Created: 12/1/1977

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Soviet Civil Defense: Objectives, Pace, and Effectiveness

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum


- li.pSeci







B. Sources and Methods

C Attribution


Strategy and

National Survival and Recovery Requirements

Factors mnuencing Civil Defense Policy

Defense Programs and



National Organization

Operating Elements

Training of Civilian Leaders



Military Units


Costing Method


Operation of Military Units


Total Costs

of the Soviet Organizational Structure

Planning and Research

Suitability of the Organizational Structure

Itcliels Aboul Disaster Behavior


Number, Type, and Location

Supplies and Equipment

B. Warning, Relocation, and Exercises

C Program Effectiveness




A. Protection ol Essential

Types of Shelter al Economic Facilities

Analysis of Shelter Programs at Selected Soviet Industries

Protection Afforded by

Dispersal ol Essential Personnel

Other Protective Measures

B Geographic Dispersal of

Soviet Economic Development

Size and Location of New Facilities

Expansion of

Territorial Production Complexes


Crisis Relocation

C IndustrUl


Underground Structures ,

Hasty Hardening

Protection of Electric Power

Reserve Pioduction




Types of Shelters

Pace and


HabtatMhty of




Evacuation Procedures

Preparations at Reception

C Life

Availability and Distribution of Suppliesiprnent

i il-etiveneas


and Assumptions

of Soviet Civil

C- Effects of US Retaliation With Day to Day Alert

Leadership Protection



Protection of (he Economy

Population Protection

of US Retaliation With Cencrated


ol Interaction Analyses for Civil Defense Effectiveness


Perceptions of Current Civil Defenses


Protection ol the Leadership

Protection of the

Protection of the Population




for Manpower


of Data From Key Recovery Industries and

Methodology for Estimating Percentage of Population

Notes for Interaction

Construction Projectiom for Five and Ten



S-l. Costs of Soviet Civil Defense Manpower. Operation of Military Units.

and Shelter Construction

HM. Human-Source Views on Effectiveness of Nonuniformed Civil

slimalcd Full-Time Soviet Civil Defense Workers

dentified Soviet Civil Defense Troop Units

osts of Soviet Civil Defense Manpower. Operation of Military Units.

and Shelter Construction

IV-I. Location of Shelters for the Leadership

stimated Hardness of Shelters for the

stimated Hardness of Shelters fordeiship in Town and at

Relocation Sites

V-I. Survey ofey Soviel Recovery Industries

urvey of Five Soviet Military-Related

vailable Shelter Area and Estimate of Plants With At Least One

Shelter forndustrial Categories

stimatedf Shelters at Economic

egional Distribution of Industrial Production in the USSR

V-G. Matrix of Hasty Hardcnlni; and Rapid Shutdown




helters Identified in Ceogiaphtc

VIhelter Survey Results it oviet Gilies

VIJ Shelter Capacity ol Subway Stations

A-l. Estimated Full-Time Soviet Ovil Defense

A-2. Full Tune Soviet Civil Defense Woikcr* in Qtie* and Urban

B-l. Survey ofey Soviet Recovery

urvey of Five Soviet Military-Related

helter Capacity al Selected Economic Recovery

vailable Shelter Area and EMimate of Hants With A: Least One

Shelter forndustrial

C-l. Shelter Survey Results atoviet

III Weapon

ase Summaries

helter Construction Initiations by

p/Down Huns Analysis of Shelter Construction

bove/Below Median Runs Analysis ol Shelter Construction

ean Rates of Shelter

helter Capacity

rojected Increase in Percentage of the Population Shelleied.on the Basis6

rojected Increase In Percentage of the Population Sheltered,on tbe Basis


Si Objectives and Priorities of Soviet CM) Defense

S-2> Effects of Soviet Civil Defense Preparations

IM. Objectives and Priorities of Soviet Civil Defense (Chart)

Organization of Soviet Civil Defense

III 2. Relationship of Oblast Civil Defense Staffs to Other Local

Organization in the USSR

III-3. Identified Civil Defense Unlb in the USSR

IV-1 Identified Civil Defense Shelters for the Soviet Leadership

V-l. Hardness Estimates for Soviel Civil Defense Shelters at Economic


V-2. Prompt Radiation In Shelters at Various Distances From Ground

Zero (Chart) l

V-3. Probability of Survival ol Personnel in Shelters Located at Aim Point

of Various US Nuclear Warheads

V-4. Probability of Suivival of Personnel in Shelters Located Away From

Aim Point of US Poseidon Warheads

V-S. Probability of Survival ofn Shelters Located Away Fioro

Aim Posot ofutemar. Ill Warheads

V-6. Probability of Survival of Personnel in Shelters Located Away From

Aim Point of US Mlnuteuvan II Warheads

V-7. Soviet Territorial Production Compleaa (Map)

Urban Planning Measures in Novosibirsk

VT-L Geographic Areas Surveyed

Vl-2 Subway Systems in the USSR




VI-3. Soviel Qvil Defense Foster Showing Subway as Protection for People


Vt-4. Moscow: Interconnecteday-Railioad Potential Evacuation

Routes to Command and Control Sites 85

VI 5 Distance From Point of Weapon Impact Versus Probability o( Producing Casualties Among Personnel tn Subways


VI* Sketch of Shelters Constructed From Conduit Sections (Sketch) 86

VI-7. Dttriboiion of Population in tbe USSR 90

VI-8 Kiev Evacuation Study 93

VI-9. Novosibirsk Evacuation Study

VIM. Effects of Soviet Qvil Defense

II-1 Ordered Distribution of Value foe Soviet Economic Targets

omprehensive Attack Damage Response Curves- Comprehensive Attack Damage Response Curves (Probability)

T>4. Radiation Levels on Evacuated Soviet-

rad levels)

D-5. Radiation Levels on Evacuated SovietOO-rad


D-G Expected Casualtiesunction of Typical Monthly Winds

Urban Shelters Evaluatedilopascali (Chart)

D-8. Urban Shelters Evaluatedilopascals (Chan)


Soviel civil defense is an ongoing, nationwide program under ilitary control, ll Is focused primarily on protection ofleadership, essential personnel, and the general population, in thatoforr.ic activity in wartime, and recovery fi-uu ihc effectsS nuclear attack. While it isrash effort, the pace of the program, as indicated most clearly by shelter construction starts in urban areas, increased beginning in lhe, andhave been made in virtually all facets of the program. However, lhe program has been marked by wide variations from area to area and year to year in both the rate of shelter construction and ihe total number of shelters and by bureaucratic difficulties and apathy toward civil defensearge segmenl of lhe population. Most progress lias been made in providing shelters for the leadership and essential personnel; shelters are available for at leastoet cent of the urban population, which, however, must depend mainly on evacuation for protection. The Soviets have made liltle progress in protecting industry by hardening and geographic dispersal.

While total civil defense costs are unknown, cost estimates have been made of ihree major elements of the Soviel program:ull-time civil defense personnel, operation of specialized military civil defense units, and shelter const ruction. The cost of these elements6 amounted toillion rubles, lessercent of Ihe estimated Soviet defense budget. If these three elements of the Soviel program were to be duplicated In the United States, Ihey would cost aboutillionith about three-fourths of this representing manpower costs. (These estimates should be considered rough approximations liecause lliey are affected by uncertainties both in the quantitative dala on civil defense programs and in estimates of prices.)

Programs for prolection of lhe leadership appear lo be well advanced. We cslimale (hat the Soviets have sufficient command post shelter space for virtually all of the leadership elements at all levelsounting all shekels, including those found at economic installations and in residential arras, we estimateinimum ofoercent of the total imputation in urban areas could presently be sheltered. This figure would rise tooercentssuming no change in the present rate of shelter construction and tiiking into account expected population growth in urban areas.


Dcspitc the scope and pace of shelter const ruction, large-scale evacuation away from target areas remains the keyarked reduction in the number of casualties. We estimate that an evacuation of the bulk of population from urban areas could be accomplished in two to three days, with as mucheek required for full evacuation of the largest cities. These times could be extended by shortages in transportation, other bottlenecks, or adverse weather conditions.

In analyzing the effects of civil defense on levels of damage and casualties the Soviets might sustain, weypothetical attack7 US forces against high value military and economic targets,

"J'n 'he attack,

eapons were optimized against critical Soviet economic targets. These weapons were in addition to (hose used against military targets and those held in reserve. Weingle retaliatory attack by US forces immediatelyoviet first strike. Our analysis in effect tends toworst case" for the United States, especially if Soviet population casualtiesajor criterion. Moreover, wc have estimated only those casualties during the first month following an attack resulting from prompt nuclear effects and early fallout.

On the basis of our analysis, we estimate that Soviet measures to protect the economy could not prevent massive industrial damage. The hypothetical US attack destroyedercent of the economic value of critical industrial installations in the selected target list. The specific damage levels shown by our analysis are subject to some uncertainty owing lo the structural damage criteria we used for assessing economic loss. The Soviet program for dispersal of industry appears to be offsetontrary tendency for investments in new facilities to be inside or near previously existing installations. The Soviet measures for protecting the work force, critical equipment, and supplies, and for limiting damage from secondary effects could contribute to maintaining and restoring production after an attack. We have not, however, analyzed the Soviet potential for recovery. We expect some improvements in the level of protection for the economy, but any radical change In its vulnerability to nuclear attack is unlikely.

The effectiveness of civil defense in reducing casualties in the USSR and in coping with the poslattack period would depend primarily on lhe time available to make final preparations prior to an attack. Using the results of the hypothetical attack referred to above, we estimate that:

Under the most favorable assumptions, including sufficient time lo complete urban evacuation and to protect lhe evacuated population, Soviet civil defenses would reduce casualties to aboutillion, and would assure survivalarge percentage of the leadership element. Withew days' prcparalion. casualties would be aboutillion.


Under worst condilioiis, withew hours or less to make final preparations, prompt easuallies wouldillion.

The critical time for preparation appears to be alKMit two or three days, because only by evacuating could the Soviets hope to avert massive losses.

arge percentage of essential personnel sheltered at economic facilities would probablyS attack, the Soviets could not prevent massive damage to theird lhe destruction of many of their most valued material accomplishments.

The casualty levels noted above could be increased if the United States attacked while an evacuation was in progress, increased the number of targets, stretched oul the attackonger period, structured the attack to produce more fallout, or if an evacuation was less cx]>cditious than planned or was impeded by adverse weather or transportation deficiencies. In assessing the protection afforded by their civil defenses, the Soviets would take account of these uncertainties.

The Soviets almost certainly believe their present civil defenses would improve their ability lo conduct military operations and would enhance lhe USSR's chances for survivaluclear exchange. They cannol have confidence, however, in lhe degree of protection their civil defenses would afford ihem, given (he many uncertainties attendantuclear exchange. We therefore do not believe that the Soviets' present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately to expose ihc USSRigher risk of nuclear attack.

We have no present reason lo believe lhat in the foreseeable future there will be any significant change in the Soviet leaders' fudgmcnt that civil defense contributesar-fighting and war-survival capabilities, nor do we believe thai iheir uncertainties about its actual effectiveness would be lessened. Thus, wo have no present reason to believe that their perception of the contribution of civil defense to their capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict will change significantly.


This study of the Soviel civil defense program focuses on those factors most likelyffect perceptions of the itrs'.sgic balance between the Soviet Union and the United Slales: lhe Soviets' ability to assure the survival of their leadership, their ability lo protect centers of production, and their ability to protect population. Because we do not know much about the consequencesarge-scale attack on the functioningodern, industrialized society, the study deals with that relatively brief periodtrike during which the most obvious effectsuclear exchange would be apparent It docs not assess the Soviets' post-nuclear-attack capabilities to conduct military operations or their longer term prospects for political cohesion and reconstitution of the economy.

We have attempted to describe the Soviet programay that would allow for an assessment of the confidence that the Soviet leaders place in thedegree to which their civil defense makes them feel more able to withstand the consequencestrategic nuclear exchange. Consequently, we have examined all-sourcedescribing the civil defense organization, priorities, training, and propaganda efforts from which inferences mighl berincipal effort has been to analyze what the effectS attack on the Soviet Union wouldassess the degree of protection provided for the leadership, for the economy, aud for tbe population.

Organization, Priorities, and Pace

Soviets' strategic writings integrate civil defense intostrategy. It is parteneral scheme of the likelyand consequences of nuclear war. Aside from thesethe Soviets' experiences in Worldogether withconcern for homeland defense, reinforce their interestdefense. By developing an active and extensive civilin conjunction with their other defensive andprograms, they hope to convince any potenlial enemyar with the USSR. But if war should occur, thethrough civil defense and other means, to assure the survival ofand to betronger postwar position than theirdefense is meant to contribute to the maintenanceunctioning

logistical base of operations by regular armed forces to win lhe war. to limit human and material losses, and to enable the Soviets to speed recovery from the consequences of war.

The Soviet leaders' emphasis on civil defense offers the potenlial to foster favorable popular attitudes toward the Soviet system, to demonstrate leadership concern for the people, and to lend credibility to calls for vigilance against potential enemies. Nearly every Soviet citizen receives civil defense instruction either in school, or through training courses, lectures, and exercises al places of work. Public attitudes aboutuclear war remain skeptical, however, and there is evidence that many people do not take the program seriously. Nevertheless, we believe, on the basis of human source reports and US and Soviet studies of public disaster behavior, lhat the Soviel people would respond to directions from civil defense authorities.

A publicly recognized, highly structured, military-controlled civil defense organization exists at all levels of the Soviet government and economy, with the head of every organization designated "chief of civilhe national organizalion is led by General of lhe Army A. T.eputy Minister of Defense. Full-lime civil defense staffs exist al each echelon of the Soviet administrative structure: national, republic, oblast, city, and rayon, as well as at all significant economic institutions and enterprises.

In wartime, this administrative structure would be convertedivil defense chain of command subordinate to the deputy commander for civil defense of each military district. The operating elements of the Soviet civil defensethat would carry outarge number of mililary civil defense units, communications elements, and civilian civil defense formations. Counting all civilian units and formations according lo guidelines issued by General Altuninhe total number of people in the program would be upwardsumber which includes many perfunctory participants. There are alsoull-lime civilian and military personnel.1

The peacetime effectiveness of the civil defense organization suffers al times from the reluctance of industrial officials to spare labor and other resources for civil defense and from misunderstandings between civil defense officers and Soviet civilians. In wartime, increased centralization of authority would probably reduce many of the bureaucratic inefficiencies inherent in this large organization. But the fact that the organization exists, despite its problems, and the fact

'yeu'i oltmilcinimum0 did re* include full-time civil detente imjoanrl il


thai progress is being made toward fulfillment of lhe objectives of (he civil defense program give Soviet civil defense leaders some confidence in their ability to function as required. On the whole, the Soviets' view of their civil defense organization structure probablyavorablebetter than il was before the military assumed control of it in the.

In terms of actual priorities the Soviet program appears to hew closely to what its organizers have declared their intentions lo be.he first priority is to protectleadership first, other essential personnel second, and the rest of (he population third. In support of this, they have built shelters, established relocation sites, and developed evacuation plans. The second priority is to maintain the continuity of economic activity in wartime. Much of the action on this program appears to have been directed toward providing protection for the work force. The third priority, "liquidation of the consequences of an enemynvolves the trainingroad spectrum of the Soviet population in postattaek operations such as administering first aid, clearing rubble, decontaminating, and emergency repair and restoration of power.

The pace of the Soviet civil defense program is affected on the one hand by commitments of the leadership to realize progress in peacetime preparations, and on the other by reluctance of some

Objective* and Priorities of Soviet Civil Defense

Objectives Protection Of Human

Continuity of Economic Activity in Wartime

"liquidation nlol Enemy

Priority Tubs

Sheltering and rekcatloo ol the

leadership Sheltering and depend ol essential


Sheltering and evacuation ol lhe w-

baa population Stockpiling food and medical mpnlia

Integration ol civil defense andotobillulloa plira

Rapid AuUewB olilluVa

Permanent and huty hardening ol uutaUifioiu and equipment

Oiiii lelc-atico ot euxiwnlc entei-I" iva

Stockpiling reservB ol miteruliUperut of Industry

Preinraton of

rmationi-escue raid;ietuiilioca for di^ribUtiaa/of lecd.

ewutial fupptioi *

ministries, industrial managers, and local officials Io dedicate scarce resources to what they regardecondary requirement and by apathy toward civil defensearge segment of the public While

it isrash effort, the pace of the program, as indicated most clearly by shelter construction starts in urban areas, increased in the late

. Civil defense preparations arc continuing, but the extent of implementation of civil defense measures varies from area lo area and year lo year.

c are 'Mil unable to estimate lhe total annua! costs of Soviet civil defense, but we haveentative estimate of the costs of three elements of the program- full-time civil defense personnel, now estimated to beeople; operation of military civil defense units; and shelter construction. (Seehese three elementsillion rubleshis figure, which indicates the burden of these three elements on the Soviet economy, represents lessercent of our estimate of Soviet defense spending. If these three elements were duplicated in lhe United States, the costs would have been aboutillionhis figure conveys the magnitude of the program in familiar terms, it does not reflect the economic burden lo the Soviets. The high dollar estimate results primarily from the relative costs of manpower in the United States and the USSR. Manpower represents aboutercent of the total dollaris.4 billion ofnly aboutercent of the ruble costs. (These estimates should be considered rough approximations

Costs of Soviet Civil Defense Manpower, Operation of Military Units, and Shelter Const ruction*

ffeUr Cam at OT9 Fncm (MW-ui

Mate 8 6

Operation of military


Co.ii ar We frvn jsJhoAi)

tlrloie Total im IBT6

Opnaton of aaabury


raumilet ihould be cnniideied lough ipproitaulieni bccaiur Ihey are affected by uncertiiiilka horli Id (he qtunUlati>v

dalaefeitte pcognnuIn cilinuiA of


bccause they are affected by uncertainties both in lhe quantitative data on civil defense programs and in estimates of prices.)

Proiorlion ol the teodcrsruo

n case of nuclear war. the top national military and civilian leadership of lhe Soviet Union would be sheltered in hardened command posts near Moscow and at other sites independently of the civil defense program we describe in this paper. When we speak of measures for the protection of the leadership, we refer not only lo the top national leadership, but also toarty and government officials at the national' and republic0 paily and government leaders at kray. oblast. city, and urban rayonanagers of key installations; and0 members of civileople in all.

hroughout the Soviet Union thereattern of shelter construction for the leadership. It consists of hardened underground shelters near their places of work and relocation sites someoilometers outside lhe cities. These shelters are usually provided with communications equipment and are located near or on trartsporlation routes. The local shelter and relocation site pattern extends from government ministries to party headquarters and oblast and city governments and includes sites for major industrial enterprises as well.

he resistance of these facilities to blast varies, depending on their location and prospective occupants- At some of the relocation sites for the lop leadership, the hardness)

Jfigures are comparable to those for military command and contiorbunkers. The ranire of hardness for shelters for other national leaders is^

Jjudging from analysis of Soviet designs, the remaining leadership sheliers are estimaied to be of about the same hardness as average shelters in industrial and urban areas. While we do not know much about exact amounts, we believe thai in general these shelters have some stockpiles of food, medicine, pro!eclive equipment, communications, and other supplies for their prospective occupants.

e have surveyedmall portion of all the cilies and rural areas where leadership shelters would likely be found. The total floorspacc for the leadership shelters wc have identified and measured adds upquare meters; roughly an equal number of shelters have been idenlified but not measured. We estimate, therefore, that, the Soviets have sufficient command post shelter space (or virtually all

stceei -

(he leadership elemenls as defined in this paper. This estimate takes Into account space required for supplies, communications, and work area.

Protection of the Economy

lans for protecting the Soviel economyumber of complementary measures, not all of which are to be taken at any individual site but which could apply selectively dependingite's imporUnrwartime economy. These measures include.

Sheltering! al installations in the even! of attack

Dispersalortion of the work forceeriod of crisis

Emergency relocation of certain installations.

Ceographic dispersal of new installations.

Hardening of physical structures.

Hasty hardening measures when an attack is imminent, such as sandbagging of equipment and earth mounding around structures.

Rapid shutdown of equipment.

To study (he actual measures the Soviets have taken, wc surveyedconomic facilities distributed amongey categories which we believee important for Soviet recoveryuclear attack. The primary civil defense preparations wc were able to identify at the sample installa(ions are those related to sheltering personnel We found thai shelters had been built or were under construction a( lhe time of the survey at someercent of the plants. Mote than two-thirds of (he shelters identified liavc been builtlthough shelter construction is continuing, construction starts observed at the facilities surveyed were highestQ ^

We also performed various statistical tests tut the sample to extrapolate our findings to the rest of Soviet economic facilities within these categories. For this purpose we usedf thendustrial categories on which our information was most complete. Assuming (hat our sample is roughly representative of Soviet industryhole and recognizing that our confidence bounds arc large owing to our small sample and the variability of the data, some conclusions can be drawn'

increased level of shelter const ruction8 indicates implementationoviet plan. The rate of increase in construction was not uniform throughout industiy. but was concentrated among large enterprises (those whose output falls inpperercent of productioniven category of

t new installations, and at those undergoing expansion.

Extrapolating from our sample, we calculate that the Soviets could shelteroercent of the estimated total labor force in these key industrial categories. Thishelter occupancy factorquare meter perowever, Soviet plans do not call for sheltering the entire labor force. They plan to close nonessential industries entirely and to evacuate nonessential workers from those industries that are to continue production. The remaining essential work force at each plant is to be divided into two shifts, one to be dispersed to locations within commuting distance of the enterprise, the other to continue work. We believe the shelters at economic facilities arc intended for that portion of the essential labor force at work during awe have designated the "crisis work force."

The size of the crisis work force would vary, but could be up toercent of the total labor force at some enterprises. Usingpercent figure, we calculate that the available shelter space at the sample installations studied could accommodateoercent of the crisis work force. The actual percentage of the crisis work force sheltered would be higher because we expect the crisis work force to be less thanercent of the total labor force.

In addition to the survey ofey recovery industries on which the above conclusions were based, welants from five military industrial categories. We found that shelters had been built or were under construction atercent of the plants, as compared withercent ofacilities at theey recovery industries which we surveyed.

The Soviet program for geographic dispersal of industry is, as far as we can tell, not being implementedignificant extent:

New plants have often been built adjacent to major existing plants.

Existing plants and complexes have been expanded in place.

No effort has been made to expand the distance between buildings or to locate additions so as to minimize fire and other hazards in the eventuclear attack.

Previously open spaces in fuel storage sites.have been filled in with new storage tanks and processing units.

Thefigure of OS square meter pet person it derived Irom Soviet Ovil defense publications. Tbe upper boundquare meter ts based on an average ol liqiifes provided by line->ledgeable human sources. Tbe range is eorutstenlnudin ol the US Delense CM PrepaiedneuWellquare metereiiriMe gtul but itbwquare melei isprietieal mtn-mum


The value of overall productive capacity has likewise been increased proportionately more in previously located sites, raising theof industry to attack even more.

Little evidence exists that wouldomprehensive program for hardening economic installations. In some cases, in fact, construction guidelines for the physical hardening of industrial sites appear to have been ignored. Published Soviet civil defense guidelines acknowledge the high cost of such measures and explicitly state that they arc to be carried out only when economically feasible.

There areew human-source reports of training exercises in which hasty hardening techniques have been employed. The Soviets appear to have given greater emphasis to rapid shutdown of equipment than to hasty hardening. The emphasis in this scheme seems to be on protecting vital equipment and installations from secondary damage triggered by prompt effectsuclear attack, such as ignition of combustibles, and facilitating longer term recovery of installations after an attack.

Overall, we estimate that the Soviets' measures to protect their economy would not prevent massive damageS attack designed to destroy Soviet economic facilities. Al best, Soviet leaders and civil defense planners are probably confident that, through rapid shutdown and emergency repairs by the surviving work force, limited production at slightly or moderately damaged sites could be restored soon after an attack. Wc have not assessed the Soviets* long-term ability to reconstruct their economy.

Protection of the Populolion

Soviet plans call for in-place shellers and the evacuation of population from urban target areas. Our evaluation of the Soviet shelter program is based primarily on analysis ofistinct regions in the USSR including three oblasts, one republic, andelected urban concenlralions. Allhough these areas do notandom sample and representmall portion of the total number of Soviet urban agglomerations, we believe theyasis for tentative conclusions regarding the pace, scope, and magnitude of the shelter program nationwide. Assessments of the effectiveness of the Soviet evacuation program are highly dependent on the scenario chosen, but tentative evaluations of this program are also possible.

The lynes of shelters we surveyed include built-inetached (separatend subways. Most of the structures are of lhe built-in type, constructed during the laying down of foundations for buildings. Our analysis of time-series data indicates that aboul half of the shellers currently in existence were builtowever, there


were wide variations in construction rates among cities and from year to year

J We have used two different figures in allocating shelter floorspace perquare meter. Using both these figures against the best estimate of tlie total floorspace in the urban shelters which we positively identified, resultsotal capacityillionillion people. Extrapolating upward for unevenneo of coverage of those areas surveyed results in an estimate that aboutoercent of the population in these urban areas could be sheltered. Extending this extrapolation to the USSRhole, we estimate that the Soviets have probably constructed more0 shelters nationwide lhat can protectillion tooercent of the total population in cities of moreeople. We arc confident that more extensive analysis would result in an upward, not downward, adjustment of this figure, but we are unable to say by how much.

Addilional protection would be available to the Soviet population in the form of subway tunnels and stations. The Moscow subway, for example, hasnderground stations and moreilometers of tunnels.pace allocationquare meter per person, we estimate thatersons could be sheltered in the station areas and four times that number in the track tunnels,otal ofoercent of the urban population of the city. This total is in addition to the number that would be sheltered in the previously discussed shellers. The five other operating subway systems in the USSR would provide an additional increase in the total sheltered population. We have not included these spaces in our count of the totals because the subways could be intended for evacuation and because of our uncertainty over the existence of life-support systems in the subways.

The shelters the Soviets have built are designed to withstand overpressuresoounds per square inch) on the basissure safe" criteiioa. According to our analysis,ercent of these same shelters would withstand overpressureshe hardness range ispercenl probability of achieving at least severe da'mageegaton weapon; the range results from uur uncertainty about the actual shelter construction techniques.

Wc estimate thatoercent of the people in urban shelters would be adequately protected from the blast and other prompt effectsuclear attack that was intended to maximize damage to industrial and military targets On the other hand, evacuation of the bulk of ihr urban population would be necessary in order toarked reduction in the tolal number ol urban casualties.


.Soviet writings State tliat Ihc order to evacuate cities would be given during the "specialperiod of high tension and increased risk of war. The order to evacuate would be issued through dedicated civil defense communications networks and disseminated to the public via the mass media. Individual installations would use available means to notify personnel of the time and place for staging their evacuation. Factories, offices, schools, or bus and train stations would serve as embarkation points. According to Soviet planners the population would haveew hours to prepare for an evacuation following the order to do so. On their arrival at assembly points people would board buses or trains, or begin walking toward their previously assigned relocation areas. Those jH-rsons destined for remote-areas would be evacuated first to intermediatehere they would rest and be fed by local authorities. There is no evidence that evacuation exercises in large cities involving the actual movement of people have been practiced. There is evidence that small-scale evacuations are practiced. Where planning exercises primarily involving civil defense staffs for large cities have been conducted the results have apparently been mixed. In an exercise of elements of the Moscow staff inhe performance of those involved was found unacceptable by city civil defense authorities.

Theoretical studiesange of times necessary to accomplish evacuation, depending primarily on the availability of transportation. For evacuation employing motorizedtrucks, trains, andto four days would be required for the last group of evacuees to reach their relocation area If the evacuation was carried out oneek or more would be required to evacuate the larger cities. Using some combination of motorized and foot transport would reduce the required time to lesseek. Unusually severe weather conditions could slow the pace of evacuation andocal decision to evacuate. On balance, an average of two or three days would probably be required to evacuate the maior portion of the Soviet urban population.

planning recognizes that the evacuated portion ofmust be provided fallout protection. Plans andexisl for upgrading existing structures and constructingin rural and exurban areas. However,ractical matter,that lhe bulk of the evacuated population would havelevel of protection afforded by upgraded basements andof standard Soviet rural structures Under ideala week or so to evacuate urban areas and to modifyarid construct hasty shelters, the evacuated populationafforded high levels of protection.


Oyet-oll Effwliveneii

e have calculated the effects of civil defense on the levels of damage and casualties the Soviets might sustainS-Soviet nuclear exchange7 forces. We have deliberately chosen to analyze important and sensitivedamage andcan be evaluated quantitatively, and have made arbitrary assumptions to deal with the inevitable uncertainties regarding preparations for and conduct of an actual nuclear exchange. This type of analysis involved trading on the realism of lhe war scenario adopted to gain detail in calculating themore detailed our analysis for purposes of calculations, the less likely the calculations would apply to another, perhaps more believable scenario.

For example, weingle spasm of weapons launched by US strategic forces from day-to-day alertoviet strike on those forces. This allows us to estimate the level ofeakened US retaliatory force could inflict in the Soviet Union under various states of preparations. For purpose of these calculations we have also assumed that in its retaliatory strike the United States would not deliberately target the Soviet population but would choose instead to attack high-value military and economic targets In our analysis,S weapons were used in an attack optimized against critical Soviet economic targets. These weapons were in addition to those used against military targets and those held in reserve. Wc assessed the industrial damage and casualties resulting from the attack on military targets as well as from the attack on economic targets.

This approach^

"Jends to establish a

lower limit for the level of casualties such an attaclTwould inflict on the Soviet Union. In effect, it tends toworst case" for the United States, especially if Soviet population casualtiesajor criterion.

command posts and relocation sites that weand located would be vulnerable to US attack.^

We estimate that, with several hours lo make finalarge percentage of leaders and communications facilities would survive.

hose measures we have described for protection of the economy could not prevent massive damage. The atlack used in our analysts destroyedercent of the economic value of the critical industrial installations in the selected target lis! The specific damage levels shown by our analysis are subjeel to some uncertainty due to the siructural damage criteria wc used for assessing economic loss. Even

. ftCCPC-r-

eek or so of preparations, there would be little reduction in the amount of prompt damage to facilities inflicted by blast. Our analysis of the hardness of shelters at industrial installations and their locations relative to likely weapon aim points indicatesarge percentage of the essential personnel wouldS atlack designed to maximize damage to economic facilities. The Soviet measures for protecting the work force, critical equipment, and supplies and for limiting damage from secondary effects could contribute to maintaining and restoring production afler an attack. We have not, however, analyzed tbe Soviet potential for economic recovery.

extent of losses to the population would dependthe lime lhe Soviels had to prepare for an altack and whether orchose to evacuate their urban population (see

inimal period of preparation (two hours orassive attack could result in casualties from prompt nuclear effects and fallout in excessillion, includingillion toillion fatalities.

With limited preparationsay orhe Soviets could reduce the number of fatalitieso.ercent. Total casualties would still be in excessillion people, of which the fatalities could be more thanillion.

oderate period of preparation (two to three days) during which the Soviel civil defense authorities implemented plans for evacuation of urban areas, fatalities of levels cited above could be reduced to aboutillion toillion. Casualties,'including fatalities, could be more thanillion.

Extended preparationeek or more) could further reduce the level of Soviet fatalities and casualties. With time lo complete urban evacuation, and to protect the evacuated population, fatalities from prompt nuclear effects and fallout could rangeillion toillion people, with total casualties in excess ofillion.

The above figures serve to point out the important fact that, in lhe preparations for an attack, the critical decision to be made by the Soviet leaders, in terms of sparing their population, would be whether or not lo evacuate their cities. The cost of nol evacuating could be in the neighborhoodillion casualties.

There are of course many combinations of preparation limes and attack assumptions which would increase llie level of casualties over those shown above. For example ihe attack could be directed against the population, carried out over an extended period, or timed so as to


come while the Soviets were in lhe process of evacuating their cities. In addition, the United States couldarger portion of its weapons inventory than thai postulated above.

e are unable loonfident assessment of how effective Soviet civil defense would be in rescue and recovery operations following an attack. Our tentative estimate is lhat, under the most favorable circumstances, stocks of essential supplies would be adequate to sustain the surviving population for weeks and perhaps longer, but the distribution of these supplies wouldritical problem. Under worst conditions, wc believe the chances would be pewSevirtr could effectively support the surviving population with supplies and services.

he Soviets almost certainly believe their present civil defenses will improve their ability to conduct military operations and will enhance Ihc USSR's chances for survival following nuclear exchange. They cannot have confidence, however, in the degree of protection their civil defenses would afford them, given the many uncertainties attendantuclear exchange. Wc therefore do not believe that the Soviets' present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately to expose the USSRigher risk of nuclear attack.

Future Implicotiom

We estimate that the Soviets will continue to emphasize the construction of shelters for the urban population. If this resultedace of construction matching thathey would,ncrease the number of shelters in the Soviet Union by roughly two-thirds, over the present estimated total. This would increase lhe minimum percentage of population sheltered in urban areasopulationr more) fromoercent to an estimatedoercent This increase takes into account the projected growth' in urban population.

We estimate lhat over the nextears, the percentage of population sheltered will increase, but the absolute number of people that would have to be evacuated will alto increase because of growth in the urban population. To avoid an increase in the number of people to be evacuated, Soviet shelter construction would have to be higher than the rate we have projected. Thus, the Soviet leaders' critical problem of deciding whether to evacuate, and when to do so. will not change substantially over this period They may. however, be able to achieve some reduction in the time required to evacuate by increasing the available transportation.

rospect* (or improvement in measures to protect the economy against altack are mixed The increase in the number of shelters will probablyarger proportion o( the work force to be sheltered. Bul the continuing concentration of economic investment in previously existing plant sites, together with an absence of construction-hardening techniques, suggestsS countcreconomic attack would be about as destructive as at present. We do not believe that the protective measures the Soviets are likelv to undertake during the nextears would significantly reduce damagearge-scale US attack designed to maximize destruction of economic targets.

for protection of the leadership arc solidlywell advanced. We are confident that this aspcel ol thecontinue to receive attention, with better protection (or leaderslevels. The continued giowth in the numbers of

"^will increase prospects of survivalarge number of Soviet leaders.

have no present reason to believe that in thethere will be any significant change in the Sovietthat civil defense contributes lo war-fighting andcapabilities, nor do we believe that their uncertainties abouteffectiveness would be lessened Thus, we have no presentbelieve that their perception of the contribution of civil defensecapabilities for strategic nuclear conflict will change significantly.


Chapter I



his report describes Soviet concepts, plans, and objectives for civil defense, explains the extent, pace, and characteristics of civil defense preparations; evaluates the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense, and estimates the future course and implications of the Soviel program.

2 In addition to these areas, several basic themes underlie the report, including the relationship, on the one hand, between warning (or the time available to make linal preparations) and Soviet civil defense programs, and, on the olher hand, between observable civil defense preparations and Soviet civil defense plans. These themes and others are carried through the report but aie specifically addressed in the sections dealing with the effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense program

he judgments and analyses of effectiveness pertain primarily to the capability of Soviet civil defense lo protect the leadership reduce population casualties, permit the continuing functioning of essenlial Industrial facilities and equipment, and conduct rescue and recovery operations. Wc also attempt to judge the effectiveness of Soviet peacetime organizations and programs to complete thecalled for in Soviet plans. When feasible, the report gives both quantitative and qualitativeof Soviet civil defense, but they do notomprelumsiv net auettment of Soviet capabilities to recover from the effectsarge-scale attack by US strategic forces. Our judgments and analyses of civil defense eflectivenesst provide approaimaliorn of the impact civil defense preparations could have in reducing casualties and damage. Neither we nor the Soviets could be confident about absolute levels of damagearge-scale nuclear attack with or without civil defenses, or about tbe effectiveness of various types of preparations for conducting rescue and lecovery operations

4.n- report covers all activities encompassed in

the Soviet concept of civil defenie. with special



attention to the effectiveness of civil defensefor survival and recovery during rise first tew weeksS retaliatory attack. It does nol cover measures to protect military forces, nor does it attempt to define the longer term capabilities of the USSR to reconstitute Its rxhtksJ, economic, and military institutionsuclear exchange

his report supersedes tbe InteragencyMemorandum on Soviet civil defense (NIO) published int does not attempt to duplicate the previous IIM in lorm or detail, although much of the basic intelligence information provided in the previous paper remains valid. All of Use findings of last year's report have been reevaluated in light of new information and analysis This IIM notes those principal findings in6 IIM which subsequent intelligence eflorts have either confirmed or refuted.

B. Sources and Methods

The analyses for this report drew on all available intelligence sources and reflect an extensiveresearch and analysis effort This effort was guidedpecial collection and produclion strategy developed after the completion of the- IIM Innder this strategy, responsibilities for taking the lead in research and analysis on the various aspects of Soviet civil defenses were appoitinned among the participatirig agencies.

To allow foi an In-depth analysis of Soviet civil defense activities, intelligence efforts wereon selected geographic regions and industrial categories The regions were selected on the basis of geographic location; political, economic, and militaiy importance; and availability of collectionIndustrial categories were selected according to their military significance and Importance to post-attack recovery.

The report also relied heavily on informationfrom broadcasts and through the open press, including leslbnoks and ncwsiiapcrs.7 edition

of lhe civil defense manual and lhe monthly publication Mi/iWry Kruxriedg* 'Voyennuye Zna-niye'. which is published jointly by the Civil defense or gamut ion and tbe Soviet preinduction training organization, haveignificant contribulion lo understanding ol Soviet civil ilclcnsc metbods and programs. It now is clear (ram other sources tltut much of the information contained in Soviel civil defense lileralure is an accurate reflection of ongoing program* Thus, these sourcestandard for measuring Soviet progress InIhe programslso recognireo. however, lhat .'he goals and activities described in Soviel civil defense literature may be somewhat distorted. Such literature contains propaganda and does not cover details of the civil defense progiam considered classified by the Soviets. (See Bibliography,

sources havearge bodyon almost alt aspects of the civilCollection was aimed primarily atof the USSR with backgrounds whichaccess to details on civil defense activitieshave provided some insights on bjwdescribed in Soviet literature work In realitygiven important descriptions of civilwhich provided signatures (ot use

At the same time, we continue lo have reservations concerning some information from these sources on the Soviet civil defense programs. Aside from attendance at lectures, relatively (ew sources participated directly in the activities of the civil defense organisation at their places oi work or study Unless ihey held supervisory positions, or their professional responsibilities brought them into contact with specific aspects of civil defense such as shelter construction, their information often tended to be superficial In addition, by reason of theirthese sources were apt to be more negative regarding the program than might be true of the general popular ion. Where specif leaHy queue.)most agreed thateal crisis aiose. civil defense diieciives tvould be complied with despite any public apnlhy or the tendency of the sources lo ridicule the program

Information from attaches ind visitors has also helped in confirming or negating leads fiom otherlthough, as foreigners subjecttringent travel restrictiorn, they were unable lo report in any depth on civil defense activities. Clandestine sources have also provided valuable input* in terms ol thei:

experiences wilh the program and idenlification of important civil defense taciltiies

atcllire photography otattng8 lo the present was used extensively in the identification of the most visible aspects of civil defense, and made its most important contribution in lhe identification of shelters For many of lhe areas, most of the dciached shelters were identified.lgnilicanl number ol enisling basement shelters in many of the areas studiedrobably not Identified While overhead photography is ideally suited forof shelters and other eatemally visible aspects of the civil defense program, it has been of little use in determining what protective measures have been taken within industrial facilities.

and understanding of Sovietby Ihc Intelligence Communityduring the past year. While there arein the data base and deficiencies Insome aspects of the programs, there is nowbasis for assessing the current extent,effectiveness of the civil defense effortthe protection of (he population arethan programs to protect thewith respect to tlie impact onThere are also uneertalntios aboutand intentions and about Iheof the Soviel civil defense effort over lhe

C. Attribution

Interagency Intelligenceapproved by the Director of Centralthe concurrence of the National ForeignBoardl wa*tlie >utplces of the National IntelligenceStrategic Programs, National ForeignIts preparationoint undertaking ofIntelligence Agency, tbe Defenselhe National Security Agency, the Bureauand Research. Department of Stale,offices of the Assistant Chief of StaffDepartment of the Aimy, ol theNaval Intelligence. Department of tho Navy, andAssistant Chief of Stalf, Intelligence,the Air Force The Memorandum wa* draftedCentral Intelligence Agency, based onby the participating intelligenceworking group was assisted by tbe CommandTechnical Center. Defensethiougli lhe Assistant Secretary ol Defense foi

Prnjiunt AmJrib ud EwIubiIbh. and by .cpff.

Chapter II


n Soviet writings on military doctrine and stralegy, civil defense is integratedeneral scheme of the likely origins, course, and cotisi*iuences of nuclear war. In that scheme, Soviel deterrence relies on convincing potential enemies that they cannotuclear war against the USSR Should deterrence fail, civil defense wouldual role in contributingunctioning logistical base for operations by regular armed forces to "win" the warnabling Soviet recovery from war damage

A. Military Strategy and Requirements

Civil defense has origins dating fiom the beginnings of the Soviet regime and especially from its experience in World War IL Currently. Soviet planning for civil defense is driven primarily by the possibility of war with lhe United Stales, rather than by contingencies suchhinese or other third-country attack. While Soviet civil defense writings discuss US motives and capabilities at length,lo China are rare. The Soviets probably recognizeivil defense capability against US Strategic forces would alto serve against anyack.

Soviet strategists regard nuclear war as possible, although they do notpecific degree of probability to it They are uncertain whether war with the United States could be contained shortarge-scale nucleai exchange, but their public commentary generally disdains limited uses of strategic nuclear weapons as envisioned by (he United States It has been the Soviet view lhat initial nuclear strikes would attempt to destroy as much as possible of the otheretaliatory capability and to disrupt mobtltu-lion, economic activity, and command and control. These strikes have been considered likely loecisive influence on the outcome of the war.round offensive would probably be necessary to secureecause of the importance attached lo the initial nuclear strikes, Soviet strategists have


emphasized the value of preemptive attack. They believe an initial nuclear attack would be precededspecialperiod of high tension and increased risk of war. during which final preparations for conflict would be made.

here is additional evidence lhat links Soviet civil defense to strategy for the conduct of military operations following an initial nuclear attack. Soviet strategists expect the ground offensive against NATO, and associated sea and air operations,uclear exchange, to be characterized by rates of advance and levels of intensity exceeding previous warfare The logistical requirements for the Soviet offensive led the Chief of Civil Defense. General of lhe Army A. T. Altunin, lo observe4 thai "in contemporary war. destruction of the functioning of the logistical base has become one of the main warccordingly, one of lhe civil defense program's main (asks is described as ensuring "the continuousof Ihe economy" in support of the Soviet offensive. Thus, th* civil defense program links all aspects of the national economy to Soviel economic mobilization plans for conversion to wartime itxiuire-menls.

oviel program choices for civil defense have been affected by shifts of emphasis in Soviet military strategy, because of the supporting role envisioned for civil defense in military operations. Change in military strategy, for example, was tbe reason for Ihe change In emphasis on urban shelter construction as compared with city evacuation measures forprotection20 Soviel civil delcnvc officials repeatedly described evacuation measures as "lhe most effective method for protecting the most important industrial-economicuring this period the Soviets were confident that NATO mobilization and US slialegic force activity would provide enough warning to permit urban evacuation, but technical improvements to slralegic forces made many Soviet strategists concerned that the warning or special period might be very brief. Moreover, evacuation, which would be


subject to observation by US reconnaissance, might signal an impending Soviet preemptive strike. Shelters were therefore preferable lo evacuation measures under such circumstances, as they could be occupied on short notice; movement into shelters would also be much leu noticeable.

civil defense officials argued againstpriority to slielters (ordemeaning the Importancein nuclear war. Nevertheless, theperceplion ol the role ol surprise andlor shelters over evacuation, prevailedA Soviet history ol the civil

In Ihe recent past, evacuation and dispersal were considered the main means ofprotection. Now. when missile-nuclear weapons and strategic aviationer development andthe aggressor may be tempted toreemptive nuclear strike. In thesetime for implementing civil defense protective measures may be extremelyespecially lime for evacuation and dispersal Consequently, today the plan for sheltering the population in protectiveis given the first place as the most reliable way of preserving people's lives from missile-nuclear weapons.'

priority in implementing thb newto constructing shelters in economicThb began in lhend isAltunin reaffirmed thb priorityxplained that "the scope and character ofmeasures" would depend "on thedefense significance ol individualSoviet civil defense planners continueon evacuation ol the urban populationof workers to sites withindistance of theireans of protecting the population.

B. Immediate National Survival and Recovery Requirements

8 The. Soviet civil defense program has for yearsomprehensive, broadly based effort to

Kmluiuv.and SgUcvskly. Clcil Defense. In Ihe Fail

and promt. Ktfncaw,

' Ai lord In ihu memorandum lhe term "economic inUiNations" icfcii to Industrial lacili'iei. design bureaus,iiuta Flat ions, and utilities engaged in the production ol goodi

and services.

convince people that nuclear war is survivable, and to instruct the population on how to survive. As Altunin emphasized in lib first public statement as Chief of Civil Defense:

The task of propaganda is to see to It lhat every Soviet person believes firmly lhatefense against any weapon, even the mosl modern.

This emphasis on programs to inform people about nuclear war to offset widespread doubts concerning survival is consistent with US researchn informationalssential to eflective disaster response. Human reporting evinces widespreadabout surviving nuclear war. Resistance to propaganda may be stronger among our sources, who havelie USSR, than among those who remain. Nevertheless, reminders in Soviet civil defense(for example,erious attitude toward training is demanded from alleinforce thethat public attitudes remain skeptical.

the Soviets do not discuss the aftermathwar in anyhrase used by Altuninfirst public statement as Chief of Civilcontinuing "leadership by parly, military,Soviet organs" implies an effort toexisting internal political order. Indeed, as willlater, protection of the leadershipbetter developed tlian any other aspectdefense-

for economic survival, Soviet civilconcern rale on immediate support to theand the interaction of economiccivil defense planning. Coordination of theplans and economic mobilization plansby the directors of enterprises .whofor both; the dvil defense posture ofwill depend on the role envisaged for itmobilizationb, whether it willwartime production schedules for both militarycivilian needs According to theircivil defense planning, the Soviets do notneed to cunliriue full produdion to satisfymilitary production requirements.

C. Other Factors Influencing Civil Defense Policy

factors influence the Soviets' choicefor achieving civil defense objectives. bureaucratic conflicts stemmingdecentralization of civil defense funding among

ihc tinny ministries, industries, arid plant; and among regional and Local government elements BeyxjinJ bureaucraticctual resource scarciltea corn-plicate the civil dele rise program. It Is diflicultudge the scope ol such problems, however, because the Soviets (end Iu discuss them in generalities or to give individual examples. Reinforcing factorsthe civil defense program include the perception of the Soviet leaden that civil defense strengthens social morale and is important for disaster relief.

he special bureaucratic Interests inherent in industrial activity and in military programs present obstacles to Soviet attainment of civil defense goals Civil defense effoils to disperse industry are still hampered by opposition from economic officials. While civil defense manuab recommend building numerous small plants duplicating each other'sSoviet planners, in the Interest of centralized control, prefer laigo projects such as the Kama River Truckegulation lias reportedly been adopted by the Council of Ministers forbidding construction of new factories or expansion of existing pbnti within city limits, in pari lor civil detente reasons Yet, Soviet factory diiectors have opposed locating additional facilities away from the home plant because of difficulty of administration and have presumably obtained exceptions fiom the regulation In tome cases reconstruction of existing plants has been more economical than newractice also contrary to dispersion

imilarly.4 recommendation fee "heightening the self-sufficiency of economic regions ands incompatible with Soviet centralized planning and the political commitment of integrating regional economiesational unit. Other documentary sources suggest thatoncern relates to the difficulty of interregional delivery of raw materials and semi fabricated goods along traniporta-tion routes damaged by nuclear attack. Theof "territorial production complexes" (I'l'Ksl intended lo overcome the peacetime inefficiencies ol unnecessary interregional shipments has moved the Soviet economy toward Altunin's objective (we ckap-ter V.ut patterns of interregional dependence continuexist and are not likely to be eliminated. Anothel exampleureaucraticto the civil dclerue program is the incentive structure for Soviet industrial managers, which em-phauiei cuireni production and makes them reluctant to divert resources for civil defense training and even causes them to delay inciter constlovtion and other expende* for civil defense for ai long as iiossihle

H. Conflicts between Civil defense and other military requirements were in part responsible for tbe Soviet decision x> plan for evacuation of some residents on foot Soviet planning for the period prioruclear exchange envisages mobiltration of some transport assets into military units, tome fnr militarynd some for dvil defense. Planning requirements exceeded available transportationduring, as one civil defense writer noted:

The eiperiencc of ezztdssi sltb'.vs that possibilities of obtaining (any kind olresources aie sharply curtailed, and considerable difficulties arose.

As late0 this resource conflictegative effect on the quality of planning. As an exampleider problem, one Soviel author noted lhat lhe locally developed plan for military rail shipments and for industrial and civil defense rail shipments around

one medium-sate city demanded more than twice as many trains as tbe rail net could carry. Consequently,

senior civil defense officials pressed vigorously for

larger tramport allocations.

he Ministry ol Defense takeover of the civil defense program, however, led to an alternate solution of the prubtcmSalking was not usually included in Soviet lots of the means of evacuation.owever, Altunin, as new Chief of Civil Defense, wrote

We have been teaching angather your things and wait tout This is not to be taught nowhe population should be by combined means on foot and by various means of Individual and public transportation

He stated lhat this change wouldaster evacuation than total reliance on availableWhile wc have noi conducted movement analysis to confirmssertion, wc believe the emphasis on foot movement, either because of transportation shortages or limited capacity of road ways,oviet decision lo give priority to military movements ovci uiban evacuation. In any case, we believe that (he change to (he combined method also gave military planneis greater flexibility In road traffic control, probably reduced the Incidence of* unrealistic plan rung lor Ira nspocration, and improved thehat transport allocations to dvil defense would be available. Although it is evident that the evacuation

arid dispersal plans o( some civil defense organizations specify automotive and nil transport,7 Soviet civil defense textboolc reiterates reliance on the "combined means" of evacuation.

formations and regular militarycivil defense units have been used tonatural disasters and industrial accidents.spokesmen have cited this activity asfor the expansion of the civil defenseassertions are false, because the nature,rate of expansion have exceeded that necessarylimited ends. However, the participation otpeisonnel in disastereen asthe civil defense effort. Inons of Cunt Defense in the StruggleCalamities, Altunin wrote that, innatural disasters:

Formations of civil defense acquire in peacetime practical work experience in complex conditions; therefore, participation ol the personnel of formations in liquidating the consequences of natural disasters and industrial accidentschool of combat training for them

D. Civil Defense Programs and Priorities

have attempted to determine howabout civil defense priorities accordpriorities suggested by evidence on civilSoviet statements have consistentlypriorities in order of importance as:

Protection of the population.

Maintaining continuity of economic activity in wartime.

Liquidation of the coirseqtienccs of an enemy


sing evidence on Ihe implementation of the Soviet civil defense program available up toof6 IIM on Soviet civil defense, we listed the following priorities:

Protection of the leadership.

Protection of induslry and the essential work force.

Protection of the general population.

Further evidence and. analysis during live past year have clarilied our understanding of Soviet stated priorities. Wc now believe that the program imple-

mentation is consistent with Soviet priorities if viewed in perspective (see.

It Is apparent that the Soviets view the saving of humanleadership, essential personnel, and tho populationthe key to all other civil defense objectives. It is also clear lhat lhe Soviets have designed and arerogram in which effort and resources are divided among the priority areas stated in Soviet writings. Within each of these areas, effort and resources are further dividedumber of intermediate tasks. This resultsituation in which progress is made in all priority areas, but at different rates for intermediate tasks within tlse major areas,

In the first priority area of populationprograms for the protection of various levels of leadership have been undertaken concurrently, with emphasis gradually shilling Irom more to lesselements. Similarly, the extent of allocation of resources to sheltering personnel at economichas depended on the ciiticality of both the installation and its personnel io postattack military operalions and national recovery. The Sovietsprograms in the other two broad prioritiesimilar fashion. Also, programs lo carry out the three

Figure IM

Objectives and Priorities of Soviet Civil Defense

Fnoflty Tasb

Program Objective*

Pideclfcnt Of Human SUllfrfng uxt rrfoalsaa oi

Sheltering aod dopenal of eaetiliil


Shellacing aod evacuation of tlie ur-*' an population-.- ednipfillei

Continuity ol Economic IniegraQco of dvil defense andn Wartime nooilc mobilization plans

Rapidf industrial ficilitie* Permanent and hasty hardening ot

install* nord and equipment CnSM rtbcrtfea ot ecoccnic erne-

of miteruli Geographic dUpersaJ ol Industry

liquidation of Come- Ptrcmalion of military and' civilol Enemy At-'lew* lortnatfdns1 Training la rescue and tweeny. rrepamioiu (or distributee, of. and cnentul

catcgorios ol civil defense preparations inteinicsh or complement each oilier Ai Altunin wroteS;

Successful solution of thu problem (continu-it* of production] depends pnmaul) on

successful solution of llse problem of popula

ItM protection.

Thus, the priority given to protection of thederives in part from its importance tor the objective of industrial protection

verall, in efforts to "maintain continuity ol economic activity inhc Soviets have made mast progress in sheltering workers and haveleast In dispersal ofcostly and long-term endeavor especially vulnerable to consider-

ations eitemal to civil defense. Meanwhile, the Sovietsontinuing program to construct urban shelters

intended,'in conjunction with evacuation, to protect

the population.

n view of the related nature of the three main priority areas described by the Soviets. Iteen decided not to organize the material in ihii IIM around Soviet priorities but to focus on lhe following four areas

The organizationationwide staff with adequate personnel and resources to plan and implement civil defense programs, including necewary training

The protection of leadership by construction of urban shelters, hardened relocation sites, and communications facilities.

The protection of economic assets by sheltering and dispersing workers and training ihem to repair war damage as well as by dispersal and hatdenlng.

The protection of the population by blast and fallout shelter construction in urban and rural areas, and by evacuation.


Soviet dvil defense organization it composedior the planning and supei vision of civil defense activities during peacetime and for Ihe direction of the oiieratintj elements charged wilh carrying out civil defense tasks during wartime. The work of these stalls is controlled by the military at the national level through the military districts A.i Structure National' Oi go-motion

he "Civil Defense Staff ofomponent of the Ministryt has been headed byo Ceneral of the Armystructure of lhe national civil defenseto resemble that of main directorates ofof Defense At leasteneral officersidentified at (he national civil defense staffof them were (eassigned from command orin military districts in connection withof the civil defense program12

oviet civil defenseof two kinds territorial and functionalsubordinate to the civilian territorialauthority, are found at tlse national,city, and rural and urban rayonstaffs arc attached to each all-unionministry in the Soviet Union Abo. therestaffs subordinate to the directorsschools, educational Instiluliom,farms, administrative agencies,similar bodies The functional staffs arelo as "installationranslation olterm obektovue shtaby. Figurehowsof the territorial and functionalstaffs lo each other and to otherin the civil defense hierarchy,military districts.

ilitary Districts,12 (heoviet mililary districts received operational control over ihe territorial and functional civil defense staffs as well as mililary civil defense troops in iHetr areas.

Before that the role of lhe military districts' "sections for civileaded by an "assistant to the comad been restricted lo control of the military civil defense unitsonsequence of the expansion of lhe authority of the military district commanders,3 the former "sections" were upgraded to "directoralcs" and Ihe "assistants" to "depuly military districthe for dvil defense of tbe military district has probably become the main link between (he national staff and the territorial staffs at the republic, oblast. and lower governmental leveb. Forf theoviet republics, boundaries of (he military districts coincide with republic boundaries. In ihese republics the territorial civil defense staffs probably function as subordinatehe military district deputy commander for ctvi) defense However, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist rUriwblic (RSFSR) and theSoviet Socialist Republic contain more than one military district As latehe RSFSR territorial civil defense staff administered subordinate terriloital staffs ihiough intermediate organizationshere is evidence thai subsequently, in connection with the expansion of their authority, (he military district commanders In these two large lepubhcs look control of (he operational zones II isii-ii what the cuirenl relationship is between the mililary districts within the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSn and the territorial dvil defense staffs-

S Details ofesubordination to lhe mililary districts of the territorial dvil defense staffs below the republic level show that thisontroversial move engineered by the military in delianceentral Corcunittee decision toinal fesolution on lhe overall structure of civil defense until the endinistry of Defense proposal made as early9 recommended organizational changes because of disputes with Chuykov* staff over command relationships, access to transportationin event of war, and military suggestion for changes in civil ilefense pokey The determination of th- Ministry of Defense to resolve these disputes in its favor was one faclnr leading to the reorganization


Organization ot Soviet Civil Defense

Minsronal CM Detente Stalls

Military Detrlcb

tar Civil Defense

CM Moras Oniis

CfvJ Oelcnse Slatfs

Repubte* CW* Defense Slatrs



CrvHOofanse Staff


Civil Defense Salt

Rayon O" DWente

Oil Defensel !nsvii..HUCiis

Ol Defense Otlian Fonoabois

iia (lh. BSlinin.k.i, nveti in* rxwnMr io Of somatf.cliOhmm* <ifloUrvyiine ol0 Hit Mluiy.

subordinated civil defense to lhe MOD, lhe replacement of Chuykov's deputies by officers from the military districts innd finally to the replacement of Chuykov himself by Altunin in July.

ofe of the Territorialerritorial civil defense staffs at republic, oblast, city, and rural and urban rayon levels are components of the respective civilian administrative authorities (from oblast down, these authoriltes are the "executive committees of thehe territorial slaffs are mannedixture of active-duty military and civilians, many of whom are reservists or retired. In practice these staffshain of command through which ihey report primarily to the military district directorates lor civil defense. The staffs arc the main operating bodies for civil defense in their territories. At each level the integration of the civil defense staffs with the local

administrative structureorum forbetween civil defense officials and local government. The mission and functions of the lerriiorial staffs are as follows:

Planning and supervising the construction of shelters and training sites in their areas and conducting inspections.

Seeking compliance by other officials and installation staffs wilh civil defensefor example, for location of new industry, procurement of equipment, and preparation of civil defense plans.

Maintaining plans and records for evacuation and dispersal al the city and rayon levels, in oMijuncliiin wilh local evacuation commissions. (These commissions arc headedeputy


chairman ol ihc local executive committee and have members representing the local party committee, the public services, housingthe police, and the military commissariat.')

Evaluating civil defense exercises at installation* in their areas, running "socialist competition" belwcon civil defense teams, organizingnonmilitary civil defense formations, and organizing civil defense courses for lhe ieaders of civil defense formations.

Organizing activity in response to natural disasters, industrial accidents, and other local emergencies.

' Tbe militaryart ofsystem lo adminMer manpower moblliution and lo determine the wartime niignmeni of all those liable lor military servtot

7hows the relationship of an oblast civil defense staff lo the other local authorities. Most of the functions of the oblast and other territorial civil defense staffs involve much coordination andof officials from other bureaucratic hierarchic! to do things that they regard as secondary to their principal functions,

ole, of the forty in Civil Defense. As lhe civil defense staff* arc not subordinate to the officialsom Ihsy deal, conflicts often result in arbltralion of dispules by the local party committee according to the usual Soviet pattern. As the military newspaper, fled Star, noted in

One cannol manage here without party influence on those who arc cool to problems of civil defense or who consider them

of Oblast Civil Defense Staffs lo Other Local Organizations in the

ODI9SI Party CommTOfl

on Milliary Oisiro Miliary Council

Executive Con-mine*

Wiser, Oisincllor Ctvi Defense

Directorate of 'Operational Zone"

Miliary Dtsfrict DrecSxtlo Ic Operaiotis

and Manning

3du# Sutardriabon

Aomtnisir alive Svucstie


Cwi Sun

Owasi Miliary Commlssanat

and Rayon Civil DcIcom SU-t*


Ana lysis of open Soviet sources suggests an increase In patty involvement in civil defense matters during the last few years One source said that when factories did not participate in civil defense training in L'vov, the directors came under pressure from partySimilar pressure occurred in Leningradayon party secretary threatened toactory director whose newly built shelter did not meet specilicatlons-

Commissariats. Certain of theof Ihc territorial civil defense staffsthose of the military commissariats. Both are concerned with manpower and economicproblems including allocation of transport. The commissariats are subordinate lo the Ministry of Defense and. like the civil defense organization, ihey parallel the civilian administration at every echelon. Before the transfer of civil defense into the Ministry of Defenseailures of dvil defense staffs to coordinate effectively with the military commissariats were apparently common. Since the transfer, the integration of civil defense plans with localplans has probably improved significantly.

of Functional Staffs. The functionalstaffs attached to ministries responsibleof Soviet economic or social progiamsprimarily in planning civil defensethese ministries. They correlate dvil defensethe periodic plans of the ministries (forquarterly, yearly, and five-yearly planssectors).

he director of each Soviet Installation Is abo designated "chief o( civil defense" for that Installation In peacetime practice, however, he delegates lib responsibility (or civil defensechief of staff of civilho may do thb fob either full- or part-time and may or may not have assistants. The number of personnel in the "installation civil defense staff" is determined by Ihc minbtry lo which the installationhe numbci of full-timesually proportionate to lhe Size of Ihe installation, although this pattern varies also according to the significance of the installation. Normally the members ol the installation staffs are retired military ollicers, nidging by both human reporting and overt Soviet sources. Retired ollicers may be given these positions to lake advantage of their militaiy experience and to provide employment for individuals who would otherwise be unemployable at iheir accustomed status and income level. Moreover, the average reported wageivil defense staff member in institutes and industrialess than lhal of the average industrial worker. The persons with an adequate educational

Tegorov, Shlyakhov. and Abstain.7i


level most likely to take these lobs are therefore retired military officers who are also collecting pensions.

functions of the chief of the civilat an installation are to prepare installationto supervise the training of civil defenseand other personneL Thehe installation's evacuationof representatives of the partytrade union committee, the personnelcivil defense staffs, and the workshop heads.plans for the evacuation and dispersaland, in those cases where the installationhousing, thdr families. The chief of slaffresponsible for access to and maintenance ofshelter or supplies.

Operating Elements

The operating clemenb of the Soviet civil defensewhich will actually carry out postattaek recoverybe divided into two general categories: military civil defense units and civilian dvil defense formations.

Military Civil Defense Unite. Civil defense regiments and independent battalions (seeescription of their number and manpower) are stationed near large cities but outside tbe zone o( prompt nucleai effects from strikes on likely targets. Among the missions of the regimenb are to establish communications, rcconnoiicr and mark contaminated zones, perform decontamination, open blockedroutes, and participate with the civilian formations in emergency rescue and repair work.

Training o( cnlbtcd personnel in civil defense regimen is is according to standard Soviet Army practice These conscripts, serving lor two years, may undergo specialist/NCO training for six months at one of al leasl five known dvil defense training battalions, or they may go directly to operational units for basic training and subsequent low-skill assignments. The curriculum* of specialist training are reportedly nearly identical lo similar specialties in other Soviet armed forces units.

nitarried out in "trainingrected at most, if not all. garrisons. The sites are used

' "Training site- Is the axial tnnshtloa of uckclmfyrim that his sometime! beenrainingraining sites are lhe most elaborate ol Soviet training facilities for civil del tut" Soviel civil defense lltenture abo identifies two leu elaborate lindi of trainingsimulation (pounds' (Mlumlu* uchosth, and "traininguthebnluene en tuple givenoviet Journalimulilion groundonstruction piojrct io whicli civil defense trams weie senl to combine work on the preiectivil defeiueraining center li oltenhelter in which lectures are given or the wearing ol gas

milk, iml protective clothing demonsliiied.

imulate conditionsiKlcar atlack. including fires, damaged buildings, nibble, and broken water mains and penrcrline* lo be reconstituted Training while wearing gas masks and protective clothing is emphasized Personnel ol the civil defense regiments also participate in joint exercises at factories In their areas with civilian formations and, to some extent, in disaster relief and industrialormer N'COivil defense regiment of tbe Turkestan Military District reported lhat as of6 his unit participated, along with civilian formations. Inexercises simulating wartime deployment.

fficer candidates for the civil defense regi-menlsour-year courseommissioning school in Balashikha near Moscow The contents ol the course are unknown, but It can be assumed io deal in depth with the missions of tbe civit defense regiments, leadership training, political education, and general military subjects. For officers scheduled for promotion lo regimental or deputy regimental commarider, there is an advanced course at Novogorsk near Moscow. There isenior NCO school al Noginsk

IS. Effectiveness of Military Civil Defense Units. The extensive experience of the Soviet armed forces in training, particularly In narrow occupational specialties, implies thai the civil defease troops are well trained lo perform effectively within the limits of their duties. Officer training is also according to standard Soviet Army practice. Graduates of Soviel commissioning schools are acknowledged In the Soviet military press to need further training and seasoning once they enter operational units, but it fa likely ihal their professionaldequate for their duties

ivilian Formaiiona of Civil Defense. The formations aie teams made up of selected personnel at all installations and facilities of the national economy, educational institutions, and communal services such as utdilies and hospitals Trained and organized in peacetime, these formations have lhe following missions:

in the period before an attack for lhe protection of workers aod other segments of the population

Reduction of losses to plants and equipment

rescue and repair work following an altack. lo aid wai lime opera lion

In practice, the Soviets appear to regard these formations as primarily intended for postattack

emergency rescue and recovery operatloni. For


example, there is little evidence ul training or involvement of the formations in preallack hasty harderung of facilities.

oviet texts and human sources describing the organization and functions ol the formations Identify two types, ilorial and installation The lerrltorial formations arc directly subordinate to the territorial staffs and are drawn from workers of cily services such as utilities, construction trusts, and medical facilities In addition, according to Sovietial formations include those organizationsactivity in wartime will not be essentially different fiom their peacetime activity and may be drawn upon lor civil defense tasks in their existing production structure.*'" This regulation applies lo cxjmmunseat ion, health, transport, retail, supply, food services, and veterinary and agrotechmcal

nstallation formations found at educational institutions and economic installations are also of twoervices and general Each formation isto be drawnelevant division of the plant; for example, the formation for communications service for civil defense is based on the installation's peacetime communications division, the seivtce for "maintenance of public order" on the guard force, and the "flrefighting service" on tbe volunteer fin-squad. In addition, "each work shift is organized. formation or subformatton by workshop, teelion, orecent reports have tended to confirm the adaptation of the existing plant organization In creating oil defense formations- Rescue, medical, and flrefighting detach menu are the most common types, although others such as reconnaissance groups and decontamination squads exist. While the forma-lions are mlcnded for pouattack operations at their own installations, the territorial authorities are cm-powered lo allocate installation forrnations asthroughout the area of recovery activity

he Soviets may haveeficiency teferred lo tn the writings ofhai military mobilization would withdraw members of Ihe civili mat ions. In plants lhat would continue lo producear. reactvists reportedly receive exemptions from mobilization; in other plants, reserv-Ists are not required lo Join the formations. The number of people designated for participation in these formations ii uncertain. Applying guidelines issued by Aitunin5 lo the total work force, the number should be upwards ofm An extrapolation of

'tcgwa*at. op (II.a.


estimates by hitman sources generally supports an overall estimate in the tens ol millions. Ilowevei. some percentage ol these formation members participaie onlyerfunctory way.

raining o/ Civilian Civil DefenteTlse training schedule lor the formations consists of livehour civil defense course outside of working hours, four days' practical training during working hours, and one eight-hour "lacttcal-ipccial-tied" eaercise during working hours each year. In addition, every three ytan lhe for mi liom participate in integrated eaercisea at their installations (begunx at the district level (begunhe quality of ihis training vaiies widely Unclassified Soviet writings cite eaamples of well-trainedbut only fire human sources have given positive evaluations of theons, and two of them restricted their commentsirefighling tramanitation team, respectively Theseigher priority lo maintainingoutput thin to civil defense training and exercises.esult lhe civil defense staff has accepted the principle of combining civil defense, exercises wilh repair work on an installation or other useful work, insisting onlyactical scenario be followed. Both unclassified documents and human sources detail frequent abuse of (his practice by factory diiecturs who place lhe emphasis on repairs rather than in the civil defense content.

addition to lhe training sites at civileanisoiu described above, some sitesji


t economic instaua-R. According to the journal Afififd'y KnowUJef. there weieraining sites in Moldaviand according to Radio Vilnyus.n Lithuania6 Because of the limitations in out search lor training sites, we cannot yet judge with confidence the scope and rate of implementation of this program

of Civilian Formations.conflicting indications of the likely effectivenessformations Human sources' evaluations oftraining with which they were familiarIn table lll-l. About half of Iheviews about the effectiveness ofAmong Ihem, negativepositiveatio. On lhedespite the evaluations of these sources,during wartime would be(unctionsamiliar selling Some ofhive also gained practical experience in


Human-Source Views on fcffectiveness of Nonuniformed Civil Defense Formations fwillw Plot*

To Civil Deieaae torn*-* NrpaWr Repeated Tottb


lighting forest fires and other natural disaster) as well as In icpalr woik following major industrial accidents, allhough human and overt reporting suggests thai spectali/ed territorial formations have primarilylo these emergencies.

hortages of specialised civil defensewould hamper the effectiveness ofEvidence on civil defense equipmentinventories is ambiguous, andon the subject are rare Although manythe presence of gas masks andat Industrial installations, the evidenceto how much o( this equipment isoviel newspaper articledetachmentsarge area ofindicated lhat basic items of centrallywere musing from inventories,locally produced items were abundantequipment which is in common usesuch as firefighting equipment,cranes, and handiools. would beavailable In addition, heavyto civil defense regimenti wouldin civilian

he existence of organized civil defenseat Soviel industrial installations and other facilities, regardless of their stale of training, provides some capabilily lor postattack recovery, but their existence cannot always be assumed For ciample. an inspectionactory in Bryansk Oblast4 revealed lhat. despite the presence of training plans, designatedon members, and reports on eaer-ciscs, the factory actually had no effective civil defense organization Workers in the wotkshop which had "won" the competition of civil defense formations for lhe pfcvious two yean did nol know what their assignments were or. in the case of one squad leader, who the members of their teams were. Formation members assembled for tactical-specialized exercises

- hKtVri

a formal lequircmenl for students win fail the final exercise lo repeat lhe course

s late as6 the civil defense leadership was extremely dissatisfied with the operation of the courses. Open documentary sources noted, forlhal in one oblast the courses had stopped operating (or three months, that in another onlyercent of the students were in attendance on the day of inspection, and that poor attendanceioblem Ihroughoul theuman source reported that, in Leningrad, factory directors refuse permission for tlieir.employees to repeal the courses when they lail Wlille6 indictment doubtlessampaign to improve the courses, its success is unknown Furthermore. Soviet officials at lower levels often respond lo pressure from above by collusion to conceal information from higher echelons Pressures from above also result in actual improvements Descriptions by individuals who have alterided these courses indicate they leave much lo be desired. In an exercise of the Moscow staff inhe performance of those involved was foundby city civil defense authorities.

I mining ol Ovilion lenders

ince Altunin's appointment as Chief of Civil Defense, civil defense training lias concentrated on preparing territorial and installation leaders for actionsoststrike environment. The Soviet view of the importance of such training was expounded by the Deputy Chief of Civil Defense for Combat Training Lieutenant Ceneral V. DyatlcDlto,6 when he noted that:

Some leading civil defense workers who have not undergone training courses, especially al economic Installation) and in lhe districts, have proven Incapable of effectively solving increasingly complex tasks or leadinginslallation-wide

rnphasis on practical activity and thepaiticipation of leadeiship personnel in com-mnnd exercises and "Integrated Irutallaiion" exercises are positive features of Soviet training for dvil defense cadres The Soviet practice of designating as low-echelon leaders those persons already in authority in peacetime takes advantage of existing skills and habitual patterns of authority at the local level-Overall. Ihc evidence suggests that the leadeiship training piogram has not been very effective

ommand ond

eadeiship training for civil defense occur) al so-called courses of civil defense, organized at district. City, obiast. republic, and national levels. These courses are intended for and nonnally restricted to civilian commanders of nonmlHtary civil defense-formations and above. As Altunin emphasizedhe training focuses on practical activity. Nonnally lasting from fivo days to two weeks, the lower level courses typically endengthy exercise. There is

ur evidence indicates that dvileonlroL and communicationsthe mililary pattern: alternateand cornmunications facilities wilhinor dispersed command posts. We expectcivil defense communication! systemsto emphasiie rcdui.ilsncy and im:fadlitiesey to their sur-


ommunications requirements (or alerting civil defense leaders across tbe country have beenDuring lhe period following anarge volume of communicalions would be required to assess tlie damage sustained and to directack civil defense operations. However, it appears likely that the



could maintain or quickly restore ai least the most essential communications links. We have not analyzed the ability of the surviving Sovietsystem lo support lhe long-term operation of the government and the recovery of the national economy

In wartime, the rnilitary district comma i* leu would apparently assume direct control of all civil defense activities through their deputies for civil defense This role for the military districts suggests that under overall political guidance from Moscow, the military would administer ali the essential activities in the Soviet Union immediately before anduclear attack. Evidence of the operation of civil defense staffs in exercises suggests that civilian governmental authorities would continue to function but under mililary control. The designation of the peacetime head of each Soviet organization as the "chief of civil defense" also suggests that during wartime the administrative and governmentalwould become partivil defense chain of command. Furthermore,7 textbook stipulates that the directors of installations are under the operational control for civil defense purposes of local authorities* However, the wartime role of civil defense authorities in two republics whoso territories contain more than one militaryis, the civil defense staffs of the Ukrainian and Russianunclear

The civil defense organization is supported by dedicated communications networks which areto link the civil defense headquarters tn Motcow with major territorial headquarters throughout the USSR Available evidence indicates that triecenters of at least republic and oblast civil defense headquarters arc manned by militaryunits. Human sources report that the personnel in these units receive their signals training in units subordinate lo various civil defense ttoop headquaitcri before assignment to units deployed near the major communications centers of the territorial stalls. Wc estimate, on the basis of firmly fepoflcd figures for the Armenian and Lilhuatuan republicv thatommunications personnel in this category operate the communication centers in the republics The facilities of these centers would be used to ti hiurim warning messages to subordinate territorial staffs and to control reconnaissance and rescue operationsuclear attack.

Tlie civil defense corumunioalions centers in the republics have been located some distance ftom the administrative civil defense headquarters of the locality. Their emergency romnsunications facilities arc in underground command posts Reports from human sources and other intelligence data indicate that these emlers possess, in addition lo dedicated radio facilities, landline capabalitiei which in some cases are reported to afford them direct access to military commands other than the military district. It is likely, in view of stockpiles oferies radio equipment (some van-mounted) reported lo be in the 'Untouchable reserve" category at these centers, that projected requirements for short- and medium-range lactical supporl for local emergency operations can be met

In addition to this eoniinunlcaliont structure, human sources have regularly reported the presence of radio and landline communications In industrial shelters and at relocation slles and alternate command posts for industries. These communications connect plants that would continue lo operatear with the ternloiial civil defense staffs and through ihem lo the national command authority. Thus the Soviet Union possesses an integrated wartimestructure, comparable to that of the mihtaiy. Irom the top civilian authority to the industrial firm

C. Manpower

current estimate of full-time militarycivil defense personnel Is aboutmore than doubles last year's estimate.estimate of civil defenseinimum figure, because full-timepersonnel associated with schools andinstallations were not included. In addition,of people in itafi organization! andis now believed larger titan was estimatedll is emphasized thai this year's highernoteal increase initecvaluation of our earlierbest judgment on the trend in manpower isSoviet manpower devoted full time tohas grownercent

Stoll Or goniro lions

estimate of the number of personnel Indefense staff organizations has increasedIli.OOO lohis is accounted foe in

See anilci A Im methodolog) ul minpoxi eslimltc

-SECBili -




MiHUty untU

MiliUry districts

Civil defense Itoopttroopiacademy


Nonmilitary oiganluIUra

Scientific institute*


Coop and public orguiita-


Ilouringand public uillilia


Estimated Full-Time Soviet Civil Defense Workers


ni" -jv*


Total el.ll detente

part bypercent across-tbo-board increase at each level to cover support and administrative personnel. In addition, recent human-source reporting hasuch better basis for judging the size and composition of territorial staffs, particularly at the city and rayon levels.

Military Units

he increase in manpower serving In the military units or organizations of the civil defense system is due primarily to increases in the numbers of civil defense regiments identified, and improvements in our understanding of their staffing Tableow listsegiments compared with thearried6 {see figurehus we have increased live strength of these units0dditional personnel arc assigned to military district staffs, communications units, and military academies, bringing the total estimate of military manpowerhisonservative estimate since li docs not include additional regiments that we are reasonably certain are in existence but which wc have not yet identified. Human sources wilh previous service in these units consistently stale ihal civil defense troop

Table II1-3

Identified Soviet

Defense Troop Unit*









are found near all significant industrial or politico-ad minis! ra live centers.

urthermore, this estimale does not reflect the wartime strength of the civil defense regiments. Information obtained over the past year confirmed trial existing civil defense troop units would be expanded in wartime through assignment of reservists. Most rerxiris indicate that lhe units would be upgraded to lhe next higher echelon and beaccordingly.

Oroaniia lions

y fat rli" most significant change in out manpower estimates arises fiom Inclusion of full-time members of civil defense staffs al Individual economic installations, educational institutions, and otherof Soviet society. Whereas In6 IIM no cffoit was- made lo quantifyct of civil defense inaninwer because of lack of data, new information and analysis now permit us to estimate the numbers of people involved full-time al the installation level The figures for this category contained in tablere based on the sizeiven facility and Ihe regulations governing the appointmentull-time chief of civil defense staff, plus assistants as appropriate For c> ample, analysis of available data indicates there it al least one full-time civil defense worker at factories havingmployees, whereas plants with more0 employees would haveull-time civil defense employees. The0 factories in the USSR were divided into categories according to work force site. Using this base, we arrivedigure0 full-rimeefense workers in factories,atio of one civil defense workerndustrial workers. This same ratio, which is consistent with human-source reporting, was applied to institutes and other msr.illa lions and provided an0 full-time civil defense workers.

D. Coils

s explained in Last year's IIM. the US Intelligence Community does not have preciseof the costs of Soviet civil defense. The USSR regards civil defense costs as classified information; therefore, only very fragmentary financial data on civil defense appear in published budgetary data. Mot rover, according to Soviet decree, financing of civil defense is from republic or local budgets and from administrative and operating funds of self-supporting enterprises and organizations.

n the absence of budgetary data on civil defense, this year wc have estimated the cost ot three major elements of the Soviel dvil defense program namely, civilian and military manpower, operation of military units, and shelter construction, fn addition to methodological uncertainties In our cost calculations, the accuracy of our estimates would be most affected by uncertainties in Ihe estimates of dvil defenseand the extrapolattons by which cstimaies were mutlo of the Soviet shelter progiam nationwide. While we believe manpower and shelter const iuction accounl


for the bulk of the costs of (he program, we were unable to cost oilier items such as stockpiles of Stralegic reserves or dispersal and fuidenlng of industries If such programs eiislational basis as pait ol the civil defense piogram, substantial addi-tlonal costs would be involved

Costing Method

hesed lo develop theseinvolve identifying and describing programs and activities in detail and applying appropriate prices to them. The estimatedin both rubles andstated in constant prices. This is done so lhat changes over time will reflect only variations in the activities themselves and not In the price levels, and to facilitate comparisons with other economiche ruble costs are expressed0 price* and the dollar costs6 prices The ruble estimates are expressions of the costs as the Soviets are likely to perceive them. They should be used to assess the internal com pout son of the coats (for example, costs of manpower compared with shelterand their telationship to other economicsuch as total defense spending. The estimates of the costs of the program expressed in dollar terms show what it would cost in the United States to duplicate the Soviet program and activities using iheir manning levels and construction practices. These costs provide an appreciation of the magnitude of lhe Soviet program in familiar terms.


The effort to estimate manpower associated with Soviet dvil defense Is limited by the body of information available. The estimate which has been developed,ulMlme workets Ins subject to tome uncertainly. This estimate includes both military and civilian personnel in governmental staff or ga matrons, military umls and other orgartizatbons.

stimates of Soviet civil defense personnel costs include expenditures lor pay. allowances, and food foe military personnel and wages of civilian dvil defense workers. Military personnel in Soviet dvil defense units were assigned the average ruble pay and allowances and food rales estimatedpply to personnel in cadre motorized rifle divisions. Military personnel at dvil defense staffs and at schools were assigned military ranks and were compensated accord-ing lo Soviel practice for paying men of these ranks. Ruble pay rates for full-time civilian workeis in civil


wete developed Irom0 Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR (USSR National Economy).employed at factories, schools, scientific institutes, public Utilities, and other enterprises where full-time civil defense workers are found were estimated to receive average pay rales lor workers at these organizations The use ot these average wages is supported by human-source reporting

total personnel costs for the civilexpressed in rubles arehe personnel costs and thelevel are onlyercent giCaler thanTo assess lhe cost in the United Statesthe Soviet programs, dollar payfactors were applied to these samelevels, ranks, arid positions. For militaryates of personnel compensationfor aclive-duty US Army and Marinewere used. Total pay for civilians servingciviPdcfense staffs was estimated byCivil Service grades and pay scales to them.civil defense workers in industries andorganizations were assigned pay rates ofpublic utility, andThis results in costs of6

Operation ol AMI)lory Units

mililary civil defense units are assumedbeen fully equipped since theirhe only costs logically associatedtherefore, are for replacement ofnormal replacement of equipment, andcosts foi spare pails, fuel, and otherThe same generalized cost factors developedthese activities for other army units inof Soviet defense costs were used herelo be reasonable approximations. The resultannual cost of aboutillion rubles.

Construction Colli

cost of construction for each lype ofshelter described in this report wasto its design lyjw using dimensionalphotographic interpretation reports andcosts" (in rubles) which are published inseries of Soviet handbooks. Thesefactors for every aspect of construction.these "estimate costs" from Sovielbyercent to adjust (or the fad thatroutinely understate actual costs of Soviet

construction. There is good evidence to support this adjustment (actor from numerous Soviet sources.

The ruble cost estimate* are then converted into dollars with dollar-ruble ratios developedarge body of US and Soviet cost data. Tlse dollar-ruble ratios developed through this methodology have been checked by costing selected US construction projects directly using Soviet cost factors. This validation process has heightened our confidence in the dollar-ruble price relationship developed for Sovielactivity.

For costing purposes, data on Soviet civil defense shelter construction were drawn from the surveys made of industrial facilities and urban areas and extrapolations described elsewhere in this UM. This approach provides an estimate ofillion rubles for the entire program,illion of which was eipended In the. When expressed in dollar terms this figure amounts0 billion for the entire program and2 billion (oreriod.

Tolol Cosn

cost estimates (see) arco( the first attempt to coslivil de(ensc program in some detail andbe considered as rough approximationsprecise estimates. Much additional work needs to

Costs of Soviet Civil Defense Manpower, Operation of Military Units, and Shelter Construction* Ruble Coin al IfflO Prices (BlUtom/ Before Total lvS8 S-76 6



Hollar Com6 Pitta (Bdlioiu) Before Total Iggg 6 $

OpCialiOu of mililiiy

Shelter 0

J 5

'Ibae Qtirnates should be oonsldeied rough arspioiiminons

bccautR lliey uc illrtttd by umiliiiiliei both in tbe qua iitita live

dm on civil defense piogiaim ind in otimitei of price*


be done In order lo increase our confidence in the estimate*.

Manpower cost* and the coats of operating Ihe military umti currently amount!otal of slightly more thanmillion rubles pet year The coat of shelterfor the entiremounted to anillionr an averageillion rubles per year Thil lotalillion rubles represents lessercent ofoviet defense57andillion reHs

When these programs and activities are ex-prfiied In terms of US cost, it Is Ihe high US manpower cost which drives the estimate upwards These costs amount lo4 billion per year. Construction costs add an averageear These figures result simply from lhe fact that wages are much higher in the United States relative to construction costs than in the USSR. The dollar costs do help gain an appreciation of the magnitude of ihe piogram, but lhe ruble values are the only useful measure from lhe Soviet point of view.

E. Effectiveness of the Soviel Organizational Structure

prepared under contract to thePicparednessCPA) havecriteria for determining effectivenessrelief in the Uniled States byto natural and otherllhoughof the results of these studiesboundaiies andifferent politicaluncertainties, we believe lhat the criteria instudies can be used tu elucidate lheof llie Soviet civil defense organization Ifpolitical differences are taken Inlomany of DCPA's findings parallelof Soviet studies, as discussed in theircivil defense These results emphasize lhe valuefollowing

Planning and research.

Communications and duvrr.inalion of

-Suitability of organizational structure

beliefs about human behavior in dinner*

* These studies are summanzed inerspective cms DinnerDiiailrr Kwareh Cenler depart. Ohio St Me Unlvrrillv.

Set in II.

data for evaluating the Sovietthese criteria come from lhe examinationdelense organization, and fromof the Soviet civil defense program'snatural disasters and industrial accidents.

Planning and Research

Use DCPA studies consisterilly emphasize the value of planning and supporting research indisaster responses. At the same lime, they warn that highly detailed legalistic plans arc likely to be difficult lo implement in an emergency. Tlie Soviet civil defense organization plans extensively, and strives to continuously update Its plans and achieve realism. The rigidity and degree of detail which characterize Soviel military and civilian civil defense planning, however, couldegative factor In llie wartime effectiveness of the civil defense organization.

According to the DCPA studies, it is not only necessary to plan well, but also lo persuade both the public and officials outside Ihe planning process to accept the plans. If this educational effort does not succeed In producing public confidence in civil defense authorities, the plan will he implemented with reduced effectiveness. Tlie skepticism of much of the Soviel public toward civil defense, and lhe reluctance of some national and local industrial officials, mightegative effect on lhe implementation of civil defense plans. On the other hand, on the basis of studies of popular behavior during crisis situations and confirmed by human sources, we believe that lhe Soviet population would follow lhe instructions of civil defense officials in the eventuclear attack.

Cormunicol ions

apid communications and dissemination of accurate information to civil defense taskand to the public arc vitally Important in disaster response. The Soviets recognize ibis requirement and have established lhe necessary communicationsKeeping the population informed of the progressisaster to encourage willing compliance with instructions may be less impoilanl in Soviet society, where coercive means of ensuring compliance are bctlcr developed and more readily used The Soviets, however, have used all media ami the telephone system to keep the public informed during past natural disasters.

Suilobilily of the Orgonirational Structure

CPA studies stress the requirement that lliereuitable organizational structure for effective


ol operations during andisaster. The planned wartime structure of tlie Soviet civil defense organization would appear to satisfy this requirement. The peacetime effectiveness of the civil defense organization suffers from the fact that it must share control and supervision over most of the operating elements whose actions are essential in making preparations according lo civil defense plans. In disaster recovery operations in wartime, however, civilian officials and lhe population likely would accept the centralized control of the military districts, and respond lo military directum at lower levels of organization.

flc'ind Aboul Orioire' Behavior

he beliefs of the leadership about lhe likely behavior of the populationisaster allect peacetime civil defense preparations, perceptions of lhe likely effectiveness of those preparations, and Iho co'ulucl of wartime operations. The Soviets are clearly concerned about population behavior in anand place great importance on psychologicaln training and indoctrination programs persuade people ihal survival in nuclear war is possible and tu improve discipline and performance

Chapter IV


Soviets have an extensive program lor lhe proleetion of (he national leadership and of key party, government, and economic personnel down to local levels, for the purpose of maintaining the continuity ol the Soviet systemeriod of nuclear conflict The program consistsystem of in-lown shelters and alternate command posts in exurban and rural areas designed to provide protection against nuclear, chemicaii and biological attack. Emergency operations of the party, government, and civil defense forces wOutd be directed from these command post shelters

Wc believe that the program to protect the top national political and military leadership isol the civil defense program. This is evident in the program to harden military command and control facilities and lo provide KCB protection andsupport for the top civilian leadership. When we speak of measures for tlse protection of the leadership in this paper, we refer not only to the top leadership, bul also toarly, government, and ministry officials at the national and republic level In addition, wc include party and government leaders at kray, oblast, city, and urban rayon level. The peacetime size of party and governmental elements varies at each of these echelons depending on Ihe importance ol the geographic area. Here wc arc concerned with those key individuals at each echelon whose functions are essential to operations of civil defense. They include chairmen of localheir deputies and the heads of vital directorates and departments such as tlse KGB, mlllllaealth services, and utilities. To this group of0 we have addedanagers of key eeunornie installations as well as0 full-time civil defense staff personnel. We estimate lhatndividuals make up the leadership essential to postattack operations.

3 The degree of planning and level of resources allocated to protecting this leadership are indicative of Soviet concern about maintaining control ol the national activitiesostattack period. What portion of the leadership survives would depend in part on US

knowledge oi its wartime locations and US targeting policies and practices. However, we have only limited knowledge of such wartime locations especially for leaders below tlie nalioual level. The ability of surviving civilian and military leaders to direct postattack operalions would depend, among other things, upon the means of communications and upon tlse effectiveness of plans for alternate authorities to assume control should control by primarybe lost. Wc have few detaib about such contingency planning.

are unable to judge Soviet longerwith respect to the effectiveness ofor other post-nuclear-attackSoviets themselves are probably uncertainthe present program would ensuieof government operations andcontrol over llie longer term. The continuitygovernment beyond the perioda nuclear attack would depend uponarc largely unknowable, such as theof the military in postattack recoverysuccession, lhe impact of ethnicthe overall progress in recovery

A. Shellers

shelters for lhe protection of theall levels above have been constructed since theThere are Indications, however, that aleadership protection was under way as early asand construction of shelters foris continuing.

Number. Typo, ond Location1

the basis of recent Intelligence, we haveto confirm the existenceattern ofthe protection of leadership in areasThis pattern consists of hardened in-luwn

1 TheprivMeil InaocUun appear IB. chapterart

the'trial lor Juliet) in urban areas

shelters, matched by alternate. and facilities at relocation areas outside tlie cities (See figure IV-M

7 Human aources frequently repoct on lhe earst-ence of In-lown shelters, many of (hem underground. multiUoriod structures, for national, republic oblast, city, and tayon government and administrative leaders. These shelters have communicationsinstalled and arc reported to be well stocked with food, water, and other supplies.^"

e are unable lo quantify on the basis of direct evidence the total number of shelter spaces for the leadership iu urban areas. The pattern so far revealedarge number of shetteis in and around governmenl facilities reflects Soviet capability to shelter key party and governnent workers with minimum warning.

subway systems in many ntajor cities play an important role In providing urban shelters for leadership cadres. Many sources have reported that Ihe multilevel shelters within urban areas as described above are connected directly with (he subways, thus affording additional protected access to the shelters. (See chapter VI,

Soviels have constructed elaboratebunkered command and control facilities fortop civilian authorities at national,and oblast levels.

^^There are at least two relocation sites around Moscow for the top national political and militaryandhird. Cliaa-dayevfca. is localed nearilometers southeast of Moscow.

t least four ministries' have been reported to have relocation sites around^

ionic of these lacililie* are eiainptes of the Soviet "dual purpose" concept, whereby installations whichivil defense function in wariimc havev i'- [XMC-fitiif. micIi .vlnHiI, and rest

1 Power and tied nl iralien. Cm tnduiliy. Iladio

Nonlcrroui Metallurgy.

i Ihc republic and oblast levels, relocation sites have also been provided for party and government


leaded and civil defense cadres. The commandor f_

*"lfor example. Isinstallation eonUinTngupportfacilities needed to direc!defense operations. Similar republic levelposts have been idenlilied elsewhere.also fits lhe Leningrad Oblastpost for civil defense. Al thesecivil defense troops provide communicationother civil defense headquaiteti withinlhe military district


Jlolal shelter floorspace in alternate command posis near Moscow and at Chaadiyevk; is

quare meters.

We believe thai such facilities are available for aTleast lhe leadership olf republics and maior oblasl centers In addition, there have been reports that citiesopulationillion also have alternate command posts.

or the economic and industrial leadership of urban areas, command post shelters have reportedly been locatedoilometers outside the city These shelters reportedly contain communications equipment lo maintain control over ongoingin the installations in urban areas. Human sources from Kiev and Leningrad, with backgrounds in design of communications systems, have confirmed the existence of this type of shelter



IS ln-town shelters for tlie leadership vary widely in size. The site of sheller completes varies with the importance and function of the installation served. For example^-


economic irutitUliOm


' IhU i do ihu IncMe (June it

hid, wc-.ld belw the em

tvunu/iiHluiini] leadership


n determining the capacity ol these shelters, we have used US planning (actors because we lack infotmation on how much of the shelter floorspace will be taken up by equipment The US (actors allow as much asquare meters of floorspace per person atonal and regional command posts, including space for equipment, supplies, and furnishings Since floorspace requirements it lower levels could be much lower given tbe smaller magnitude of the effort in such jurisdictions, we havequare meteis per person On this basis, shelters in town and in eiurban areas lor which sufficiently precise data exist to permit measurement, add up loquare meters On the basis ofquare meters per person, they could accommodate00 people. Tins represents only those shelters lhat have been identified and whose sire have been estimated. Roughly an equal number have been identified whose sixes cannot be estimated If we wete to apply tlie same calculations lo those shelters whose sizes have not been estimated, the total would be doubled Since we have examinedmall portion ol all the eilies in Ihe Soviet Union, the overall total would be much greater. From lhe evidence available we conclude that the marority of ihe leadeiship elements could be accommodated in shelters priorn altack if several hours' warning lime were available.

ardneit. The shelters available lor the lop national lei lersl those al Sharapovo. Chekhov, and lad* yevka. are estlinaied lo be the hardest. Our hesi estimate ol shelter haidness ranges Irom aboul

jWe have not Iseen able lo calculalc lhe hardness of alternate command posts al the republic and oblast levels. Tlie built-in or detached shelters available lo the leadciship In town have been assessed assi) hard, which is the same hardness we estimate foi other shellers of ihese types (See chapter V.or an explanation of how these hardness values were derived-)

shelters within urban areasat alternate sites would also jjrcrWde aof personnel protection against sucheffects as initial nuclear andAdequate information on(EMP) protection is lacking.

Supplies ond Equipment

sources have reported that sheltersareas and at relocation sites haveof food, medicine, protectiveand otlser supplies for theiroccupants The exact level of supplies is

B. Warning, Relocation, and Exercises

ithin minutes after warninguclear attack was under way. many in the leadership could take shelter in available del ached and basement shelters in urban areas near Iheir headquarters or In other available shellers. Including subways If the Soviets believed an attack would not come for several hours orarge portion of the leadership at all levels would probably evacuate to relocation sites arid bunkered shelters in rural areas.onger period for final preparations orrecautionaryortion ol the leadership could be letccated prior to the notification and evacuation ol the general

' The dynamic responseared is deprmlciu on Ihe applied irnpubc.oncuoool both the rmjttilude wi du/aiico or lhe applied loadj

a larger -capon -illiven impulse load tolarReia lowr pressure Ihin "ill be ilelivf.nlmallec tveapon.

population Most of lhe relocation sites for lhe high-level leadership are within an hour ol Moscow and other major cities by car. Subways and other transportation resources would be availableriority basis to facilitate the relocation process Below the nationalortion of the leadership probably would be sheltered in cities lo direct lhe civil defense efforts.

ince thehere have been numeious references Irom all sources to civil defense exercises at all administrative levels in which high-level officials participated Eiercises have included saxrm activities a* evacuation to relocation sites and practicingrolei under it mu la ted conditions These earicises served lo detect weaknesses in the leadershipprogram, lo familiarize Soviet leaders wilh iheir responsibilities, and lo build confidence in their ability tn react effectivelyrisis situation.

mergency relocation procedures are known to have been tested recently for some key ministerial uf ficials al the national level Evidently the Sovietsontinuing requirement for leadership participation if. cm! defense exercises, and dvil defense officials haveeed for increasing the number ol practical caerclse* at oblast. city, and rayon level

Ptc-firam Effeclivonoii

llhough Ihe Soviet* have constructed many Snellen Ilhe leadership in major cities and at relocation site* in rural areas, those shelter) which have been identified are vulnerable to direct atlack. Such shelter* would provide effective protection only in the event thai these lacilltles were nol directly targeted by lhe United Stateif-"

I Considering

the number ot Snellen liteiy to be available lo protect the leadership at all levels and lhe communication! support for civil defense, we estimate ihal with several

hours to make finalarge percentage of leaders and communications facilities wouldarge-scale nuclear attack


Chopter V


The Soviets' civil defense plans and programs (ot protect ion oF the ecwiomy. as reflected in iheir publications and reporting from intelligence sources, encompass several complementary measures They include geographic dispersal of industry, sheltering and dispersal of essential personnel, relocation ol certain Installations or equipment to eiurban rones where operations will continue, the physical hardening of some facilities using permanent construction techniques, hasty hardening measures, and rapid shutdown procedures

2 The. way in which any combination of these procedures is implemented depends on the civil defense category toiven economicbelongs. Such classification hasey element of all Soviet civil defense plans' and relates both to the installations themselves and the areas in which they are located. This categornation of enterprises probably explains the variations we have observed In such things as shelter allocation or the degree of hardening al economic installations. Wc are now beginning to acquire some information on the iypes of installations in each of the categories Yet. our data bate is still too limited to permit us lo identify patterns of civil defense preparations at economic installations from which we could Infer the types of industries and measuresith lhe three categories Confirmationategorization system

i* I'jOl Ki-wihin.-it ot the Central Committeeil ol

Minuter, of the USSBlheilatutt Hales

copc ind limetoe carryingcivil defeasemadajJaaW ofetcf nul

areodanrr nth thru admJiiitrMin amlatna*. .J

defensive Mf-nificanc* Pur ihu purpose laifte adininifrative ernirnInge industrial citie* are divided Inm cfliea of the special 1st. 2nd. and Sid K'uupi lor civil defense The mod linpnnint iml.liit.ini of the national nomir are divided Into iiutalotioni ollanpoetanc* aad iho 1st aed tod flagnryTl*mi

iratbooV andSanaa wm nafMn the eunamn nf rslrcocn lot uitun arrasndlndiaal iaaiillatifms and piortdod Vrttte rumple, ofihr applnaimn ol ihn ivilcn (tetermlnes the eilrnt of dvil defriw miviiurei


is being used, however, should aid us in understanding how economic protect son is practiced and mayuture analysis of dala on this subject

ll soutces indicate that the survivalufficient number of management personnel and skilled workers is the key factor in maintaining and restoring productionuclear strike This emphasis has been confirmed by the Large number of hardened shelters at economic Instigations Identilied In photography during the past year. Protection of personnel is .also reflected in the reporting by numerous human sources who state that their places of employment have plans for dispenal or relocation.

While many sources have reported thai lhe Soviets have em ployed special construction techniques such as the use of underground structuies lo protect production facilities, there has been limitedio photography Weew reports of gec^raphic dispersal of industry for an! defense purposes and preparations (or hasty hardeningures. Rapid shutdown, which Is emphasized in Soviet -civil defense publications, baa been reported by human sourcesey dement of the civil defense procedures and training at their places of work

While many sources refer to the etistenee of strategic reserves for industrial use as well as the needs of lhe population (see chapter VI,c are still unable to develop evidence which would provide some indication of the magnitude of these teserves and any steps the Soviets have laken to prolccl them agalnsl nucleai effects

In this chapter we report what we know about protection of personnel, dispersal, relocation,rapid shutdown ol economic installations, and stockpiles of supplies and equipment. We have made no effort, however, to evaluate Soviet economic recovery capabilitiesottattack penod. The effectiveness of Soviet programs for protection of the economyued herein provides an appreciation of tlie levels of industrial damage the Soviets may sustain


j full-scalettack by the United States It dot! not. however, provide an estimate of the ovciall Soviet ability to recoverafor ecortornic and military poweruclear exchange ot torotracted war.

A. Protection of Essential Personnel

7 tn their programs to protect the economy, the Soviets have given fust priority lot personnel at economic facilities Their plant for protecting the work force are related directly lo Ihe importance of the place ofboth in terms ol lis output and its contribution to postattack recovery Some industries and other enterprises will continue to functionwo-shift basis, with one shift dispersed to eiurbao areas and lhe other protected in shelters at ot near its installation Employees of enterprisei which will stop operations or are considered noncssentiol will be evacuated In ihls section wc have concentrated on protection for personnel al industrial facilitiesessential lo defense production and postattack recovery

measures described for protection ofat these industries arc also applicable to oilier economic installations. Civil defense equipment is available al these inslallalions for personnel protection, rescue, first aid, and training. Information from all intelligence sources confirms that apart fromprotection the Soviet program for protecting essential personnel has received the most emphasis

Types ol Shelter ot

IM on Soviet dvil defense noted Ihe decisions in they the USSR Civil Defense Headquarters and the State Committee for(Cosstroy) stipulating thai shelters be included in plans for all new buildings. Recent reporting from several sources with eaperiencc in ihe design and construction of Industrial, adminisliativ-e, andfacilities has provided further insight into these resolutions, the manner in which Ihey areund the technical specifications used in adapting shelter designs to new construct ion These sources all confirm the existence of sundard shelter designs and requiremenls which aie coordinaled with theterritorial civil defense staff. In particular, they have discussed the administrative procedures for implementing shelter construction and Ihe manner in which civil defense staffs monitor this construction io ensure adherence to approved specifications. While none of these sources could provide the precise guidelines used by the civil defense staffs in allocating

shelters, they all believed thai lhe requirement lot llie inclusion of shelters in new construction was most rigorously enforced. Detailed descriptions ofshelters by these sources supported this contention and provided photographic signatures which greatly assisted analysts in their search for shelters.

hese standard designs are of two basic types, detached and built-in. The latter, often referred Io as "basement" shelters, are constructed ai an integral par! of new buildings Oi may extend fioin the foundalion areatructure into adjacent open areas. While they resemble basements in the early stages ol construction, iheir actual specifications are geared to civi! defense requirements lot bins! and fallout protection Several human sources wilhin dvil defense construction have stated that built-in shellers are the most common because construction costs are understandably lower. Into new basement shelter conslruclion. ihese same sources report that older,asement shellers are being brought up Io current dvil defense standards, particularly with regard to life support systems. Detached shelters, on the other hand, are coaslruded in open areas such as courlyaids and normally do not form un integral pari of the surrounding buildings. In some cases, ihese are semidetached in thai there arc undergroundwhich provide protected access to the shelters Capacities of these standard shelters vary widely Soviel literature categorizes shelter sizes as small (up0nd large) Human sources and photography confirm these capacities and have identified large shellers which canersons or more

II. In an effort to reduce the cost of shelter construction, provisions are often made in the design for thoir use in peacetime as garages, classrooms, storage areas, or other purposes Such dual use should not inhibit the use of the structurehelter. Human sources and photography confirm this practice. All of

the foregoing pertaining to shelter design standards.

construction methods, capacities, and dual use rclale nol only lo shelters al economic facilities but tu all

shelters In urban areas

Anotyvi ol SSeller Pic-jro-ns at Selected Soviet'

ate Bote. As part of lhe effoil dt-sciibcdetailed study was made of civil defense

' for details on the metbodology ol (heee anne. B

C I'tt

al ISO Soviet industrial plants selected Iromey recovery Industries, tnlants Irons live mililary-related induorlal categories were


imtfationa of ihr Data Don. There are several limitations and restrictions on the use and interpretation of the daU available lor estimating lhe total number ol ihclteri ai economic facilities:

Imprecision in the estimates of lhe available shelter area and the tlie of the work lorce to be protected limit the strength ol the inferences to be drawn


The small number of plants sampled wilhin each category lessens the degree of confidence lhat can be placed on rise estimates ol civil defense activity at all plants in these categories in the USSB.

Some categories ol the sampled plants ne not representative of the totality of all such plants in the USSR.'

Projections from the sampled plants can I* made only for those key recovctv industries included in

some categories.


the survey.


listing is incomplele.

These limitations reduced the usable daia base on industries considered to be key economic recoveiy categories fromond military-relatedfrom five to three.

ercentage of Crisis Work Force Froitdtd in Plants Surveyed. Soviet plans do not rail lor sheltering the enlire labor force. They plan to dose nonessential industries entirely and to evacuateworkers from those industries thai arc to continue production. The remaining essential work

ample ol only large plmu inpaiiioilar

category "ill bits any protections made io ill luehlie uir

lant ll relaled to lhe pinrnre and levell de'enie telivily

lorce al each planl it lo be divided into two shifts, one lo be dispersed lo locations within commuting distance of ihe enterprise, the other io continue work. Wc believe the shelters at economic lacilities are intended for lhal portion ol live essential labor lorce al work du'ing awe have designated ihe "eiisis workhe sire of the ctisis work force would vary, but could be no more than SO perccnl of lhe iwal labor lorce at some enterprises. If an occupancyquare meter or more per -oelei is applied, lessercent of the plants (II out of ISO) Surveyed could accommodate the entire crisis woik force.actorquare mete' per worker.ercent of these plant) (SO out of ISO) could protect the total work force.uch smaller crisis work force, si many asercent ol theut of ISO) could sheller this criiil work force

IS. Combining all the key recovery industrial categories loi which there it lulficientlhal is. IS oulinimum of '8 percent nl all dills wOrkeri would be sheltered alquare rnele' per worket.inimum ofercent, if the occupancy factorquire meter per worker. These ealtmalei do not tale into consideration the unknown number of shelterseasonable distancelant Eslimaiessuch shelters would, ol course, result in anhe above percentages

ompanion of Mililary and

Industrie, With Shelters in lhe USSR.surveyedl lhe (see) we -siimatc thatercent of all plants in fhose categories in the USSR have at least one shellerotal sheller areaquaren ihe three military-related categories sampled completelyJercent al lhe missile production plants. S3 percent al lhe ball-bearing plants, andcrcenl at the suspect biological warfare plants had shelters Overall, lhe percentage ol plants will, shelters in those three military categories in the USSR wasercent,

' Sheher "occupancy laelon" aie Sued an the figurei moai c'ten

i)ii<*fd by the Scictl in theii publications at OS tqua'r me<Ci pc'

pei tonil* lower bound.ei boundrjiuieis

the minimum currently rncummeiided bynalioro which

ad -mime experiencethtvpancy alutSe upper boundqulie merer il luted on an avrurc oi spaer allocalto* ligurea pwnlod by Vrmwledge-

human wuius. thoe rangein meitriuaic

meters pe' pcrton Theae firvir) aie comitteni wilhudua whtfhite metrri 1mlquiir meter a> a practical minimum.


Fractrtn ol

Total Capac-




na Un*

No ol

Plant. '




M Unit 14


Unk M7






Survey ofey Soviel Recovery Industries






ydro) ..

and iter!

Machine Irak








Survey of Five Soviet Military-Related Industries







product ion


warfare (imped)


and motor vehicles

Floerspaee* (sq meters)




Area Per Worker'



Unk Unk

o-lhird( o( theeers puce e( ihellen (or of theakenife vuppor' equipment andalculated uiinj; estimated number ot eriiU workers.


Available Shellcr Area and Estimate o( Plants With At Lean One Shelter lorndustrial Categories

ijnmite ol Numbo of planii Wilh

Eitimaic ul HiHn Aie*ean On* Shellri


Conlidrwe Booeds







and lied
















pereen. eorddeoce bounds for Ihe total (that it. nol merely lhe mm olpe.ceni confidence

moderate but significant increase over the 4lG percent for lhe key economic recovery categories'

ace and Scope oj Industrial ShelterData onf thendustrial categories" were analyzed to determine lhe pace and scope of shelter construction. It was found that:

Plants which were recently constructed or had been expanded8 arc more likely lo have shelters than plants which have not expanded

Aboutercent of the plantsajorxpansion have at least one shelter; of plantsajor8 expansion, onlyercent have al least one shelter.

More large plants have shellers lhan do smaller ones;ercent of thelanls have at least one shelter, while onlyercent of the 'mailer plants have at least one shelter.

Ow of the more dittuibmg toulu of ihiihe Urgeof the catimaim Oder, ihe upper SOperceta bound it morece ihe pointed USSHhen confidence tnier-ah. reflect onlyorlo umplmg. not ihose due to mltclaiuficatkxi or other souice* Thm. ih* (merobably larger. Hence, moabased on

ihU sample ihould be coruidered tentative.

'Aluminum, bearings, ecmcni. cotnmunicalioru eqvlpKwnl. electric power (withoutngines, lion .ojmachine look more* vehicles, nonferrou*ihooi alumir.vmi

petroleum, and synthetic rubber.

'ls_definedlant -hose eaparlly Wis inilrgOiy

ombining these Iwo analyses.ercent of those plants that arc "large" wilhxpansion have at least one shelter Alternatively, onlyercent of the plants lhat are small with noxpansion were found to have al least one shelter.

Two additional statistical analyses wereto determine if any differences in civil defense activity among industrial categories and acrossregions of the USSR could be due to sampling error alone. Using total shelter area as the measure of civil defense activity, only the chemical Industryignificantly higher average shelter area There did not appear to be any gross regional effect on civil defense activity at industrial plants

In summary, the analyses of lhe dala on Soviet industries indicate that within key economic recoveiy and military installations, ihcrcroad and comprehensive civil defense shelter piogram. That portion of the crisiserccnl of ihe total workforce) who could be sheltered atut ofey recovery industrial categories surveyed ranged fromoercent.

Proieclion AlforoW by Shelters

manuals state that shelters atin general are designed toohese are the designureapplied by the Soviel construction induStiy.

(The hardness valuel'so 25 not ipply (o any yield)

Technical analysis of ihese tame shclierif*-


analysesangeu)0 pelcent probabilityamage. (These are estimates of(or two differenl Soviet designs)ernonstiale hardness

esiimalesaisooaicd withllwlo

oderate level ol protection against blast. Ihcvc shelters would also provide very good protection against other nuclear effects such as thermal and prompt radiation The hardness leveb attributed lo these abetters assume that other shekei components such ai doors and ventilation equipment are also designed -and built to withstand blast and other prompt nuclear ellecUevel at least equal lo thai ol the structure itsell.

any kinds of Wast closures lo protectopenings and entrance ways have been designed and built since0 Several countries besides ihc United States manufactuie Man closures, and the stale-ofis considered lo be eacellenl and well known to the Soviets Numerous tests of clotures have been conducted by the United Slates lo oveiicess0 psi) in fullicale nuclear field lew. and no blast door failures wereie closures portrayed in Soviet manuah art much like those used in the United States and Kuropein countries, and there is no reason lo believe lhal their closuict have lesser capabilities than those which have been tested elsewhere

eports on stocking of these sheltersiied picture on tbe type and level ol supplies and civil defense equipment. From many human source

reports, ii would appear thai most shelterseen provKled with at least water supplies and emergency medical kill, but are not normally preslockednd Some report! indicate lhal protective clothing, gas masks, and dosimeters were stored in ihese shell en. bul others state that while such civil defense L'r]uipmcnl was available it was generally Stored elsewhere in the plant. If. as indicated, many of these sheltersot been rsrestocied with food. Iheir adequacy lohe occupants would depend largely on lhe amount of lime lhe Soviels have prior lo an altack lo complete lhe outlining ol shelters Shelters are inspected periodically by terrilonal cii'il defense stalls, which could improve the overall level of preparations Nevertheless, there are continuing reporll ol deficiencies in sheller readiness

M"'iiol ol Estenkol fVionnel

oviet civil defense tesibookof. essential pcisonnel as lollows

Dispersal is lhe name given to the organized withdrawal and quartering of employees in an eiurban tone (or those enterprises and organisations which [will] continue toin then lhe category of dispersed persons aie also the employees of the installations which suppoit the vital activitiesily (lor eaample. utility workers)

Among the instatUtiorrs lo be dispersed are those whose production lines will shift to wartime Kiicdoles, which will continue operations up to the time of attackorder to minimize loss of production, and which.itempi to resume operations as soon after an attack as possible.

plan as described in7 SovietIrilbook is lo lesettle employees intone or 'outside lhe limit; ol the tonesdestruction,'* yel close to roads or railwhich they can he trnnspoi led to andew hours. Available transport will be usedpersonnele dispersal site and iheotder lo provide lor uninterrupted productionenterprises.

uman sources have confirmed that such plans ousted al their place of work, although many did noi know ihc details We also know of dispersal plans from rc'cieisces to eaercisesoised in ihe Soviet press ind by human sources Some sources base participated in dispersal eiercises staged by iheir enterprises and have indicated lhal the level of preparation al ihcse


sitcs wasis, there was housing and food available. Others have observed minimalDispersal sites can be small towns and villages or special facilities such as rest centers operated by the enterprises and by olher organizations. Most of the sites referred to by human sources have permanent structures, such as residential or administrativeor have been provided with some type of expedient slructures. such as tenls. or hasty shelters.

Other Protective Meosutes

rolective civil defense equipment such as gas masks and special clothing is reportedly available at many enterprises. In civil defense exercises at some

plants, workers have practiced donning their gas masks and clothing or operating other equipment such as dosimeters Some sources, however, report that they were measured for protective equipment but lhat no equipment was subsequently provided From human sources and other Intelligence data we find thai Soviet economic enterprises must acquire such: their employees and include its cost in their civil defense budget

c conclude that the Individual protective equipment and supplies available depend on the civil defense priority category of lhe industrial facility and on the emphasis placed on civil defense by its director. Each industrial enterprise probably has atmall

enr t

of protective mull and suit* for (lainint- and demonstration purposes, and many have lufficienl equipment lo< those civil defense learns that have been organized We are unable to estimate what perre of the essential work force would have protective equipment available in an emeigency II is doubtful thai Ihe availability ol individual protective gear woulderious problem in important economic Installations, because most of this equipment consists of standard models manufactured for general and industrial use


alculations and estimates or shelter capability to withstand specific nuclear weapons eflccls are nol the only measure of effectiveness of Soviet capabilities lo protect essential personnel during the days and weeksuclear attack. The adequacy of shellers in protecting the work force depends on such olher factors as their equipment, facilities, and supplies To date, our overall estimates ol shelter capacity al industrial lacshties indtcaie ihalinimumoercent of "crisis workers'* could be accommodated in shellers This is based on the arbitrary assumption that lhe crisis work loice would comprise one-half the total woik force. Il is possible that in some instances all those on shift could be sheltered

n any case,easonable to assume thai the Soviets would have lo depend on the evacuation and dispersal of off-duty workers away fium expected target areas This assumption is consistenl with Soviet statements lhat nuclear war would most likely occureriod of ruing tension during which the riskuclear attack would be recognized. If it is assumed that shelter equipment and supplies aie adequate, then Ihe probability of survival of lhe critical work force wouldunction of shelter hardness against prompt elf ecu and fallout.

l is appropriate lo consider workerprimarilynci ion of shelter hardness against blast, because analysis indicates that if the slipilei mivivol the blast il would also provide adequate protection from prompt ^

ypical Soviet shelter located at these distances from the burst point the initial radiation within the shelter would range fromoads (see

) Theid level Is below threshold of noticeable symptoms of radiation illness ofads. while llie BO-rad level is well belowad level which would result in illness io aboutercent of those eiposed To calculate lhe overall radiation dose, fallout radiation that the shelter occupants may experience must be added to lhe prompt radiation II is difficult to define wilh precision llie fallout radiation environment. If the atlack were at optimum height ol burst to achieve structural damage lo industrial facilities, the So-net shelters wouldrovide fallout protection adequate for survival of the occupants If (he attack utilized ground bursts, ihe radiation from fallout would be greater butthe exact leveb would lequiie target analysisase-by-ease basis.

epict lhethe overall survivability of the work forcepresents lhe results of analyzing lhe probabilityof workersiven type of shelter alof an attack which u> located essentiatpoini of Ihe factory |^


,resent the probability of survival of worken actually in shelter* al the time of an attack Suceled at various distance* liom the weapon aim point.

question now arises as lo what iheltermight be required toeryof probability of survival for personneleapon aim point This calculation hasperformed but it would be estimated lhatof0 psi) otbe required to provide such capabililycosts of luch shelters would bemore than construction costs of thehere Considering the overall probabilityof live workresented in figuremay noteasonable or wise expenditure

n general, there are many uncertainties associ alcd with (he overall elfeellveiicss of shelters at industrial enterprises. For example;

llie adequacy of equipment such as doors, ventilation system* and sanitary facilities needs lo be analyzed further. The equipment described in Soviet manuals ami by knowledgeable human source* appears to he technically capable ol meeting minimum survival rcquiicmenis. Some


rcports, however, indicate that necessaryin some shelters was either missing or in poor condition

The haUlability ol these shelters is scenario dependent andunction of the level of supplies and the number ol people who would occupy these shelters With adequate warning, supplies and equipment could be provided and norscssential personnel would be evacuated. Without sufficient warning It would be difficult to cany out preparations and maintenance activities, and the number of workers to be slieltercd could exceed available capacity

f the preparations described above weie in lact carried outeriod of tension priorn

attack, then shelters at industrial enter"-ises would be highly effective in reducing the number of total fatalities among workers at these installation! to very low levels. In the absence of these preparations, available shelter capacity and the length of time these shelters could be occupied would be ledoced. but we are unable to estimate what impact this may have in lentn of the increased number o( falalitiesand injurieswould occur. The radiation environment generated under various at lack assumptions couldheller stay in tome areas which could last as long as two weeks

s mentioned above, weaken al industrial enterprises could be dispersed lo eiurban areas in one or two aa)slollowing lhe initiationpecial pcilod


Their dispersalfrom major urban areas could reduce the number of fatalities and injuries by half or more. If fallout protection were abo provided, the number of fatalities could be reduced to low levels,

B. Geogrophic Disperse! of Industry

ost recent Soviet plant continue to call for the dispersal of industry on several Itvels-

National !IIctm evolutionary prograrr. toew industrial plants, com pfeies, and associated towns in areas of low industrial concentration, aimed al equalizing productive capacity of the various economic regions of the USSR.

Regional Dispersal; The concept of limiting growth in old. established indusliial centers by siting new production facilities in eiurban areasegion. Regional dispersal Ls often characterized by the presenceiven regionarge plant, suchotor vehicle assembly plant, supported by small, highly specialized enterprises which are geographically dbpersed in small towns as well as in urban settlements.

Urban Dispersal Locating new plants in lesser developed parts of urban areas and siting new buildings and storage areas away from existing ones within plant perimeters to reduce the collateral effectsuclear strike.

Soviet Economic Develop men I

evelopment of industry in remote areas of* the USSR has historically been one of the goalsoviet economic doctrine. In the lastears the need to reduce congestion in urban industnal.ied areas by restricting construction of new plants there has received increasing attention, albeit undermined by regional political motives. During lhe past decade the Soviets have taken limited steps in this direction by locating some new plants in the eastern pan of the country. Most of these have been sited there to take advantage of the abundance of critical raw material or energy resource* By contrast, the Soviets have notarge number of plants producing either finished capital or consumer goods in remole areas These remain concentrated in western urban areas, also for economic reasons

3S. PJTinmiir development during the past decade also has been characterizedubstantial increase in the number of light industrial plants For lhe most part, this effort occurred In the most sparsely

developed regions in the west which possessed relatively well-established transportation nndnetworks. This dispersal, however, has noi significantly lessened the overall concentration of Soviet Industry In dense, urban areas. Tlie labor surplus upon which Soviet planners based the viability of the concept is largely noneaistenl and. even more importantly, diseconomies in dense, industrial areas have not become great enough to stimulate large-scale dispersal

lt available evidence indicates lint, despite Soviel guidelines, the regional distribution of Industry has remained virtually unchanged since thesee) Crowth in remote areas has been balanced by continued expansion of urban-industrial concentrations and. in some cases, even outpaced by it. Thus, the construction of new plants and lhe eipansioo

Regional Distribution of Industrial Production in the USSR (Percent)1






Nonb 5


Wert S

East 3



Lithuanian 3

Lai'Ian SSft


; i- ssr I


Aimni SSR I


Kvgj I

tiit.-'- il SStl I

Torlewn Ned

Ktukh SSR | I

Beknuulan SSR Ne/J


' Because ol rounding ceaspooenu mar not addercent.

' (he regional breakdownwhich thu percentage dittrlbuilon is hosed as MIowv ihe firstreas named are ecoivHnae regions within ihe Haitian Soviet Federated SodiJut Republic. There other republics of the USSR.

1 Includes Kaliningrad, admlrutlmivcly under Ihe RSFSR but included in the Baltic Economic Region with Ihe Lithuanian. Lat'iln, and Estonian lepvblio.

of existing facilities in developed areas gcncially have increased the number and size of plants, as well as lhe value ol their output, by at least as much as new facilities in remote areas, despite the unusually large scale of industrial construction in remote areas.

Sire ond location of New Facilities

oviet literature indicates that civil delense considerations should be an important factor in determining the location of industrial plants The purpose is to improve the self-sufficiency of economic regions in the production of products critical for both immediate survivability and to lay the ground work for postwar rebuilding. For example:

Measures may be taken nationally to limit the concentration of industry in certainational and dispersed location of industries in the territories of our country is of greal national economic importance, primarily from the standpoint of aneconomic development but abo from the standpoint of organizing protection from weapons of massniformly dispersed distribution of plants may be accomplished gradually by developingin underdeveloped regions andthe construction of new plants in highly industrialized regions.*

ur analysis of the patterns of growth of Soviet industry shows little evidence that actual Soviet practice in siting new plants, either in light or heavy industry, includes civil defense considerations. Most important is the reluctance of ministries to locate new facilities in remote areas which, although rich in natural resources, may pose considerable transport, labor, and climatic problems. Tolhe extent that such problems can be overcome, ministries have agreed to build new plants in remote regions, bul only if they can be assured that such siting will not be detrimental to plan fulfillment.

6 Ihe Soviels have built some plant* which appear to satisfy the requirements for national dispersal as well as Ihe more important economicrime example is lhe huge Kama River Truck Plant and Its associated new town. Nabcrczhnyyc Chelny. This plant, which covers an area ofquare kilometers, is locatediEume.teix eavl of Moscowetalively isolated region. The location of the plant, near key power

rcgorov. Slils-ati hov. and Alabin. Clcd Otlenif, MOsco-.

sources of the Volga ncgion, and its sizeictory for Soviet planners who argued for the economic benefits resulting from itsgreater efficiency and economics ofthe incidental benefit of dispersing motor vehicleaway from tlse traditional, large urban areas. In terms of regional dispersal, however, Kama and similar plants offer Utile protection from nuclear attack. In contrast toother plants in trie motor vehicle industry, virtually all components arc manufactured on sile, rather than being shipped in from specialized plants throughout the country. Thus,mall nuclear attack against Kama could eliminate the productionumber of parts essential for truck assembly.

Soviet industrial development has, especiallyeen characterized by gradual growth in the size of new plants. This reflects the Soviets' idea thai "bigger isut also irtcorporates their belief that true economies of scale can be obtained from large plants. Horizontal integration is becoming increasingly widespread in the Sovietinlo the extent thai ilumber of small, dispersed plants, is increasing the vulnerability of Soviet industry. Wc have little information on instances where civil defense considerations alone determined the siting of plant facilities. However, we have three reports where civil defense coiisidcratioits were known toactor in selecting plant sites.

Near urban areas, new plants often have been built adjacent to major existing plants. These nesv facilities, which often provide specialized parts or services to the main plant, have been sited, regardless of dispersal considerations, lo facilitate production. This has occurred frequently in Ihe European USSR, particularly in the largest cities such as Leningrad-The trend toward such agglomeralion may beype of vertical integration and, as such, increases the vulnerability ol the planl usinggoods from other facilities located In close proximity.

In numerous cases new plants have been sited on Ihe outskirts of urban areas to losver industrial density while also taking advantage ol transport and communications facililies. This phenomenon typifies the development of the area around Moscow as svcll as most other large, well-established industrial cities. For example, the area between the important urban industrial centers of Lyubertsy (steelefined petroleum products, optical inslrumeriis, and

ubytischi (subway, rotting itock. motor vehicles, andnd Moscow ii gradually being Irsduttrializcdesult, there i) IIItlr distinction between the city limit* and unround-ing areas, thus increasing lhe size of lhe potential target area.

egional analyses and analyses ol plants in key industries indicate that, within these categories, there appears to have been aattempt to disperse facilities in only foin categories synthetic tuhber. petroleum refining, aluminum production, and trans-'portalion equipment manufacturing The USSIVs largest synthetic rubber plant, for ciample. which started productionocatedather isolated area in theral mountains region, lhe new Mozyr Petroleum Refineiy is in Belorussla away from urban centers and other plants, llie llcgas Aluminum Refinery was sited in isolated Central Asia, and the Kama River Truck Plant is in the Upper Volga region We do not know what role, if any, civil defense played in determining the location of ihese plants.

E.ponvon of taistino focStiei

he Soviets also have deviated from civil defense requirements when ihey have expanded existing plants and complexes. Surveys ofey recovery industries reveal (hat virtually no effort has been made to increase the spacing between buddings or to locate additions In areas that would minimize fire hazards In the eventuclear strike In many of the eases examined, expansion has occurrederimeter, actually increasing buildingIn particular, previous open spaces in petroleum refineries have been fitted with highly flammable storage tanks and processing units; the latter have become progressively larger over time The reason lor this trend probably centers on transportation and and general efficiency criteria, theof which evvidentry outweighs the desire to conform to civil defense codes.

he continued expansion of existing plants has ineieased the value of productive capacity pcopoilion-ally more than plant density in urban areas This pattern of expansion has tended to increase the overall vulnerability of Industries which often arc located in an urban environment to serve consumers, provide inputs to other manufacturing processes, ot lo utilize inputs from other enterprises. roam pics of industries most hkcly lo be affected in thb way include, machineearings, synthetic rubber, arid electrical equipment

Territorial Production

n Important dement in Soviet economic planning is the concept of territorial production complexes (TPK in BussianJ. According to thePK is an "interrelated combinationarticular industrial center or in an enliieased on physical and economic conditions and its economic-geographic and transportSees such, TPKs have been the major means to develop the unique and obundaiil national resources of the remote areas ol the USSH,ew are located in lhe more industrialized areas of the country

Because most Tl'Ks fall within the boundariesingle economic region, they are often thought of ss administrative subunits of these regions. At present however, they are more accurately described as planning devices to overcome the traditional problems of poor industrial siting and neglect uf accompanying infrastructures by industrial ministries In either case, the size and composition of industry in given TPKs reflect economic resources of an area. Whatever lhe usefulness of the TPKivil defense measure, it is incidental to these factors and plays little, if any, role in either the composition or location of TPKs.

Some TPKs have increased the degree of industrial dispersal in the USSR to the citcnt that they are located away from highly Industrialized urban areas that are likely to be targeted with nuclear weapons Ncmctlseless, lhe eatablishmenl olrepresentsurgeocations! shift in economic activity that would not have occurred In the absence of civil defenseiscussions of t'utuie TPKs reflect (he Soviet policy of continuing to plan for greater ecorsornic efficiencies and more rational deveJoprnent, although military organs prob-ably also approve nf ihese efforts. Moreover, the inteidcpendency of Individual plant* within Tl'Ks and the common use of central services make them more sensitive lo disruption through losseysuchowerplanl. Some industrial centers, despite their location away from high-density urban areas, are vulnerable targets because of their concentration.

inally,ew eases. TPKs have been established by bringing the direction of canting industrial plantsiven ieriHory under one central aullioiity. without planning to build more plants within for organizational and political reasons, such as in the case ofningrad Regional Production Complex, which

includes Uningrad City and Oblast. TPKs such as this one have had little impacl on the Soviet civil defense program.

n sum, widely dispersed TPKs male the overall task of destroying Soviet industry more difficult, but concentrations of industries within regional complexes make them as vulnerable as if they were part ol established urban areas. To the extent that TPKs increase ret-ional self-sufficiency, ihey could ease the tack cf long-term reconstitution of the Soviet economyuclear attack.

U'bon Planning

n the broadest sense. Soviel urban planning for establishing new towns and expanding industrial areas of existing cities is largely dictated by the needs of associated industrial plants and complexes. The Soviets dislinguish among types of new towns:

Industrial dltcs, with0ersons, are the most important Each Ispecialized industry, such as petroleum refining, machine building, or metal processing.

Central cities of adtrunistration and service for agricultural regions. The primary theoretical criterion for the siting of these cities Is the availability of rail transport lo ship raw materials to processing points. Some of these regional cities service areas as large as an entire republic.

Transportation cities, which are builtavorable location at the confluence of rivers! railroads, and roads.

Scientific production centers, which focus on seienlific research, higher education, testing, and series production of newly developed ilems. Scientific centers often are formed on theof large cities.

Cities that are centers of recreaUon and tourism. These are scatlered throughout the USSR in areas ul moderate climate.

lthough economic, transportation, and labor considerations for the mosl part determine the size and location of newivil defense factors appai-cntly are lo have more influence in determining their

' In someown may (it more than eoe catcgotical description.

" To the mom ihat new Indmtiiil compleso

detente rravins, lhe location ol their aoooialed town may be

viewed as determined by civil defense.

physical characteristics. More recent Soviet manuals, for example, still call for

Constructing wide roads so that rubble from buildings will not impede transportation.

Reducing building densities and creating satellite cilies.

Creating green belts (forest areas) to separate industry from other activity.

Creating water reservoirs-

Building circumferential highways to helpthe traruportalion network

These criteria also are to apply to urban planning in areas of expansion of listing cities or In rebuilding old sections

of various regions of the USSRwhere possible, the Soviets have built slreetslo prevent rubble from buildingsthem. In Novosibirsk, for example,selected for ihoroughfare analysis. Vhethat many streets arc at least as wide asheight of buildings on both sides, plusas stipulated in civil defense manuals.such as Akadcmgorodok and Agrogorodok,been developed outside of the city. (SeeReservoirs and artesian wells havefrequently in photography of variousit is difficult to ascertain their capacities,and the influence of civil defense InOther parts of the program haveout less frequendy.-Building densities inand in some cases even new towns, fornot been reduced substantially. In suchefficiency and spatial considerationsoutweiglied the desire to adhere to civil

Crisis Retocotion

oviet dvil defense tcttbook referswhich will "shift their operationshe open literature provides nothis program However, since the relocationindustrial plants and scientifica crisis period Is tied lo economicwartimelassified subject.both historical precedent and numerousreports indicate that the Soviets probablykey facilities i( they were afforded thesufficient time Between July and

for example. Ihe SovieUnterprises, nearly all of which were warrom the European USSB Io (he east, using rail cars. For many plants, only several weeks were required to resume production, although overall output dropped sharply for a year following the relocation.

uman source reporting indicates that current crisis relocation plans have been designed to conform more closely with the threatuclear strike rather than to escape the broad acquisition of territory characterised by Worldhe mobilization plan of Ihe L'vov Lenin Industrial Technical Union near Ihe Polish border, which calls for the relocation of plant, equipment, and personnelite aboulilometers southwestov, was described in last year's IIM on Soviet civil defense.

his year, other reporting from human sources on crisis relocation suggests that this programthose elements of the economy which could be moved with relalive ease to new areas and continue to function. Installations named by human sources have included design institutes, research facilities, and production shops of the optics and creclronicsRelocation of heavier industries would pose problems and wc do not know to what extent such moves arc planned or would be undertaken.


e do not believe that the Soviets are carryingationwide industrial dispersal program for civil defense purposes. Policies concerning the general paltern of economic development now and in the future will determine the extent and character of industrial dispersal.esult, civil defense benefits can be realized only if economic development is characterized by growing dispersal of all types. Urban growth and the expansion of industry generally have made the task ofiven percentage of Soviet economic facilities more difficult; however, the vulnerability of many Individual industrial complexes has increased liecausc of the growing density o! manufacturing processes.

he Soviets could cffeclively achieve rapid dispersal of some enterprisesarning period through crisis relocalion, but only through great effort. Wc believe the Soviets would undertake such an eflort only under special and unlikely circumstances. Be cause of llse scale ofrogram, we believe Soviet leaders would have to be convinceduclear conflict was probably unavoidable but not imminent before production were disrupted and transporlatum


and olher resources committed toove. If war appeared imminent the Soviets would not have sufficient time toassive industrial relocation.

C. Industrial Survivability

n their literature. Ihe Sovietsumber of engineering-technical measures to help increase the survivability of industrial facilities. In addition to increasing the physic-!of structures and equipment the Soviet concept of increased survivability also encompasses such elements as rapid shutdown of industry, passive fire prevention measures, and Improving the siabilily ol production by stockpiling or protecting supplies and spare parts. Among these measures are;

Construction of personnel shelters (secf this chapter).

Hardening by use of stronger structural maieri-ab. embanking, reinforcing walls, and burying.

Protecting valuable equipment by hastyand storage In underground structures.

Providingapid shutdown of the installation.

table source of power and water by diversification, burying utility lines, and installing rapid shutdown equipment

Preventing fires and secondary damage by using fireproof materials in construction, removing flammable materials, creating firebreaks, and burying combustible and toxic substances

Stockpiling supplies and materials and preassem-bled articles, scattered over an area to be less vulnerable to destruction.

Preparing to resume disrupted production by drawing contingency plans to remedy slight and medium damage.

the measures outlined above, wein this section on those which we feelmost important in terms of protection againstpermanent hardening byhasty hardening, and rapid shutdown.

Construction Methods

Soviets" approach to hardening isby economic considerations and by their

assessments ol nuclear weapon, effects on buildings. They readily admit that:

The raising of the residence of the existing production buildings and sliuctures as well as their resistance to the effect of the shock wave, in the first pUce. eruaib significant eapenscs, and secondly, still docs not completely guarantee their survival in an area ol nuclear destruction. In (his regard, the carrying out of work lo strengthen various structures can be planned and implemented only in the aim of protecting particularly valuable and specially made equipment, or in those iiisfariors when individual important structures possessless strength than lhe remaining, and il is possible to bring their strength uphe average values of the plant without major outlay!"

6S. According to Soviet writings hardeningshould be carried out in the process of construction or repair work, or in coordination with other measures necessary to improve conditions at installations. In general, the Soviets design and construct their Industrial facilities beyond the criteria for structural stiength called for by Western building practices. This has been attributed lo both an inferiority in the quality of construction materials and such factors as climate and soil conditions More massive Soviet cxmslruotKXi. however, may increase the eapected level of damage to equipment and machinery Soviet manuals, for example, recommend that valuable machinery not be "located in lhe basic production building but rather in separate standing ones which have light, fire-resistant structuralthe collapse of which will nol destroy this equipment "

Underground Structures

t many industrial facilities, subaloors and basements could be used lo project etitlcal machinery, equipment, and supplies/


underground roomsarietya lions which play no ap|>aieut role in the production process but abo are not equipped to accommodate people Detached and basement shelter! per se could also be used to protect equipment and supplies, but we believe relatively lew would be used lor this purpose, given the emphasis on survivability of key workeis

" regarov.ndco-

Although one type of detached shelter has been identifiedong ramp (sechis may be to facilitate stockpiling of essential provisions for human accortiiiiodation Some of these structures probably are usedaily basis to store supplies, equipment, and even semimanufactures. This is consistent with the Soviet *dual purpose" concept of adapting shelters to peacetime needsrisis siluation, these slructures would have to be emptied and'their readiness for shelter use checked.

here is little evidence to indicateomprehensive program for hardening eworaomicnder way. In general, what evidence has come to light is as foliows

Numerous human sources report ihe eristence of underground facilities at economic enterprises which contain both life-support system* and the specialized equipment necessary to permit operations to continueuclear environment. These underground facilities reportedly include industrial production shops, researchdesign bureaus, and other facilitieswith military and civilian industries. In some cases, these facilities have been leported to be completely underground whilr others form part of larger aboveground complexes Although some of these reports are tenuously based on hearsay and rumors, the large number of sources reporting on underground facilities suggests that such facilities probably exist

Bunkered I'OL and water it or age facilities have been idenlilied at many industrial facilities. While such structures may be requlied lo protect their contents (rom freezing or cotilaminition, (hey alsoivil defense hardening purpose.

Tunnels and underground conduits areemployed at Soviet industrial facilities to carry utilities and supplies. Again, thesemay be required for other reasons, but they doivil defense purpose as well

here arc, however, numerous examples where construction hardening guidelines have been ignored. As noted in the previous section, increased expansion of industrial capacity at existing facilities has in many cases reduced the open space between industrial buildings Certain industries such asduction and petroleum refining are not easily hardened and ihe advanced teclinology of other indusliial processes, particularly in tlse chemical industry, has in some

cases increasedulnerability of these facilities. In many cases utility lines ate aboveground both within and outside plant perimeters While bunkered POL facilities have been observed, other unprotected POL links have also been built. Other methods which may be subsequently implemented, such av equipment mountings and interior walls, cannot generally be detected by photography but are largely dismissed in human reporting

nVnce on the imc4emrmtaiion of construction hardening methods indicates thai the Soviets have not engagedarge-scale, rwmprehen. sive program to upgrade the physical hardness of industrial lacilities and equipment The Soviets realize the difficulty and high cost ofrogram and they have eapJidtly stated that such measures are to be carried out only when they are economically feasible. One aspect of hardeningot addressed in thisinherent hardness of Soviet industrial equipment, much of which is rugged and relativelycompared with comparable UScouldore significant impact on tlie overall vulnerability nf Soviet industry than construction practices for industrial facilities

Hasty Hordcewsg Measures

oviet civil defense manuals prescribemeasures to protect buildings, machinery, and equipment from the effectsuclear strike These measures would be implemented during the period preceding an attack either to supplement permanent hardening or. more often, to provide the sole means of protection foi an economic installation and its machinery. According to Soviet textbooks, the civil defense planypical installation dictates hasty hardening (as well as other) measures that would be takenpecial period were declared. They are relatively simple actions such as;

structures with metal supports and


Earth mounding of low buildings, pipelines, and other structures

Cable supports fur towers, columns, and derricks

Sandbagging of equipment and various Structures.

Ficeproofing with paints and Special coatings

Scaling windows, doors, and other openings.

Covering vital equipment with special protective structures.

Removing valuable equipment and dispersing it within Ihe plant or transporting ll lo relocation


civil defense plans at industrialgive much more detailed consideration tomethods which include

Shutting off gas and power lines.

Banking and sealing kilns and furnaces.

Stopping moving equipment -Draining lanks and reservoirs.

from human sources tends tothe tndicationi in unclassified writings thathave given greater emphasis to rapidlo hasly protection of buildings, machinery,There are Iwo possible explanationsfirst, the overall effectiveness of :hemeasures is questionable, particularlykey industries with vulnerable,second, rapid shutdown is easier to achievefew material inputs. The civil defense planplants, however, calls for both types ofin no case does the implementation of oneother.

ortrays those hasty hardening and rapid shutdown methods which, if implemented, would be useful for Increasing Ihe hardness of various industrial installations. These methods can bein one or two weeks as opposed to construction methods which might be undertaken 'during plant construction or renovation.

Some measures such as burying machinery and rapid shutdown of Industry could result in significant changes in vulnerability for selected critical facilities and equipment Other methods sasch as bracing and cabling would havemall unpad on ctecreasing the vulnerability of various structures Even if such methods do not significantly alter lhe hardness of industrial installations against primary nucleareffects, such as blast, they would provide improved prulcclioii against secondary effects, such as (ire and radiation. In addition, some lorms of rapid shutdown could dramatically increase the longer term abilily of various Industries to recover and initiate production again following an altaek.



Maltii of Hasty Hardening and Rapid Situldown Methods


ml id it ill Element! Thil

May Be Hardened By Virion ai i







T $





and roof*

To-en and imnkeatacks

* Window*















Cenoiton and.

Boilers and reacton




x ;


< c




machine* Precision instrument*


Heavy equipment







; x


Y a


Office equipment







x :






inrj firm

. ..



X >


and smelters



Cement kilns





vaU and leaching

and canals.

Pumping nation*









Natural gu






onstruction methods advocated by civilofficials appear to have had litllc impicl. if any. on reducing the overall vulnerability of Soviet industry. The limited implementation of thesereflects Soviet concern over the cost and difficulty that rogram entails

hardening measures, on the otherbe implementedrisis Suchnot assure the survival of any facilitythat is Specifically targeted. On lhehasty hardening measures wou'rdof those facilities that lie on the peripheryaim points If such measuies were knownnt any particular facility they could be oflselatlacker through refinements in targetingselection and allocation

however, the Soviets were able toplans for hasty hardening and rapid shutdowncomprehensive basis tnrocghoui their industriesreduce their recovery time following aattack Studies of I'itoshims and Nagasaki,as of selected German and Sovietduring World War II. suggest that suchmeasures as those described above wouldin reducing the overall level of damageslioilenlng overall recover, time Im the MOAOt&y

Protection of Electric Power Sources

In Soviet plans for the restoralion of services and industrial production, tbe capability to produce and distribute electric poweruclear environment is as important as stockpiles and transportation Recent evidence suggests Soviet civil defense authorities have made progress in this area through application of various civil defenseurvey ofelected electric powerplants in the USSR Idenlifiedersonnel shelters al eight of theuman source wilh extent!ve experience in the power induitiy reported that as of7 the regional pOWQi station at Kharkov had shelters for all plant personnel, plus remote control equipment permitting operation of the plant from the shelter

In addition, other reliable soutces have reported un the construction during theetwork of power distribution center) under the Ministry of Power and Electrification which would function in wartime The centers, which arc located outside large cities, contain (ransfonnei yards, power* line connections, and shelters with space for operating personnel uttd for communications Icrmirialt. both

radio and telephone (via United cables) through which power distribution grids would be operated in an emergency. The grids would cover not only the USSR bul tbe East European nations as well Several of these emergency power distribution centers wilh civil defense shekels have been identified in lhe Ukrainian SSR and others at points a* widely separated ashe Kazakh SSR and Vladivostok in the Far East In the case of one renter, the shelter facilities reportedly had water and load stocks sufficient to support GO persons for several weeks Trie centers have been confirmed In photography. (Sec discussion in chapter V| on availability ot othei (uels.)

Reserve Production Copocily

he average age ol the capital stock in many civilian industries remains high, reflecting the Soviets' desire lo use all their available productive assets in order to fulfill plan goals. There is some evidence, however, both from human sources and in the open literature, which supports the existence of at least minimal unused capacity Reports indicate that plant officials not only frequently overstate the utilisation of existing capacity in. order lo discourage higher production quotas, but also attempt to acquire mote new machinery and equipment than is necessary to meet planned goals Thus, there is some excess capacity which could be usedational emergency. There is little evidence, however, to Indicate either its extent or distribution among industries

n contrast to the production of nonmilitary items, the Soviets have deliberately constructed excess capacity in their defense industries. The Soviets capacity to produce military goods can be increased by converting (rum production ol nonmilitary items. At Ihe Vilnyus Microelectronics Plant, (or instance, production for nonmilitary use was to slop as soonspecial period" was declared, and only essential military items made As reported in other cases, quality control standards are to be reduceda

S2 The Soviets do not appear to have embarkedrogram to establish redundant facilities to produce items essential lor either immediate survivability or for the longer terra recovery of Soviet society, except to lhe extent that such redundancy is provided by low economic concentration For some military items, however, lhe Soviets have abo built redundant plants Tanks and armored personnel carriers, for example, are produced in several plants, each of which probably

-fit Off I

could increase lis output significantly above current levels

The Soviets' capacity to continue production in the postattack period also depends on their on-hand inventories and reserves ol raw and processed materials Some rough estimates ol tlie amount ol time production could continue by drawing downaie possible As indicated6 input-output model of the Soviet economy using Soviet data, none of the industries in the mcdel could continue at prewar production levels more than several weeks without access to additional raw materials and manufacturing components. It is dilficull tothese results, which arc based6 data, lo the present time. We continue to receive reportsthe existence of stockpiles and strategic reserves of industrial materials, but we still have Utile oew evidence on their location and magnitude- Such evidence as we have suggests that some inventories are erratic, especially in those sectors heavily dependent on agriculture. On the other hand, tlse Soviets place great emphasis on preparations lor the wartime continuity of industrial production, and theof stockpiles and strategic leserves of materials may be morethin the evidence suggests

In recent years the Soviets have publicly espoused the balanced development n| economic

regions lo reduce their inter dcpcndcnclea (or supplies and raw materials At the same time, they have continued to develop their transportation network in an effort to facilitate the distribution of material Still, economic, political, and geographic factors continue to militate against autonomous economic regions, while lhe sire and extensive development of the USSR present Soviet planners wilh major transporlation problems To help offset deficiencies in distribution of industrial andoods, lhe SovseU have stockpiled bridging equipment, steamnd railroad rails and tics In escess of lhat required for regular maintenance- They have also built shelters for the proteclion of essential railroad operations

he inability lo identify and locate major stockpiles and strategic reserves of supplies and equipmentirected attack against these resources Attacks against industry in general would reduce the overall level of supplies on hand, but il is likely that supplies would be available at surviving industrial facilities to allow ptcductton to continue for several weeks following an attack. The adequacy of Strategic reserves for continuing productiononger period, however, would depend heavily on the survivability and availability of the transportation and electric power systems. The Impact of deficiencies in these areas can probably be reduced if the personnel and equipment essential to the operation of these systems can be protected.


Chapter VI


Thecceni edition ol lhe Soviet Risr/js! CtW Defense, publishedescribes prepara-tiOm lor the protection ot* the population as follows

Tho preparation lot protective measures should be carried out In peacetime on the entire territory ol the nation and in an obligatory procedure. The scope and character of these measures are dctet-iiiitted in each specific instance, considering rise particular features of the individual areas of the country and the national economic installations, as well as the probability of an altack on them with nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological weapons

Underonditions, the protection of the population Is carried out byange of measures including three methods ofrotecting the people In protective

ispersal and evacuation, and Ci)

supplying Individual protective gear.

The basic method of protection is the sheltering of people in protective structures, but theand most complete protection is achieved by combining all these methodsthe specific situation

Such Soviet statements about protection of themost often refer to allleadeiship and the essential workers, as well as those elements not essential lo immediate post-nuclear.altack operations. In previous sections of the UM we discussed protection of Ihe leadership and essential personnel; in this section sve assess protective measures for the entire Soviet urban population, including both essential and nonessential personnel except where specifically noted Otherwise.

A. Shelters

hc Suvicts havearge number of shelters, but most arc at industrial, administrative, and institutional lacilities. Although sheller spaces for the urban population have also increasedc believe they could not presently shelter the major^

portion of Iheir urban population wilhin urban areas. Evacuation away from likely targets,ey element of Soviet civil defense

3 Since latl year we have acquired much more evidence on the number, size, and orgs ni rat tonal association of sheltersesult of an extensive research effoit by the Intelligence Community.have been made of tlie probable hardness of thetypes of shelters, allowing assessments ol their sulnerabih'ies Although both the open literature and human source reporting describe evacuation proce-duies, we still have only limited information about certain aspects of Soviet capabilities to assemble,protect, and support urban populations at evacu1 ation sites. We have evaluated the effect of evacuation and sheltering on population survival, our findings are most sensitive lo assumptions about the warning time available prior to an attack for the Soviets to complete final civil defense preparations. The evaluations In this section of the Soviet ability to distribute essential supplies and medical services for theirostattaek period arc hugely subjective judgments, but they too are sensitive both to warning time and to the nature of the US attack.

A As stated in the chapter covering protection of tlie economy, lhe Soviets have designed andmany built-in and detached'shelters for the protection ol the urban population Subways abo have been designed for civil defense applications, but arc not Included In our analysis of shellerther structures (lower floors of multlstoriedbasements not specially configured as shelters, and the like) which would afford some blast and radtalion protection, also have not (seen Included

> In addressing the availability of shelter space (or the populationhole, no attemirt is made to

Old* all Soviet cities havtoixumu;ddingnsttaa*pUnVsn waiaU awl chare*<al toil shaker space, hidinger space inmi estimate onlr Jiftitlt (leu than I

Uie el funnel, -ould ivectuile um ot live systems lot tiiiupoilatioai

separate those shelters which may be allocated for essential personnel alone Rather, wc have evaluated the overall Soviet civil defense shelter program Hi urban areas. In some cases we have been unable to associate shelters with specific installations, and we do not know how available shelter space would heIn all circumstance*

6 In analyzing the overall Soviet shelter program, wc deal with the numb*"'shelters Identified, classify them according to type, consider Ihe pace and priorities of the program, determine shelter capacities

and finayy present our estimate of the total urban population wh icfa could be sheltered. The data in these analyses are derived from several cc4leclion programs, and while other intelligence sources were used, the bulk of the evidence comes from overheadthe limitation* of which were described in the Introduction

he principal contribution lo (hi* analysis of the shelter program involved coverage of severalareas and individual cities as described inSee tableod figuren addition


to studies of entire geogiaphic areas and cities, several categories of civilian and defense iisdustries were also studied as described in chapter V. To the number of shelters identified in these regional and industrial surveys we have added those shelters identified by other Intelligence sources.

Nurnbers Identified

analyst! of all source evidence on shelter construct ton. we conclude that there are more basement shelters in most of the aieas than shown in uur figures.

he insights we have obtained on Soviet priorities for shelter constiuction offer interesting parallels to lhe conclusions reached earlier in this paper on the piiorities-of the civil defense program. Soviet emphasis on the protection of key officials is supported by our findings]

numbers of shelters Identified to date. There isationwide shelter program

types of Shelters

n our analysis of lhe shelter program we hove divided shelters into pre- anderiods and into the two standard destruction types, detached and built-in, as described In the previous chapter.8 an important Soviet decree was Issued, requiring lhat civil defense shelters be included in all new construction.

of the buildings rsMistructed inave basement shelters. Detachedpriorhich appear more primitivedale from World War IL have aboin many areas. The Moscow subway,usedomb shelter during Worldubsequently expanded. Since World Warwere constructed In Leningrad, Kiev,Tbdtsi which have some civil defense

Pore ond Priorities

The pace of shelter constructkki8 hai not been uniform in the several regions and industries suiveycd. Dates of construction varied widely among cities from year to yeare do not know the reason for this apparent unevenness in the pace ol shelter construction- It may be due to lhe categorira lion of Soviet cities for civil defense purposes,availability of resources In an area, or lo our lack of complete information.

In terms ol total rrumbers. more built-in (base mentj lhan detached shellers were found, although detached shellers arc more easily delected. Based OB


Shefle Copoerry

ur method for estimating the lotal urban shelter capacity In the USSHhole, using the sample data, was the same as that described inor estimating shelter capacity at economicWe estimate lhat two-thirds of the available spacehelter is for personnel and that the occupancy factor range isquare meter per person Ofities surveyed,ere selectedasis for our estimate of the total shelter capacity for all cities withopulation (see tableur selection was made on the basis of population and availability of information For three of theities selected, shelter jiea was obtained by scaring up the available area ligutcs given for the fraction of the city actuallyited

o estimate the percentage of (he urban population protected for cities ofopulation in the Soviet Union, it would be necessary

Tabic Vl-2

Sheller Survey Results at IS Soviet Cities



Sheller Area*


ta m)



We have allocated two-thirds otthe total floorspace of shelters for personnel, since we know lhalhird of tho llootipaee Is taken by IJe support equipment andl OS square meter perquare meter perstimated

'Scaled up estirnate for entire dty.

assume thai iheseities arc representative of all such cities in the country. This is not the case, since these cities were not randomly selected. Furthermore, such factors as populatioo size, economic distribution of industry 'for example, heavy industry versusnd geographic location may all be IrnporUnt in determining the extent of Soviet civil defense activitypecific dty. If, however, the IS ciliesresents live, then one method (or estimating the overall fraction of population protected would be lo use Ihc ratio between the tola) available| cilia and theii total population This estimate1quare meter perhis approach yields an estimateinimum ofercent of the Soviet urban population can now be protected (orercent atquare meter perhe OS-percent confidence hounds on this estimate, based on sampling error alone. Indicate that tho actual percentage liesercent andcrcenlquare meter per person) These confidence bounds do not take into consider*ti<xi (actors such as the estimation errors in scaling up available shelter area, error* Inof detected shelters, uisdetccted shelters at each of the cities, and any bias due to the unrrpreseniative-ness of theities Thus, the real confidence liounds

of the estimate may be considerably larger than those given because ol sampling error alone.

n alternative statistical approach to estimating the fraction of population protected is the least squaies method Area and population may be each plottedogarithmic scale. The pointsis log scale should lie approximatelytraight line, indicating lhat the percentage of population sheltered is about the same in small and large cities in ourowever. there are wide variations from city to city. Using this method, it is possible to obtain the best fitting line through theoints. The least squares line correspondsonstant proportionhus, using this approach, lhe estimate of the percentage ol population protected isercentquaie meter per person) This corresponds very well wilh the ratio estimate ofercent discussed earlier

hus,estimateinimum ofercent of Ihe Soviet population in cities with moreeople could be protected at an occupancy factorquare meter per person andercentquare meter per person.ore detailed discussion nf lhe statistical methodology involved in this estimative process, see annex C


The role of the subway systems In Soviet plans to cope with nuclear effects was alluded to briefly in6 IIM on Soviet civil defense. New information received since then, together with additional analysis, hasetter understanding of tlie methods whereby subway systems appear to enhance llie Soviets' ability to implement overall civil defense plans for protection of the population in key urban arras. Six systems are now operating andore are in various stages of planning and coristruction {see figure Vl-2)

Although subways constitute an essentialof urban transportation resources of major cities in the USSR and Eastern Europe, their civil defense applications have been given high priority. Were this not the case, urban trartsporlalion goab could have been.met without incurring the additional expenses creating those features of subway systems which seem linked to civil defense requirements. According to extensive human source reporting, facilities meeting these requirements haveeceived such priority in the construction of the Moscow. Leningrad, and Kiev subways. Although there Is less information from human sources on the Khar'kov, 8aku, and Tbilisi systems, it is likely that all systems presently operating, and those planned for lhe future, will incorporate some or all of the same technical concepts.

Chapter IV has referred to the interrelationship between the subway systems and facilities forof the leadership- Moscow pioneered in the construction of multistoried underground shelters and their linkup wilh deep subway stations. Many of these structures are accessed directly by special stairway or elevator from offices above them, while the subway system provides alternate access. Expansion of this network has continued and has been noted in photography as well as extensive human source rejiortirig. The most recent example is Ihe tunnel running from the new RSFSR Council of Ministers building in Moscow lo the Krasnopresnrnskiy subway station In Kiev and Leningrad, where certain of these underground protective structures existed before completion of lhe subway system, the linkup was accomplished as new subway construction progressed

Facilities for protecting other elements of the population in subway systems are less well understood and il is sometimes difficult to separate such structures from those intended for the leadership Best known, and the subject of considerable human sourceand hand-field photography, arc the heavy doors

with hermetic closures for sealing off subway station platforms from surfaceuman source with extensive experience in tlie Leningrad subway system reported thai similar closures were erected9 in tunnels at either end of the stations to seal station platforms from the track tunnels. All closures could be sealed aulomatically by central control or independently at individual stations. As5 the Leningrad subway management was experimenting with biological filters, which would impiove air quality and also cope wilh toxic which might enter the ventilation systems. The foregoing suggests that consideration has been given to use of the station platform areas as shelters, perhaps inwith the shelter slructures described below.

everal sources have reported on the existence of underground structures adjacent to, and on approximately the same level as. the subway stations which could provide shelter for large numbers of people. These shelters were built at the same time as the deep subway stations. Access to these structures is from the station platforms or tunnels neareliable source has confirmed the existence of such access tn the Leningrad subway. These structures reportedly have extensive sanitary facilities (unlike the subway stations andood, water, and medical supplies. That they are intended as civil defense shelters is indicatedeportormer member of the civil defease regiment at Kotpinoingrad. whose company participated ineningrad subway shelter structure lo test psychological reactionsive-day slay under shelter conditions. The shelter, measuringyeters, was one of the severalomplex which was located just beyond the station platform. The same source reported that these shelters had filtered ventilation systems which were inspected, maintained, and operated by career NCOs of the Kolpino civil defense regiment.

n addition to the use of station platforms and adjacent structures as shelters, there has beenthat subway tunnels would be used as shelter space. While no knowledgeable source has supported this speculation, its origins may be traced back to Woild War II practices in Moscow and to civil defense posters printed9 which show individuals seeking shelter entering tunnels on boards placed temporarily over the tracks. (See figuret is conceivable of course that the boarded section served only to provide access to the shelter structures described above. In oeitain circumstances it might be IMssiMr to use tunnel space, bul ventilation, sanitary


facilitics. supply, and crowd com ml would pose problems.

Tbcte Is no consensus among human sources concert lung the procedures and priorities governing use ol* subway platforrns and adiacent shelters to supplement other urban shelters However, several sources who participated In civil defense leadership training courses were told by theii instructors that the subway system would provide fully equipped and stockrc! shfTtr' facilities for thousand! of people Others, whose places of employment were scheduled to. relocate'special period" and who had no orcseiH shelters of their own. were required ursder their civil defense plan to proceedpecific subway-station In the vicinity of their enterprise. This would occur if they had no time to carry out their planned relocation. These roports indlcale that iuWay shelter space will lie allocated in advance This view is supported by some sources who claim that use of subway shelters will be restricted to specific groups and that the heavy closures are essential to control access to the system, not only in its shelter mode butrotected transon system as well

There it little information on the projected use of subways to affect the concealed evacuation of key personnel, either In the "special period" orostslrike situation. It has been reported in general terms by several sources, aod recent efforts of various subway systems to combine or link up with suburban rail lines support the logic of ibis concept (See figurevident, however, lhat if the systems are to serve evacuation requirements and shelter needs, use of track tunnelsarge scale for shelter is ruled out.

ot possible to provide an accurate estimate of the number of people who could be sheltered In the six subway systems now operational There are too many variations In the system* (for ciample. lhe number of deep, as opposed to shallow,ore important, we do not know the number ofshelter structures, nor how the spaces are to be allocated Nevertheless, the subways doignificant civil defense shelter resource. (See table VI-3)

HobilobJily of Shelters

s indicated in the section on shelters for essential petsorsnct we have limited information regarding the adequacy of food and supplies and the presence and condition of life support equipment in Ihese shellers Soviet plans call lor the population to

hree-day supply of food with them; therefore, it is likely that few shellers arc prestocked with food.

ith an occupancyquare meter per person, the factors that directly affect shelter habit-ability are as follows:

Soviel Specif tea I

ii"cu rn



I far 25

' These data derive Irom Soviet documeni* and. wurce


Most of the shelters now being built appear to be of lhe type employing air regeneration facilities, plus small amounts of outside air and backed upupply of compressed air in tanks. Thb option allow* for period* of complete hermetic sealing and for period* of temperature increase when supplemental air may be needed. Shelters which obtain all air from the outside have been reported. The allowable period of hermetic sealing without backup airaclor particularly sensitive to overcrowding.

Tlie per person allowanceubic meters per hour ofudged an adequatehelter occupant could survive with about one fourth that amount under resting conditions. The air regeneration system mentionedupplemented with particle- and ione-chemical-filtered oultlde air, plus an internal emergency air supply, should afford adequate protection under most nuclear attackShelter* In target areas using filtered outside air as the sole air source may have to be henrteticaUy sealed in the eventass fire. Such shelters usually can be sealed for several hours before carbon dioxide levels rbe substantiallyercent

Soviet ventilation specifications listed! above as allowable were stated to be adequate for susUlned period* (presumably several days) without harming health or working ability. However, temperature, humidity, and gas percentages would allow only for short period* of minimum exertion Ursder these conditions, any overcrowding would be dangerous. Soviet document* are to specify one toilet perccupants This wouldinimum number

Table Vl-3

Sheller Capacity of Subway Stations1









4 m)

5 oi)

m l


3 ra)

Si nee ptatfcain dimension! of wine newer ttiiioni are noi Inown. estimates ef totil unble plallonn area are based oo the largest category of Anion* loc which dtticiuions arequare meter per person/atquare meter per person

would present an increased danger of Individual toilet failure.

Soviet literature Indicates concern about those habitability factors which could contribute toof shelter stay time, such as failure of air regeneration systems, outside air filter failure, sewage backups or leaks, overcrowding, spoilage of stored food, or in the case of shelters using only outside air. being forced to remain sealed for periods in excess of those recommended. Thus, wc believe two weeks al capacity occupancy under the most favorableprobably would represent the maximum period of reasonably safe use However, since human sources indicate that some shelters are poorly maintained and the essential equipment such as doors and ventilators are sometimes inoperable, the habitability of these shelters may dependarge extent on the length of time available to prepare shelters for occupancy.

The use of subways as shelters would be limited by many of the same factors described above, Soviet subways have ventilation systems for normalbut It is not known if they are all now provided wilh equipment for filtering air taken in from outside or if the air InlakeS can be sealed to prevent the enlry ol con laminated air. At the entrances of many stations heavy doors have been installed, presumably for blast protection but also capable ofhermal barrier and protection from fallout contaminalton.

Subway stations themselves have no food and water supplies or sanitary facilities capable ofarge number of people for an extended period of lime. Human sources have reported that the shelter strueliircs constructed adjacent to the stations have supplies and lacllitlei. However, wc have notthis.

As indicated in the section on shelters at industrial enterprises. Soviet standard construction specifications for built-in and detached shelters rangeoounds per squarehese designure safe" survival) are not weapons related. Our technical analysis of these structuresangeounds per square inch) forpcrccnt probability of severe slruclural damage. (Seenor shelter hardness against various US weaponsepending on the thickness of the concrete roof and earth overburden, these shelters could provideagainst radiationrotection factor (PC)Fr more.

Subways would provide protection against both blast and radiation. Many stations areo GO meters underground but even the newer, shallower slalicuu would provide proteciion from both blast and

raa-und and loafri the

in ofxtaiion

unJpi conitraclton


to oihaad itaanN natiin


(teeauon iKilities wilh bunt*'!



MOSCOW: Interconnected Subway-Railroad Potenlial Evacuation Routes to Command and Control Sites


radiation. (Figureisplays the probabilityproducing casualtiesesult of groundGround acceleration is the factor producing most damage doe lo the depth of the subways.

ther effectsarge nuclear attack some of which arc not fully understood and cannot be anticipated, could increase the overall vulnerability of shelters and subways. For example, eilensive fires may Impair Ihe habitability of detached and basementanding of subway tunnels and stations could occur; and the totality of primary and secondary nucJear effects could combine In ways to degrade shelter protect ion more than expected These effects cannot be quantified in terms of resulting casualties Furthermore, the hardness levels described herein refer to the structural integrity ol the iheller itself Shelter occupants could become casualties even though Ihe shelter remained intact

fcapedient Shelters

oviet manuals provide examples ofexpedient shellers both In urban and rural areas for protection against fallout. The shelters described include adapting existing structures such as basements and storage buildings and constructing hasty shelters using available materials. Many buildings In rural areas could be adapted lo provide additional fallout protection, and given an adequate time in which lo make such preparations, farmhouses and rural storage facilities are likely to be upgraded. The construct ion of expedient theaters, however. Is likely to depend heavilyumber of circumstances- Such factors as climatic conditions, an adequate supply of tools and construction materials, and lhe availability of plans and Instructions could limit tlie feasibility offrccslaiiding abovcgrouitd or undergroundshelters.

Tbeltorogram (or ibc emergency construction of blast shelter* usingprefabricated, reinforced concrete structural component of the type commonly used by municipal utilities Thli approach wai lint2 civil defense manual on methods for eocoJrucfinf, expedient blast and ladlalion (belters. (See figureource who workedlant in Leningrad producing prefabricated leinlorced concrete products reportshe fallfficials horn the city civil defense stall vliiird the plant tu inspect components produced there for lhe public utilities The civil defense officials described their interest in using these components lo build bias! shelters which could be erectedhort period ofecond source from Odessa reported lhat as6 his construction firm was tasked lo build rapidly erected blast shelters duringpecialsing prefabricated components normally available to the firm. Upon declarationspeciallements of the firm would proceed lo industrial sites previously designated by the Odessa civil defense staff and erect blast shelters with capacities ofersons This actionaximum ofours to complete, Other human sources, wilh extensive experience in construction piojects using the components inhave confirmed ihal these structures could be erected in the time frameoours).

Soviet intent to supplement permanent blast shelters in urban areas was highlighted in7 textbook which stated: "With the onsethreat of attack, rapidly erected blast shelters are constructed to provide complete protection to the population of cities. These structures, in terms of their protective properties, are almost as affective as shelters built ahead ofhe capacities of various types of rapidly erected shelters range fromersons, at an occupancy factor ofquare meler. Hardnessepending on components used, arc reported to range fromPaosi) for one typeosi) for the largest units. We have not. however, conducted vulnerability analysis on these Miuctures. Imagery confirms that these components are in general use in many areas of Ihe USSR and. in one case, shows three of these structuresivil defense training facility in the USSR. Il has not been poaaible to quantify the additional blast shellers which would be available in urban areas lluuugh this program

Progrom CHec liven" u

he Soviet urban shellei program would provide adequate protection loroercent of the urban populationinimum, depending on the occupancy factor assumed In the eventS attack intended lo maiimite damage to military and industrial targets; but without urban evacuation, the shelter program alone would havearginal impact on reducing lhe total number of urban casualties (See the section on evacuation, below, and chapter VIIiscuuton of the effects of shelters and evacuation in reducing casualties.)

detailed analysis was made of (heof shelters at industrial facilities in thearea. As weapons were employed in aon targets In tlie area to maximize damagefacilities and mililary installationstype of attack, llie analysis showed that:

A large poicent of the hardened shelters at industrial facilitiesigh level of protection for the occupantshe prompt nuclear effects.

More thanercent of the sheltei* at industrial facilities would have survived even if all shelters were rated at their design level of hardness discussed in Soviet writings

At our estimated hardnasi forsi) orthanercent of these shelters could be expected lo survive with little or no damage.



civil defense manuals and olherstate that llsoso people not required loactivity in potential target areas willto aiea* outside possible -tones ofThese areas can be as farilometerscities, sometime* crossing "blast boundaries,within the same military district. Theretime requirements set by the Soviets for thestay in these areas.

vacuation of the population is organized and planned through lhe place of work, study, or residence. Civil defense staffs at these facilities arc required to draw up lists of personnel and families to be evacuated and their planned reception areas This information i* then provided to the rayon evacuation


The modes ol evacuation rnost frequently mentioned in Soviet sources are buses, trucks, trains, and walking. Transportation problems in terms ol vehicle availability could arise,ilitary mobilisation took place conrurrently (as wouldbe Ihehe transport of military personnel and equipment wouldarge number of vehicles, although there is disagreement on tlie scope of their requirements.

ources who have worked mi motor vehicle parks havs statedumber of tholr vehicle* were scheduled for civil defense use duringivil defense evacuation plant reportedly wereal leastear, and included picking up some civilians al designated assembly points and tianspoilfng them to predesJgnated relocation areas. Breakdowns of vehicles or lack of spare parts would affect the total number of vehicles available, at would Ihc timing of an altack.

general, there would be severe demandsrans portal ion resources during the period ofThis wasrincipal factor inSoviel decision to opt for theof evacuation including walking Thewould also contribute flexibility to the tasktraffic controllers in circumstancescongestion would also pose serious pioblems.

Piopo'Olioos ol Reception Areas

descriptions of preparations atare rather general but indicate thatwater, shelter, and medicalbe provided upon the arrivalCivil defense stalls reportedly arethese requirements in formulatingplans and io acquire the necessaryservices for tbe evacuees. We have onlyon the actual status ol preparationsareas

he Soviets intend lo use all available space In rural homes and other buildings, including public buildings, recreational facilities, youth camps, and farm storage lacilities. One Soviet manuala hosting ratio of two urban evacuees for every rural inhabitant, although human sources had cited higher figures. Wc have not quantified the total amount of space available in elisting rural structures

* Tbeof(el la nimi'hB it theoi. conntouriMi oHich weekaMi detente sliHl in manpower allecatMiit and in encualiun eomraiWtu.

commission. which is responsible for coordinating Ihe evacuation plan of Ihc entire rayon.

Evooxinon Pfoceourti

heoretically, the order to evacuate could be issued at any time.7 civil defense text book refers merely to actions lo be taken upon the "announcementecision to carry outost sources agree, however, that the order lo evacuate would be giveneriod ol threat of attack. Some human sources have also noted plans for evacuationuclear attack as radiation levels permit movement from available shelters. Theorder is given by tbe national leadeiship and transmitted to local officials via ihc mililary districts, military commissariats, and civil defense staffs.

o carry out urban evacuation In the shortest possible time, the order would be disseminated both through dedicated dvil defense networks and Ihe mass media Upon receiving the alert, civil defense staffs and individual installations would implement their evacuation plans, using available communications lo notify subordinate personnel ol the time and place for staging their evacuations. Factories, offices, schools, or bus and train stations would serve as embarkation points. According to Soviet planners, and confirmed by human sources, tho populations would probably haveew hours to prepare for the evacuation following the order to evacuate. Upon arrival at tbe assembly points, people would board buses or trains, or begin walking toward assigned relocation areas People destined for more remote regions would be evacuated to intermediate points where Ihey would rest and be fed by local autlsoritios.

The status of advance preparations for an evacuation varies. Students and personnel at economic installations are generally told about the existence ol evacuation plans, butew know details Many seem to know their evacuation areas, but are less certain about tbe extent of preparations.

There is no evidence that large-scalencises iivvolvirig the actual rnoveinont ol thousands of people have been practiced. There is evidence, however, thai small-scale evacuations arc practiced severalear at schools and economic installations in some urlsan areas.ew instances, personnel are evacuated to reception areas, but in rnost eases they are dismissed aflrr arrival at assembly points.


near all luge urban areas. From our analysis ol some areas, however, we believe lhal lhe availability ol rural floesrspace Isactor limiting evacuation, particularly In most of the heavily populated regions of tho USSH. (See figureor example, in the Kiev Oblast we found lhat the uiban population could be redistributed throughout the rural region at an urban to rural hosting ratiot the same lime. In remote areas such as Norilsk and Komsomol'sk. where sufficient space is unavailable in existing rural buildings, additional accommodations would have to be provided We have no information on steps taken in these areas to provide facilities for evacuees. .


umber of studies have been completed over the past year to evaluate the feasibility andof Soviet urban evacuation using various means of transportation! These studies attempt to combinecriteria for evacuation with geographic and other factors, in order to determine Ihe extent lo which Soviet guidelines can be followed and the rales al which the population can be evacuated (See figures VH and Vl-ft)

he basic assumptions fo: these studies include

Twenty percent ot more of lhe urban population comprise the "essential" personnel and their lamiUes who would be dispersed to areas within commuting distance ol their places ol work.

Seventy percent orof the urban population would be evacuated to points beyond the dispersal areas

Adequate housing in rural areas for evacuees would be available.

Various modes of transport (buses, trains, trucks, and walking) would be


defense planning and training of cadres would be adequate for directing the evacuation

eather It also an important factor in carrying out an ovacualion. Unusually severe weathercould slow the pace ol evacuation These conditions could be revere enough tooviet decision on whether to evacuate some areas Soviet civil defense authorities in the areas alfccted would be expected to take such conditions Into account iu their plans and preparations. For eiamplc. they may seasonably ad put the allocation of transportation resources and alter their evacuation timetables Other

factors which affect evacuation feasibility, such as the availability and distribution of fuel and confusion among the population, have not been evaluated.

5fi The resultsour studiesange of possible evacuation rales depending primarily on Ihc availability of different transportation modes These studies generally confirm the conclusions reached in last year's IIM on Soviet civil defense concerning the feasibility of Soviet urban evacuation and the rates at which such an evacuation could take place For evacuations employing mot on tedtrucks, trains, andestimate that, from the time the evacuation order was given until the last group of evacuees reached reception areas, one to four days would Ite required to evacuate most Soviet cities ofillion people or less. Larger cities, such as Moscow and Lerungrad. would require more than this time to evacuate, and cities with populations lessould be evacuated within the lower bound above Overall, we estimate that Iwo to three days would be required toajor portion of the Soviet urban population. If, on the other hand, the evacuation were to be carried out oneek or more could be required to evacuate the larger Soviet cities. It is more likely, however, lhat someof motorized transport and walking would be used, reducing the evacuation period to lesseek.

hb estimate compares favorably with thestatements concerning the time required for evacuation.0 their textbooks stated that evacuation would inquireours to accomplish, whereas7 teitbook reported time asours These times are given as guidelines and can vary from place to place,*

C. llfo Support

Availability ond Distribution of Supplies and tquipnsenl

ood ande estimate that the Soviet grain storage capacity isillion metric0 million on-larmillion off-farm) According to Soviet sources, the total on-farm capacity of grain and oilseed storage facilities, which vary from open-air plaTiorms and pits to well-ientilated, covered buildings, wasillion metric tonsAl leastercent of Soviet grain is stored on Ihe

It ihould be noted thai U* Soviets abo referour lime frame Im the cecaxrwtMn elblast saeben

Mm el the cofwJuwu in tSu lecUw an whlfl freer three

in list year's IIM on Sovietdefense.

fa in ii, and most of the remainder is probably kept tn rural areas Off-farm storage was reported lo boillion metric tons Off-farm facilities are usually covered, frequently ventilated, and are able to hold grain in good condition for several years. In the USSH. food storage and food processing are activities performed outside urban areas of greater0 population While we have some information on other foods, we have concentrated our analysis on the availability of grain, because it is :he staple of the Soviet diet.

ntelligence reporting consistently referred to lhe existence of food reserves, some In underjrourid storage, throughout the USSR Many buried or semlbuiicd food storage facilities outside urban areas have been Identified, but the number and capacities of these Installations are nol known, nor do we know how long the surviving population could be sustained on the undamaged stores afler an attack

In addition lo thenderground grain storage bunkers Identified last year, three large grain storage bunkers of another type have been identified near Leningrad and Riga, both non-grain-producing areas They differ from the others only in that they are not cotocatcd with arxiveground grain storage. In Kiev, where other semiburied food storage bunkers were tooted north of theuman source stated that the food was to feed the evacuated population in that area. Other sources have reported the existence of other food storage facilities near major cities which they refer lo as strategic reserves. We do not know the size of these reserves

Civil defense plan* abo require ihal rural staffs and formations prepare for protection of livestock and growing areas from fallout- In Soviet writings, emphaiis is placed on *afcguarding the current harvest.

Evidence on the protection of sources of water supply dates back to thehe program include* drillingdentilyirrg aquifers, and building reservoirs. There arc reports lhat these aspects of the program arc being carried out. In addition, the Soviel practice of building underground or hunkered water reservoir* in lhe outskirts of cillcs will provide some protection against blast and excellent protection against fallout. Allhough we have little Information on Soviet plans for large-scale purification of fallout contaminated water, we krtow that1 the Ministry of Health was tasked wilh developing proposal! for methods ofowever. radioactive purticlcs settle outew days

or could be filtered oulariety of expedient methods

uel. Calculations of the storage capacity (or refined oil product* are as follows (in million barrels):

Prestnlc Capacity Norm*! Withays' Stock Levels Wa.nlnj

Ite'ineiies mi

RlS and lank mills



Thus, oil products in storage and transit would be enough to satisfy civilian,nd mililary users at peacetime consumption levels for about one month. Coal stockpiles have been estimated al aboutillion metric tons. This is the equivalent of about -toupply. Natural gas utilization in major urban centers would probably be disrupted and we cannot estimate how rapidly service to key user* could be restored

n any case the above figures suggest that supplies of oil products and coal would last for alonth al prestrlke consumption levels II these levels were reduced by nuclear attack, or if damage to transportation facilities impeded even localthese losses could be offset by energymeasures, alternate fuel sources,ecrease in industrial demand. We believe, therefore, thatstocks of fuel would be available in the post-attack period to sustain the need* of the surviving population.

Individual Prolcctioe Equipment. The basic ilcms of individual protective equipment are masks, respirators, and protective clothing Foe years, gas masks of various types have been produced and distributed, and the general population has been instructed in their use. Masks are not retained by the population, bul are stored at work or in housing areas Detailed instructions in civil defense manuals on how to fashion expedient masks suggests an inadequate supply of gas masks for rural Inhabitants and norsesserstial urban residents. Special protectivehead and hand coveting, goggles, andnormally available only lo civil defense formations

haracteristic of nuclear attack is that the numbeis of surviving injured are expected lo equal or exceed those killed by blast. Tins could mean



of millions of injured survivorsation. In tho immediate postattaek period, treatment of trauma (wounds and broken bones) and burns creates tbe greatest demand for professional care by physicians and surgeons. There Is no specificfor radiation sickness beyond bed care,and replacement of fluids. This can be provided by relatively untrained personnel. Proper treatment of injuries and burns, however,eavy demand on those who possess specialized medical skills.

A rather high incidence of shelters wss foundospitals and medical institutes surveyed in Kiev andthanhelters identified at someocations. At some of the hospitals, shelters are interconnected by tunnels, while Otheis have shelter space probably in excess of requirements lor patients or staff personnel. The apparent extra space could be for wartime emergency use, or for lhe protected storage of medical supplies or auxiliary equipment.

In addition to protection in place, the civil defense medical service haslan for medical evacuation and treatment using Ihe countrywide assets of the Ministry of Health. The plan is basedwo-stage evacuation and treatment system: first aid and emergency treatment in or near the focus of destruction, followed by evacuationpecialized hospital outside the target zone.

The first stage of medical evacuation and tiealment would be performed by mobile first aid detachments made up of physicians and paramedical workers from city and rayon health services, and first aid teams from factories and other installations. These arc to be deployed lo the edge of lhe "zone of lighthe detachments and their subordinate medical learns are la perform the full range ol emergency lifesaving services, decontamination,of limited temporary hospitalization, and evacuation of casualties to hospital base areas.

While plans for the operation of detachments appear adequate, size and composition of units would vary from place to place depending on local assets. Their availability would depend heavily on whether there was sufficient time before an attack for medical units to make final preparations The Soviets estimate that at leastercent of all casualties will require specialized medical care. The estimated handling and transit time of three to four days or so from the first-slage treatment centers to hospitals outside lhe target areas may result inoercent mortality amuug the seriously wounded requiring hospitalization who have noi been stabilized prior to evacuation.

Ttse second medical evacuation stage consists of delivering specialized medical care to casualties from the ureas of destruction. This stage Is lo be located in the eiurban zone and consists of expanding existing medical facilities to tbe maximum, convertingInto hospitals, and deploying mobile tent hospitals ol upeds The combination of all such lacilities isospital base Soviet plans call for these bases to beale distance from the urban targcl area's) lhal il must serve Each hospital base would manage two or more hospital collection points, and each hospital collection point is to provide up to eight types of specialized medical care which will be organized from existing medical assets.

The main hospital ol lhe hospital base iseneral hospital with additional assets for fallout decontamination and shock treatment. In the event of mass casualties, it is these hospitals that arc in the greatest danger of sudden overloading. The hospital base oiganization is wdl planned and comprehensive in scope, but is beyond the present capability of ihe Soviet Onion to implement fully. The demands for highly trained manpower, specialized equipment, and essential drugs in tlie amounts required could not be met by the present Soviet medical system. An additional load on the medical syslem would arise Irom Ihe need to arrange lor Ihe evacuation and continued treatment ol patients at hospitals whose personnel and facilities will be converted to civil defense hospital bases.

Another important problem facing lhe Soviets in the operation of hospital bases concerns the number and quality of medical personnel. The Soviet medical establishment5 was estimated to containhysicians*hysician-to-population ratio of aboul onen addition, there arcoctors"urses,ther medical workers capable of rendering first aid and other treatment during an emergency.

In addition to lhe individuals making up the formal medical establishment, there are moreillion members of civil defense formations who have received various levels of first aid training. Important in this group are lhe female graduates of institutions of higher learning who are required to take two yeais of civil defense nurses' training and receive civil defense mobilization level of lhe installa-

' This figure possibly includes mililary physiciansin (he unliod Si net. ihii ration about ooeigure*).

(ion formations, it is the first aid trams on whom civil defense authorities have coticenlrated their efforts.

t the level of nurses and doctors* assistants, the training in first aid is more advanced and includes selected aspects of trauma management as well as some practical training At the physician level, except for specialists, in service advanced training in the management of severe trauma often consistsew hours of lectures with little advanced clinical cross-training. This places the average narrowly trained Soviet physicianoor position to function effectively as, forurgeon. The main burden for definitive medical care would fall on surgeons and other medical specialists who are in chronic short supply, thusimiting factor in the Soviet ability to render definitive treatment to mass casualties. Thb situation could markedly reduce the Soviets* ability to treat serious casualties. On the other hand, human sources with experience in civil defense medical services have Described the emphasis given to sorting the casualties in conformance with slairdaid military medical practice. By determining which of the wounded are likely to recover following treatment, and which will not because of the severity ol their condition, civil defense medical units will be able to limit the number of individuals requiring further tieatment andevacuation.

edical supportrovided in dispersal and evacuation areas. Personnel, supplies, andfor ehb service would be In addition to those serving the two stages of medical evacuation. We have not been able to determine the extent to which infectious disease outbieaks. possibly facilitated by radtation-induced suppression ol the immunewouldignificant health threat to the evacuees.

here is little Information on specific medical supplies presJuckcd at evacuation centers or relocation sites. Although it is believed that the USSfl has extensive stockpiles of medical materials, the locations, item inventories, and number of days of supply are not known.

he lackreakdown of physicians by medical specialty prevents our determining how many physicians in the critical specialties would be available lo provide the kinds of definitive tieatment which will be required since total casualties could range as highillion, including GO million toillion

fatalities. The only data presently available thai addresses the capacity of atortion of ihe Soviet medical establishment concern lhe results of simulations of nuclear strikes on lactically deployed troops carried out several year* ago. In these exercises, all medical facilities in Ihe strike lones became salurated within three or fournd after two weeks or so the accumulation of unlreated casualties reached wellillion Such .incises irsdacale (hat lhe Soviet* are aware of at leastf the deficiencies of their medical establishment lo copeuclear strike However, we cannot estimate Ihe maximum number of casualties lhat civil defense medical services could Healeneral nuclear aliack.

describing lhe limitations on the abilitySoviet civil defense medical services lo copemassive casualties which would occur inwe conclude that the Soviets would nol be ableall the (reatment requiied although it haspossible to quantify their shortfalls It shouldhowever, that casualties would certainlywhich make it doubtful that the medicalof any modern nation could be adequatetreatment to those requiring il

Providing for the distributionsupplies to an evacuated population inperiod would develop into afor Soviet civil defense planners Asof food, watet, and fuel are exhausted,Soviel transportation system wouldcalled upon lo distribute stockpiles andto lhe surviving population. In general,of the Soviel transport systemon ihose measures taken prlrfr to an attackequipment and personnel Soviet civilhave made preparations to disperseto establish stockpiles of rolling stock,maintenance, and material, to organizeservices and formations inand to protect personnel throughof blast shelters at critical point* in the roadtrjrrsportationvertheof requbrrrsessl* with availableoenplei ptoblern foreven in peacetime, and we have difficultytlie impact on Soviet preparations ofnuclear exchange Therefore.on and com mun leal ions, dislocationand reduction ol supplies andcould posse problems in the postattack period.


ivcn al least several weeks lo build up reserve* and distribute special supplies of food and fud. lhe Soviels could probably provide adequate supplies to sustain the relocated and surviving urban population, but as the weeks progressed supplies would have to be distributed (turn stockpiles and receives in other areas Much ol the inquired transport equipment would

probably survive even in an attackpirparation. but coordination and control problems would limit its utility. Soviet civil defense medical preparations would be unable to cope with the levels of casualties which large-scale nudear attack would inflict on the civilian population. Even if the medical services functioned according to plan, it is likelyarge portion of those injured or affected by radiation would become fatalitiesonth or so

Chapter VII


Tlie likely outcomeudear exchange is largely unknowable Neither we nor the Soviets canrecise assessment of (be overall effectiveness of present civil defensethose planned for completion in the hours, days, or weeksuclearreducing damage or enabling recoveryuclear exchange We can, however, apply quantitative data on dvil defense, drawn ftom evidence of the Soviet program, to the computer models by which measurements are made of tome aspects of the interaction of US and Soviet strategic forces The results of this type of interaction analysis do not conoty the overall effecttoentu of doll defense; they onlij indicate the effects ol some quantifiable features of civil delense on the outcome ol an analysts, assuming other values in the stiategie equation remain constant The results of interaction analysis are used by both the United States and the USSR lo test the adequacy of their strategic forces: thcrelore. the degree to which such results areby civil defense measures is pertinent to both sides' perception of lint strategic balance.

uring Die past year, interaction analyses have born conducted by several agencies to assess the effects of Soviet dvil defense on calculations of the result: of various types of US attacks, ranging from onebolt-(torn the-blue" Soviet attack, wilh all conceivable Soviet defenses assumed to be ready,assive US preemptive altack by fully generated forceselatively low level of Soviet civil defense readiness. The large number of scenario variables resultedide spectrum of possible outcomes, tome indicating lhat Soviet civil dderues could reduce industrial damage and fatalities to very low levels and others suggesting that the Soviet civil defense preparations would make little difference

3 In our interaction analyses to assess the impact of Soviet civil delense we used our latest findings. <utr spot it torn, and estimates of Soviet civil del erne programs and activities andumber of assumptions about the attack scenario and the state of Soviet preparationsthe assumptions used.

analysesange of outcomes The results do.he "most likdy" case, nor do theyet assessment of the probable outcomeassive nuclear exchange between the United States and the USSR. The absolute levels of damage on the USSR shown by our calculations are less Important than lhe relative differences In levels of damage attributable lo varying states of dvil delenseThe results of these analyses are, however, only one measure of civil ddense elfoctiveness Other measures, on which our findings are largely subjective, are ihe effectiveness of the wartime dvil defense organization and its command and control structure, levels of life-sustaining supplies and equipment likely to survive, the capabilities of transport at nm networks to distribute essential supplies and equipment, and the effectiveness of medical services

A. Methodology and Assumptions

4 In our analyses of the effects of Soviet civil ddense preparations on damage to the USSR we made the following assumptionsont case which conveys the more threatening end of the range of possible outcomes that would resultingle spasm attack:

The only US weapons used were those that we calculate wouldassive Soviet counter-force attack against US strategic forcesay-to-day alert posture.

The objectives of the


ere to destroy high-value ry targets In order to minimize Soviet capability to reconstitute the USSKajor power. Specifically, our objectives were to destroyercent of the economic value of industrial Installations in tlie selected target list and to achieve OO-percent damage expectancy against selected military targets. Population was not specifically targeted.

eapons were used in the attack. These included all surviving Minuteman


2 bomber weapons against mililaiy and hardened command and control taiPosei-don weapons were allocs lot against economicorcePolaris.B-III, andbeld in reserve. Forward-based systems were not in- -eluded in Ihe attack

Weapons allocated lo mililary and leadership targets were ground burst whenoeccr.OS'.'e. targets weredeight of burst to achieve maiimum destruction of industrial facilities.

The primary variable in our attack analysis was the level of readiness of Soviet civil defense preparations dependent upon (he time available to make final preparations.

e have made some assumptions which would not likely occur in combination. Soviet efforts lo maximize civil defense preparation* would almost certainly be detected and lead Ihe United States to place Its forces at increased levels of readiness. In addition, llie attack scenario assumes no effort on the part of (he Uniled States lo compensate for Soviet civil defense measures such as retargeting, altering (he height of weapon bursts, protracting the period of the attack, or reducing the number of weapons held in reserve. Moreover, if US forces wereully generated alcrl posture, additional weapons could be used to strike additional targets, to increase the level of damage expectancy, or to compound damage against selected Soviet military and economic targets

6 The interaction analyses were conducted using computer modelsimulate (be results of US attacks on (he USSR. (Seeore detailed explanation of tlse analyses) These analyses Included lhe following steps developmentomprehensive list of Soviet military and economic installations.

allocation oTUS weapons against targets selected "from that list; and optimisation of lhe effects of these weapons against these targets lhe results of this analysis were used in an evaluation of fatality and casually levels produced by the weapon laydown (for prompt nuclear effects aad fallout only) for various Soviet civil defensesingAC moclel' Some of the more common problems associated wilh analyses ol ihii type are as follows;

Tlie iixxkli cmplofid ill analysisiniiiKaloed by the Defense Commoiiitillooommand aniiConlKil Teehnseal Cmlei


^jThc taigot data base employed in our analyses included approii-iniielvercent of the economic valueof the Soviet Unionarger percentage of the economic .value of those industries coruideted strategically most im|>nrtant.

US attack was formulatedaximize damage to Sovie( military and industrial targets, but weapon allocations generated by ihis method do not correspond lo actual US planning. While ihi* attack dees not consider many of (he operational factor* (hat are covered in highly sensitive US plans, it doeseasonable

for evaluating the telative effects of civil defense measures on the levels of casualties which could resultassive nucleai eichange.

damage criteria used for Soviet industry are primarily for Mructural damage and do not fully account for measure* to protect machinery and


everal studies were undertaken in the past yeai which assess in greater detail the local effects of civil defense measures in lhe Kiev and CorTuyhese studies examined such Soviet programs as evacuation, dispersal industrial hardening, and urban sheltersange of US attack scenarios. These analyses are probably more realistic than (heanalyses in (heir treatment of spodfle Soviet civil defense programs. While we did not extrapolate lhe findings fiom studies ol only two relatively small areas to lhe entire country, the results of the studies were consistent wilh (hose of our aggregated analyses of simulated attacks against the USSR

B. Readiness of Soviet Civil Oefense

N lhe amount of time available to implement planned proccduiesritical impact on the readiness ol civil defense measures. In turn, the time available to make preparations would depend on Soviethe perioduclearecision by the USSR whether and to what degree to implement dvil defense plans would be made In con junction with decisions to alter (he readiness posture of its military forces and couldumbci of purposes, such as-.

S attack, lo coerce the Uniled Stales, or to show determination by visible dvil defense preparations.

'riwmuilcuaxupiaUe of nr* output (minufaetoier

viliM filed) and ClfKlal UivnWrneiU

-Tocivil recautionary move made to puiSSlt in ihe


decide to attack the Us

avoid provoking (li, Rata hlock or to avoidttack, by improving Soviet readiness through covert civil defense prcrsarations

alance beiwecn improved readiness and surprise priorlanned attack on lhe United Slates, by undertaking only certain civil defense preparations

9 We have not attempted lo judg* how (he Soviets

T8-nd miscctding when and toefense plans We therefore cannot predict the extenl of Wl preparations based on the lime available for carrying them out. For puip01r3 of auT analvses we have listed below the preparations which we behove ,he Soviets could comply with varvinc-amounts of time The preparations listed are consent hut are not related to any particular Sov.el purpose or prcatlack scenario. We have cale-gomed the preparation periods as lollows: two

yess, limited Preparations; twothree days, moderate prepara-tlons;eek or more, estended preparations.

Minimal Preparations Uwo hours or less)

leaders would be protected by evacuationlace shelters

Ac tors, hose who did not would use in-place or bcsl available sheller.

for the urban population could bebut few would be fully stocked and ready lor occupancy.

-Some rapid shutdownpossible, buthasty narocntng ai industries would take place.

- Military civil defense regimentso designate)ut not augmented tiy reservists.

brat-fed" Preparationsay or lei,)

-Key national leadersarge portion of the lower echelons of leadership would reach


banlhcr lowCi odickm leaders svould Occupy iheir designated urban slsclters.Kinions.Wnii.i| personnel wouldpcrscd and sheltered0 percenthe urban population probably would be accommodated in hardened urban shelters.

' IT"fo ihe urban populaUon.el ftc,q

reatdenees, and otherome of which could be upgraded to provide increased protection.

-.Some prrparaiions fee hasty ha.deningofwould be made and many rapid shuldown measures would be ;jkcn.

-Mililary civil defense regiments could beaugmented and deployed to designaled staiions.

- Other measures ,uch ashelter con-stnscuon.he emergency drstribution o( supplies could be initiated

-Civil defense formations would he alerted and partially mobilized.

Moderate Preparationso three day,)

-The leadership at all levels would have been relocated or otherwise sheltered.

of essential personnel would be completee

major portion of the urban population would have been evacuated and provided with best available shelters in relocation areas (thecopk. so protected would increase rapidly after the, two. although some citiesrequire moreew days to complete evacuation).

o COf the total uibanould be sinliered.

-The qualily ol prelection provided by shelters would be upgraded. boldC cities and in rural areas.

<Ji*ir. but ions of supplies, especially food and water, would be well under way if not


equipment lor individuals could be issued or improviwd.

The shutdown and hardening ot industrial facili-lics would be implemented.

Mililary civil defense regiments and civilian formation* would be fully mobilized

Extended Preparation*eeth or to)

Urban evacuation would be completed

Available shellers could be upgraded andshelters in urban and rural areas could be constructed

The level of emergency stockpiles, theirand their survivability could be improved

The relocation of some selected facilities tolocations could have begun.

C. Effects of US Retaliation Wilh Doy-lc-Day Alert Force

leadership Protect-on

nder most circumstances effective protection fo: (he leadership at all levels could be prov Ided. Withinimal period (or preparation, many lower echelon leader* may not be effectively protected. Those command post* and relocation sites that we identified and located would be vulnerable to US attack. The number of shelters for the leadership clement* described in (hi* paper is to great and their locations so widespread, however, lhat most would survive an attack such as that we have postulated. We assume, moreover, that Use Soviels recognize theof some installations and have madearrangements at least for the top national leaders.

Protection of the Economy

hose measures we have described for the protection of the economy could not prevent massive damage We were able to achieve our goalercent of the economic value of thosein the selected targetaboutercent of the estimated tola) Soviet economic value. Eveneek or so of preparations, evidence of Soviet plans for industrial hardening indicate* thai ihere would be little reduction in the amount of prompt damage to facilities inflicted by blast- The Soviet measures for protecting the work force, critical equipment, and supplies and limiting damage from secondary effects could contributeaintaining and restoringafter an attack. We have not, however, analyzed the Soviet potential for recovery.



he eatent of losses to the populatioo would depend primarily on the time the Soviets bad to prepare for an attack and whether or not they chose to evacuate their urban populationtgure

inimal period of preparation (two hours orassive US atlack could result in casualties from prompt nuclear effect* andof in eaeessillion, including GO million toillion faUhttes

With limited preparationsay or less) the Soviets could reduce the number of fatalitiesoercent. Total casualties would still be in excessillion people, of which the fatalities could be more thanillion.

A moderate period of preparation (two to three days) during which the Soviet civil defense aulliorilir* implemented plans (or evacuation of urban areas could reduce fatalities from the levels cited above to aboulillion loillion. Casualties, including fatalities, could be more thanillion.

preparationeek or more) could further reduce the level of Soviet fatalities and casualties. With lime to complete an uibanfatalities from prompt nuclear effects and fallout could rangeillion toillion people wilh total casualties In excess ofillion.

n general, even partial evacuation of cities could reduce urban fatalities and casualties from an attack against Soviet industrial and mililary tar getv Evacuation alone could reduce the total number of Soviet casualtiesactor of two or three Expedient shelters in rural areas for evacuee* would reduce the expected number of casualties oven further. We have analyzed (he effect* of urban shelters and evacuation on reducing casualties and fatalitiesetaliatory US attack on eosnemie and military targets Under optimum conditions, including time for evacuation, shelter protection for the entire population, and other final preparations, fatalities could range from 5toillion people, with tolal casualties in cuccss ofillion Considering the difficulty of cairying out an expedient shelter programide scale, we do not believe the Soviets could be confident ofeduction in fatalities to such low levels. With urban shelters and evacuation bul withoutshelters in rural areas. Soviet fatalitiesS attackndustrial and military targets could

range fromillion ioillion people Told casualties could be on the order otillion toillion people.

D- Effects of US Retaliation With Generated Force

believe, as do lhe Soviels, that awould most likely occureriodtensions in which both sides recognized aof general war. Under these circumstances,expect US forces lo beully

appreciation of tlie effeelS strikemilitary and industrial targets using ainstead of the day-to-day alert force, is baseddone by other agencies. It is assumed thatnumber of weapons in the generatedwould be used to strike more targets andthe damage expectancy on tlie samewould be struck by the day-to-day alert force.that the increased weight of attack by theforce would increase Soviet casualtiescalculated above depending on the numberof additional targets selected

E. Alternate Options

any variations on the postulated scenarios described above arc possible- For example-.

The Soviets could seek covertly to undertake some of the civil defense preparations described herein, as well as military preparations. In order to achieve an increased level of readiness without alerting the United Slates. Gvil defensecould include readying shelters, positioning supplies, and increasing exercise activity, but would rule out public announcementsarge-scale urban evacuation. The Soviets mightthese preparations either as precautionary measures orecision to attack Ihc United States. The resultsS attack would probably be similar to those postulated under the limited preparations case.

On the other lurid, the Soviets could deliberately delay even covert preparation of Iheir civiliu order better to conceal their Intention touclear exchange or in the belief that such preparations mightuclear war which could still be avoided. In this event, they couldarge portion of llieir leadership, but fatalities and casualties would be similar to

those for the minimal preparation case used in our analyses.

attack scenarios could reduce the potential effectiveness of Soviet civil defenses. The Soviets might decide to carry out civd defenseovertly over an extended period. The United States, (saving been alerted by these activities, could respond by fully generating its strategic forces and target them to optimize both their potential for inflicting industrial damage and Iheir fataitty-producing potential

if the United States engagedrotracted nuclear responseoviet attack, slrikes against cities and economic and military targets could be spread outeriod of weeks or months rather than being concentratedingle exchange. Even after the initial exchange postulated in our base case analyses, the United States would have moreO0 weapons which could be employed in subsequentS force on generated alert could hold many more weapons in reserve The limitations of nuclear weapons exchange models did not permit us to evaluate such scenarios, butattacks optimized to offset Soviet Civil defenses would seriously degrade civil defense efforts.

F. Implications of Inleraelion Analyses for Civil Defense Effectiveness

nteraction analyses provide indications of levels of damage to economic targets and numbers of surviving military forces of the two sides immediatelyuclear exchange. Despite their limitations as measures of lhe overall effectiveness of civil defense, some useful implications can be drawn from such analyses:

To reduce urban casualties significantly Ihewould require Iwo to three days.

Increasing Use number of weapons to raise lhe level of damage to individual military andlargetsdoes not Increase expected casualties significantly unless additional targets are attacked

Measures, to disperse and harden industry which we observed and projected have little effeel on expected damage levelsS altack on economic targets

in US targeting and weaponpolicies could Increase the number of Soviet casualties depicted in our analysisill* effects ol Soviet civil defense

G. Uncertainties

ur interaction analysis and our assessment of the Soviet civil defense program contain largeWhile there arc remaining gaps in ourstanding of the SovieT. civil delense progiam. our collection and research effort of the past two years hasong way toward givingoodof Soviet civil defease jJans and activities. The most critical uncertainties about Soviet civil defenses In post-nuclear-attack recovery operations apply to Soviet as well as US assessments of their effectiveness. Some of (hose uncertainties involve factors that are practically unknowable.

The precise nature and liminguclear attack and how il would occur.

The nature and extent of all the secondary effects of nuclear weapons on people and facilities

Tho aggregate effects, both prompt and longer Icrm,assive attack involving severalnuclear weapons detonatedhort span of time

The reactioni of leaden, tbe military, and the general population under theassive nuclear attack.

e also have uncertainties about some aspects of Soviet civil defense preparations.

The length of lime shelters could be occupied versus the length of time such protection would be icquircd

The actual degree of protection against blast and radlalioti provided by tliese shelters.

The extent to which hasty hardening incisures and rapid shutdown could contribute tosurvival and recovery

Prospectsuccessful nationwide urban evac-

uation, and the length ol lime required to evacuate.

The adequacy of fallout protection and housing for urban evacuees in rural areas.

The prospects lor successfully distributingol food, water, and medicines nationwide.


The survivalnhly of transportation resources and their ability to function in the postattaek period.

The ability of Soviet communications to function effectively in lhe postattaek period.

H. Summary of Effectiveness

Wc have summarized below the findings of our analyses and our judgments about measures ofof Soviet civil defense. Our interactionIndicates at best the magnitude of Soviel casualties and industrial damage immediatelyypo (helical nuclear altack. Out findings largely confirm the highly tentative conclusions in lasl year's IIM

Judging by evidence of Soviet preparations, we conclude that undei optimum conditions with seveial days or more preparations prior to an attack such as that we have hypntlresiicd. Soviet civil defenses would

Assure survivalarge percentage of the leadeiship which would be necessary to maintain control over postattaek operatldns.

Reduce total population casualties to less thanillion).

Contribute lo maintaining and restoringafter an altack bul not prevent massive damage to the economy.

Improve Soviet capabilities to provide medical services, but not assure adequate medicaleven for lhe minimum number of expected casualties.

Improve the prospects of being able to distribute essential supplies to the surviving population

ith minima) time to make final preparations, we estimate that Soviet civil defenses would

ssure survival ol many national and lower les'el leaders, but it would be doubtful that effective control over postattaek operationsaintained

Not prevent extremely high casualties estimated al aboutercent of the lolal population.

Permit adequate medical treatment furery small percent of the casualties.

Reduce the prospects of sustaining the survivors

"il The Soviets clearly view civil defense as on integral part of their military strategy, and they

apparently believe that oonliuued development of their civil defense programs will improve lhe over all military posture ol the USSR. They cannot have confidence, however, in the degree of protection (heir civil defense* would afford them, given the many uncertainties attendantuclear exchange Weno evidence thai the Soviet* have undertaken the developmentrogram that will emlwlden them deliberately toigher risk of nuclear attack.

I, Soviet Porceplioni of Curronl Civil Defenses

he Soviet leaders do not view the effectiveness of civil defense preparations in isolation from other aspects of Iho strategic balance. Theii view of (he effectiveness of civil defense is probably tempered by changes of US strategy.apabilities, and weapon employment policies. They are evidentlythat Iheir civil defenses contribute loto Mice ess in war, and to national survival should detcirencc fall. We do not know what Soviet leaders actually think about how effective iheircivil' defenses would be in carrying ou! their mission. We base our view of their perceptions on thctr writings and statements and on evidence of their mililary and civil defense programs

uring thehe Soviets becameabout how much warninguclear strike would be available. Prior to that lime civil defense planning was based on the Soviel convictionuclear attack would be precedederiod of warning sufficient to make final civilhe Soviet civil defense program ha* been adjusted to take Into account the possibilityuclear attack with little or no warning. However,

Soviet leader* are almost certainly pessimistic about the effectiveness of iheir civil defense* if ihey had. minimal preparation lime. On lhe other hand, they may not believe that nuclear attack with little or no warning is the most likely way nuclear war would begin. If ihey had time to implement their plan. Soviet leaden piobably would be more optimistic about the cifet tivi-new of their civil defenses

espite any uncertain lies, the Soviet leadership considers civil defense to be an Important element of lhe USSR'* overall military strategy. The scope and continuity of theseogether with the result* ol our assessments ol tlie potential effectiveness of the variou* civil defense programs, lead us to conclude that:

Soviets believe lhat their present civilimprove the USSR's ability touclear attack from the Uniled States, enhance their prospect* for longer terra poslnuclear-altack recovery, and contribute to Soviet chances to betronger position than the United Statesuclear exchange.

the same time, however, given the inherent uncertainties and difficult circumstancesostattack environment, the Soviets recognize thai such an exchange wouldrave risk to their existing politicaL economic, and social system.

would expect,inimum, massivedamage lo the economy, including lheof many of iheir most highly valuedaccomplishments. Under worst conditions, ihey would expect massive human casualties as well.



Ovotall Trends

prctjMlions of future dcvelapmenlssubjective, because there Is Insufficientabout the Soviet program on which to basetrends We do know that civil defensereceived varying degrees of attentionSoviet leadership The program receivedin the, and we believe ital the pace lhat has been observed sinceexpect this lo result in further improvementsnext decade.

Protect-on of the leoJerthip

for the protection of (lie leadershipestablished and well advancedarethai this aspect of tbe program will continueattention, with better protection for leaderslevels Soviet planners undoubtedly appreciaterelocation sites and other shclteit for theare likely to become increasinglythe expected growth in Ihe numbers, yields,of US weapons during the nextthe continued growth In the numbersfor leadershipof whichstill be unable to locatefor survival of large numbers of

Protection ol the Economy

for the improvement of measuresthe economy ate mixed. The entire questionprotection requires further sludy.

4 We see little likelihood of any significant change in Ihe overall pattero of industrial dispersal over the neat decade. Even if lhe Soviets were to apply their civil defense criteria rigorously to all new const ruction, tbe change in the overall pattern would be gradual In addilion. the same economic and poll Ileal factors that have driven the pattern of Soviet Industrial develop ment will ulmoil certainly continue lo Isold. This creates strong pressures that are in opposition to the

preferred patternivil actense standpointsigriificantly tk; Scvic's

would have toassive relocation of canting industries, and we doubt tbeyadical move during the next decade, particularly since we believe the Soviets will be con-frontcd^ith Increasing economic difficulties

ndustrial protect .on measures are likely toto be impicmented selectively, giving priority to those laeilities most important to defense production and to recos-ery. We need to learn more about the extent tn which they have already built underground production capacity al existing facilities. ShellerIs expected to keep pace with the construction of new facilities and with the expansion of existing plants Measures to harden structural components and facilities, especially those which could be undertaken as part of new iradustrial construction ormay be more widdy applied than has been tbe case to date. Rapid shutdown methods, with reduced times loi their implementation, arc likely to remain an important aspect ol Ihc program. There are many techniques for hasty hardening which the Soviets could develop for particular categories of industries and types of equipment if they chose lo do so Evidence to date docs not show tbe Soviets moving in this direction. In general, we expect them toon those measures that would have the most effect primarily in easing tho longer term task of reconslitution of the economy.

6 The Soviets have recently placed increasedon organizing and training avusaa civil defense formations, and we eipect this (tend to continue If tt does, the result shouldeneral improvement in the quality of such units and in Soviet postatlark rccovciy capabilities. Wc would expect, however, thai negative attitudes within ilvilian formations and the population generally will be of continuing concern to civil delense authorities We abo eipect somein the training and state of readiness of military civil ddense regiments. While we do not project any major change in the size or composition ol


(otCcs. (here may be additional military civil defense units that we have not yel idcntilicd

n sum, we expect some improvements in the level of protection for tbe economy, but any radical change in In vulnerability to nuclear attack is unlikely We continue to lie unable to quantify tlse level of Soviet preparations in this area, however. To do so wc require additional Information and further analysis

Protection Ol lh* Popolalion

he most significant change in Soviet capabilities is expected to be in the means of protection of thenonessenliil portion of population as well as essential workers. The main improvement probably will be an increase in the ability io provide in-place protection of urban target areas. If the Soviets maintain theirrends of coruimction. the number of in-place shelters would iricrease by roughly two-thirds over the nextears- This would indicate that the current capability to shatter at leastoercent of the urban population would increase lo at leaitohis profcction does not reflect possible shifts in the pace of shelter construction which could be prompted by changes in tbe Sennets'of the range of contingencies against which ihey must plan. For example, they might give less emphasis to shelters in urban areas if the sasmvabilily of US and Soviet strategic forces were such lhat neither sideilitary advantage in striking first. Barring such major changes in the strategic balance, weteady program of improvements to expand shelter protection for residents of urban target areas.

'e estimate, lhat over lhe nextears, the percentage of population sheltered will increase, but the absolute number of people that would have to be evacuated will also increase because of growth in the urban population. To avoid an increase in the number of people to be evacuated, Soviet shekel construction would have to be higher than the rate we have projected Thus, the Soviet leaden' critical problem of deciding wliether lo evacuate, and when lo do so. will' nol change substantially over this period. They may. however, be able to achieve some reduction in the time required to evacuate by incieasing lhe available transportation.

1 Seeur metMology of ealeuliiioru.

Soviet Expectations

here remains lhe question of overall Soviet goals and expectations for dvil defense efforts over lhe neat decade Since wc lack direct evidence on these matters, our conclusions necessarily reflect our general perceptions of Soviet society as well as the extent of our knowledge ol actual Soviot programs andinformation on expressed views of the "eide-ship

oviet expectations for progress in civil defenses over thedecade would be tern pet nl by forecasts about increasing US offensive capabilities, as well as inherent uncertainties aboul civil defenseIn this respect the Soviets have expressed concern over US attention to their dvil defense efforts Tlsey probably expect steady improvement in the effective-nest of their defenses, and may believe that such improvement will be necessary simply to keep pace wilh the increasing power of US offensive forces. We believe the Soviets' goab for their civil defenseover the nextears are

To maintain or improve the already substantial degree of protection afforded to the leadership

To reduce the amount of time necessary to Implement population protection measuies. thereby expanding their options and improving somewhat thdr confidence in the efficacy of these efforts.

To maintain and possibly improve effectiveness of civil defense formations in limiting damage from secondary effects and in carrying out repair and restoration operations

he Soviets* basic goals will continue to be the survival of the Soviet system and recovery from lhe devastation that would be inflicteduclear exchange. The Soviets believe thai those goab are difficult bul by no means impossible to attain It is emphaated. however, lhat they see their dvil defense objective* in relative terms: lhe Soviets seek lo reduce tho consequences of nuclear warfare and to imptom their postattackdo not see any way to prnarnf massive damage.


Annex A



The6 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum entitled Soviet Cloll Defense (NIOstimated that the Soviet civil delense elloit involves0 full-time civilian and military personnel. The report states lhat thisinimum figure which excludes full-time workers al nonmilitary organizations.

A new research effort intended to fill in the known blanks in the previous estimate and to update earlier data indicates that the Soviet civil defense structure includesull-time military and civilian workers. The bulk of the increase reflects

inclusion of civil defense workers whorecounted becauseack oi data. These additional full-time civil defense workers serve al factories, scientific institutes, schools, and publicand enterprises. The remainder or the increase represents adjustments to earlier data.

omparison ol lhe Estimates

old and the new estimates are comparedA-l. (The old data are shown in parentheses.)

C, Methodology

following statements discuss theto derive the manpower data noted in.


Estimated Full-Time Soviet Civil Defense Workers 1




Numhen In parenthesa (old estimates)nclude the adatinliiritive and support personnel cweied

in tlx- new



ata regardingf admiuistraiivr and support personnel employed at ststff organizations are eatremely limited On tbe Isasisingle report which stales that the Riga Municipal Civil Defense Headquarterstall olrofessionals and two clerks, it was decided thatercent would be added to lhe IIM tola! to account lot civilian administrative and support personnel at organizations where it is kiuwti that these additional workers should be added.

Staff. There is no basis (or changing the IIM estimateilitary personnel at ihis level Tlie numberollective "beston the part of the IIM working group and is reasonable Fifty civilian administrative and support personnel have been added reflecting theercent factor noted aboveotalull-time dvil defense workers at the national civil defense headquarters.

Republic Staffs. One report gave Iho manning al the Armenian SSR civil defense headquarters at Yerevanilitary personnel andivilians. These figures were used for allepublics and are assumed to include staff and administrative personnel

Oblast Staffs. There it only one known report on oblast dvil defense manpower: the Magadan Oblast dvil defense staff was authorizedlots as ofecause itata point, however, it was used in our estimate to extrapolate to the other MB oblasts, krays, and autonomous republics. This resultsotal manning figure at thb level. On lhe basts of another report, this number was divided evenlycivilian and military personnel

City Staff: Full-time civil dderue personnel at city and urban settlement staffs are estimated0 While evidence was scant, five human source reports provided tbe basis for our estimatehows the number of Soviet cities and urbanas ofhe estimated number of full-time civil defense workers per dty in each size giouplng. and the estimated total number of military and civilian civil defense workers.

ftnvon Staffs. Based on six reports, an average of iwo military and dght civilian civil ddense workers, including administrative and support person-nd. are estimated to be employed full time at each ofrbaningle report stated that the Maloyaroslavets Rayon has three retired military officers oi full-time civil defense workers. This figure was used as the average for rural rayon staffs and resultsotal0 full time dvil defense workers, including administrative and suppoilat this level The total personnel figures for allandestimated to0 civilianilitaiy.

MA lory Units

IL Military District Headquarters. Theestimate for military district headquarters was increased byivilian workers to account for five civilian administrative and support personnel al each of theistrict headquarters (again reflectingofpercent factor).

ivil Defense Tmop Units, Troop unitestimates were increased byreflecting the addition ofivil defense regiments to an earlier total ofnd an increase in estimated average manning. Thirty-nine docu-

Full-Time Soviet Civil Defense Workers in Cilies and Urban Are:

Number el full-TimeFull-timeWoden Per Ciiy Orlcnseot



menl* were used in lhe analysis underlying these revisions.

ommunication*he manpowerfor communications troops was increasedn the bastseport which slates that the cornmunicalions unit al the headquarter* ot* lheSSR includeseople Thissed lor allepublics

r4onm*lory OgoniiotKWS

TMof full-time civil defense workers per factory, school, or public service unitunction of the size of each oiganixalion. Human source reportsiversity of opinion regarding lhe minimum size, of an Installation in order for it toull-lime civil defense staff. Analysis ol tliese data indicates that there is at least one full-time civil defense worker for each plant havingmployees; that these full-time workers have part-time assistants, and that part-time civil defense winters serve alone in some smaller installation* This analysis provided the basis for Ihe estimates of the total number of full-lime civil defense workers'In nonmilitary organizations.

he0 factories in tbe USSR were separated Into categories according to work force size. The following tabulation shows this breakdown by number of factories according to data found in Sarodnoue Khotyayituo SSSfl (USSREconomy)3 In addition, an estimate of the number of full time civil defense worker* at each factoryotal figure are given

atio of approximately one civil defense worker forndustrial worker*.

chools and Public Service Units. This ratio of one civil defense workerndustrial woik-ers was applied to organization* in the following tabulation on the basis of the knowledge that they include full-time civil defense workers and on the assumption that these workers exist in the same ratio a* at industrial plants.


Number ofcd Number Worken Per ol Full-Tune Civil Oigarb ration Defense Workers

Scientific institutes (deluding schools)



aad higher educational institutes

Slafli of Kale and


agencies and todies, administrative bodies of cooperative and public organinHoiu

Housing, public otthtks. and everyday services to

ihe pubue


Toul lull-time civilian defense workers at ichooll and publicUO ill

Sim ol lhe Week Force

of Faetooea

cf Fult-Trme Civil Defense Worked Per Factory




and above

ull-time civil defense workers, divided by0 industrial worker* in the Soviet Union,

With tlse exception of about half the civil defense workers atare estimated to be militaryabove classes of civil defense personnel are estimated to consist entirely of civilians Human source reports state that these workers arc either retired military personnel assigned to theseor that they arc employees of the organizations it hose duties consist entirely of civil-defense-related siork

n combination, lhe preceding methodologies support an aggregate estimate, which is detailed in.ull-lime civil defense workers, of0 are military personnel0 are civilians.

t Ij


Annex 8


The Dala Baio of civil defense measuresoviet industrial plants selected Iromey recovery industries andlant, from five military-refaled industrial categories were conducted over the past yearly

categories and summary icsulti arc given in lar^slM

first column ofists itlc number ofa mined within each category. The second column indicate* the total number of such Plants in the USSH[_

nUB the third column lists the fraction of total capacity included in the sample.'

3 The Ian three columns ofresent the overall results of the survey the number of shelters identified, available total floorspace in these shelters, and the estimated square meters of shelter area per crisis wotker' Thb estimate was obtained using twc-thi.dt of the shelter aiea calculated from the exteriorhe Usi column ofists the square meters of shelter area per worker. Thb number is the ratio of the total available shelter aiea lor those plants sampled within each caiegory to the total estimated crbis work force.

'"'WifJcu. bul. far ihc nut pan

o. IndiieW IT?1 u,

l Ik.rrooDuioru


hall the em-wiedUwc-acfc

* TViWlw

f w


t fnrmm at iV riinv

i 15

B.rtiikinsm on thehe available data impose several limitations and restrictions on the use andon of the estimates

The imprecision in (he eslimalcs of the available shelter area and the ctisis work foice. while unavoidable, clearly limils the stiength of the inferences lo be drawn



problem will .esull in an underesTimaiion of the Soviet civil defense effort.

of time and manpower constraints lhe number of plantsmall within 'each category. Thb lessens the degree of confidencecan be placed on the estimates of cM defense activity at all plants in those caiegccies in the USSR

For some calegones, the sampled plants are. reptesertlative of the totality of all such plants inUSSR Forample of only large plantsarticular category will bias any projections made to all such planu, if the siteelated lo the presence and level of civil defense activity.

from the sampled plants can be made only for the industrial categories used in the survcv and only (or those plants listed//

limitations reduce Ihe usable keyu it co-ery categories fromornd military related oalegoriea from five to three.

C. Pcreentooe of Crisis Work force ihe estimated percentage of the crisis work force which could behe .dent died shelters, Iwo different cccupancyquare meter per

Survey ol 17 Key Soviet Recovery Induinlri











Katkint ot .he Ii uVen by life luppcel

Survey of Five Soviel Military-Re la led Induitries

Mu.ll. production



No ol






rlooopaee (nq eifloi)'





Unl Uea




by Uc tuppoet equiprornt aw) wpplin.

'Calculatedcl cruu

c* oTiheher)hud of thellm


Shelter Capacity al Selected Economic Recovery Planli

Nantber ol Pllntl bv Fnrri*cuuorce


OSnxir an

an occupancy tactotquare meter or more per worker is used thenre*lessercent) which could accommodate the entire crisis work force

6 Combining all the key recovery industrialfor which there i* sufficientis,utverage available shelter area per crisis worker4 *quarc meter. Thus, it is estimated tlmt for those categories,ercent of all crisis worker* would be shelteredquare meter per worker.sercent of all crisis workers would be sheltered If the occupancy factorquare meter per wr-tker. These eslimates do not take into consideration the unknown numbereasonable geographic distancelant. Estimates including such shelter* would, of course, result in an increase in the above percentages

of Totol Shelter Area for ADan Industrial Category

f the key economic recoveryis possible to estimate, within confidence bounds,shelter area for all plants of that category inThe best eslimates and the upper andbasedpercent confidence boundsin. One of the more disturbingthis analysis, however, is tlie large variance ofpopulation estimates. Often the upperconfidenceore than Iwlec theUSSR total' Hence, most conclusions basedsample should lie considered tentative.

of Plants Within EachHave At Least One Shelter

l the key economic recoveryis possible lo estimate the number of plantscategory thai have al Inst one shelter (seeBecause of lhe small sample sires, ibe. confidence

Tho* coaftdmc* immk reftart only UW arm due lo hmsv ptotg. notouW una TW u> tn*

n prcbabl, Uif*

bound* on these estimates are large. However,acrossfiut>cs,stimated thatercent oflant* in lhe USSR in theseategories have at least onetatisticalof these data indicate* therepercent certainly lhat the true proportion lies betweenercent andercent.

three nf tlse military-related industrialsampled.lhe percentage of plantsercent, moderately but significantly abovekey economic recovery categories.

F. Soviet Strategy for Constructing Shellers at Industrial Plants

In addition to estimating quantitative measures of Soviet civil defense activity, the dala have been analyzed in an attempt lo identify those factors which might aid in explaining th* Soviet program forshelters al industrial plants

One of lhehat plants which have been constructed or upended8 are more likely lo have shelter* than plants for whichor capansion occurredithinndustrial categories.ercent of Ihe plantsajorxpansion have at least one shelter. Of those older plant*ajornlyercent have at least one shelter. This difference is statistically significant, and reflect* the Soviet policy of requiring that civil defense shelters be included in new conslructlon.

nother finding is ihal the Soviets tendlarger pbntj more than smaller one*,islant whose capacity falls25

its category. Acrossategories,ercent ofthe "large" plant* have at least one shelter, while onlyercent of the imaller plant* have al least one sheltei ThU difference is abo stalbairaliy significant. Oirnbin ing these Iwo analyses,ercent of those plants that an- brge" -thipansion have at least one shelter Alternatively, onlyercent of the plants


Avaibblc Shelter Areai.miir of Hants Wilh Al Least Potndustrial Categories






Iron and ileal Utge*




WieW Bound.


ol Number ol rhw.Shrlie.










ofrratw aplrfmn ' j)

arc small wilh noxparision were found lo have al least one shelter.

wo additional statistical analyses were ton duciod lo determine if any differences in civil defense activity among industrial categories and acrossregions of lhe USSR could be due lo sampling error alone. Using total shelter area as the measure of civil defense activity, only the chemical industryignificantly higher average shelter area.

n order lo examine for differences across goo graphic regions in lhe USSR, the country was divided inlo sia regions obtained by combining the ISof Ihe USSR The sample plants were

then allocated to the sia regionsest wai made for dlffeiences in average shelter area among the regions. There was no statistically significantfound and thus there does not appear to be any gross regional effect in civil defense activity atplants.

he overall results of lhe analyses of live data on Soviel industries indicate that within key economic recovery and mililary installations, thereroad and comprehensive civil defense shelter program These installations, however, representortion of the entire Soviet economy. This (actoted when considering the estimates presented in this report.



Annex C



This annexethodology forthe percentage of the Soviet urbanhat can be sheltered by civil defense personnelSome of the limitations and restrictions imposed on the estimates by the available data are also discussed'

Because of limitations on the survey data, only IS Soviet cities were used to make protections to the USSIthole. Theities and associated survey results are given in. Under the assumption that theities are representative ol all cities in the USSR wilh over lOO.tXK) population and that all die shelters actually present at each city have beenin the surveys, it is estimated that approximatelyercent of the Soviet urban population could be sheltered by personnel shelters using an occupancy factor'quare meter per person. Under the same assumptions,percent confidence bounds based on this estimate are that the true percentage protected liesndercent.square-meter occupancy factor is used, the estimate isercentpercenl confidence boundsndercent.

here are. however, several indications that the assumptions underlying these estimates andbounds are not valid. For example, theities may not be representative of all cities in lhe USSR with regard to such faclor* a* population, economic considerations, and geographic location. In fact, theities were not chosen randomly. In addition, the actual numbei of shelters and, thus, the total shelter area in theities arc most likely larger than the figures given inecause of new information on basement shelters acquired after some surveys had been finished.

' Urban population is defined lo be iheUvine in cities olersons

Shellei "occupancy factors"buedod often qiiocnl in Soviel publications and by human touted

It is nol possible Io quantitatively assess the effects of Ihe missing shelters and the unreprescnta-tivencss of theities on the estimates andbounds obtained- Certainly, one implication of the unidentified shelter problem is thatixed occupancy factor the percentage estimate is higher and the confidence bounds are wider than those given if the assumptions staled are correct.

The choice of the occupancy factor itself greatly influences the percentage estimates. For example, if the average occupancy factor is closer loquare meters per person, then the estimated percentage of population sheltered dropsercenl.

B. Estimates of Percentage of Population Sheltered

The objective of this analysis is to estimate lhe total civil defense shelter capacity of all cil its* in the Soviet Union withopulation. Theor lotal number of people sheltered canerivedpecified shelter occupancy factor (forquare meter per person) and the latest Soviet population estimates

The shelter capacity estimates are obtained by scaling up informalion derived from theegional studies lo lhe populationhole. However, thetc ate several problems wilh the data obtained from these studies. For example, onlyf theurveys provided eslimates of the area of the shelters delected.

8 After considering problems such as the above.ities ofopulation were selected fiom theegional studiesasis for estimating civil defense shelter capacity for the Soviet Unionhole. These cities with relevant survey results arc listed in. The cities are listed in the first column in order of6 population figures. The total shelters arc the actual number of shelters identified by the surveys The available shelter area is the interior measurement of the shelters. The available










ol* ihttten for

non net, ilnce

know lhal

en oy bit support equipment ind mppuet Alquaie meter perquat, metci per person

' Staled up estimate (or entire eHy.

area for Khabarovsk, Ulan-Ude. and Nabereih-nyye Chelny was obtained by scaling up the available area figures given for the fraction of the city surveyed

9 Odessa is the only city included that did not have an estimate of the available shelter area, since the Odessa regional survey did not include she estimates of the shelters. Thus, the estimate of available shelter area lor Odessa was obtained by deriving aIxlween shelter area and numbers of indentiftcd shelters. The methodology lor this estimate is discussed inhelter area estimate foi the city of Novosibirsk would abo have been included, but i! was not possible to obtain sheller counts for city alone as dblincl from the given counts for the entire oblasl.

The last column ofontains estimates of the percentage of each city's population sheltered Two estimates aie given, oneiquare-ineler-per-person occupancy factorquare-meter-pet-person factor. There Is considerablein theangingercent at Ufa toercent at Nahcrerhnyye Chelnyquare meter per person).

In order to estimate the percentage olthcltcicd for all citiesopulation in the Soviet Union, it is necessary to assume thai theseities are represent alive of all such cities in the

country For ci ample, such factors as population si/.e. economic distribution of Industry (lor eiampir. heavy industry versus agriculture) and geographic location may all be important in determining the eilent of Soviet civil defense activitypecific cily This assumption and its implications on the estimates are discussed inelow

f theities are Indeed representative, then one method for estimating the overall population fraction sheltered it to use the ratio of lhe total available sheller area at theities tcr the total population. Thb estimatequare meter perhus, this approach yields an estimate that II percent of the Soviet urban population can now be protected (orercentquare meter perpercent confidence bounds on thb estimate. umphng error atone it lhat the actual percentagelndercentquate meter perhese confidence bounds do not take into coniideration such factors as the est una lion errors in seating up available shelter area, estimating thearea, errors in the sire estimates of the shelters, unidentified shelters at each of the cities, and any bias due lo ihe umepresentaliveness of theilies Thus. Use real confidervrc bounds of the est imale may be considerably larger lltan those given due to sampling


alone. These problem) are discussed further below

n alternative approach to estimating tlieof population protected allow* the assumption of representative net* of theities to be dropped. However, it does require an additional assumption lhat the available shelter area for any city bea constant proportion of it* population. That is. that the percentage of people *hcltcrcd remain*but the absolute number of people *heltered would vary Area and populationeach plottedogarithmic scale If the assumption of constant proportionality is correct, the points on this log-log scale should lie approsimatelytraight line Theoints exhibit an increasing trend, allhough there is considerable variability. Using Ihe method of leasi squares, il is possible lo test for constantand lo obtain the best fitting curve through theoints.esulttallsiical teal, (he assumption of constant proportionally cannot be rejected and. hence, there appeal* lo be no evidence lhat the proportion ol the population protected increases wilh population. The best fitting line correspondsonstant proportionhus, using Ihts approach, the estimate of the percentage of population sheltered isercentquare meter perhis corresponds very well (within the error of estimation due to sampling error) with the ratio estimate of II percent discussed earlier.

C. Assumptions ond Caveats lo lhe ArtcJyui

H In the previous section, estimates were obtained for the percentage ol the total Soviet urban population sheltered by civil defense personneln the discussion of the estimates, several assumptions and restrictions concerning thr data were discussed The purpose of this *cclion is to further cmphaslic the importance and implications of these and other factors that impact on lhe inlerpretatlon and use of the estimates.

tainty doea nol appear lo be the case wilh this shelter analysis Theegions selected to be surveyed were not selected randomly Irom all possible regions, since there was considerable tobjective bias in theirAi discussed earlier, theities used to derive lhe estimates were *eleeted isotiraridomly and were chosen on the basi* of completeness of information The IS cities appear lo be either in the high orclasses of populationelative to the population distribution of ctlies for the whole country. Medium-site0illion) are perhaps underre-presentcd in the sample

he validity ol tlie point estimate andbound* for lhe ratio estimate (shelter area to population) depend heavily on llie randomnessThe agreement of lhe least squares estimate with the ratio eslimate add* credibility to the point estimate given, bul without the assumptionpercent confidence bounds given are not realistic and it is not pnstible to determine non-trivial bounds on the true percentage

s discussed earlier, the shelter area for four of theities had lo be estimated. Thus, the variability in the final estimates is increased and would further widen lhe confidence bounds on lhe true percentages

Mrostee-neerf o* Shatter Ai*o

here is error introduced by lhe inexactness and iricoetsislency of rneasuring both the eiiersor and/or interior of detected shelters. Thb error will have little effect on the point estimates, if there is no consistent bias eilher lo always overestimate orshelter area

verve is ofities

IS. The validity of statistical estimates such as those given above dependsarge extent nn howlhe sample is relative to the population of elements from which the sample was selected In statistical terms, this means ensuring that the sample is randomly selected. This Implies, in the problem under

discussion, that each Soviet city with astill may be uisdiscov-

greaterHOGhance (sometimes an equal ered shelters in the surveyed cities. Il is nol iwssible chance) of being selected for the sample Iriis cer- to estimate lhe extent of this. However, il appcare


realistic to conclude that live cslimatcs given above are most likely lower tlian the true percentages.

D. Mothoaolooy

his iccfion discusses the statisticaland includes some ol the numerical calculations used in the earlier sections of this report. These Include the ratio estimator and the least squares estimator of the percentage of uiban population protected.

The ratio estimator Is defined as

s the estimated fraction of populationa, is the available shelter area ofIrom) and p, is5 population of cily t. Fromr approximatelyercent of the population can be protected. Thepercent confidence bounds on this estimatesampling error alone are obtained from W. C. Cochran's book' as


Sp, is the average population.

Thus, thepeiccnl confidence boundsrThus, the boundsndercentquare meter per


he least squares cslimale of the percentage protected was obtained by fitting the model

a( and p, arc as defined above.ndre constants to be estimated, and e,andom error termfthen the model implies that shelter areaonstant percentage of population as measured by the proportion ft, then shelter area is not proportional to population, but perhaps to some powerpulation, forr

he constantsndan be estimated by fitting the transformed model


by least squares. That is. .using the sheller area nnd population figures forf Uie cilies inexcludinghe estimatesre determined by minimizing the sum of squares


2 llogtaJ-log'W-rS.logtppr-

The estimates obtained arc*


The estimate ofs not significantly different fromhus, the best fitting model is:



Thus,nd the least squares estimate is lhat approximatelyercent of the population can be protectedquare meter per person.

ontains an estimate of the shelter area for Odessa. The estimate0 square meters falls within the range of three different estlmaling procedures discussed below. Substituting any other value in this range0 would not alter any of the conclusions reached In thb report. This approach is Imprecise, but the range of estimates is not large enough to significantly affect the analyses conducted using Odessa.

Gxhren. W. C. Sampler TettinUpvt. fohn

$mnc- blanket

Annex D



This annex summarizes the assumptions,and conclusions ol ihe eilects ol Soviet civil defense measures described In. Themodels used were developed by lite Department of Defense and Its contractors. They were modified and calibrated by members ol tlie InteragencyCroup for the purpose of estimating population damageomprehensive US altack against the Soviet Union. The assumptions in all cases are those of the Interagency Croup and not those of theof Defense or its contractors.

The interaction analysis consisted of threeparts: the designypothetical US attack; an allocation of US weapons to Soviet targets, tracking predetermined levels of damage; and an assessment of population casualties and fatalities. We deliberately selected an attack lhal would test the population protection measures ol the Soviet civil defenseunder conservative assumptions in order to establish boundaries that could then be evaluated for sensitivity of results. We did not attempt to construct our analysisplausible" scenario. cr_athat matched more or less likely attacks)


B. Atlock Designs and Assumptions Obfrx lives

3 The lundarnental assumption was lhat the United Stales would not attack lust, but instead would be attacking in retaliationoviet strike We, therefore, did not assume that US foicesattack Soviet ICBM silos. We did not degrade US attacking forces for possible effects ol Soviet strategic defenses Trteteiore, attrition of US forces was limited only by probabilities of arrivals for US weapons as used by US planners for current forces In our analysis wea substantial reserve of

'irially. the Soviet


population was not specifically targeted Casually figures were derived from the effects of weapons detonated on military and economic targets with no regard in the aiming of those weapons lor population casualty effects.


The required leveb of damage for both military and economic targets was initially0 percent For military targets the valuearget was assumed to be unity for eacheapon was assumed lo haveercent ol the target il the damage effects of the weapon covered Ihe target The value of economic targets usedombinalion of replacement cost and the manufacturing value added of an installs!ion's product. However, required leveb ol damage were applied to the aggregate ol installations in the target list rather than lo each installation Thus, some targets were theoreticallyentirely while others theoretically could have escaped with liltle damage so long as ihc overall level of damage of each industrial category met required levAir

After an initial trial ol the weapon allocation model, it was determined thatpetcenl damage level for economic value would be more appropriate than theercent originally set- Ashows, an oO-percent damage level roughly approximates that point on the damage curve beyond which thereecreasing marginal return in value destroyed lor each target added to the list The targris -erein ihe list by order of economic importance so that weapons would be allocated against high-value tatgeis first

6 Owing to the dissimilar value systems used for mililary and economic targets, for convensence in conducting the analysis we broke down tlie USattack into Iwo waves. The first wave was against military targets; the second against economic targets The model assessed collateral damage to ecO-

Ordored Distribution of Value for Soviet bcoiiomic Taigols

Num&ef ol Economic Taroots (in Usousanfls) Toial3

The increase in value of da-nsordbto-ii to diminish beyondillion pon Ihii curve. Thli corresponds io Kiglttyeonomfc targtu.

installationsesult of the military attack as well as damage to military targetsonsequence of the economic attack.

eapons were used in the economic attackn the military attack. Ashows, tho weapons assigned to economic targets weie alls, while those used against military targetsombination of gravity bombs, SUAMs, and the surviving Minuteman forces. Welleapons were held In reserve. These numbers were determined to be within ihe limits of ihose survivingypothetical Soviel counter-force attack against calendar8 US forces on day-to-day alert.

lightly modified NUCWAVE' model was used to allocate weapons and assess nonpopulation damage. This model was able to achieve the required level of damage with the focus described inbovehow the damage response curves for various categories of military targets. The most striking features of these curves are 'he relative ease with which submarine bases were likely to be damaged and the relative difficulty the model had in destroying coinmunication facilities. The "missile" curve refers to Intermediate-range and

This model was developed and is mainUinod bj iho Oilk* ol the AsCsUrrt Secretary of Dofenw, Pre*rami Analysis and Ev aluitlon.


Cornpfchetaive Attack Damage Response Curves (Probabilily)

Probabiily ol Opens

" CuvvlUvePO


Number ol Weapons Used

KaaMffli dun

range missiles targeted or located with other target) Leadership targets were military command facilities and (acililies known to be associated with the Soviet national command authority.

heodel was used to assess population damage This model assesses damage from blast (overpressure) initial radiation and fallout overvels of protection against all these ctlecls are assumed to remain constant throughout theay period. The SIDAC model was run several limes in order to assess the elfocts of assigning various levels ol

TVu modelndby rhr tHtiee of ihe AuUUn' Seeieury ol Deiecue. riopMni AmlniiEv.lull Ion


hardness and protection factors to urban centers rural areas.

he population evacuated from urban areas was distributed uniformly throughout inhabited rural areas according lo the following criteria: no one was lo be moved moreiles; no evacuation toareas was to take place: and only cities larger0 population were to be evacuated When evacuation was modeled, we assumed lhatercent ol lhe population of Ihe affected cities would be moved, tlie otherercent would remain in shelters We followed Soviet planning criteria inosting ratio for the evacuated population. However, that part of the Soviet plans which calls for evacuation

along iiiiin! traiispoitatloit routes was nol followed. Instead, the population was dirtributedii 'i. center to all adjacent cells, so long as those celU were populated before thewas modeled

amage in urban areas was assumed tooint function of the distribution of peopleoint according to theystem of population density, and the oveilapping cf(eels of the weapons bursting in that area. The evacuated and ruralwas assumed to be located in the geometric centerell measuringyinute*ide. Fallout or blast elfects covering the center point generated casualties according to the intensity of effect* and the number of people assigned to the point. Theof radiation effects across the Soviet Union are shown In.

omposite of March winds for each cell was used for population damage assessment since these

were thought to be most representative in terms of eipected casualties and fatalities. The lerxeaenutive-nes* of those wind patterns was determined by(he SIDAC model (or average wind pattern* of each month while holding blast protection equal to that piovidcdultistory concrete reinforced building and fallout protection equal toopulation damage effect*unction of varying wind patterns for every month of the ycoi are *hown in figure DO.

Population Damage Astctsmenf

ase case and eight eieursions were selected for study in assessing fatalities and casualties. The variable* were protective factors, hardness of shelter, and whether urban evacuation was assumed lo have taken place Protection facto"ere. corresponding roughly to the shelter affordedreestanding frame buildingeliberate shelter.

RacUatJon Levels On Evacuated Soviel PopulationOO-ad raosatior,


hardness for the rural population was oi.Miird to be equal lo lhat affordedultistory concrete reinforcedresistanceounds per square inch)percent damage. Urban population was assumed to bepcrcenl evacuated or not al all Hardnesses (or lhe sheltered portion of lhe population were assumed lo besi)0 psi) depending on whether ihey were assumed to be in deliberate Ot in expedient shelters. Assignment of lhe above variaMns for Ihe nine cases were as shown in

n estimating casualties and fatalities (or dtfler-cnt periods of Soviet civil defense preparation, we used four of the nine case* shown innd



he base case was chosen to represent tlie minimal preparation period. In this case, the overall prelection factor assigned isural population isardness ofnd no evacuation is assumed to have taken place.

I represents tho limiledIn this case,ercent of the urbanassumed to have taken sheltei in blast sheltersassumed to be hardened0

average of the lowest and highest figures that our

study ol blast shelters revealed.

3 represents the rnodcrate preparation

period In this case.ercent ol Ihc urban population is assumed to be evacuated. In other respects this case ii tlie tame as case |.

-cccritr '

Expeciod Casualtiesunction ol typical Monthly Winds*

tyieefod CeauSUes On melons)

100 -


Ciy Wind

ase SUrnrnaries

ropuliIMn Siroetuie







relet! lo multistory concrete reiuloreod buOJutp of nindud SovietEL relen to.hciW

EVAC menu liut theXP telers la eipedieeit tbebeo


A substantial body of open-source literature is available on Soviet civil defense aiai related wai

survival subjects. This iVouOgrapiiyefcu:

en sources based on (he following criteria

a, Documents published in lhe USSR duringyear.

b The intrinsic value of each documents corn en Is

o The coverage of representative subjects within the broad field of dvil defense.

all of the documents included inhave been translated intosources in the Russian languageso that those readers interested inresearch of Soviet disaster preparednessappropriate, initial, open-source data base

following selected books are arrangedorder by date of publication,the oldest

Defense Is Everyone's fob (Graihdanskayaiennrodrioye

. Gulfuclear-Mutile Warfare (Crathdanskayaaketno-Yademoyoscow:

hat One Must Know Aboul Carrying Out Rescue and Emergency Repair Work in Areas of Nuclear Destruction {Chto Nadoedeniieotlosh-nykh AcanynoVosstanootteTnykkchage Yademogooscow:8

rom MPVO to Civil Defense fOtrathdanskoyoscow:

rotection of Ihe Population From Radioactive Fallout {Tashchtta Naseleniya at Radioakttvnukh Osadkov) Moscow: Atomlrdat. l'>VJ


* ImH I

rotection of the Population is lhe Principal Task of Civil Defense (Tashchila XaseUntya- Ciavnaya Zadacha Crathdanskoyoscow: Press

ivil Defense (Grazhdanskayaoscow: Vysshaya

, Protection Against Weapons of Massive Destruction {Tashchlta ot Orvzhtya Massovogooscow:1

Lysenko. AN. Clod Defense Ezercise* for the Fifth Crade {'tanyaiiya po Gratliderakoya Pyotomoscow;

Kim merer. Yumergency Work on Public Service Networks in Areas of Nuclear Detiruc-lion (Avariynyye Raboty na Kommunalnyklichage Yademogo porasheniue) Moscow2

Krechclnlkov.iW Defense at Machine-Toot Plants (Graihdanskaya Oborona no Mashinos-trxnlrCnykh PrrdpriyaHyakh)2

, Radiation Shelters in Rural Areas (Protitoradiatsionnyyeet'skoyoscow-2

Akirnov. Nl, Civil Defense at Agricultural(Grazhdanikaya Oborona na Ob'yektakh Set' skokhoiycystvennogo Proisvodstoa) Mciscow;

Dalayev, AS, Flrefighting at National Economic Installationsuclear Environmentosharami naod no goslotxyskh Yademogo Porasheniyay Moscow:

he Use of National Eamomic Equipment for Decontamination Purposes (Ispofsot-aniyc Tekhntkt Narodnogo Kho-lyaystit Dtya Tseley Obesoruthlvaniya).: .


jinerrinj; Approaches to Protection Againsl Modem Means of Dfitruc-tlon (Itizhenrrnyyc Meroprlyallya Zashchtia ot Sovremyennykh Sredsto Porashcniya) Moscow. Voycnlrdat.

Goryelov. UL, Medical Assurance and Protection of the Population in Areas of Massive DeMruc-Hon [MeditiinskayaashchUachagakh MassotvgoMoscow:4

. People and Affain of Ctoi! Defenseeta Crathdanskoyoscow

rotection of tlie Population From Weapons of Massive Destruction {Tjuhchtia Nasclentya ot Oruzhlya MassavogoTashkent:

Mikhno.estoration of Destroyed Facililies (Vosstanootenlye Resnahennykhoscow VoycfUBJat.4

ooperation of DOSAAF Committees With Civil Defense Staffs (Sodeystvtye Komite-too DOSAAF Shlabam CrasJusanskoyoscow.

. Civil Defense at an Industrial Installation (GratJidanskaya Oborona Promysh-lennogooscow:

Kozaclsok.ioll Defense Yesterday end Today 'Crashdanskayt Oborona Veheraoscow:

Krotkov. FC. The Medical Service of Ctotl Defense {Meditsinskaya Sluslda Crathdanskoy Qborony). editsina,

Unknown Author,eryone Should Knou? and Re Able To Do (Eta Dotthenmetoscow:

Zelensky, KP. Instruction* to lhe Rural Populace on Protecting Animals From Weapons of Mas-

sive Destruction {Pamyatka SeTskomu Naselyen-iyu po Zashchite Zhioolnykh ol Oruxhiya Masso-vogo Porashmiya) Moscow;

lod Defense Formations In Action Against Natural Disasters IFormirovantya Ctashdanskayor'be so Stikhlynymi Bedsloiuaml) Moscow

ivil Defense {llraihdamkayaoscow:

Yegorov, Ciott Defense (Grasndatukaya

oscow: Vysshaya. Actional soutces include:

a. Newspapers in: Itvestiya Literary Gaiette Pravda Red Star Socialist Industry Soviet Palnot . Trud

b. Journals in Russianommunist of the Armed Forces Mililary Historical Journal Military Knouiedge New Time* Soviet Military Review

c Soviet encyclopedias:

Soviet Military Encyclopedia,

77ur OeoT Soviet Encyclopedia,

d. Journalistic reports:

Foreign Broadcast Information Service Joint Publxatsoos Research Service Radio Liberty Reports

C Intelligence reports:

Central Intelligence Agency intdligence reports

Department o( Delcrue intelligence rcporls


Original document.

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