COMMENTS ON MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY AND DESIGN FEATURES OF SELECTED SOVIET MIL

Created: 4/1/1977

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Comments on Manufacturing Technology and Design Features of Selected Soviet Military Equipment

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate Of Intelligence April I'S'H

Comments on Manufacturing Technology and Design Features of Selected Soviet Military Equipment

Summary

The Intelligence Community recently had the opportunity to examine several Soviet weapon systems. In addition to detailed technical analyses of theby many elements of-the Intelligence Community, an analysis of the costs of producing the weapons in the US was sponsored by the Office of Strategic Researchn important by-product of that effortompilation of comments by US weapons manufacturers and militaryexports who inspected the Soviet equipment. The comments are summarized in this paper.

The equipment included five major ground force two aircraft, and four surface-to-air missile. (SAM) systems. Most had been manufac-uredut the dates of initial production ranged8 All Ot the weapons which were examined are of types which are still widely used by the Soviet armed forces.

Two the ground forceBMP infantry combat vehicle and thentiaircraft

Comments end qu&sies regarding n' aza

theCenter, office of strategic Research,

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systems which the Soviets have designed since the early sixties. The other ground force systems and the two aircraft are of earlier, less complex designs. The four SAMs which were examinedeneralin design characteristics over time, -

Since the weapons constitutemall sample of the systems which the Soviets have designed and manufactured since the late fifties, the comments in this paper do not necessarily apply to Soviet military design and production practices in general. Several re* curring themes, however, can be gleaned from the remarks

The Soviettheir US counter-parts--typically were designed to perform only one or two priinary functions.

The design and manufacturing techniques of each weapon apparently have remained basically unchanged for the entire production period.

Standardization of components was evidentiven system and among related systems

Except for the BMP, the design of the weapons showed little concern for environmental effects

Value engineering--mininizing production cost through hardwarewas not emphasized.

Preface

The Intelligence Community recently examined several Soviet weapon systems--two aircraft, four surface-to-air missile systems, and five major items of ground force equipment. Most had been manufacturedut the dates of initial production ranged8

Studies of the equipment were undertaken by theto improve estimates of Soviet weapons performance. of Strategic Researchn addition, viewed thefor direct examinationeans to improve itsprocurement costs for these weapons. For this purpose aof the available Soviet equipment, was

undertaken by OSR in conjunction with the Foreign Material liranch of the Domestic Collection Division. Directorate of Operations, andice ot Weapons Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence.

A by-product of the cost analysis effortompilation of comments by US weapons manufacturers and military weapons experts who inspected the equipment. This papera their observations about Soviet manufacturingnd weapons design. Although the comments are not intelligence assessments based on detailed analysis, they do provide important insights into the nature of the Soviet weapon systems which weie examined.

This paper does not present, detailed cost analyses of thecost analyses are stiliand have been presented in other publications.

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Contents

Procedure and Scope

Exploitation

Hardware Examined

Assessment of Design Features

Simplicity of "

Conservative Design

Limited Design . .

at ion of Components and

Subsystem

Little Attention to Cosmetics

Lagging Design Technology

Lagging Produciion Technology . *. . . ..

Labor-intensive Hanufacturing Methods

Reliability of Equipment and Ease

of. 13

Supporting oi.

Simplicity of ."

Conservative.

Limited Design; BlttS cin

Standardisation of Components

Subsystem . 7 1

Little Attention to 17 .

Lagging Design Technology

Lagging Production

Labor-lntonsive Hanufacturinq Methods . . fOnBXJTi*.

Reliability of. v

Ease of .

Table: Soviet Military Hardware Examined .

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Procedure and Scope

Project Scrap Heap was initiated by the Military-Economic Analysis CenterOffice of Strategic Research to have weapons specialists examine Soviet military hardware firsthand- The specialists made cost estimates based on US manufacturing practices and commented on design and manufacturing philosophy and techniques. Many elements of the US intelligence and industrial communities assisted in the project.

Exploitation

Analysts from OSR, representatives from US weapons manufacturing companies, and weapons specialists from the US military were directly involved in examination of the hardware. Cost exploitation teams were formed to examine and analyze each piece of hardware. Thewas conducted at military installations, each item being examined for one or two days. The teams prepared cost estimates and comments on the design features as well as the technology that the Soviets used in the manufacture of the items, of particular interest were characteristics reflecting standardization, quality control, and design concept.

The estimates and comments then were consolidated into intelligence handbooks for the use of analysts in OSR's Military-Economic Analysis Center. The information that follows was extracted from those handbooks. .

Hardware Examined

involved the exploitation of two aircraft, lour surtace-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and five major items of ground force equipment. (Photographs and descriptive notes are provided in the Annex.) Most had been manufacturednd all are in current use.

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Soviet Military Hardware Examined

Initial Year ofon/ menu tac-

deployment

Aircraft Systeas

xport1 airframe

Avionics

0

Spin Scan airborne intercept radar

Communications equip-

Data

Partial airframe only

Intact, not

Intact, not

Severely daaaged,not operational

Intact

ngine

irfraae

Land Arms

B armoredcarrier

BMP infantry combat vehicle

mphibiousvehicle

Sagger2 medium tank

Intact, not

Partial airframeo avionics or engine available

Tntact and

Intact and

Intact but daraqed

intact and

Intact andonal

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production/ denj oyment

Year of

Arcs (Continued)

ntiaircraft gun

Surface-to-Air Missiles

2 Some damage to

electronics

Guideline missile (Mod 1)

SA-3

Goa missile (Modauncher

Guidance fi control van

Lov Blow target acquisition radar

ainful missile seeker head

rail missile (Mod 0)

' Kefers to the year in which thv weapon fato tared.

Intact

Intact but not

3 Substantially

intact

Severely damaged;

limited exploita-tion performed

Seeker head intact;

remainder ofnot available

issile, launcher, and gripstockand operational

system examined was wnu-

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The systems and components that were available for examination are listed in the table onndome systems were intact, but subsystems on others were damaged or missing.

Except for the BMP infantry combat vehicle and thentiaircraft gun. the systems in general do not have "new design features, and most lack the more advanced features characteristic of Soviet land warfare systems designed sincerly sixties.* The examined, therefore, do not represent current Soviet design technology. Rather, they reflectthat went into the design of several currently deployedonly indirectly revealthat will be incorporated in future systems.

Assessment of Design Features

The findings of the US weapons manufacturers andweapons experts who participated

* are summarized in this section (individual comments are compiled in the "Supporting Comments* section which follows),. The features of Soviet weapons design and technology discussed below were, identified by theas being common to most of the hardware Not all were found, however, in the BMP and thenewest of the Soviet weapons examined.

These comments should not be interpreted ason the effectiveness of these weapon systems. They pertain only to differences between US and Soviet weapon design and manufacturing technology.

Simplicity of Design

The feature most frequently mentioned by project participants was design simplicity. This attitude or

* Design features and complexity of tlie DM? andew Soviet land arms are discussed in detail inin Soviet Land5

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philosophy toward product design allows Soviet manu-

; v.lj ': I > , l pur-

pose machines and conventional assembly operations in the production of weapons. Even theassimple in actual hardware, although it isinnovative in the integration and optimization of components and complex in design concept. Only the BMP incorporated new conpononts whose featuressignificant changes in weapons design.

An important design criteria therefore seemed to be that tho weapon could bo produced with existing manufacturing methods. Existing manufacturingis moreonstraint on weapons design in the USSR than in the us.

Conservative Design

A dominant feature of most, of the hardwarewas the conservative design, except for the BMP combat vehicle and theun system. The designers tended to use proven technology or standard components, and there was little apparent effort to strive for maximum system performance. For example, thendirframes as well as theauncher were judged to be bigger and heavier than required for their missions, and bigger and heavier than the US counterparts. This practice minimizes potential hardware stress problems but results in sacrifices to performance characteristics such as payload, range, and speed.

Limited Design Modification

The design reflected in nearly all the hardware examined has remained basically unchanged over long periods of time. Thend theAM systems perhaps are most illustrative of this. They were designed in the middle fifties and have been produced in several variants since the early sixties. The few design changes that were incorporated affected only specific systems components and did not reflect aweapon system redesign. in the US, designare made more often and are generally applied to all applicable componentseapon system.

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Standardization of Components and Subsystem Designs

Standardization of componentsivenund among related systems was evident. Theuidance and control vanotable example. AH relays and oil-filled capacitors were of three basic types; and standardized magnetics, vacuum tubes, and diode rectifier networks were used. Pneumaticon theurface-to-air missile and their-to-air missile appeared to be similar. Other parts such as clamps, brackets, and connectors appeared to be of common design and supply.

It was also evident that existing subsystem designs were used in new versions of weapon systems. Forthemploys some subsystems used in earlier ground force antiaircraft artillery systems.

Little Attention to Cosmetics

High-quality or expensive manufacturing techniques generally were used only where absolutely necessary for system performance. By US standards finishes were rough and tolerances were loose on many Soviet weapons components and parts. This was especially true ofndirframes and engines and thendissiles.

ng Design Technology

Soviet design technology, for all systems except the BMP combat vehicle, was judged to lag that of the US. This apparentlyrue technology gap in certain cases, while in others it probably resulted morereference for standardization and simplicity than from an inability to incorporate more advanced technology. The lag was particularly evident in electronics, and less obvious in mechanical systems. The evolutionary nature of design changeseluctance to introduce now production processes contribute to the technology lag.

Lagging Production Technology

The production techniques required to manufacture these weapons also are outdated by us standards. For

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instance, thendould have been produced without tho use of any three-dimensional machining equipment. Mao, with the exception of one or twoengine could have been produced usingtechnology available in the early forties.

ho r ing Mt't ho cl

The production techniques used to fabricate these weapon systems reflects the fact that labor ia cheaper relative to capital in the Soviet Union than in the US. Labor-intensive production techniques ware used on all weapons. Perhaps the most obvious example was the use of the hand-atltched fabric cable on the wiring rather than plastic or heat-shrinkable cable commonly used in the US.

Reliability of Equipment and Ease of Maintenance

A detailed analysis of equipment reliability and ease of maintenance requires exploitation of greater depth than was possible in this project. ew comments were made by US weapons manufacturers regarding the reliability and ease of maintenance of Soviet equipment in the field based on their analysis of design features. Their commentr. are of interest and arc reported onut arc not sufficient for even tentative conclusions.

ommento

Quotations fron the us experts who examinedare detailed

below. References in parenthesis identify the pieces of equipment.

Simplicity of Design

"Adequate space was available for all Lhe components of the system, making it easily producible. No unique manufacturing techniqmm.woce Ln evidence. Conventional techniques were utilized throughout the product. Consideration for cosmetic appeal appeared to bo minima!." issile)

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"Machining, chem-milling, and Capering for weightnot apparent as onluse of titanium in

placp of alloy steel is made for purposes ol weightnd SU-7)

"The machined components appear to be made from forgings or castings. wiLh machining limited to such applications assurface mating (none for weight reduction). Soviet design does not. require three-dimensional or sculptured machining. Alloy steel and aluminum (no titanium) is used for forgings, andand magnesium are used for casting." nd SU-7) v

"Examination of the relative complexity and quality of the vehicle as compared to its US equivalent,A1 (mediumndicates toesser level of complexity as well as quality. Specifically, the vehicleange finder, and haspowertrain, and fire control of simpler, less expensive design. We have estimated that this vehicleer pound basisperccnt less costly vehicle."

"The above generalizations can be applied to the system ashowever, elements of the systemell-developed specializedpossibly highly The modular makeup of the

subject, vehicle wouldarge numberith only the final assembly of the sus-tainers being accomplishedssembly facility. The point to be made here is that this vehicle permits more latitude along these lines than any other the writer is aware of." issile)

ommitment to simple and straightforward execution of design to permit an equally straightforward execution in pro-duction.- issile)

"Theeekerunctional, well-designed infrared seeker." issile)

enerally unsophisticated approach co design Inof vibration and shock envircnnenl, Although no evident failures appeared. Although unsophisticated in approach to the problem, the use of shock mountr, on flio equipment main franw; at al) appearedurprise improvement to us. Studies by us of earlier vintage hardware had determined that all equipment was hard-mounted to the aircraft franc," adar)

"Quality :iad boon applied with more discretion/discernment than any other in the writer's experience, where precision and tare were required to assure function, they were readily apparent.

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and where not required, little effort was expended. This wouldery mature and realistic approach to the application and control of quality requirements. An element that generallyigh level of quality, at least visually, were the welds. Machined juris best demonstrated the overall philosophy. Many were very crude by contemporary standards; however, they too reflected precision where required." issile)

"The chcm-milling of skins [removal of metal by etching with an oblating chemical] shows rough surfaces, undercuts at edges, and sharp ccrners, none of which would pass US inspection. The Soviet integrally stiffened wing skinsing surface in which

the outer skin and load-bearingcut out of one piece ofave ribs that are parallel to each other

(do not follow percentre not high and thin, and are not tapered in thickness. Soviet riveting consists ofercent drlven-bucked rivetsivet that requires two operators forto hammer the rivet and another to hold the template that fastenso blind fasteners [any oneumber of fasterners, such as screws, that only require one operator to install) are used. Kxtensive use of alloy steel fasteners is made rather than Monel, stainless, or titanium fasteners. There is little concern for the effects of dissimilar metal contact such as alloy steel to aluminum." (MIGnd SU-7)

Conservative Design

"Machining, chcm-milling, and tapering for weight reduction are not apparent as onS. So use of titanium in place of alloy steel is made for purposes of weightnd SU-7)

"The machined components appear to be made from forgings or castings, with machining limited to such applications as critical surface mating (none for weight reduction). Soviet design does not require threo-dimensional or sculptured machining. Alloy steel and aluminum (no titanium) [are] used for forgings, and aluminum and magnesium are used for casting." nd SU-7)

"weight, volume, nnd technological advancement seem to be secondary to continued use of existing equipment." nun ica tions)

ercent line in the rate at which the gap between the ribs in an integrally stiffened aircraft wing widens or narrows from one erfge of the wing to the other, ro cut the metaling &nd leave ribs that follow percent linen requires much coreoi'ichinerg than does the cutting of metal to form parallel ribs.

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"The overall appearance of the hardware indicated that the major consideration in manufacturing was function, with little or no consideration for cosmetic appeal. Size and weight do not appear to be significant design criteria." issile)

"The Soviet design philosophy appuars toingle purpose simplicity,cceptanceeavier airframe,horter overall life in terns of environmental influences.

Good finishes and close tolerances are not the general rule

but are very good in the areas where they are really required.

C;irroR>on protection such as exterior painting and plating are

not equal to US standards." U-7,

"It was observed that the design agency had been veryin lits] effort to achieve standardization in component selection and application. As we mentioned above, all relays were cf three basic types and, in addition, oil-filledwere of three general typesimilar degree ofamong magnetics, vacuumnd diode rectifier In addition, all chassis, mechanical items, connector blocks, sheet metal, and hold-down hardware were standardized. Offsetting the advantages of standardization, however, wenumerous instances wherein the standardization effort resulted ineight or volume penalty. This wastrue in certain of the chassis drawers where at times no more thanoercent of the total volume was utilized. This was apparently the direct result cf utilizing standard sheet metal enclosures, front panels, chassis dimensions,ommand and control van)

teritableforgings and castings with all electronics encased in castings and further shielded by steel panels." auncher)

Li mi ted Design Modification.

"Extensive inspection of every sclJer joint was indicatedolor-coded varnish dot on each and every connection. No changes, re-works, or engineering improvements were indicated by the uniformity of the assembly and the untouched inspection marks." adar)

"There were no obvious signs of post-manufactured change incorporation. We term such changes ECPs (Engineering Change proposal) and tend to continually update the performance of equipment in the field through modification of circuitry. Such

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modifications are usually obvious, since wire types are different, components an; positioned in nonconforming places, and new wires are added outside ol original wire bundles. The lack of such changer, jn this hardware indicates that che equipment design maturity is high, that upgrading of performance is done bycompletely new suits of equipment, that changes are accomplished by rotatingo the factory of origin for rather complete physical rework to incorporate functional changes, or some combination of these considerations." adar)

Standardization of Components and Subsystem Designs

"Weight, volume, and technological advancement seem to be secondary to continued use of existing equipment."

communications)

"It was observed that the design agency had been veryin [its) effort to achieve standardization in componentand application, As we mentioned above, all relays werebasic types and, in addition, oil-filled capacitors weregeneral typesimilar degree of standardization vacuum tubes, and diode In audition,

all chassis, mechanical items, connector blocks, sheet metal, and hold-down hardware were standardized. Offsetting the advantages of standardization, however, we observed numerous instancesthe standardization effort resulted ineight or volume penalty. This was especially true in certain of the chassis drawers where at Limes no more thanoercent of the total volume way utilized. This was apparently the direct result of ucilizing standard sheet metal enclosures, front panels, chassis dimensions, etc." ommand and control van)

"The wricer had the opportunity to review parts of an air-to-air vehicle from the same builder. In comparing the units, it has been apparentincere attempt was made to use common hardwareroup of vehicles. The case in point revealed actuators (pneumatic cylinders) thac were atrtlly common to each vehicle. Additionally, hardware items (clamps, brackets, connectors) appeared to be comipon design and supply." ndissiles)

little Attention co Cosmetics

"Adequate npoceavailable for all the components of theeaking it easily producible. nique manufacturing

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techniques were in evidence. ConvenI.echniques were utilized throughout the product. Consideration for cosmetic appeal appeared to be minimal." (Sft-'J missile)

"Quality had been applied with more discretion/discernment than any other in the writer's experience, where precision and core were required to assure function, they were readily apparent and where not required, little effort was expended. This wouldery mature and realistic approach to the application and control of quality requirements. An element that generallyigh level of quality, at least visually, were the welds. Machined parts best demonstrated the overall philosophy. Many were very crude by contemporary standards; however, they too reflected precision where required." issile)

"The chem-milling of skins (removal of metal by etching with an oblating chemicaii shows rough surfaces, undercuts at edges, and sharp corners, none of which would pass US inspection. The Soviet integrally stiffened wing skins ia wing surface in which the outer skin and load-bearing supports--ribs--are cut out of one piece of metal) have ribs that are parallel to each other (do not follow percentre not high and thin, and are not tapered in thickness. Soviet riveting consists ofercent driven-bucked rivets la rivet that, requires two operators forto hnnuner Che rivet and another to hold the template that fastenso blind fasteners lany oneumber of fasteners, such as screws, that only require one operator to install] are used. (Extensive use of alloy steel fasteners is made rather than Monel, stainless, or titanium fasteners. There is little concern tor the effects of dissimilar metal contact such as alloy steel to aluminum." (MIGnd SU-7)

"The overall appearance of the hardware indicated that the major consideration in manufacturing was function, with little or no consideration for cosmetic appeal. Size and weight do not appear toignificant design criteria." issile)

"The Soviet design philosophy appears toinglesimplicity, cceptanceeavier airframe,horter overall life in terms of environmental influences. Gocd finishes and close tolerances are not the general rule but are

ercent line is the rate .it winch the gap between the ribs in an integrally stiffened aircraft wtn$ widens or narrows from onef the wing to tho other. To cut tho metuJing and

1 stave ribs that follow i. . sophisti-

cated macbSnarf than does tbe cutting of irotal to form parallel ribs.

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very good in tho areas where they are really required. Corrosion protection such as exterior painting and plating are not equal to US standards." U-7)

"The entire hardware suit reflects impressive standards of workmanship, especially the handwork involved in assembly and wiring. The wiring is point-to-point: That is, each wire is routed and soldered into place individually. All solder Joints arc of good quality and consistent, and wires are evenly stripped and dressed. No loose wire strands (presume wire i3 stranded, but no check was possible) were evident.1 Hardware was not burred during installation." adar)

"Machining operations (drill, punch, mill,re at an absolute minimum. Welds are not dressed; little or no attempt was made to remove burrs or flockinqs [residueoating applied to keep stamping tools clean) from stampingadar)

"The [gyro] spin and gimbal bearings appear to bc of good quality with regard to the balls and ball grooves. Outside finishes are less than instrument bearing quality, however, giving the impressionow-grade bearing. The poor coast-time characteristic of the gyro may be attributed to either an over-oiled condition or excessive preload." eeker head)

inimal use of anodize finish for corrosion protection; however, no sign of corrosion." adar)

Lagging Design Technology

equipment,ew minor exceptions, could have been designed by us inra and fabricated by us inra." adar)

"Cost analysis studyoviet MIG-^IM gunsight system reveals that the technology involved approximates thatmilar US systems designed ineriod. S manufacturerunsight8 that looked very much like theystem. It was manufactured inn.urir.!

Although the design is crude in some respects (note the externa] push rods to actuate the roll control, and the wire holding the booster fins in the foldedt is quite functional in all issile)

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ugqed, heavy, high-quality notorial anduns, turret, and electronics)

"The examiners were particularly impressed by the BMPvehicle. Itegree of sophistication of armored vehicles which the Soviets were not expected to possess. The transmission and transfer case arrangement on the vehicle are excellent. Seals to assure pressurization are superior to those in the US, and it is equipped with automated CBB devicesm cannon loader that operates with an indexing ammunition basket which is unique and eliminates the needecond gunner." (BMP)

"System capabilities concept was quite ambitious for the. The technology representedears old relative to present state of the art." uns, turret, and electronics}

"The Sovietunsight system was assembled withworkmanship, particularly in the electronics area. There was, for example, very careful tying of wire bundles, indicating that the labor content in the assembly of the equipment was high. The Soviets used better care in the details of construction than would have been used by the US in producing comparable equipment. Some Of the wire connectors in the gunsight system were solf-aligning and show advanced design techniques, considering the time of their manufacture." unsight)

"The equipment and technology are estimated to beequivalent tointage equipment." ommunications)

"An analysis of the hardware available for observation showed the manufacturing technology to be comparable to that experienced (for US) missiles produced in the. These missiles were an air/hydraulic sysLem with vacuum tube type of electronics." issile)

"The Lechnology used is not equivalent to0 American technology. They have used mostly vacuum Lube circuits with very little or no solid slate circuitry. There were noprinted circuit boards but rather mostly hard wire boards with discrete components. This system is probably equivalentr0 American system." adar)

acuum tube type radar employing no solid state technology. Wiring is all by hand: no formed cables were in-

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dicated. Thi* entire unit is labor intensive, that la, hand labor was used to an excess in lieu of mechanical, automation, machine, or cost effective ald(sl in completing any oporotion. Cables are obviously assembled bycrimping of wirelaced extensively (in fact it looks moreood sewing stitch on the cable cover ratheracing job). Cable relief points are manually tied within the wire bundles, and each wire end is individually tied to prevent fraying. Ho use of teflon or heat-shrinkable plastic to protect these wire ends was observed. All of the aboveigh use of manual labor rather than machines or other labor-saving devices." adar)

arge, flatcasting (appears dio cast) on the antenna, of very thin section, is pushing, and may be beyond, our state of the art. Prom appearances, it is not acid dipped for thinning. It would be worthwhile studying this in aore depth with respect to alloy type and method ofadar)

"The general design period relative to US hardware would appear to bo2 This eguiproentarked similarity to US Vtorld War II equipment in thoand application of components. The command and control van ia all vacuum tube, carbon resistor, with all chassiscabled and laced. The only major departure from equipment of this approximate timea3 the limited use of single-sided printed circuit boards. Such boards weresimple in circuit layout and density and were rigidly mounted and hard-wired to tha internal chassis cable." ommand and control van and radar)

"Kxamination of the relative complexity and quality of the vehicle as compared to its US equivalent,A1 (mediumndicates toessor level ot complexity as well as quality. Specifically, the vehicleange finder, and has suspension, powertrain, and fire control of simpler, less expensive design. He have estimated that this vehicleer pound basis0 percent less costly vehicle."

enerally unsophisticated approach to design lnof vibration and shock environment, although no evident failures appeared. Although unsophisticated in approach to the problem, tho use of shock mounts on the equipment main frame aturpritio improvement to us. Studies by us of earlier vintage hardware had determined th.it all equipment was hard-mounted to the aircraft titmm." adar)

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Lagging Production Technology

"The chem-millinq of 'Air. {removal of metal by etching with an oblatlng. chemical) show* rough surfaces, undercuts at edges, and sharp comers, none of which wouldS inspection. The Soviet integrally stiffened wing skinsing surface in which the outer skin and load-bearing-are cut out of one piece of metal] have ribs that are parallel to each other (do not follow percentre not high and thin, and are not tapered in thickness. Soviet riveting consists ofercent driven-bucked rivets la rivet that requires two operators forto hammer the rivet and another to hold the template that fastenso blind fasteners (any oneumber of fasteners, such as screws, that only require one operator to install] are used. Extensive use of alloy steel fasteners ia made rather than Honel, stainless, or titanium fasteners. There is little concern for the effects of dissimilar metal contact such as alloy steel to aluminum." (MIGnd SU-7)

"The machined components appear to be made frost forgings or castings, with machining limited to such applications as critical surface mating (none for weight reduction). Soviet design docs not require three-dimensional or sculptured machining. Alloy steel and aluminum (no titanium) [arc| used for forgings, and aluminum and magnesium are used for casting." nd SU-7)

"Machining, chem-milling, and tapering for weight reduction are not apparent as onS. No use of titanium in place of alloy steel is made for purposes of weightnd SU-7)

"The Sovietunsight system was assembled withworkmanship, particularly in the electronics area. There was, for example, very careful tying of wire bundles, indicating that the labor content in the assembly of the equipment wan high. The Soviots used better care in the details of construction than would have been used by the US in producing comparable equipment. Some of the wire connectors in the gunsight system were self-aligning and show advanced design techniques, considering Lhe time of their manufacture." unsight)

ercent lino is the rate ar. which the gap between tbei an inte^raJly stiffened aircraft wing widens or narrows from one edge of tne wing to the other. To cut the metaling and leave ribs that follow percent lines requires much more sophistica-

, foim paral tol ribs.

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rugged, heavy, high-quality material anduns, turret, and electronics)

"Cost analysis studyovietunsight system reveals that the technology involved approximates that of similar US systems designed ineriod. S manufacturerunsight0 that looked very much likeystem. It was manufactured in unsight)

"This equipment,ew minor exceptions, could have been designed by us inra and fabricated by us inra." adar)

"The entire hardware suit reflects impressive standards of workmanship, especially the handwork involved in assembly and wiring. The wiring is point-to-point; that is, each wire is routed and soldered into place individually. All solder joints are of good quality and consistent, and wires arc evenly stripped and dressed. No loose wire strands (presume wire is stranded, but no check was possible) were evident. Hardware was not bur-rod during installation." adar)

"Materials used appeared consistent with [those of the USl as did methods of fabrication and use of sheet metal tooling. Thereack of newer styleuch as ABSut other older types such as Micarta were inadar)

"Electrical components appear to be quite similar to American manufactured components. Powdered iron or ferrite cup-cores like we use were in the ADF [automatic direction finder)." lectronics)

"The use of double insulated hook-up wire,lastic inner jacket (presumably for electrical protection) and fabric

outer sheath (presumably for mechanicalouldack of plastic insulation capability cither in terms

of formulation or production capacity, since the technique used required more assembly time." adar)

"Radar equipment, aside from antenna, employs subminiature vacuum Lube discrete component point-to-point wiringno semiconductors of pwbs." uns, turret, and

for the most part, had the appearance of being direct copiesajor [US]ippUers. An interesting

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observation was that nany components wore date stamped, with the latest observed date Two items of component interest, in comparison to lUS) hardware, are the lack of carbon resistors (the substitutes appear to be of ceramicnd, conversely, the lack of ceramic disc capacitors (most are tubular).' adar)

"Adequate space was available for all the components of the system, making it easily producible. Ho unique manufacturing techniques were in evidence. Conventional techniques were utilized throughout tho product. Consideration for cosmetic appeal appeared to be minimal." issile)

he minimal amount of special tooling and equipment required to produce. Assuming tho next vehicle produced in this facility/facilities followsame philosophy, it would bo reasonable toery low cost and speedy re-implementation." issile)

"Ho unique or unknown manufacturing techniques were in evidence. Conventional machining and fabrication techniques appear to be utilized throughout the product." issile)

"Skills appeared to be commensurate with the requirement. Critical components, suchgyroo, showed greater refinement

m nanufacturing techniques and ikills than was evident for circuit biles, machined surfaces, and extorior

finishes." issile)

"The vehicleoviet commitment to engineering and tooling for production not normally to be expected. It alsoegree of craftmnnship never before seen in Soviet, producedraf tmanship which is not absolutely necessary,urfaces finished which would not have to bo put through the finishingstep." (BMP)

"The manufacturing techniqucn employed were approximately equivalent to those utilised in the US in the0 time frame. These techniques are adequate for this design but could not bo utilised for today's sophisticated missile systems, due to cost, size, and weight." issile)

"The hardware available for observation did not appear to show any excessively difficult manufacturing requirements. The raanufacturirwj technology employed appeared to be in lino with the state of the art of issile)

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"The packaging design ol theardware requires the useiring techniquesignificant degree. It has been estimated that fullyercent of all component and/or circuit connections have been made by hand. With respect to printed circuitry, very little use has been raade of thiswithin the electronics boards, while this approach is implemented tolightly greater extent within the modules used within the control electronics. The overall electronic packaging is reminiscent of techniques utilised in early Modedeye and Sidewinder (AIM-9B) hardware." issile)

"Manufacturing quality is good and the intornal design is equivalent to US technology of the issile)

"Protection plating, coating, or painting is at anminimum. Host individual chassis are raw aluminum. In areas where the equipment is paintedo preparation of the surface before painting is made. ew areas,were coated, but no general attempt was made toprotect this equipment." adar)

"The production methods/techniques employed require the sequential performance of several small incrementseach one generally requiring the usepecific piece of universal equipment and frequently only hand or power tools. The associated skill levels required have been the semi-skilled grades;igh level of dexterity alongeneral commitment to performance by tho labor elements would be required to assure uniform product quality. There was virtually no evidence of the use of automated or high-rate production equipment in features where their use would be visually detectable; conversely, there was much evidence of manually controlled fabrication and assembly." issile)

"The construction of this seeker implies the existenceacility whichigh-quality, accurate toolingset up for this design. The basic cleanliness of the interior of the seeker head furtherontrolled area for assembly and testing where the standards for contamination are very high." eeker head)

"It was noted that electrical wire bundling was largely done manually, and that no micro-miniaturisation was evident. Also, hydraulic piping and fittings used flared connectors, with little evidence of welded connection*. It ls concluded that ln both those areas the Soviets are usingecade or no old by US standards." nd SU-7)

CONFIDENTIAL

"This equipment is simple, mode to minimum standardslant with minimum sophisticationarge laboradar)

"In conclusion, it is obvious that many more man-hours of labor are being expended on fabrication and assembly compared to US practices. There is little evidence that the Soviets are using automated fabrication techniques or advanced assembly methods." nd SU-7)

"The processes used to produce the chassis were old,methods, and duplication would require no new orequipment." hassis)

Labor-intensive Manufacturing Methods

"inspection was evidently detailed. Each electricalpoint, including some that were not wired, bore an inspection dye mark. In addition to an obvious visualthis may also havehassis ring-out [check of circuits for continuity! of completed wiring. Each piece of hardware (nut, screw,lsoye mark that probably doubled as an antivibration operation such as our Glyptal applications of an earlier era." [Glyptaled liquid chemical that was applied to connectors. Upon contact with air it hardens aodeal that prevents thefrom vibrating apart.] adar)

"The Sovietunsight system was assembled withworkmanship, particularly in the electronics area. There was, for example, very careful tying of wire bundles, indicating that the labor content in the assembly of the equipment was high. The Soviets used better care in the details of construction than would have been used by the US in producing comparable equipment. Some of the wire connectors in the gunsight system were self-aligning and show advanced design techniques, considering the time of their manufacture." unsight)

"Itacuum tube type radar employing no solid state technology, wiring is all by hand; no formed cables were The entire unit is labor intensive, that is, hand labor was used to an excess in lieu of mechanical, automation, machine, or cost effective in completing any operation. Cables arc obviously assembled by hand- no crimping of wirelaced extensively (in fact it looks more likeood sewing stitch on the cable cover ratheracing job), cable relief points are manually tied within the wire

bundles, and each wire end is individually tied to prevent fraying. No use of teflon or heat-shrinfcable plastic tothese wire ends was observed. ALL of the aboveigh use of manual labor rather than machines or other labor-saving devices." adar)

"Extensive inspection of every solder joint was indicated,olor-coded varnish dot on each and every connection. No changes, re-works, or engineering improvements were indicated by the uniformity of the assembly and the untouched inspection marks." adar)

"The entire hardware suit reflects impressive standards of workmanship, especially the hand work involved in assembly and wiring. The wiring is point-to-point: that is, each wire is routed and soldered into place individually. All solder joints are of good quality and consistent, and wires are evenlyand dressed. No loose wire strands (presume wire isbut no check was possible) were evident. Hardware was not burred during installation." adar)

"This eguipment is simple, made to minimum standardslant with minimum sophisticationarge laboradar)

"It was noted that electrical wire bundling was largely done manually, and that no micro-miniaturization was evident. Also, hydraulic piping and fittings used flared connectors, with little evidence of welded connections. It is concluded that in both these areas the Soviets are usingecade or so old by US standards." nd SU-7)

"In conclusion, it is obvious that many more man-hours of labor are being expended on fabrication and assembly compared lo US practices. There is little evidence that the Soviets are using automated fabrication techniques or advancedmethods." nd SU-7)

"The printed circuit assembly appeared to be hand soldered, with the body of the components held up off of the board during assembly." ommunications)

ack of large plastic sleeving was apparent. Thefor this lack weretched protective covers

on main cables, and the use of hand whippingight binding that prevents cable unraveling) with string on cable and wire

ends.* adar)

CONFlOpiriAL

equipment is assembly labor intensive as opposed to utilizing technological advancement to reduce labor." on s)

"The packaging design ot theardware requires the use of hand wiring techniquesignificant degree. Tt has been estimated that fullyercent of all component and/or circuit connections have been made by hand. With respect to printed circuitry, very little use has been made of thiswithin the electronics boards, while this approach is implemented tolightly greater extent within the modules used within the control electronics. The overall electronic packaging is reminiscent of techniques utilized in early Hodedeye and Sidewinder (AIM-9B) hardware." issile)

"Judging from the number of hand-soldered connections in the seeker headreat deal of time and well-thought-out planning is required to assemble the hardware and avoid errors. eeker head)

Reliability of Equipment

"The team was impressed by the total number Of controlin the van electronics. By actualelays are utilized, including snap-cover teleplione type, hermetically sealed, and miniature. From the standpoint of reliability this; would appear tootentially troublesome area." ommand and control van, radar)

"The team was equally amazed at the total number ofpotentiometers Tthese allow for screwdriver adjustment to vary the electrical currentircuit) within the system. By actualotentiometers are used throughout, and this again should have an additional effect upon system ommand and control van, radar)

"Tne forced-air rack cooling system would appear to be several counts, i>'ve

rack dissipation wiLhin the van enclosure. Even innvironment, the rack temperature appeared to be very highhort period of operation." ommand and control van)

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CONFICtfNTIAL

"The seeker apparently hay low sensitivity in terras of state

of tin- I . OA' (continuous wav-} is may he cclibci-

ate in design It is simpler and le.'is expensive to produce target seekers with lower sensitivities, which in turn will not undergo as much receiver degradation when committed to field conditions. Thus, missiles areigher state of readiness and will require less field maintenance and eeker)

"The mechanical characteristics of the resistors in use, however, are certainly less than desirabletressoint. When soldered in place, these devices can be fairly easily broken with only slight excessive handling of the issile)

Ease of Maintenance

orollary observation concerns field maintenance. estimates of field reliability are beyond the scope of our observations other than to note that this specific suit of hardware bore no signs of field repairs, the difficulty of field troubleshooting and repair is inherently obvious. As previously mentioned, the tightly packed, layered construction renders the replacement of parts (other than many of the tubes) difficult. Also, there are no service loops in the harness wiring lor] in the component leads. In terms of troubleshooting and fault isolation, it would appear that relatively highly skilled technicians aro required. Presumably, there is some kind of special field test equipment to provide assistance in isolating faults to the black box level, and possibly some additional equipment to troubleshoot each black box at an intermediate or depot level. There are some test points on the front panels of tho black boxes. But designed-in help* to the field users practically stops there. Wires are notmarked [or) even basically color coded to indicate that they carry power, signals, etc. Chassis are minimally marked to indicate the specific component in the circuit that is mounted at that position. Although the pins are individually numbered on each terminal board, the boards themselves are not individually identified, and the individual terminals on large

* This includes any equipment aid Co the field maintenancesuch as built-inrovided exclusively forcircuit continuity, color-coded wiring foe easy tracing, and identification marAs on terminals. Later US equipment hasprogram tapes which, when raniece of equipment, will isolate trouble spots.

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CONFlD&^lAl

components are not identified. f this means that highly experienced electronics technicians, workingombination or schematics, wire tabs, and pictures or drawings, and using basic laboratory test equipment, are probably needed to service the hardware." adar)

"The packaging concept used does render field changesat best. Tho hardware is densely packaged, built in layers, and all hard wired. There are no replaceable plug-in units that could be easily replaced in the field by improved versions, except at the complete black box level." adar)

"These features indicate that the first equipment maintenance level is module replacement." ommunications)

"The maintenance of the vehicle can be readily accomplished assuming the availabilityadre of trained (not highly skilled) technicians. Most elements of the vehicle are easily replaced, adjusted, and in some cases, field repaired." issile)

"Each unit front panel provided numerous test points available to the technician. It would appear that all adjustment andwas performed by means of the numerous blown-fuseand the several hundred test points as provided. Thedoes notelf-check capability or anything that would assist in rapid isolation and identification of faultyommand and control van)

"lhe graduation level electronic packaging design does not lend itself either physically or economically to any seriesas any efforts to carry out repair work might well create more problems than they could solve." ontrol package)

"Should an error or component failure occur, the gyro or seeker head is probably discarded because the design does not lend itself to rework or repair." eeker head)

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Annex

Reference Guide to Soviet military Hardware Examined

The systems examined in Project Scrap Heap were manufactured in either the late sixties or early seventies. Except for the BMP infantry combat vehicle and thentiaircraft gun, however, their basic designs date back to the fifties and early sixties. Despite their apparent lack of sophistication,numbers of the systems are still used by Soviet and Soviet-supported military forces.

Aircraft Systems

nterceptor. Thean export version of the Sovietis primarily an all-weather, medium-to-high-altitude interceptorecondary role of ground support. It is capable oflight. Thes similar to thexcept that it is equipped with the older Spin Scan airborne intercept (AI) radar. Thes equipped with the new Jay Bird AI radar, which givesetter low-altitude intercept capability than the export version.

Theurther development of the Fishbed series aircraft initially designed2 by

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COMFIfAL

the Mikoyan Design Bureau. The principal changes are an improved engine and weapons system. The aircraft is equipped with the ngine, whichaximum engine thrust estimated0his engineirect derivation of theurbojet engine used on some earlier Fishbed models. The most significant weapons changes made in theere the internal installationm twin-barrel cannon and the addition of two more wing stations, which enables the aircraft to carry four, instead of two, air-to-air missiles.

There is some evidenceater version of the FishbedFishbed Lreplaced then the production line and is currently being fielded. However, theemains the mainstay of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact air forces as well as the air forces of Egypt and Syria.

ighter. Thes the first of three variantsedium-weight, sweptwing,fighter designed in the early fifties by the

Sukhoy Design Bureau. Its primary mission is ground support and interdiction, but it also haslear-weather interceptor.

Series production of theegan in7 and the fighter is estimated to have become operational in When fielded, it was equipped with anurbojet engine. Its armament consisted

3?

A;

of one gun in each wingaximum payload of0 pounds). ircraft-later variants of the Fitter produced in the late sixtie and early sevcnties--have variable-geometry wings and were modified wiLh an uprated engine, avionics, andpayload. Thes being replaced bynd Flogger aircraft in Soviet Frontal Aviation but there are stillith Soviet units andith other Warsaw Pact air forces.

Land Arms

B Armored Personnel Carrier (APC). TheB is an amphibious, eight-wheel-drive APC. It can carryroops and is powered by twin gas-fueled engine

For amphibious operation, the vehicleydrojet propulsion system similar to that found on previous Soviet APCs.

TheB has Lwo machine guns mall turret and is equipped with overhead armor. It6 and is based on the, an earlier version that lacked the turret and overhead armor. An intermediate version, theK, had overhead armor but no turret-

Currently both theU anc Ihc newer BMP are replacing older APCs in Soviet units. The Soviets

CONFllWHTiAL

probably will continue to produce theD and field it throughout their forces in conjunction with the BMP.

BMP Combat Vehicle. The BMP tracked infantry combat vehicle entered service Unlike most systems examined in Project Scrap Heap, the BMPmany advanced design features. The vehicle is similar to the earlier wheelednd trackedPCs in its ability to carry troops but is not limited to this role. It is armedmgun and the Sagger antitank guided missile; older

versions of this vehicle were armed only with heavy machine guns. In addition, the gun system on the BMP, unlike those of older Soviet armored vehicles, is fed by an automatic loader.

Other features of the BMPentralsystem that provides protection for passengers and crewBR environment; provision for venting the fumes from small arras that can be fired from inside the vehicle when It is closed; and improved armor, engine, and track. Only the BMP's amphibious propulsion system is less sophisticated than that of older vehicles. The vehicle moves by spinning its tracks, while some older vehiclesydrojet propulsion system.

econnaissance Vehicle. Thearmored amphibious reconnaissance vehicle first fielded inbasedRDM vehicle produced in the early sixties. Theas initially armed with twoguns mountedmall turret, but9 wa modified to carry six Sagger antitank guided missiles

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COMriW NTIAL

mountedetractable pylon. Like earlier versions of thehese modified vehicles have four-wheel drive, weighilograms ounds) andop speed of aroundph). They also have four auxiliary wheels for added mobility in poor terrain. Theas also been modified to serveransporter-erector-launcher (TEL) for theurface-to-air missile.

edium Tank. 2 medium tank, first fielded with Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisionson) vehicle armedmm smoothbore gun. The tank's gun is the only major improvement overs predecessor,hich was first produced 2 uses the same engine, transmission, track and suspension system as

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The Soviets beganew medium tank with their qround force units in the early seventies. Thisncorporates significant improvements over and has been replacing45 tanks in Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions. Nevertheless, it appears that2 will remain in the active inventory for some time.

ntiaircraft Gun. Theracked tactical antiaircraft syst.ex for defense of combat units against low-flying aircraft and helicopters. The weapon was first produced The most significant advan-

tage ol this gun system over older weapons is thoof an acquisition and tracking radaromputerized fire control system. The fire control system has an analog computer that automatically aims the lourmn gun barrels and an indicator that enables the system to distinguishoving target and background clutter.

Fourre in use in each Soviet tank and motorized rifle regiment. These weapons, together with theAM system, are replacing the older elf-propelled air defense guns in tank regiments and the towed light antiaircraft guns in motorized rifle units.

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Surface to Air Missiles

od 1. Theommand-guided SAM System designed to provide defense against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes. The original version of this weapon entered the Soviet inventory odfielded9 with an

improved fire control radar, the Fan Song B. odifications have been made to improve theltitude intercept and electronic counter-countermeasures capabilities. Although theystem is old and Is gradually being phased out and replaced by newer systems, it is still widely used by Soviet strategic and tactical air defense forces.

od 1, Theommand-guided,SAM system designed to provide point and barrier defense against aircraft flying at low altitudes.

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The system is primarily used to defend fixed it was initially given to Soviet units Modifications to theave improved the low-altitude intercept and refire* capabilities of Lhe system.

SA-6. Theobile, short-range SAM system intended to provide Soviet field forces with defense against high-performance aircraft at low and medium altitudes. rototype of this weapon was first seen in7 Moscow parade, but it was not fielded The system consists of three missilesEL and associated acquisition and fire control radars mounted on separate tracked vehicles.

Thean-portable, shoulder-launched, infrared guided SAM system developed for tactical defense against subsonic fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft flying at low altitudes. The original version of this weapon entered the Soviet inventory It is similar to the US Redeye. odfirst observed with Soviet forceshis version has improved range and altitude capabilities.

cir.cr.tlyh. two-tail SA-3 launcher at some sitesewer four-rail launcher. This doubles the number of ready missiles for firing

Original document.

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