"Top
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SAN ITIZED
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through the
ey Judgments and Summary
Top Spfifflt
.jsi
J
ISM
MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of National InteUigence, "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through the"
Bush
1- Thc attached National Intel! iqpnee Estimate is thc official appraisal of. the Director of*Central Intelligence. This Estimate, including Its italicized statements of differing views by merabers of The National Foreign Intelligence Board, was drafted and coordinated by professional intelligence officers of the US Intel 1igence Community and was approved by me with the advice of the Board.
2. Thp judgments arrived at in this Estitnato were made after all parties to the Estimate had the benefit of alternative .. . views frost the various elements of the Comnunity and from panels of experts from outside governsentew selected subjects. The assembling of the panels of outside experts, and thcof their views, was agreed upon by me and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is in experiment, the purpose of which was to determine whether those known for their more somber views of Soviet capabilities and objectives could present the evidenceufficiently convincing way to alter the analytical judgments that otherwise would have been presented in the attached document. Thi*ofxvf't^e some effect. But tr the extern tNr tMl Estigatgtarker appreciation of Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives, it is but the latesteries of estimates that have done so as evidence has accumulated on the continuing persistenceigor of Soviet programs in the strategic offensive and defensive fields.
SECREWJDFORN
';ocn.iwnt.on approval foiirough' the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM ot the Central Into*acy.
P
3. The experiment in competitive analysis that was begun wtth this Estimate has not been completed, and any final judgment on its utility cannot be rendered. Nevertheless, thereegative aspect that is already clear and which concerns me deeply; namely, theaks;regarding the details of the process and, worse, the substantive conclusions developed by the "leamanel that was concerned with Soviet strategic objectives. Inspired by these selective leaks, allegations have appeared in the press that thc judgments appearing in this official Estimate were shaped by pressure from the
A. There is no truth lo such allegations. Ihe judgments in the attached Estimate are the best that can be made on tho basis of the ana'l'ysTs'of the available evidence.
5. Although these lcaks.may appear to discreditontinue to regardorthwhile experiment, they have not diminished the integrity of thc Estimate itself, nor the integrity of the Intelligence Community.
Attachment
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON,
37
Holders of
Sheet for Volumeey Judgments and Summary
OVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL CONFLICT THROUGH THE, dated6
following pen-and-ink corrections should be made inSoviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through thedated
,oviet Long-Ranqeajidlntermed Bombers: foromberf thender "Oneadius toange to"
Page, Surmiary Compar_ispn_gf./orce Projections: under "Force Levels"ir Defense Interceptors (lineor bothndo"! under "Force Levels"ir Defense Interceptors (lineorolso under "Force Levels"0 MIRVed Missiles (lineoro" respectively.
are also advised that plotting errors were made inonuantitative,ForcesAttack. Because of these errors, thc projections forre incorrect in the last five charts, although the end pointsrenain approximately the same in each case. These errors do notof the jjdgments made in the text. The reader should refer to VolumeV-l,orrect version of this graphic.
Deputy to'the DC! for National Intelligence
APPROVED FOfl ROFJtSE CIA HfSTORiCAL-REVIEW PROGRW
SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL CONFLICT THROUGH THE
ff *-
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS!
fl inlelUgence organiiat.oni pothdpoled in lhe preparation of Ihe ettimatet
The Central Intelligence Agency. Ihe inlelligence organ! rorioni of Ihe Deportment! of Stale and Defenio, the National Security Agency and the Energy Research ond Development Administration.
Concurring:
Ihe Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing theU,.i, Agency
The Director of Intelligence ond Research representing the Deportment of Stole The Ditector. Defense Inlelligence Agency Tlse Direclor, National Security Agency
The Deputy Assistant Administrator for Notional Security, Energy Research and Development Administration
Abtlaining:
Ihe Special Assistant lo the Secretary lorSecurity, Deportment of ihe Treasury
Ihe Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
A/so Parl'icipalingi
Ihe Assistant Chief of Stoff for Intelligence, Deportment of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence. Oepartment of the Navy
Ihe Amslont Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Department of th- Air Farce
FOREWORD
This Estimate considers Soviet offensive and defensive forces for inierconlmenlal nuclear conflict through the. It draws upon the findings of other recent Inielligence Community assessments which consider in greater detail some of the issues addressed herein, for example:
NIOrospects for Improvement in Soviet Low-Altitude Air Defense, dated6
NIOoviet Approaches to Defense Against Ballistic Missile Submarines and Prospects for Success, dated6
, Low Altitude Air Defense Capabilities of Soviet Nuclear-Equipped SAMs, dated6
he Soviet Atomic Energy Program, dated6
Xoviet RAD delated to Particle Beam Weapons, dated6
NIOoviet Civil Defense, dated6
. Soviet ICBM Silo Hardness Estimates, dated6
NIO IIM, Prospects for Soviet Interference with US Space Systems in Crisis or Conflict (in preparation)
The Estimate docs not consider all the systems which the Soviets regard as strategic. It does not cover in detail all the Soviet medium-arid intermediate-range nuclear delivery systems, which arc intended mainly for operations on the Eurasian periphery. Nor does thc Estimate treat Soviet objectives and policies governing the use of all elements of national power toward thc attainment of overall strategic goals. For
iifi9tsi-tr<f-
information on these subjects, the reader is referred lo the following issuances of thc Intelligence Community:
oviet Strategic Objectives (in preparation)
arsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO,5
oviet Military Policy in the Third World, dated6
oviet Naval Policy and Programs, dated4
NIO IIM. Soviel Strategic Forces for Peripheral Attack (in preparation)
NIOrends in Soviet Military Programs, dated6
In estimating Soviet objectives, policies, and programs, we have assumed that future United States forces will be as described in the Department of Defense, Five-Year Defense Programhich includes US programs for such strategic systems as the Trident ballistic missile submarine,omber, the improved Minuteman HI missile,CBM. and advanced cruise missiles. Wc have made this assumption in the belief that US programed forces probably comprise the minimum future US inventory of forces for intercontinental conflict against which the Soviets plan and evaluate their own programs. Our forecast of thc strategic environment does not attempt lo weigh the implications of increases or decreases in programed levels of US effort or of alternative US decisions about specific weapon systems.
In order to judge the future overall effectiveness or all Soviet forces for inlerconlinenlalas well asdetailed net assessment is required which pays particular attention to operational factors and to the way in which the full range of US and Soviet forces and capabilities might interact. We have not madeet assessment.
The findings of this NIE are contained in three volumes.resents the key judgments and thc summary of the Estimate. The full Estimate is in Volume II. Supplementary annexes and tables of future force projections are contained in Volume III.
IV
Top--Secret
CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD
KEY JUDGMENTS
SUMMARY ESTIMATE
I SOVIET POLICY TOR INTERCONTINENTAL
A Kurt on Influencing Soviet Forces fat Intercontinental Conflict
The Utility of
if. f tbe US
Attitudes Toward Detente and SALT
Economic Considerations
Commitment to Research and Development
B Present Objectives for Intercontinental Forces
II. SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL AVI"ACK
Ballistic Missile
Deployed
Thc New Missiles
Land-Moblle Missiles
Millions and Capabilities
Future ICBMi
Launched Ballistic Missile Forces
Present
Patrol Posture
Future SLBMs
C Intercontinental Bomber Forces
Deployed
LHA Operation* Against the Contiguous
Thc Backfire Bomber
Future System*
D.ruise Missiles
OHVISI'Tli/ltwf-
Page
STRATECIC DEFENSES
A. Defense Againsi Ballistic Missiles
Winning Systems
Antiballistic Missile
SAMs in an ABM Role
ntisatellite Systems
Air Defense
Air Surveillance and
Inlcrceptors
Surface-to-Air Missiles
Electronic
Tactical Forces lor Stiategic Air Dclcnse
Future Aii Defense
Technologies lor Air, Missile, and Space Defense
Defense Against Ballistic Missile
Research and Development in ASW
Prospects lor Improvement ol Anli-SSBN
F. Civil Defense
FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR
INTERCONTINENTAL
A. Command. Control, and Communications
B Intelligence and Warning
C Strategic Targeting and Operations
and Deception
with US Space Systems
FORCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
A. Future Force Projections
Alternative Force
Static Measures ol Offensive
B Thieal to ICBM
Soviet Counfcrsilo Capabilities
Soviet Silo Survivabillly
Efforls of Uncertainty
to Bombers and
Offensive Forcesurprise Countetfoice
Factors Affecting the Strategic Environment
Impactcet tain ties
EffectsWO Agicemcnt
Piospects for Technological Advance
vi
KEY JUDGMENTS CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET PROGRAMS
In offensive forces for intercontinental conflict, the Soviets arc continuing their long-term effort to acquire more powerful, flexible, and survivablc weapon systems.
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are being deployedoderate pace.ow are operational, most of them with multiple independently targetabie reentry vehiclesnd there will probably be morehese missiles have belter accuracy, greater throw weight, and more survivable silos than their predecessors. Deploymenland-mobile ICBM is apparently still deferred
Several unitsew version of the Soviets' latest class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) have been launched. They will probably carry the first Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) to be equipped withew. large ballistic missile submarine may be under construction. If so, it could be operational by
Improvements in ICBMs and SLBMs will not slop with tin-current missiles The Soviets areumber of new and modified ICBMs and
iThcsc systems will incorporate qualitative improvements, probably including still better
Backfire bomber continurs lo be deployed. Theie are uncertainties and differences of view within the Intelligence Community about the extent of the Backfire's capability for intercontinental operations and about Soviet intentions to employ it in (his role. We have additional evidence this year pointing to Soviet development ofa new long-range bomberew aerial tanker.
The Sovicls arr also pressing ahead wiih efforts lo improve their strategic defenses.
l,argc new radars under consliuction in the northwestern USSR will improve and extend Soviet ballistic missile early warning capabilities when they become operational inhere are uncertainties and differences of view in the Intelligence Community about whether these radars will also be given capabilities to direct and manage antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses. The Soviets continue their research and development on ABM systems.
A number of programs are aimed at remedying thc critical deficiencies in Soviet defenses against low-altitude air attack. The Sovicls have been deploying data-handling systems and are introducing an improved fighter into strategic air defense forces. New air defenseew low-altilude surfacc-to-air missile (SAM) system,ew fighter with better low-altitude intercept capabilities arc under development and could be operational by
Soviet forces for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) are improving but are not now an effective counter to US SSBNs. The Soviets continue to investigate both acoustic and nonacousticin an effort to solve Iheir fundamental problem of detecting and tracking SSBNs at sea.
The Soviets have this yearapability to attack satellites at low to medium altitudesore timely manner.
Soviet civil defense preparations are steadily improving. This program is more extensive and better developed than we had previously understood, Thc Sovicls also continue to harden facilities associated with strategic forces.
The Soviets arc conducting research and development which could lead to dircctcd-energy weapons having important applications in strategic defense. The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, belieoes that this effortarge and well-funded program toharged-particte-beam weapon.
SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND EXPECTATIONS
The growth of Soviet capabilities for inlerconlinental conflict over thc past decade has provided the USSRowerful deterrent and
oe9fShPe/t
has contributed to its recognitionuperpower equal to the US. An
assessment of Ihe perceptions and objectives underlying present Soviet programsatter of interpretation and considerable uncertainty. Much that we observe can be attributedombination of defensive prudence, superpower compelitivem-ss. worst-case assumptions about USilitary doctrine which stresses war-fighting capabilities,ariety of internal polilical and institutional factors. But the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet programs give rise lo the question of whether the Soviet leaders now hold as an operative, practical objeclive thc achievement of cleat strategic superiority over tlic US during the period of this Estimate.
The Soviets' belief in the evenhial supremacy of their system is strong. They see iheir forces for Intercontinental conflict as contributing to their ultimate goal ofominant position over the West, particularly the United States, in teims of political, economic, social, and military slrength. Having come this far in strategic arms competition with lhe US, the Soviets may be optimistic about their long-term prospects in this competiiion. But ihey cannot be certain ilwut future US behavior or aboul their own fuiure strategic capabilities relative to those of lhe US They have seen US lechnology and industry mobilized to grcnl effect ln the past and are concerned about current US force modernization programs. Thus, ihey probably cannot today set practical policy objectives in terms of some specific relationship between iheir intercontinental capabilities and those of thc US. to be achievedpecific period of time.
We do noi believe that the Soviet leadeis presently countcombination of actions by the USSB and lack of action by tbe US which would give them, in lhc nextapabilily for intercontinental conflict so effective that the USSR could devastate the US while preventing the US from devastating lhc USSR. Soviet expectations, however, clearly reach wellapabilily that merely confines to be sufficient to deler an all-out attack.
In our view, the Soviets aie striving to achieve war-fighting and wur-survival capabilities which would leave lhe USSRetter position ihan the US if war occurred The Soviets also aim for intercontinental forces which have visible and therefore politically useful advantages over lhe US. They hope that their capabilities for intercontinental conflict will give ihem more latitude ihan they have had in the past for (he vigorous pursuit nf foreign policy objectives, and that these capabilities will discourage the US and others Irom using force ot lhe threat of force to influence Soviet actions
The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Department of State, agrees with the statement above on the ultimate Soviet goal but believes the Soviet leaders have more modest expectations for tlieir strategic programs. He uxiuld emphasize that the Soviet leaden
that the US need not concede the USSR any meaningful strategic advantage and do not expect the US to do to, whatever their assessment of present US resolve might be: and
not entertain,ractical objective in thc foreseeable fuiure, the achievement of what could reasonably beas a war-wlnning" or "war-survivor posture.
Rather, in his view, Soviet strategic weapon programs are pragmatic in nature and are guided by more proximate foreign policy goals. He sees the Soviets undertaking vigorous strategic force improvementsiew to achieving incremental advantages where possible but, above all, to avoid falling behind lhe UStrategic environment increasingly characterized by qualitativethus losing the position of rough equivalence with the US which ihey have achieved In recent years through great effort. Moreover, he believes il unlikely that the Soviet leaden anticipate any improvement in the USSR's slrategic situationis the US over lhe nexlears which would substantially influence theirtheirfor riskperiods of crisis or confrontation with the West.
The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Energy Research and -Development Administration, thc Assistant Chief of Staff forDepartment of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence. Department of thc Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of thc Air Force, believe that the Soviets do. in fact, see as attainable their objective of achieving the capability to wage an intercontinental nuclear war, shouldar occur, and survive il with resources sufficient to dominate the postioar period. Further, these agencies believe lhal this objective servesractical guideline for Soviet strategic force development even though the Soviets have not necessarilypecific date for its achievement. In their view:
Soviel programs for improving forces for intercontinental conflict (including those for strategic lutrdening and civilheir extensive research on advanced iveaponsand their resource allocation prioriucs are in keeping with this objective and illustrate its practical effect.
combination with other military and nonmilitary deoelop-ments, the buildup of intercontinental nuclear capabilities is integralrogramed Soviet effort to achieve tlie ultimate goalominant position in the world.
it cannot be said until confidence when the Sooiets believe they will achieve this goal, they expect to move closer lo it over the nextears and.esult, to be able increasingly to deter US initiatives and to inhibit US opposition to Soviet initxatiws.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, further believes that this Estimate understates, as have previous NIEs, the Soviet drive for strategic superiority. The lines of Soviet strategic policy, objectives, and doctrines enunciatedarge body of authoritative literature ore viewed within tlie context of differing US perceptions and aspirations rather tlian in the larger context of Soviet history, ideology, and military investmetit.
The Soviets have made great strides toward achieving general military superiority over all perceived constellations of enemies and forcar-winning capability at all levels of conflict. War survival and civil defense efforts to date have already placed the VSosition of serious strategic disadvantage by neutralizing much of its capability to destroy or damage effectively those elements of the Soviet leadership, command, military, and urban-industrial structure required forredible deterrentealistic calculation of nuclear fatality exchange ratiosar today would probably show the USSH emerging with considerably morewentymo-one advantage.
Tliere nowubstantial basis for judging that the Soviets' negotiations at SALT and their detente, economic, and arms-control diplomacy have thus far been exploited by them for strategic advantage: by slowing down US defense investment and by permitting easy access to high US technology. Thc net effect of improved Soviel and Easi European access to loans, goods, and services from many Western countries is that inefficient sectors of the Soviet economy are in effect being subsidized, thus encouraging uninterrupted investment in strategicegree of hostage control is being acquired over elements of thc West European banking structure by Moscow and Us East Europeanthe form of extensive loans [now approaching allowable limits for manylias serious economic warfare implications. Additionally, tlie extraordinary advances being made by the Soviets in ASW and high-energy particle-beam technology could
5
place the Free World's offensioe ballistic missile capability at serious risk well before the terminal date of this Estimate.
While the present NIE is much improved over some of its predecessor documents, it falls far short of grasping the essential realities of Soviet conflict purpose and evolving capability, the latter clearly constituting the most extensive peacetime war preparations in recordedsituation not unlike that of the. when the entire Free World failed to appreciate the true nqtttre of Nazi Germany's readily discernible preparationsr and conflict. The dissenting judgments of the past five years regarding Soviet defense expenditures, Soviet. strategic objectives and policy, ICHM refire capability, predictions3 that someoajor new or modified offensive ballistic missile systems were under development, Soviet war-survival and civil-defense measures. Backfire bomber capability, and directed^energy weapons development have often served as the principal means of alerting the national leadership to trends which now are clearly evidenced. Failure now to anticipate the implications of such trends will impact adversely on lead times essential for the alteration of policy and redirection of technology programs.
Such lead-time impacts are illustrated dramatically in judgments of the0 which implied tltat Soviet goals entailed tio more than strategic parity and did not involve commitmentajor civil defense program. The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, Dej>artment of the Air Force, believes that the former was the basis for US arms control policyliile the latter influenced the ABM Treatye is concerned that the present perceptions of Soviet goals and evolving capability provide an inadequate basis for the pursuit of further negotiations at SALT or thc reformulation of national defense and foreign security policy. Al issue is whether present intelligence perceptions provide an adequate basis for averting global conflict in the decades ahead.
TRENDS IN fORCES AND CAPABILITIES
Varying degrees of uncertainly characterize our estimates of Soviet strategic programs and of the quantity and quality of Soviet forces. Forecasts (or the next few years can he made with relatively high confidence on the basis of direct evidence. For the period of primarytoearsof system characteristics and force composition musl be based on very limited evidence and indirect considerations. In this connection, it should be noted lhat uncertainties about lhc quality of stralegic weapons and
rap
preseni nnd particularly for theIn some areas large enoughf feci judgments about Important asjwcls of lhe strategic balance.
Our forecast for the nextears assumes lhat the ABM Treaty remains in effect and lhal US forces will evolve as currently programed We employ commonly used measures of force capabilily bul cannot take full account of operational factors which would affect the actual outcome of an intercontinental conflict. Examples of such factors are lhc efficiency and vulnerability of US and Soviet command and control systems, and the effectiveness of US air attacks and Soviet air defenses in an electronic warfare environment.
Offensive CopobilitiBv
The bulk of Soviet intercontinental striking power will remain In ICBM forces. The striking power and survivability of SLBM forces will continue toelatively small intercontinental Inimber force will be retained to complement lhe ballistic missile forces.
the, the number of Soviet missile reentry vehicles {HVs) will probably approximate and possibly exceed that of the US. The large Soviet advantage in missile throw weighl will be much greater than it is loday, and (lie Soviel advantage in total equivalent mcgalonnage (EMT) will be somewhat greater. Soviet ICBMs will pose an increased threat lo US missile silos; this threat couldajor one In the next year or so if Soviet ICBM capabilities arc at the more threatening bul highly unlikely extremes of our range of uncertainly. Soviet silo-based ICBMs. however, will not be very much mote vulnerable than at present. Despite the probability that the US will continue to have more varied offensive forcesarger total number of weapons, increasing Soviet missile throw weight and numbers of RVs. and the increased threat to US silo-based ICBMs. will add to perceptions of Soviet strategic power.
the, the raw power of Soviet offensive forces will coniinue to increase. Soviet ICBMs willajor threat to US missile silos, although thc Soviets themselves would remain uncertain alxml the results of counlersilo attacks. If US forces develop as now programed and Soviet forces continue to develop along preseni lines, some of the earlier Soviet gains in relative offensive capabilities will be eroded. With tbe deploy-meni of new US systems. Soviel forces would be likely to fall behind in numbers of missile RVs and farther behind in total weapons. In any event, lhe chances that the Soviets could
7
arge lead in missile RVs would he reduced. Their advantage in total EMT would he likely to drop back lo about today's level, but their advantage in missile throw weight would remain very large. The Soviets could judge that their own silo-based missile forces had become very vulnerable.
In lhe licit few years, SLBMs willarger percentage of the total Soviet ICBM and SLBM force, thus increasing the proportion of launcheri which can achieve better survivability through mobility. Although lhe Soviets have evidently deferred deploymentand-mobili' ICBM. they will probablyn such systems and might deploy one toerceived danger to their silo-basedand-mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) now aboul lo be deployed will be difficult for US inlelligence to distinguishimilar land-mobile ICBM and might be convertible Io an ICBM fairly rapidly.
The Sovieis could at any time increase the threat to US bombers on alert by deploying SSBNs close lo US coastlines to reduce the potential warning limes available lo bomber bases. In deciding whether to rely on SLBMs for this purpose, the Sovicls would have to consider US ASW capabilities, US options to reduce the vulnerability of existing bombers, and Iherogram. We believe the Soviets would conclude that, throughout the nextears, most US alert bombers wouldurprise SLBM attack
We believe lhe Soviets have no compelling military reasons to deploy long-range cruise missile systems in the present strategic environment. They evidently believe the USechnological advantage in such systems, but if they cannot prevent US deployment through SALT, they may follow suit They could modify uny one of several existing air- and sea-launched cruise missiles for long-range use or could develop large, new ones for deployment by the end of. Small, long-range cruise missiles accurate enough lo destroy hard laigels probably could not be flight-tested before lhe early to.
Soviet Intercontinental striking power would be increased if Backfire bombers were employed against thc US The Backfire is well suited to operations against land and sea targets on the Eurasian peripheryariety of flight profiles, and it has some capability for operations against the US on high-altitude subsonic profiles. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, estimate that the Backfire has stgntficant capabilities for operations against the US without air-to-
ooaisi-Tti/
Top Stoat*
air refueling. The Central Intelligence Agency and lhe Department of State estimate that it has marginal capabilities against the US under the same conditions. With air-to-air refueling, the Backfire would have considerably increased capability for intercontinental operations, even in the case of the lowest performance estimate. In addition, the Backfire could be modified in various ways to improve its range.
Wc believe it is likely that Backfires will continue to be assigned to theater and naval missionsthc exception of DIA, ERDA, Army, and Airbelieve it is correspondingly unlikely thai they will be assigned to intercontinental missions. If thc Soviets decided to assign any substantial number of Backfires lo missions against thc US. they almost certainly would upgrade lhe performance of the aircraft ororce of compatible new lankers for their suppori. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Energy Research andAdministration, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assitant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe tlie available evidence on Backfire employment indicates only that peripheral and naval attack are its current primary missions. Since the Soviets could use the Backfire's intercontinental capabilities at their initiative, these agencies believe that the Backfire clearlyhreat to the US. even witliout the deploymentompatible tanker force or the upgrading of the aircraft's performance. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, further believesortion of tlie Backfire force will have missions against the contiguous US.
Defensive Capabilities
Thc Sovicls arc continuing to improve their ballistic missile detection and tracking systems lo close gaps in existing coverage, to make warning information more precise, and to provide additional warning time. Wc believe thai two large phased-array radars now under construction in the northern USSH will be used for ballistic missile warning. Radars such as these, however, could also be given thc capability for ABM bat lieis. to provide tracking and prediclion dala to support ABM defenses. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State, basing their judgment on analysis of the individual characteristics, locations, and orientation of tlw.se two radars and on the status of the Soviet ABM research and development program, believe that both radars are intended only for ballistic missile early tiximing. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and thc Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, however, believe
9
the available evidence regarding these radars does notonfident judgment about whether they may alto be intended for ABM battle management. Concern aboul (be possible use of tbc large phased-array radars for ABM battle management would Increase if lhc Soviets started to construe! more such radars in locations appropriate for ABM support and if lhe Soviets punned ABM research and development vigorously. The Department of Stale believes lhat the extent to which construction of additional such radars would be cause for concern would also depend on the assessment at the time of the likelihood of Soviet abrogation of tlie ABM Treaty. This assessment, in turn, would depend in large part on the cxlent to which the circumstances which led tlxc Soviets to negotiate thisthus avoid an ABM competition with thechanged. The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, believes the two radars alone might be able to support significant deployment of ABM defenses In the western and central USSR.
An ABM system which the Soviets have been developing7 is more rapidly deployable than thc current system al Moscow. Thc pace of fllghl testing has been slow over the past two years, but recently lhe interceptor missile was firedive target for the first time. With this interceptor, the system appears to have atimited capability. Recent construction at the test range suggests developmentighinterceptor, which could greatly enhance the system's capability. If development proceeds vigorously, the system could be ready for deployment in one lo three years or so, depending on whether it Includes thc high-acceleration interceptor. This ABM research and development activity probablyedgencertainties about the futute strategic situation. We believe it is highly unlikely that the Soviets now plan to deploy ABM defensesscow.
The USSR will probably not have significantly better defenses against low-altitude air attackor the period beyond that lime, we estimate that:
For defense against low-altitude bombers, improvements in Soviet air defenses will have lhe potential for overcoming many existing technical deficiencies by lhe. Il might be possible for the Soviets to oveicome these deficiencies somewhat earlierery high level of effort If Soviet deployments are at the rates we think probable, bomber penetration of Soviet defenses would be considerably more difficult in thehan it would be loday.
10
-fop 6wwf
defense against short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) in flight, one Soviet SAM system now under development might have some capability. While there are uncertainties about the characteristics of this system, we believe that, if it has any capability against SRAMs. engagements would be at short ranges with low reliability. We believe that thc Soviets will not have an effective defense against the SRAM by the.
defense against low-altitude cruise missiles in flight, current Soviet low-altitude SAMs and future air defense systems would have some capabilities Their effectiveness will depend on their specific characteristics, their numbers, and their deployment patterns. Wc are uncertain about the degree of protection that could be achieved against low-altilude cruise missiles In the, but we believe it would be low. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes, however, that the Soviet SAM system underdevelopment might have capabilities permitting deployment to provide some limited terminal defense against cruise missiles for approri-maicly half thc estimated target groupings in the USSB tn the.
The combination of US air attack forces will coniinue to be more difficult to defend against than any one of ils elements alone. The air defense problems which the Soviets now face would be complicated even further by US deployment of advanced bombers and cruise missiles US penetration tactics and tbe degradation of defenses by ballistic missile strikes would continue to weigh heavily against the overall effectiveness of Soviet air defenses. Wc cannot, however, assess the full effects of these and other operational factors.
Recent developments point to modest but steady improvement in Soviet ASW systems and continued growth in their numbers. Tbe future effectiveness of Soviet defenses against SSBNs on patrol will depend in targe part on how successful the Soviets are in detecting and tracking SSBNs at sea. Improved US SSBNs and greatly expanded SSBN operating areas will further compound thc Soviet problem. From our understanding of the technologies involved and ofrograms iu thc US and the USSR, we believe that the Soviets have little potential for overcoming SSBN detection and tracking problems in broad ocean areas This judgment must be qualified, however, because of gaps in our knowledge of some technical aspects of potential sensor developments. On the basis of evidence now available, wc believe that Soviet capabilities againsi SSBNs in confined waters will improve during the period of this Estimate, bul that Sovicl ASW capabilities
-Jep Sew*.
will Tall short of being able to prevent most US SSBNs on station from launching their missiles.
Soviet civil defense preparations couldignificant impact on both Soviet mid US assessments of the likely outcomeuclear conflict. Thc Sovieis probably believe thai civil defense measures contribute to giving tbehanceurviveational entity and to beetter position than thc USuclear exchange. The priorities of lhe Soviet program evidently arc: first, to assure the continuity of government by protecting the leadership; second, lo provide for lhc continuity of important economic [unctions and the protection of essential workers; and, last, lo pcotcct lhe nonessential pari of the population.
There are gaps in our knowledge of lhe civil defense program. Our tentative judgment is that, under optimum conditions which included an adequate period of warning and evacuation. Soviet civil defenses would assure survivalarge percentage of the leadership, reduce urban casualtiesmall percentage, ond give (heood chance of sustaining the population with essential supplies. With minimal warning, some key leaders would probably survive, but the urban population would suffer high casualties and the chances of adequately supplying survivors would be poor. The Soviets probably do notighly optimistic view about tbe effectiveness of their present civil defenses. Even under the most favorable conditions, they probably wouldreakdown of the economy and, under the worst conditions, catastrophic human casualties as well.
Our evidence of Soviel civil defense prepaialionontinuing, steady program ratherrash effort. Because of the gaps in our knowledge, however, we cannotonfident estimate of its pace and future effectiveness.
The Deportmenl of State believes thai thc Soviet civil defense program is seen by the Soviet leadership primarilyrudent hedge against the possibility of attackuclear-armed adversary. The Department believes that tliese Soviet civil defense efforts toil! not materially increase Soviet willingness touclear exchange and will not undermine the deterrent value of US strategic attack forces. It further believes that, at the present time, the scope of the civil defense program does not indicate Soviet strategic objectives beyond maintenance of rough equivalence with the US.
Thc Defense Intelligence Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Assistant Chief of Staff forDepartment of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence,
12
Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Ait Force, believe that the impact of Soviet war-survival efforts upon the US-USSR strategic liatance is greater tlian can be inferred from the foregoing discussion of the Soviet civil defense program In their view, the Soviets see their civil and passive defense program as an essential element in the achievement of the capability to wage intercontinental nuclear war. should one occur, and survive with resources sufficient to dominate the postwar period. These agencies believe that this program willefinite and increasing impact on US-USSR strategic balance assessments in the years ahead. Further, they believe the Soviets wilt attempt to enhance their influence, particularly tn the Third World and Europe, by capitalizing on real and perceived improvements in their war-waging capabilities. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, further believes that the strategic balance already has been alteredajor way by civil defense and other measures the Soviets have carried out thus far.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Some of thc Soviets' present programs reflect concerns that US programs would affect their own strategic position adversely. Examples arc ICBM silo hardening and the deployment of long-range SLBMs. Wc are uncertain about the implications of others. The mobile IRBM und ICBM programs, for example, would enable thc Soviets to place more of their missiles on launchers less vulnerable to attack. By their continuing efforts lo improve ABM technology, the Sovieis could put themselvesosition to deploy additional ABM defenses if the ABM Treaty were nbrogated. Such programs probably represent Soviet hedges against future US threats as well as deterrents lo US withdrawal from strategic arms limitation agreements. They could also represent efforts to give lhc Soviet leaders the future option to break out of such limitations if they concluded lhat the situation warranted.
A SALT TWO agreemenl based on the Vladivostok accord would confront thc Soviets with difficult choices and tradr-offs between new and existing systems within an aggregate ceiling on delivery vehicles. Il would limil the more extreme possibilities for growih in Soviel missile throw weight and number of missile HVs. In the absenceALT TWO agreement, the Sovieis would probably increase theirdelivery forces moderately; il is possible thai they would increase ihem considerably. They would not. hrrwever. expect quantitative competition alone to aller lhe strategic balance significantly. They have evidently come to recognize that thc strategic environment in lhc
la
ill be most significantly affected by tlie quality of the forces deployed by the two sides. Their progress in this area will be larpely independent ofWO.
Soviet RAD programs arc consistentesire both to avoid dipping behind the US and to gain the lead in the technology of strategic offensive and defensive forces, particularly if US programs falter. We continue to examine closdy Soviet RAD programs and prospects for major advances that might seriously erode US deterrent capabilities. Wc give particular attention to RAD applicable to directed-energy weapons [or use in air and missile defense and to the detection and tracking of US ballistic missile submarines. Thc Soviets arc working actively in both fields, and there are gaps in our knowledge of this work. Thc available evidence, together with our appreciation of ihe physical, engineering, and operational hurdles which must be overcome, leads us to rate as small the chances that the Soviets can sharply alter the slrategic balance through such technological advances in the nextears. Bul Soviet efforts in these fields merit very close watching.
The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes that the Soviets are significantly ahead of the West in the technologies applicable to particle beam-weapons research, and that the Soviets could berototype eharged-porticU-beam system
PROSPECTS FOR IHE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
The long time period of (his Estimate and the gaps in our understanding and information about aspects of Soviet capabilities require that judgments aboul tlic futuie strategic environment be made with varying degrees of certainty. Wc conclude that:
slrenglh of Soviet offensive forces for intercontinenlal attack will coniinue to increase It may be at its greatest relative Io US programed foices in the. In subsequent years, some of thc earlier Soviet gains will be eroded, assuming that US forces develop as now programed and Soviet forces continue to develop along present lines.
Soviet ICBMs will pose an increasing threat to US missile silos.
but Soviet forces will almost certainly remain unable to prevent most US alert bombers and SLBMs at sea from being launched Soviet defenses will almosi certainly remain penetrable by missile and bomber weapons.
u
Soviet forces will be able to inflict massive damage on the US in either initial or retaliatory attacks. It is extremely unlikely that Soviet forces will be able lo prevent massive damage to tlic USSR from initial or retaliatory US attacks.
There are critical uncertainties, however, about the degree to which the Soviets inould be able to reduce human casualties and limit damage to those functions and facilities which the leadership would consider essential to the survival of their society.
rcref-
SUMMARY ESTIMATE
SOVIET POUCY FOR INTERCONTINENTAL FORCES
I. The' Soviet* are continuing to press forwardroad and vigorous program lot improving ihrii capabilities for intercontinental conflict Sovielduring Ihe pail decade have enabled lhe USSR io surpass lhe USrowing number of quantitativelthough the United States has maintained many qualitative advantages in such capabilities (tec Figureuirenl Soviel programs include.
In offensive forces, the deploymentew-generation of ICBMsmultiplelaigetablc reentry vehiclesiealrr throw weight, better accuracy, and more survivable tilol; the productionhird versionlass SSBN, probably toew MIRVed missile: the development of additional new ot modified ICBM and SLBM systems, the developmentew. largeew heavy bomber, and possibly an aerial tanker: and continued deployment of lhe Backfire bombet. the range and missions of which temaln
In defensive forces, continuing expansion of Soviet capabilities for obtaining cady warning of missile attack; improvement In capabilities againsi air attack, especially low-altilude attack, continuing search lor ASW capabilities Iu counter the US SSBN force, improvement of. defense capabilities and otltei passive defense measures; and further developmental work on ABM lystemi and an antisatellite system
There arc (note uncertainties and differences of view tlilt yeat about the Soviet perceptions and objectives which underlie iheie developments than there were Inst ve,"
A. Factor* Influencing Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict
The Utility ol Forces
2 Soviet foices lor intercontinental conflict have political us well us military utility. The Soviets see Ihese forces, along with olher military capabilities as serving their long-term aim ofominant posilion over lhc West At present, tbey believe that the growth of theirits lot intercontinental conflict, along with poliiical. economic, and other miliiary developments, have helpedew "correlation of forces" In the wodd lhal is more favorable to theorrelation olrequently used Soviet term roughly synonyroous witb "balance otut more btoadly construed to encompass political, social, and economic as well as militaryn the Soviet view, lhe present correlation requites Weslern policymakers lo accord (he USSR Ihe statusuperpower equal to the US. and to give greater consideration to the USSR now than in the past when dealing with various world situations.onfrontation, tne Soviets expect their strategic power to enhance tbe prospect oi favorable nulcomes. while reducing tbc likelihood of nuclear war They would, however, expect lhe resolutionocal crisis or conflict to test as well on factors other than Ihe sltategic weapons balance, such as Ihe comparative strengths and dispositions of general purpose lotos. '
1 VndnLocal crisis or reefed
IV (redsneaUS iKr.u- teem aed el mrmnilcuoui Uealrd Stain twroirm Mncannili important Since lite mklt&Wi lli- Sovmiiajni npaminn and marvel ina el (bar ilntriO IW doner* si list pu decadera omtj eipiaHSrd ihe tin ol Senrl Imm buthn mi'Ir ihem rnorr luUeced anil ape rationally HtilbV. Willi
In to In'hikLw ind uualigf -arlax W
NIK ll-UUeladrd anew, ol< ofi tupnlnnt) ol tkralr> lorcei In Euidj-
Historical Trends in Selected Aspects of Strategic Forces
(COM and SHIM Launchers
thousands U
On-Line Missile Weapons*
rhoaaands
6fl
On-Line Missile Throw Weight
milUjn pounds .0
68
4 gram*
10
Defensive Forces
6
(Mot
iSSfc 68 ro u 74
US Bomber Weapons
Intercontinental Bombers and On-Une Bomber Weapons
I9GC
Sov-e! Bomwt Weapons
, Soviet T6 Bomhors
On-Line Equivalent Megatons
thousands nd eo,nbofi)
ICBM aVouiwM* roo-trvcoa* a* nMrmSLBMt-otoom ot
1mvu4.Ii) fi tOvnWn* RV.
-SftOH-
17
-tap bet'tt -
AssUtant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Department of the Aii Foecr. beheoes that heavy-handed Soviet support jot dienti in the Middle East. Southeast Atla. and Angola since the attainment of strategic tuperioriti attests to the Soviets growing confidence and to the polilical leverage which they seek from their forces for mtercontinental conflict. He furthri helievei that the sizable asymmetry of the aimnt strategic nuclear relationship between the US and the USSH resulting from the combination of strategic offenstue and defensive forces beingand deployed by thelong with moult* war-survival preparations, should allow therowing ability to coerce at all levels ofof and including ntsdear.
available open and classified Sovicl tilrra-lute indicates lhal Ihe Soviets ate committed lo improving iheir capabilities lot waging nuclear war This commitmenteadership consensus nn Ihc need to assure lhe survival of Ihe Sovicl Union inaiiliiary doctrine which holdsuclear wat ould be won. Allhough the Soviet leaders apparently accept mutual detertcsem reality in East-West relations, lhe US concept ol mutual assured destruction has never beenaccepted in the USSR The Soviets do not tee the present cot relation ol forces ai desirable ot tailing, orondition which would preclude majorbetween tlic US and thr USSR
5 Soviet military doctrine calls fot capabilities to fight, survive, anduclear war. In the Soviet view, war-fighting capabilities constitute the best delerrml. Thus. Soviet doettlne emphasizes counter-Force cajabilities nnd the necessity lo desltoy an enemy's war-malting ability, and also slresses active and passive defense measures lo llmil damage Iu the Soviel homeland The extent of Soviet active and passive defense efforts contrasts sharply wiih that of lhe US
Perceptions of the US
6 Both open and clandestinely acquited Soviet witlings reflect high tespect lot the economic, technical, and iniluslri.il prowess of th" United Stales. Although the Soviets continue to believe thaiin the West represent another phase in the steady retreat of capitalism. Soviet commentaloti have viewed lhe recent US recession as essentially cyclical rather than lhe beginninginal crisis of
18
citpllallsm. The Soviets probably assume that US tlicnglh and resiliency will pcitnit continuedin US slrategic capabilities
7 Some trends in US policies nvrt lhe past yeat or so pmbalily lueled Soviel hopes that the US was weakening in ils resolve- toigorous slrategic and political cornpelitot. The Soviets probably saw events in Angola, for eaamplr. ai an indication ol US reluctance lo confront Soviet influence more directly in some parts of lhe world. Tins perception may have made Ihe Soviets feel bolder aboul Involvement In areas ol low risk lo themselves ot of marginal concern In the US On lhe other hand. In the atmosphere of cooler relations between Ine superpowers following the war in Angola and lhe Confetencc on Securily and Cooperation lit Europehe Soviels haveloser dialogue between the US and itsreater willingness by Congress to vote for defrnte funding,ote aiseilive US allilude against furtherof Soviet influence. These developments are probably perceived by Soviel leaders as elementstiffened US policy toward the USSR Since the US election, key Soviel leaders have indicated that they eipect no Important shift In US defense policy under tbe new administration They havepressed guarded optimism aboul Ibe fuiure of detente and SALT 7Vie Defense Intelligence Agency, lhe Energy Research and Developmentthe Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence. Department of the Navy, ond the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, Itelteve lhat ihli paragraph overstates Soviet concern about US willingness taore assertive altitude toward the USSR's efforts to enhance its influence
Altitude; Towatd Detente and SALT
Detente fur the Soviets provides fot limited sphctes of cooperation and relaiation of tensionsarger conical of continued competition In ils hrtiadesi aspect, detente is lookrd uponramework for nuiluring changes luvorable lo Stis'iet interests, while avoiding direct challenges to the US and id allies that would provoke ihem into concerted and effective counteraction. For the USSR, detente affotds opportunities to reduce Western competitive licsi, to constrain US strategic programs, to Improve flic Snvirl economic base, and lo acquire militarily
useful Western technologies. Al the sameighly compehlivc relationship with the US is assumed, will) ronming gains and losses for both sides
Soviet leaders value SALTariety ol reasons Thr process ilself confirms and continually publicttn lhe USSR at Ihe strategic and political equal of lhe US. and itiominenl place in Soviet detente policy. Itotuin foi constraining US iliategio amis ptogiami und for influencing US strategic goals and perceptions of thc USSR The ABM Treatyompetition in ABM dcploymcnlime when the Soviets viewed thc L'S as having major advantages in ABM technologies Implicit in lhe more recent Vladivostok understanding is Moscow's judgment thai the USSR can compete successfully with the US dutirtg tbe neat decadeituation in which llie aggiegatc ceiling on ICBM launchers. SLBM launchets. and limited type* of uotnlvois is equal on both sides The Soviets foreseevigorous qualitative sttategic aimswith the US In which they will continue to strive fo maintain and enhance their lelative position.
Sovieis* interest In negotiating atteaty has undoubtedly been sustainedUS strategic program, end by concernforthcoming espiiation of the InlerimOffensive Ainu and mutual tcview of lheEven duting thc period of uncctlainty priorUS elections, the Soviets leaffhmed theirsecuring such an agreement and showedto move ahead on the technicaldiscussed in Geneva Mote recently.stressed tlie importance to the USSR nfSALT TWO agreement based on the
II. The Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, Department af the Au Force. beUeoei that theSooicti view SALTeant through which 'hey canuperior itrategic position over the US. He would note that, ihonly after the itenlng of the SALT ONF. agreement, the Sovurti began unambiguous resting of four new ICBM systems, ol lean three of which are now bring deployed He would note further that today the Sovieu areumber of development prog-anu fo- both offensive andtliaieglc uirafxnu which superficially would noi be SAL accountable hut which have Inherent capabil-
iliti lo make them so. For example, he believes theW could be firedighter payload to rangei of up lo0n defemive weaponry, he believei theong-range SAM may already have been covertly modified to give il an ASM capability
eifllrd area, ht nolo lhat. white signing IrV ABMgreed to keeping the populations of both the USSR and the US hostage to the nudeer threoi by leaving themSovieis had previouslyassive civilian and Industrial sheltering program, which hot since been accelerated. Thin, he believes thai lhc Soviets viewed their patrtee defense program as lelaining lhe protective bentflU whtch widapiead ABM deployment might have provided, whilethe US to end ils own ABM deployment Consequently, ht cmslden the ABM Treaty to have been Intended by the Sovtetiiplomatic deception,
n turn, the Asstilonf Chief af Slaff,Department of llie Air Force, believes that SALT ONF luis had little, if any. constraining impact on progranu designed to give the Sooted irraregu: superiority over the US. Moreover, he btheves thai theave programs underway designed toany it'oiegic arms agreement orsch lriev migni agree to sign
Kcutiomic Considerations
M New evidence and analyil* of Sdvict defense eipendilures indicate lhat we have underestimated Ihe proportion of CNP the Soviets have devoted lo defense and. therefore, that they have been willing toeavier defense burden than we previously thought lo be tbe case. Thb analysis also indicates thai Soviel defense induitiiet ate less efficient than foimeily believed. It leads thc Central Intelligence Agency to estimate lhal (he overall Soviet defense budget absorbs some II loerceni of Ihe Sovieli comparedercent lor the US. There has been little change, however. In the share of Soviet CNP lalen by defense (Seeraphic summary of the results of the ne-apendi-lures lot forces for intercontinental conflict have incirated shaiply in the past lew years, largely because of lhc deployment of new systems for Intercontinental altacl The Deftme Intelligence Agency and lhe Assistant Chief of Slaff for Inlelll-
iiPi
Estimated Soviet Expenditures for
C- Percentage Distribution ot Estimated Tela! Expenditures [Calculated0 Rubles)
Ftextirch, 0evth>jnneal4
Nreei lot
Etaierjf Pcrpctf ml
.?tfipfi;;ii AillcL fctCCS
EilrtJl* .tHifl it Iht Sttirli nr^ tint ffKVI UtrMCc ftTtitfwtth ii
i: hide* ol Growth ot Estimated Iota! Expenditures lor Procurement aod Operation ol Intercontinental Altack and Strategic Defense Forces (Calculated0 Rubles)
C (Of forcci lO*
pwufemrrM lor
thw -orctt Irom
Keountttirfetfjhly On*l foulV) owS PoW. OMm nUtmd to forow fo* *Etrantk*rttk< conflictoWoCtotMna
lor imltttfv
tiwi o* toulor eomnundtl(CMS!
ISrrpMi oao/ oWlicr CIA Mlta.!tn* ixtvtitft i* fo* fht dtvitoerwtwflifocflul finchomi* (WrOn offorUi*lV brtrvttci Hcwtlnp ih-feraireonilntoul OOnnk I.
COtti torACTcmbil-tV
ur imlvcM in thr Ou'ttv* lorullf* theyhaliooA
orof pfrtphorvV .hmAj b,v*r.
ihu ihtri or.n th*rda*
r*oolfir.MIvinoolv. ilort lv I*
0 rJrVFlop hitJi tn
70
gence. Oeportmenl of theelieve that the percentage of Soviet CNF devoted lo defensecould he somewhat higher.
15. The Ainstanl Chief of Staff. Inulbgence. Department of the. Atr Force, notes lhat use over the last decade of undo valued ruble prices has led to unrealuticallu low estimates uf Soviet defenseHe believer tliat new Soviet pricing data alone do notufficient bans for renting estimates of the productivily of Soviei defense industry. He rejects lhe negative notion regarding Soviet defense Industries as "Uss efficient than formerly believed" He also believes llutt the eslent of the economic burden of lhe Soviet defense effort is greater than reflected, because of its physical dimension and because of the economic growth rate and the paucity af consumer goods. The principal causes of low estimates, in his fudgment. Iiave been the costing methodologies used, failure to account foroajor ballistic missile systems known to be under development, and inadequate accounting with respect ignificantly large number af imprecisely defined defense-relatedlit believes that more comptrie exploitation of data available from recent Soviet emigres, coupled with extensive analysis of pertinent overheadcould add several percentage points to lhe esUmate of tlie portion of Soviet CNP devoted ta defense spending
e see no evidence thai economic consider-iltons would inhibit the Soviets from continuing the present pace and magnitude of their strategicor from undertaking increases if these were deemed essential by the leadership Major military programs have been gcnerouily supported, even In periods of economic setback, and the military sectoi rontinues to command tlic besl of the USSR's scarce high-quality resourcesALT TWO agreement is reached, economy-minded leaders may push for morr critical scrutiny of slrategic programs Reduction of expenditures would be unlikely, however, given the momentum of strategic programs, the political5 ami militaiy docttiue winch animate them, institutional influences, and the projected availability of resourcesonstantly expanding industrial
Commitment to Research and Development
he Soviei leadershiparge omj rtlicionta national defense
asset As theii design and industrial capabilities have grown over tlie years, the Soviets have made generous allocations for weapons development, as well as fot basic fckeabfic research and industrial lechnology in supportonU. regardlesi of shortages or difficulties ehewhete iu thc economy. The steady increase In thc number, variety, and sophisticationiganlzatiom and piogranu ovct the past decadeijo* commitment to tbedevelopment of (tiatcgic systems in the USSR. In offensive missiles alone, we have evidence thai at leastew or modified ICBM and SI-BM systems are under development. It is unlikely lhat all of these will br deployed, but development of sevetal more probably will be undertaken during the period of ihis
for Intercontinental
he Soviels' broad base of technology has given Ihem increased fleiibilily in weaponsetter basis fo> evaluating perceived US threats,etter capability for evolutionary development of weapon systems using proven technology. In theirstablishment, the Soviets appear to have organisational and technological problems which may impede their efforts to develop and deploy exotic weapon systems. In recent years, however, llicy have embarked on energetic and weU-lunded militaryrograms In fields where significant and perhaps novel weapon systems may emerge, such as In the areas of ASW tensors and directed-cneigy weapons. In ihese aieas, iho Soviets havefforts in progress,ough lhe potential in terms of practical weaponi development Is not alw3ys clear.
B. Present Objective! forces
here remains thc mote fundamentalthe USSR's present objectives fot its forcesconflict Our understanding ofis far from complete We base ourthe Soviet leaders' objectives (orforcesombination of Soviet statementsboth openly available andon the past and present developmenlactivities which we observe, and onof the challenges, opportunities, and
constraints which we believe are operating on tlir Soviet leadership.
n addressing this question, tvc distinguish between ultimate needs based on pervasive ideological principal and practical objectives which Soviet leaden may eipect to achieve in some definable time period. Ilatter ol interpretation nnd consldeiable uncertainly as to whelhcr the two are becoming one Much lhalobserve in iheu present postuie and programs can be attributedombination of traditional defensive prudence, military doctrine which stresses wor-flghling capabilities, superpower competitiveness, worst-case assumptions about US capabilities,ariety of Internal political and institutional factors But the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet strategic programs gives nv lo the question ol whelhcr Ihe Soviet leaders now hold as an operative, practical objective the achievement of dear strategic superiority over the US within tke neat derade
21 Deeply held Ideological nnd doctrinalcause the Soviet leaders to hold as an ultimate goal the attainmentominant position over thethe Unitedterms of political, economic, social, and military strength The Sovieis' belief In thc eventual supremacy of iheir System is Strong Having come this far in stralegic arms competition with the US. the Soviets may be optimistic about Iheir long-term prospects, bui Ihey cannot be certain about future US behasHor or about their own future capabilities tclallve lo those of lhe US. They have high respect for US technological and industrial strength They have seen it moblll/ed to gteal effect in tbe past and are concerned thai current US force moderniration program! could aflect theit own strategic position adversely, Titus, lhc Soviel leaders probably cunnot today set practical policy obteclives in teitm of some specific and immutable posture for their intercontinental forces to be achievedredetermined period of time Their programs almost certainly arc framed and adjusted to hedge against possible futuie developments.
e do not doubt lhat if Ihey thought they could achieve Lt, Ihe Soviets would program now lo attain capabilities for intercontinental nuclear conflict so effective thai lhe USSB could devastate Ihe US while preventing tho US from devastating Ihe USSR Wc do not believe however, that thev presently countombination ul actions by thc USSR and lack ofy Ihe US which would produce such capabilities during (he nextears. Soviet expecta-
tions, howevet. clearly teach wellapability lor intercontinental conflict that merely continues to he sufficient to dotes an all-out altacV
n our view, lhe Soviets arr striving toar-fighting and war-suivival poslure which would leave lhe USSnetter posilion than Ihe US if war eccurrcd The Soviets alto aim for Inleicontinenlal forces which have visible and therefore politically useful advantages over lhe US. They hope that (licit tapabililies for Inlcrcontinenlal conflicl will give them more latitude than they have had in lhe past for the vigorous pursuit of foreign policy obtertim. and lhat these capabilities will discourage the US and olbert bom using fotce or the lineal of force to influence Soviet actiom
he Direclor, bureau of lntethr.rr.ee and tietrorch. Department of State, agrees with the statement above on the ultimate Soviet goal, hut believes the Soviet leaders have more modes! especta-for ifceir itnjugtc programs. He wouldthat the Soviet leaders
ihat the US need not concede the USSR any meaningful strategic advantage and do not expect thr US to do to. whatever their assessment of present US resolve might be: and
noi entertain,ractical objective In the foreseeable future, the achievernent of what
could reasonalAy be chaiectentcdwar-winning" oi "war-survlvat' poslure. '
Rather, in hu view. So-i'l strategic weaponragmatic xn nature and are guided by more proiimale foreign policy goals. He sees the Soviett undertaking vigorous strategic force Improvementsiew to ochiexing incrernentelut. above alt. io avoid falling behind the UStrategic environment Increasingly characterised by qualitativend thus losing the position of rough equivalence wtth the US which they have achieved tn recent yean through great effort. Moreover, he believes it unlikely that the Soviet leaden anticipate any improvement In the USSR'i strategic situationls the US over the nestean which would substantially influenrr thti'especially their tneitnation forperiods of crisis or confrontation unh the Weil.
-top-Secret-
he Defense Inlelligence Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Assistant Chief of Slaff for Intelligence. Department of lhe Army, tlie Direclor of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Novy. and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe lhat the foregoing discussion is in error In that it gives the impression tliat lhe Sovieis believe thai ultimate goals cannot serve as practical policy objectives for future force development because they cannot be achieved in some predetermined limeexample,year period of this Estimate. These agencies believe that the Soviets do, in fact, see as attainable their objective of achieving the capability lo wage an intercontinental nuclear war. shouldar occur, and survive ll with resources sufficient to dominate lhe postwar period. Further, these agencies believe that this objective servesractical guideline for Soviet strategic force development, even though the Soviets have not necessarilypecific dale fvr its achievement. In their view:
Soviet programs for .mproving forces forconflict {including those for strategic hardening and civilheir extensive research on advanced weapons technology, and their resource allocation priorities, are In keeping with this objective, illustrate ils practical effect, and are bringing it progressively closer to realization.
In combination wtlh other military and non-military developments, the buildup ofnuclear capabilities is integralrogramed Soviet effort lo achieve the ultimate goalominant position in the world.
While it cannot be said with confidence when the Sovieis believe they will achieve ihis goal, they expect to move closer lo it over the next JO wears and,esult, to be able increasingly to dcler US initiatives and lo inhibit US opposilion to Soviet initiatives.
he Assistant Chief of Slaff. Inlelligence. Department of lhe Air Force, further believes lhaltlmale understates, as have previous SIF.S, the Soviet drive for strategic superiority. The lines of Soviel strategic policy, objectives, and doctrines enunciatedarge body of authorilaUve literature are viewed within the context of differing US
perceptions and aspirations rather tlian In the larger context of Soviel history. Ideology, ond military investment.
he Soviets have made great strides toward achieving general miliiary superiority over allconstellations of enemies and foraiwmcapability al all levels of conflict. War suiili.i/ and civil defense efforts to date have already placed the USosition of serious strategic disadvantage by neutralizing much of thc US capability to destroy or damage effectively those elements of the Soviet leadership, command, military, and urban-Industrial structure required fora credible deterrentealisticof nuclear fatality exchange ratiosar today would probably show the USSR emerging with considerably marewenty-to-one advantage.
2ft There nowubstantial basts forjudging thai the Soviets' negotiations at SALT and their detente, economic, and arms-control diplomacy have thus far been exploited by them for stralegic advantage: by slowing down US defense investment and byeasy access to high US technology. The net effect of improved Soviet and East European access to loans, goods, and services from many Western countries is lliai inefficient sectors of the Sooiet economy are in effect being subsidized, thus encouraginginvestment in strategicegree of hostage control is being acquired over elements of the Wen European banking structure by Moscow and ils East Europeanihe form of extensive hats (now approaching allowable limits for manyhas serious economic warfareAdditionally, the extraordinary advances being made by the Sovieis in ASW and high-energy particle-beam technology could place thc Free World's offensive ballistic missile capability at serious risk well before the terminal date of this Estimate.
hile the present NIE is much improved over some of ils predecessor documents, Il falls for short of grasping' lhe essential realities of Soviel conflict puqiose and evolving capability, the latter clearly constituting the most extensive peacetime ivartn recordedsituation not unlike thai of the. when lhe entire Free World failed to appreciate the true nature of Nazieadily discernible preparations for war and conflict. Thc dissenting judgments of the past floe years
res tvmti-rGft
regarding Soviet defenseonet Mraugic objectives ond policy. ICHM re/Ire3 that someoajor new or modified offensive ballistic missile systems were under development. Soviet war-survival and dvddefense measures. Backfire bomber capability, and dsrtclrd-energy weapons drurlopmrnl have often served as the principal means of alerting lhe liational leadership to trends which now are dearly evidenced. Failure now lo anticipate the implications of such trends will Impact adversely on lead limes essential for the
alteration of policy and redirection of technology
programs
uch lead time Impacts art illustrated dramotiudgments of the0 which implied lhat Soviel goals entailed no more lhan strategic partly and did noi Involve commitmentajor civil defense program. The Atslslant Chief of Staff, InteUigence, Department of the Air Force, believes lhat the former was the basis for US arms control policy9 white tht taller Influenced the ABM Treaty2 Hi to concerned that tht present perceptions of Soviet goals ond evolving capability provide an inadequate basis for the pursuit of further negotiations al SALT or the reformulation of national defense and foreign security itolicy. At issue is wliether present intelligence perceptions provide an arltquaie basts for averting global conflict in the decades ahead.
II. SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK
A. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force, Deployed Forces
he SovietsCBM launchers af operational comple.es asovemberfewer than lasl year, because ofurns of oldn launcheri In addition, there aieaunchers al thc Tyuiatam missile test center which wc conlinuc to believe sic part of the operaUonal fore Of tho total force at operationalCBM launchers wereere under construction or conversion, andere in Ihe process of being dismantled under terms of Ibe Interim Agreement (Seeor tbe status ol the ICBM foioe andor system characteiislics. see Volume II for additional delaib on both.)
The New Missiles
ll four of ihe new Soviel ICBMs incorporalc major qualitative improvements over (he systems Ihey are replacing:
Three of ihe four new ICBMs are being deployed wiih MIRVs Veneon. of the newndairy lour and si. MI HVs respectively. Theas been tesled wllh both eight andingle-RV version ol the"as also been deployed Single-RV versions of thendre being tesled
The new systems have rnore throw weight. Ihe useful weight which can be deliveredhan theii predecessois ThendCBMs have three to tour limes lhe throw weight nf theUtiles which they are replacing.
The new systems are more accurate than their predecessors {We refer to -icy as "
circular
errorr CEP; CEPressed as the radiusircle into which loeiehance thai the warheadissile willc csliinalef
that accuracy will improve somewhat as the* Sovietserieoc* with lhe missiles (see.
The silos for (he new ICBMi are several limesthus less vulnerable lothan lite older silos.
Our estimates of ICBM throw weight, accuiacy. yield, and silo hardness are subject to varying degrees of uncertainty. Moat important to tbe attack capabilities of Ihe new missiles Is the uncertainty In operational CEPs. which significantly affects judgment!the capability of Soviet ICBMs to aitack hard targets The implications of uncertainly abouland yield, as well as improve men Is in accuracy anticipated in future rrmdificattons and. are discussed in later paragraphs of this section aod in Section
*tiKwon ol the nflMif SovKt ICBM lelunctcs. and nl (hrnr Volume III. Anno. C
T.bl> I
Sutu. ol tht Sovfrl ICBM Fern
Syiiem
ICBM SonS-8
ICBM Hard
SS.)
ssa
SS-0
S-IO
Subtotal
TOTAL
SS*Si brrlrurd to ht upt'a-tlonul al Tyuniim
4u
4a
174
ii*
WOO
OooUtucllon or Convcniofi
,
Dranaolllnj;
44
91
Tot.l
^04
T-.l
69
51!
M
Silo Modernisation Conversion, andAs manyilos were operational with tlie new missiless last year. Ihese is good evidence that the program now underway callsotalndidSS-lfi silos. The conversion of older silos Io house the new ICBMi continuesoderate pace. Thii pace is evidently dictated In partoviet desire to keep most of the ICBM force ut service at any given lime. (No mote thanoercent of the total ICBM force Is off line for conversion at any onehc overall pace of conversion starts lias increased this year and is
slightly higher than we had predicted at this time last year1 Conversion ofilos fot thes proceeding more rapidly than wc expected, while conversion ofilos fot their replacements is somewhat slower. Theie Is conflicting evidence as to wlicther tbes being deployed in iheilos fnr the oldeiissile The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Department of the Ab- Force, beheoes that deployment of theo replace thes underway.
'ti, l thc Sovwt -to com* won
Estimated Characteristics of Older Soviet ICBMs
HtltH
JO
1(0
Estimated Characteristics of New Soviet ICBMs
Mrtri
ft*
/S
iJrn
SS
bvgitti to iwhi
c
K*|'t;i- IMI
*)
I
op-fatlonvi -e'enmvSmll. Own ll. kx <tau.ii
on .nglallV dowlopmanl.
lorS. Sr*II. Ow" II.
lti.:niiij'i o' Id deployment naiui
-1
2
Impact of
Silo Conversion and Modernization Programs on Soviet ICBM Forces
i.Mfl
NuBiair of ICSM Uun:ftti; JAM
lire Ti
Al tn* msi mitmi trttf OW 'o'er tnC fitIW
TmbMM out.total rnj"4a> ot
milrili briBvif rAcnd SSth not"fl
roCBll.imsti proportion o'till)itmtMui lly oji o'lt tha* areA<tne SovKti to comDOt*
f in*nrMM* by Oe iM0 io IS tw-wii atofti mt
tonnriur tor Ititw* i, .
n tlw inte'im.
!M, If our projections of ntimbcr and pace ate correct deployment ofndo. winint will be accompltshed in0 Chronologically, the Soviet* ate about halfway through what evidently will be an eight-ycatprogram. Inrogram toilos with newer variant of theystem was completed in the summer6 We expect the Soviet) to complete the dismantling of the last of their olderndaunchen by8
V> Force Mix. Until thu year, it appeared that only one of the new ICBMi. theould be deployed in both the ungte-RV and MIRV variants, thendppeared to be intended for MIIIV. only, and the smalleror single RVs. Thli year, the Soviet! started flight testing single-RV pavtoads or. thende are confident lhatf thr SSI* now operational are the smgle-RV variant, and lhat allnd SS 1now-opcraho.'ial are MIRVed.]^
^The MIRV
variant
of thci now ready, however, and probably has been installed in atew it lot At two operalioial completes, we know thats were In.sdrd Into ihronfigured foi fhe1her" ii uncertainty aly>ut which missile has been Installed in the silos converted mote recently at these locations We are confident lhal tlie Soviets had no more thanIHVrd ICBMs operationalhrrc may have been only about IM
Top
3b. Il will coniinue lo be difficult if not impossible IO determine the precise forcehete are no external differences between the silos (or the single-RV and MIRVed variants of tbe new missiles, no pattern of segregating variants by deployment complex is evident, and we have yet to diicover any indicator which would conclusively establish that anissile is in fact installedilo configured for thche last of these problems, which mayemporary lag inroduction, it likely to disappear tn due course as the Soviets deploy SS-IOs In all silos configured for them, but il lhe Soviels catty to completion the development of both single-RV and MIRV versions of all their new ICBMi. this will fiirthoi complicate the picture ^
Laud-Mobile Missiles
e believe that the Soviets haveobile version of theCBM. but it oppeai* that deployment has becn-deferred. li theof mobileot bannedALT TWO agreement, wc believe lhat lhe Soviets will continue to work onIRVed variant ot an entiirly new follow-or in themaintain their technology and to hedge against the possibilityreakdown In SALT oi the possibility of increased ICBM silo vulnerability
Jin view
of the throw -eights and potential accuracies of theie systems, however, the MIRVed versions asthai of thecontribute to Soviet countcapabdlbes This contribution willin the future as these systems are Improved und modified Thus, tbe Soviets arc acquiring greater fletlbtlity lo use their various ICBMs against both hard and soft targets.
hendold launch technique which would permit the Soviets to telond the silos fot these missileselativelyoours There are no indications that the SovieU arc providing the equipment or facilities necessary loubstantial rapid retire capability lor silo launchen. and we think It unlikely
he solid-propelobilewo Hag* derivative of theaities three MIRVs. Estimates of tlic range of then its curi'iii conliguration vary: the Central Intelligence Agencyange0he Defense IntelligenceO0SO0nd the Aiilifnnf Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, aboutkmm) Regardless of the differing range estimates, all agencies agree thai thct cunently configured. Is an intcimediale-rangc ballistic missile and lhat il will replace agingedium-range ballistic missiles andRBMs Preparations for tbe initial deployment of therc now-underwayhows potentialarget coveiage. considering ibe spread of range estimates indicated above.)
be range of lheould be extended in several ways if the Soviets those lo do so. Range
?8
Likoly Deployment Areas and Target Coverage of0
5EGRCI-
LikelyO daploymenl areas
(hey will do to in tlie future. Tlie Assistant Chief of Slaff. Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, believes that the Soviets are planning to reload andortion of theirnd SS-18
force. The cold launch technique leaves the silos for these missiles virtually undamaged. He abo notes that there is sufficient hard and soft storage atnd
ompletes to liouse missiles needed to reload most of tlie tlloi at these locations The hanlened
facilities are atomplexes only and supported
then the pott.
Fuluic ICDM*
hereevidence that imptovetnent* in the ICBM foice will not stop with the completion of the current deployment piogram-L
addition, some of the facilities involved in
ReVD appear to be expanding, suggesting that the Soviet capability for simultaneous development of missile systems will Increasehe programs which we have identified involve systems which are already being flight tested or which could enter flight testingt i* unlikely that all of these programs will result in actual deployment, but there probably ate additional programs in lite planning stages which we have not yet detected
n developing new or inodilied ICBMs. wc expect one Soviet objective to be improved accuracy. Improvements in missile accuracy are likely to involve better inealial guidance systems and reduction of RV separation errors Over thc longer term, several other approaches ate possible, among which on attractive but technically demanding approach would be toancuveilng RV (MaRV) designed for high accuracy We would not expect the Sovieis lo be able toighly accurate MaRV beforeime period, bui we cannot rule out tbe possibility that Ihey could do so as earlyable III shows our estimate of future Soviel ICBM accuracies. (See Volume III. Annex C,ore detailed discussion.)
B. Submarineallistic rniisilo Forces Present Forces
he Soviets have been steadily increasing lhe size and ovetall stake capability of iheli submarine-launched ballistic missile force since the. AsheyLBM launchers onuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) which had reached operational itatus. andore launchers on lour SSBNs on sea trials. In addition, there were at least IS6 launchers on nine nuclear-powered submarines will outfitting or under construction Fnough SSBNs now are underto exceed lhe Interim Agreement limits of 62
L
modein SSBNi and 0S0 modern SLBM launchers inhortly after Ihc agreement eipirei. In addition, iheie tutaunchers (or aide* missile* on dieselut these units are believed lo br? assignederipheral rather than inreiwntinenlal targets (Tbe characteristics ol Soviet ballistic missile submailnes and SLBMs arc shown inndhe status of llie force it shown in Tabic IV.)
he Soviets conlinuc to launch SSBNs at the rate of about sti per year. They now have launched four unlithin) version ofn SSBN, which we designate (he Dill One of these units Is believed recently to have conducted theea firing of the new MIRVcdLBM. The first
MlltVed Soviel SLBM syslem will, therefore,become operational
4G lasl year we believed thatll wouldlonger thantubelassI) and lhal il might carry as manynly
observable difference between the two variants is that Ihe turtleback onittle over one meter (aboul four feet) higher lhan lhal ofl. Thr higher turlleback Is required to permitll to carry theonger than lhe older non-MIRVedarried*lsof these submarines to carry the SS NX-In would require major shipyard work which piobably
Characteristics of Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarines
ISCra-<M0 li)
DS n
I)
iau*!
ri)
IB MC rm)
" WBtas
D rm)
>S SS-lt-S t,)
ura In (MO nnl
3 J0 ten ('Ot un>
3
mud-
bioGetaii uniu
Onewa, ^vadif^ rocry^?
mooonomee,s.
31
-leo-SeereS-
Top Stern
Estimated Characteristics of Soviet SLBMs
II -
RV( CEP[
taunt* malic Yd! taeiaiiorit)
il!
MM 1
Submitted | 1 1 8
I
MhJJ * |
3
SS-HX-IB
zt
RVtfiVi
S*airi(|il
one ItV hai been teftwJ to dale. Capability mavexin for uplflVt.
Only twoe tested io dan with tha MIHVed vetlion.
be identified
J
lass SSBN (which wc call thc Mod-Y) has been extensively modified. It now has onlyubes, which will accommodate another newpiobably the soltd-propcllcdecause of its size and weight, we believe that theannot be retrofitted intolass units. There are no indications that thc Sovieis are modifying anylass submarines. In view of thestatus of Ihelight test program and the fact that no other submarines have been delected undergoing modification. It seems doublful that the
ill be cilcnsivdy deployed. Since the Soviets have not previously flight-testedSLBMs.inal decision on deployment of thesyslem may have been delayed. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believes that thet being developed forlube.lau SSBN. This first application of tolld-propeUanl technology lo Soviet SLBMs, lhe improvementi In lellabdily, safety, and accuracy, ond the Increased readiness, in additionotential MIRVcd payload, would upgradelass weapon system. In hit view, this upgrading could eventually Involve SO to GO percent oflass iriocntory-
c continue to believe (hat the Soviets areew class of much largerthe size of thc US Trident. Ifubmarine it
Toll I
Subrnjciirf fjliu
l/IE4
Y
J/12
a/t*
1/Z4
I
9
9 10
CIju Total Submarines Annuntablc Under
0
0
iremen I
K.*
Toul Tubes
Acvnun table Undo
Inlrrim Afiennrnl
4/CQ
lTorHull* ond Tubes
' Indudes unln undergoing refueling. ovtAtul. at? of lhae lubmirinet hu born launcheditting nul
'Tht bunchen on It-eUode, tb, teem, of the Interim Agreement, but lhe
"diael .niti-ondcaMedKiich hive been converted to lire modern ir Unlet
^rm SAt,fNirpatct. tbe MeJ-Yfa HiD eor*denvJ lohaveuba.ng.ng theto
'onveiled to fire modemauncher, on CcUa .ubnmnna are not Included in theAgreement Altuniw .reederianal .Hack Blitt)0n.
under construction, as some evidence luggeits. It could be operationalew. large SLBM by about "
Patrol Posture
he Soviets continue to maintainmall portion of their SLUM fonx* on operational patrol; this is consistent with their vieweriod of Incteased tension would likelyuclear war.issiles can leach the US from the vicinity of home pods In the USSR, however, so the number of SI.BMi normally within firing range of tbe US it Increasing atass units equipped with long-range SLBMs become operational. The numberasi submarines on patrol at any given time remains atoff each coast of lhcwill evidently remain ar aboul present leveh. The numberlass mills on patiol has varied from one to possibly as many as five: these units normally pattol much closer lo home thanlass. II-
Sovlcts probably will routinely keep at leastn. units on station in tbc Northern Fleet patrol atea and at least one in thc Northern Pacific, altliough oppottunitics for more distant patrols exist {see Figurehe possibility of further eslension and variation of patrol patterns is raised by the recent firingtandard or modifiedo0 nm) and by SSBN patrol eicunlotu near US coasts in lhetwo years
Future SLBMs
he two new Soviel SLliMs-thcndto undergo flight testing. Both of these new missilespostboost vehicles required for Ml HVs, bo! thus fat onlybeen testedIRVed payload. As with their latest land-based ICBMs, Ihe Soviets are also testing Iheingle reentry vehicle. If development of both variants Is carried lo completion.
best copy (VAIESBIF
-Top
wilt be difficult lo estimate ibe mix of MIRVed and single-RV SS-NXISt.
e believe lhc Soviets will begin flight lestinga new and still larger SLUM in thc next few years for thc new. much larger submarine noted abovcf*
]
here are continuing differences within the Inielligence Community concerning SLBMbut wc arc confident thai no current Soviet SLBM systemshieal to hard largcts. Although we expect bothX-I7 ando have improved accuracy, neither lyitem is expected lo have the accuracy and yield combination lo threaten USilos Wc do not know whether this would be tbe case fot lhe new large SLBM cited above
C. Interconiinenlol Bomber Forest Deployed Forces
Long Range Aviationong range Bear and Bisonoisons arc configured as tankers *Backfire bombers have been assigned lo lhe LUAAll agencies agree that the Backfire willloi peripheral altack and antishipthere are continuing uncertainties andabout its capability for inlercontinenlalabout Soviel Inlenllons lo employ it in thisremainder of the LRA force consists ofBadger und Blinderor lhe chataetr it sties of Soviet) In addition lo the traditional andmissions of Intercontinental andattack. LRA units trainariety ofincluding antiship strike,electronic warfare. We believe lhat thecontinue loelatively smallbomber force to complement theirand SLBM fotcca
LRA Operations Against lhe Contiguous US
the event of general war, Ihebombci foice probably would follow
'indirites lint ihit air lewtiien Ihan the SOhaveslimltrd.
lhc Initial ballistic missile attack with ilrlkes primarily against pieaiiigned targets. Wc do noi know whether LRA aircraft would fly radius (two-way) missions or range (one-way) missions against North America with tccovety outside the US. Range missions, if employed, would permit indirect touting and longer low-level operations and would reduce lhe need fot in flight refueling and Arctic staging.aintainedow dayloday readiness, makingulnerable lo surprise attackeriod of (tialeglc warning, we believe Ihe Soviets would take' meatuics lo protect iheii bomberby increasing iheir alert posture, including dispersal of airciaft.
Thc Backfire Bomber
roduction and Deploymenl. We estimate lhal aboulackfires had been built asf which have been delivered to LRA and Soviel Naval Aviation (SNA) units Judging from past and current indicators of aircraft production priorities, we believe the Soviets will produceackfires0 andy theroduction could be higher if tbe priority were increased. New constiuction al Ihe Kazan' airframe plant, which will increase the size of (lie facility by aboutcicent, may be indicative of Soviet plans lo ineirase production of thc Backfire. The plant continues to produce theransport and lo overhaul Badgers, however, and we would cipect bolh of these programsnd priorignificant Increase in Backfire production. Aboutercent of Ihe Backfires produced probably will go lo LRA and SNA operational units in roughly equal numbers, with lhe remaining IS peicenl used fot replacements and for testing and training.
u date, Backfires have been opetallonally deployed only to Badger bases and have replaced iomo Badgen at Ihese bases. There are Indications that lhe Soviets ate preparing to deploy the Backfire lo another SNA base and to four more LRA Badger bases,
erformance. During the past yeat. we have obtained additional technical intelligence on the Backfire!
and new evidence on missile loadings Although this new evidence has contributed to out analysis, il has noi significantly affecled agency positions regarding Backfire ijctfurmance. Because ol differing Interpreta* lions of available evidence and differing lechnicat
Tui wiMW V4
Backfire
II a-
Sovicl Long-Range and Intcrmedlato-Range Bombers TU 'ih Bear
OUVfaa.f
bum tofW
ciou
Blinder
i.AHiiud* Sutxonk Millionautical mitei):1
UncelueieeJ
* OonfwrtonBomb*.OofrtMrCIA. 5mii OIA. Aimy. Aif i OidV* llrxr.be/Bl flei BomDw 1
SJttO
W)
0
PjykvW Th*KxcerKe
ruyicwS ii oneeigh0
B.eVin, ,UotH can .Xo cam,ee Volume l|mBa ^
PWOOieiprrux*the QtgMrtf,
it/r-
-Top-
assumptions, current estimates range from an aircraft dearly capable of intercontinental operations without air-to-air refueling to one with marginalcapabilities under the same conditions.effortsulve these differences atewe cannoi stale confidently lhal wc will be able lo nartow ihem significantly.
he Central Intelligence Agency hasrassessment of the Backfire's
he basti of this analysis. CIA concludes thatakeoff weight and engine power are less than previously estimated. CIA estimates that the Backfire, as tesled and currently deployed,aximum highsubsonic, unrefueled rangemorren<ondlng radiusm0b) payload The higher valuesesign optlmtud for subsonic performance and the loweresign compromised for both subsonic and supersonic performance. CIA haiboth designs because they represent reasonable upper end lower bounds of subsonic cruticImportant performance characteristic about which there currently Is no direct evidence.
he Defense Inlelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelbgence. Deportment of lhe Army, and the Assistant Chief of Slaff. Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, continue to believe that the Backfire,b) payloadangemadius of 2JXX) nm for ihe high altitude, svbiontc minion They note that numerous analyses by government and Industry groups using all available inlelligence sources support their estimate and thai no new information has surfaced during the past year whichhange in their assessment.
he Department of State believes lhal the Backfire designompromise between requirements for low-level pentlratton and htgh-altltude subsonic crude The Department believes lhat CIA'sound and generally supports that agency's assessment. It Is tlie Department's view, however, that the uncertainties are such tliatcapabilities could be greater than CIA'sfor this0 nm radiusm range) but probably are still within CIA's overall radius and range citlmates.
he Energy Research and Development Admin-Ulratton and she Director of Naval Inlelligence. Department of lhe Navy, beHeve that It ts not possible toonfident single figure esllmale of the Backfiie's maximum radius and range with the evidence now tn hand.
ir-to-Air Refueling. All Backfires observed to dale have refueling piobes, and air-lo-air refueling operalions were atnducled as part of the Backfire test program The use of air-to aj: refueling would enhance lhe Backfire's capabilities both for peripheral atiack and naval missions. With air-to-air refueling, lhe Backfire -wouldonsiderably Increased capability for intercontinental operations, even In (he case of the lowest estimates of ils current performance figure II shows tbe following: without air-lo-air refueling, lhe Backfire could reach targets In the contiguous US under either assessment of its perform-ance. but. accordinghe CIA and State assessment, only on one-way missions; wiih ooe in-flightaccording to lhe DIA. Army, and All Force assessment, the Backfire could reach virtually all targets in the contiguous US on two-way missions; according to Ihe CIA and Stale assessment, with one in-flight refueling. Backfire could reach all targets in the contiguous US on one-way missions, bui ilt target coverage would sllll be only marginal on two-way missions
Upgrade Potential. All agenda agree that, wiih vanous modifications, the lange of the Backfire could be significantly improved. Someas adding eiternal fuel tanks or using weapons bay fuelbe made relatively quickly and easily. In the mew of the' Central Inlelligence Agency, olher Improvements In lhe Backfire's performance would bt required tofor any resultant significant increase In welghl. The Assistant Chief of Slaff. Intelligence. Deportmenl of the Air Force, believes that current takeoff performance of the Backfire is sufficient lo allow for carrying additional fuel without additional tmprove-menii
Olheras aerodynamic design improvements In thc wing or lengthening lhc fuselage to permit greater fuelbe morelsey probably would be irtcorporated info new Backfires. The Central Intelligence Agency has not yet evalualrd lhe potential range mliance-
y>tt
BEST COPY ftVMLABlE
'ir-'t ii
Assessments of Backfire's Capability Against tho United States Unrefueled Mission
CIA.irAiltliatal
mem of such modifications. The DIA. Army, aid Air force etllinalct of Backfire range would be Increased ai follows:
Increase
Add external fuelweapons bay fuelImprovedaerodynamicpercent
Two or more of the above possibilities could be combined, but the overall improvement would not be gseatc thanoercent, because af offsetting design considerations.
ikelihood of Employment Againsi the US. There is no direct evidence about current or future Soviet intentions to employ thc Backfire Inoperations, and differences of opinion erht about whether Backfires will be used in this role. The differences involve not only the question of the Backfire's assessed capabilities but alio the question of how much weight should be assignee" to the available indicators of intent.
3?
e believe it tl likely (hat Backfires will continue to be assignedheater and naval missionsthe eiception of the Defense Inielligence Agency, the Energy fteseaich and Development Administ ration, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Inielligence. Department of thc Army, and (he Assistant Chief of Staff. Inielligence. Department of (he Ait believe it Is correspondingly unlikely lhat tbcy will be specifically assigned lo Intercontinental missions. Thc history of the Rackfitc'i development, the observed patterns of deployment to dale, and the low-altltude and supetsonic chatacterii-llcs bulll Into ihc aircraft strongly suggest that Ihe Soviets designed ll as anf mediate-range bomber and ASM cariiei lo fulfill the peripheral and naval attack missions. The capabilily of the Backfire loide range of peripheral and naval missions on ipccialliecl flight profiles, however, also gives it al least some capabilily for Intercontinental operations. Wc cannot, therefore, etclude lhe possibility that some portionrowing Backfire force would be employed againsi targets in thc US. although it II more likelyew intercontinental bomber would be deployed for such use If Ibe Soviets decided lo assign any substantial number of Backfites to inter-
-
coniincntal attack, they almost certainly would upgiadc the pcrfoirnance of lhe aircraft ororce of compatible new tankers to support ihem
'fce Centraf Intelligence Agency concurs wtth the ludgment In the preceding paragraph but believes there is additional penuartoe evidence that the primary mUrioni af thtt aircraft are peripheral and naval attack. The evidence shows that, as earlyhe Sovietsrogram to redesign thelinder Inltrmedtate-rangt bomber toserious deficiencies which became apparent after llust aircraft entered operational service. The results of that effort, as reported by human sources, correlate closely wtth ukal is known about the Backfire program. In CIA's vitw, thlt conelatton confirms its judgment that the Backfire was designed for the roles for tonicn the Blinder wasperipheral and navalfound lacking.
he Defense Intelligence Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, theChief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Staff.Department of the Air Force, believe lhat available evidence on Backfire employment indicates only that peripheral end naval attack are lhe aircraft's current primary missions That evidence. In thetr dew. does not support the conclusion that the Backfire was specifically designed as an Intermediate-range bomber to satisfy peripheral end navel requirements. Their detailed technical analysis of lhe Backfire'sIndicates that itong-range bomber with significant, unrefueled capabilities foras well as peripheral and naval, operallaru. While they agree that observed Backfire basing at ERA Badger airfields is consistent with peripheral missions, they would stress that the fUxibtiity of bomber aircraft and the pretence of Beat and Bison bases tn the same geographic area reduce lhe significance of lhe location of these airfields and of post aircraft asssociotiont foe the assessment of theissions In lhe view of these agencies, the evidence relating the Backfire lo thelinder, even if oahd. does not Indicate that the Backfire was Intended only for millions perfonned hy lhe Blinder. Since the Soviets could use the Backfireintrrcortrinenlaf atpabilitlti at their own tnlliative. these agencies believe tliat those capabilities shotddrime consideration in assessing the aircraft's present and future missions. Thus. In their view, the Backfire dearlyhreat lo the contiguous VS. even turnout ihe deploymenl of
a compatible tanker foicr or the upgrading of the aircraft's performance The AuUianl Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, further Mieuei that tome portion of the Backfire force uxll be used in mlitioru againii the contiguous US
Future System*
have additional evidence thi* year thataie developingnew, long-range bomber.
believe Ihe
chances are better lhan even thatomber will be deployed during Ihe period ol" this Estimate. There Is no evidence, however, thai the Soviet* haverototype.rototype were complelcd In Ihe near future and the Soviet* followed pail practice, the fiutbably would be operational in thehere alio i* new evidence (hi* year that the Soviet* areew tanker to replace thea variant of theandid tianiportt could enter icrvice in lignificanl numbers In Ihchc Soviets also continue to work on improved penetration aidsfor bombers
O. long-Ronge Ouiio Missile*
The Soviet* have considerable experience In the development and deployment ol cruise missilesariety of tactical and relatively thort-range *tra:egic applications, bui they have eihibiled little interest in long-range cruise missiles since theoviet efforts in SALT to impose tight constraints on cruise missiles, while not ruling out the possibility lhat the USSR has long-range cruise missiles undersuggest thai Ihe Soviets believe the present advantage In such programs rr*ls with the US Clven tbe present itralcglc environment, lhe Soviet* do not appear to have compelling miliiary reasons to develop long-range cruise miiillci If such missilesALT TWO agieemenl but are Included in delivery vehicle ceilings, lhe Soviel* piobably would no! sacrifice other wrapons lo have them If Ihey are not limited and lhe US deploys Ihem. the Soviets mighl follow suit.
If the Sovicls decided lo add long-range stralegic cruise missiles lo iheir arsenal. Ihey could
' For Ike pwpnr eltxwnioe. "lev*,mean* in eicrutoo km PsOUum usrdSALT.
iollow one of ihree approaches upgiade an existing cruise missile,rge cruise missile using current or near-term technology; or develop new technologies in guidance and propulsion for use in small, accurate systems laler on Any one of *ii existing Soviet ax- and sea launched cruise missiles could be mod.ficd for long range employment Such modified missiles could have maximum range* ofom) and could be made accurate enough lo attack large, soft targets Using available technology, the SovieU couldew. large cruise missileange of0 nm) and bring it Into service by the end of, bui ihey probably could not make It much more accurateodified version of an eiisling system
ighly accurate, large crulio missile, possibly with multiple warheads, piobably could be available for deployment Ineriod. Small, long-range cruise missiles accurate enough lo destroy hard targets piobably could not be tendy for flight testing before ihc eariy touidance probably would be the pacing technology.
IH. SOVlEI STRATEGIC DEFENSES
he Soviet* are pressing aheadariety of programs to improve their strategic defenses These programs apparently are intended to assure the survivability of lhe USSRational entity in lhe event of nuclear war ind lie consistent with lhe emphasis in Soviet miliiary docttine On Improving war.fighling capabilities
A. Defenseallistic. Missiles Warning System*
ith completionew Men Houie radar at Mulcachevo In thc weslern USSIthc Soviets will have essentially complete bnlllillc missile early warning (BMEW) radar coverage of missile* fired toward thc European part of the country (icen addition, new. large phaicdartay radars are under construdlon al Iwo(neat to an Misting Hen House thete) and Pechora, both in the northwestern USSR* Both radars could be operational by9
ASMBM birdr ma*af**rerlan set aet
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
figure 12
Soviet Ballistic Missile Early Warning and Battle Management Radar Coverage
NOTES
-fop Seed-
-fop.
Wc believeboth lhc new radars will improve Soviet ballistic missile early warningand coverage and that they will be used in ihis role. Large phased-array radars such as these, however, could be given the capability for ABM bailiethe capability to provide tracking and prediction dataupport thc operation of ABM systems. For such radars to perform this role, they would need lo have appropriate signal character-Islics. lo be operated in an appropriate way. and to be equipped with suilable computer hardware and software as well as data transmission systems!"
]
If radars al these locationsattle management role, tbey would noi significantlylhe baltle management support alreadyto the Moscow ABM syslem by eiisting tadars. Assumlngole, they could provide support for limited deployment of additional ABM defenses in the western and central USSB Additional battle management radars would be required lo support widespread ABM deploy men! in these areas. Battle management radars could constitute the long-lead-time elements of an ABM syilern like theow under development al Sary Shagan (secB7
There are differences of view within the Inlelligence Community about the likelihood lhal the radars now under construction will have capabilities for ABM baltle management tittd aboul thc likelihood that the Soviets ate building them Inr use In this role. Concern about the possible use of latge. phased-array radars for bailie management would increase if the Soviets started lo construct more such radars in locations appropriate for ABM support, and if the Soviets pursued ABM research and development vigorously.
Central Intelligence Agency beheoesini^nt. physicalorientations of thru two new radari requirehe eoniideied separately. CIA believes thatof lite new Otentgortk radar was dictated byuse with the Hen House radar at thisIn CIA's view, lhe combined capabilitiesnew radar and the Hen House will noi makefor an ABM battle management role, because
the Hen House is highly susceptible to nuclear blackout and thus cannot be defended by nuclear-armed ABMs CIA docs not believe the Sovieis would base an ABM defensealllt management radar which Is not itself dcfcndabU.
The Central Intelligence Agency furtherihai lhe design of the PechoraIsdictatedequirement to operate autonomously, perfonnlng boih search and tracking functions. Tlwre is no Hen House al this location. The new radar it oriented lo view US ICBMs launched toward the central USSR, and thus wilt provide early (turning to areas, which are not now provided such Information. Although the Pechora radar might have ABM bailie managemeni capabilities, lit location and orientation are not suitable for supporting ABM systems In lhe western USSR, and defense of the central USSR is probably not as high in Soviet priorities.
TrSc Central Intelligence Agency therefore believes thai the new radars are only for ballistic missile early warning. Moreover, CIA doubts that tlie Soviets will lutve an ABM system worth deploying againsi the US threal In the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, further deployment of Pechora-type radars in locations appropriate for supporting ABM defense would be of major concern.
The Deportmenl of State generally supports the CIA assessment of the role and capabilities of these rodan. The Department believes, however, thai the extent to which construction of additional such radars would be cause for concern would depend not only on ihetr locations but also on lhe assessment al lhal time of the likelihood of Soviet abrogation of the ABM Treaty. This assessment. In turn, would depend In large part on the estent to which tlie circumstances which led lhe SovieU to negotiate thisthus aoo'd an ABM competition with thechanged.
The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Slaff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Slaff. Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, agree lhal the radars ot Pechora and Otenegonk will be used to provide BMEW. The Olenegorsk radar would Improve tlie BMEW capabilities of the Hen House system, and the Pechora installation would esiend coverage lo areas not now covered. These agencies believe, however.
trial the available evidence regarding theie radon doei notonfident judgment about whether they may alto be Wendederform ARM battle management. TheU analyni Icadi them to believe that both the Olentgorsk and Pechora Installations would be capable of accomnhshlng baitlefunctions. They recognize thai the radars are vulnerable lo nuclear effects but believe that this does not preclude iheir defense. These agemiet believe that the Soviets couldeployable ABM system within the penod of this Estimate, and lhal these radars could provide the necessary battle nusnagement support if the Soviets chose to deployystem tn violation of the ABM Treaty or after wtthdrauing from it
he Assislant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Deiianment of lhe Air Force, further believes that the two radars now under construction might, inwith appropriate weapon systemsodified SA-Ss, ditected-energye sufficient to provide significant ballisticarge portion of the western and central USSR.
ver the-hoi.zon (OTH) detection iadan at Kiev and KomsomoTik probably could be used to detect both ballistic missile launches and aircraft, but with differing degrees of reliability. If not disabled by missile attacks, OTH radars have the potential forreating warning time against aircraft attacks, regardless of aircraft altitude. Depending on radio propagation conditions, they could also provide aboutinutes' warning of an ICBM attack. Signals from the Kiev radar were interceptedhe Komsomol'skot expected to be transmitting8 The Soviets ate ahopace-based warning system, which piobably will be opetationa] by theot detection of ICBM and SLBM launches and nuclear detonations.
Aniiballislic Missile Defense
improvements, we believe It Is unlikely that the Soviets will either replace the current Moscow system or augment It with the radars anddditional launchers allowed by thc ABM Treaty.
ABM research and developmentat (he Sary Shagan missile test center.complct there, the Soviets appealed toa follow-on to thc Moscow system, butwere ever flight tested, and the launchersbeen removed,owever, we wereidentify at this complex what probably is alaser. This Facility may be anunder development; on the other hand, ilintended to serve other objectives, includingof lasct radars fot ABM or spacelaser could not destroy missile reentry vehiclescould disable most satellites at tow altitudes.
anolhei complex at Sary Shagan, thecontinuing to work on an ABMlhecould berapidly than the Moscow system.foi this system could be deployed in aboutbut widespread deployment wouldyean. The Soviets began work onut apparently experienced technicalin its development. Theie have beenthe associated radar, some launchers haveand lest activity over lhc past two yearslow. Inowever, thewas firedive taigct for the firstis also recent evidence that the Sovietsihc development of ainterceptor at this complex.is pursued vigorously and lhcis used, thc system could beear or so.omponent (ur this system or forlyitcm, would requite at leasl three years of
The ABM system at Mtncow became opera- - sing lhc present interceptor, lhc
tional4 launchen are deployed atwould have little ot no capability to engage
complexes around Ihe dly The system wouldRVs wiilioui etlcrnal battle management data,
little defenseassive US missile attacksuch data, it wouldmiird capability to
could provide some protection fot Moscow andso. provided tbe interceptor wete launched before
fairly huge atea of the western USSR against aengagement radat acquired tbe target The Central
accidental, or unauthorized US launch, or againstAgency doubts the feasibility of such a
small, unsophisticated attackhirdof operation. Introductiongh-accetera-
Unlcstrograms result ininterceptor into Ihis system would greatly
<TC$
"toy flmcf-
ils capability, although external radar dala probably would still be required.
BeVD goals of this developmentrange from avoiding technological surprisedeveloping an ABM system suitable forThc broader underlying intentions mighl be;
to hedge against abrogation of lhe ABM Treaty;
to deter US abrogalion byapability to respond with widespread ABM deploymenl; and
toew ABM system widely as joon as developed.
Wc think ii highly unlikely that this programreseni intent to deploy beyond Moscow. It probablyedge against uncertainties about the fuiure slrategic situation.
Assistant Chief of Staff,of lhe Atr Force, believes thai,to the conventional ABMabove, lhe Soviets have established awell-funded ROD programtechnologies, which he believesinvestigated fot ballistic missileummary of his views on thissee.
SAMs in an ABM Ilole
believe that the currenl Soviet SAMsdeployed lo provide ABM defense and lhatnot suitable for Ihls role. The ABMtesting of SAM equipment in an ABMlhe Soviels might undertake alo upgrade Iheir currenl SAM systemsa measure of AUM capabilily, we believebecause (he kind of improvementsbe achievedovert program wouldin any significant ABM defense Wca more ambitious upgrade program,ignificant measure of ABMbe detected early in the program. Theof Staff. Intelligence. Department of thebelieves that modification of the SA-5point intercept of reentry vehicles islo achieve, and that it may already haveand not been delected.
B. Antisatellite Systems
he Soviets have an orbital anlisalelhle system armedonnuclear warhead capable of intercepting satellites which pass over lhe USSR at altitudes below0 nm)the Soviels have only two launchers for thisat Ihe Tyuralam lestsome evidence suggests thai lhc program may soon be espanded to the Plesetsk test tangc In the north-western USSR. This year, following four years without any lest flights, lhe Soviets dernonsliated thelo accomplish an intercept after only one orbit of the inietceptor. and thus to shorten the reaction time available fot coon let measures.
e believe lhe Soviets can cuirenlly employ electronic waifare against US space systems They have ground Millions to collect signals, they probably can jam satellite receivers and control links, and they may be able to degrade some US space systems by other means as well.
addition lo the probable lasetvidenrly underway on awhich we believe would be suitable lotsatellites. Theudged lo be inbul we believerototype couldand launched by thc
C. Strategic Air Defense
its massive size and wideip>eadthe Soviet air defense system bin ill ability to defend againstand bombers attacking at lowdeficiencies
citical gaps In low-altitude radar coverage;
too few ground-controlled Interceptite* fot controlling air defense Interceptors, and deficiencies in CCI radar tracking, equipment, and procedures;
the lack of an air borne warning and conirol system (AWACS) fot fighter interceptors.
the Inability of most, if not all. Sovieteffectively to detect and engage low-altilude
-lop-Seere*
targets while Ihc interceptor it Hying, above the Urge..
lhe limited low-altitude capabilities ol current Soviet strategic SAMnd
the lackefense against the US short-range atiack missile (SRAM).
The Soviets aie workingumber of programs to overcome Ihrse deficiencies, but wc do not rspect any significant improvement In Soviet capabilities foi low-altilude air defense befotc0
Air Surveillance and Control
he spacing ol all surveillance tadar sites suggests Ihll Ihere Is virtually continuous radat coverage down to0 ft| in lhe more populated areas of Ihe USSR andn lower altitudes in heavily defended areas (se*errain masking, howcvei. would reduce low-altitude coverage in many areas (sec Figureoi onend the Soviets have great difficulty in maintaining accurate tracking data on targets at the lower altitudes in any cane They have undertaken training which attempts lo respond to the low-altitude threal
an attempt lo ovcicome their deficienciessurveillance and Hacking, llie Sovieis began,years, lo Introduce new data systcmiin (heir air defense conlrol structure.was tu net groupt of air surveillance radarscenter* more effectively and toand timely target Hacking dala fromcenten directly lo individual SAMunits New dala systems havewidely wiih SAM liies. Thesuggests that deployment foris si ill limited, but there rs uncertainty on
by fighter aficraft arc slillwithin line of sight of Ihe radar at thcunit. If dalaumber of outlyingwere rapidly und accurately Iran tm it led to
llfc CCI units, interceptor vectoring beyond lhe CCIadar line of sightemote vectoring) would be possible. In vectoring interceptors to Ihelt targets. Ihe Soviets could compensate for some inaccuracies and lack of timclinesi in tracking data if they had an interceptor with good capabilitiea to locale and Hack am iaft flying below the interceptor's altitude. The Flogger interceptot, now being deployed to ittalcgic defense fighter forces, can delect and (rack targets below lis altitude, but its capabilities in combination with the most widely deployed CCl system are too limited to be effective for intercepting low-altitude targets.
here are differing judgments within the Inlelligence Community about whethet the new Soviet dala syslemt aie sufficiently accurate to permit remote vectoring, The Central Intelligence Agency and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Department of ihe Air Force, hold that the capabih-tlei of the new data systems, tn combination wtth current intciccptoa, are not sufficient to allow effective remote vectoring agalml low-altitude largeti. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Na turned Security Agency hold that the new data systems are technically sufficient to permit remote vectoring of llie Flogger interceptor againit lowaltilude aircraft but thai neither these dala systems nor the Flogger aircraft art being df ployed widely enough lo upgrade the present defenses before0 AH agencies agree, however, thai afterhe Soviets will have both interceptor* and data systems of sufficient qualityermit lhe use of remote vectoring and that these systems will be widely deployed-
n alternative or supplement to widespread improvement in ground conlrol intercept capabilities would be the introduction of on AWACS which could detect, track, and vector interceptors against aircraft and cruise missiles at any altitude over land as well as water, Development of anACSwouldomplex undertaking in view of the Soviet State of Ihe art; an overland AWACS would be even rnore so. While we have no evidence that the Soviets arc developing such systems, we believe that ihey could initiate deployment of an AWACS capable of lookdown overwater operations in theore advanced system capable of overland operalions
t
r
iguresndhow the characteristics of thc newer Soviet Interceptors and the locations al which Ihey are deployed. Except for thc Flogger, currently deployed Soviet Inteteeptors are unable to detect and track aircraft at low altitudes. As noted above, the Floggerimited ability to detect. Hack, and engage aircraft below iu altitude. It is now being deployed with strategic air defense forces In addition, the SovieU aieew interceptor,odified Foibal, which will piobablyookdown/shootdown system' This aircraft could be introduced byc expect it toetter low-altitude engagement capability than the Flogger. Wc believe the SovieU could introduce an advanced lonkdown/shootdown system by Ihe.ystem would have good
'A taetdoon/ihootilniinii tin* ihil can dual. luck, andttitude(remltitude writtlx Urielcondilxini -her* lhcreturn i. muled bf pnad djltei
-res-
detection and Hacking capabilities against aircraft We are leu certain aboul ils capability againit cruise missiles, but il probably would be able to detect and track ihem at reduced iangea.
Surface-to-Air Missiles
oviet strategic SAM systenu have little capability against aircraft penetrating lhe USSR at low altitudes. (See Figuresndor the deployment, coverage, and characterislics of thesehey arc deployed al fined locations, well known to US intelligence, and vulnerable loor luppresslofl tactics The SovieU havealternate SAM sties, but tbeir locations are also known. SovietndAMs could operate from unprepared locations not known to inlelligence Movement of large numbers of SAMs to unprepared location! in the period immediately prior to conflict, however, would rrouire extensive planning foe their support as -til as exercises to practice such movements Tlicie are no indications
Currently Deployed Soviet Strategic SAMs 40
SA-2
1?
SA-3
uaji [I'cclivc aUilBtt Maiimtn
Minikin*
ft Mailmgcn iinga
I SltilBBB
clfcttivt allileft*
Yrar eperailanjl
(10
I nm
n
II
Kfl in
m
13GJ
I
il
ill 10
optimum conditions and conventionalnptoiive vartiaedt.
any such preparations.
he use of nuclear warheads ooace-to-air missiles could increase the effectiveness of SAMs against low-attitude targets We now have evidence which indicates lhat nuclear waihcads aie available lo allites (thes deplored only aroundore than half theites, andmall but growing number oflles Thete is no evidence lhal nuclear wathead* are available for ther that theuclear option.^
rom what we know about the characteristics of Soviet ilrategic SAM systems, all but lite Defense Inlelligence Agency and lhe Assislant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army, believe that thes (hc only one that could be employeduclear warhead against low-altitude largels using
[they have made lis notmal engagement mode. In this mode, useuclear warhead could compensate for the large miss distances which would occur at the extreme* of the SA-2's low-altitude range It would be technically possible lo eitend ibe effective low-altitude iinge of anuclear warhead to as much asm) using an engagemcnl mode which did not requite elevation (racking. There is no evidence, however, ofmployment in this mode. Thciobably would be useduclear warhead only in situations in which the danger of collateral damage was acceptable and In which the attacking vehicle was within line of sight of the firing unit's radar. Operating at fixed locations. Iheould still be vulnerable lo avoidance and suppression Incllia
50
-ftp- Sjv.
he Defense Inlelligence Agency end llie Chief of Staff foe InteUigence. Department of the Army, beheoe that the pouibilUyuclear option for theannot be discounted and ihat ll ts premature to dismiss the use of nuclear-armed SA-Js andgainst1 loio-altltude targets. Tkca further
he aU defense datanow in uie in lhe USSR aie limely and accurate enough to allow the SovttUtr nuclear-armed SAMi against targets at ranges beyond line of sight
The Soviets sirew. low-altilude. strategic SAM system at Ihe Saty Shagan missile lest center II development continues at expected, the system could be operationalhc new iv-!nn it Uanspot table and appean suitable fot use against low.altitude litctafl and low-altitude ciuiie missiles Out pteltininary eslimale is that theaximum engagement range would be aboutm) against an aircraft the site ofm) against cruise missiles al an altitude of aboul0is ability to engage such lake's would depend on ill reliability undet various operational conditions and on the penetration, lactic* used by lhe US.
Wc cslimate on the basis of pasl Soviet ptactices and deploymenl tales lhatties for the new SAM syslem would be operational by thec aie uncertain aboul t'se degree of protection thai ihis number of tiles could provide. All but the Assistant Chief of Staff, Inielligence.of Ihe Am Foice. believe, however, lhal deployment on thb scale would not provide an effective terminal defense against crube missiles fo* moremall proportion of the target base The Assistant Chief of Staff. IntetHgence. Department of the Air Force, believes thai the foregoing understates the Soviet capability lo defend against in-flight enstse missiles Q
"Jlle recognttet that theof the SAM system It uncrrltrin at present and would be highly deisendenl on lhe attack scenario and on the characteristics of the SAM's targets (radar cross section, altitude, velocity, and capability to operate in cr electronic warfare environment) As an example of she uncenainiits about this system's capabilities, he notes lhat tome agencies have assessed It tootential cmsse missile engagement range of as much asm) He believes further data on the SAM system are needed before we can begin to resolve uncertainties as to tti capabilities.
here ate un ceil unities aboul the capabilily of lhe new SAM system to engage short-range attack missiles. Analyses by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Anittanl Chief of Staff, Intelligence,of the Air Force, lead ihem to believe lhal the radars associated with the system could notdirect an interceptow-altitude SRAM. Analyses by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Clilef of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army, and lhe National Security Agency lead these agencies to believe lhat, under optimumhe new system might be able toow-attitude SRAM at aboulmllhmall engagement zone and the likelihood lhat combat conditions would be less than optimum, however, it ts unlikely that the tysiem would achieve high reliability againstifficult target. All agree that lhe new SAM might be able toHAMemiballistic profile, allhough there is uncertainly aboul whether the systemuitable search radat and about whether thc system will have lhc short reaction lime required for such anGiven Ihe technical limitations tl appears to have, the system probably would not provide an effective defense against SHAM attacks.
Electronic Warfare
During thc past year we learned that aboul half of fhe ground-based Jamming equipment in lhe USSR belongs to Soviet strategic air defense forces. Previously wc had believed that this equipment belonged to the Soviet ground forces. These jammers probably would be used against terrain avoidance radars and bombing and navigation equipment. The overall effectiveness of Soviet defensive- jamming would dependumber of factors, however, such as weather, thc number and location of jammers, bomber penetration tactics, US electronic counter-counter measuresnd Improvements in US bomber forces.
The Soviels are aware of the degradation which jamming by enemy forces can have on their own ait defense systems, and they haveariety of ECCM measures to minimize the effects of such Jamming. In view of thc many uncertainties, wc are unable loonfident Judgment about (he effectiveness of Soviet ECCM. Such evidence as we have suggests that, in thc aggregate, current Soviet ECCM would not be successful in offsetting (he effects of US electronic countcnncasurcs (ECM).
-fop*.
-fao fecial -
Tactical Forces (ot Strategic Air Defense
addition lo their strategic airlie Soviets have sizable tacticalelements in lhc USSR. The tacticalwill, the Soviet gtound forces havecapabilities than those deployed withand most of them ate mobile. Thetactical avialion have nU bcltetthan those in PVO" Nevertheless, ifavailable. Soviet tactical ait defenses couldsource of significant additional resourcesof the USSR. Since the Sovietslhat an intercontinental nuclear warftom the escalation of lesser conflicts, itthat they rely heavily on laclical airfor slrategic defense purposes.
Future Air Defense Capabilities
Is unlikely that the Soviets willbetter low-allituderobable improvements inand control in interceptors, andmissiles have thc potenlial formany of the current technical deficienciesdefenses againsi low-altitude bombers byIt might he possible fot the Sovietsthese deficiencies somewhat eatlier withhigh level of effort. If Soviet deployments arcrales wc think probable, bomber jwnetrationdefenses would be considerably morelhchan it would be today.
The only Sovicl defensive system which might be able to engage the SRAM is the new SAM under development. While there are uncertainties about the characteristics of the new system, wc believe lhal. if it has any capability against the SRAM, engagements would be at shod tanges with low tcliabiliiy. VVC therefore believe that thc Soviets wilt not have an cffcclivc defense againsi thc SRAM by thcnd will have to seek lo atlack SHAM carriers prior to missile launch.
For defense against low-altitude cruise missiles, current low-altitude SAM syslcms might have some capabilities at short ranges. Fuiure Soviel air defenseAWACS. interceptors, and SAMs-will have some capabllilics against lo*-allilude cruise missiles in flight. Their effectiveness would depend upon their specific characteristics, their
numbers, and iheir deployment patterns. Wc arc uncertain about ihc degree of protection that could be achieved against low-altilude ctuisc missiles fn lhe- Ml bul the Assistant Chief of Staff. Inielligence, Department of the Air Force, believe, however, lhat lhe combination of characteristics and numbers ol Soviet defensive systems will belo provide prelection fot moremall proportion of the target base. The Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, believes that, in treating cruite missileseparate entity, the foregoing dtscuttion understates the Soviet capability to defendruise missile force. He believes lhal the analysis reflected in his tcrt inotential Soviet capability to defend moremall proportion of the target base againsi in-fltght cruise missiles. Further, he believes that. In an attempt lo dealurely cruise milstte force, the Soviets could eipand on the numbtrt of defensive elementt forecast in this Estimate.
IIS. The combination of US air atlack forces will coniinue lo be more difficult to defend against than any one of its elements alone. The air defense problems which Ihe Soviets now face would be complicated even further by US deployment of advanced bombers and cruise missiles. US penelralion laclics and thc degradation of defenses by ballistic missile strikes would continue lo weigh heavily against Ihe overall effectiveness of Soviet air defenses. We cannot, however, assess the full effects of these and other operational factors.
D. Advanced Technologies for Air, Missile, ond Space Defenso
he Sovietsarge and growing capacity lo exploit promising avenues in research andwhich might lead to new means of slrategic defense. While we espect them to continue lo develop andide range of equipment based on evotulionaty improvements in existing technology, we also expect them to slress research and development in areas which could lead to tadically new weapon systems In particular, we have considered the possibility that the Soviels might develop direcled-cnergy weapons--lasers, electromagnetic pulse, and particlc-beamstrategic defense
WWr-foY*
Soviets reportedlypace-bascd laser weapon in. From whal we know aboul (lie syslem. we believe il would be suitable for use against satellites, and we fudgerotolype could be launched by lhec do not believe it would be suitable for missile defense, but it couldleppingitone to longer term development for such purposes.
There Is no dlrecl evidence ol Soviet workonnuclear electromagnetic pulse weapon, and wc doubt lhat lhe Soviets could developeapon for strategic defense duting the period of this Estimate
Wehal the Soviets have conducted pteliminaiy studies on (he feasibility of particle-beamut we find no direct or convincing evidence that they hove embarkedevelopment program foiystem. We do noi believe they could beginrototype befoie lhe
We caution, however, that the Soviets do have high-priority USI) ptogiams underwayaploil advanced technologies, so developments in these areas bear close scrutiny.
he Assistant Chief of Slaff. Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, beheoei that the potential capabilities of partide-beam weapons were so attractive to the Soviets that they have beenigorous effort to detenmnt their feasibility-He considers that Soviet development of particle-beam weapons li lhe most important strategic undertaking since the development of lhe atomic bomb. The evidence thus far accumulated
that particle-beam ueapens for ABM defense could be operational by lhe
E. Delense Agolnil Botliuic Missile Submarines
he USSR currcnlly docs not have anto lhc US SSBN force, but the developmenteffective defense againsi SSBNsajorWe believe the Soviets leek Ihe capabilitya coordinated strike againsteriod of escalatinga possible conflict, ihey probablylo find and tiack as many SSBNs ashostilities
slatted, they would Iry lo dcsltoy nearlythose SSBNs which had been localiud. The Soviets piobably would also attack US command, control, und communication facilities in an cffoit to delay, disrupt, or prevent elocution of US SLBM strikes. Attempt* al attrition would follow.
he Soviets have been steadily improving ihend capability nf Iheir ASW forces (seeajor Soviel weakness in anll-SSBN operalions Is the lack of an effective broad-ocean surveillance capability We believe Soviet knowledge of (lie location ol US SSBNs al sea is limited to lhe general aicas In which lhe SSBNs opeiate. Olher weaknesses include the short range of Soviet ASW sensors, inadequate force levels, loo few bases for aidramc ASW operations over the open ocean, and difficulties In Integrating lhe USSR's own submarines into coordinated ASW operations. To use most effectively the capabilities they do have, lhc Soviets conduct coordinated ASW operations wiih several types of platforms, tactics, and weapons
tittle doubt tliat the Soviets areoean ahead of US science in actively developing particle-beam technology toend destroy ballistic tnissiU RVs He believesevelopment and testing facility to demonstrate the feasibility of beam propagationeam uvopon Is itfanvg completion,rototypearticle-litem weapon system could be availablend
'lel tinsr thetCHeeMiir* report ettaled "SnwrKHated fc> Futieie Bear*CS
]
Research and Development in ASW Systems
he Soviets ate carrying out eHensiv* research in ASW sensors, employing both acoustic and nonacoustic techniques They have apparentlya towed acoustic systemniquely configured sutfacc combatant This ship may be Involved In array lesting and evaluation. Towed passive ariayi would enhance surface ship passive acoustic performance, and surface ship towcd-airay technology could be adapted lo subinailnes The high noise level of Soviet nuctear-powcied submarines will
Future. 18
of Soviet ASW
UinLn af Haiti opiate otIS* aatratlani)
A. Selected Nuclear Submarines
B. Selected Major Surface Combatants
llr
Id
Graphliu ind Vtt.ii imIkimi -imi.
PdudiictiueiKan. Krctu II.
Kenin.rivak. end Kmu I.i lev ttmw la totalarrySW Mx^ei. Of*ei of Ova MoUn and* ovroe aotkaaaanv
ncludneopreri write" era cen lad on 15
Snvieilit* nolr far Chart
C. Selected ASW Aircraft
MOi-
US
Tih-
ASW Aircraft Capaole ol Operating in Potential Polaris Patrol Areas
M -
Shipborneelicopters
nd May Aircraft
J
-stcntt-
probably coniinue lo interfere with lhe effective operation of theft passiveowed array isolate* the passive sensor* fiom the submarine'* own self-noise and allowt fot enhanced passive tonar performance Passive acoustic sonars could also be improvedubmarine quieting ptogtam. Noise reduction for rusting Soviet submarines il less likely than the introduction of quietingew class.
e beheve it unlikely lhat thc Soviets will attempt loassive, acoustic, open-ocean system compatable to lhat of the US soundlytlem (SOSUS) during tire period ol this Cslimate. This judgment is based primarily on the technical difficulties involved as well as on geogiaphic constraints, such as the lack of reliable overseas sites fot shore lerminab. Passive acoustic systems may be dcvclo|ied fot barrier arrays, however, which could be deployed In sltails or confined waters, such as the Barenll Sea.
oviet investigation of nonacoustic detection techniques Includes aliborne radan to detect surface disturbances causedubmerged submarine, inflated sensors to delect thermal effects, and lyslems to delect extremely low frequency radiationubmarine^
3
Prospects fot Improvement of Anli-SSBN Capabilities
ecent development* point lo modest but steady improvement in Soviet ASW systems The future Soviet effotl probably will focus on the ute of many platforms and sensors wllh relatively short-tange detection capabilities, rather ihan on the use of fewer systemsroad-ocean surveillanceImproved US SSBN* and greatly expanded SSBN operating areas will further compound tlwroblem From our understanding of tbe technologies involved and of the RftD programs si the US and the USSR, we believe that the Soviets have little potential for oveicnming SSBN detection and hacking problems In broad ocean areas This judgment must be qualified, however, because of gaps In out knowledge of some technical aspects of
potential sensor developments. On the basisrme now available, we believe that Soviet capabilities againsi SSBNs in confined waters will improve during lhe period of this Eslimale. bul lhat Soviel ASW capabilities will fall short of being able to prevent most US SSBNs on station from launching Ihelt missiles. Nevertheless. Soviet ASW research and development merit dose and eaieful watching In the years ahead-
F. Civil Defense
ignificant shift in emphasis in the Soviet civil defense program occurred in thend, when the Soviets subordinated thc enllic progiam lo militaiyecent review of all available evidence on lhe Soviet program has revealed lhat some of the civil defense ptepatalkms which the Soviets have had underway since lhat time ate mote extensive and belter developed than we hadunderstood The Soviet civil defense program is evidently being pursued in accordance with the following priori:ia first, to assure the continuity of government by protecting the leadership, second, to provide for the continuity of important economic functions and the protection of essential workers; and lasl. to protect the nonessential part of the population.
arder.ed shelters and command posts ate now available for the top political and miliiary leadership and for milllaiy and civilian leadenumber of capitals and military headquarters below the national level Although Soviel planning calls for tedislribuling industiies oulside utban areas, lhc expansion of Soviet industry In the past IS years has noi significantly reduced ils vulrieiubilily to nucleat attack. Soviet heavy Industries temain mostly In large urban areas. The vulnerability of industry has been reduced somewhat, however, by expansion of some industries from urban centers into the suburbs or nearby towns and by producing certain miliiary equipment al more thin one facility. In addition, wc have info* mat ion on several hundred underground sttuctuteside variety of industrial facilities.
he number ol hardened shelters, particularly for industrial workers and other essential personnel, is increasing. We can make no estimate at present of whit percentage of such personnel could bePlans call for lhe mass evacuation of nonessential personnel arid for the construe!Inn of
relatively simple (alloul ilicttcis in evacuationSoviet* have reserves of food arid fuelareas,o not know the actual tirereserves or how long they would last Inappears that the Soviets* greatest difficulty inof large tea Ic nuclear attack) would not be their reserves but the problem of
istribution system and operating il under chaotic conditions
joi gaps remain in our knowledge of lhe Soviet civil defense program. Thus, we can make only tentative assessments of how effective that program would be under wartime conditions It Is out tentative' judgment lhal. undet optimum conditions which included an adequate period of warning andSoviet civs! defenses would assure survivalarge petcenlage of the leadership, would tcduce prompt casualties among Ihe urban populationmall percentage, and would give theood chance of bring able to sustain the population with essential supplies. With minimal warning, tome key leaders would probably survive, bul lhe urban population would suffer very h'gh casualties and the chances of adequately supplying survivors would be poor.
he civil defense measures which lhe Soviets are taking couldignificant impact on bolh US and Soviei assessments of the likely outcomeuclear exchange. The Soviets probably believe that Civil defense measures contribute to giving thehance lo surviveational entity and to beetter position than the USuclear exchange The Soviets, however, probably do notighly optimistic view of the extent to which theit present civil defense! could preserve the fabtlc of Soviet society in the event of large-scale nucleat attacks Even under the most favoiable circumstances, ihey probably would have toienkdown of the economy and. under the wont conditions,human casualties as well The effectiveness of the program in the future will depend in considerable measure on lhe pace and thoroughness with which Ihe Soviets carry out theit stateddefense plans The evidence to dale does not suggest ihai lhe Soviets ate carrying out theit civil defense programslash pace, but ralhei that theyontinuing, steady program II is not possible at piesenl, however, loonfident estimate of the pace and fuiure effectiveness of thc program
he Defense Intelligence Agency, lhe Energy Research and Development Administration, lhe Assistant Chief of Staff foe Intelligence. Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence. Department of tlie Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of tht Air Force, believe that tht Irnpocl of Soviet mar survival efforts upon the US-USSR ilrateglc balance It greater titan can be inferred from the foregoing iltscuulon of tlte Sotritt civil defense program. In their view, the Soviets tee their civil and passive defeme program as on essential element in the achievement of the capabilily to wage Intercontinental nuclear war. ihould one occur, and lunMoe with resources tvfflctent tothe poitwar period. Theie agencies believe thai this program willefinite and Increasing impact on US-USSR strategic balance anessmenti In the yean ahead Further, ihey belleoe tlie Soviets will etttmpt to enhance their influence, parttculady In the Third World and Europe, by capitalising on rtal and perceived Improvements tn their war wagingThe Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, further believes that lhe strategic balance already has been alteredajor way hy civil defense and otlier measures ihe Soviets have carried oul thus for.
he Dtpartment of Stale believes that lhe Soviet civil defense program is seen by the Soviel leadership primarilyrudent hedge againsi the posubility of atlackuclear-armed adversary. Moreover, the Department of State believes lhat these Soviel civil defense efforts will not mattrlally increase Soviet unlllngness touclear etchnngr and unil not undermine the deterrent value of US ilrateglc atlack forces. While fully agreeing tliat this is an important area of activity which deserves closer attention by tlut US Intelligence Communtlu. the Department of State believes that al the preseni lime the scope of the cied defense program does not indicate Soviet strategic obfecHuts beyondof rough equivalence with the US
IV. OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL CONFLICT
he Soviets today possess sufficientlyand survlvable intercontinental capabilities lo ensure lhe executionevastating retaliatory strike, even il caught unawaresassive US atlack. In a
umisi-nf-i-
first or preemptive strike against (he US. however, these lotcei are capable neither of fully destroying US offensive forces nor of effectively defendingS retaliatory strike. Details of lhe factors addressed in thb section affecting Soviet capabilities forconflict probably would not significantly influence ihese broad gcneralirations
hese factors can be highly relevant, however, to judgments about how Soviet decisionmakers and military commands would function and the decisions Ihey mighl makeeriod ol crisis or conflict when the risk of intercontinental nuclear war had become high, in (lie period during which an Intercontinental conflict was actually In progress, and in the event lhat Ihe US employed selective nuclear options inonflict We have only limited evidence oil which to base judgments on these questions.
e believe lhal Soviet initiation ofdeliberate nuclearighly unlikelyoviet perceptionevere crisis or some major local conflict involving the targe-scale commitment of US and Soviel forces was likely to escalate lo the nuclear level would, in our judgment, bring lhe Soviets lo consider such initiation. Nevcitheless. if ihey were to decide to attack the US In peacetime circumslances, we believe that Ihey could minimize indications of their intent by limiting their initial strike forces lo ICBMs and to those Sl.BMs within range of their largcli Preparations could be com-pleled within several hours aflei lhe decision lo Strike had been promulgated. Under ihese circumstances, there would be few indications and liltle lime for analysis upon which US warning staffs could reach andonfident judgment thai the Soviets were aboul lo strike.
e continue to believe thai the Soviets could engage in limited intercontinental nucieai war if ihey chose lo do so Soviet leadenesponseimited US attack would consider the circumstances at the time and what they perceived to be the consequences of their reaction. They probably would not he able to distinguishassive US attackubstantial selective attack on their territory Moreover, if ihey had not specifically planned for it in advance, theit latgeting doctrine and force stfuctute might make it difficult fot them to respond promptly in kind to whal ihey perceived lomall-scale limited altack. Even II they could, their
willingness to respond would be Influenced by Iheir ei pressed conviction lhat limited nudear warfare would likely escalate quickly to an unrestrained conflict, as well us by iheit miliiary doctrine collingaximum effott to destroy the enemy's capabilily to fight.
uring al least the next several years, (hercfofc.ighly unlikely lhal lhe Soviels would merely respond in kindmall-scale, limited US attack Any Sovicl responseimited strike by the US would be likely,inimum, toarge-scale attack on selected military targets, primarily nuclear delivery means, ratherore limited altack with lesser objectives.
A. Command, Control, ond Communicotions
ltimate authority fw the direction of lhe Soviel military in both peace and war rests with the Politburo. In wartime, however, lhe Soviet command sttuclute would be different from lhat in peacetime (sec. The Defense Council wouldthe nudcutational defense command which would consider all defense issues. The Supreme High Command would constitute the military leadership of the armed forces and would include lhc ptcdesignuled Supreme Commander In Chief (cu needy Brexhney) and hb Stavka (Ceneral Headquarters) The Cenetal Staff would implement thc decisions of (he Supteme High Command.ystem of interlocking memberships In the several decisionmaking bodies, the political leadeiship would continue lo dominate lhc political-military command structure.
entrahrat ion mayeakness* In Ihe system. The rapid assumption of decisionmaking authority. Induding authority toonflict, mighl prove difficult should Ihe top national polilical leaden be killed, incapacitated, ot isolated likewise, if thereost-Brezhnev petlod of political jockeying, full effldcncy of leadershiprisis or wartime situation would have to awall (he growth of new bunds of persona! trust and mutual dependence
ssar
+
Nationai
Political
Authority
National
Military
Authority
Command Authorities: Transition to Wartime
Peacetime
Potiibufo IS Mtmbsra
Defense Council
(Chairman! Koayg'n Podoornyy
Minister 0*
Detcnse
Ustinov (Minister ol Oolennel andlllfl'5
J
and control survivabilitysubstantially since theommand posts and communicationsbeen hardened and provided svilhfacilities. Underground antennas havedeployedumber of switchingmain communications routes haveOn the other hand, lhe warningnetworks serving Soviet air. missile,defense forces, as well as lhcSoviet space tracking and space-bawdand communications capabilities,and vulnerable.
Siiviels frequently complain inliteialurc about weaknesses in Ihciicommunicalioiis system and nole thai their
present in formation-handling capability docs noi fully meet iheir requiremcnls. They conlinuc to place great emphasis on improving (heir ability lo acquire and integrate baltle management dala and on improving lhc redundancy and protection of means fot main, lalning control over their forcesariety of dinimstanoes anderiod of warfare which they assume will last for some time.
HI We believe that lhc syslem would be degradeduclear wai. even if noi directly allarked. bui lhal it almosl certainly would be ableupport continued intercontinental operalions Under direct atuck. thc system would suffer additionaland probably would noi be able lo perform all baltle management functions. Thcand dura-lion of the degradation wuuld depend on thc nature of the atiack and on the Soviets' abilily to leconslilutc the system There are too many uncertainties at this lime for us lo judge thc cxtcnl lo which (he USSR's abilily to conduct intercontinental nuclear war would
t-
construlned under these nrcumslanocs. We believe, however, thai Ihc Soviets would be able lo carry out relalialory strikes
B. intelligence and Warning
ariety of sources contribute to Sovietv warning capabilities, but lhc Soviets appear to depend heavily on the reporting of Ihcir large and redundant signal intelligenceINT) network. Changes In lite status of US strategic forces ate known lo be prime MCI NT targets We believe lhe Soviets can monitor enemy force postures in sufficient detail to provide enough strategic warning to permit prompt and accurate interpretation of the changes that Soviet doctrine anticipates would likely precede an enemy atiack
Sovieis routinely maintain the bulkforce* foi intercontinental conflict in astale of readiness, eipecting to have timeeriod of tension or upon receivingalthough the hardness and reaction timesforces arc making such warning leulhe Soviets. Kor lactical warning, eaislingprovide Moscow wiih upf ICBM attack and up lo fiveof SLBM attack. In lhe future,wil] probably lie increased to ns much asthrough lhe useatellite eatlyand ovcr-the-horizon radars.
Targeting and Operations
among Soviet targeting objectivesintercontinental conflict would be lhean enemy's capability to attack thcand militaryecondbe the neutraliration of enemyand major economichird would be thc isolation offrom olher theaters of warfaie by disruptingsea lines of communication. We judge lhatwould launch an intercontinental attack Inof waves over an extended period, withheld in reserve We abo judge thai thethe capability lo retarget iheir force*.
ond Deception
and deccplinn of camouflage, dummy target), diversionary
59
*op-6e
tactics, dummy communication nets, emission contiol procedures, false information, snd Ihean inlegral part of Soviet military doctrine. Allhough many of the techniques which we delect appear lo be eaperlmental and are often crude, (here have been cases which were uncovered only after prolonged snalysij.f
J
laaminalion of tbe concealment andprograms which we have detected suggests ihree general objectives: lo deny the US (he capability lo deleiinine Ihe characteristics of new weapon systems, to add to (he survivability of Soviet forces, and lo degiade US strategic warning capabilities. The trends of Ihe past five years or so indicate that lhe selectivity, cen (rallied direction, and sophistication ofand deception measures applied lo Soviel strategic forces are likely In increase in (he fuluir We believe lhat thc Soviet leaders would see Utile prospect of successfully achieving meaningful slraleglcover thc US under cover ofroad program of concealment and deception Nevertheless, we cannot eicfudc the possibility that Soviet leaden, if they came to believe ihey could succeed, wouldnore olrnsive program of concealment and deception designed to contribute toignificant stralegic advantage over the US. Tlie /Jeporrmrnl of Slow believes lhal unless US-Sovietdeteriorated sharply it is highly unlikely thai tht Sooieti would seek to achieve meaningful strategic advantage under covet ofand deception,notedpiobably would tee Utile prospect of success tn luch an undertaking, t'a- the virui ofthe Aiststant Chief of Slaff. InteUigence. Dtpartmtnl of lhe AC Force, on thii subject, tet
E. Interference With US Space Syjloms
he Soviets now possess capabilities todegrade some US space systems From ihcirconclude that, doling or
receding an intercontinental nuclear war. Ihe Soviets would seek lo Interfere wiih US ipace syiteim used for reconnaissance and miliiary support.
rilcfconl mental war due resultediisis oi local conflict, iho likelihood lhat thc Soviets would already have Intetlricd with US space systems would vary willi Ihe circumstance* In general, lhc likelihood of such interference would he low in cireumslances where US and Sonet (orcei were not directly engaged and would rhe with the level of direct US-Soviet involvement. In the caseATO Warsaw pact conflict in Central Europe, there wouldigh likelihood of Soviet inlrrfrience
ven in the absence of crisis of conflict, all but the Department of Slate believe that the Soviets might seek selectively to degrade certain classes of US space sensois. The Oepartnxenl of Stale believes thai the uie of active measure' lo degrade US stiacc sensors would constitute interference with these US space systems, and that the judgment tn the preceding paragraph continues tois, the likelihood of such interference would Ih low In other than conflict situations.
V. FUTURE FORCES ANO THEIR IMPLICATIONS
A. Future Force Projections
n projecting lhe sire, characteristics, and mil of Soviel form for inlriconllnenlal conflict, we face varying degrees of uncertainty
In projecting Soviet force levels and mixes for the near termhe neat Iwo yean ore rely rnosl heavily on observed activiiy; wc have relatively high confidence In these near-term estimates.
We aie less certain about force levels and mites for Ihe midterm (about (wo to five yearsut can srill project wllh some confidence because Soviel force* will consist mostly of systems ahead) deployed or in testing.
Large uncertainties pervade our protections of force levels and miaes for the longer term (llie period from five loearsecause we almost never have direct evidence on Soviet long-range planning Our long-term projections are based partly on indlicct evidence and some insights into the Soviet research andprocess nnd partly on our assessment of overall Soviet objectives, technological prospects, and priorities.
arc also uncertainties in estimating thc char act eristics of individual weapon systems, even for the present and near leim, in part because the Soviets go to considerable lengths lo deny us Information on system characteristics.
Alternative Force Projections
ISO. In view of thc variety of deployed forces potentially availablee project five alternative forces to Illustrate the range of capabilities which the Sovieis might develop and deploy under differing circumstances;
Best-SAL) represents our best projection of Soviet strategic force developmentsALT TWO agreement based on thc Vladivostok accord Is leached and Soviel programs continue at the approximate levels of effort andachievement demonstrated in the recent past.
Moderate-No-SAL) illustrates generally similar levels of effort and achievement, butALT TWO limitation.
High-SAL)igh level of Soviet effort and technological achievementALT TWO limitation.
High-No-SAL)imilarly high level of effort and achievement, but without SALT TWO limitations.
Low-SAL)ow level of effort and achievemenl within SALT TWO con-si rain ts.
ISI We corisidei both thc high forces to lie upper-boundary cases and, thus, highly unlikely, because lhe Soviets probably could no! sustain such high levels of effort and achieve such consislantly highsuccess on all fronts simultaneously through theyear period. The low force Is considered an equally unlikely boundary case. Tlse projections, summarized in Table V, are discussed in dclail inhapter V. and tabulated in tolo in Volume III, Anne* A. They encompass both intcicon-tincnlal atiack and strategic defense furces. We do noi include projections of Soviet nnti-SSBN ASW forces because of the difficulty in separating ASW from general purpose naval forces.
n alt projections, wc assume lhat the ABM Treaty lemains in effect throughout thc period. In
-Jop-Seeret-
Tib l< V
Foe*
!
Summary CowparUon of Foce* Projeeuo
Fore* 3
OMt-.ive Svitim IOC Datei
I sea
7
rr.llc.wOn ICBMi ICBM Car.ying MaRVi MnUIrIRVed SLBMs
New SS IIN/Si IIM
r.-Range
ystem IOC
Force <
9
ISM
Foice 3
t I
New Interceptor
Loldcwn/Shool-
Syslem*
ISM
AWACS
AWACS
*rfv
IUM
Mobil* Lo-AltiludeSAM
I
Molrilr ICBMi SLBMs
MIRVed Miuilei Bison. Boar, Follow-On
AM launchedi* tnlerceplon
0
ICBM Mobil* ICBMs SLBM.
MIRVed Miuiln Bison. Sou. Follow-On
Biunlxn '
(DacMiin)*
SAM Launched
efense Inlercepton
projecting forces within thc constraintsALT TWO agreement, we have assumed that Backfire bombers, among other things, arc excludedggregate ceiling 10
n thc next few yean, SLBMs willarger percentage of the total Soviet ICBM and SLBM force, thus increasing the proportion of launchers which can achieve belter survivability throughAllhough the Soviets have evidently deferred deploymentand-mobile ICBM. tbcy will probablyn such systems and might deploy one loerceived danger lo their silo-based ICBMs. For purposes of Illustrating lhe land-mobile optionALT agreement, we have included land-mobile missiles in one of our SALT-lirnited proiections. but not in the other two.
Static Measures of Offensive Forces
sing certain quantitative measures offorces commonly used by the US defense and SALT comrnunlly, we compare in Figurehe US and Soviet offensive forces actually deployed06 and compare thc several projected Soviet forces with the US programed force7c assume that US forces evolve as programed4 in the US Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) datednd have extrapolated directly from it for thc final Iwo years uf thc period No attempt is made lo compare future US and Soviet forces should US force programs change.
he US led In almost all sialic measures of offensive power. At lhal time, however, fhe Soviets had large ICBM and SLBM deploymenl programs underway,rogram to deploy ronsidrrablc numbers of heavy ICBMs. Tlic US had leveled off In Ihc number of launchen by then, but began0 lo deploy MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs in existing launchen. By lhe. lhe sialic measuresituation wherein Ihe US slill led in some measures while thc USSR led in others. {None of these sialic measures reflects significant qualitative force characteristics, such as missile accuracy.)
deluded1 clement) arc <heS-9ai Tywaiam which we believe ire pun ol thc operational 'orce. lhe 16
Si.BM tuba on otiln in bin ui net thai hat* been modifiedarry
St,fJM launchen: th* SLUM lubriclau ilinrl rubinarinei.oison lantern and atwilr" alrcralt which are vied for ASW and rcconnaluance-
or Ihc futuic. lhc graphs In figurehow thai:
In tola) delivery vehicles, thc two No-SAL Soviet fotces exceed lhe U5 programed force throughout the period of the Estimate.
In total MIRVed delivery vehicles, Ihe two No-SAL forces surpass lhe US programed force beginning
In on-line missile RVs, tlie US programed force loses its leado Ihe Soviet High-SAL and High No-SAL Forces, and in1 to the Moderate-No;SAL Force, while the Best-SAL Force grows lo be about equal lo the US force in thc, when Ihe US foice begins to climb again.
In on-line missile RVs and bomber weapons, none of lhe Soviet forces except the High-No-SaL Fotce overtakes lhe US programed fence.
In on-line missile throw weight, all five Soviel fotces exceed the US programed foices by substantial maigins thtoughoul lhe period of this Estimate.
In combined on-line missile ihrow weight and bomber loadings, all Soviet forces exceed the US programed fotce until the, although the Best-SAL Fotce and tbe US force are no! gtcatly dilfetenl. but tbe US foice then climbs sharply to exceed all bul thc Hlgh-No-SAI. Force by the
i ii Inheicnlty dHlleull tamiulle throwand lhe b alenfiiwllc throw weight. Owol
handling lha probleml throw weigh! ol each
balliilk mluilr lad the full wctf.nl ol weapon normally ea/rted as payload by rack bomber Tkla laehada ihe Ml weight elSt ot ear* MIRVad aneaUe aad iW UI -eight ol earli at'- to Hiilatr mo&lr carriedanbn. ma though ifcetc
lirtiid* popultkm irtterru and ffmrluin in addition IO
ayVaad. Oilier melhodl olmiuiV throw wrlght and bniiitwi luytoadi eouM rnull In ilenilicanlTy dillnrfll results. One frequently uied method computet bom be paytoad by trUiing
il la ICHM llwow weight employed lo carry weafHiU of rumiwaHIr
yirld Fee ti uncle,m weight tounaleail -irhhl at
eeirpardSS0 t| {tt.OOO IbJ -Vr computed Wing w
nritaxt If thli alternative method wen employed, bomlrn would miitribvl* mmlistiahlj lev lo thr tola! mature, and lha throwll Soviet forcea would eiieed the US piognmed Joree throughout lha period ot ihli Eitimat*.
i
fop SoenarH
In online equivalentll Soviel forces now lead the US and icmalii ahead in ththe Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Department of the Alt Force, bttttoei that EMT haseu meaningful measure for evaluating US foice damageprimarily because of the Soviets' extensive passive defense program
fl. Throof to ICBM Silos
Soviet Counlersilo Capabilities
Out assessment ol Soviet rountenllo capablli-ties is affectedumber of uncertainhe most significant are thc accuracy, yield, and reliability of Soviet ICUMi. the hardness of US silos, and the effects of fratricidehe degrading effect of one missile RV on another if two or more are employed in closely spaced nuclear attacksingle target) These factors are discussed in detail In Volumen Ihis analysis, our uncertainties about Soviet ICBM characteristics arc aggregated in Ihe several projected Soviet forces lo show the variety oflica lions. Also treatedariable Is the question of whether" thc Soviets can overcome fratricide effects. US ICBM silo hardness, however, I) taken (torn US planning factors and Is noi varied
It should also be noted that the analysis presented here does notet assessment of the interaction between US and the Soviet strategic forces under actual wartime conditions, such an assessment would require consideration of many additional operational factors Only stereotypedhave been used here, US and Soviel ICBM foices are considered in isolation, command and conlrol systems are assumed lo function effectively, and no detailed war game has been petfoimcd. Accordingly, this analysis is meant only to Illustrate trends; It should noi be used to evaluate various alternative US force mixes or to icptesenl the actual resultsuclear exchange between tlie US and the USSR
isplays tbe calculated results oi hypothelical attack* on US missile silos by Ihe five protected Soviet ICBM forces.lluslrales the degree to which the calculations aie Influenced by uncertainty about Soviet ICBM accuracy and yield, lite two figures together illustrate lhat qualitativeaccuracy, warhead yield, unrl whether
one or Iwo weapons ran be effectively delivered by different missiles to eachof Soviet counteoilo capabilities The Assistant Chief of Slaff. Intelligence. Department of the Air Force, believe* thai the Soviets would conclude lhal IwoHV allacks by different missiles to compound damage are not operationally feasible, because of the nuclear environment and atiack timing requirements He believes that the possible damage the Soviets could expect to achieve against US missile ttlos ties between the one-RV and two-RV cases shown in. Civcn the large number of ICBM warhead* projected in all of our alternative Soviet force projections, the differences In ICBM launcher levels are of little significance lo lhe calculation*.
he countenilo capabilities of all the projected Soviet force* increase with the deployment of Ihe eiistlng new ICBMs. and specially with theand follow-on missiles lhal are expected. As displayed In, our calculations show lhat:
The High-SAL and High-No-SAL Forces couldajoro US missile silos in the next year or two."
Tlie Beat SAL and Moderale-No-SAL Forces couldajor thtral lo US missile silos In Ihc, or by0 assuming effective fwo-RV attack*.
The Low-SAL Force could notajor threat lo US missile silos at any time during the period of this Fjlimalr. even if two-RV attacks wcic effective.
hows thai if the most thtealenlng extremes of our uncertainty aboul accuracy and yield aie combined with the number of ICBMs projected in ourajor threat lo Minuteman silos could he achieved by thai force in the neat year oi so. assuming effective two-RV allacks
"For the purposes ol that calculations, wr niiieir ilur il* disability to destroy more Ihun (OJ US ICBM liljt ivsttfiluf.esmi jar threat.
" NotendinUniiinl by I'-ooruird-tirr.fl tilt iqpabilittn ne-rW
llun thr corresponding No-SAL lores, brc*uir moir iiiir.le-RV ICBMs. ftih hightr yieMi thinie rrojoCei! Ir. lhe SAL lorces lo conform "it'll the limit on th* number of MIBVrrl delivery vehictw.
-fop
r
Sovicl Silo Survivability
ossible Sovicl view of lhe USSR's own silo survival problem is illuitiaicd inl sfiowi the estimated number of Soviet silos and ICBM warheads which might survive il lhe Soviel Best-SAL Force were subjected to hypothetical attacks by thc programed US ICBM force This US force contains the accuracy improvements programed for theor the Minuteman III. as well as the deployment ofCBM systemonsctvative Soviet planner could judge that, even with the Improvements in Soviel silo hardness now In progress, his silo-based force could be in severe jeopardy by the mid-IOnusowever, also show. lhat. because of Iheir silo-harden ing and MIRV progtamt. lhe Soviets couldenerally upward tfend in lhc number of warheads surviving such an attack until lhc US deploysCBM. Il should be nolcd lhat wc assume Soviet planners would be concerned about the possibility of US two-RV atlacks in lhe fuiure.
Effects of Uncertainty
s indicated above, we ate uncertain of Soviet capabilities against US slfos and of Ihe extent to which Soviet silos couldS ICBM altack. Thc Soviets face similar, but probably somewhat less, uttcertainly. They will reduce their uncertainties aboul the actual CEPs of iheir own missiles through furthernd operational (eating. Nevertheless, this will nut eliminate (lie problems Sovicl planners would have lo contend wllh in attempting to plan an attack againsi US silos. Among other things, the variations in operational performance likely to occurarge-scale attack, especially if multlple-RV ladies ate employed, would lead to considerable Soviel uncerlainly about lhe resultslrlke against the Minuteman force. Soviet planner* would also have fo consider the possibility lhal Ihe US would launch ill ICBMs prior to the impact of Soviet RVj. We eapcel uncertainty lo influence bolh US and Soviet views of ICBM survivability throughout Ihe period of (his Estimate.
C. Three! lo Bombers and SSBNs
S SSBNs in port (about half of the total force) und nonnlcrl bombcit (about two-lhirdi of thc force) would be vulnerableurprise Soviel altack. Wiih (lie warning lime provided by US sensors, thc alert US
bomber force could be airborne and well dispersed before (he arrival of Soviet ICBM wotheads. Current Soviel SLBMi fired from present Soviet SSBN patrol areas would be only slightly more effective against the bombet fotce than ICBMi, assuming US missile detection systems provided timely warning. If launched from dose lo US coastlines. Soviet Sl.RMs couldote setioui ihteal to the alert bomber force In deciding whethct lo rdy on St.BMithis putpose. the Soviets would have to cotssidet US ASW capabilities, the measures available lo the US to reduce the vulnciabllily of its exisllng bomber fotce. and lhe greater survivability of thc.
IW- We believe the SovieU would conclude that most US alert bombers wouldurprise SLBM atlack throughout the period of this Estimate As noted earlier, we also conclude lhat Soviet ASW capabilities will fall short of being able to prevent most US submarines on station front launching iheir missiles Moreover, because of (he longct flight limes of ICBMs tatgeled againsi US missileoviet planners could not rdy on maximizing the ptelaunch desltuclion ol bolh bombers and ICDMs.
ost Soviet ballistic missile submarinesin pott. Soviet intercontinentalew main bases and arc not kept instate of alert. These submarines andiprise US atlackeriodwarning, which thc Sovietsthey could put roughlyeiccnt ofto sea and could alert and disperse
D. Residual Offonstvo Forcesurprisettack
lie US FYDP force and the Soviet Besl-SAL and High-No-SAL force projections aie compared in Figuren teims of tesldual missile warheads and bomber weapons available fee immediate etnploy-menl after hypothetical surprise allacks on ICBM silos and submarine and bomber bases (Residual weapons are those remaining to lhe attacker and those surviving on the side attacked) There is some evidence of Soviel inlciest in residual EMTeasure of tclative capabilities. Residual EMT calculations are presented in Chapter V. Volume II.
or ihese calculations, it is assumed lhat neither side launches on warning, lhal ICBMs lurvlve
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in lhc numbcn shown eadicr. llnl nil alert lumbers and SSBNsurvive, and that cotnmand and conlrol systems survive to permit these residuals to be used Because llie details of alternative basing modes forystem have noi been finalized, wc have assumed thaias deployed in alius. These calculations do not lake operational factors into consideiaiion and are intended only to Illustrate tiends. not to predict the actual outcomear.
he Energy Rtitarch and Development Administration and the Assistant Chle/ of Staff, Inlelligence. Oepartment of the Atr Force, agree thai the number and eapalnliites of reiidual forces are significant measures of merit. However, they believe lhal the analysis described tn this section and reflected In Figures Incomplete, can be misleading, and does noi belongational Intelligence Estimate. Theased on what ihey consider to be an unrealisticne-round ICBM attack. Aiuilysls was not performed to ascertain the relative strength of each forceull exchange (ICBMs, SLBMs. andn analysis which they believe Is essential in order to determine lhe strategic balance. They believe llust wlun this type of analysis is accomplished it mull be dynamic, use the best target bases available, and be bated on US SIOF planning, alongange of Soviet attack options
ht calculations .show thai,ypo-thelical Soviel sui|ielse ICBM attack, the Soviets would have to eipecl the US lo retainurviving missile RVs and bomber weapons through the. alter which US surviving weapons would Increase toepending upon whelhcr it is assumed that one or two weapons are targeted againsi each silo. At present, the Soviets could retaineapons As more MIRVcd mits.les become available, however. Soviet residual weajiont would rise tepidly. The Soviel Dcst-SAl. Force would retaineapons. The highest Soviel force, not limited by SALT, would have0 weapons left.
ypothetical US surprise ICBM attack, thc Soviel Bcst-SAL Force would haveurviving weapons af piesent. The number of weapons surviving would risen the, but fall backn the High-No-SAL Force, surviving weapons would growut would ihcn decline againt the end of the
period Tlie number of US weapons remaining would growoday lo more0 weapons6
lie SovieU apparently do no! believe thai intercontinental conflict will take them by surprise; lliey operate iheir forces accordingly. Underin which their foices were alerted, rnore Soviet weapons wouldor rumple, the US attacked Ihc form contained In the Besl-SAI. Force afler ihey weie alerted, and if the Soviets did not launch their ICBMs upon receiving tactical warning,oviet weapons would survive at present andould survive6
he calculations presented above do not account for the effects of Soviet air defenses upon US residual bomber forcei. Analysis of the alternatives and uncertainties aboul the effects of future Soviet air defenses would require full-scale, two-sided wargam-ing Figurell uuhese potential effects of air defenses by compiling surviving US missile capability with surviving missile plus bomber capabilityypolhelical Soviel surprise attack by lhe Soviet Besl-SAI. Force. It shows thai, while surviving US weapons and EMT irscrease considerably in lhe early and, most of ihisn bomber weapons subject to attrition hy Soviet alt defenses.
E. Olher factors Affecting the Strategic
Environment
alternative piojeclloni ofide range of possibleIn capabilities lor wagingand in perceptions of power which couldin crises or con frontal Ions short of suchIn all of Ihc projections In this Estimate,power of Soviel forces willmost ofion l. Substantial ty. The eat erst to whichconfers greater war-lighting capabilitiesUSSR will, however, depend Inon whal the US does. Further, wethe resolve of each siderisis or localdependost of factors in addition tostrengths and wellnesses offor intrtcoiilincntal conflict.
Impact of Uncertainties
arenumber of criticallhe future sltalegic environment. In addition to
US Missile Warheads and Bomber Weapons ^Projected toypothetical Soviet Surprise Attack
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the range of possible Soviet levels of effort and achievement, which we believe we have approximated in our alternative force protections', thereumber of alternative US force posluiet under consideration which would significantly affect relative capabilities and vulnerabilities in thectual force capabilities, today and especially In the future, would be affected by operational factors on both tides which we cannot take fully into account Important among these arc the efficiency and vulnerability of Soviet and US systems fot warning, command, control, and communications; thc degree lo which the Soviets
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could degiade US capabilities by concealment and deception and by interfetence with US space systetns; and the effectiveness of alt altack aod defense forces in an electronic warfare environment. Finally, tbe significance of Soviel civil defense preparations, both to war-survival capabilities and to perceptions of powct. will depend in considerable measure on lhe pace and extent of lhe Soviel program, which we cannot presently determine wiih confidence
ome present Soviel programs rencct Soviet concern lltnt US pfortatm will affecl the USSR's own
stralegic position adversely. Examples arc ICDM silo hardening and lhc deployment of long-range SLBMs. Wc are uncertain about thc implications of others The Soviel mobile IIIDM and ICBM progiams. for example, would enable thc Soviet) lo place mure ol iheir missiles on launchers less vulnerable to US attack. Another such program is the ABM system on which testing has recently resumed This syslem can be deployod more rapidly than (he Moscow syslem. although widespread deployment would take several years. By continuing to improve technology related to this syslem, the Soviet) could put themselvesosilion to deploy additional ABM defenses in the even! the AIIM Treaty ii abrogaled Such prog)ami probably constitute Soviet hedges against possible future US threats ai well at deterrents lo US withdrawal from stralegic arms limitation agreements. They could also represent efforts to give the Soviet leaden the future option to break out of such limitations if they conclude that the situationit.
he Sovicls have noi yel made atl ol (he decisions about forceeapon characteristics, and supporting elements which will affect their capabilities for Intercontinental conflict in the. Choices already made will be subiect to adjustment. The stiategk environmentears hence will be affected importantly by Soviet decisions about how lo respond lo perceived US challenges, by lhe negotiated limitation) on strategic arms lhe Soviet leadership li willing to accept, and by the degree of success thestablishment achieves in pursuing advanced technology applicable to itiatcgic forces.
he Soviet leaders will continue to regard strategic nuclear powei as central to their security and national aspirations. Aspects of their programs will continue fo fhieaten elements of US deterrent capabilities At lhc same time, lhe Soviets tend lo assess US developments. Including certain features of thc US programed Inrce, as threatening to their own strategic position.
EffectsALT TWO Agreement
ALT TWO agreement based on Ihc Vladivostok accord wouldmall initial reduction In total Soviet Intercontinental delivery vehicles. II would confront lhe Soviet) theteaftei with difficult choices and trade-offs between new and
enisling systems within an aggregate celling on delivery vehicle* Such an agreement would also limit lhe more crtrrme possibilities for growth in Soviet missile throw weight and numbers of missilerom Ihe point of view of US Inlelligence, agreed limitations would reduce some uncertainties, mostly quantitative, about future SovietALT TWO agreement, however, would not prevent Soviel ICBMs fromajor threal lo Minuteman silos or prevent the USSR from acquiring more missile HVi than tlie numbers programed by the US.
n the absenceALT TWO agicement, lhe Soviets would piobably increase Ihetrstrike forces moderately, and it fa possible lhat Ihey would increase (hem considerably. The Soviets, however, would noi eipcd quantitative competition alone lo oiler lhe strategic balance significantly They have evidently come lo recognize that Ihe stralegic environment inill be most significantly affected by the quality of the foioes deployed by lhe two sides, including possible major technological advances In stralegic weapons and lupporlingTheir progress in thb area will be hugely independent ol SALT TWO.
Prospects for Technological Advance
oviet RftD programs are consistentesire both lo avoid slipping behind lhe US and to gain thc lead In the technology of strategic offensive and defensive forces, particularly If US programs faltee During lhe nextean, the Soviets willrowing potential for significant and perhaps novel development* in weapons and supportingoviet programs in RAO related to stralegic weapon systems ate both broad and intensive. The Soviet base of applied terfrnology it growing, although the USSR still experiences difficulty In translating technological advances effectively info deployed hardware. Our knowledge aboul Soviet RAD project* in the early stages is Improving, but it is still heavily dependent on fragmentary information from souices which can be and often arc denied lo us by Soviet securitye are uncertain about when we would delect and identify an advanced or rsovel weapon program, and aboul whether we could give sufficient warning for Ihe US lo adopt counlenneasiire*
e continue to examine Soviet RAD progiams and prospect) for major advance* in fields having itraleglc olfeniivc and defensive applications thai
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might seriously erode US deterrent capabilities. We give particular attention to research and development applicable to directed-energy weapons for use In air and missile defense and to systems for detecting and tracking US ballistic missile submarines. The SovieU are working actively in both fields, and there are gaps in our knowledge of this work. The available evidence, together wllh our appreciation of the physical, engineering, and operational hurdles which must be overcome, leads us to rate as small lhe
chances that thc SovieU can sharply alter tbe strategic balance through such technological advance In the neatean. Nevcrthdess. lhe scope and vigor of Sovietarticularly In ilrateglc defensive lys-tems. bear especially dose watching In the yean ahead The AisUianl Chief of Staff. IntcUtgence. Department of the Air Force, hrlteoet that the SovieU are significantly aliead of the Writ in th* technologiet applicable to parttcUbeam-xoeaponi tetearch, and colli attention lohti alternative Itzt In,
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