SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE - RHODESIA - LOOKING AHEAD

Created: 1/28/1977

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SPECIAL NATIONAL: INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Rhodesia-Looking Ahead

Approved for Ralease

Daw JX/NfC"

Ociret

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unoulhorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

. DISSEMINATION CON1ROI ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN- sobk- lo Foreign NolionaU NOCONTRACT- Nor Rolecioble lo Conlractori or

Con rrct lor/Information Involved

NFIBONLY- NFIB DepartmentJ^

ond Extraction of Information

Controlled by Originator Thli Information hai been Authorized for

ReleoieNINTEl- Warning Notice-Sensitive Intelligence

-

..Source* and Melhodi

AHEAD

THIS MEMORANDUM IS ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS. EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT. AS FOLLOWS;

The following inte/figtrtCe organizations participated In the preparation of Ihe memorandum!

The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence orgoniiatlom of the Deportment) of Stole, Defense, ond Treosury, the Notional Security Agency, ond the Energy Research ond Development Administration.

Coficwrrt'ncj!

The Deputy to Ihe Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Commgnlty, Vice Chairman

The Depvty Oireclor tc- Intelligence, representing the Central Intelligence Agency The Director of kiTefbgexe ond Research, representing the Deportment of Stote The Director. Defers* tr.teSgence Agency The Director. Notional Security Agency

The Deputy Auistcnt Administrator for Nationalnergy Research and Development Administration

The Special Assistant to the Secretary for Notional Security, Department of the

Treasury

Abslalntngi

None

Afio Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Deportment of the Army

"he Director of Novel Intelsgenee. Deportment ofNavy

Theetff. tnte'lger^e. Deportment of the Ai- force

Page 1

CONTENTS

PREFATORY NOTE

KEY

I. RHODESIALOBAL PERSPECTIVE

II. THE CURRENT

III BASIC ISSUES AT GENEVA

IV. OUTLOOK

Scenario A; If Then: Ii an

Scenario! If There I* No

Scenario Bartial Settlement

Scenario C: No

Scenario D: Conflict and Remmed Negotiation!

Kpatl

SECJrT

AHEAD

prefatory note

The draft of this Estimate was completed shortly before Ivor Richard's announcement onanuary that Ian Smith had rejected the UK's proposalsasis for discussions, and Smith's subsequent statement to the same effect. Smith himself indicated that hii government was not closing the door on negotiations. These developments, in our opinion, do not affect the validity of the SN'IE'i conclusions nor the usefulness of Its discussion.

key points

This paper does not attempt to estimate the likelihood that the Ceneva negotiations will be successful. It does look aheadime frame equivalent to the "transition period" envisaged in the Ceneva negotiations (independence byo as to point out the particular problems likely to arise in four cases:

-successful Geneva-style negotiation, completed in the near

future;

stalemate at the Ceneva talks, accompanied by initiatives from the Smith regime to open Its own negotiations with selected black nationalist elements;

breakdown, as distinctecess, in Geneva-style negotiations, without any attempt by the parties to continue serious talks in other forums;

breakdown, followed after some months by renewednegotiations.

These distinctions have been made to assist analysis; we recognize that success at Geneva would not preclude Smith from attempting his own negotiations in some fashion, nor would failure at Geneva necessarily mean the total absence of discussions among the parties.

Our major point is that whichever outcome might at one stage or another seem most likely, none will provide relief from the need for continuing close US attention to and. If US objectives are to be met. engagement in the Rhodesian issue during the period of this Estimate.

the world scene the Rhodesian question has again taken on an importance that transcends the immediate issue. This ls Inesult of the Ceneva negotiations themselves, but more aof the involvement of the US. If negotiations did break down for all practical purposes. African and Third World opinion would assign to the US much of the blame for failing to pressuccessful conclusion, and ensuing events in Rhodesia would precipitously reduce US leverage on the situation

the ground, the next phase in Ihe history of the Rhodesian IttUf will be one of turbulence,otential for violence,f

the outcome of the Geneva negotiations. Neither the white minority nor the militant nationalists (especially those with bases in the guerrilla movements) are yet psychologically prepared to make the practical adjustments needed to achieve an untroubled evolution of their relationships. In many respects, an agreement would beeginning of the process of working out many aspects of these relationships.

follows from this that the UK, the "Front-line" African governments, and South Africa will remain involved in developments in Rhodesia, however the Ceneva negotiations tum out. The USSR (both directly and through Cuba) and.esser extent. China, will also continue to play roles of some significance. In the absence of successful negotiations, and as military operations grow, the Soviet role would become greater, though probably still not comparable to that in Angola. The employment of Cuban military elements would expand, but Cubans would not be likely to be used operationally inside Rhodesia during the period of this paper

major opportunity for limiting tht violence and disruption inherent in the Rhodesian situation lies in the interest that front-line governments and South Africa will continue to have in containing the problem. The front-line governments In particular, however, are not likely to focus these interests and develop this opportunity without the good offices of the UK and the US. especially the US.

South African government will keep the key to the white side of the problem. In the period of this paper. South Africa's own internal problems wilt not be such as to compel that government toine radically different from its present one, which we believe toragmatic and cautious attempt to resolve the Rhodesian Issueay that will preserve South African influence in the region while defusing African nationalist militancy. But external developments, especially more overt Soviet/Cuban involvement in Rhodesia, could lead the South Africans to enlarge their military role.

of the parties (except, of course, the Soviets and Cubans) believe that theyegitimate claim to US support of some kind, regardless of the outcome of the present negotiations. In the case of an agreement, the US would be expected by each side to use diplomatic and economic inducement* to support both theof movement toward majority rule in Rhodesia and the security of the white population In an extreme situation, either side would hope that the US would at least endorse the use of force tn keep thr basic terms of an agreement.

the absence of an agreement, the Africans would expect the US to use its diplomatic influence to keep up pressure for majority rule. They would hope, but not necessarily expect, that the US would use economic influence in their behalf by repealing the ByrdThe whites, in Rhodesia and South Africa. In the absence of an agreement would expect US neutrality and further offers of good offices, on the ground that Smith had fulfilled his "contract."

withdrawal of the US from the issue would probablyreakdown of negotiationseaceful resolution and would limit the ability of thr US to influence later events in the region.

DISCUSSION

RHODESIAlOBAl PERSPECTIVE

I. Th* Rhodesian insurgency sputtered lotecade, essentially as an African problem, although It remained on lhe Third World and UN agenda* The terms of (he problem were changed by lhe withdrawal of lhe Portuguese from Africa; ihb development left while-ruled Rhodesia almost surrounded by black stales and depending exclusively for tupport on the government of South Africa and on whatever sympathy the Rhodeiiani could muster among ultra-coniervativ* element*he guerrilla effort to bring down Rhodesia's while minority regime escalated, thia effort now threateni to involve othersome outsidehas moved the Rhodesian problem back into the work) arena

many black African* (andhodeila i* the testing ground to determine whetherny hopeemi-peaceful resolution of black-white difference* In Africa. They will also view the outcome in Rhodesia a* "proof* whether th*ctually committed tothe vestiges of white supremacy In Africa or whether ih*erely giving lip service to lhe idea In th* hop* of somehow slopping communist inroad* into the area and ofegional economicem dominated by South Africa.

Ih* USSR and Cuba. Rhodrsia te an arena where these government! are trying to capitalize on thtir mccati In Angola.egotiated trltlemrnt would not freei* them out of th* picture. It would not serve their end* a* veililitary resolution in which they couldajor supporting role to the detriment of US Influence.

China, the Rhodesian situation poses the dilemma of Irving lo balance il* revolutionary rhetoric against it* concern over Soviet imoadt in Africa Peking has Insitfedvrgotialrd settlement may benly whenare backed b> victories in the battlefield.

Pelting recogniies. however, thai relianceilitary course would probably work loadvantage, and so it ha* lupnorlednationilHlV participation In the Onrva talks.

thetlem*nt in Rhodetia would fulfill Its Deceived responsibility for the country, whilr at the time time creating the hurie that London could eventually rid Itself of Ihe

th*uccessful outcome inwould enhance th* US position throughout Africa and at Wait modify ih* growing belief among African* that Ihe militaryif it meant doser relationships with theIt th* only way lo tolv* black-white problem* in Africa.

II. THE CURRENT SCENE

A monthalf of talk* al Cenevanot diminished either the antagonitm thatbetween Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith* regime and the nationalni! or th* divisions among ih* nationalist* themselves.

Smith, absent from much of th* proceedings, ihowed no willingness to go beyond the settlementannounced last September that he would accept. He seem* fully prepared lo go on resitting Ihe Africanemand* for tranifrr of power to an interim government on the basil of what Smith contends would be majority rule. He appears lo be convincedeal can be struck with moderat* 4fricans short of meeting th*demands At th* sam* time, th* nationalists, even with prodding from the front-line presidents, were unable to agreeommon negotiating petition to counter Smith's intranilgence. despite iheir basic unitv on lhe demand that Smith mint.

se^ef*

A. Smith probably feels under less pressure now ioettlement than he did last October. Despite serious and growing strains. Rhodesia's economic situation has no! deteriorated in unexpected ways and South Africa continues to facililale Ihe flnw of Rhodeslan tiade. The nationalists' inability to uniteegotiating position and the success Rhodesian security forces have had against guerrilla bases in Mozambique have encouraged Smith ihat he can hold fasl lo bis position for the short term al least.

The considerations thai brought Smith and the nationalists to Geneva bave changed somewhat, however,ew factor emerged during the. conference. Two of the four nationalist delegations. Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) delegation and Robert Mugabe's delegation, represenling the Zimbabwe African Nalinnal Union <ZANU> and the Zimbabwe Peoples Armyormed for negotiatingeparate loose alliance called the Patriotic Front. The Front survived the first round of talks, and despite strains, the two leadersommon position throughout and won the endorsement of the front-line presidents The Front is now showing signs of es'olvingemporary eipedient into anprobably notThe Front enhanced the slature of its leaden by holding ihe limelight throughout the

The front-line presidents were unable to bring unity to the nationalist movementhole and to move the British as far as they would have liked to assume direct responsibility for dismantling the while minority regime in Salisbury.

Nevertheless, all participants atrocess was set in motion which cannot be reversed, although it can be hatted. But if there is toegotiated settlement the participants must come to grips with the hard questions of the shape of the transilional government, the constitutionalfor transferring power, and the degree nf British involvement in the interim government.

mith's goal now is lotrategy that will relieve oulside pressure upon him bul will retain for Ihe while Rhodesians the preponderant share of economic and political power, either through the Geneva framework or outside of it.

he goal of Ihe nationalists remains to find the means to transfer power to the black majorityransform Ihe existing Rhodeslan social and polilici order They have by no means abandoned the militar option, even though they have been disappointo and. in their own eyes, temporarily weakened by thel inability to achieve significant gains on tbe battle field Aggressive Rhodesian combat operations agatns guerrilla camps in the Mozambique border area de railed the much talked-aboul rainy season offensive underscored basic nationalist combat weaknesses, am revealed Mozambique's inability to repel Rhodesiar cross-border raids.

developments not only have led tocombat-supportive Involvement bystates in support of Mozambique, butdoorider African as well as

ASIC ISSUES AT GENEVA

In the broadestuccessful negotiated seltlemcnt of the Rhodesian crisis would be one tha]least for the shortpersonal and economic security of the while population whil< selling in irreversible motion (he transfer of power tc the black majority. Il would also need lo take Inli account, even if It could not completely reconcile, ihr] Interests of all the participants Finally, any workable arrangementajor role for the UK, the front-line presidents, and Soulh Africa as guarantors

A negotiated settlement must also resolve three major questions:

of the interim government;

of ministerial and administrative! appointments; and

of the defense and police portfolios.

(he question of leadership. Smith holdsthat heovereignthat the Geneva negotiations are betweenand Ihe nationalists, with the Britishto lhal of mediator (and not an impartialhishe nationalists argue that they areheirs lo Rhodesia, that the Smith regimeand that it must be replaced by aThese two positions, as they haseso far. arc no! rawly reconcilable: diveslingregime of its stmbolic aulhorily and aol real power and establishing responsibilityinterim govrrnmenl in "neutral hands willelements In any agreement

M- Polarities aretrong on th* question o( lhe diitribution of mlniiterial and admlnlitratlon posi-tjoni (with the exception of the defense and police portfolios discussedhetoric aside, thecan see the wisdom of allowing the whites to retain control of "technocratic" portfolios, and the whites can appreciate the political realities of giving up nontechnical positions and allowing noncon-trolling participation where expedient. The keyuccessful arrangement on distribution rests with the nationalists agreeingormula for sharingpositions among themselves and with the whites

he question of control of the defense and police portfolios carries the most emotional weight of all the questions facing the Ceneva participants. Even if the control Issue were avoided by having the British ot some neutral council manage the portfolios during the transition, the Issue* of command and composition of the security forces themielve* wouldocus of contention. The nationalist* and the whites appreciate the coercive power and the political potential Inherent in thesend they hesitate lo putjhem In the handsast or likely ad<

on the

principles for integration of some guerrilla elements into Ihe defense and police structures, and on the role to be assigned to the presenl securily forces, even If working out the mechanics is deferred to the future.

There are no assurance* that talks. In whatever venue, will not eventually founder. Th* issues lying ahead arc thorny, and no major hurdles were overcome In the September-January period. Mutual luspicion and animosity continue, and these may well sharpen if and when talk* re*ume and lhe participants again are confronted with the problems.

The talks could end abruptly cither by Smith withdrawing or by some or all of the nationalists walking out. Smith has threatened (and we believe he mean* It) toettlement on his own If th* conference moves toward excluding him or the Rhodesian Frontajor role in the iranillional period. Smith ma> decide that he has no choice; th* cimfrrentvciilv that whit* Rhodesian

"management" of the transition process Is out of the question. Indeed. Smith may not wait for talks In collapse before trying to convince some of the nationalists (most likely Muiorewa and Si thole, perhaps in asiociation wiih Internal Rhodeiianand the party formed by tribal chiefs and others) lhal they canetter arrangement independ enlly than they can through continued negotiation* within the framework of Geneva.

Flanking lhe prospect of Smith seeking an indcp*ndent settlement is th* possibility that either th* nationalist* or the Smith regime will reject unv serious negotiating track either because of frustration over lack of progress in the negotiation* or became they com* to believe that they can better obtain thui goal* or protect their equities on the battle-field thai, al th* bargaining table.

ariant of the above i* that the present round of settlement efforts might fail or stall, but that some months In the future there mighteturn to the bargaining table a* th* various parties weighed the cost* of military action against the possibility thai they might after all get their best deal by rciuming negotiation*.

IV. OUTIOOK

ihall treat the pos*ibic Rhodesianunder four headings (we are not estimatingpaper which of the development* is most likely/;

Scenario A: If there is an agreement at Geneva.

Scenario B: If. lacking an agreement, the Smiih governmenttrong drive fnr an "Independent" agreement.

Scenario C: If there is no agreement and both sides intensify military operations.

Scenario D; If there is no agreement butreiumeubstantial

Scenario A: If There Is an Agreement

that an agreement produces angovernment, political maneuvering amongnationalist leader* and group* "illlhe franchise and determining how torJ to hold electionsepresentativeand government will becume theordi-rfor the tr.iinitiomil gmrritiiwnt.

ellarly has an organization from whichhii base of support lies primarily inBishnp Muzorcwa'i Africanii strongest in Salisbury and around aurban arras Although large crowds havrto meet Mutnrewa on his recent visitshis real Influenceuss followingbeen tested since1

from Nkomo and Muzorcwa.of the other nationalist leaders hat aWe believe few leaden would br ablea significant political base solely onfactional, tribal, or regional Identitiesthat Mugabe. Tongogara. Nhongn. Sitholeof tbe other ZAffU or ZIPA leaden has.external membership of ZaNU. aof significant size in Rhodesia,

a consequence of divisions amongleaden, ethnic ties constitute an initialpolitical loyalties The various nationalistsnaturally punue support in their own homeareas. If they succeed In portrayingpolitical causes as those of their ownand identify opponents b> their ethnicpolitics and Intertribal hostility andwould again emerge inside Rhodesia.

areuest forbased upon ethnicity also would leadfor power to seek poliiical alliances, sinceethnic group, even if It myld bea single leader, is sufficientlyear-majority Hence, asthe prospects for alliances orwould grow, perhaps mitigating some ofbilterness lhal characterizes theIn this situation, Nkomo wouldtome advantage, since hii ownirm and not likely to beif at all. by ZANU or the ANG

mosl Intense electoral competilionbet-een the anc and ZANU. both oflie in Sbooaland. albeit oftensubthbet Coalitions between partleiihe same conslituency will be harder to makethan those brlween more dlserse parties

here is remiderahle uneertjints surrounding the political rule lhal the guerrillas would playost-settlement situation, although it would cirarl) an important one. ZIPA leaders presumably wou have tohare of political pooer in the po <rtt|rmrnt arrangements, in addition to their secu: role Tbe guerrilla military forces potentially cov wieldpow hy the ihreat nr use nf Iheir arms. Whether tl potential would be realized would depend on number ofas Ihe attractions of ri< ethnic leaden, whether the guerrillas could rem; unified, what arrangements would be madeettlement agreement regarding the guerrillas' role

All of these uncertainlies aret any judgment depends heavily on tbe terms onettlement would be implemented.elieveoalition arrangement, indudi Nkomoentral but not necessarily the lead! figure. *ould be the most likely result In tht circumstance*.

With regard lo white political activityakeeneva settlement. Smith's Rhodesi Front (RFl by far the largest and mosl influent white party, would find il extremely difficult loadji lo the notion ofinority partyoun runlack majority Theong-standingsupport among white farmen bas been based alm| exclusively on ib stiff-backed resistance to politt concessions for blacks Among thear right settlement would bentraparty strife and defections would almost certaiil follow. Indeed, some part of the RFs traditloi constituency would simply evaporate through emig lion while other portions would fragment.

Smith, or someone with similar vi*wj. retof the RF,ll be unlikely to teekwith any but the tames! of blackRF leadenhip. commltled to working withan effective power-sharing formula,lake oser the party; but (heactive whiles who would be likels lobe more likely to shed !he RF labelracist image in favor ofr"nr parliesew. multiracialThe focus of while political activity(hew groups

electoral constituencies,arge extent upon ho- the Unites and tnmrksI In- fr.inchifr illi.il is. the yiMMtgif "nd ihe

qualifiedlo education, prnpefty, oihe mote susceptible are lhe volen to simplistic and inflammatory'aclor which moderatet of both ram regard asangrrout advantage to ihe guerrilla -dominatedA Thhmay serve to overcome some of lhe Ingrained revuliion within lhe white community againstolitical deal with the less militant nationalists.

A successful settlement would also bringew set of problems involving the relationship of the Rhodesian security forces lo the guerrillas. Apart from lhe question of the willingness of Rhodesian regulars lo remain In thedependi onease-fire arrangement is tied to amorale will be severely foiled by any prospect of Integrating the guerrillas into the defenve structure This applies to blacks in the security forces as well They will fear that integration will eventually give wayuerrilla takeover, with reprisals quickly to follow. Thus lhe regulars will be torn between remaining tn lhe service, andore comfortable professional climate say in lhe Soulb African military or. in the case of the blacks, seeking arrangements with the guerrillas.

The police would be called upon lo maintain orderew. complex, and highly charged political atmosphere to which ihey are not accustomed. Operating In lhe contexthanging social and political order would create psychological strains as well as put new demands on tribal and personal loyalties. Again, as wiih the defenseorale would also be tied directly to Ihe way In which African nationalist elements are introduced into tbe police structure

negotiated settlement that encouragestransition could, with luck, forestall theeconomic breakdown that occurred In Angolafollowing the Portugueseand expansion of the key elementiwhile-run economic system in Rhodesiaa strong program lo bring blacksand government would he thelo renewed economic growth for both blacks

ven under less than ideal conditions,economic benefits wouldegotiated scillcmcnl

of I'N sanction*;

of Irade andhblack stales;

of substantial foreign aid h)utline* lohe transition In black rule -ml provide capital for black endeavors, and

membership in international limrtve

and aid organizations, such as Ihe Ini.

Monetary Fund and lhe International Rjnl [iw Reconstruction and Development

h* Soulh African government would view tn agreementajor advance in heading off communiil influence in southern Africa by giving renewed credibility toas opprnnl loa mean* of adapting In new pnl.llcjl correlations Vonler would endeavor lo Main and eipand South African economic imolv* merit tn Rhodesia, both lo give the new Rhodesiana stake in peace and siabilily in the area and to give lhe South African government morr leverage over it. Th* net result. In Venters view, would he to give Pretoria's long-faltering "outwardew lead on life. Vorster would see an opportunity to encouraw new relationship* with the US. the UK. the front-line stales, and toew Rhodesiaonsortium thai mightlually expand beyond th* Immediate area These hopes may well be exaggerated, bul they would be major elemenl* in Soulh African pulley

eaceful settlement would certainly win thr support of lhe front-line stales and lhe Organization of African Unity as long as its aim is ultimaiely tn dismantle the existing Rhodesian social and political order Zambia. Mozambique, and Botswanatrong economic Interest* in an orderly transition This is particularly true of Mozambique, which has suffered more than Rhodesia from the border closure last April and from th* subsequent Increaied Hrain* of war.

he Soviets and th* Cubans would not he frozrn out completelyettlement, bul ihey wouldleu loom for maneuvering lo influence Ihe future political orirr.lalion of the regionlies to Nlomo are not as close as they nnee were and lies to other nationalists, mosi notablyre only beginning lo take thape During lhe iramiliorul period lhen particular,speeled in maintain close contacts with lhe front-linele*n 'crfc Wronger tie- with Mack Rhode-innhereby positioning lhe I'SSH to

SJaKt'ET

transitional arrangements (all. The USSR would be unlikely to lake steps out of concert with lhe leaders of the front-line stales toransitinnal government, although the Soviets and Cubans could be expected to voice support for (he more militant black positions.

the US would not in allIn the day-to-day problems of ait would be viewed In many quarters asmover In bringing about theeneral way would be held accountableoutcome. The US Is bound toargethe blame for any failures that occur along theindependence. Moreover, the front-line states,and the UK eipect the US toand political support to the transitionsubsequent Independent ZimbabweUS stake inettlement work thuslarge; already the perception of the US inIn large part on how the US stands up forcommitment to support black majority rule.

Scenarios If Thert Is No Agreement

are three basic alternatives to aagreement at Ceneva;

"partial" or "Independent" arrangement reached by the Smith regime on Its ownombination of nationalist leaders and "loyal" black elements inside Rhodesia: or

settlement of any kind with anyone, with the Smith regime opting lo "go itr

settlement at Ceneva.esumption of negotiations after some monlhs.

Scenarioartial Settlement

partial settlement most likely would be based

nti:

hare of power for black leaders, perhapslack deputy prime minister;

enlargement of economic opportunities for blacks, accompanied by modest improvements in social conditionsomewhat broadened franchise for Africans, and

indeterminate transition to majority rule on (he basisradually widening franchise

Smith's view, such an arrangementhis commitment to work toward anwidening political opportunities for blacks,hope to head off (he inevitable chargesand from (he international communitywashile-controlled stale.believes that Muiorewa and Sithole caninto such an arrangement, despiteBoth men are suffering serioustheir respective organization* and withpresidents, and probably have no futurecollapse Smith would try lo wed Muzorewelo the new chiefly-led ZimbabweOrganizationmith may alsoto the Idea that he can also weanfrom Mugabe.

would hope lo gain at leastof such widespread Wackfor tuch an arrangement that the UK. theSouth Africa would accept his fail accompli.alio seek Western economic and Ifsupport on the ground that he hada "settlement" on the basis of the UK and

artial settlement, if Smith could achieve it. would be supported by Soulh Africa Prime Minister Vonter and his Afrikaner constituency would view iteasonable solution In the circumstances. Thus. Soulh Africa would encourage the US and UK io accept thn. and Pretoria would maintain the present level of military and economic cooperation.

he Patriotic Front, lhend the front-line slate* would rejectsettlement" made hy Smith, and there would be widespread international support for iheir position Nearly all

sense llut ihe situation Is basically unlavnrjMe tn lis interest* Despite the fnrrgnsnt.lear thai Smith is seriously considering an "independent settlement gambit and that he has taken some preliminars slept in this direction.

Scenario c; No Strr/emanf

he possibility that no independentcan be reached remains strong, and elihrr Smith rw the nalionalisli en masse could decide the (alkt were gelling nowhere and walk nut Sifch an ouicome would inexorably lead to an Intensification of military operations on both tides.

The major (heater of operations would he the Rhodesia-Mozambique border, where the Rlmdsiidn security forces have demonstrated iheir capability In conduct tuccetsful cross-border spoiling operations againsi guerrilla camps and staging areas ssltri virtual impunity. Guerrilla operation! launched from Zambia would probably stimulate similar disruptive and punishing raids against border camps in Zambia. Presidentot likely, officially, lo allow guerrilla bases in Botswana for fear of Rhodesian reprisals, but he will not be capable of preventing some ute of Bolswana's territory by the insurgents

The objectives of Ihe black nationalists would include disrupting rail and road links with South Africa, discouraging whites from remaining Inareat; intimidating blacks who are not active In the guerrilla movement; promoting defectiont among blacks in the security forces; end Infiltrating Into the urban and industrial sretonoment ditconlrnt, organize protests, and conduct tome sabolagr and urban lrriorum Demonstrated guerrilla organizational and combat deficiencies, however, will limit their ability lo attain these objectives without substantial training and/or external advisory assistance

he effectiveness of lhe guerrilla! will be greatly dependent on the degree of security provided for training areas and forward staging bam in Ihe neighboring countries ai well a* on the quantity and quality of aims and training lhe guerrilla! receiveomplete breakdown In negotiations, lhe flow of Sonet material assistance lo Ihe insurgents would probably Increase. To defend Mozambique and the guerrilla bases In the border area againsl Rhodesian cross-border operations. Tanunlan forces would augment Ihe Moiambican defense units, and units from other African countries mighl be provided to assist in this function. Tanzania. Mozambique, and probably Zambia would Increase iheir training efforts, and Cuban troops wouldreater role both in training and defense, primarily in Mozambique. Conceivably. Cubans could appear In Zambia if Kaunda should become desperate.

h escalation. ftiBWatnl 1 ian security force would respond quickly and gressively.

tmui During anhese reserves would be called lo active duty,auive search and destroy effort would be launched Inside Rhodesia and across tbe border Into Mozambique In an attempt to neutralize basetaging areas, supply depots, and logistical facilities. Raids would be focused on targets In Mozambique; however. It is possible that raids of this nature would also be carried out against Insurgent entry points in Zambia and Botswana

hodesian security forces do not have Ihe capabilities, especially lhe manpower, torolonged counter!nturgency struggle; they would be stretched very thin to defend against the eip3nded insurgent effort that we foresee at likely by the end of Ihe period of ihit paper Rhodesian leaden are aware both of this and of lhe economic strainsrolonged war would entail They therefore will attempt tn contlnur In use Iheir technological superiority and aggressive tactics bated on this superiority, ralher than engage in purely defensive operations lhal would necessllale large numbers of menradual increase in guerrilla capabilities and especially improvement In lheof the Mnzambican border area through Ihe use of more sophisticated weapons will in lime force lhe Rhndesians toefensive strategy.

he morale of the Rhodesian black regulars and while reservitls would be crucial lo lhe successgo II alone" policy. Many while reserviils mighl try tu evade Ihr extended government call-ups that would be required, and even if they responded would not want lo chance risking iheir liveslostut the major uncertainly would be Ihe attitude of Ihe black soldiers. Blacks represent over SO percent of the regular army, not Includimg reserves, andoercent of Ihe police force. We believe they would fighl until il becomes dear that Ihey were on Ihe ultimately losing side

he key element in the "no settlement" contingency ultimately would be Soulh Africa The Rhodesian economy Is already experiencing negative growth, severe foreign reserve pressures, andsiiess. But the slate ef lis economy alone would no!ritical factor during lhe period of this Fslimate as long as guerrilla operations are contained, while resolve maintained, and lhe Soulh African rail connections krpl open But in the eventustained transport squeeze by South Africa, the whites could not long hold on In Rhodesia. Having no other outlets. Rhodesia's export sector, which contributes roughlyercent of CNP. would quickly wither Lou of imports would end military supplies and cut off vital fuel, raw materials, and capital goods to manufacturing and commerce. Heavy unemploy. menl. reduced white living standards,im picture of the future probably would prove ditheart-rnlng even lo ihose most commit ted lo white rule.

oulh African support for the Smith regime would be decided upon largely on the bails of Prime Ministerssessmenl of the affordable-nd economic costs of such support In the interest of protecting the prospects for eventual detente with bl*ck Africa and of avoiding possible L'N sanctions against his nun country. Vorster probably would want In lunir South African military Involvement loaaction loassacre of while He would not cut Rhodesia't supply lines

SEC

completely, bul he could and would manipulate (hem to support hb political policy

here are Wrong economic arguments tthich might move Vonter lu limit carefully South Africa'* help lo Rhodesia Foe example, al tome point Rhndesia'i limited foreign exchange hoJdingt would force South Africa lo decide whether lo auume the burden of helping Rhodesia pay for in foreign arms impnrtv The option of making arms available from indigenous South African production would not be attractive because of the danger of depleting the stocks of arms held In reserve for its own forces. Again. South Africa'snly now beginning lo show signi of recovery afler two yean of severe recession Domestic demands on the country') limited foreign exchange earnings will rise sharply at recovery proceeds. Looking ahead, moreover. Vonter can almost certainly see the possibility that the Third World majority in the United Nations could move the UN toward economic sanctions against South Africa.

losely related to economic considerations would be calculation! of the effects of support for Rhodesia on racial politics Inside South Africa If Vonter believed it necessary toublic stand against further support for Rhodesia, he mlghl well rett his case on the persistence of serious disturbances among South Africa's urban blacks as well as on economic exigencies. But we do not believe that such disturbances are likely to become so serious during the period of this Esllmale thai they wouldecisive impact on Vorster's real thinking, one way or another

l (he tame time, on Ihe poliiical side, Vonter could come under Increased domestic pressure to rally to Rhodesia's defense Many South African whiles might conclude that the failure of the Ceneva talks proved ihat Pretoria's detente policy toward black Africa restsallacy. Instead of waiting passivelyinal pan-African onslaught against South Africa itself, they would argue thatetter to fight the "inevitable" batllet In Rhodesia or even loreemptive strike against Maputo. Mozambique's nearby capital Although the odds favor Vonter rejectingoune of action,ufficient uncertainty concerning exactly Wattle he stands loramatic South African reaction aThb possibilils would becomeore likels in the event of significant communist

ollapse of Ihe negotiating prneets would spark united African tupport for the guerrillas. The front-line stales would try loan-African military force, and seek Increased Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban supporl if Ihey could not penuade Ihe US and UK to undertake tome dramatic counteraction against Smith.

he military option would be the onl> inn available to the frontline slates; they cannot Wgnifi-cantly Increase economic pressure against Rhodtia without South African cooperation. An emliaigo against Rhodesian transport by Botswana it the only economic move left Ihem. but without South Africanotswana embargu would hurt Botswana more than Rhodesia.

Soviets would lose no time in attemptingon the situation. Moscow would havea number of new facton intoin tailoring its involvement in theUnlike Angola, where the Sovietsable to provide support directly toMovement, in Ihe Rhodesian situationwould be dependent upon theTanzania andarms to the Rhodesian nationalists, ihetherefore, could regulate the eatent ofMoreover:

contrast lo Moscow't almost two deeadex of liaison with Angola's Popular Movement, the Sovielt have no entrenched ideologically-ba-iJ relationship with any of ihe Rhodetian groups or leaders; Joshua Nkomo is one ol the few nationalist leaden with whom the Soviets haveontinuing relationship, but since be now appean to have Ihe support of the West, the Soviets are probably studying the other national-bt leaden and keeping Iheir options open.

Soviets undoubtedly recognize that the Immediate capabilities of ihe Rhodeslan security forces are far superior lo those of the groups that opposed Angola's Popular Movement

would of course keep an eye onthai could be caused io the USSR'swith the US. Wr nonetheless believe that inthe Sovlrts would al asignificant amount) of arms andlo the liberation forces and theThey have already offered help lo Botswana.

and reportedly have responded In Mozambique's requestsccrleialcdoviel shipments would be likely Io include more tophbticaleduch asiullet.ircraft, and field artillery, which would require an Increaie in Soviet and Cuban military advisers. Aggressive Rhodeslan ttrlket deep into Mozambique probably would prompt President Macbel lo call for communist assblance. Moscow is already shoeing that it is willing, as It was In Angola, to engage in "naval diplomacy" In support of Mozambique. Il also would probably encourage Cuban or other communist forces to participate actively in the military defense of Mozambique and. if necessary, of ibc other front-linee believe, however, thai Ihe other front-line presidents woukd carefully limit the use of these force* lo defensive roles They wan! loarge Soviet/Cuban presence if (hey can. they also want to avoid stimulating direct South African combaton the Rhodesian side and increasing ihe potential for greaf-power conflict

uba's position in thb situation would be ambivalent. The Cubans know ihat ihe Rhodesians woulduch more formidable opponent lhan were Ihe FN LA and UNITA In Angola. The prospect of significant casualties in ihe Rhodesian struggle coupled wiih ongoing manpower losse* in Angola would be unappealing to Havana But the Cuban leaden could not afford to ignoreequest for assistance. The Cubans would readily provide supplies lo the Insurgents, help train them, give them technical assistance, and perhaps provide defensive forcea lo protect guerrilla base* in Mozambique The Cubans would be very hesitant about actually fielding combat units for fighting inside Rhodesia Itself, and we do not now anticipate developments during the period of this Estimate thai would require the Cubans to makeommitment.

n increase In conventional, as opposed Io guerrilla, military operations would alarm Peking because it would increase the opportunity for Ihe Soviets to oulbid the Chinese In arms and related assistance. China's experience in Mozambique has probably led it to doubt the short-term ability of the front-tine presidents lo filler Soviet poliiical Influence oul of incoming Soviet aid no mattrr how fatorahly predlspnsed those leaden may be lo China Chinaegional cohesion as iheong-term mean' In meet the Soviet challenge in southern Africa am therefore will publicly support the region's leaders.

would maintain and perhaps Increaseof small arms and related supplies loLiberation Committee In Dar et Salaam -to Irain guenllla forces in Tanzaniaalso continue to urge the African! Io unitework against the eipantion of Soviet influenceregion China, however. Is not in awith the Soviets In equipping theIhe front-line slate*.

Ihe nationalists and the RhodesianseekS and UK. militarysupporl. The guerrillas and theslates would demand lhal the Wesiout of the resultant slepped-up guerrillathem In their efforts lo complete the Iransitkgenuine African majority rule.

* Resumed' Negoliofioni

f events unrolled fairly rapidl* duringeriod of this Estimate. Il is possible thai before tlhad reached the point of involving large-seantervention, an effort might be made reunite negotiations, at Geneva nr elsewhere, resumption of negotiation* mighl come about ihroed

severalncluding 'perhaps In7 ne

battlefield stalemate, hut with high military cost* to both tides and the front-line states, particularly Mozambique and Zamabla;

dissatitf action fnildc Rhodesia with the coili of an endless war, and demoralization of the security forces, particularly the territorials;

bul cautious and perhaps dimlnbhing Soulh African support;

Western and possibly South African eahorlatlon and supportettlement

hould Rhodesia be willing lo try theroute again, il probably would have lo do soeader other than Smith, who is the pertonifjcalion of Rhodeilan Infiantlgence and perfidy In the minds of the Africans. Nkomo and Mugabe are likely lo be .the principal If not the only leaders of the nationalist tide al that point The Patriotic Front Is likely lo have held during the period of conflict without negotia-Ikons, although there would be friction if integration of ihe ZIPA and ZAPU armies were attempted. Muiorewa and Sithole would have becomeeilher through some by-this-iime discredited effort lo work out an independent. Internal deal with Smith, or because ihey lacked lhe guerrilla forces lohare of the credits for having hrmrghl lhe Rhodesian* back lo lhe negotiating table

he lerm*ettlement would pmbahly be harder than before, however, and mighlear-turrendcr by the whiles, perhaps Involving the Immediate dismantling of Rhodesian security fttffM In this event. Ihe Rhodesian* would Inuk more favorablytrong Bflttih presence, andommonwealth role in the security fortes

hile competition for power between Nknenn and Mugabe, or al least their factions, would ensue, they probably would postpone any sortruiitve showdown until independence or shortly before The nature and outcome of this showdnwn remain obscure, but the prospects for Nkomo'* leadershipelatively moderate Zimbabwe government are inversely proportional lo ZIPA's strength Wr believe, thai Ihe front-line itales would agree lo restrainisarm many of the guerrillas, thus diminishing lheir| leaders' own hard line regarding, and claim lo power in. lhe Interim government Conversely. Mugabe would not necessarilyetter (hjner at assuming tbe leadership if ZIPA were not defanged-Ihe guerrilla high command would probably put forward II* own candidates In thai case, inlemecine struggles between guerrilla factions would likely ensue.

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