II. arno: Rosenberg]
A file in the Prague archives on Julius Rosenberg, executed in the United States3 for espio- n behalf of the Soviet Union. It had been gathered emarkable revelation,say tvo American historians who dealt with thecaoo.
matter is extremely delicate. It lend, itself too readily to manipulation of every tort. And besides, it's not in my field. I pecialist in Crcohhistory. an tellnow about the history of thenow nothing about American history."
This was the first response of historian and Crech conmunistKarel KapUn (PANORAMA'sarried the first instalment of Kaplan's recollections on Stalin and his decision toar in Europe), when, during one of many conversations in his -little apartment in Munich, where he now lives with his wife, VJlma, the name Rosenberg cane up.
It was the PANORAMA correspondent who first-mentioned thef the American couple, both committed communists, vho wereto death3 for atomic espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. There was talk of the political trials ir.during the years8 during the Stslinist era, and the Rosenbergs vcre cited as an example of political trials on the other side of the wall. "Maybe there is something in the Prague archives that relates to this,aid Kaplan, who knows those archives ss no one else can. He is in fact one of the very few peoplefive or six in allwho had free ac-ceac to those fileshole year, fromS to What does Kaplan know about the Rosenberg case? It was not easy to get him to tell.
Karelh an internationola Pfarty official8S, then expelled likeDubcek's people, at the time of the Prague
consultant for historical sciences to the Central Conmittee of the Czech CP, was, in that spring given an assignment of extreme delicacy nnd cnoroiOus political importance to Cxjcho-slovakia by his top superiors in the Party 1 to write thehistviy of the political trials, the story of how the dream"ocialist Czechoslovakia had been turned into tragedy.
Already thoroughly fr.miliar with tho history of tho trials, in which he was concerned bothistorian andolitician3 onward, Knplan foii'id himself suJdenly given complete
freedom, along with his colleagues, examine ten* of thousands of potentially explosive documents, on which no one had everbeen permitted to lay hands. They contained damagingnot only against Czech leaders like former PresidentCottwald and his son-in-law, former Defense Minister Alcxel Copicka, but laid serious charges against the Soviet Union
"The name of Rcscnbcrg was one of many that passed before myaplan says. But that was notas looking for. ausedomc.it becauseemembered what thecase hid meant to us, aplan recalls.
Tho answers Kaplan and his colleagues were looking for, gatheredypewritten pages, never saw the light of day. Theknown as the Pillcr report (Janember of tho Central Com-nittee Presidium, was responsible for laboras until now remained secret: in theondensed version of it was published, the only segments to slip through the meshes of the Party until now.
The Soviet invasion of8 and Dubcek's replacement 8later with the present Party secretary general and Custav Husak, was wljat prevented publication of the report. As PANORAMA readers could see for themselves from the historical essay in our last issue, both the Soviets and Czechs had good reasons to keep the report under wraps.
After much insistence, Kaplan agreediscussion of thecaue with two American professors invited to Munich by PANORAMA. They were David Kennedy of Stanford University inpecialisth centuryolitical and Allen Keinstein of Smith College, in Massachusetts, vho brought suit to obtain most of the FBI files on thecase and isook about it. The discussion took placeunich hotel onarch. In mid-Apiil, met with Kaplan again. Shortly thereafter someleaks passed across tho Atlantic and give an inaccurate picture of the information on the Rosenbcre case in Karelpossession.
PANORAMA: It may well be impossible to talk about the Rosenberg case withoutit emotional, pro or con. Believing or not believing in the innocence of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg is in factatter of faith than of concrete legal proof. It was so, according to rr.an> of tho scholars who have dealt with the matter, even for the judc.es who decided the fate of the two "Hy your betrayal you have changed tho course of history to the detriment of youraid Judge Irving K. Kaufman from-the bench where he presided over the court. Theso vcre high-sounding phrases, but, accordingot ot people, they only thinlyack of solid facts on vhichsc the harsh sent encu.
' Go .
KEKhEDYi That'- true. Itighly political trial Yollkeep in mind thatublic opinion vas strongly oriented, after the experience of var and victory, toward ato the isolationism of the 'thirties. Let the rest of thearticularly Europe, stew in its own juice, was the attitude of the average American during those years. President harry Trur-an, Secretary of State George C. Marshall and his'sue ccssor. Dean Acheson, decidod on the contrary to takeead ing role in world politics. Hence you had, first of all, he tough talk of the Truman Doctrine, astutely designed to scare the American electorate to death. Then there was the political manipulation of some court cases, those of Alger Hiss and the Roscnbercs above all, for political purposes. These vere not trumped-up trials, but even so they helped awakenopinion to what the group then running things in Washington then considered the cotjnunist peril.
KAPLAN: You might perhaps say that even In the United States there vere those who played the political role created inby Public Prosecutor Josef Urvalek, the prosecuting attorney in the Rudolf SIsnaky trial.
KENNEDY: Certainly, even though the overall situation in the two countries was different. America, right after the war,rief period of euphoria. We had von. We had th. atom bomb. We were the strongest of all, ve were all-powerful.
Then9 came the shock of the coup d'etat in Prague. And, before the year was out, the Russians exploded their first atom bocb, andittle while later, in thehe Korean War broke out. The American dreanasting peace guaranteed by American omnipotence was shattered. Tho people were asking why and, as often happens, the easiest and mostBrtKver vas: find the traitors. It was the old, old explanation of history as the doing of conspirators. Look for the traitors! And this soon became the warhorse of thewho vcre in the opposition at the time. That was how wc got tothe charge of treason levelled against the entire Democratic Party, vhich had been in power for almostninterrupted years. The Rosenberg case has to be looked at in this context.
PANORAMA: Afterear's of impassioned debate between those vho think the Rosenbergs vere innocent and thoso vho think they vere guity, do you know anything new about -the Rosenberg case?
VEIKSTEIK: Not much so far, since all' tho investigations have been concentrated, not en the caso per se, but on the trial ond on the very harsh sentence which vas, to say tho least, an But almost nobody has dug into all tho things that happened prior to the trial, or into hov the FBI happened, in it;
hunt for epics who may haveo pick on Julius andwg? o the USSR,
PANORAMA: Crantcd that tho trial1
prevailing political climate, therojsnanswered question: wereuilty or
WEIKSTEIN: No historian can makeUd-c
a sentence. That is what the courts are for. msjorla^
PANORAMA: are there additional pieces of evidence ofthoso introduced at the
WEIKSTEIN: Incredible though it may seen, the FBI had evidence that would have been of greot help to the prosecution, and did not use it. for example, etter seized on0 in the house of David Grcenglass and written by Crcenglass's wifo. Ruth, to Grcenglass while he was workingeehanic at the secret nuclear Base at Los Alamos in new Mexico, where they build the bombs that were dropped on Japan.
ergeant "in the army, knew absolutely nothing as to what the piocee he was making under the direction of thewere to be used for, nor did he know the reason for all the secrecy that surrounded the base. it was his brother-in-law Julius Rosenberg who explained it to him: "Julio (that's what everybody in the family called him) was here and told me what you arc probably workingrote Ruth Creonglass to heron Well, the prosecution would certai.-ly *iave scored some heavy points by asking Julius Rosenberg how ln the world ha happened to know, ecret no otherknew, with the exceptionew dozen people in
PANORAMA: Why in the world wasn't the letter produced and placed in evidence by the prosecution?
WEIKSTEIN: That is one of the many mysteries surrounding the Rosenberg case. hall explain it in my book. I'd like to ask Professor kaplan now if he has anything to tell us. After all, we are in the same boat": ave had access tosecret documents through a lawsuit under American law, and he has had the same kind of access thanks to the particular straits in nhish his country found itself
PASORAMA: Professor Kaplan, now that you don't like to talk about this matter. But you must be aware of the historicalof your testimony. up until now, in fact, allabout tlic Rosenberg cose has come from American, or at loawt from Western sources.
KAPLAN: ave already said, the Rosenberg case is very it is not my specialty, "andnow aboutearnt by chance* Anyway, there is in tho archives of the Centralof the Coaimunist Tarty inile on Julius set up prior Tho file isolder whichains notes and details relating to an intelligence notvork set tp by the Czech secret services in the United States
PANORAMA. What does rll that meant
KAPLANt ouldn't say for sure. as never directly concerned with the Rosenberg case, norave foreseenonto that particular file during my researchowever,as interested in the intelligence network set up by the Prague secret services in the United Statesas looking into it in connection with the Field case, which was Indeed of great importance in shedding broad daylight on thetrials),an offer some theories.
The fact that this file exists may mean either that the Czechs were indeed ln contact with Julius, or that they wanted to make contact with him. And here again it is impossible to makebased on guesswork.
PANORAMA: father that proof, what we have here are strongto support one point: Julius Rosenberg was known to the Prague secret services even before he became, following his arrest lnrotagonist in tho dramas played out on tho front pages of every newspaper in the world.
KAPLAN: Certainly, even though what is in the Prague archives does not constitute proof that Rosenbergpy for
PANORAMA: At this point, thoush, there are some things to clear up. The Rosenbergs were found guilty on charges of spying for tho USSR during the period when David Grocnglass was at Los Ala-Bios, that is,4 And at that time the SVAB Intelligence agency was not yet active in the United States, since it was not founded Forthcrmore, during the trial, in March of there was talk of contacts between Juliusand Soviet diplomat Anatoly Yakovlev, but never any mention of Czech agents.
WEIKSTEIN: Julius Rosenberg began passing information to theat the beginning of the war. Minor stuff, petty industrial espionage. It should be emphasized furtl-.crmore that the United' States and the Soviet Union were allies theno-quarter warism and fascism. And that Julius Rosenberg and his wife (Ethel's role in this whole business has yet to be clearedight perfectly well have felt that he wasuasi' legal action. The USSR then vas In fact no longer merely the one country to have nd opted the political Idcoloary in which he but was also COCVfltcderculean ci'fort o shoulder with the United States.
And then, intoife of JuJJus Rosenberg, vho was certainlypy on the level of Rudolf Abel, reat ivent, one destined to change his existence totally, and tragically: by one of those imponderable and perhaps random decisions ofcommands, hie brother-in-law, David Creenglass, was sent to Los Alamos. Suddenly, In the eyes of hi* Soviet friends, btcamc an important personage. Maybe he even thought so himself. Anyway, there is nothing to indicate that Julius, once the war was over, ceased his activities as an informer, and it ls quite possible that he had contacts with Czech agents as well.
PANORAMA! But why did the Soviets have to use/caeehshey had maintainrd direct contact for atears, so they could perfectly well have continued them.
KAPLAN: The.entire system set up by the Czech secret service In the United States had, as one of Its principal aims, to provide aid and support for the Soviet apy system. Czechoslovakia stilloalitxon government, vas stillommunist country, and so its diplomats were not nearly so closely watched, in the United States or elsewhere, as were the Soviets.
The Czech roleo been to stand in for their Soviet col- -leagues In making certain contacts, or tc provide local agents with tha funds required for operations. Itollaboration between Prague and Moscow that wont beyond the area of action of the intelligence services. Nor is It even certain that thlawas imposed by Moscow. Quite the contrary. For many Czechs during those years, it vas what you mightoint of honor to help the Soviets in their battles on the international level.
VEINS1EIN: The contact between Julius Rorcnberg and the Czech services in America explains one point in the Rosenberg affair that has hithertoystery: why in the world, according to the testlnony five* at the trial byGrccnglass, would Julius Rosenberg have told his brother-in-law, ino flee to Mexico and froai there,topover in Switzerland or Sweden, to head for Czechoslovakia? In Prague, according to his testimony at the trial, Crcenglass was to get in touch with ambassador.
PANORAMA: This sheds light on one detail of the affair. But, on the vho,le, does the document Professor Kaplan saw in theexplain what in many vays ls still tho mystery of the Rosenbergs, or doesn't it? Does it tell is whether thewere guilty, or not? m
WFXKF/ElKi The proof that the Prague intelligence people knew Rosenberg prior to his Arrestery important dimension to the luihappy affair, one which none of those who have been looking
into the case, whether they leaned toward innocence or njllt had dreamed they would have to take into Consideration. And' for that matter, it should have been impossible, working as we do with Vestcrn material only.
ust layremise. The new revelation Dr. Kaplan has imparted to us and which we believe because ve have no reason to doubt his word, obviously does not change thenegative judgment we have formed as to the imposition of the death sentence. Having saidhould like to remind JJ" <fcJat *hccase left two great questions unanswered! aid the Rosenbergs really pass info.-matlon to the Soviets, Iwere they actually guilt of treason? Was the information really Important?
PAXOKAXA: The majority of scientists questioned on thatthat it vas not. Basically, It consisted offron memoryergeant whose scholastic record wasbut
JCNXEDY: Be that-as it may, the answer to the secondhighly technical. Asc first question, though, asthey were guilty or innocent, it seems clear to meProfessor Kaplan has told us confirms the theory shared (and, epeat, quite independently of any opinion astrial), that the Rosenrcrgs were indeed involved inUSSR. As 1 sea it, in the present state of our know-
lrdge of the case, thisevolution of the utmost Importance.
VtUSfBXXl hould like to add that lt is not possible now, and perhaps Itil- be possible to know exactly what thedid. ould also emphasize the point that you have to distinguish between the guilt of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and the unbelievable and cruel death sentence. But, having saidhould like to say thatave learned fromKaplan, as to whose intellectual honesty there can be no doubt whatever, ls of extraordinary historical significence.
The Rosenberg case is linked vith the history of the atomic bomb, vith the sense of safety which the possession of the terrible new weapon gave the American public for several years, and with the sense of loss that struck them vhen the United States' treat rival, the Soviet Onion, exploded its first nuclear device in the fall Only treason on the part. communists and Infiltration of Soviet spies in America, many Americans be-lie*-od, ove given the Russians the atomic secret. And that is how the hunt for the traitors bcyan.
ritish scientist Klaus Fuchs, who had worked on theora bomb at Losasforpe. Fuchs confessed.
Wheeling, West Virginia,ebruary loio- _
Senator, Joseph McCarthy, for tho first
"communism" and -treason" againstfficials. Overnight, McCarthy, Depart-
ment case, to be baseless! became*"
Philadelphia, FBI agents arrested Harry Cold,hemist, vho confessed to having worked vith Fuchs in atomic espionage for the USSR.
New York,avid Creenglass, mechanic, aLos Alamos during the var, charged with having passedto Coldas arrested. Shortly"told vhat he
.Nev York, The FBI arrested Greenglass's brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg, achine-shop owner, vho had been fired5 from an army desk job because heommunist.
J?ew York,ugust: Julius Rosenberg's wife, Ethel, Creenglass' sister, vas arrested.
Laredo, Texas,ugust: Escorted to the border by the Mexican police, Mortonniversity classmate of Julius Rosenberg's, was arrested.
New York, The trial of Rosenberg and Morton on charges of atomic spying for tho USSR. The events date back to the days vhen. and the USSR vcre allies against nazism, but the climate now is very different, and the charge is pitiless. "Their loyalty went not to our country, but tosaid prosecuting attorney Irving Saypol in his summation to tho jury. David Creenglass accused Julius of persuading him to pass along atomic secrets at Losold admitted again having picked up intelligence from Fuchs and Grcenglass. The charges said that the intelligence was pissed on to SovietAnatoly YakovJcv. Emanuel Bloch, the Rosenbergs' defense counselawyer for the CPerica, argued that theagainst his clients, unlike those against Cold andverinvalid.
5 Judge Irvin R. Kaufman pronounced the deathon Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Morton Sobell gotears. All three protested their innocence.
Cor-nJttees for the Rosenbergs* defense vere formed. More than inhere the earlier Alger Hiss case had somcvlut sated the public's interest, the pro-innocence campaign built up in Europe.
The death sentence was confirmed on appeal.
Attorney Bloch, aa American law allows, tried to persuade Judge Kaufman to reduce the sentence. Why didn't the Rosenbergs plead guilty, andighter sentence? loch explained to theeep down in their hearts they believe they are innocent."
Two Kobcl Prize-winners, Harold Urcy and Albert Einstein, ask clemency for the Rosenbergs. The pro-innocencewas still growing.
For the third time, the Supreme Court, despiteopinions from two of the justices, refused to hear tho case.
"Once again we solemnly declare ourrote the Rosenbergsetter asking for clemency fromDwight D. Eisenhower. onfession could save them from the electric chair. elephone line was kept open in the prison in caseast-minute clemency decision.
Having refused to make any confession, thedied in the electric chair, while in Washington, London, Paris, Rome, and Stockholm silently weeping crowds mourned their passing. They faced the end, wrote the KEW YORK TIMES, omposurc that astonished all present."
Almost 24 years have gone by since that day, but the Rosenberg dase, the aiost controversial of all the postwar espionage cases, itill enthralls and touches people all over the world. There have been countless pleaseview of the trial. 1 vindicate us," said Ethel Rosenberg before she died. "lherote the American weeklyittle while ago, "lie in an uneasy grave."
PART IV: REVELATIONS FROM CSSR ARCHIVES (conclusion)
Triple Play for Stalin, by Xarcl Kaplan]
[loxtj The whole truth about the Fiold Caae. Washington charged him with spying for the Soviet Union. The
Soviets were trying to make him confess ho wasing for Allen Dullus. Actually, hoool in Stalin's hands, used to unleash one of the most passive purges in the communist world.
Heecret agent, but who was he working for? He was used in tho most cynical possible wayigantic political game. But by whom? Tho Americans or the Soviets?
Forears, now, these questions about tho incredible affair. diplomataviland Field, who disappeared in Prague9 and surfacedears later, in Budapest,waiting for an answer. Nobody has been able to como up vith the answers until now. So impenetrable was the cloud of dust andkicked up around Field thatustot ofin Washington wore accusing him of spying for the USSR, over in Budapest tho secret service and Soviet agents were usingto make him confess that hepecial agent for Allen Dulles, the Crey Eminence of American espionage.
Numerous inquiries cameead end. Two books about the affair, one by FloraEW YORK TIMES reporter, entitled "Red Fawn: The Story of Koel and one by BritishStewartperation Splinter, came to diametrically opposite conclusions: he was an Ignorant tool in Soviet handt, according to Flora Lewis,isturbing element used by Allen Dulles to put an end toolitical careers of Eastern European conmunist le.dcrs, according to Steven.
. Karel Kaplan, the historian and former communist leader whoS had access to tho cecrct archives of the Czech CP (PANORAMAnow has the final word about the Field case. It was the Soviets, says Kaplan, vho made use of that idealistic and some- hat ingenuous American, and who transformed an intellectualentle eyeenerousyed-in-thc-wool communist who had worked for the Moscow secret services during the 'thirties, into the number one prosecution witnesswithout his knowledgein the dreadful political trials that transpired93 in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland., and Bulgaria.
Itellish pirn, one in which Stalinersonal hand, and one "which worked perfectly.
The Kremlin's aim9 was the foil and absoluteSoviet power in all of Eastern Europe. To do this,to break with his own eonmunist ruling class, and replace itmore pliable
Field knew almost all the communist leaders, whom he had helped during the war when they were fleeing to escape Hitler's po**ce. The plan the Soviet secret serviceup vith, despite its cruel cynicisn, was little short ofass Field off as an American spy, in direct contact with Dulles, andhimisthundreds of names. Every naneeath sentence pinned to it.
f,US-vh2 wefc workin* on thereport on thetrials anecalls Kaplan, who for th<T
n liv*ne in Munich, "shedding light on
the Field case was of the utmost importance: it would have enabled usore crucial bit of evidence to prove that thewas wholly responsible for the deaths and persecution of thousands of sincere communists."
.thecase' wnose finings were publishedage study originally attached to tho Pillor 1
report (Study noy the working group prepared for theCommission of the Central Committee) several details came to light in connection vith Alger Hiss, one of Field', friendsolleague at the State Department in Washington, whoound guilty of espionage when he was triedndetition for review of his case.
Karel Kaplan's two preceeding articles, one on Stalin and 6ne onand the discussions of the Rosenberg case haveup and commented upon in the press all over the world. on hoel Field, which Kaplan wrote on the basis of thehe examined in the secret archives in Prague, is thethe aeries written by the Czech historian: orld-widefor PANORAMA
'"Duringorths he was held they tried everyonzech secret police chief Karcl Svab reported from Budapest in9 directly to President Klceicnt Cottwald. "But no matter vhat they did to him, he confessed nothin- that was not already known."
lhe object of all this attention, both from his torturers in the Hungarian police and from two very hish-ra:,kinS Czech officials,year-old American couxtunist, tall, thin, intellectual-looking. ypical American, cordial, kind, onderful pmilc. lie voulc* look youn the eye in open and iricndly wa>. That'se is remembered many years later by
the tenants of the apartment building in Marseilles where he was living
His name, Noel Haviland Field, never attracted iho notoriety of his friend and colleague, Alger Hiss, or the tragic renown, in connectionhameful trialruel death sentence, of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. And yet, strange though it may seen, to someone who has never dug deep into tho records of thecases of the immediate postwar years and of the political trials toward the end of the 'forties, the case of Xool Field, his wife llcrta, and her brother Hermann,rucial role in the history of the Soviet bloc. Born of tho cold war, it helped to fuel and Inflame the conflict between the tvo rival superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.
In the summert was not only two very high Czechlike Cottwald and Svab who were interested in Field. From the Kremlin, Stalin himself was following developments day by day, determined, vith his secret service, to exploit the American idealist to set up the hideous machinccry for political trials of the Eastern European communist leaders and to show everybody, especially those party members who might have notions aboutfrcm Moscow, vho vas really boss east of tho Elbe.
Just hav,ng known Field, even years before, for thousands ofHungarian, Bulgarian, Chechoslovakian, Polish, and Eastcommunists, meant arrest, torture, long prison sentences and. In many cases, death.
But vho vas Noel Field? Was heangerous American agentirect line to Allen Dulles, head of American espionage In Europe during Worlds Moscow wanted people to believe? To find out, and to understand the political and police aiacjiincry . om the very beginning, determined the course of the whole affair, ve have to goew steps, and see Noel Fieldthft crisis in his life as an active Ancrican communist, when the outbreak of the cold var,?s, shook his world to its foundations and drove him, unknowingly, straight into the trap set for hia by the Soviet secret service.
- It hadong, cold, winter and, early in April, it was still snowing on the mountains around Lake Geneva. Noel Field spent long hours pondering his future, thinkingover tho war years and their horrors and their greatnd turning over and over in his mind the menacing unknowns of the present.
By now he had time to think. ew months earlier, in the board of the Unitarian Service Committee hod informed himfron Boston that he vas no longer head of tho AmericanChurch Rescue Mission, set up in Europe at the outbreak of tho war to succor the victims of fascism.
Enthusiastic antff edicatcd, convinced thetT *fcs wasotumanitarian ideal, and wbll supplied with funds. Field had transfoimcd the USC into one of the most imporr ta.it aid centersar-torn continent. But in the spring8 there was no longer any room in tho organisation for aintellectual who stood accused by those who had escaped from the clutches of the Gestapo, of always giving precedence to the communists.
To Fiold, the loss of his job was the final bit of proof, if he had needed any more, of the endrnaa he and many otherAmerican intellectuals had cherished for years 1 that oftho wartime alliance between tho United States and the Soviet Unionolid and lasting friendship in the name of freedom and progress for the people.
onsiderable debt of gratitude which,not overlook. .
What to do? Field had to decide, inhether to stay in Western Europe and lookob as correspondent for some American newspaper, or to go through what the former British Prime Minister, Churchill,ears before dubbed tho Iron Curtain, and settle in one of the new socialist countries. There he had many friends, whom he had aided during the war.with every kind of assistance, with money and introductions into allied circles in Europe, could perhaps repay those favors somehow. The Soviets themselves owed him Field was sure, they would
The fact was thatears,3oel Field,oung diplomat who had signed on in the State Department6 as deputy vico consul to the Western European Office, had collaborated with the Kremlin's intelligence services. Hishad had nothing to do with greed for money or cynicalto his own country's interests, but stemmed from hisrooted ln3 decision of the "leftist"of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to recognize the Bolshevikof the USSR, that the United States and the Soviet Unionommon mission to save the world from the abyss into which Capitalism and the imperialism of the European powers were driving it. In those months, the USSRrowing admiration in Noel Field, so great as to move him to approve its political,and economic objectives as well as the concrete steps of oviet policy throughout the world.
Ko was supported in those convictions3 hy several friends whom Field and his wife, Herts,young-German womantrong and determined character, bound to her husband"by tics not only of deep affection, but by shared political ideas, had met in Washington, foremost amonc these friends were Hcdc and Paultwo Gcrr.anfascists who hadairsbrcodth escape from the Fiihrer's bloodhounds, and Algerrilliant young attorney who worked for the Agriculture Department.
Q - O
After leaving Germany, the Massing* had done'a lot of traveling, and they had more than ideological tics with Moscow. In America* where llcde Massing arrivedollowed shortly thereafter by her husband, theypecific secret mission to perform for tho USSR intelligence service: they were to recruit-sources in Washington among politicians and bureaucrats. They also helped recruit fiold. This has been described inbooks, including Hcdc Massing's own "This Documents in the Czech archives conform this. Alger Kiss, by now about to be transferred to the Statewhere he was towift and brilliant career, as was shown during his triallready had relations with the Soviet security services.
The Massings did not know Hiss. It was Field who introduced them, inviting them all to dinner at his house in the springccording to what Hpdc Massing testifiedhen she had already abjured communism, at that dinner party thero wasittle verbal clash between her and Hiss, since both of them wanted to get exclusive rights to Field's collaboration (this oplsode is recounted in Massing's book). The two intelligence notworks, the one Hiss was ln contact with and the one the Mas-sings vcre setting up, were in fact keenly interested in theumcnts on American foreign polucy vhich Field, once his initial fear ond reluctance had been overcome (at first he vould mcrsly pass on verbal summaries of the material that'came across hisas beginning to supply to them.
6 Field decided to leave tho United States andtate Department official,t the League of Nations in Geneva. The post offered to Field in Geneva Was in the disarmament section, and one vhich, tho "idealisticas convinced, would help to drive away the gathering storm clouds of another war.
In Geneva, the Fields settledovely house. Villa La Chotte, In the little town of Vandocuvres just outside the city. Inwiss city Field was put in touchew representative of the Soviet security agency, and began to work vith him. That did not last long, however, because the agent quarreled with theand was liquidated. Not long after that, inop agent in Soviet militarycncral Walter Kri-Vitsky, made contact with Field and invited the American diplomat to come to Paris. According to the general, this trip, called for onew hours' notice, vas necessary because one of the top men in the Soviot intelligence service had defected, andhad to be done (other sources say it was to be actualeliminationEd.). Krivitsky and Field reached agreement on the overall operation, and then tho general put Field touch vith on agent who explained to the diplomat what his role was to be. But on unforeseen event, whichto have future coriiin Field's relations vith^_cancelled the whole
business- Krivit.ky himself defected to thc^iLrlcanin his roommell Washington
The plan to get rid of the traitor, of course, was out In the ooen
another agent to get in touch with Fieldi the fairly murky role
adncvcntsy So called for prudence. Some people in Moscow In ihH
Field might have helped Krivitaky delect? '
That Field was nevertheless quite uninvolvcd in the whole thinr
heard^?vStorakCdfry thC faCt that erta Ug^t-
li tr:ip toas tourists. Had he had
Sinlv J? Sir? WitDField would cer
n CnraBh Mtointo the very den of the Kremlin's secret service.
Soviet capital, the Fields Mf.ii.
the; their heJP' "c" tried Party' and thl*ho ^uceeodld, ember, but only
pecial affiliate run directly by the Comintern, the
ionale, and kept secret, even from'tSe -leaders of ths American CP. flic Soviets in factnterest
and for that reason they had instituted secret membership, via the Comintern, some time before During that stay in Moicow,assword vith which he could identify the Soviet agent who would be sent to renew contact with hire.
l* rc*urnG"eva, the league of nations shut-up derinfi ln theclimate of war. Earlv an the spring9 Hitler invaded and dissolved the State ofs. Noel's brother, Hermann Field, whoondon,
he British Trust,'a humanitarian oT'
ganization that managed to save hundreds of Czechs fpoa thcof the Gestapo. 1 Noel and his wife Horta, too,?finl*;ri;ln Service Committee (whosenthusiastically into tho work of succor-
For Field, this was the beginningong period of frenzied
onstantly between France and Switzerland and "
in th,^IfaCt Mvarious proups
" .strussle. He made contact with-the leaders of communist and antifascist groups all over Europe, particularly with the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians,-and Germans. Field did not want to be confinedupporting role, but longed to be on the tront lines in thongnlnsL Hitler.
He considered it altogether natural and in harmony with Soviet foreign policy to carry on the gathering cf intelligence about the political, economic, and military situation in the nazi-occu-pied territories and to pass on that intelligence to anypower that might indicate Interest in having it. ho would have preferred to work with the Soviets,'but that direct link seemed to have been severed, at least for the time/ being. oscow agent had turned up, with thepassword, He had asked whether Field was still disposed to collaborate and, upon receiving an affirmative.reply, ordered the American diplomat to drawetailed report on his meeting vith Krivitsky and on his own activities over the past several years. Field hesitatedoment in agreeing to the collaboration or in doing vhat had been asked of him. When he handed in the report ho vaa told to wait for further contact, but he waited in vain.
While the Soviets di'd not seem particularly interested in Field's offer ofegree of interest in the intelligence collected by the hundreds of people Field had known as director of the USC was manifested by the American intelligence services, the OSS (Office for Strategicredecessor of theCIA, whose Berne office vas run during tho var by Allen Dulles, vho later became director of the CIA. Field sent them some information, data of at best limited importance and helpful only in the military struggle against Nazism.
Tovard the end of the var Field also went to Parisecora-ne.idation from Dulles, intending to seterman Anti-fascists Committee for Eastern Europe. The suggestion, as recounted by American historian Arthur Meyer Schlcsinger,oung corporal in the Paris OSS, did not arouse much enthusiasm; the idea was to set up an organism vhich, relying mainly on refugees, vould gather intelligence of all kinds about Germany and about the territories-still occupied by the Germans. So theears of the war passed in constant traveling from one refugee Camp to another, visits to hospitals, and growing hopes for tho final victory of theascists forces.
The Letter to Dulles
Inuring the final wocks of the conflict, Field did .something destined, ew years, to change his existence totally and to subject him to unimaginable trials. Of itself, it was innocuous enough: etter asking that backing be given Tibor Szcnvi ungarian anti-fascists and communist who was later to die on the gallows when the Stalinist trials hit his country. The letter was addressed to somebody vith whom it was quitein those days, evenor.imunist like Field, to have Allen Dulles. To make sure Dulles got it. Field gave the letterwiss acquaintance, togetherovering note "Dear Sir? nclose the letter for Mr. Dulles which Ithis morning. . Field."
PSC aid to the victims of fascism did not end with- -
Jield, vho had alwaysmone the antifascists his organization helped, continued to do -so. In some tastcra European countries, ro even managed toommunist onto the DSC board. In Czechoslovakia, for ,
ictiv^whrtilint bj Gcjnaeteran cor^st Mdaken part in the October Revolution in Russia, tit fDe ffo Providc Field with information as to
social situation. Pavlik had reported
Dothfiirand Villima wtTlShthe Czech Communist '
Party, both of whom told him to go right ahead vith It.
Broodlotelythe war, and still .in contact* European communist leaderahip croups. Field was able to meet
CF, among them Arthur tondon, the future deputy foreignone of the three acquitted among then trial in the*nd Otto Kosta, both high ranking officials *
an the Ministry of Information.
i^nth^aCF<Vi5ytn* . wo have
r/ ition to the
thero'"other more urgent at the endll American sojourn permits for Europe lapsed. In order to be able to stay in Ewopeworkm was Faeld'B intention, youew Americanourn permit, which was hard to get nowot of stories about Field's CP membership were beginning to circulate inor else youew sojourn permit for ono of tho new Eastern countries. What to do?
snd with tho *rrlval in Switzerland inith an invitation to come to Czechoslovakiarize for fll he had done during the war, of Klinger and Kcsta. Field, delighted at the prospect, accepted the invitationonth later leftengthy visit to Prague and Warsaw. His objective: toojourn permit andob.
lie hoped to get all this without difficulty in the East. Hehe rounds of friends he had made during tho war, all of them nowdown important jobs. He considered,eginning,downhile in Prague andook for Western readers about the people's democracies. He had already begun fathering the necessary data.
Among the people Field saw in Prague was Vilcmember of 'OCnl>cr of parliament, ond editor-in-chief of RIT1ERudolf Margolius, who9 was to be named deputy minis-tcr,rorcipn Trade and2 vis to climb the scaffold with Rudolf Sl/msky, Karel Markus, Alice Kohnovo, and Gircl* Kischovn. Allhim letters of recommendationojourn permit.
viet security people.
In Poland, too. Field asked his old friends for help. Hewith Jakub Berman, ember of the Politburo, inintelligence, and then thean in Poland. Derm anto help him. In September he contacted Leo Bauer, anofficial in the German CP, who ttVt him word from EastPieli had helped to escape to Mexico
Party would be no obstacles to his joining the
Id October andhe so-called "intelligence sector" (Evidencnif the general secretariat of the Czech CP, headed by Svab. gathered information about Field. To do this. Svab's men turned to the American's friends and acquaintance*,all of whom had nothing but good things to say about him. Somebody even camo up with the letter sent on8 to Ccmindcr from tho central office of the Unified Party of East Germany (SEl>), signed not only by Marker but also by another top party leader, Franz Dahlem, asking that American communist Field be granted permission to stay temporarily in Czechoslovakia.
During that name period Svab topped A. Jandus, of the "party section, to tail Field. Jandusoman,ember Of the CP, who knew Field voll, and from her he found out that Field "for his book, needed to make the acquaintance of somoof the opposition." That there were already some suspicions about Field, perhaps stemming from this very eagcrncs Of hisct representatives of an opposit ion'which, since th coup d'etat of, no longer officially existed, is evidenced in the report drafted later, in Junehen Field had already been arrested. "Our prudence in dealing with Field has provedaid the report, "in light of the copyighly interesting letter found in Pavlik's safe-deposit box (Pavlik-rolitzer was arrested later, at the time of the Slansky trialEo.) The letter is addresser to 'Dear Leo* (probably Leo BauerEd.). Field confided to Leo that he had pulled all he strings he could tozech sojourn permit, and complained that even so, he had not succeeded." (Froa the Archives of the Czech CP Central Committee, Files from the Interior)
In any .case, whether they actually had some dcubts about Fieldhether, after they had arrested him, they were trying to show that thoy had had, the wen of Svab's section, in Octoberame out in favor of granting the sojourn permit, thcroatch: Field would first have to answer boro questions pjt to him by tho secret police. It vas on thisthat Field told the Pranuc Intelligence peopleout his paj-l
from tho transcript
with somebody from the Moscow intelligence headquarters. At this point, however, the Prague intelligence people, who had beer,to enlist Field as one of their own agents, lost all interest in him. They were not about to get into competition with their Soviet colleagues and snatch an agent away from them.
zerland to settle his residence in the new
I affirs there before establishing permanent people's democracies of the East.
Meanwhile several things of extreme importance to the future of Noel Field and that of his wife, Ilerta, had been happening. About some of them, which were headlined in all the papers. Field was completely aware. About others, planned in deep secrecy by the espionage headquarters of the Eastern countries, he was completely
The upshot of the questioningeport from the regionalpolice official of the Prague section, in which it wasthat N. Field has socialist ideas.* The date of the report is Shortly thereafter Fieldisa validthe following May, and immediately left for France and Svit-
in the dark.
months before he got his visa from the Czech authorities, while he was staying in Warsaw inield had found out that the Massings had testified before the.House Un-American Activities Co-nmittcc, having meanwhile abjured communism end ser vercd all ties with the Soviet Union. Field, although there was no formal evidence to support it, was sure that the Massings, in their depositions, had mentioned him, too, and in fact this strong suspicion had spurred him to even greater efforts to obtain .the; longed-for sojourn permit from some Eastern-country. Thosoonths after the alarming news about the Massing testimony, tho American press had informed Field of anotherevent involving him: onctober, in fact, the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE had published the news that the HUAC had released the so-called Chambers deposition,age document including, in addition to accusations lodged against American corrtunists hv ex-enmnr and journalist Whittaker Chambers, an additional early deposition from the Massings. Thtn, in December, Chambers produced further documents which he had had in his possession for years,howed that during the 'Thirties there had been two groups ofagents operating inside the State Department, one headed by Alger Hiss, the other by Noel Field. Clearly, this increased Field's insecurity and convinced himif indeed he needed that he could never return to the United States. And vhen he refused the official summons to return to America, where the Congressional investigating committee wanted to question him, that road vas cut off forever. Ho oven considered, as he said later under questioning by the Hungarian police, the possibility thot the American police night try toim or silence him
The actual attack, though, cane fron another quarter, from the quarter he had served, not from the ono ho waa working against. "
The Czech secret police had begun to take an interest in Field, who bode fair toood agent in future, back in Apriloro or less ot the same time when Kosta and Klinger, unaware of the secret service plans, had gone to Switzerland to invite Field to Czechoslovakia.
The Prague secret services were looking for collaboratorscitizens. They had actually sent some of theirthe United States, amongoman member of theember before the war, and who had spent some ofyears in America. She wasery capable person,to this very-delicate sort of work. In viewthoshe wos encountering, she had herself asked to beher mission and brought home. The only fruit of her worka few reports on the situation in American intellectualCircles in which, among others, she hadname (she had known him for years)ossiblewith the Czech secret services. She had also suggestedbe recruited into the secret service and officiallymission of organizing the intelligence network among his
She was not the only one to mention Field's name to the topin the secret services. In the summbcr while the former American diplomat was in the Eastern countries, he was recommended as an agentot of other people who knew him well. Via Arthur London, the letter Field had written to Dulles at the end of the wor had come back to Czechoslovakia. In Prague, the letter was received by the security forces, specifically by the official in the Czech secret services who was working withintellectuals ond who was interested in Field.
Onecret police official, by the name of Vchlc, who waa later hanged during the purges, was telling his colleagues that Field knew Dulles. The proof? etter, said tfehle, written by Field at tho end of the war. Even though the official wasAllen Dulles with his brother, John Foster Dulles, thedecretory of State, the name Dulles was automaticallyin the Eastand not without reasonthe idea of peril and threat.
But h'chlc had'not found out about the letter from London. had already spoken to tho Czech authorities about thefrom Field tocopy of the
letter, which was later to be the prime piece of evidence of Field's collaboration with American intelligence, had already been sent to
Prague in the spring8 by the Soviet IntelligenceCentral Europe, whosoun by General in Vienna. Why that
The explanation, after lengthy examination of all the documents relating to the political trials in Czechoslovakia, seems pretty simple today: Soviet intelligence, probably on direct orders from Stalin, was already laying the groundworkroattrial in the people's democracies, and had already given some thought to assigning Koclolo in this grand stage production.
The trouble for the Soviets was that nobody in Prague wasby the letter, and nobody there attached too much importance to it. Notwithstanding their having received the copy of thecr sent them by the Soviets, the Czach police8 actuallyisa to Field, as we have already seen, thus confirming his statusocialist.
In view of the skimpy results he had achieved in Prague, Belkin and his men went prospecting elsewhere and, since the famous Field letter to Dulles dealt with the Hungarian communist leader Szonyi they turned to;Budapest. One of the leaders in the Czech secret police, I. Mi Inn, one of whose jobs was to keep in touch with the Hungarians, stated later that he hadom his Hungarian colleague, Cclonel Szuts . that the whole Field matter had popped Out of "Field's letter to Allen Dulles, which dated back to the end of the war and which had fallen into the hands of theintelligence oeoplc. now that the same letter, or one likeaid Milen, "was also in the hands of our secret (Archives of the CCP CC, File G, Commission I,
In-the latter half ofzucs' arrived in Prague. He had come to ask his Czech colleagues' help in shadowing and perhaps arresting Noel Field. From the notes made onanuary by the secret service man in Slovakia, Valasek, concerning that meeting, we find that the help was to consist in arresting Field andhim over to the Budapest people.
During that period Field's friends in Czechoslovakia and Hungary lready knew that ho was suspected of spying on the people's de--moeracics and on the USSR. The news had come from Budapest. The Czech President, Klemcnt Gottwald, tried to call his country's intelligence sleuths off the matter, and showed, no desiro toarrest. Later on, of course, he changed his mind, and" had this to soys decision: "If even General Belkin has verified the facts in this ma'tcr, do what they ask."
t the invitation of rcpiescntotive nf CzechNoel Field went to Le Boui^ct airportis, and boarded Air Franceon-stop to Prague. Wholly in the
dark aa to vhat was going on, he kissed his wife Hcrtathat they would soon be together for good, in the Here, meanwhile, the stage was boing sot, down to the
The Interior Ministry informed the Hungarians of Field's arrival, and asked that Szucs_ come immediately, bringing with him the evidence of Field's criminal activities. The ministry people also wanted Matyas Rakosi, the leader of the Hungarian communists who officially hid the final word in thin matter, toequest directly to Cottwald to use the Prague police to make the arrest.ay, Cottwald received the follc*ing telegram: "Please comply with our request and arrest Field, recently returned to Prague. Rakosi."
Onay, the Czech secret service arrested Field and immediately shipped him off to Budapest. Two weeks later, fromoay, the representative of the Soviet police. General Belkin, stayed on Prague. He was there in his capacity as responsible for the safety of the Soviet delegation to the Czech communist congress. He talked with the Prague leaders about, among other things, thecase," since he was concerned with itpecialto Hungary. The leader of the Hungarian Party delegation also mentioned tho natter to the Czech representatives.
In Budapest the Hungarian secret police, working with the Soviet advisers, particularly UKrlACHDV and Makarov, tried out several Interrogation procedures on Field, using cruel tortures. But nothing worked. They could not get him to confess his'spying for Dulles, much less having setetwork of agents in tho people's democracies for the purpose of cutting the Eastern countries off from the Soviet Union.Even Colonel SzucS like Svab, marvelled at Field's having stood up under so much and such dreadful torture without confessing anything.
All the butchers found out was that Field had collaborated with Soviet Intelligence and about the pressures brought to bear on Field by the American authorities, beginning in the summer of o get him to come home. They were given reason to recollect the unflagging aid Field had given during the war to theists, and particularly to communists. They got an explanation as to why Field hod written that famous letter to Dulles. They wrenched from him information about the book he was writing, and the names of those who had gi*-en him completely innocuous infoi-ma-tlon about the development of tho peoples democracies.
They alsoengthy list of communist loaders, practically all of those Field had known and helped during the warhis was tho origin of the list of people who became, thanks to
Soviet intelligent^, suspect of espionage oC^oubverslon. Itfor Field, all unknowing, to have mentioned theirDulles letter became the foundation on which to buildpolitical trial of the .Secretary of tho HungarianLazslo Rajk, which ended in three death sentences,that of Xibor f
A Cruel Came
Heither Field nor his wife, nor yet his brother, Hermann, who as ve shall see had been arrested after hin, ever appeared before the court, either on charges or as witnesses. They were kept in the shadows, used, and not only in Hungary, but In Bulgaria, in East Germany, and in Czechoslovakia, as mysterious witnesses kho had testified for the prosecution. Ho lessop people in the East Geman CP, for example, were stripped of their office and imprisoned solely for having known Field briefly in the past.
Vhy this apparently absurd behavior on the part of the secretin Hungary and in the other countries, particularly in the Soviet Union, who were actually the stage directors and producers Of the Field case?
First of all, the Field case was the contribution of the Soviet secret police, working with their opposite numbers in the people's democracies, to demonstrating tho inherent rightness of tho formulas and tho political line of the Cominform. support was needed for Stalin's line on the heightening of the class struggle and on the penetration by enemies into the communist world, and evidence was required to back the charge that American imperialists were trying to isolate and separate thedemocracies from the Soviet Union; lastly, the Soviets could use some emphasis on their chargo that the Yugoslav leaders were anti-Soviet imperialist agents. All these ideological andformulas with which Marxism-Leninism was then boing interpreted were the fruit of tho cold war and, at the sane time, constituted the facade designed to mask the real intentions of Soviet policy, which was then one of preparation for war on the United States.
Set against this background, the Field character offered several potentials for profitoblo use. Most important of all, though, ithance to strike at the hoart of the whole ruling classstern Europe, whom he hod known during the war. It was theective, albeit the cruellest way to root out any vestige of re.tance to the new lines of Soviet policy and to rid tho apparatus
omotiraps the earthof people who, for one reason or an&tht-r, no longer enjoyed Moscow's full confidence.
more than likely that, in the Field affair, tho not
hloodlcss struggle during those years between the American aixlict intelligence forcesart. lhe American police
ad dircovcred fyS espionage system of whOi Field had been part* It io truo that it hod not been operating for more thancar.s, but the men who unleashed the anti-Soviet campaign ln the United States exploited it to fuol their hysterical attacks on the USSR. The Soviet police respondedand this isguess that certainlyound oneby picking all their cards up from thendew game. They turned their own agent into anagent. They sacrificed their own man, vho for one thing was of no mere use to them and toward whom, over the Krivitsky affair and ln the wake of the "Massings1hey had some suspicions, and they tumed himoviet agentpy for American imperialism. And since Field's whole family hadone way and another, at least through their political activism, the whole family vas caught up In the pitiless game.
Nerta Field, worried to death over her husband's disappearance, and not having heard from him sinceay, arrived in Prague in August, accompanied by her brother-in-law, Hermann Field. They searched desperately among their friends in Prague, trying to pick up some trace of him. Herta had already written, when her husband had first .vanished, to Arthur London, deputy foreign mhe had said in her letter, "that he has fallen into some trap set for him by agents of the Americanonray."
From the moment they entered Czech territory, the police hadthe Fields' every move. Ms.Field, who fiad told both London and Merkus she was coming, met with tho two communist leadersotel where the police had installed hidden microphones.
From the tapes of that conversation, which were immediatelyby the secret service and is now In the Party archives in Prague, ve see Ms. Field's deep concern for her husband's safety. 'The lady, completely unaware of the cruel design of the people vho had orchestrated the whole affair, announced her desire to seek help fromironicallythe Czech secret service. She wasthat, after the Massing and Alger Hiss cases, her husband had been kidnaped by the American police, and that sooner or later he would be haled before an American tribunal. She did not know vhat to do: all she hoped vas that she vould somehow be able toer husband, even in such extraordinarily difficult circumstances as political kidnaping. She asked the secret service to confirm or deny the kidnoping theory, so that, if necessary, she couldassive press campaign to save Field from the American judges. Both London and Markus approved her decision to ask the Czech intelligence people for help.
CJjfliCe*"Cro she vent immediately afterwards. Herta
tne coincrs.Uion. On vhat occasion, she described in detail th-
no wjshc stoic Department in Washington.
Her information also coincided with what Noel hadsin Budapest. Even the lists of names which tho twowere more or less identical. In the end, the Czech police promised to help find Noel Field, and assured Herts, that thoy would Jcccp her informed: actually, thty were very careful not tdinger, fearing that Herta and Hermann would mount acampaign that would hove ruined, or at least complicated' tho plan, that had been laid to make Noel Field the accuser in all the political trials.
Shortly thereafter, onugust, Hermann went to Warsaw, where heot of people. But, as he was preparing to return to ?raguc, he was arrested, repeatedly interrogated by the Polishand thrown into jail.
The noose was about to tighten around Hermann, too.
Onugust the headpecial section of the Centralof the Czoch CP,apel, asked Party Secretary Slansky there ves any reason why Herta Field should not be arrested. Almostimilar quory camo from Budapest. The decision, in view of the importance of the case in which, asknew, Stilinersonal interest, was left up to Cott-wald. The Czoch comm-inist leader and President of tho Republic gave his consent onugust, butecommendation that the secret services not get involved in the affair. By the time it was framed, however, that recommendation had already beenead letter by events, because the Czech secret police were up .to their necks in tho business by then.""
Onugust, through some friends who already knew the truth, the police told Herta that they had managed to get news of her husband, and informed her that they would take her to where Noel was. Herta, vith several police officials, set offar for Bratislava. There she was taken into custody by the Hungarian police. In the following weeks every attempt on the part of Elsie Field,ife, to find out what had become of her husband, was in vain. The United States consular authorities, underfrom the public to explain the mysterious disappearance of three American citizens, one after the other, tried in vain to find out what was going on. Erikaoung Germanwhom the Fields had met in Spain during the final months of the civil war and had sheltered asaughter on several occasions, determined to try to find them: sho disappeared in Berlin innd wound up in Siberia.
ears, even thoush theirtill sent terror Into the hearts of oil vho had known them or even heard of them, the Fields scornedave vanished into thin air.
Hermann was tho first to be heard of: he left the Polish prison of Hlodxsyn at the end of4 and, after receiving an
indemnity-rom the Polishto the
Unitedhere he lr; now teaching architecture.
The last one to regain freedom, hen Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation campaign was already dismantling most of the police apparatus established during the dark Stalin years, was Erika Meanwhile, on Budapest Radio announced that "it was no longer possible to sustain the charges laid in the past"-against the Fields, and Noel and Uerta were freed too.
ecision that was somewhat surprising at the time, theynot to go back to tho United States and settled down insteadretty little hillside house on the outskirts of Budapest, where Noel diednd where Herta lives still.
They still professed unwavering faith in the political creed to which they had devoted their entire lives. "Both of us feel the symptoms of prenaturc oldield wroteriendfaithettere added, in that same letter, "has never left us."
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