A. Questions Raised by the US' '**-
; I. Soviet Reporting of Dismantling'of ExcessvABM Test Launchers
2 the USSR dismantled seven excessthe Sary Shagan ABM test range. uring SCC negotiationsprocedures for excess ABM test launchers, the Sovietsall, excess test launchers had been dismantled but did not Identifyused." On Julyhe SCC-agrecd procedures for suchentered .Into force. -
SCC-IV, the USSR provided "notif
thatad dismantled seven excess test launchers In accordance with the agreed Procedures when.act, five of the launchers had not beenin complete" accordance with those Procedures. However, rapidof. these few launchers would not be of strategic significance. The US concern was that such Inaccurate reporting,eft unchallenged, couldad precedent.
The issue was raised in SCC-VIase ofor reporting. The US stated thatxpected that 1ncare would be taken to ensure that notification as well asor destruction would be in strict accordance with the agreed
The US statement was not'intended toesponse and none has been made during four subsequent sessions of the SCC.
2. Concealment at Sary Shagan
. Article XII of the ABM Treaty enjoins each Party "not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party" and "not to use deliberate coucealment measures which impede verification by notional technical means of compliance with the provisions of this.Treaty. This [latter] obligation shall not require changes In current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices."
I Much of the Soviet concealment and deception efforthis area of strategic weapons development ond deployment was Initiated prior to 4 the extent of Soviet concealment activities increased substantially. While none of these activitiesiolation of the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agreement, there was concern
Between-January-anil theend. of.-Aprta'refto^analyr nunl torlhg.:pf- tho .USSR" led"b---
inconsistent with-the SALT
3. Testlng'-of "Soviet Square Pair SAM Radarn ABM Mode?'
r i'ftrtl cle VItbe ABrUltreatyo enhance'-ass'urance of "the effectiveness*he limitations on ABM systems, and-their'-components proyided;by'each Party 'undertakes:not to give missiles, launchers, or radars; other than ABM interceptor missiles,'ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to"counter strategic ballistic missiles or their plpments^ln flightnd not to test them .in en ABM mode."
prilhe..US made aHmilateral -statementart as follows: .we wouldadar to be 'tested InBM mode oradar makes'measurementsooperative target vehicle uring the reentry portion of Its trajectory or; makes-measurements 1ri^conjunction with the test of an'ABM Interceptor; missile or an ABM radar: at the same test-range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety'or Instrumentation would be exempt from appl 1cat1on of theser
vadar wasan .
, and raised this issJe inebrulrJ 1) et?ntry technical means had recelvtW nXl!.nJ LbZtestedne|nil^ar was
missiles during the reentry pin on ofthelr fHnh?oviet abm test range. The Soviet? Swoosh JhSJ trajectory Into the radar, jj, bemg testedlS'tr^klSe^fnS0
..ballistic missiles during reentry. ntrategic
.rang,light from Kapusttn Yar. Onthe radars. Square Pairs, wore active ahn.ijngagement minutes .after Impact buTwe dnot rnow ffrL^'T0 [PS'S' and
situationsnlsunoeJr,s ref^CURRENT STATUS:
ThealSed in !hc last foursessions. SCC-IX and XaJ Mrt I? .? ABH and air defense radars was discussed 1n
range. .Tho Soviets did not accept the US-proposed ban on using AD radarsmaking measurements on SBMs during reentry. They "argue that AD radars my be used.for.this purposendividualontinued discussion of this.issuehe JDT-ison the agenda for the next:-session; It..couldart.of the ABM Treatyy
ABM Radar at:-v
Article IV ofreaty states: "Thefor In Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or theirused for dcvelopmont or tcsting,,aDJLJocated withinagreed
impact area of. the Soviet ICBM tes^range. Since the ABM Treatyexempts from the"'limitations of Article III only those ABMfor development or testing at current or additionally agreedof this radar'-could have"constituted establishment of aAOM test*
,. , ftt.-
Though the ABM radar on Kamchatka was not strategically significant, it was decided to raise the Issue in order to set the record straight on whether Kamchatka is an ABM test range and to protect the principle that additional ABM test ranges require prior mutual agreement.
The US SCC Commissioneretter. on;the issuehe Soviet SCC Commissioner onAn ambiguous response was received on The Issue was again raised at SCC-VITI to establish that Kamchatka is'an ARM test range and that Sary Shagan and Karchatka are, as of now, the only ABM test rangeshe USSR. Tho Soviets repliedadar instrumentation complexh Kamchatka on the7 date of signature' of' the ABM;Treaty 'and that iflt ,would helps, the USSR'would be ready to consider therange to beurrent test range'withln the meaning of Article -llIV .of..the. :
iscussions of topics related to the ABM Treaty during SCC-IXncluded references to the Kamchatka radar but the US did not. reopen the subjectompliance Issue during'that session.
The Kamchatka radar issue remains formally openfutuVc discussionompliance Issuehe SCC forum. the SCC-IX discussions of the definition of an ABM testIn-Soviet acknowledgement in essence that the Kamchatka area"current" ABM test range'onnd is'a range at the'
In SCC-X, the Issue, while not raised specifically, was -discussed In the process of defining what constitutes an ABM test range. The Soviets have not formally agreed to identify the Kamchatka area as en ABM test rangehe JDT of the Agreed Statement on the ABM Treaty topics. They hove, however, privately stated that they will doontingent upon satisfactory resolution of the issue of the procedures for establishing new test ranges.'
:' B% Questions Raised by
ry*. " "'
1 adar on Shemya Island
Article III of the ABM Treaty states:
" "Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their componentsithin one ABM deploymentcentered on the Party's" national. and within one deploymentontaining
Article- IV of the ABM Treaty states:
"The limitations provided forrticle III shall not
apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located Within current or additionally agreed test
|wII,f tho JDT Agreed Statement states:
1 The provisions off Sectionhall beg into account the obligations in Article VI of the Treaty concerning the testing of missiles, launchers, or radars which are not ABM Interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars except that theconcerning radars shall.be applied, taking Into account theof Article VI of the Treaty regarding radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack and the Agreed Statement ofegarding phased-array radars used for the purposes of tracking objectsuter space or as national technical means of
. 3 the United States began constructionew phased-array radar on.Shemya Island, Alaska. Final development testing on the radar (known as Cobra Dane) began innd the radarn the final phases of becoming operational. Mhlleakes use ofadvances, attributable to our ABM program,s not an ABM radar end will not be usedn ADM role. Its missions will bo intelligence gathering, space tracking and early warning.
The Soviets alleged in SCC-VI that the USadar complex undor construction, outside US ABM test ranges, which IncorporatedektQd and developed for ABM purposes. The US stated that the HMU KmP ItltOrltbfotUd no ABM components and thatould be used for national technical means of verification, tracking objects in space, and
early warning. At the final meeting of SCC-VI the Sevfe*the right to continue discussion ofjjjsnt
'Theot reopen the question of th* radar nn
Shemya Islandompliance Issue during see-ill! SC?-vm n ireuring SCC-IX, however, they did describe the radar as onevue'whirh"jested in an ABMccording to US definition in connect?^
clatRd t0 the flSM o?
state-that-they.considero beype testedn ABM no n>he subject,was not raised formally in SCC-X.
ismantling of PAR Radar at Malmstrota
- Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) washe *arlv
5il9sat Matron, AFB when the ABM treaty was signed on
c./tll'plt h'us?w" 1redutely halted Dn the radar* Dismantling Mayulld'n9 commenced on Octobernd was completed by
The dismantling actions Included cuttlno off all
reinforcing rods. Concrete columns Integral to the structure wereabove the remains of thewere left
he US notified the Soviets that
dlsmant 1ng activities at the Malmstrom site were completed by
'i!fe sovlet concern, the US again photographed
tk sonets on AnHl^bUiOMnfl fffof th0 pkotssjg to wn? in fullclearly indicated that the dismantling
v1thProcedures and that the external pro-trusions above the remains of the PAR building are concrete columns.
'ik At the final SCC-VIll[.plenaryonhe SoWetTthQ US t0 take 1nt0he considerations d ?ha? rhj3th! eXtCntthe Malmstrom PAR building, and that they might return to this subject.
... CURRENT STATUS: scr.X pen the Issue during SCC-IX or
nowevor* thoy.hovo not formally closed out the Issue.
C. Potential Issues . Article VJ of the ABM Treaty states:
nbu . "t^ *pha,nce assurance of the effectivenss of theABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each (b) not to deployhe future radars for earlystrategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along
periphery of Us national territory and oriented outward."
. . Agreedtates:
, "The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radarspotential (the product of mean emitted poweratts and antennasquare meters) exceeding three million, except as providednd_ VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposesobjectsuter space or for use as national technical moans
onhe US Delegation ma do the
"Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars! can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at oreat distances, theyignificant AOM potential. Accordingly, the'US would regard any increasehe defenses of such radars by surface-to-air n1 ssl les .as. Inconsistent with an agreement."
1. Radars at Olenegorsk and Pechora
The Soviets now have two large phased-array radarthe northern USSR. One Is located
next to the Men rouse raoar at Olenegorsk, andriented to detect US ICOHs/SLfiHs launched Into the western USSR. The second radar Installation is located Just northeast of Pechora at the northern end of the Ural Mountains,riented to detect US ICBMs launched into central USSR.
ikely roles for these radars-ballistic
missile early warnings (BKEW) or ABM battle management.* The primary advantage of the Olenegorsk radarMEW role would be to provide the Soviets with better trajectory prediction accuracies than the Hen House radar or to provide the capability to handle more targets. The Pechora radar in the BMEH role would extend early warning coverage to areas not now covered by the Hen House radars and probably would provide an improved target handling capabilityddition to more refined prediction data.
* ottle management radar provides precision information to ABMmont radars, sorts and assigns targetsadar complexes and could provide them with data for point-pace Intercepts.
ouldcapability for ASMl .In^SrlyiflU
at these locationsattlp mflnnnomnr.*
ravnrago. ana at tho same timeigorousrogram.
Jtossible, however, for air defense*research endthe facility tl Intended
AQM' launchers'at test ranges- Thus ,far, the Soviets, have, not provided*at1 on inX,f the' SCC Protocol appearsclus1ve-and notr Just-'l1mited-.tc-.deploycd ABM Jhis concern could be;raised.in either the^CC or during the ABM Treaty
in regard'tethe consistency .of: these deploymentsrie provisions of the ABM Treaty, both are.oriented outward, located along
the periphery and hoveCnot been tested .In ah ABM mode. /Thus; thesedeployments appear to be consistent with-'the ABM Treaty restrictions onwarningare should be taken, however, to .insureilometer criterion established by the Pechora site does not.
of view about the-likelihood thathave ABM battle management capa-
bilities, ffic'aDou^Tne^nRe^nood that the Soviets ere building them for usehis role- Concern about possible use for battle.management would Increasehe Soviets started toconstruct more such radars In locations appropriatefor-ABM support.-andhe 'ovletsMevelooment rloorousl;
1. Questions Raised by
a. Soviet Reporting of Dismantling of Excess ABM Test"
As the Soviets seem to have.accepted the US concern
accurate reporting; it does not appear to be necessary to raise this question duringreaty Review process.
b. Concealment at Sary Shagan
-c. Testing of Soviet air defense radarn on ABM Kode
. The specific practice raised In5 has not been repeated and the6ctivity was indirectly discussed in SCC-IXnder the general question of the use of any air defense radar at an ABM test range. esult of these discussions the sides reached agreement ad referendum to the Commissioners regarding concurrent testing which treat tne Us concerns. It would be appropriate to hold further.discussions and finalize this agreed statement eitherCC-XIr during the ABM Treaty review.
d. ABM radar at
This question remains formally open, however, in SCC-IX
and X, the US concerns on this matter were addressed In the discussion of what constitutes "an AQM test range'* and "testingn ABM mode." The "agreed statement" would be an appropriate agenda item for either SCC-X1 or the ABM Treaty Review conference.
Raised by the Soviets V o. US radar Shemya Island
V Ithe US view that the radar on Shemya Islandot a'conplfahce Issue under any provision of the ABM Treaty.
it Although described by the Sovietss oneype which had been "testedn ABM mode"onnection with theof topics related to the ASM Treaty, the Soviets have not formally raised this subject since SCC-VI. As Itelieved that this subject was raised by the Soviets In the first placeounter to the US 'concern about, the radar, "Square Pair" could be raised by the SovietstacHc'cTurlrig the ABH"Treaty
-bJ, Dismantling of PAR radar at Malmstrom
H.MKi . not raised by the Soviets since SCC-VII, the Soviets havenot formally closed out this Issue. Ashe case of the US rndaV on Shemya, this Issue was probably raised by ,theesponse to our cpneern about accurate reporting on dismantling and destruction"of test launchers at Sary Shagan. Depending on the nature and substance of US agenda Hems for the ABM Treaty Review, the Soviets could raise this Issue againactical ploy.
3. Potential Issues
at Olenegorsk and Pechora
t Olenegorsk and
too early to
any doqroe or certainty wRit their misr.ion one" capabilities will be. If for BKEW purposes they appear to fill the criteria established by the ABM Treaty for such, located along the periphery, oriented outward and no significant Increaseir defenses (US unilateral statement). attle management role for theso radars may be difficult to determine under the best of circumstances. Ih vie* of this,s believed that It would be premature to raise this question at this time. 1
The secondary concern from the US viewpointhe location of the Pechora0 km Inland). Although,oglstlcaj viewpoint, its location at Pechora Is logical, the US would notrecedent set that would legalizem for future such deployments. This concern could be raised eitherCC-XI or during the ABM Treaty Review. In either forum, the US concern should be set forth that, while the location at Pechoraot being questioned, future deployments will be monitored closely1eso-by-case basis for adherence to the criteria established by tho ABMlong the periphery.Original document.