they will steer away from rigid positions that might brand them as obstructionists In the eyes of the moderate majority.
The Soviets probably calculate that eveneneva conference does convene the chances for success ure dim and that failure would work to Soviet advunluge. The Arabs' resentment at the US for failing to induce Israel to meet their demands would provide opportunities. Moscow must hope, to restore the Soviet position in the area.
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Afri
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Africa it marked more by contrasts than by similarities, certain trends are discernible.
The black struggle against white rule In southern Africa hasew and more ominous phase. The utilmate outcome,in South Africa, ti not clear, but the basic issue is whether the problem can be resolvedelatively peaceful and orderly fashion or whether it will have to be settled on the battlefield
Great power competition Is once again on the rise In Africa.
North-South Issues are assuming moreIn shaping the attitudes and policies of many African states.
Political and economic change in the region is in the direction of Manlsl socialism, albeit with African Innovations.
Hopes for regional cooperation and groupirtf are loundering because of nationalism and interstate rivalries.
Tribal dlvlslvenesi continues unabated In mmt black African stoles.
One-man, or one-party, rule Is becoming the norm, and such rule Is Increasingly repressive.
Force Is becoming the accepted, and often oult. way tn guin political power.
Economic prospects are discouragingAfrica, and the economies of most states depend on basically uncontrollable factorss ihe vngurles of weather, world prices for primary pn-ducts. and the whims of Inept and erratic leaders
Such geneniliriiti'ins. however, con be misleading lu many case* It Is the differences, complexities, ond nuances that provide the telling fjioltits In viewing Africanew csumplcs make the point.
Repression In South Africa Is far different from and more Intractable than repression In Uganda.
Ttie dynamics of tribal politics In Kenya are far different from those In Rhodesia or Angola.
Economic prospects of most of the mini-states In west and central Africa are bleak, while In others there Is at least some potential for creating development momentum.
Despite Increased attention to North-South Issues, bitateral relationships ore still viewed as more Important.
Southern Africa
Set In motion by th- collapse of the Portuguese African colonial empire In4 and fueled by subsequent developments In Mozambique and par-tlculady tbe war in Angola, the black-white struggle In southern Africa is mounting in intensity. The events of the past year demonstrate that ihe major world powers ore destined to remain major factors In lhal slr.igglr.
Now that the effort toegotiated transition to black majority rule In Rhodesia has apparently foundered, thereood possibility that the Issue will be resolved on the battlefield. This could take some time. but. given the support the black guerrillas are likely to receive and the strains likely tn lie Imposed on the whites, the odds strongly favor the Insurgents. This, however, would not end thenmhahwran) problem. Resides the nrn' certainty of severe economic setbacks, iheretrong likrllhood that the antagonisms among the black mitionalists would leadtruggle for power among liiem. ami this could easilyull-scale civil war amidoe* the present(Hmibillty of external Intervention.
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The- situation in Namibia It likely- lo follow much ihr same course, although It will probably takr mure lime. South Africa may yetay to balance its Interests in Namibia with those of thc blackbut thc record to date Is not promising. Ifot found. Namibia will almost certainlyajor atent for armed struggle In southern Africa.
Even In South Africa pressures are Increasing. Although the government Is not faced with any Immediate threat, it has been unable to respond to these pressures except by outright repression, which only adds to Internal discontent. In any event, the forces set in motion by the Soweto riots last year are not likely lo disappear, and the coming year will probably see increased racial turmoil In South Africa.
Perhaps the basic question concerning the future course of the black-white struggle In southernhether th* transition will be peaceful andor whether It will he violent and revolutionary. Tile final returns are not In, but theoward violence and revolution.rend may find broad support throughout black Africa because many African leaders hnve long viewed this as the only leallsllc way to produce change in the white-controlled states In southern Africa.
The impulse drawing the major powers into tbe situation in southern Africa Is strong. Angolarime example, and the success of the Soviets and Cubans there has not been lost on the black states in Africa. Rhodesia is now th* testing ground, and the resolution of this struggle may provide the paradigm for the future In the region. Having come out the loseris Ihe Communist powers in Angola, theow at the center of the attempt lo arrangepeaceful transition to black majority nile in Rhodesia. If this effort resultseaceful resolution of lhe problem, the US will gain substantial credit, but. if ll foils, there willendency by both friend and foe to view the US os on unreliable factor In lhe African equation.
Ironically the history nf great power Involvement In Africa has demonstrated that activism often falls tn rrsull in long-term advantoge. External powers are invariably viewed with suspicion, ond they provkb* nmvenient scapegoats for local government* to blamr for theirt least In Afri-an eyes, the USSR (with Cuba' and the US hove op.ed to compete, and it will be difficult for either lo disengage without being viewed the loser
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In ony event, southern Africa has emergedorld Issue. The outcome will curry weightyond the area's geographic confines. In this sense, the ilrugglr Inernot Just lo determine lhat region's destiny: it has also become an important rlemenl in the overall relationship between East and West
The Horn of Africa
Long an area of smoldering tension and turmoil, developments In the Horn of Africa during the pail year point toward Increasing problems.
Rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia over thc French Territory of tbe Afar* and Issashich Is due to becom* Independent by midyear, will cause Increasing tension and will probably lead eventually lo open hostilities
The Soviet Influence and presence in Somalia remain strong, despite some friction between the two countries. Moscow has the Inside track in Ugandatriving, with some success, to enhance ill position In Ethiopia.
The mil" ry regime In Ethiopia haseftist tack and bos resorted to widespread repression against lis Internalo would-be challenger is yet Identifiable, butecoming endemic.
The Insurgencies In Ethiopia, particularly In Eritrea, have grown in size andajor challenge to the government. Much of Ethiopia Is not under government control, and the oddsorsening of the situation In the months ahead.
e In Kenya, the struggle to succeed the aging and Infirm Kenyalto has already begun. Whileikely to be contained within the existing system, the possibility of untoward developments is present.
The FTAI question, however, I* the mostand most ominous problem Somalia appear* determined to achieve It* goal of eitherlient government In lhe FTAI or actually assimilating the country Into Somaliaqually determined to nppose *uch an outcome, viewing access in the *ea through Ihe FTAI os critical to Ethiopia's survival.
Thus, the Ingredients for war lietwren Somalia ond Ethiopia ore present. Event* may not go this far; Ihe Somali* maygo-slow" approachhe
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nd the Ethiopians face serlotK internal' problems thut could curb their actions. Tension is mounting, however, and it will not take much toilitary confrontation. Whatever the specifics, it appears likely that Somalia will ultimately have its way in the FTAl.
If events move to open hostilities, the risks Increase that the great powers, even though reluctant, will be drawn into the picture. Neither Somalia nor Ethiopia could sustain conventional hostilities for moreew weeks. Somalia would look to the USSR for sustenance. This wouldroblem for Moscow, not only in the context of its broader international objectives but also In its ongoing efforts to Increase Its influence in Ethiopia. Moscow would probablyolicy of restraint on Mogadiscio. The Sovietsajor Investment in Somalia, however, and It would be exceedingly difficult for them to avoid providing some materiel support If Somalia requested It.
Ethiopia, despite Its leftist government and rnetorlc. would lie likely to look to the West for support, especially to the US. If this were not offered and Ethiopiaumiliating setback. It might well turn to the USSR in the hope of salvaging something out nf Its odversl'y. In this case, the Soviets could well find themselves In the position ofinner (Somalia) andoser (Ethiopia).
The reverberations of this would be felt throughout Africa and elsewhere. To many It would reinforce the vlrw set In train by developments In Indochina and Angola that the Sovietsore reliable source of support than the West.
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Forrlgn Policy
Tlinc will be fewer changes InIn
domestic policies. Thus far. the new leaden have not modified In any way Mao's Intense hostility to the USSR. The ihreat from the Soviet Union {ihe "mainas required ratkmallty from the Chinese and less "revolutionary adventurism" than have Internal problems. The opening to the US was In fact actively sought by the Chineseonsequence nf their troubles with the Russians, ond the effective use nf ihe UStrategic counterweight Is still their mnst lin-xifiiinl foreign policy objective.
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strong connection wilh the Independent-minded Communist regime In Cambodia, giving It the support It needs toafe distance from Hanoi.lso playing on Thai fears of Vietnamese aggression toose slate-to-ilate relationship with Bangkok,
The Chlnne continue to view the Taiwan question as the principal obstacle lo Improved ties with the US.rief period last summer,ime when radical leftist influence In Peking was still high, the Chinese began to indicate to Washington lhat Pekingtbe use of force tbe "only" way to reunify Taiwan with China. Peking quickly backed away from this line, however, probably realizing that the effect of such talk In tbe United States had beenr productive.
Once again the Chinese, while reserving the right to use force to regain Taiwan, are taking pains to signal Washington of their patience and their desire to workeaceful solution On the other hand, the Chinese show no sign of softening their long-standing conditions for the normalisation of relations with the United States: the US must break diplomatic lies with Taipei, withdraw its forces from the Island, and abrogate Irs security treaty with the Chinese
The Chinese,ood reason, want to maintain the status quo of two Koreas on the Korean peninsula. They have continued publicly to support Kim Il-song on political matters, especially his demand for the withdrawal of US troops. But privately, they probably regard the US presencetabilising factor. The Chinese have not supported Kim to the point of underwriting or even encouraging military adventures against thenotably failed to offer Kim strong public support during Ihe Panmunjom crisis last August.
In competing with the Russians and, regionally, with the Vietnamese, the new Chinese leadership probably will stress itate-lo-itate relations while keeping support of Manlil insurgents in Southeast Asiaow level. The leaders will try to avoid an open split with the Vietnamese, wilh whom they havedifferences.upture would redound entirely to Moscow's benefit, Nevertheless, Slno-Vletnamese competition for Influence In Southeast Asia has alreadyajor diplomatic factor In that region.
China ts concerned lhat Vietnam Intends to project itselfower, challenging Peking's own inline* in Southeast Asian capital* and among the region's various Communist movements. Theo view Hanoi as loo sympathetic to Moscow's Interests and fearrowing Vietnamese rote In Southeast Asia would open the door to equivalent gains In Soviet Influence. Peking thus has developed a
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Cuba
In Cuba, lb* Castro regime is beginning the new year pleased with its successes abroad but sobered by worsening economic problems at home brought on by km sugar prices in the world market. In tb* wake of the victory in Angola, th* Cubanseme of revolutionary exhilaration brought about by their new-found military potential. Although Havana was initially cautious about becoming deeply involved in the Angolan civil war.ully committed lo maintaining the Neto government in power and can lie eipectrd Inarge number of civilian and military personnel (probably on Ihe ordern lhe Angolan areaking as tbe USSR continue* lo fool most of the bilb-
There are signs lhat lhe Castro regime would not hesitate toimilar operation If favorable circumstances existed and significant political capital were to he gained. This altitude may eventually change. Angola's persistent insurgency remains tn be ileall with, and Cuba, deeply committed tn the survival of the Nrtn regime, has not yet paid the full price In lives for Us Intervention there
Since the USSR can he expected to continueigh level of economicat
million aCubans will continue to aid Angola and other African and Caribbean countries despiteown economic plight Foreign policy initiatives will continue, particularly in the Caribbean where the Cubans are realizing generous returns on minimal Investments. Although Havana's rrlotions with some South American countries, notably Peru and Argentina, have deteriorated over th* past year, there are no signs thai lhe Cuban leadei nip has resumed the wholesale support of violent revolution In Latin America that It provided in. Instead, in those countries with governments hostile to Cuba. Havana is urging revolutionaries lo adopt broad-front tactics under th* leadership of the local Communist Party.
On th* home front. Cuba's pcrjspects for economic growth remain bleak. World sugar prices are not likely to rise enough Inr future to alleviate foreign payments constraints. The country's first five-yeai plan has already been revised downward at least once, ando indication that Moscow can be cajoled Into providing additional relief to compensate for reduced Imports by the West. The process of institutionalization that has affected virtually all governmental and social organizations throughout Cuba will provide little economic benefit. An early reversal of Cuba's extremely heavy economicon th* USSR is thus no* in lhe cards.
ariety ofCuban* are Interested in Improving relations with the US and will be looking for *ign*haw from Ihc new US administration. They would look fovorably. for example,uhlic stalement scoring thr terrorist activities of th? Cuban exiles.ommitment to suppress terrorists will probably be required before the Castro regime agree* tn reinstate the Cuban-US understanding on hijacking, due to expire on7 Despite Fidel Castro's notification ofof the understanding last October, he dearly left the way open for discussion* leading not only to (he reinstatement of the hijacking accord but lo lhe resolution of other problem* as well. Even Raul Castro, who as Cuba's ranking conservative heads lhe element of lhe leadership that is deeply suspicious of any rapprochement with lhe US. indicated in early Drccmlrer thai Havana Is looking tn lhe new administrationign of Interest In improving reintlnni. The chonces of significant political ot economic concessions on the part of lheowever, are very slight, nc matter what bait might be offered Neithereconciliation change lhe Ca*trn regime's basic antagonism toward the US.
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Original document.
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