Created: 12/1/1976

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This document is one pari of an experiment in competitive analysis undertaken by the DCI on behalf of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Thc views expressed are those of thc authors and do not represent either coordinated Nalional Intelligence or the views of lhe Director of Central Intelligence.

The mandate of Team "B" was Io take an independent look at the data that go into the preparation ofnd on that basis determineood case could be made that Soviet strategic objectives are, in fact, more ambitious and therefore implicitly more threatening. security than they appear to the authors of thc NIEs. If the answer to this question was positive, they* were further to indicate what accounts for the NIEs unsatisfactory assessments. Members of Team "B" were deliberately selected from among experienced political and military analysts of Soviet affairs known toore somber view of the Soviet strategic threat than that accepted as the intelligence community's consensus. However, the' Team made every endeavor to look objectively at the available evidence and toesponsible, non-partisan evaluation.

No attempt has been made in this Report to arrive at anythinget. capabilities are not touched upon except to give perspective to certain Soviet programs. The Report concentrates on what it is that the Russians are striving for, without trying to assess their chances of success. Nor has Team "B" sought toull-fledged counterpart toovering thc same range of topics: its contents arc selective, as befits the experimental nature of the Team's assignment. Failure of thc Team to address itself to any given subject should not be taken to mean that it necessarily concurs with thc NIEs' treatment of it.

A certain amount of attention is given to the "track record" of the NIEs' in dealing with Soviet strategic objectives, in some cases going back to thcs. Thc purpose of these historical analyses is not recrimination, which, given the Team's advantage of hindsight, would bc pointless as well as unfair; rather. Team "B" found certain persistent flaws in the NIEs that do not disappear with the change of the teams responsible for drafting them. II concluded, therefore, that only by



trackingeriod of time NIE assessments on any given subject is it possible fully and convincingly to determine what methodological misconceptions cause their most serious errors of judgment.

The Report consists of Three parts. Tart One seeks to clarify thc assumptions and judgments that underpin NIE evaluations of Soviet strategic objectives. Part Twoollection of ten papers which analyze critically specific Soviet efforts in the field of offensive and defensive forces covered inart Threeummary overview of current Soviet strategic objectives, as perceived by Teamn Annex traces thc NfE treatments25 of Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The Report is precededummary.

It needs stressing that the present Report was prepared in some haste, members of Team "B" being allotted twelve weeks (and in the case of some of them, less than lhat) in which toast amount of material andinished draft. Given thc complexity of thc subject, this lime clearly was insufficient and the resultant product suffers from flaws. Even so." feels confident that its criticisms, analyses, and recommendations ought to contribute to theof the treatment of Soviet strategic objectives in future National Intelligence Estimates.

ln the preparation of this Report, Team "B" heard briefings by the following experts to whom it wishes to express its gratitude: Mr. Fritz Ermarth, Mr. Richard B. Foster. Maj. Ceneral George Keegan, Dr. Sherman Kent. Dr. Andrew Marshall, and Mr. Gordon Negus. Capt. John P. Prisley (USN,ontributed to the preparation of the analysis of Soviel ASW efforts in Part Two.

Team Professor Richard Pipes

Professor William Van Cleave

U. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA.r. Thomas Wolfe. RAND Corporation General John Vogl. USAF,dvisory Panel mbassador Foy Kohler

The Honorable Paul Nitze Ambassador Seymour Weiss Maj. General Jasper Welch, USAF Dr. Paul Wolfowitz. Anns Control andAgency






of Intelligence gathering 9

2 Implicit judgments about Soviet international10

A. NIE conception of Soviel itialcgy10

B NIE judgments about Soviet itrategic11

Critique oi these13





Central Strategic Attack Systems

Restraint" on Soviet Stralegic Forces


Mobile Missiles

Anti-Satellite Testing


and Directed Energy

Non-Central Nudear Systems


Political Objectives41






Team "B" found lhal the8 scries5 has substantially mis perceived the motivations behind Soviet strategic programs, and thereby tended consistently to underestimate their intensity, scope, and implicit threat.

This misperception lias been due in considerable measure to conceiiOalion on thc so-called hard dala. that is data collected by lechnical means, and the resullant tendency to interpret these dataanner reflecting. concepts while slighting or misinterpreting the large body of "soft" data concerning Soviel strategic concepts. The failure lo take inlo account or accurately to assess such soft data sources has resulted in the NIEs not addressing themselves systematically to thc broader political purposes which underlie and explain Soviet strategic objectives. Since, however, the political context cannot be altogether avoided, the draflcrs of the NIEs have fallen into the habit of injecting into key judgmcnls of the executive summaries impressionistic assessments based onhe attribution to Soviet decision-makers of such forms of behavior as might be expected from. counterparts under analogous circumstances. This conceptual flaw is perhaps the single graves! cause of the misunderstanding of Soviet strategic objectives found in past and current NIEs.

A fundamental methodological flaw is the imposition on Soviet strategic thinkingramework of conflicting dichotomies which may make sense in. context but does not correspond to cither Russian doctrine or Russian practice: for example, war vs. peace, confroiilatlons vs. delente, offense vs. defense, strategic vs, peripheral, nuclear vs. conventional, arms limitations vs. arms buildup, and so on. In Soviet thinking, these are complementary or mulually supporting concepts, and they by no means exclude one another.

One effect of "mirror-imaging" is that the NIEs have ignored the fact that Sovici thinking is Clauscwitzian in character, that is. that it conceives in terms of "grand strategy" for which military weapons, strategic ones included, represent only one elementaried arsenal of means of persuasion and coercion, many of them non-military in nature.

Another effect of "mirror-imaging" has been thc tendency to misconstrue the manner in which Soviet leaders perceive thc utility of


those strategic weaponstrategic nuclear forces) to which tlie NIEs do specifically address themselves. The drafters of8 seem to believe that the Soviet leaders view strategic nuclear weapons much as do. analogues. Since in thc United States nuclear war is generally regarded as an act of mutual suicide that can he rational onlyeterrent threat, it is assumed that lhc USSR looks at thc matter in the same way. The primary concern of Soviet leaders is seen to be thei" securing of an effective deterrent to protect the Soviet Union. attack and in accord with the Weslern concept of deterrence. Thc NIEs focus on the threal of massive nuclear war with the attendant destruction and ignore the poliiical utility of nuclear forces in assuring compliance with Soviet will; they ignore the fact that by eliminating the political credibility of. strategic deterrent, the Soviets seek to create an environment in which other instruments of their grand strategy, including overwhelming regional dominance in conventional arms, can better be brought to bear; they fail to acknowledge that the Sovicls believe that the best way to. strategic capabilities is by assuring that the outcome of any nuclear exchange will be as favorable to the Soviet Union as possible; and, finally they ignore the possibility that the Russians seriously believe that if, for whatever reason, deterrence were to fail, they could resorthc use of nuclear weapons to fight andar. The NIEs tendency to view deterrence as an alternatioear-fighting capability rather than as complementary to it, is in the opinion of Teamrave and dangerous flaw in their evaluations of Soviet strategic objectives.

Other manifestations of "mirror-imaging" are the belief that the Russians are anxious lo shift thc competition with the United States to other than military arenas so as to be able to transfer more resources to the civilian sector; that ihey entertain only defensive not offensive plans; that their prudence and concern. reactions are overriding; lhat their military programs areeaction. programs and not self-generated. The NIEs concede that strategic superiority is something the Soviet Union would not spurn if it were attainable; but they also feel (without providing evidence for this critical conclusion) that Russia's leaders regard such superiority as an unrealistic goal and do not actively pursue it.

Analysis of Soviet past and present behavior, combined with what is known of Soviet political and military doctrines, indicates that these judgments are seriously flawed. The evidence suggests that the Soviet leaders are first and foremost offensively rather than defensively minded. They think not in terms or nuclear stability, mutual assured destruction, or strategic sufficiency, but of an effective nuclear war-


fighting capabilily. They believe that thc probabilityeneral nuclear war can be reduced by building up one's own strategic forces, but that it cannot be altogether eliminated, and that therefore one has to be prepared forar as if it were unavoidable and bc ready to strike first if it apjwars imminent. Thete is no evidence that the Soviet leadership is ready, let alone eager, to reduce thc military budget in order to raise the country's standard of living. Soviet Russia's habitual caution and sensitivity. reactions are due less to an inherent prudence thanealistic assessment of the existing global "correlation ofhould this correlation (or the Soviel leaders' perception of it) change in lhcir favor, they could be expected to act with greater confidence and less concern, sensitivities. In fact, there are distuibing signs that thc latter development is already taking place. Recent evidenceoviet willingness to take increased risksy threatening unilateral military intervention in the Middle East innd supporting the Angola adventure) may well represent harbingers of what lies ahead.

Soviet doctrine, confirmed by thc actions of its leadership over many decades hascontinues toimportant points; the first is unflagging persistence and patience in using the available means favorably to mold all aspects of the correlation of forces (social, psychological, political, economic and military) so as to strengthen themselves and to wcuken any prospective challengers to their power; the second is closely to evaluate the evolving correlation of forces and to act in accordance with that evaluation. When the correlation is unfavorable, the Party should act with great caution and confuse the enemy in order to gain time to take actions necessary to reverse trends in the correlation of forces- When the correlation of forces is favorable, the Party is under positive obligation to take those actions necessary lo realize and nail down potential gains, lest thc correlation of forces subsequently changeess favorable position. (It is nolcworlhy that in receni months one of the major themes emphasized in statements by the Soviet leadership to internal audiences urges thc "realization" of thc advances brought about by the favorable evolution of forces resulting from detente and the positive shift in the military balance.)

We are impressed by the scope and intensity of Soviet military and related programsroliferation and hardening of its command, control and communications network and civilhe size and nature of the Soviet effort which involves considerable economic and political costs and risks, if long continued in lhe face of frustrated economic expectations within their own bloc and the possibility that thc West may come to perceive the necessity of reversing current trends




before lltcy become irreversible, lead lo thc possibilityelatively shoil term threat cresting, say.0s well as the more obvious long range ihreal.

The drafl NIE's do not appear to take any such shorter range threal seriously and do not indicate that the threat itself, or its possible timing, have been examined with lhc care which we believe the subject deserves.

Although in thc past two years the NIEs haveore realistic view of the Soviet military buildup, and even conceded the possibility that ils ultimate objective may well exceed the requirements of deterrence, they still incline to play down the Soviet commitmentar-winning capability. Three additional factors (beside thoseabove) may account for this attitude:

Poliiical pressures and considerations. On some occasions the drafters of NIE display an evident inclination to minimize the Soviet strategic buildup because of its implications for detente. SAL negotiations, congressional sentiments as well as for. forces. This is not to say that any of the judgmcnls which seem to reflect policy support are demonstrably directed judgments: rather they appear to derive mainlytrong and understandable awareness on the part of the NIE authors of the policy issues at stake.

Inter-agency rivalry. Some members of Team "B" feel that the inclination of the NIEs to downplay military threats is in significant measure due to bureaucratic rivalry between the military and civilian intelligence agencies; the latter, being in control of the NIE language,eputation for tempering lhe pessimistic views of military intelligence with more optimistic judgments.

The habit of viewing each Soviet weapons' program, or other development, in isolation from the others. The NIEs tend to assess each Soviet development as in and of itself, even when it is evident that thc Russians areariety of means to attain the same objective.esult, with each individual development minimized or dismissed as being in itself of no decisive importance, thc cumulative effect of the buildup is missed.

Analyses carried out by members of Team "B" {and presented in Part Two of this Repoit) of NIE treatments of certain key features of lhe Soviet strategic effort indicate the extent to which faulty method and biases of an institutional nature affect ils evaluations. This holds true of the NIE treatment of Soviel strategic offensive forces (ICBMs


andf ils views of (lie alleged economic constraints on Soviet strategic forces; of ils assessment of Soviet civil defense and miliiary haidcning programs; of ils interpretation of the strategic implications of Soviet mobile missiles and the Backfire bomber; of its evaluation of) in the fields of anti-submarine, anti-satellite, and anti-ballistic missile defenses; and of ils perception of Soviet non-cenlral nuclear systems. In each instance it was found lhal through. the NIEs have tended (though not in ihc same degree) to minimize the seriousness and success or the respective Soviet efforts, and (by thc injection, of de facto net assessments) to downgrade the threat which they pose. security.

hi formulating its own estimate of Soviet strategic objectives. Team "B" divided it into Iwo aspects: objectives in the broad, "grand strategic" sense, as they arc perceived by thc Soviet leader-ship; and objectives in thc more narrow, military sense, as defined by

As concerns the first. Team "B" agreed thai all the evidence points to ar undevjating Soviet commitment to what is euphemistically called "the worldwide triumph of socialism" but in fact connotes global Soviet hegemony. Soviet actions give no grounds on which to dismiss this objective as rhetorical exhortation, devoid of operative meaning. Thc risks consequent to the existence of slialcgic nuclear weapons have not allercd this ultimate objective, although they have influenced the strategy employed to pursue it. "Peaceful coexistence" (betterknown in thc Wesl as detente)rand strategy adapted to the age of nuclear weapons. Itwintress on all sorts of political, economic, ideological, and other non-military instrumentalities to penetrate and weaken the "capitalist" zone, while at the same lime strengthening Russia's hold on the "socialist" camp;n intense military buildup in nuclear as well as conventional forces of all sorts, not moderated cither by the West's self-imposed restraints oi by SALT.

In its relations with the United States, which it views as the central bastion of the enemy camp, the Soviet leadership has had as its main intermediate goals America's isolation from its allies as well as the separation of thc OECD nations from thc Third World, which, it believes, will severely undermine "capitalism's" political, economic, and ultimately, military might.

With regard to China, while thc spectrewo-front war and intense ideological competition have to an inportanl degree limited the Soviet Union's freedom of action in pursuance of ihcir goals against the West, it has not proved an unlimited or insuperable limitation. Further.

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given current trentli in the growllt of Soviei militory power.. cannot confidently anticipate lhat concern wiih China will deter the USSH from increasingly aggressive policies toward lhe West.

As concerns the inoie narrowly defined military strategic objectives. Team "B" feels thc USSRfor effective strategic superiority in all the branches of the miliiary, nuclear forces included. For historic reasons, as well as for reasons inherent in the Soviet system, tbe Soviet-leadership places unusual reliance on coercionegular instrument of policy at home as well as abroad. It likes toreat deal of coercive capabilily at its disposal at all times, and It likes for it to come inich mix so that it can be optimally structured (or any conlingcncy that may arise. After some apparent division of opinion intermittently ins, thc Soviet leadership seems to have concluded that nuclear war could be fought and won. The scope and vigor of Soviet strategic programs leave little reasonable doubt that Soviet leaders are indeed determined to achieve the maximum possible measure of strategic superiority over. Their military doctrine is measured not In Western terms of assured deslruction but In thosear-jighting and war-winning capability; it alsolear and substantial Soviet predominanceeneral nudear conflict. Wc believe that thc Russiansigh priority on the attainment ofapability and thai they may feel thai it is within their grasp. If. however, that capabilily should not piove attainable, they intend to secure souclear war-fighting advantage tliat,ast resort, they would be less deterred than we from initiating the use of nuclear weapons. In this context, both detente and SALT are seen by Soviet leaders not as cooperative efforts to ensure global peace, but as means more effectively to compete with the United Stales.






Influence of Intelligent* Gatheringon the Perception of Soviet Objectives

The National Intclligi-ncvales concerning lhc USSR are essentially assessments o( Soviel military capabilities which, in lhe main, are based on data gathered by means of highly sophisticated optical and listening devices Because the Soviet Unionniquely closed society, human contacti, traditionally the principal source of foreign intelligence,istinctly subordinate role In lhe preparation of these documents: not only Is such information exceedingly scarce, builways suspect of being lhe producteliberate dislnformalion effort in which the Soviel government engagesassive scale. Furthermore, information obtained from sensitive human sources often has such limited distribution that it does notignificant pail in the preparation of NIEs. Thus It happens lhat Ihe hard evidence on which thc NIEs are based relates primarily lo the adversary's eapabililies rather lhan his intentions, his weapons rather lhan his ideas, inuiivei, and aspirations.

The particular nature of lhe intelligence-gathering process exerts an important influence on the manner In which Soviel strategic objectives are assessed in the NIEs we have here an instance of technology turning from tool into master Because lhe hard evidence is so overwhelmingly physical (malenal) in nature, the tendency of the intelligence community is to focus on questions of wfial rathei than wliy or what for. Problems of eapabililies ovrrihadow those of Soviet purpose.onsequence, the NIEs cither gloss over in silence the question of Soviet stiatcgic objectives, or else treat thc mattererfunctory manner. Judging by the available evidence, tt seems that thc intelli-

gence community has spent moie effort and produced more literature on each and every Soviet ICBM system than on the whole overriding question of why it is that lhe USSR developstrategic nulcear posture In the first place.

To gloss over Soviet purpose, however, does not mean lo be tid of the issue: exluded from lhe front en trance, itay of slipping through lhe back door The potrH ii that whethet one wants lo or not. in assessing lhc enemy's eapabililies one must of necessity male some kind of judgment! aboul his objectives, or else lhc raw data are of no use. Facts of themselves arc mule: they are like thc scutteicd letlers of an alphabet thai the reader must arrange in sequence according to some system. Tlie difference is only whethet one arrives at one's judgments about an adversary's objectives consciously and openly, le. spefh ihem oul. ot unconsciouslyule, whenever lhc latletaken, one's judgments tend lo be drawn from simplistic "projections" of one's own values and aspliatsons. For unless we are prepared lo acknowledge that our adversary Is "different" and unless we are willing to make (he mental effort required to understand him on his own terms, we have nn chnice bui in fall back on lhe only alternate posilion available, namely the postulate thai hii basic motivation resembles Oun The result is that well-knownirror-irnhe persistent flaw ol lhe NIEs bearing on lhelaw which may be said In constitute the principal source of their unsatisfactory assessments of Soviet objectives- In other wntds. the disinclination, in no small part induced by the srienlilie-technical character of intelligence gathering aboul the USSR, lo facethe inn nlwhich dow Ml lend

Uwtl tn conventional scientific or technical analysis) encourage! (he authors ol the NIEs toet ol questionable aisuinptioni about Russian intentions. These assumptions, in turn, lead to the formulation of ludg merits about -Sovicl intentions which aie not Supported by fhe available evidence, and, indeed, sometimes stand in slurk contradiction to it. Thus, oven'iiipli.isii on "hard" data and the failure tu draw on other sources of information with the same degree ol conviction all loo often causes the information supplied by the "hard" data lo bc misinterpretedhe opinion of Teamhe NIEs ore filled uHth unsupported and questionable ludgmenls about what II ii thai lhe Sotnei government umm and intends. It ii thii practice, ralhei than the abttnet of solid information, that has caused in lhe past (and in considerable measure does to In the promt) recurrent underestimation* of lhe intensity, scape, and Implicit threat of ihe Soviet ilrateglc buildup.

mplicit NiE Assumptions and Judgments About Soviet Internalionol Behavior

The umpoken assumptions of. intelligence community (and. one may add, much of. political. Intellectual, and business communities as well) aboul Soviet international behavior derive from several sources, which can be briefly identilied as follows:

a.. commercial tradition and the business culture which. society: among Iheir components nrc the beliefs lhat (IJ peace and the pursuit of profit are "normal" whereas war is always ann relations between parties both shouldhare of the profits,uman nature everywhere is the same, by and large corresponding to the rationalist, utilitarian model devised by Jeremy Benthnm snd his followers.

emocratic tradition which regards social equality as "natural" and elitism of any sort aa aberrant

c. An insular tradition derived from llie lacl lhat unlil Iwo decades ago. when (he Russian* deployed their first IC8Ms. the USA had enjoyed total immunitytrategic threat to its teirilory.

These threedemocratic, and insularhave imbued the United Slateinique outlook nn the wnrkl. an outlookhared

by no oilier nation, least ol nil by the Russians whose historic background Is vastly different llorld outlook mi geneni and ret nevertheless one which deeply colon the intelligence eornnsunaty'i pereep-tloni oi ihe motives and aspirations of lhe USSR

As one reads Ihe NIEs issued ovet the past fillecn years, one finds underlying theirhole set of urupoten oawmprsons about Russian national character and goali that In all ettentiel respects CQirrrpondi to the ideahied Image the Untied Slatri hm of Itself bul bears very llltle resemblance lo anything that actually relates lo Sootet Russia.

A. NIE Conception of Soviet Strategy

To begin with, thc key word, the adjectivehe Soviet conception ofs much broader Ihan that covered byussiaontinental power not an insular one. and it happens to have the longest external frontier of any country in the world In contrast to Ihe United Slates, il has never enjoyed the lutury ol isolation, having always been engaged in conflict along ils frontier, sometimes suffering devastating invasions, sometimes being the aggressor who absorbed entire countries lying along its bordersountry wtth this kindis:oric background it would make little sense to separate any category of military weapons, no matter how destructive, from the rest of the arsenal of the means ol persuasion andhe strategic threalhe homelandhe ability of an enemy to inflict "unacceptable" human and material losses) is for lhe Soviel Union nothing new. and the danger piesenled by strategic nudear weapons, grave though it may be. does not callualitative departure from the norms of tradilional military thinking.

There isurther factor which militates against the Russians' ihinltng oi strategic weapons in the same way as do lhc Americans. In (he United Slates, the miliiary are not considered an active factor In the political life ol the country, war Itself is viewed ai abnormal, and the employment of weapons of masa destruction as somethingut sad* ihe norms of policy. The Soviet Union, by contrast, functionsimil conglomerate in which military, political, and

' Ir ii (rue. nf (uwir. ilijc ihe flijiiiam luvrrjianire oi" rhe .imrd fimri. Ihe Strategic llortrl Fortes This ii an olmiiiior'Hvr (Wife, hriwrxr. "hicli don noi lenity rl.itm! fiiorlameriolly diflnou do.ii fit* mini*.iw all (met.


economiclhe instrumentsto each of ihem are urn at partiversified arsenal of power, all arlminulered by the same body of men and all usable for purposes of persuasion and coercion The distinction between lhe civilian and (he military sectors of society and economy, appropriate to capitalist societies, is not very meaningful in the Soviet environment All of lohxh meant, that tn the USSR military weapons in grnenl. and strategic nuclear weapons in particular, are treated not as unique instrument! to lit utrdery last retort, but as elementsiltotr range of mutually supporting meant of pertuaiton and coercion available to the stale in punull af lis intertill

The Soviet conception of strategy resembles that which in Western liloNilure it lomelitnei referred to as "grandl entails (he application of off the available tesoiirces In the pursuit of nationalSoviet military theory ii decidedly Oausewlt-zian in orientation In Soviet stralegic writings, the point is made wiih monotonous emphasis thai military actions are subordinate to politics, and have no function outside of politics The following passageair example of Ihii kind of argument:

The organic unity of military strategy and praliey with lhe determining role of the latter signifies that military sttategy proceeds from policy, is determined by policy, is totally dependent on policy, and accompllihet its specific tasks only within Ihe framework ol policy ..

The distinction between lhc American and Soviet conceptions of strategic force is well leflecled in thc criteria which the Iwo sides employ In aliening the power relationship between potential adversaries. The American concept of "ittnleglr balance" concentrates almost eiclusivcly on military forces, whereas the Soviet concept of "cotielotton of forces" (sooinoinenie Jif) includes in lhc equation alio luch non-military factors ai political power, economic capacity, social cohesion, morale, and so forth

By adopting in ils cttimslei oi Soviet stralegic objectives lhe narrow American definition of what constitutes strategyltategic threat instead of Ihe broad ClausewitxJan one. lhe8 have no choice bui lo ignore weapons oilier than nuclear


unes in lhe Soviet strategic arsenal* Ihey grossly underemphaiire the connection) between lliemiliiary. eeonomie. and ideological elements in Soviet foreign policy.ingling out for near exclusive treatment the three component) of the Triad, ihey not only leave out of consideration Other nuclear and non-nuclear military means buthole range of strategic weaponion-military kind which tlie Soviet readership tees as available to it in thc pursuit of world politics. And yet in Soviet eyes such actions ai the Interdiction of tlse Weslern flow of oil. supplies or (he disruption of thc democratic processes by Communist parties may well beai "strategic" moves equal In Importance to lhc deployment of lhc latest series or ICBMs.

IE Assumptions ond Judgments About Soviel Stralegic Objectives

Much the same "mirror-imaging" holds true when we turn from theerception of whatstralegic ihreal" lo their view of Soviet "strategic objectivei" Here weather mechanistic projection onto Soviet society of the sentiments and aspirationsociety which tees war as an unmitigated evil and the militaryocial overhead lo be curtailed wheneverociety which conceives Ihe purpose of organized life to be the steady improvement of lhe citizen'% living standard! These views are never spelled out In so many words; nevertheless, ihey unmistakably underpin lhe NIEs evaluations ol whal il it thai the Russians aim at.

Muchnalysu of Soviet military programs and actions Is based on granting exeeiiive legiiimacy lo an alleged Russian obsession with national security derived ol experience with foreign invasions andoviel Hussla's telenilesi drive to enlarge and improve its military power. Ils Impulsive reaction to any moves lhat threaten Its territory, its overriding concern with obtaining International recog-

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of ill poll-world Wat il conquests all of 'hit is attributed lo historically-induced nalional insecurities.

Thii basic aiiumption. strongly (though indirectly) reflected in lhc NIEs.umber of important cotollanea

(I) That Soviet militaryirst and foremost defensive in character. Thia view is caplicltly. conveyed InIssues nriif Options In Soviet Million/ne of the few Inielligence publications which addresses Itself seriously to Soviet stralegic objectives in the context ol "grand strategy"

"Certain broad alms of Soviet foreigndescribed today in much the same

wayecade ot roote ago: (a) ircuniy of the homeland and of the world communistb) protection of the "gains of socialism" and more specifically maintenance ofmrnu-nlst regimes in eastern Europe; (c) fostering awareness everywhere of Soviet military strength and readiness so as totrong foreign policy aimed at expanding Sovielp.mphasis supplied)"

The possibility lhal lhe Russians may he pursuingefensive bul an offensive strategy is not entertained in the NIEs. Ihc spread of Soviet "influence" (which can also mean the use of peaceful means) Is as far as they are prepared to go in that direction. Apparently, the issue is discounted as not meriting serious thought. In line with this assumption, thc whole Immense Soviet buildup ol nuclear strategic weapons is seen as serving primarily defensiveocument called Soviei Nudear Doctiisu: Concepts ofand Theater War, issued by thc Office of Strategic flctearch inlatly asserts that the Russians perceive iheir nuclear forces as serving essentially defensive aims: "The major effort has* been or. programs which ensure the ability of slrategic forces lo. strike and still return a

ew ofioltlary pokey, ie. ai Inherentlrlb advanced in NIV.a Vol. II.nd NIEJ The Inter, lorays- "TJi*

USSH laniliSni ib ntlif arv irimfiti in Europe ro be fundamental lo

tH-at Hi national uxaren. is tbeet aa uia'mie fntw*UWad Mlamqmmir at tereifnEfliprlibi wpplwd) He National latrMifnar* Esriruie* jrarliu> on rheIE IMSTI. SooUs Mood JWleybo trod, on lheIn fr Soviet naval buildups in defensive rather ihan Irimi


deviating blow"teie. too. the possibility of ihc Russians using (heir strategic weapons lor olfcn-slve puipotcs is ignored. Indeed, lhc very possibility of nuclear war is rejected, for which reason thc NIEs tend lo disregard evidence that suggests the Russians view the matter differently.

Consistently with this perception of Soviet defensive objectives, the Soviet Union is seen as being interested primarily in securing an effective deterrence forcer "Drtnrenceeyoreover, deterrence it regarded as an end goal and, as in Western thinking, at someihing fursdamentallyfrom war-fighting capability and slrategic superiority. Proceeding from this premise, thc NIEs have notoriously underesllmated both thc Intensity and seo|ie of thc Soviet commitmenttralegic nuclear buildup.p.ent on record as staling that there was no reason lo believe that the USSR drtired to match the Uniied Slates in the number cf ICBMs.he NIEs conceded that the Russians might perhaps be aiming at strategic parity wllh the United Slates. Only. however, was the possibility ol the Russians seeking advantage and superiority over the United Slates advancederious contingency.**

Once the Soviet Union has attained parity with the United Slates and assured itself of an effective drtenent. it will not wish to continue the arms ince As they gain strength, thc Russians will also acquire self-confidence and thcrelore cease to feel lhe need lo Ilex theiro impress potential enemies ihe acquisition of military might will make the Soviet Union aware that the "contest for international primacy has become iricrcasinglyand less amenable to simple projection' of power") The Soviet Union will turntabilizing fotce in international affairs and shift an increasing share of its resources from lhe military to the civilianhe Soviet leadership would no doubt prefer to shift some scarce resources

to the civilian. p. It

its pjcoccupalion Is with defense,military effort thc Soviet Union mainly respondsol its poteniial rivals, especially thc United

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Hie NIC recordregard to Soviet itnrteeic obictti-ei is diiruiwil al greaterhe Anofi

States Ilt strategic moves air reactive in character and opportunistic rather ihan self-gen eta ltd cm tone term In conception

the ahvetsion wiih nalionalthe fact thai its military arsenal servespurposes, lhe United States canalarm lhc Soviet elfort lo attainThr attainment ot such parity will providewith the sense of conlider.ce necessaryto decelerate lhe aims buildup

Russians would admittedly not begaining strategic superiority over the Unitedthey thought this goal feasible. However, until the authors of NIK regarded such to be unrealistic and they did not allowleaders could seriously entertain it (eg. lhat the USSR has conHuded thatof clear superiority in strategicis not now. SevUtand the Outlook for Sotnet-Amertcanp.o evidence supporting this contentionin this or any othernlyhas the mass of data which suggests thatmay not be content wiih mere paritydeterrence become so compelling as thc NIE to concede that the Sovietindeed possess more ambuious goab-and vigor of these {strategic)ime when the USSHa powerful deterrent as well as recognitionstrategic equal ofaise thcof whether the Soviet leaders embrace assome lorni of stralegichis qualified admission, after yearson tlie purely defensive character ofobjectives, isgiatifying, even though thetends to disparage the Importance ofand. refuses to acknowledge that it canmeaningful The prevailing tone of thealong has been to view Soviet policy as oneopportunism The Himians are seento lake high risks or to make any movesprovoke the United Stales, on whose goodarc believed to place extremely high value

oviet military doctrine and the official pronouncements of Soviet leaders which seem loore aggressive stance, as. for example, when Ihey speak of "socialist" (read: Sovicl) world hegemony, nerd not be taken (Ou seriously. While

some intelligence analysts apparently do attach considerable significance to Soviet doctrinal pro nouneements. lhe consensus reflected In NIEs holds that Soviel doctrine is primarily cihortallve in character and possesses little if any operativeIts main function Is to serve domestic polilics. for whichind of Soviet counter pa it. campaign oratory

ll is not difficult to perceive that lhe picturemotivations and intentions as implicitly orexplicitly drawn in thenealt respect! buttheof an abiding, historically-conditionedsense of nationalthat ol lhe

Umlrd States The Soviet Union is seen as delensivc-mlntlcd, concerned wllh securing merely an elfecllve deterrence, preferring lo shift the compeli(too with the Uniied States to other ihan miliiary arenas so as to be able lo transfer resources to the civilian sector, and lacking tn any strategic objectives apart from those that are forced upon it by the United Slates and other potential adversaries Superiority is somethingussians would no! scotn if thc United Slates were lo allow them to gain It; but by Ihe very nature of thingi. il is noi an objective they can actively pursue, the more so that strategic superiority In the nuclear age is somethinghantom. The Russians indeed do display opportunistic proclivities but they are above all prudent, cautious, and conservative.

These assumptions permeate (he analysea presented in the National Intelligence Estimates and often lead to quite unwntranted astcssmenti Examples of such procedures are given in Part Two of this Report which indicates how, partly by virtue ofnd partlyesult of firmly Md convictions aboul what II it the Russians must or ought lo want, hard data are interpretedanner that closer scrutiny reveals to be at best questionable and at worst palpably unsound.

ritique of Ihese assumptions

The poinl is lhat these assumptions do not stand up to scrutiny in the light of Soviel hbtory. Soviet doctrine, and Soviet actions.

(I) To begin with, the tendency lo view insecurity" as the motor force propelling Soviet foreign and military policies. Although undoubtedly (he desire to protect the homelandactor in

Russian behavior, il dors nm Iradefensive poslure in Ihe on) in my meaning ol (he woid: lhc Russians comlriie their own securily In lhe sense thai it can bc assured only at the expense of their neighbors This leads to an essentially aggressive rather than defensive approach Id secunty. And in fact. Russian, and especially Soviet political and miliiary thrones arcennoe rn character: theit ideal is tlie "science of conquest'- (ncufco pobtikdai) formulated byh Century Russian commander. Field. Suvorovreatise of lhc same name, which haslandard teat of Imperial as well as Soviet military science.

There are valid rejsoni why Soviet political and military thinking should be offensive.

A.ailer of the historical record, it is untrue that Russia has suffered an cxcepiional number of invasions and inteiventlons: it hat probably done more invading itself The expansion of Russiaontinental empire is wi.hout parallel in world history: no country hai grown so fast and bone has held on so tenaciously to iti conquests. It is no accident tbat Russia alone of all the belligerents has emerged Irom World War II larger than It had entered it As concerns thc celebrated interventions of the West in the Russian Revolution, most cf what is said on this subject is myth pure and simple: suffice it to say that except on rare occasion! Western troops did not actively fight the Red Army, thatesponse to Soviet Intervention in western politics (the call to clan war and the overthrow of the existingnd that thc net effect. intervention in the Russian Civil War has been to save Eastern Siberia for Russia from certain Japanese conquest. In olher words, thc Russian "right" to be obsessively concerned with securityisconception basedne-sided reading of history: indeed, if anyoneight to be obtessrd with security it is Russia's neighbors It is ically not surprising thatar lesser part in Russian thinking or psychology ihan Is normally attributed to it. The Russian outlook, where politics and mihtary attain are concerned, has traditionally been confident and aggressive rather than anxious and defensive Hence there is no reason to assume that the growth ol military mighl will assuage Ihe Russian appetite for expansion: thc opposite proposition It far morestronger they are and feel, the more Ukeiu are they lo behave ajritreutvely.

II. There arc alio Internal reasons which push the Soviet leadership toward an offensive slancc: Thc great Importance which Soviet polilical theory attaches to lhe sense of forwardIhe lack cf any kind of genuine legitimacy on lhe part of the Soviel government compels it to croale. its own pscudo-legitimacy -which rests on an alleged "mandate of history" and is said to manifest tlielfelentless spread of lhe "socialist" cause around the globe;

Connected with It, the altitude that in polilical. military, and ideological contests it is essential always to seize and hold thc Initiative;

l-ack of confidence in the loyalty of lhe populationorld Warxperience),where East Europe is concerned, and thc fear of massive defections to the enemy in the even! oi prolonged defensive operations;

The better ability of the regime to exercise conirol over military commanders (as well as over lhe civilian population) in pre-planned, offensive operations, than under conditions where thc initiative is left lo thc opponent;

Thc traumatic experience of the first few months of the Russo-Cerman War.udden Nazi onslaught caused immense Soviet losses in manpower and territory, and almost cost the Russians the war; the experiences of war in the Middle East73 have reinforced the belief of Soviet military In the value ot decisive offensive action;

The conviction that in the nudear age the decisive blows will be struck in thc first hours of the conflict, and hence he who waits to strike second ii almost certain to lose.

here is no evidence either In their theoretical writings ot in their actions that Soviet leaders have embraced. doctrine ot mutual assured destruction or any of Its corollaries. Neither nudear stability, nor strategic sufficiency, norlay any noticeable role la Soviet military thinking. Thc Russians seem to have comeegard strategic nuclear weapons as weapons of unique capacity whose introduction has indeed profoundly affected military strategy, but which. In the ultimate analysis, arc Still means of persuasion and coercion and as such lo be employed or not employed, as the situation dictates.

Hop Seerct-

regard nuclear wai j* feasible and (as indicated below in Pails Two and Three) lake many active steps luapability to wage and winac. Tlie attainment ol nuclear parity with the United Slates has served only lo strengthen iheir view ol the matter. True, Khrushchev In the, and for several years thereafter various spokesmen from Soviet institutes, appeared to accept mutual deterrenceoncrete fact in thc face. strategic superiority and Ihc then bleak prospects for lhe USSH to reverse lhat situation. These indications of serious internal consideration ol Weslern cuncepls of nuclear balance disappeared as prospects for meaningful Sovietsuperiority improved, although Sovici spokesmen continued lo suggest to Western audiences thai nuclear war could be mutually destructive. In any even! there is no evidence lhat Soviet planners have adopted thc essentials. strategic thinking with it* linchpin, the theory of nuclear sufficiency: indeed, all the available evidence points lo their deliberate and steadfast rejection of such Western concepts.

here is no tcason to assume that thc Soviet leadership, like. counterpart, regards military expendituresaste and wishes lo reduce the military budget in order to be able lo shift resources lo the civilian sector. For one, Ihe priority enjoyed by the Soviet military seems unchallengeable. Secondly, lhe sharp civilian-military duality, basic lo our society, does not exist in the USSR; hence, the Soviet military budget is noi clearly differentiated from Ihe civilian one. The reduction of Soviet military expendilures by so many billion rubles would not automatically release resources for thc civilian population. Finally, it is unwarranted toriori that the Soviet leadership is eager significantly to raise itsliving standards. The ability lo mobilize the population not only physically but also spiritually Is regarded by thc Soviet leadership as essential lo any successful war effotf. Having had ample opportunity to observeevelopments in the West, the Soviet leaders seem to have roncludedopulation addicted to thc pursuit of consumer goods rapidly loses lis sense of patriotism, sinkingood of sell-indulge nee lhat makes it extremely poor material for national mobilization. There is every reason tothe basis of both thc historic record and the very logic of lhe SovietIhc Soviet regime is essentially uninterestedignificant rise of ils population's living standards, at any rale in thc foreseeable lulurc. Certainly, the

prospect of acquiring additional resources for lhc civilian sector is lor it no inducementeduction of the arms buildup.

hile lhe Soviet Union obviously, and for good reasons,ery close watch. strategic developments, and. when necessary, adopts appropriate defensive countermeasures. there Is no evidence that ils long-term stralegic planning is pnmarify influenced by what the United Stales or any other power happens to do. The Soviet Union is pursuing its own long term global objectives, doing all lhat is necessary Iu safeguard the home base, but without allowing tlie requirements of defensetu alter its offensive objectives. It is striking, for example, how little attention is paid in Soviet military literature (both open and classified) to SALT. In contrast to the United States, where strategic arms limitation is regardedentral clement in the development of Ihe US-USSR strategic balance, in Soviet literature SALT is ttcalcdinor sideshow without much influence on the overall stralegic competition. Attention must abo be called to the Soviet Union's response lo what it must have perceived as thc greatest threat to its security since the end of Worldamely theeonflict with China. Instead of depleting its Warsaw pact foices to confront the Chinese threat, thc Soviet Union proceeded ino buildowerful and substantially new military force on the Far Eastern front, thereby once again demonstrating that il does not intend actions by others to Interrupt or defied Its own long lerm strategic planning.

Since, as we have pointed out, the decisive motive in Soviet poliiical and military thinking isefensive but an offensive spirit, thc assumption that growing Soviet strength uaII caute them to become (Vis aggrettive it unwarranted.

It is certainly true that the Russians have been prudent and generally cautious, and that they have avoided rash military adventures ofthe kind that had characterizedascist")of lhe lD30's. As the record Indicates, whenevei they have been confronted with situation! lhal threatened to leadUSSR miliiarythey prelcncd Io withdraw, even at the price of some humiliation, llie reason for this cautious behavior, however, lies not in an innate conservatism, but rather in miliiary inferiority, for which reason one cannoi muni un it recurring as thai inferiority


decisions of Ihe Soviet leadership, as officially enunciated, are filleted downhe masses by meansast and wcll-organiaed agitprop machinery, and ate understood by the population al large lo be formal directives Nowhere cjn "minor-imaging" be more deadly than in thc tiratmenl of Sovietwith that cynicism with which wc are accustomed to respond to our own electoral rhetoric.


If we juxtapose the implicit and explicitol NIEs about Ihe Soviel mentality and Soviet strategic objectives with what history, the exigencies of the Soviet system, and lhe pronouncements of Soviet leaders indicate, we are not surprised that the NIEs eonsuimfly undtrettimate the significance of the Soviet strategic effort. All Sovicl actions in (his field (end lo be interpreted in the lightutative sense of insecurity; aggressive intentions are dismissed out ofs our bclicl that (he NIEs' tendency to underestimate lhe Russian slrategic drive stems ultimately from threen unwillingness to contemplate Soviel slrategic objectives In terms of Ihe Soviet conception of "strategy" as well as In thc light ol Soviet history, the structure of Soviet society, and the pronouncements of Sovietn(and related) tendency to view ihe USSRountry whose basic strategic objectives are limitedn assured defense of the home country,hc resultant tendency to ignore ot misinterpret evidence that points to dUletent conclusions In whet words, such mlsjudgrneuls as have been committed and to some extent coniinue to be committed ate due not so much to the lack of evidence as to the absenceealistic overall conception of SooUt motives and intentions, toithout which the significance of such evidence as enits cannot be property attested.








section presents summary analyses of specific aspects of Soviel strategic force developments which, in the opinion ol Team li, NIEs havereated too lightly in estimating the Soviet threat. security. We have not attempted in thii section to cover the sweep of Soviet strategic programs either comprehensively or in depth. The summary analyses, arc meant to be representative of the Team's review of developments that have contributed to its conclusions as to Soviet strategic objectives. The papers make the following principal points:

1 Soviet ICBM and SLBM programs reflect strategic objectivesetermination. security in both political and military terms than the NIEs acknowledge.

Economic Restraints on Soviet Strategic Forcei: Consistent low estimates of the Soviet defense burden combined with overestimates of eeonomie constraints have contributed to thc NIEof Soviel strategic weapon programs and have tended to offset in the readers' minds concern for thc growth of Soviel militaty eapabililies: Soviet strategic force developments have yet lo reflect anyeffects of competition fiom lhe civil sector of thc economy.

Soviet Owl Defense. Soviet civil defense efforts have been either downgraded or ignored in thc NIEs.. consensus that such defenses lack strategic utility in fact. Soviet civil defense efforts appear to be integrated wiih all other military programs to maximize Russia's capabilities touclear war and emerge viable from it.

Military Hardening: The extensive hardening program connected with Soviet command and control dearly demonstrates Soviet intent torue war fighting capability, as opposed lo acceptanceutual deterrence concept.

Mobile Missiles: The Soviets intend to produce substantial numbers ofissiles which use thc same two-stage and ground-handling equipment as docs thentercontinental mobile missile; the NIEs do not address themselves to the Soviet potential of altering the strategic balance by quickly converting thco ICBM's with the addition of thc third stage.

Backfire: Tlie Backfire dearly possessescapability which me3ns lhat if deployed in significant numbers it would pose an incremental threal to Ihe strategic balance.

Soviet Anti-Satellite Testing: There is stronger evidence than suggested by the NIEsoviet determination lo develop anti-satellite systems having high military value across the spectrum of conflict, and il is likely thai in the foreseeable future thc Russians will couple their anli-salellite systemwith developments of directed energy

oviet Strategic ASW: Tire uncharacteristically strong negative long-range estimate of the NIEs disparaging lhc possibility of successful Sovietof ASW capabilities is challengeableand if wrong, could have profound implications (or US. security.

OM including Directed Energy ROD The evidence does noi lupoorl an indisputable conclusion ihai the Sovieis have eilhei lott inletest in Iheir ADMi1oi downgraded it.

oviet Non-Central Nuclear Syitems The omission from lhe Estimates nl any treatment ol Soviet non-central lyslems. and iheii relegation lo oi.niii'j! and rathei perfunctory treatment in other estimate*eripheral" lorces.icture ol Ihe strategic balance seriously al variance with lhc Soviets' own view and minimises lhe extent of iheir buildup

I. Soviet Cenlrol Strategic Attack Systems


As broad and diversified as the Soviel strategic drive has been, the core of the intercontinental aitack force effort has been the amassing and continualol modern ICBM andLBM forces

ng History *

NIE Protections duringf Soviel ICBM and SLBM forces constslenlly underestimated their growth, lhe variety of programs, qualitativeand foice capabilities, and lhe intensity and determination of Ihe Soviet effort. In the, even aftei the obseived start of lhcnd Yankee SSBN programs. NIEs did not forecast any very large scale ot determined buildup of ICBM and SLBM forces The Judgment was simply: "We do not believe lhal the USSR, aims al malehlng the United Slates" in these Intercom menial systems Thc Soviets were depicted as resigned lo or even satisfiedosition of inferiority, and their objectives limitedinimal but adequate retaliatory deterrent loice Not untilas it projected thai "the Soviets will shortly oveicome. lead In numbers of ICBM launchers" (notnd byS-style arms conlrol and limitation rationale was attributed to theay lo place presumed limiti on further growth and development

Latet NIEs. al the start of, as ihr number nf fised ICBM silo launchers was levelling off. disparaged lhc Soviet effort to gain ostentatious superiority and In develop ICBM and SLBM lorces guided by real warfighting criteria. Instead, lhe goals

" Hie AwiJ Nil:.r>

WiM Oi.lrri. liver oVvrlxixirrHi

of ihese programs were si tested In terms of "rough panly" and "equalven after NIEad acknowledged thai Soviel ICBM and SLBM programs were noi "leadily eaplaiaed as merely trying lo keep up with the compelutual assured destruction reasoning dominated the estimates, asonviction that lhe Soviets would willingly limit these programs mcuningfully in pursuit of SALT, strategic stability, and detente

By5 NIEs, the Soviet ICBM and SLBM efforts in general were more accurately represented asigorous and costlyiih rapid qualitative improvement, but progress made In improving ICBM accuracy was underestimatedeam report on Soviet ICBM Accuracy) and Ihe implications of (he enormous Soviet throw weight advantage were not drawn out In fact, until very recently, hltle point was made of throw weight at all

Current Anolysis

Volume I) concludes thai the hard large! counlerforce capability of the Soviet ICBM force is growing and couldajor ihreat" to Minuteman in the. Yel, the net atieument Implied in the key judgments remains far more comfortable than hard evidence warrants especially when viewed in the context of broad Soviet strategic concepts and objectives, as comparedimilar context. rcquiicments. This occurs becauseontinuing insistence on treating these strategic forces solelyarrow mutual assured dcstiuction(buttressed byrelatively optimisticof enduring Blue force capability) and on seeing Soviel strategic motivations In. leims.

Conseipienily, even while reporting evidence of far-reaching physical developments, the NIEs have resisted condusioni equally logical to those favored by the Introduction of non-physical, soft conceptual biases: mutual deterrence In an assured destitutionerspective on strategic force superiority lhal greatly limits ill utility,. views on SALT and delcnte. The NIEs. then, have been based as muchertain set of conceptual and political assumptions about Soviet motivations as upon hard evidence Even when the cumulative hard evidence tended lo contradict these assumptions, they persisted.

Since lhc NIE in eflec* resls ils conclusionscl assessment, lhe! shouldroader

lip Scw4-i

ul maicgic force impllcaliom and should explicitly. and Soviet strategic force requirements beyond that ofdevattat-Irw retaliation'1 capability. Soviet objectives go beyond that and so. forcehich recognize an assured destruction capabilityithhold ororce and only one of several criteria far strategic force sufficiency.


ould emphasize far more strongly than (lie NIEs live ominous implications of lhe growth ami developing properties of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM force* The full sweep of these programs, and in particular Ihe great ICBM throw weight. Iheand multiplication of MlllVed warheads given that throw weight, and the steady modernization of thc ICBMin accuracy and systemsa conclusion that thc Soviets seek clear superiority in the capabilities of these forces, including the maaimum feasible counlerforce and warfighting capability. The thrust of these Soviet force developments and their potential threat to US security and strategic objectives, politically and milltanly. have not been adequately reflected in Ihe NIEs. The threat includes the steady developmentotential war-winning capability but also broader Soviet drive for strategic superiority as discussed In Parts One and Three Thc political Implications of tliese strategic capabilities and their role in the overall "correlation ofwe would been insufficiently recognired In past NIEs.

2 Ltonon-K

Slrolegic Fortes

Thc Estimoljng History

Consistently low intelligence estimates of the Soviel miliiary defense burden have had serious broad waiping effects on the estimating process and on the perceptions ol usersstimates of Soviet mililnry expenditures expressedercentage ol CNP were as low or lower lhanerceni. The high-level reader of Ihe estimates was often reassured by lhe percent of CNP figuies that the military balance could never get seriously skewed These Soviet miliiary "cost" etll-



mates raised implicit or explicit questions in some quailen of. Government as lo whether the magnitude of Soviet military efforts was being grossly cxageeratrd Even In lhc faceirect challenge ol thc basis for the low estimates, (here was no inrluialion to reconsiderood number of years Iheie was strong resistance to competing analysis showing higher levels of Soviet military spending

National estimates on Soviet strategic nuclear aitack fours written2 have withoutslated thai Soviet strategic eapabililies have been conslrained by consul era lions of economy Estimates of Soviet strategic defense force* aho containreferences to economic constraints, but less forceful ones tlie history ol massive Sovieton strategic defense lyitems seems to have impressed the drafters of the eitimales and made them more cautious about positing resource limitations.

Much of the argumentation regarding constraints on force build-ups assumes (there it no documentation offered) thai resource allocation and priorities issues In ihe USSR are reasonable facsimiles of such issues in the United States. This passage froms typical: "Moreover, lhe question of the proper allocation of total economic resources among compel -inr. demandi, and In particular hetaeen military and civhan purposes, has been an active tisue at thr highest leveli of Soviet politic. These considerations will continue to influence lhe scale and pace of Soviet programs for long range striking fnrces.'*Emphasis added)

tnimilar judgment is made withto strategic defenses. Aftereneral Soviet disposition to accommodate miliiary programs, that estimate states: "Nevertheless, Soviet leaders will continue lo face difficult choices in allocating resourcesariety of claimants, both civilian and military Their decision as to whether, and to what extent, lo extend ABMthe most dully single miliiary program on thebe made in lhe context of ihese competingara.

The evolution of NIE judgments about economic restraints on the Soviel ABMnteresting ll suggests eilhrr an analytical blind spotolicy influenced bias, or both Thereisturbing correlation between thc changing lodgments72 and the policy issues affecting ABM programs for Ihe same period

iH thereistinct muling of7 economic restraint argument about thc Sovicl ABM piogram It was replacedationale which in essence ptedicted rather uncorisl rained icsourccIii lhc piogram in lhc absenceALT agreement on ABM

"CuminI pressures mayestraining influence on the strategic defense effort, but are unlikely lo reduce II. For lhe near term, atiuenditurcs for strategic defense will probably lie maintained at Iheir present high levri, while military expenditure*hole continue to rise The trend for the longer lerm will depend heavily upon Soviet decisions concerning ABMthe ment costly single military program on thethe relatedol strategic arms control.he Soviels embark upon any sizable new program of ABM deployment within the neat few yean, expendi-tures foi strategic defense will increase and by thcs are likely to exceed those for straiefic attackubstantial marrin Para 7.

p 1

The estimate9 Ireated the subject essentially as8 with thc addition of some cost estimates.13 was not republishedhe NIE on stralegic defense contains no reference to resource restraints in the discussion cf the Soviet ABM program In he future of the Soviet ABM program Ii discussed primarily in terms ol ABM Treaty constraints and thc capabilities of lhc Soviets lo develop and deploy ABMs in the event lhal treaty were abrogated. Economic restraints on lhe ambitious Soviet ABM programs which are postulated in the event of abrogation are dremphasiaed. For Instance, in rationalizing lhe Illustrative Force Model IV, the worsl abtogalcd-treaty eaie postulated, economic restraint it Ireated thus:

"Deployment cf strategic defense forces would Increase to the point that, even thoughwithout majot new increases in productive capacities, they strum these capacities, and resource* must bc diverted In thc extent lhat thc rate of growth of the civilian economy is. p.Emphasis added.)

In2 estimate thereeavy cmiihuii on the rclallonthip between future Soviel strategic defense efforts and successful conclusions ol offtnnve

arms limitation agreements, which reflects tlui change ol emphases from AHM to offensive systems in SALT.

When thb series of judgments Is cor related over lime with Ihe evolution. policy (and political contioversy)BM programs and arms limitationtrong circumstantial case emerges on the matin of politically Influenced intelligence. This easestrengihened by the lack of any apparent evidential basis for shifting estimates of the nature of economic rcstrainls lo Soviet ABM programs.

A blind spot inndicated by the fact thaiao reference in the Soviet Strategic Attack and Ceneral Purpose Force estimates of the effects on economic constiainls of the ABM Trealy which supposedly relieved lhe USSH of Ihe burden of pursuing "the most expensive military ptogram on thcince competition among military claim-anli hasersistent pail of the NIEitsncerntng economic constraints on ilrateglc attack systems, one would expect Soviet costs saved from ABM to have been applied to other military programs The unspoken assumption of the drafters appean to have been that the savings effectuated on fulutc ABM programs would go to the civilian economy, and not to other military programs

Serious disagree men ts over military resourceorn have occurred among Soviet military claimants and inch disputes are well-documented.]

1 evidence rcveab policy disputes between components of the mi lit aspokesmen versus ground force spokesmen, missile and rocket enthusiasts versus thc "multimillton man army" traditionalists. Thesewere couched In operational or strategic terms, bul no doubt had some roots in competing resource demands.

Siren documentation ts not available to support the persistent NIE emphatu on mtlttary oersm civilian resource competition There have been in the past some disputes between heavy industry and medium and light industry acctors of Ihc Soviet economy. Thc heavy induilry spokesmen (from time to time referred to as "metalnclude the producers of miliiary equipment, butot convincing evidenceivilian economy challenge to military rcsouice allocation priority paralleling thai which ccctiri in Western societies.


One area of evidence which hai changed sharply during lhc pasl year it lhat concerning (he Sovicl defense burden An accumulation ol evidence on (he Soviel military budget, topped by the testimonyerson who had had an opportunityaanvine (he budge( in detail, hasrossof Soviel drleme capenditurct by0 Soviet miliiary budget to which this source had had accessercent higherstimate* lor lhal year. New estirnates by the inielligence community based on this source and others indicate lhal an error of ihis magnitude was involved in (he economic input! lo national estimates for theean.

stima te

The primacy of the military priority in Soviet resource allocation dcctiiom has long been strongly indicated by thc magnitude of Soviet military programs and forces. This evidence Is now reinforced by evidence of much higher miliiary budgets than previously estimated. While Soviet military claimants for resources may compete with one another for resources. lhe> face no serious competition from claimants in llie civilian economyts this surprising. Within what Is, alterarge and expanding CNP. lhe Sovteti have made il absolutely dear that defense requirements have an almost absolute first call un available resources. Denial of consumer needs isew or inconsistent pattern of Sovietthe contrary is the case. Therefore, Soviet ilrateglc forcei have yet to reflect any constraining effect of civil etonorni/ competition, and are unlikely to do to in the fcieseeable future.


Soviel strategic forces will bc shaped almost exclusively by the political leadership's view of military and political utility of producing the types and numbers of the systems Involved. Constraints on the growth of slrategic atlack and defense capabilities urill be technical in nature or due to production limitations

Arms limitation agreements will becomefactors only to thc extent lhat ihey do not interfere with Soviet military-political goals They may appear to resultedirection of expenditures from one military purpose to another bul evert here this almost

certainly reflects decisions which mighl well have been made In any event in the absence ol agreement. Const ia in Ing agreements may bc reached provided thr alternative curries high risks to lhe Soviets. action which would endanger the attainment of their mihlary-polilical goab

oviel Gvil Defense

U.S. Estimoling History

The National Estimates seriesealing with Sovicl Strategic Defenseseneral lack of Interest in lhc subject of Soviet Civil Defense coupled with doubt on the part of the diaflcn about lhe seriousiirvi oi efficacy of Soviet clfoils in the civil defmtr area and doubt lhat civil defense would have any strategic importance even if the Soviets toeee serious aboul It.

Relative lack of interest is indicated by the brief and generalized treatment afforded the subject Between36 and thaiivil Defense wat not even mentioned in the Summary and Conclusions (or "Key Judgments" or "Precis")of the estimates, which are normally all lhal is read by policy makers. When Civil Defense finally was mentionedt was in one reassuring sentence Soviri Ovil Defense will be unable "to prevent massive casualties and the breakdown of the economico far as we know, no serious analytical sludy supports (his conclusion

Doubt about the seriousness or efficacy of Soviet civil defense efiorts was reflected in thc persistent NIE references lo "apathy" toward piogrami, resource constraints, and probable Soviet realization of thc basic inlcaslbtlliy of civil defense in general. Doubl aboul thc strategic Importance of civil defense was reflected In judgments about lhe requirement for several days' warning lime for Soviet ovtl defense plans lo be put intoactor essentially nullifying the stralegic impact of Soviel programs, in Ihe view of ihe NIE draften ll is perhaps not irrelevant to note thai these views attributed to Soviet authoriliet are precisely the views held In many quarten In. civil defense effort Thc possibility of "mirror-Imaging" is therefore one which cannol readily be rejected.


iluly reported ihe greying evidencetrong Sovici emphasis on civil defense, such ai lhc elevation of Hi chief lo Deputy Minulei of Defense level. Breihnev'i men on civil defense atd Party Congress, and lhc large number of peopleto lhe) But the evidence to dale and its implications has noi been analysed in national miniates In the contest oj the total Soviet policy of ittalenic offense and defense Rather there hasendency to view Soviet civil defense efforts in lhe eonieU ofoncept of Mutual Assured Destruction. Thii "mirror-imaging" probably accounh in large measure for the treatment in lhc estimates of civil defense as essentially anhis faclor was no doubt reinforced by lhe eoneentia-lion of intelligence analysts on the technical aspects of weaponry and military force structure whichall national intelligence estimates on military mailers


Satellile photography and Information supplied by recent emigre* from Ihe USSR haveubstantial body of evidenceery heavy and costly Soviet em pham on Civil Defense atuch of the phoiographic evidence has been on band for several yean, but until recently il

has not been exploitediew to measuring.

Soviet civil defense efforts

This evidence polntiuch more determined and effective Soviet civil defense effort than we have hitherlo estimated. Both photographic and human source evidence strongly Indicate that sincehen Ihe function wai directly subordinated io lhc Ministry of Detente, there haiharp increaie uf emphasis on Soviet civil defense.proves Ihe emphntls of lhe last several years on construction of personnel ihellen In built-up areas and the hardening of war esiential Industries against nuclear effects. Human sou reel report lhat in the same period there hasonsiderably increased emphasis on thc training of civilian personnel of all ages in protective measures lo include practice evacuations of heavily populated arras The goal of these efforts, as expressed by ihes to reduce

onet im rwilihdtmlaia Otmroii

tile* Mill lonnja perccnr ol ittr So-id

urban papulation Mni'i' Al' tlommaitd analywt corroborate thr

l( ill till fly ol lint


casualtiesudear exchange lo underillion and lo ensure lhc continued viability of essential industries.

The Soviet civil defense emphasis has beenin about the same periodassive effort to ensure thc survival of the Soviet command and control system f


Soviet cot/ dtfensr efforts appear to be Integrated with ail other military programs to maximise the USSR's capabihties toudear war and emerge from iliable society. Survival of key military and political cadres has priority in the Soviet effort, butf the civil populationhole is receiving increasing attention as lhe programs for hardening command and conlrol systems nearThc civil sector enjoys sufficicn: priority for resources lo account for un annual expenditure0 the equivalent of aboul one billion dollars per year. (Some analysts believe even this figure may understate the magnitude of thc Soviet effort. The key point is however thai no concerted USC effort has been made to study and assess this effort.)

The increased Soviet emphasis on civil defense dates from about the time lhal the Kremlin leadership could foresee the successful conclusion of an ABM-limiting treaty with the United States This correlation In lime was piobably not coincidental. Soviet leaders piobably reasoned lhat they would lose any contest with Ihe Uniled States in the field of active defenses against nuclear attack because. technological advantage at lhe time, bui lhal In any contest in thc field of passive defenses Ihe USSR would win because it had the advantage of ccntralued controlisciplined populationear only In the context of US concurrence not to protect Its population with the ABM that the Soviets couldoal of achieving assured turvtoat for the USSR and assured destruction for Its motor adversary

The circumstantial evidenceorrelationthe pt edict ability of an ABM agreemenl and

Hie new emphasis on civil defcnic ll strengthened by tlie initiation ut the samegeneralof an unprecedented i; j- sion of Soviet Hialegie attack capabilities Soviet cipendiluics on malegic attack lorcci lumped sharplyoubting5 outlay!

Thc great importance attached by thc USSR to itiefense effort provides an unmistakable clue to Soviet overall doctune with rcgaid to general nuclear war Such efforts arc inconsistentiew that the Soviets tacitly accept thc concept ol Mutual Assured Destructionasis for strategic force structure (or arms limitations] When viewed in combination with active strategic defenses and strategic attack forces thc civil defense effort underscores the fiankly stated Soviet adherence to thc Uausewitztan concept of wat as an extension ofunder nuclear conditions These efforts contradict the assumptions that thc Soviets view nuclear cichange as tantamount to destruction of their society and system or that they perceive strategic nuclear capabilities primarilyeterrent Rather these efforts point to the structuring of both defense and offense for war-fighting, with deterrenceerivative function.


The Soviet civil defense effort will continue to enjoy high priority and heavy funding until and unless the Kremlin leadership becomes convinceduperior Soviet nuclear war fighting capability is either not achievable or not useful militarily Or politically. If current efforts continue there is no reason to believe the Soviets will not achieve their civil defense goal of being able lo hold casualtiesuclear exchange lo an acceptable level as well as preserving Intact their political system

Impression that the subject was of limited military slgnifrcancc


U.S. intelligence has identifiedacilities hardened (or nuclear warfare, about half of which are utilised by lhe Soviet high command. Ceneral Staff or Major Command Headquarters The remainder are related to subordinate command levels



The programs are continuingeaiured pace Overaval aviation airfield command and control facilitici have already been hardened and lhelearly programmed Al Strategic Rocketacilities are already hardened with the major headquarter!trategic armyhardened0 PSI [


Command Centers at Theatre. Air Defense and Moscow NCA Icveti arc believed to be hardenedOO PSI [


withurled antennas hardened0 PSI already identified.


Mililory Hardening

NIE Estimating Record

The Soviet program of dispersal, hardening and redundancy of its command and control system is unmatched In the Western world. The significance of thii fad. and particulariy the greal disparitynd Soviet hardening efforts with its implications for thc stralegic balance, has barely been touched on in past NIK'i The treatment was so brief in fact in NIE . that the reader was left with the



ll is apparent lhal (herogram is designed louch higher level of turviu-ability than that planned by the Weitem world It repseienti clear evidence of the Soviet desire loudear war fighting capability tnio the mutual deterrence concepts of lhe Weil.



is now coming lo lightn extensive program at providing protection for personnel of ir ruin industrial facilities While lhe analysis hai only scratched lhe surface, an interagency working group has already identified several hundred sueh facilities hardened to perhaps betweenSI This program has been in effect since thend construction is ongoing.

This ts further evidence of the Soviet objective touclear atlack and reconstitute its industrial capabilityrotected skilled working lorce. It offers thc Soviels high assurance* that its vital command and control structure will continue to functionudear exchange while serious doubts exist as to US and Free Worlds capability undei similar circumstances This matter needs far more detailed consideration than il has received in thc pait NIEs.


We believe Ihe Soviet hardening program will continueeliberate pace until all vital military command and control facilities have been treated, ll will provide Increasingly dear evidence of Soviet intent to be prepared for general nuclear war rather than to achieve mutual deterrence.

obile Missiles

Although the intelligence community is debating Ihr range and mlended use of lhehr prevailinghaineplacement lor thrndntermediate range missiles. The numbers of missilestRV'son each) will cover the present raeripheral target system now handled by Ihri ai well asiverted to that use. (Thus thereood possibility that as manyntercontinental capable missiles will bc released for use against US targets with no SALT penalty when thceployed )

Past NIEsave estimaled theoeplacement for theilos, wltb indications lhat once started the conversion could be completedear. These same estimates stale lhc Soviets have probably decided to fotego deployment of the mobile version of theALT TWO agreement be reached. Thus wc are left with the Impression that therogram will remain small and probably restricted to the silo mode, even though new versions are underand the mobile ventou if. in ill probabdtty. an operational missile. These estimates further conclude that the mobileilledge against increased silo vulnerability with the Soviets perhops subitiluting some mobile missiles for silo missiles if mobile ICBM's are not banned in SALT TWO.


Estimating Rocord

The Soviets have developed two mobile missile systems which couldignificant impact on the strategic balance. Theolid fuel intercontinentalM) missile, almost certainly tested inilo and mobile TEL (transpoCer/erector/laurrcher) mode The program hasigh degree of cover and concealment associated with it


Thes an IRIIM version of (he same missile using idcnltcal first and second stages. Wc have firm evidencearge scale program planned for lire SS-20

A veriojt problem of concern to Team *'B" arises, however, in connection wtth Ihr fact that thenlercontlrienlal missile, according to best available evidence, almost certainly uses launch and ground handling equipment identical to lhat of thehu givei theeal potentialreakout situation to add the 3rd stage to theuvsoie first two ilagei are identical with thehereby giving tlie entire force an Intercontinental capability. There Is no dispute within thc intelligence community as to the feasibility of thb move, yet no discuss.oo of thii mailer can bc found in currentoveted TEL could contain an> easily as ans could the covered itorage iheda now beingruded.






We ate concerned, therefore, with boih the eate ol conversion of theoissiles and (he nuinbon ofomponents now being produced. The ease of producing and storing in concealed areas an ICBM such ashich can be launched from mobile launcherserious potential threal to the strategic balance. In addition, the verlllcalion problem associated with deploymentobile ICBM like tbelready In productiondiifingnishable from anhen on covered launchers, is sobering This malter needs full coverage and evaluation In


We believe therogram will continue apace with Improvements and modifications made to give theIRV capability as well as improved accuracy. Wc abo believe the Soviets will continue lo conceal the number of components produced which will permit the conversion ofo intercontinental missiles. We also believe the Soviets will retain this conversion capability lo provide another opllon which could help upset ihe strategic balance, should international developments warrant such an exploitation.


NIE Estimaling Record

emorandum ptepaied by the Oflice of Slralegic Research,hich updates Ihe Backfite Program, concerns itself solely with the use of lhe aircraft In peripheral missions and its roleeplacement aircraft for the aging Badgers. No mention is made of any capability for using the bombers In lhe intercontinental ioie

This pe-occupallon with lheaof the aircrafl has recently been extended toof lhe unrefueled range of theapurport-

ing lo ibow the Backfire toelatively short range vehicle with half the |iayfoad previously ascribed to it and thus not as well lulled to the strategic mission.

Emphasit is abo being placed in CIA memos on recent statements by Soviet SAL talk participants who repeatedly assert lhe aircraft to be designed and Intended only to carry out peripheral strike missions, especially againsi NATO largels. In this connection, the Soviets have been ambivalent themselves in Iheir statements on Backfite range, with lhe chief military man un thc Soviet SAL Delegation, Cen. Trusov. giving Ihe radiui0 nautical miles0 NM range) while Breihnev told ('resident Ford the aircrafl had only one half thc range of the Boon. Since we credit the Bisonadius0 NM, this would make Backfire0 NM radiui aircraft.

Thus tbc intelligence community has been engagedigorous debate over whether or not the Backfire bomberstrategic" bomber or one Intended primarily for peripheral use. The issue ol range hasreat deal of the analysts' time, with the view prevailing in some quarters that any unrefueled radiui of action figures falling much0 miles would severely limit the aircraft's use in lhe strategicajority of the community lias credited thc aircrafl with an unrefueled radius of0ilehile the recent CIA analysis

mentioned above J

Jreduces these figures substantially. This analysis based on twelve Backfire missions describes an aircrafl ofoundsadius of action of00 nauticala payload of0 pounds.


All these estimates have an Inherent range analysis and assumptions sensitivity which could substantially

reduce tlic. high estimates or increase the low Recent evidence, however,ifferent'lie Backfire's intended role. As indicated above, all

Backfires have been observed to be equipped for refueling. With this capability thc issue of unrefueled radius becomes more academic, f

more significant poinl however is thata bomber at "strategic" is moreatter of umcfuelcd range. The Russians have proposedduring SALT discussions which use terms like "anything comparable to caliting stralegic aircraft,hehey suggest we look at all parameter* of the aircraft including intended use and characterise an aircraft accordingly. We consider ourtrategic bomber and plan its use against Soviet targets even though its unrefueled radius falls short of even the lowest estimates of Backfire performance. Our strategic air command plans multi-pic refueling of the aircraft which gives It,ypicalangeefuelings} of0 nautical miles All Backfires we have seen to date have been equipped with refueling probes. We have monitored refueling missions. There is no question therefore that the aircraft has lhe inherent capabilily for stralegic millions, should lhe Soviets choir lo uie it this way

espite iu planned use of thetrategic role, has sought to keep it out of SALT restrictions The Soviets so far have preferred not to raise this tisue. in the expectation that we would not insist on including Backfire in lhc "strategic"

The fact remains however that both aircraft have immense valuetrategic role if either side intends to use them that way.

A case can be made thalfi

j'ii- Soviets intend to use the Baekflre only against peripheral target! luch as NATO and China (and of course In ils well established Naval role) The evidence fot thb lies in Ihe absenceizeable tanker fleet. Ihe very limited refueling leen to date,ow level of operational training in this mode, the relatively short missions we have lern. and the current basing pattern, (including no staging to advanced bases sueh as Anadyr) And at lhe ClA studies so frequently poinl out there are many targets in NATO and China that cun bc covered well by the Back! n'

JJCIA lakes the view that thr current tanker force it insufficient loizeable intercontinental bomber force and as late as5 felt that the available evidence indicated the Soviets werr notew tanker aircraft.

New evidence indicatci Ihe Soviels are Iuwith (lieossible tanker. TheIhe "fJassac" transport could provide aforce in relatively short time pettods withfrom such an aircraft extending0 miles. Two refueling! wouldIhe minimum performance version0 NM plus radius aircraft, clearlyintercontinental capability In fact usingsec the

aircraftange well in excess0 miles with two refuelings.

A reasonable view of Soviel intent could very well be that the aircraft has been designed to provide lhe flexibility to accomplish both the peripheral and intercontinental mission! with the aircraft actually being used in lhe role which the developing tactical scenario dictates. This view Is enhanced by the facl lhat the SovieU arc now deploying an aircraft slightly smaller but scry similar to thell lor use against NATO targets now probably covered by the Backfire Theanyetter aircraft fot use against NATO as i: is optimited fot low altitude penetration,ore accurate all-weather bomb/nav system than Backfire and with lis small radat cross section ii mote difficult to detect, track and destroy than the Backfire One might well ask why the Soviets felt il necessary lo produce such an aircraft in large numbenowet month) if Backftrci were to bc the primary peripheral vehicle. Most NATO vital target! (oilfields.


nuclear storage silcs. command and conlrul laciiilics.rc wirhin easy rango(he Fencer now deployed just beyond the Polish border In Western Russia.

One must aho consider the lact lhat the Backfire program is still in Its infancy and thai thc real intended use of the aircraft may not become apparent until it appears in some numbers in LHA operational units. At present the force consists oflus planes located at Iwo operational bases We have good evidence that il probably- will be produced in substantial numbers, withircraft off the line by4 Al that point lhe numbers of Fencers and Backfires combined would appearfor the peripheral mission alone In (hisrecent pholographic evidence of substantial plant expansion raises the poislbilily of even higher production rotes for Backfire.



If Ihe Backlire Is excluded from (he strategic category we will be ignoring the Soviet optionreakout which could be significant in light of the production figures mentioned above. We believe the Soviets will keep thisn viable and will develop supporting capabilities, sueh as modern tankers, dearly permitting use of the aiicraft In therole, should this become advantageoushem.

oviet Ami-Sotollite Testing Estimating History



8 lhe Soviels initiated actual non-nuclear ASATact which was reflected in9 NIE13 notedon-nuclear ASAT capability bad been demons!rated, butully operational system would require greater flexibility ihan was displayed in the Sovietl was believed that the same constraints on ASAT use discussed in earlier years would continue lo prevail, and wuuld, in facl, be reinforced by the Increasing dependence of thc Soviets upon (heir own salclllte systems as well as the effects of (he SAL negotiations.

In nn1 supplement, the NIE noted thai (he Soviets wereeriod of frequent ASAT testing, and questioned why they did noton-nuclear ASAT variant of the Calosh ABM. which would be capable of direct ascent intercepts and therefore highly effective againsi US reconnaissance satellites This reasoning led to the view ihai the ASAT lystemong range program ultimately directed against (he full range of US ipacc lyitems. which could have originated in response tosyslemsrbital bombardment) wlddy do. cuticd in thes. but not introduced

The hiatus in ASAT testing16 has led to the publication of essentially unchanged estimates concerning the Soviet ASAT system,Soviet laser capabilities have been given increasing emphasis as they have advanced In addition,4 the NIE noted that the Soviets hadapability to place satellites in geostationary orbit, thus potentially extending tlicir ASAT capabilities to that altitude.

lhe Evidence



number of satellites, which cannoi be rapidlyonilitarily effective aitack upon planned systems (such as CPS) would seem to require development of an ASAT vehicleultiple engagement capability.



Analysis. Estimate

As It cuirently exists, (he Sovici ASAT system has several operational limitations which must bein assessing its potential utility to the USSR

Altitude Limitation This was noted above, and isunction of lhe launch vehicle. It could be alleviated by usearger launch vehicle such as thelthough Soviet views regarding the necessity of testing at higher altitudes prior to operational use remain unknown.

Launch Site Limitations. Using only TT, ASAan be launched only when target satellites pawthe TT coordinates For low altitude satelliles. thiroccurs twiceday. thus yielding periods of aboulours In which targets are not subject to negation This could be alleviated by establishment of ASAT operations at Plesetskhere two SL-II launch pads are also available, or by convertingilos to accept thextensive modifications would be necessary for the latter alternative, and no evidence of such modifications loloi currently exists.

Capacity As rioted,eparate ASAT launch.reconnaissance systems maintainna!]


While Soviet intentions for tbe current syslem cannot bedeleimiried. consideration of Inand limitations does permit attribution of several potential applications:

Use. Demonstration of Intent,"shoe*'" effects, etc

Crisis Management One time denial of informationigh intensity crisis situation.

Extended Convenlional Wai. Denial of tactical information over an extended period of time, possibly preceded by or coupled with lower level anti-saicllile operalions, such as laser blinding. ECM. etc Physical satellite destruction may be more likely as lhe nuclear threshold is approached.f


would be fully in consonance with Soviel employment ol oilier (pace systems, such as their radar ocean surveillance larellile. in tactical operalions.

Strategic Research and Development Provide test and operational data for use in development of more capable ASAT systems.

ll is worth noting lhat Ihe second series of Soviet ASAT tcsti beganear afler lhe ABM trealy. which had significantly constrained the number of ABM launchers thai the Soviets could poasesi Since thii ASATotally Ineffective in an ABM role, its development mayoviet desiie lo ovoid diverting any of their ABM system to an anil-satellite

Jep Scere*-

while at thc same lime acquiring an ASAT system tliat cuuld in no way be construediolation oi the ABM Trealy.

Fo recoil

The most significant threat represented by the Soviel ASAT may well he lit uieciearch and development role since, il true, ihu provides evidence of Soviet Intentions to be able to deny the US lhe essential supportpoce lyslrmi in potential future conflicts at all leoeU of lhe spectrum.

'llie developmentore capable ASAT tystem would be indicated by teit* of one or more of Ihe following capabilities:

High altitude intercepts.

Intercepts againsi maneuvering targets

M ultiple interceptsingle ASAT vehicle.

Crossing intercept! at greater relative

Employment of directed energy weapons (lasers, particle beam weapons) to or In space.



In aliening the impact of the current Soviet ASAT system and technological developments related lo more capable future systems, it is necessary to Veep in mind tlie long developmenl lead times and long orbital lifetimes char act eristic of US space systems These factors give rise to the possibility lhat, if survivability measures for US systems are predicated upon the observed Soviel ASAT system, the USSR could seriously threaten essenlial US syslems by nutans of an accelerated test and deployment program for an advanced ASAT system To avoid this danger, it soould be prudent to base mroloabditu measures for US space systems more upon recognised Soviel technological capabilities than upon identified Soviet ASAT sijitems.

To summarize, the USSR currently has ona nil satellite system which has military utilityimited number of scenarios, but whose primary importance is as evidenceoviet determination to devrlop anti-satellite syitemi having high military


value across the spectrum of conflictikely that ihe 5oviels will continue anti-satellite lyaleinm liar foreseeable fuiure, and ihey are likely lo couple il with iheir cieveloprnrors of directed energy weapons

oviei SirolcgicASW

U.S. Estimating History

Thef Soviet strategic ASW was lint raised int that Ume. evidencearge-scale, aggmsivr effort toariety of new ASW senaon. weapons, and plat for mi. lorsvr of ihrm employing techniques which are not used by the US. was finl formally acknowledged by tlie community. In like manner, this estimate reached the Judgment thai at the time, some 3S6 of the lotal Soviet military and space budget was spent on ASW. However, this did not count research and development and the estimate noted "we cannot quantifyut (outre very substantial, and are especially

The key judgment in each of the1 tn the present has been lhat the Soviets will be unable In tntve the prnblems of initial detection. SSBNi in the open oceancalc which lhc estimators believe would lie required tn counter this force within lhe period of Ihe estimates. Thc most recent estimate) is worded "we conclude lhat lhe Soviets have little potential Ine achieving success in either of these arras [detecton and (racking in lhe open ocean] in Ike neil len

On the oilier hand, every estimatenanimous Impression of an aggressive, citensive,vigorous, and broadly based reseaich program wllh high priority in naval planning. Likewise, every estimate distinctly made the point that our Information on the direction of Soviet basic research, the specific applications of broad technical programs, and lhe potential should one or mureignificantly deficient. Each paper further staled in equivalent terms,. work ondetection means was no! eatemive

*i IS. fiiiagiafili 7.

"Ulf.ol iugiapo 83

The Evidence

The estimates13 which deal with Soviet ASW. and the in let agency memotarsdurm mprnrting them, provide only the briefed tutorial of many acouilic and non acoustic detection principleshort reference to some Soviet woik In these fields. The impression lefton-technical reader isof Soviet dabbling in arcane arts which are tlraJained. technology, andild goose chase, with little motivation for u< to follow, given the tmall chance of lueccu opined hy the authors.

While the evidence il less than complete, there is inubstantial body of inlelligence on Soviet ASW HAD accumulated since about thei when evidenceajor thrusl In non-acoustic research

could be identified.

Thereumber of analyses of these activities some performed in CIA. mote in the Navy^

Jwas the firit extensive, in-depth, and technically broad examination of all aspects of Soviet ASW. It was done under Navy auspices and published rn4 This report should be required reading fur anyone seriously interested in the depth and breadth of Soviet work und the scope of their involvement and dedication to the solution of thc strategic ASW problem

A study on Soviet work in internal waves and surface wake phenomena of lubmarine* was published In6 by DIA. Tho work details thc extent of Soviet resource commitment lo this work and gives an overviewow classification level) of the technology involved. There are oridoubtadly similar studies which relate to Soviet work on magnetics, radar, electro-optics (includingnd nuclear energy Thereody of evidence in these areas


um. ieh the

estimates lend to indicate; rather there hai been a

limited capability in. intdligence community to undentand. analyze, and assess ll. Non-acoustic ASW hu> suffered (or lhe appellation of "unsound

asw: {_

^Hence the technical base from which to


judge Soviet intentions and progteii has been imaller and more limited lhan is desirable

Ano lysis/frsli mole

Even without access to the body of inlelligence availabler the opportunity to trace US intelligence progress In collection and analysis ilnce Jooe can make some rational assumptions and judgments basedeneral background and the references In lhe NIEs1

I. (and all non-Soviet) SSHNs is one of the highest priority national objectives of

strategic defensive planning and policy of the Soviet Union It would be totally uncharacteristic of the

Soviets and contrary lo evidence lo find otherwise.

he problem has been addressed since thehen our determination to proceed with Polaris and out success In mating weapon and platform became evident.

A major Soviet commitment lo non-acoustic research was made In lhe.

The Sovieti probably rtcognlicd their lag in acouitic technology lor low-frequency surveillance, quieting, and mobile tensors by at least the early tond certainly by the. Thisecision lo place greatest emphasis for research on non-acoustic metbodi. and to continue acoustic system developmentiower pace. In addition, the Soviet' have so farajor commitment to ASW systems based on LOEAft technology per ie.

Soviet investment inD has increased significantly over the pari ten years, and together with other spending for itrategic ASW,ubstantia) portion of the strategic defensive budget

Clven ihis extensive commitment of resources und the incomplete appreciation In the US of the full implications of many ot the technologies Involved, the absenceeployed system by this time Is difficult lo understand. Thc Implication could be that the Soviets have, in fact, deployed some operational non-acouilic systems and will deploy more in the next few years

Following this step in logic it ii both unprudent and illogical to eslimale no succesi ovei the next ten

years In programs of which wc haw so incomplete an understanding Technicaluchoubling ol detection ranges achievable by using airborne magnetic anomaly detectionile or more, (by means of an adaptationommercial magnetic radiometer, already achieved here) tend lo make the sweeping optimism of5 very difficult to Justify.


The very firmyear forecasts of Soviet ASW capabilities are uncharacteristic of national intelligence csiimatcs, which normally tend to hedge bets over the longer term. This is especially true of estimates of defensive capabilities which are perforce net assessments. Thc firm negative Judgment could well raise doubts among consumers whether it Is not affected by policy considerations, such as the desire to protect. SLBM program; the less obvious conjidcralion being support for the generalthat Ihe Soviets could never hope for militarily meaningful strategic nuclear superiority because they would always have toull SLBM strike. These doubts are reinforced rather than dispelled by the more detailed ticatmcnt of Soviel ASW efforts in the tent of the estimates.

A more definitive forecast of Sovietery thorough reviewass of pcrtinenl evidence, much of which the Navy (lor valid operaUonal reasons) strictly controls.eview should be carried out under national authority using scientific expertise of indisputable neutrality asthc mil come.

Untilhoroughgoing review has been accomplished we cannot with any assurance whatever forecast the probablllly or extent of success of Soviet ASW efforts. However, we are certain that these probabilities are not zero, as the current NIE implies-

BM ond Directed Energy

Estimo.ling History

Thc history of Soviet ABM esllmatei' has generally been characlerlzed by:appreciationigh level of Soviet Interest and effort, especially when seenomponent of lhe overall strategic air defense program;

" These estimaki *'we puteparate) on Soviet Strategic Detcntct unlil combined4 inlo Nib'eport*



projection duringf the possible deployment ol large numbers of ABMs;

continuing assessment o( greatly limited actual achievements and prospects for success (except (or thc early warning radar network);

controversy, somewhat muted in most receni years, over (lie potential and- inherent ABM capability of SAM.eneral NIEof such capabilities.

The conclusion of Ihe SALT ABM Treatythe subjective community disbelief InABM effectiveness to leadeneral conclusion that the Soviets had become "dissatisfied with lhe effectiveness of conventional ABM systems" and downgraded their programs' goals. Continuing Sovietecame seen largely taedge againsi treaty abrogation" (byrudent exploralion of alternative technologies.

Until recently there has been no estimating record on dueclcd energy programs. Recently Soviet RrkD programs in these areas have been included in Strategic Defense estimates or in one caseairly thorough special repofl (Interagency- Intelligence Report on Soviet Capabilities to Develop Strategic Laser Syslems..

Present Estimates ond Evidence

Thc ABM capability of those presently deployed syslems treated as ABM by the NIE seems to bc as strategically limited as concluded. That conclusion, however, does not extend to the overall impact of:

ABM potential in systems treated as "non-ABM" or "tactlcal-ABM";

ffort and prospects for improvement in ABM capabiliUes. bolh conventional and exotic:

ABM as one integral partombined damage limiting strategic defense.

5 touches upon all three areas, and gives considerable treatment and weight to the second, but reaches conclusions from the evidence available lhal unnecessarily discount or downgrade thc Soviet effort, wllhoul emphasizing what it hassincerelative. ABM efforts. The effectiveness of ABM. of course, cannot be assessed without direct comparison

offensive ballistic missile eapabililies, and it ii cleat that ibe judgments made ate implicit net assessments based upon high confidence in tee enduring penetrability of US MIRVs.


'lhe NIE conclusion lhal current Soviel SAMS "are not suitable" for ABM defense is eiplicilly rejected as regards 'heote by the Air Force Assistant Chief of Slaff for Intelligence. It is alsoonclusion accepted by many olher SAM-ABM experts, even though the NIE conclusion rests on currently deployed SAMs instead nf Improved or new generation SAM components. We know lhat SAM systems do inherently have ABM capability. The judgmental question is how significant or extensive is Ihis capability.V

]The ABM

capability, when related to other defensive means, may therefore be considerable. This Is especially possible when Soviet advances in what Is referred to as "tactical ABM" and in mobile radar components are taken into consideration. Mobile ABM systemcombined with thc deployed SAM syslem couldignificant ABM capability.


Thc NIE ambivalently concludes in one place lhal Ihc Soviets continue their ABM RADace not significantly reduced from thai which existed prior lo Ihe ABM Treaty" and in anotherrelatively slowowever one sorts oul these conclusions, neither gives adequate weight lo the vigorous and multi-facetedrogram covering both conventional and possible future ABM means. In tlie conventional ABM area, (he SALTrcatycan be taken as evidence of Soviet appreciation of Ihe potential ofBM talhcr lhan as loss of interest in ABM In fact, lhc continuing effort al SSMTC. the Ernba "tactical" system, thc emergence of new andradars and interceptor missiles, all strongly indicate continuing interest and progress. Theof the effort is In slark contrast lo that of.

In the more exotic areas of technology applicable to ABM il is more difficult Io evaluate progress, in no


small parinderstanding of the state of the art and near term prospects of directed energy Is fat from Complete and possibly noi as advanced as that ol thc Soviets, who. il is dear, have been conducting far more ambitioui research In ihese areas. Understanding that there are differing evaluations of Ihe potentialities of laser and CPB for ABM, tl is ttttl cleat that lhe SovieU haoe mountedorii In both areatagnitude that it is difficult lo overestimate. At least, ileasonablebased uponcnsc and vigor ofn Ihese areas that the Soviets attach greaterto eventual tuccesthorter period of time than doer the (AS.

Thc scale and scope of Sovietre too considerable to conclude loss of interest or to wtite them off as mere componentsore dynamic and highhilosophy (although they arc that also).

Strategic Defense

One of the problems with llie NIE approach is that even though the subject is Strategic Defense ll Is broken down into separate areas (ABM, Air Defense. ASW. ASAT. Civil Defense andach treated separately and in isolation from the others. What is then omitted is an assessment of present and potential Stralegic Defense capabilities combtninR all effortt. While it may be possible (though often erroneously, in our view) to disparage the effectiveness of each component of Strategic Defense taken scparalely, the combined and cumulative efforts may possess considerable strategic significance.

10. Soviel Non-Control Nuc'cor Systems

Estimating History

Coverage of the Etttmoles. Throughouts. discussion of most Soviet non-ceottal sysiems was Included in the NIE's on Strategic Atiackn

* Sovietation Foreei hi't revet bren dlscuoed. tie-pile iba (ad lhat that Include up-ordi of SW Badger andedium boratico ihese ire principally directed. Naval forces, although tame elements couU be rhilted to attacb on land latent, ihould the need ante The estimate on peripheral forces inotes lhal Nivil Aviation lorces may bt intended lot uie in the Imge-icale nonnutieu Biracl oo NATO's nudear loroo that is put of Suvlel plinnm' lor lhe earlyonvrnilonal war in Eurnpr.


stiinalc. medium bombers and MH/IHIIM (meet were relegatedeparate section on "Peripheralrareshadowlng their dtsapprar-ance dom8 teiia oi (be following rear

9 NIE alio relegated ill discussion nf the roughly GO Soviet cruise missile submarines equipped withaunchersootnole. Their syslems had been included ui earlier estimates, which had ftoled lhal one variant of thead been lested againsi land targets lo ranges of 4SO nm:56 NIE's evenap showing coverage olromthorn lineissile of this range8 NIE slated, however, that the use of this systemtrategic attack role wasonsidering the site of the Soviet ICBM force and the appearanceew SLBM (the Implied assumption being that this meant the Soviet Union had readied some level of "sufficiency").

By0 NIE, peripheral altack systems had been dropped entirely from6 series, and theit Ircatment relegated to other cslimate* (the hulk of them comingery little discussion was given of this change, which obscured fromery large number of Soviet ddivery vehicles, albeit older and less capable ones. Such reasoning as was given lo support lhe initial distinction between

"peripheral" and "Inlercontinental" attack. In9 NIE. represented unabashed mirror-Imaging:

"Thii method of treating Soviet forces is basically the

same as that being usedl>iliiary


The change of coverage thai began wiih0 estimate may have been intended to fit categories that would be more relevant to the SALT process then beginning If so. however, the approach would have to be faulted forundamental SALT issue, unresolved to this day, namely thc qucillon which systems ate la be considered "strategic" In the SALT tense.

By failing to present the Soviel view of their own penpherai attack systems in the contest of discussioni of strategic forces, lhe NIEs during lhc SALT period may have. perceptions of the FBS liiucisleading fashion. The strong Impression reportedly made on American negotiators when confronted by Btcxhnev with maps showing llie potential of. syitemi for attacking Ihe Soviet Union, mighl have been different had lhe

NIEi regularly contained maps showing rhe numbers and capabilities of Soviet peripheral systems

pioiecuom of numbeik. Tliris downgrading of Soviet peripheral altack systems had been lore shadowed in earlier years by projectionsharp dedine In numbers of these systems4 Estimateapid decline in LHA medium bombers'tankers from0 and continued reduction thereafter. (Aclualumbenn LRA. in addition lo moreadgrrs and Blinders inf which ate configured as bombers ot ASM carriers )

Tlir projection! in lhe Estimatci of thes ol relatively flat MH/IRBM numbers did not project thc deactivation of tomeaunchers in the Far Eait. However,5 projectionorceneriod,ong-term reduction on the low side which did not materialize (current force is

fV>iL> Syifenu The Estimates ofCO's tended to overestimate the rate of introduction of new medium range missiles.6 NIEew IRBM. possibly mobile, as early8 (but did no! predict Ihe capabilities of theMIRVed, large Ihrow-welghlappeared. TheRBM was never deployed In the "substantial numbers" predicted in9 NIE. Frequent dissents by AF Inlrlligrnce projecting thc appearanceollow-on medium bomberew ASM for the Badger as early0 were fundamentally more accurate Ihan the NIEthat no new medium bomber would appear.

Doctrine nnd Mtitkmi of Medium Systems.of thcisplay someover the difficulty of explaining the objectiveia massive peripheral attack fotce, whichbeen expected to decline at thegrew. The previous theory thatoor man's subslllule for thccapabilily the Soviet Union hadlost plausibiUty as the ICBM andparaded China

began to bc mentioned, even though most of thr foices In queslion are deployed against Europe and thc one notable diawdoion of peripheral forces wai in the Farhird explanation offered was lo refer lo earlier Kruuahchcv statrmer.ti about the need toultlpliclly of systems to eniuie

Tlie value ol large numben lot war fighting, oitrategic icscivc in an extended nucleai conllict, wai apparency nor considered, although lo do so would have raised Some interesting questions about thc objectives of Soviel longer-range systems as well. Instead, consideration of the close connectionsmedium-range forces and longer-range ones simply ceased with0 restructuring of the NIE.

There was much discussion in thc early NIEs of the question whether Sovicl medium bombers had the capability and/or mission for atlacks on tire United Slates. The majority (with the Air Force dissenting) generally concluded lhat there was insufficientof thc training in refueling or preparation for use of Arctic Bases such as were deemed necessary for missions against. targets. However, the majorily which held (he view thai medium bombers were intended for peripheral missions rarely elabo-raled on what those missionsn general, there was no mentionossible role for medium-range bomberseserve forcerotracted nuclear conflict.

Evidence/Ana lysis

Artificiality of Peripheral/IntercontinentalDespite the evident importance of systems clearly designed to attack the Uniied States, thc emphasis on these systems, and their abstraction from others, contributesisunderstanding of the Soviei view of strategic forces. It places lhe analysistrait-facket that does not fit the Russians' own organization of stralegic forces, distributed antong SRF, LRA, and the Navy, not betweenand peripheral.

Thc orientationigni(teanl portion of tlie Soviel ICBM force so that it can attack targets In Europe and China as well as thc United States reflects their basic view that the continuum of available forces should be usedlexible and coordinated fashion to achieve unilied slrategic objectives.**

" Tlie omtuion it mast tinting in lhe discussion ol Batlfire. whichvery linlc about the need far to tubiltntinl an imitate in Ihe pat-load i* rangr of Soviei priiphcral bomben, and fail entirely lo rlitriiu ihr iole of shorter-range aiioali (lite FENCER! innning the peripheral million In (ad. there it only one lenience oncllue in lhe rett ol NIEn Warsaw I'aet Fortes Opposite NATO. See alio abort, pp.

"f an iHganiialinnll nature pointingiviet rmrilmii on lhc iinllynm-lrai ttiikr fmn* camei fiomhint.Ihc mmrnoniililyUM am) ICHM aV-eliipuwnl Iirnc'si ins

Tlic impression derived from Soviet organization is reinforced by doctrinal writings which emphasize, indeed in tiresome detail. Ihe importance ofof all military arms.f


The evidence It clear that the strategic balance, in the Soviet view. Includes much more than those systems labeled "ttraleglc" In. defense budget. On the Western side, (hey include. and allied nudear delivery systems (beyond very short rangehis half of the equation has been pressed by thc Soviels at SALT. At the same lime, however, lhe Russians have attempted to reject thc relevance of their own massive non-central force capabilities by insisting that they could not strike the United States and were therefore nothis claim is factually Inaccurate, since many of these systems, such as medium bombers and long-range SLCM's can reach lhc United States. Moreit is ai variance with the actual Soviet view of nuclear forcesontinuum of capabilities which, if used, wouldingle strategiche political actpiicsccnce or military defeat of the Western Alliancc.

Current Soviet Buildup. While the decline in medium range forces projected by the NIE's In thes failed to materialize, there was In fact no large buildup of these forces during that time. Tills no longer holds true ofajor buildup has been underway. While much of this buildup comes under thc heading ofhc term is misleading for it suggests simple maintenance nl agmg or obsolescent forces. In fad, developments now underway will substantially Increase Soviet capabilities by:

Increasing nuclear ground attack capabilities, through the introduction of new tactical aircraft, particularly FENCER bul abo FITTER.ER and late model FISH BEDS. TheENCER, (very similar to thean


carry four0adiuind has tubtfari'nil- improved capabilities lot ixrielralinp NATO all defense*urrent production ofaitctall ai replace-menu for much leu capable tadical aircralt will greatly increase the number of sysiems available lo the Sovici! for attacking theater target* near lhe fronl. It will also add to their fleiibllily. including their capability for destroying western nuclear forceson-nudear phase of combat.

Substantially eilcndmg the range of peripheral attack systems with Backfire and theo cover larger surrounding land and ocean areas beyond the Eurasian land-mass.

Introducing qualitative improvements which have the effect of increasing quantitative

Jltackf ircubstantially larger payload than Ihe Badgers and Blinders, and will be significantly less vulnerable In air defenses.


Nudear operations on the periphery of (he Soviet Unionrucial importance In Soviet military-political doctrine. Singling out forces capable of damagingor separate andisleading Impression of Sovietobjectives Soviet writings it rets, for rumple, that "in the final analysis, the area and direction of the main attack andhould ensure achieving operation objectives pertaining to crushing thearmed forces and renioomg Individual countries or coalitions from thi war."*

Sovietfortes fit tntoan overall strategic framework in svhich thc value of forces, even for

deterrence, is measured by their potential contribution lo fighting andaiestern coalition Capabilities to attack US allies. lorces oveiieai are at important ai capabilities to attack Ihe United Slates itself In this framework, greater numbers arc always better, not merely to enhance survivability but for offensive use. to hedge against Inevitable uncertain lies of warfare and Iu provide reserves for an ci tended conflict

Current Soviet development, in peripheral attack capabilities indicate an intention lo weaken the second leg of thc NATO triad of conventional theater nudear and ihaiegk nudear forces With dear superiority in conventional forces and parity or better in intercontinental forces, the Soviets may now be seeking tu eliminate whatever remaining advantage NATO may possess in theater nuclear forces. Civen the political iin|<urtance of the "coupling". long-range nudear forces provided by NATO'i theater nudear capabilities, the Soviets must believe tSat important political benefits In Europe would flow from achievement of demonstrable ngtonal nudear preponderance.hii ir so. we may now be witnessing an evolution of theater nuclear forces that has cloie parallels to the evolution of Intercontinental forces In thes.

An additional concern arises from thetke Soviets of forces they describe aihave either the inherent capabtlily foroperations (as in tbe case of Backfire) orto be easily and quickly converteduse (as in the case of Ihehem thc flexibility to pose the threat lhalsituation demands at any given time.ofpin-

off from the SSrogram fust as SALT was getting serious,ossible deliberate Soviet conciu-that while SALT may tuntl slightly the rate of growth of their intercontinental capability, the effect af the limitations can be reduced by development of nun-limlted systems




be properly understood, (lie strategic objectives of the Soviel Union require,ealistic analysis of strategic nuclear force capabilities,careful monitoring of Soviet global activities: theoretical pronounce men tl of Communist leaden must be observed concurrently with Soviet actions in the military, political, and economic inheres in the various regions of thc globe; thc evidence thus obtained needi to be juxtaposed and synthesized Such monitoring and synthesizing is not dfectivdy realized at the present lime In. Government,here cxisti no document that provides an overview of Soviet "grandiven thc absencetudy of thii kind within. Government, thc best lhal can be done here is to provide an outline of some of the outstanding features of Soviel global strategy, especially as it bean on lhe United Stales

olitical ObfeehVw

The ultimate Soviet objective is (as it has been sincehc worldwide triumph ofy which is meant the csiabllihmentystem which can be best characteriiedegime of state capitalism administered exduilvely by aelite on the model of the Soviet Communist Party. Soiet leaden still strive forew global system, wholly integrated with the Soviet Union and directed from Moacow. fudging by pronouncements of leading Soviet theoriits. thii ideal continues toong-range objective However, the realities of an expanding Communist realm have induced the Soviet leaders to accept (at any rale, for the timeote limited and flexible formulation in which rhe USSR icmaini Ihe authority of last resort and the principal ptutcctor but no longer thc model which all Communist counlriri must undeviatingly



emulate. Thr East Berlin meeting ol Communist parties held InG ratified Ihis formulation; but only time will lell how willing (he Soviet elite It to grant non-Sovieteosure of political freedom

dherence to the historic idealorldwide Communist state and the steady growth of military confidence lhal lends Soviet policies lhal offensive character which is stressed in Part One of the present Report Not (he fear lhat "capitalism" will engage in an unprovoked assault against "socialism" but the desire steadily lo reduce the "capitalist" realm and still lo bc able tn deal with any possible backlash when it Is in Its death throes motivates Soviei political behavior.

The emergenceorldwide "socialist'" order is seen by (he Soviet leadershiponllnuoui process, inexorable In nature but not witbout iti pitfalls and tcmpotary reverses The ultimate triumph of the cause is seen as the result of economic, political and military processes which will bringerial ofin ihr itniclures of thc Western wotld ond end in their destruction. Once these condition! occur,Communist parlies, leading (lie disuffectedand backed by Soviet power, are expected lo be able lo assume control.

As noted, this historic process Is perceived ai occurring concurrently (though not necessarilyyrichronized manner) at all levels Green thit view. (Ommuniil "grandequiresariety of weapons be utilized to stimulate (he process of Western decline andeize sudi opportunities as may present themselves while il Is in progress Thus, for example, thelose Sovietllei with Third World countries or Soviet direct or indirect involvement in these countries can help (o

weaken (lie links connecting "capitalist" economics with their essential sources of taw materials and cheap laboi. and thereby help to accelerate "capitalism's" ceonunuc decline. Communist parlies operating In thct" world can help organize disaffected groups of all kinds and with their assistanceorderly democratic processes; or else, where Ihey aie too weak to undertake such ambitious attempts, they can seek lo have their members or sympathizers occupy key positions in Ihe trade unions, government or academic centers so as to beosition to paralyze Industrial economies and democraticat the appropriate lime Violently discontented ethnic groups, such as the Palestinians, can be taken under Soviet wings and encouraged to promote conditions of permanent turmoil over large geographic areas.

In other words, strategicas weapons capable of destroying an enemy's capacity loIn the Sooleireater range of irislrumentalitlei of persuasion and coercion lhan is commonly dealt witk In Western stralegic analyses. The Soviet objective is an international system totally responsiveoviet mandate. Inystem an antagonists military eapabililies must be effectively neutralized so that they cannot be used lo resist Soviet aspirations If necessary, ultimately the Soviet Union should be able to destory those capabilities if the antagonist icfuses lo acquiesce. But this is not all. Because tlie Soviet Onion ultimately wishes to destroy not merely Us opponents' fighting capacity but their very capacity to function os organized political, social, and economic entitles, itt strategic arsenalreat choice of political, social, and economic weapons beside the oboiout military ones, for this reason, Soviet strategic objec-titles cannot be accurately ascertained andby an examination of the USSR's strategic nuclear or general purpose forces alone. Indeed, even an undemanding of Uiete military forces requtret an appreciation of the leverage they can provide to attain economic and political objectives. "Power" In the Soviet stralegic understanding is perceived not merely as serving specific objectives (for example,but as negating the enemy's ability to tutotoe. The grasp of this fact is fundameiual for llie understanding of Soviet strategy and Soviet strategic objectives.

In the dualism "socialisi-capitalist" whichSoviet thinking much as lhc dualism "good-evil"

did ihai of Manichcanism, lhe United Slatespecial place. It is seen by llussia as the "citadel" of thc enemy camp, thc main redoubt without the final reduction of which thc historic struggle cannoi be won no mailer how many victories are gained on peripheral fronts. By virtue of its immense productive Capacity (and the resultant military potents wealth, prestige, its example and moral leadeiship. and- -lasl hut notstockpile of strategic nuclear weapons, the Uniled Stales is perceived as thc keystone of Ihe whole syslem whose demiserecondition lo lhe attainment of Communism's ultimate goal.

As seen from Moscow, thc United States is somethingaradox in thatt one and the same time both exceedingly strong and exceedingly weak. Its slrenglh derives primarily fiom Its unique productive capacity and the technological leadeiship which give il the capacity toilitary capability of great sophat Ion, dangerous to Soviet global ambitions. Bui the United States is abo seen as piesently lacking in poliiical will and discipline, unable to mobilize its population and resourcesustained struggle foi worid leadership, and devoid of clear national objectives. This assessment has led thc Soviet Union toarticular strategyis the United States which, under thc name first of "peaceful coexistence" and thenas dominated its iclations with the United States (except when overshadowed by immediate crisis situationsuba2 and Czechoslovakiaver Ihe past Iwo decades.

America's strategic nuclear capacity callsautious Soviet external policy, wherever. enjoys an advantage or may resolutely resist, at any rate untilime as the Soviet Union will liaveecisive military edge. Not only do direct miliiary confrontationshreat to the Soviet homeland, but they also tend to feed America's anxieties aboul the Soviet Union and thus loigh level of military preparedness. An intelligent poliiical Soviet posture toward the Uniled States requires lhe allaying ofiter's fearsoviet threat. (Which does not mean, however, that USSR svill hesitate to engage in direct confrontation if they deem it essential to achieve important nationalconomic relations ought to be utilized so as to cicate within the American business community influential sources of support for collaboration wiih (he USSR. Cultural and scientific tics ought to be

exploited so as to neutralize anti-Communist senti-mpnn in the intellectual community. Encouragement ought to he extended to those American political groupings and lo those oiTice-holdcrs and office-seekers who favor better relations with the Soviet Union. The effect ofolicy of "detente" is expected toeduction In the influence of those elements. society which desire greater miliiary preparedness and. resultingeakening of the United States precisely in (hat sphere where lies its particular strength.olicy, furthermore, may bring the Soviet Union valuable additional benelits.esull of closer economic and scientific links with the United States, the Soviet Union can expect lo acquire capital and technology with which to modernize Its economy, and in this manner to improve the quality of Us military industries.

Soviet motivations for Stralegic Arms Limitation Talks should be seen in the same way: They are means to further unilateral advantages instrumental to the continued shift of the strategic balance and to the realixalion of political gains from thc shifting conda-tion ol forces. SALT and the limitations it produces arc seen as means of. political and miliiary responses to Ihc changing balance of forces. Agreements inconsistent with these ends or agreements that would restrict Soviet ability to further them are unacceptable Thc perception lhal there is any tendon between Soviet interest in SALT and Soviei strategic programsundamental misunderstanding of the Soviet approach to SALT, and of the types of "reslrictions" thai can be expected from SALT agreements at the present lime.

At the same time, however, as provocations of thc Uniied States are avoided and economic, cultural and political contacts wiih it exploited, nothing must be done that mighl slacken the global advance against thc "capitalist" order of which thc same United States is thc principal prolagonisl. It appears lhat the intermediate Soviet stralegic obfecllve Is to the greatest extent possible to isolate die United States from both its allies and lhc neutral countries of thc Third World. This objective can be attained In several ways-

(I) As concerns America's allies: The most important of these arc the countries of Western Europe combined in NATO followed by Japan, in thc Far East. In respect to theserimary

Soviet objective is toedge between ihem and the United Slates The separation of Europe from the Uniied Stales can be attemptedariety of means: establishing on Europe's easternilitary lorce of such overwhelming preponderance that icslslanec to it will appear futile and the continuation of NATO noi only pointless but dangerous; making Western Europe increasingly dependent economically on Ihc USSR by incurring heavy debls ihete, entering with if into all sorts of long-term cooperative arrangements, and supplying an increasing share of Western Europe's energy needs; insisting on thc parlidpation of Communist parties in nationalarousing doubts in Western Europe about. commitments to ils defense; and so forth. This objective undoubtedly enjoys very high priority in Russia's strategic thinking. Severance of Western Euiope from the United Stales would reduce any military threat or opposition from that area as well as deprive. of its European forward bases, eventually bringing Europe's immense productive capacities within the Soviet orbit, thus making the "socialist" camp equal If noi superior to. in economic (and, by implicalion. militaty) productive capacities.

s concerns the Third World; Here the stress is on political and economic measures, backed with military means. The Soviet Union strives to sever thc links connecting thc Third Worid with thecamp, and especially the Uniied Stales, by:

supporting those political groupings and bureaucracies which tend to identify themselves with polidcs of nationalizing private enterprises and which broadly back Soviet international policies;

working to undercut such privatesectors as exist In the underdeveloped countries, and eliminating the Influence of multi-national corporations;

reorienting these economies to theextent possible toward the Soviet Union by means of military assistance programs, economic aid. loans, etc;

building interlocking networks of base, oveiflight. military and logistic agreements etc. which permit the use of surrogate forces. North Koreans or Cubans) for thc purpose of conducting military operations so as to outflank positions important lo thet .


(e) through the creation of voting blocs of Third World countries in the United Nations and its agencies lo isolate the United States bom ihem.

n its relations with China, the Soviet leadership has as ils main immediate goal access to Chinese internal poliiical developmentsiew to influencing long range Chinese orientationirection consistent with its view of 'Communis! inter nationalism" To support such an evolution andedge againsi failure in achievinguture orientation, they intend lo be able lo tace China wiih preponderant military (orce even in (he contingency of military confrontation with the US. and if possible and necessary, with political and military

While seeking Io Isolate the United Slates,the Western camp, and contain China, the Soviel Union is concuncntly Hrtving to maintain and strengthen the grip on Its own camp Three principal policies have been initialed toward that end:

Economic integration through lhe so-called "complex plan" adopted by Comecon under strong Soviet pressure1 and now in lhe process of implementation Tbe "'complea plan*ong-lerm undertaking which strives to transform tbe separate "socialist" economiesingle supra-nalional economic system wiih an internal "division ofnvestments, labor, research and development are to be shared in common. Civen the Soviel Unions economic preponderance, not to speak of ils political and milegemony wilhin the Communist Bloc, there can be little doubt that If it is evet fully carried oul. the "complex plan" will give Ihe USSR decisive conlrol over lhe other "socialist"economies as well as over those countries which, through Soviet aid, are being drawn within the orbit of Comecon.

Political arid military integration, both of which lhe USSR ii ptestlng on the other "socialist" countries Eiamplr* ol such pressures are attempts to amend the constitutions of lhe "Peoples' Republics" so ai to assign lhc Soviet Union special status in their internal and external relatiom, hints of the Deed to bringloser political union between the "Peoples' Democracies" and lhe USSR, lhe Soviet effort to compel Ihese republics to accept the principle that in casear between Ihe USSR and China, Ihey will be obliged lo comehe aid of lhc Soviet Union: nnd recent decisions (made mainly for military

reasons) to Integrate Ihc Enil European highway and railway networks with ihose of the Soviet Union.

he enunciationoctrine, called lhc "Brexhnev Doctrine" In the West ond "proletarian internationalism" in lhe Soviet Union, which makes ilightuly of lhe "socialist camp" lo see to il (by military means, if ncceiuiy) thai no country which had oocc made the transition from' to "socialism" ever slides back and opts oul of the "socialist bloc "

AI Ihis point, stress mult be laid once again (as had been done in llie Foreword to ihis Report) lhat toe ere mating no attempt to axicii the prorntoiflly of the Soviet Union attaining Iu strategic obfecttoei. There is, Inreat deal of evidence lhal the USSR is tunning Into many difficulties wiih theof ils policies, and that (he record nl its grand strategy is often spotty. Thc evidence, however, supports lhe contention that lhe above are, indeed, Soviet objectives

ilitary Objectives

1st this global strategy, miliiary power. Including strategic nuclear weapons,btinct role to play. The Soviet Union, to an cuent inconceivable to the average Westerner, rehca on forcetandard instrument of policy.hiough force that the Communist regime first came to power, dispersed all opponents of its dictatorship, deprived the peasantry of its land, and established near-total control of the country, ll is thiough military power lhal it defeated lhe Nuri attempt io subjugate Russia, and it is through the some means that ll subsequentlyhalf of Europe and compelled the world to acknowledge itt is through sheer force that il maintains In lhe USSR Its monopoly on authority and wealth. One may say lhal power In all Its forms, but especially In Its military aspect, has been the single most successful instrument of Communist policy, supplanting both ideology and economic planning on which the Soviet regime hod originally eipected lo reJy for the spread of uihus.

* It Bpn!ctU> Inn. af owu, (haieat lam uitki.ii cr atUiiUaj and coeioMaliitf pollliralot ion lined to Soviet tUmia. being common in other parti at lha wodd alincluding theHnwevei.airier unique lo Soviethai here no terrain itMmrM hai been made In th*reads! thi! haw. elapied lioce ihr coup d'etal ol7 la gioundore iiahtt foundation In which la- and popular enment would pl*rilgnilleant mle



regime hataluial predisposition ro look to iwvver. particularly in Its moil visible and readily applicable modes, as an inUmmmi of policy, whether internal ot eilernal Thb is the arena whete it enjoys tome decuivr advantages over free societies, in that it can spend money on armaments without worrying about public opinion and mobilize at will its human and material rcsouices. Militarism it deeply ingrained in the Sovicl system andentral role in Ihe mentality of ih elite

One of Ihe outitanding qualities of Snvir: military theory and practice is stress on Ihe needreat choice of options This characteristic Is to be seen in thc broad spectrum of weapons in the arsenal of Soviet "grand stiategy" as well ai In lhc variety ol military wcaponi which Russia produces. It would be quite contrary to Ingrained habits (or thr Soviet elite to place reliance on any single weapon,eapon as potent as the strategic nudear one. Its natural inclination is to secure the maximum possible variety of military options fot any contingencies that may arise, all batedeal war fighting capability, and thus both lo produceighroad range of arms and to accumulate stockpiles of weapons, old and new. This tendency alone militates against thc USSRtrategic policy that would place ultimate relianceingle deterrent ordeterrence only" strategic pott uie. One of the fundamental differences. and Soviet strategic thought has been the rejection in Soviet doctrine and strategy of such concepts as mutual assured destruction, the underlying logic of which ii lhat if deterrence fails neither side can hope touclear war. Ralhcr, the main lluuit of Soviet doctrine has been that in (he eventailure of deterrence, war-winning and national survivalcan be improved by having in rradioes! balanced forces superior to those of ihr adversary, together with an effective dvil defense system.

Thc USSR can be expected to continue pressing forward with large-scale diverse military programsroad front, ony one of which mighl be regarded as containable by the West, but the cumulative effects of which may welt be far more significant

We do know thai duringremiership (hereebate about the fundamentals of Soviet miliiary doctrine, and in particular about (he impact of nuclear weapons on doctrine. Khrushchev himsell apparentlyragmatic examina-

tion of thc prevalent Western view thai the destruc-tiveness of nuclear weapons had altrtrd tlie nature of war lo (he talent thai deterrence of war rather ihan wat-lighting capabilities should determine military policy. This view challenged thc fundamental Marx-Ist-Ieninisl tenet drawn from Clautcwilr lhal "war Is an extension of politics by othercceptance ol the Western deterrence Iheory would havethc baric Morxist-Communitt view lhat the capitalist world In Its "death throes" ii certain to lash out in war at the Com mount camp

This flirtation with Western concepts of deterrence wasn era of. strategic superiority over thc USSR Eventually, the debate, which seems to have lasted unlil at least the mid- IQGOi. was settled in favor of the adherents ofhe notion that stralegic nuclear weapons had madr general war mutually suicidal came lo be denounced as heretical: (he new doctrine declareduclear war could be waged and woo The view which prevailed holds thateneral war "victory" will mean thc triumph of Soviet military and political control over the world that emerges from ihe devastating conflict. (Within this framewoik, limiting civilian damage to lhe USSR is Important nut only as an end In Itself but In relation lo preserving lhe poit-war poll Ileal-economic power of the Soviei Union: hence, protection of the key cadtes is of particulareneral nuclear war was still lo be avended if at all possible, which meant that other weapons in the Sovietmilitary, polilical economic,preferable instrumcnlsupport policy goals, with Soviet strategic nudeai weapons inhibiting Western

The key decision adopted sometime Ins seems Io have had as one of its consequences (he effort to build up all the branches of the militaryconventional,(he point where the Soviet Union could both confidently confront any possible liostile coalition raised againsi itlno-Amcrican alliance) and project its power in any region of the world where suitable opporfurillics might arise,

Since that time on intensified miliiary effort has been under way designed to provide (he Soviet Union with nuclear at icell at conventional tupenoritu both in itiategic ferret foi trUcretmbnenteJ conflict and theater or regional forcei. While hoping lo crush lherealm by other than military means, tlie

Sooiei Union is nevertheless preparinghird Wodd War asere unavoidable. Thc pace ol lhc Soviet armament effort in all fields iienainhj exceeds any lequlremenl for mutualThc continuing buildup of thc Warsaw Pact forces bears no visible relationship to any plausible NATO threal. it can belter be interpreted in terms of intimidation or conquest. The rapid growth of lhe Soviet Navy alio seems to be connected more with the desire lohreat than merely to defend thc Soviet homeland. Intensive research and/or testing in Ihc fields of Anli-Suhmarine Warfare. Anti-BallUlie Missiles. Anti-Satellite weapons, as described in Part Two of this report, all point in the same direction. So do the massive Soviet civil defense and hardening programs. And so does the high proportion of the national budget devoted lo direct militaryThe intensity and scope of the current Soviet military effort in peacetime is without parallel iu twentieth century history, its only counterpart being Naz: remilitarization of lhc ISSO's.

Short of war. the ulilily of an overwhelming miliiary power for Moscow may be described a* Follows:

l enables the USSR tonited States (andhinese orChinese) effort to compel the Soviet Union to alter any ol ils policies under thc threatudear attack.

If accords the Soviet Union "super-power" status which il interprels to mean that no significant decisions can be taken In any part ol the world wiihoui its participation and consent:

ll imimidales smaller powers, especially those located adjacent to Ihe USSR, making them more pliant to Soviet wishes. Judging by theirH appears that some highly placed Soviel leaders believe lhat even. acceptance ol detente ultimately resultedecognition of the Soviet capacity In intimidate.

It will in lime give thc Soviet Union Ihe capacity to project lis power lo those parts ol the world where pro-Soviet lorces have an opportunity In seize power but are unable to do so without outside military help;

Itource of Influence on countries which purchase or receive surplus Soviet arms, as well as ol hard currency earnings;

t is an instrument by means of which, in lhe decisive moment in the sltuggle for world hegemony, the retaliatory power of thc United Slates can be preventively neutralized, or. if necessary, actively broken.

Militaiy power has for the Soviet Union so many uses and it is so essential lo ils global sitategy lhat the intensity and scope of its military buildup should nothe least surprising.


Thc principal Soviet strategic objectives in the broadest sense may be defined as follows: Break up the "capitalist" camp by isolating thc United States, its backbone, from NATO and the Third World; undermine further the disintegrating "capitalist" realm by promoting and exploiting such economic, political, and social crises as mayoccur in it over lime; solidify thc "socialist" camp and Russia's conlrol over it; contain China; and all the time continue buildingilitary force of such overwhelming might that il can in due lime cany out any global missions required of it by Soviet policies.

In lhc more narrow sense of strategic objectives used byhe scope and rigor of Soviet programs, supported by identifiable doctrinalleave little reasonable doubt that Soviet leaders are determined to achieve the maximum attainable measure of strategic superiority overuperiority which provides conservative hedges against unpredictable wattimc contingencies; which is unit-slialned by concepts of "how mudi isnd which is measured not In Western assured destruction teirns but rather in leims of war-fighting objectives of achieving posl-war dominance and limiting damage lo Ihc maximum extent possible. We believe lhat Soviet leaders, supported by internal political factors that assign the highest resource piiorily to the militaiy.igh priority on the attainmentuperiority lhat would deny. effective retaliatory optionsuclear atiack. Short of lhat. the Soviets intend toubstantial enough strategic nudear-warfighting advantage lo be able lo bring their local military advantages In bothand nudear forces to bear without fear of aescalation.

The question of lhc cxienl to which such goals remain mere long term aspirations or hare become

and cuttenf objectives, as well at lhe question of timing, Inevitably arise, ll was pointed out tn ihe Introduction that Team "B" focused on Soviet ttialegicithout trying lo evaluate iheii chances for succcti. since lhe latter wouldet assessment which exceeds the icopc of this effort. However, the learn recognizes the overwhelming gravity of this question Evenet astess-ment. lhe team beJievei thatovMble. relying on the evidence available in Soviet pronouncementt and In Ihe physical data, to reach some judgments ai tn how the liussian leaders assets iheir chances ol success.

The breadth and intensity of Soviet military programs, statement! by Soviet leaders to internal audiences, available Soviet literature, and the growing confidence of Soviet global bchavioi, all lead ui lo

conclude lhat in Sooiei perceptions the gap between totXg M'HI aspirations aivl short-term objectives is closing This probably rneam that llie Soviet leaders believe that iheir ultimate objectives are closet to realization today than ihey have ever been before Within the Un year period of the National Estimate ihr Sovieis may well eipect toegree of military superiority which would permit amore aggressive pursuit of (Art/ hegemonwl oblecllots, including direct military challenges lo Weslem vital interests, in the belief lhal such superiorrce can pressure the West to acquiesce or. if not. can be used toilitary contest al any level. The actions taken by Ihc West lo develop lis political cohesion and military strength will be ctltlcal in determining whether, how, and when the Soviet* ptess to such conclusion.


Tup SlWl






Nalional estimates on Soviel ft rat eric nuclear forces2 have been based not only on observed Soviet programs but alto on assessments of Soviet stralegic policy, motivations, and objectives While proper, and certainly necessary at least to mid-to-long range proiections, Ihese aueisments hovebeen ethnocentric.nd reflec-more. policies and motives than of Soviel. As such they seem to have bren fundamentally responsible for consistent understatements of Soviet strategic goals These basically political assessments have been far more Optimistic than subsequent developments provedtheir were more pessimistic interpretations occasionally contained Incan bc orgued that they were more optimistic than warranted by available contemporary evidence, frequently, the political assessments appear to have been little more Ihan articles of faith and statements ol preference, which tended to persist even In the face of developments that should have invalidated them (eg. tbe attribution to the Soviets of American arms control and assuredlogic arid objectives, which flnl appeared in. can be found muraiii mutandis, throughnd even up to

onjectured lhal the Soviels were guhled by "no well-defined strategicere "willing toondition of limited mtcrcontin-ental capabilities and coniidnabie vulnerabilityong period ofnd wereeeking lo malch the United Slates In numbers of delivery vehicles" or contemplating forces to. strategic lorces' In addition, for thc first time, apparently American strategic aims control thinking infiltrated Ihc Eilimalc It was suggested thai Ihe



Soviets mighl be inter citedn lei nationalto limit or reverse the armshile "in (he absence of an arms limitation agreeonly in the absence ofSoviets will continue improving their capabilities, buloderate

eiterated: "Wcdonol believe thai lhe USSH aims almatchlng Ihe Uniied States in numbers of intercontinental deliveryn fact, the Estimate actually "ruled out (hbn the basis of economic constraints, concern over provoking (he US. to new efforts, and lack of firm strategic objectives in the direction of parity with.onsequence, the Estimate, even though notinghird generation of Soviet ICBMi had been flight tested since3ew SSBN under conitruction had appeared al Severodvinsk, did no) lorecasi any very large scale or determined buildup of Soviet ttratcglc forces.

These conclusions prevailed in the neat two annual Estimates, asemarkable convection that lhe Soviets had no mid-to-long range force goals

"The Soviet planners themselves may not yel have set clear force goals foreriod

"The major difference (from (he Khrushchev era) in tlic coming period may be the inabilityollective leadership loew course.

Even as il was necessary to revise force level projections upward in the face of continuing Soviel

*. raragraeai tt

". Paragraph R

Nit:s. p. i.


const iu ct ion programs, the estimatorsof US assured destruction and arms race-arms control logic combined with insistence upon social-economic constraints on military programs lo bias the Estimates. Whatever the strengthening of Soviet lorces. it was consistently maintained lhat the Soviets would "continue to adhere to the concepteterrentnd Soviel objectives were cast in thc Western termsetaliatory assured destruction force: thc Soviets wereetaliatoryto "assure lhe destructionignificant portion. Industrial resources and population.Arms race" logic popular within. Administtalion at lhal lime governed thc Estimates: The Soviets were al the same time rcaciionaliy motivated.hc. ICBM force almost certainlythc USSR to Increase Ils force,. deployment of ballistic missile defenses might incline them toward even higherndby fear of an arms race (the Soviets "would probably judge that if they appeared to be acquiring as many ICBMs as. they' would simplyurther armshe net outcome of that inconsistency was the judgement that thc Soviets were seeking neither superiority nor parity. Only an Air Force footnote forecastosture of strategic inferiorityis.etermination to eliminate such

, afler Ihe numbers of operational Soviet ICBM launchers had tripled in only two years and the production of lhe Yankee SSBN was clear, the estimators revised Soviet goab somewhat andto thc Soviets thc objective of "narrowing lhe lead that. has held" in strategic offensive forces.The Soviets might seek an advantage overn stralegic foices. if they believed it wcie possible,following mutual assuied dcstiuction and mutual deterrencewas clearly noi believed likely.

ere thc tint Estimates slrongly influenced. SALT rationale and aspirations, to the point of becoming rationalizations for SALT. With Soviet ICBM launchers approaching

. i>. faiaeraphIbid,. foocnole.



U.S. numerical levels.redicted that "the Sovicls will shortly overcome. lead in numbers of ICBMnotut concern over an uncertain future and continued aims competition would lead lhe Soviet Union to arms limitation agreements, as would their reasoning "lhat further increments to Iheir strategic foices would have Utile effect on lhe relalionship bclween. and thche Estimate openlyase foi Soviet interest in arms limitation agreements designed to end the "armsoncluding that "they are evidently interested in strategic arms, conlrol as an option thai could conserve economic resources. Only falling such an agreemenl would the Soviets conlinuc lo build up strategically: "In lhe absence of an arms control agreement, we believe that they will continue the arms competition withven in that event, however. Soviet strategic goals would be limited by (Mutual Assured Destruction) MAD realities. The estimators considered it "highly unlikely" that the Soviets would "try for stralegic superiority of such an order that It could be translated into significant political gain.Such anthe Soviets would recognize, would bewould involve unacceptable economic sacrifices, and "would almost certainly. reaction.

Only the possibility of superiority for political advantage was considered by the Estimates (andhe possibility of superiority for military advantage, andapability to. ictaliation lo "tolerableas dismissed oul of hand as absolutely "not feasible"

Now, however,utualparity became llie reality, the ultimate Soviet goal, and not undesirablelegitimized and preserved through SALT. Soviet willingness lo enter

M,.. I. Paragraph B

. I. Paragraph A.

fW, p.aragraph fl.

. Paragraph a.

One other. which ed by

inn <il SALT and SALT limitations, -ai that it wai ihe firsl NIK na itntccicto drop MR/lRBMi and Badgeo-Blmden Irnm Snregle Am ad. forces. Ilmlilng Forces for Intercontinental Allae* in ICDM. SLBM. aod heavyurn around bom raider eslinialei ro this teiin which defined the luhjecl forces oi


SALT was taken a* evidence of SALT Interest! similar to those uf. That ihe Soviets might view SALT differently wai not oven given teiious consideration:

"Mnieow'i willingnest lo discusi strategic arms control probahly reflects thr view thai it has attained or is in the process of attaining an acceptable stiategie relationship with. Moreover. Moscow may believe lhal even if an agreement could not lie rrached. nrgotiatiom would have the eflect of damping downim race, perhapsonudeiabir lime""

"If forces on both udct could be maintained al something like preseni Irvrli.olicy mighl he attractive lo lhe

BUT: "In Ihe iihiencc of an arms control agreemenl, Moscow will almost certainlylo strengthen Iti stiategie

This sentiment was reinforced.. both of which argued lhal the Soviets wanted merely to haveense of equal security" which would be satisfied with "roughr of their recent strategic lorce buildup, now at handuch of it from the SALT*)

indicates thai "the Soviet leaders think they have now

achieved that position, or are about to achieve it."

and are consequently "seriously interested"ALT

agreement to preserve ll

"It has been evident for tome time (sic) that an important Soviet objective has beenosition of acknowledged strategic parity wiih. Soviet acceptance of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) wasin part to. recognition of thb

The Estimates were so confident in the assignation of this goal that they slaied that the reasons for thr Soviet buildup are "neither eomplei norparity with the US Not to make war. orecure objectives through pressure backed byrevels ol nucleai force, but to be equal and to deter. Evenuggested thai that objective may have come about willy-nilly through pluralistic

li-.. . T. raaaajnata. Paragraph II

. Paragraph 7.

p IS-tU. Paragraphp s. Paragraph M

bureaucratic happenstance. "Wc think it unlikely lhat observed Soviet programs arc thc productarefully though) oul strategy orhai thc Soviet leaders mighl bc determined to achieve strategic superiority over thc US or might even considereasible objective, was explicitly pooh-ponhed Constraints, including ecooomic constraints and fear of an arms race, were again emphasized.

as lhe first SALT-Agreasssent-NIE: The agreements, il announced, "have profoundheyewfter repeating verbatim the statements of the preceding NIE. noted above, and emphaiizing again the putative constraints on lhe USSH. thr SALTwere cited as constraints as wed as faithful reflections of Soviet limited strategic objectives:

"hi the context of artni control, other pressures for moderation will be at work

The SAL agrcemcnli have been hailed in the USSHuccessful manifestation of the current Soviet policy of detente, consequently there will be incentivet lo avoid oclioru which, though not actually isolating the egret menu,Emphasis added.)"

"Any step which mighthreat toihe NIE confidently asserted, would disturb the personal stake (hai Soviet leaders "most notably Urezhnev" have In (he agreements.

Dy, In contrast to earlier suggestions rhat Soviet strategic offensive force programs lacked coherent direction, other than perhaps to attain rough parity in retaliatory capability, the breadth and intensity ofto anthat "Ihe present Soviet effort involves more than can be readily eiplained as merely trying lo keep

up with theIn Ibe SALT frame

work, moreover, it was pointed out that the new famities of programs were "conceived long before the Interim Agreement wat signed Inhc Soviets were clearly not ercrciiing the care not lo disturb (he agreements formerly predicted.lhe continuation of mutual deterrence, detente. and SALT thinking in the Estimate produced

NIE.aragi.pfc P.

TLp B. Ciraf uph U.

". p. 3.

p I

am hi valence: On the one hand, hope: Thc continued Soviet buildup "is not ye! irreversible, and the Soviets may prove willing tn accept some curb* on It within Ihc broader contot of their detenten the other hand, concern; "they have shown littlelo eiercise volunlaty restraint.""

As fo Soviet strategic goals, despite explicitof pursuit of greater throw weight, numbers of RVs, and counter-force capabilities, assuredlogic continued to prevail. Not only was It judged (Red/Blue implicit net assessment) lhal "under no foreseeable circumstances in lhe nexlemphasis added) could Ihc Soviets develop lhe ability lo reduce damage In themselves to acceptable levels, but Soviel programs were also explained largely in Ihe framework of retaliatory assured destructionncreased concern for retaliatory force survivability) and equal security objectives. Soviet Incentives lo press on broadly with improved weapons sysiems derived from "compcling drives" of internal politics, from "concern wiih being accepted as at least the 'tralcgic equal ofnd from "genuine concern thai the USSR could fall behindF.ven if Ihe Soviet leaders fell that they couldead in static measures of stralegic power Ihis would convey an image of marginal superinrity only In "those who ascribe highIn theseNot very important, hy implication )

That lhc Soviets might have entirely different stralegic goals and concepts was not seriouslydespite doctrinal and program evidence strongly supportingroposition.

By this point nf lime the breadth of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM effort was wellvigorous and costly buildup of the various elements of their forces for intercontinentalwas lhe rapid qualitative Improvement of theselhe exception nf continuedof thc progress made in improving the accuracies nf these missiles. (For thendee *'B" Team report Soviet ICBM Accuracy: An Alternative



'amrrjphW. pp.


NIK>j-WjiiIi ll

irst noled lhe appearance Of follow-on ICBMs to thendnd the appearance of the Delta SSBN carrying theut placed the development of MIRVs atears away.

What is noteworthy is the continued absence of recognition of Soviet strategic counteiforee emphasis and aspirations. Il is curious thai, despite all of the emphasis placed on throw weight in lhe context of SALT preparations and by the Department of Defense (even in unclassified SEC DEFo point is'made of Soviet throw weight evennd no lelalion is made between lhat capability and the direction of qualitative improvements to draw counteiforee implications. While the estimated RV weights are noted, and thc possible throw weight of the new large missile Is suggested in supporting analysis, no emphasis whatsoever is given to throw weight or to counlerforce aims.

oted thc throw weights estimated for (he new ICBMs and observes thai each has subslanttolly more throw welghl than the missile il will replace but no particular emphasis Is given to this.robable Soviet desire to improve hard target counterforce capabilities Is noted, barely, in passing, in no sense Is that registered as among major objectives. Soviet programs continue to be presented in Western "mirror-Image" terms, such as "increased concern for Ihe survivability" of retaliatory forces. The major leasons given for the Soviets pressing ahead simultaneouslyroad front of stralegic force programs are:

"lo accommodate competing drives within Ihe parly leadership and military and defenseministries and lo overcome reservations about arms control"*

"genuine concern that Ihc USSR could fall behind strategically or lose some of its own bargaining leverage if il failed fully lo hold up its side of Ihc strategic competition""

That the Soviets might have strategic objectives more sinister than "comprehensive equality withnd perhaps "some degree of. behavior permits" is noi in the slightest

* 70

". riraEriph 71

degreen facf il is suggested thai "tlie need to maintain the present level ol economic commitment to slrategic forces may appear less pressing in Ihend; "How far the Soviets will go In carrying out these lines o( development will depend in the lirsl instance on the SALT II negotiations."'"

For the first time, tlieVolumeaises more ominous possible direclions lor the Soviel strategic altack force program (not. however, for the strategic defensiveoviel forces have moved and thc "well beyond the minimumofapabilily of the Soviet ICBM force to. Minuteman "is growing. It will probablyajor threat in the" Despite that, the net auetsment. both politically and militarily,omfortablemore comfortable than the hard evidence contained in the NIE warrants. Part of the reason for this lies in implicit assessments of Blue capabilities, part, in treating the matter in an assured-destruction-only framework (and discounting civil defense in thatnd part in continuing to sec basic Soviet motivations, objectives, and logic in American terms. (For specific examples, see the supporting "It" Team topical papers.

The Soviets would try to achieveirst strike capabilily, "If ihey thought they could achieveul "toe do not belleoe" they believe it. While some measure of


. ParagiBph 2.

. 2.

strategic superiority, "which has some visible and theeefom politically use/ut advantages' (emphasisacknowledgement ol such advantagelrateglc loicend which might even give the Soviets "belter capabilities than. touclearovietin fact comparatively niodrsl. and heavily influenced bybe NIE makes lhe Judgement that these objectives willALT TWOot achieved'" (At thb point the NIE hecomei asiiperflcial apologia for SALT II as an inielligence estimate on Soviet forces. The forces the Soviets would regard as adequateALTgtcemcnt are Ireated as much different from, and are controlled with, thoie they would pursue in absence of an agreement)

Finally, in any case, the Soviets could not expect that during lhe next ten years they could launch an attack on. and prevenldevastating retaliation" because:

a considerable number of Minuteman would

allew US SSBNs would survive

confidence in ability to defend against bombers would be low

defenses, including ABMnd civil defense would not be effective.

That there aie other applications and consequences of their strategic forces is submerged In this final assured destruction rationale,

"IM.PP it


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