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Special Memorandum
emigre discloses recent debate ON swiet military doctrine
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ffll&re discloses recent cerate cw scvibl MILITARY ktlmne
According toSoviettudy
by sociologist* undertaken In thes (or theMinistry concluded*"
Contrary to the views of "militaryhe Soviet Union could not sustain an Initial nuclear blow ond continue military operations; ana
An ares policy basedbalance of terror" Iseliable basis for peace.
The existence oftudy, hitherto unpubllcized, was revealed early this year by Ilyaormer Soviet party functionary and prominent sociologist, in the Frankfurt Journal CRAM . According to Zetatsov, the study sparked an intensive debate on uilitary doctrine in upper levels of the Defense Ministry ond the party bureaucracy1 He claimed that one result of the debateoviet decision to stop work on the developmentclean atonic bomb."
The revelations about the mllltory sociologists' study are included in extractsistory Zemtsov Is writing on the development of Soviet socloljgy published In GRANT. Zcntsov, who emigrated from the Sovlel Union in3as an aide to Azerbaydzhan First Secretary Aliyev and later headepartment in the Institute of Concrete Social Research and an Instructor in the CPSU Centrol Committee's Information Sector. He has Indicated that his knowledge of highly classified sociological studies cooc through hia work aa member of the board of the Soviet Sociological ALsocia-tlon and aeaber of the editorial board of the association's "Information Bulletin."* ranslation of his revelations about the sociologists' work on military subjects Is attached to this report.
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* For additional details on background, as well as accouitn of nrevioui revelationsthe CPSU Iradershla. scec
Zemtnov said thatociologists commissioned by the Ministry of Defense tasked withtudy of the "Social Problems of War" arrived at conclusion conflicting with accepted
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military doctrine. Their report challenged the contention ol "militaryhat human lossesuclear conflict could befticiently to permit continuation of military actlonirst strike, and.lt challenged the General Stafr's ability to predict accurately the character of-any at'acketermine the appropriate responses. The sociologists argued th.it nuclear war could not be viewed simplyarger version of conventional war, because there would be no victors and because It would be over in minutes, with little role for the traditional military to play.
In addition, the sociologists disputed what Zemtsov described as accepted Soviet military doctrine on the arms race, which he said was based on the American theory ofhe sociologists argueu against the theory on the grounds that the "balance of terror" on which it rests Is an ineffective method to preserve peace because:
4- it stimulates arms development and encourages bluffing and ucccptlon, which can get out of control;
4- titer Hide can feel secure because each has an imperfect knowledge of the other's strength, and moreover, both have differing ethical norms;
4- and, in any case, an initial strike will guarantee success in spite of any countermeasures.
These arguments, though said to have been "oblique" and "cloaked" In scholarly language, represented an unprecedented criticism of military doctrine, according to Zemtsov. Despite their seriousness, he said, there was no attempt to accuse the authors cf "subjectivism" or "lack of party principle." Instead, the conclusions were discussederies of conferences in the Ministry of Defense and even in the Central Committee Secretariat1pecial military-party-governraent commission was created to study the concepts. According to Zemtsov, one of the outcomes waso government, directly responding to the opinion of the sociologists thJt the "USSR should subordinate military tactics totopped workclean atomic bomb." It la unclear whether the sociologists opposed the bomb on the grounds that the Soviet Union hod no political need foreapon, or whether they used other arRumenta, such as the incompatibility of the weapon with th* Soviet Union's public posture on arms control.
Apparently reflecting the success of the above study, the Ministry of Defense sociologists subsequently received other important defense-
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related assignments. Apparently they are now studying factors which night lead the United States touclear strike and ways to rebuild the economyossible atomic conflict.
tudy was said to have been carried out by the ailltVy division of the Soviet Sociological Association under_the leadership of Col, V. Konoplev. Identifications In the press'RED STAR on Indicate that. Konoplev was chief of the department of military-sociological research of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Array ond Navy at the tine the study began. Konoplev has clearlyrominent role In Soviet sociology, representing Soviet sociologists at0 International sociological congress, according1 COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, and being reelected chairman of the bureau of the military division of the Soviet Sociological Associationccording to the3 RED STAR, 3erhaps reflecting the success of the study described above, he was promoted to major general (so identified for the first time in the5 REX STAR). till ns head of the Defense Ministry's military-sociological research department, he has been active in delivering lectures on military-patriotic training. Konoplev published an article on the impact of the scientific-technological revolution on war and the military In SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH No.
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APPENDIX il'ya zemtsov on development of soviet sociology..
Frankfurt GRANT In Russian So. ,.
(Second and lost portion] of Il'ya Zemtsov article: "History of the Development of Soviet Sociology")
(Excerpt) 9 sociologists of the Ministry of Defense received an order to look into the reasons for the lack of popularity of service in the army. They learned: frequent transfers, unsatisfactory pay, and Insufficiently rapid promotion in the service. As soon as the conclusions of the sociologists reached the desk of the Minister of Defense, the government, having found funds, raised officers* pay byercent and pensions byercent, to the universal Joy of the army. Moreover, length of leave was extended, the diplomas of all the higher military educational institutions were made equivalent to those ofev more stylish uniform was introduced, and special settlements In which military units had been quartered ware modified.
A very special assignment was given to sociologists ininvestigate the social problems of war.* The extent to which the conclusions of the sociologists contradicted existing Ideological stereotypes can be seen from some of their conclusions presented below.
Present day military conflict cannot bes war, since nuclear-missile combat presupposes:
absence of victors and vanquished, nrA mutual annihilation and destruction;
importance belongs not to the army but to the scientific-technical forces; differences between cadre military units and the civilian population are obliterated;
characteristic feature of past war hasignificant Interval of tine, allowing organization of alliances and changes of strategy and tactics; the outcomeodern conflict will be decided In minutes;
* rhe study was conducted by the military branch of the SSA (Soviet Sociological Association) under the leadership of Col. V. Konoplev. The report was discussed In the military branch of the SSA in The project wan called "Soclnl Problems of War."
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In the past has encouragedpl-it of collectivity; modern war reduces to zero Individual bravery and ability to resist and results in passivity.
The study was conducted under the "leadership of_V. Konoplev-'and wilt beyond the limits of an objective statement oft clearlyritical position toward the doctrine of the "arcis"race" accepted In military circles of the USSR nnd stemming from the American doctrine of "deterrence."*
Here are some arguments presented by V. Konoplev:
we proceed from the principle of. confrontation, it Is evident that mutual danger will constantly contribute to the arms race and therefore also to the planningetaliatory strike (udar vozaezdlya).
it follows from game theory that the first action will lead to success regardless of any subsequent counterinasures. esult, each side will increase the scale and tempo of Its arms procurements, which Inevitably will give rise to such phenomena as bluffing, deceit and other factors which, getting out of control, will cancel out tho chances for peace;
--the existing balanceragile balance of fear, because it ignoreseal factor as the relativity of ethical norms. Meanwhile, political decisions are frequently carried out without adequate knowledge of the distribution of forces and they do not contribute in any way to the preservation of calm.
Aside from these defects, the doctrine of "deterrence" engenders purely linguistic ambiguity in its argumentation, since one understands the concept of "control ovrr disarmament" to mean "control over armament production."
Doubt was cast on the confidence of military specialists that It la possible in practice to carry out measures which can limit human casualtiesuclear conflict to the point that the war game can be continued, to the end. The sociologists caet doubt on the ability of the General Staff to accurately determine the type of attack and tho range of retaliatory measures.
Soviet military doctrine until then had never encountered such dcfc.ructlve aid profound criticism, even though It was oblique and "packaged"ystem of thoughtful scholarly definitions. As a
* The study was made by the military branch of the SSAnder the leadership of Rear Admiral V. Shclyag In the Military Section of the CC CPSU, In (As published].
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result endless conferences on the most diverse levels beganfrom the collegium ot the Ministry of Defensehe CC CPSU. T
It ls.notevorthy that despite the fact that the coheiuslins of the sociologists exploded Soviet military doctrine, which had consumed an astronomical quantity of material assets and on which the global policy of the government was based, no one tried to accuse the scholars of "subjectivism" or "lack of party principle." pecial military-party-governmental commission was created to study the concepts of the General Staff. And one of the decisions of thecease developmentclean atomicdirectly from the opirion of the sociologists, who believed that the USSR should subordinate military tactics to politics.
At the presente sociological group under the Ministry of Defense has embarkedtudy of problems connected with studying the reasons which could cause the United States of America touclear missile strike and of questions connerrwith restoration of tht economyossible nt'-.lear conflict.
COPYRIGHT: 7 Possev-Verlag, V.rankfurt Am Main, Izdatel'stvo Posev
Original document.
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