South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decisionmaking
fCev Judgments
The evidence is clear thai President Pak Cbong-hui in4rogram to develop nuclear weapons technology.
At that time, however, he had not decided that Korea would actually build bombs.
He probably did not expect to confront the need or opportunity toecision on the production of either warheadselivery system for at least several years.
Totrong alliance with the United States, Seoul seeks to minimize frictions in bilateral relations. Under US pressure, in6 it suspended negotiationseprocessing facility; in6 it suspended the whole formal program to develop nuclear weapons technology that it had inaugurated only two years earlier.
Nevertheless, the concerns that prompted Seoul's interest in nuclear weapons remain. Since the Korean war, P'yongyang has shown unabated hostility toward Seoul and has substantially strengthened ita offensive capabilities. South Koreas confidence in the US security commitment and, in particular, Washington's willingness to defend it with nuclear weapons has declined.
Officials in the Korean nuclear research community believe thai, even while bowing to US preferences on tbe line of work they pursue, certain activities can and should be undertaken to keep Seoul's nuclear option open. These activities include the Agency for Defense Development's current work in high explosives and its development of surface-to-surface missile technology.
The explosives research has legitimate conventional weaponsbut an established capability in this Held would be highly advantageousedicated nuclear weapons program resumed.
Centralfaiwv
Agency's missile program also has, in the minds of many South Koreans, logical conventional military applications. The presentis obsessed witheapons system with which it can threatenthe political more than the pure mililarythe extent thai North Korea can threaten Seoul with conventional artillery and FROGSs.'
A careful search of all available information has turned up:
No evidence that any nuclear weapons design work is under way at present.
No evidence that the South Koreans are trying toranium enrichment capability.
No evidence of any current activity related io the acquisitioneprocessing capability.
No evidence of stockpiling of fissile material.
No evidence of work on weapons fabrication.
Even those South Korean officials who sec military utility in possessing nuclear weapons concede lhat decisions on the weapons question will probably not be made before the early or.
The South Korean Government probably will, however, make decisions in the next several years that could affect the future lead timeecision lo produce nuclear weapons and their actual acquisition.
Among the decisions that are likely to arise arc those concerning whether or not torototype and then produce inurface-to-surface missile, and what to do with the substantialKorea has in nuclear research personnel.
North Kom hu hid Ihe SPWel-typplied PROG (free roctet ott foundliembe type* of FROG* ia lbc Nona Koran inremory hitrange ol AO kilometer*.
The most important factor in South Korea's future nuclear decisions will be Iu perception of the reliability of the US security commitment and, conversely, the imminence of the North Korean threat. Waning confidence in the United States, particularly if accompaniedecline of US influence in Seoul, would strengthen the hand of those South Korean officials who want touclear weapons option.
South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decisionmaking
Strategic Policy
The Norlh Koroan Th.eat
The South Koreans view the threat from the Northundamental, although not immediate, problem.
Since the Korean war, Pyongyang has demonstrated unabated hostility toward the Seoul government and no interest in reunifying the peninsula on other than its own terms. Even while occasionally altering tactics, the North bas never abandoned attempts to foster revolutionary conditions in the South. Key elements of this strategy over the past decade have included propaganda and psychological warfare, armed raids, attempts on the life of President Pak Chong-hui, efforts to isolate Seoul internationally, and agent infiltration to collect intelligence, build Communist cells, and subvert officials.
In thendhe stepped-up acquisition of weapons from the Soviet Union and Cbina, combinedajor expansion of the Norths defense production activities, began tipping the static North-South military balance in Pyongyang's favor. Today the North has andvantage in numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. The North alsoubstantial edge in numbers of combat aircraft, an advantage that is not offset by the superior quality of the Souths US-suppltcd planes. If P'yongyang achieved surprise in massing these assets forilometers from the demilitarizedbe vulnerable to quick seizure.
A complex of restraints hasesumption of hostilities3 and provided South Korea the breathing room to concentrate on nonmUitary facets of economic development. These restraints areand not readily susceptible to unilateral change by North Korea. They include the US treaty commitment to defend the South, the general if unspoken consensus among the major powers on the need to maintain stability on the peninsula, and the strength and tenacity of the South Koreans themselves. The factor that weighs most heavily in Pyongyang's calculations is the US security commitment, and, particularly, the presence of US forces in the South.
The importance of the United States in the peninsula's strategic equation has made Seoul acutely sensitive to what it perceives as any weakening of Washington's commitment. South Korean concerns in this regard began
tec-eel
intensifying after the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine9 and theto Pak in Marchreduce US troops in Korea0ino-American moves toward detente raised further apprehensions tn Seoul that the United States might seek, above the heads of Seoul andig Power solution for the peninsula. Today, South Korea not only worries about an outside compromise on its fate, hut fears thai the United Stales might be secretly willing io deal directly with Ihe North Korean regime.
In the wake of the US withdrawal from Indochina, officials in Seoul question whether the United Slates can politically afford to be involved in another continental war in Asia, and tbey worry lhat the War Powers Act might cripple ibe ability of Washington to aid Seoul. More broodly. Seoul is concerned (hat ihe increasingly activist role of Congress in foreign afTairs undercut* any commitment made by Ihe US executive alone.
Although ihe South Koreans arc anxious to maintain and indeed reinforce the US commitment, their security concerns have at the same lime driven them lo strengthen their own defense capabilities. This has led Seoul down two primary paths: the preliminary considerationuclear weapons option, and ihe modernization of its conventional arms inventory.
Planning for force modernization began1 when, concurrent with tbe withdrawal of the US Seventh Division fromS-Korean committee identified weaponry needs for the South Korean Army.ollowing ihe fall of Saigon, Paknilateral review of ihe earlier plan and an accelerated timetable for defense industry expansion. Seoul hoped lhat this revised force improvemenl plano be completedould enable the South to meet an attack with only logistic and air support from Ihe United Slates.
South Korea today is able to produce for iit ground forces adequate supplies of imal) arms and munitions, some types of communications equipment, and assorted wheeled vehicles. With foreign assistance, it il beginning to fabricate light antiaircraft weapons, towed howitzers, and wheeled armored vehicles. Tankwhich Seoul is investigating the purchase of US and European technology, -does not appear feasible before the early or. Although able to fabricate the hulls of light naval craft, Korea must impori ihe propulsion, electronics, and weapons systems for ihem. Aerospace and missile programs arc in their infancy. Production of combat aircraft other than helicopters, and possibly light propeller-driven craft, is not now planned.
In the order in which weapons production programs have beenthe development of South Korea's defense industry parallels that of
the North. The North, however, has been turning out arms far longer and has been willing toar larger share of national resources to defense.
While all South Korean power groups share the goal of self-reliance that calls for expanded domestic arms production, there are important differences in opinion regarding the nature of that expansion. Policymakers in the Blue House, and President Pak in particular, view the concept of self-reliance in decidedly political terms. This reflects the need toublic perception that the North is militarily superior,irongcr-than-usual apprehension that the United States will noteliable source of arms. Some of these officials talkomestic arms industry eventually capable of filling all weapons needs save those of aircraft. The professional military, in contrast, views that goal as technically and economically unsound.
The drive lo modernize the arras inventory has contributed alsoivelier "guns or butter" controversy. The percentage of gross national product (GNP) allocated to the military has increased steadily,ercent5 to anercentillion6 billion. Defense officials are seeking levelserceni9ercentconomic planners, on the other hand, argue that rapid growth will make possible substantial real increases in military spending even if the defense share of GNP is reduced modestly. Theyouth Korean GNP five times that of the Northnd claim that this will allow Seoul to compete militarily.
Con.id<mngWc-opon,
South Korean success in meeting its arms-buildup goals is by no means wholly ensured, but neither are these goals fundamentally unreasonable. In thend earlythe nuclear option was under more seriousgoals would have appeared beyond reach. Few officials in Seoul would have then voiced confidence that South Korea could build adequate defenses by conventional means alone.or example,1 US-Korean arms modernization plan was in disarray, and domestic defense production was limited essentially to crew-served infantry weapons and small arms ammunition. It was not then as obvious that the South Korean economy was outpacing that of the North. In these circumstances, the nuclear weapons option appeared to someelatively direct and economical route for deterring war.
ew. and then very general, statements on the potential missions of an independent Korean nuclear force are available. The primary theme that emerges is Scours desire to acquire such weapons as asubstituting for, should the need arise, the deterrence now provided by the US security commitment. From tbe outset. South Korean thinking about nuclear
1 CIA (Minutesplace it* Sentb't GNP >lBitkime*betoi (be South by
J
weapons has focusedissile-delivery system. This focus on missile systems implies an interest inumber of nuclear devices, but indications of specific Korean thinking in this area are not available. It is clear lhat Seoul has noi addressed the question of physical and chain-of-command control of nuclear weapons.
System
Missile work has focused, in turn, on modifications lo the US-produced Nike Hercules. In the South Korean inventoryurface-to-air missile, the Nike Hercules can also be employedurface-to-surface modeaximum rangeilometersilogram payload. Fired from just behind the demilitarized zone, the missile could reach P'yongyang and two of North Korea's majorand Wonsan.
This docs not allow for much flexibility, particularly under battle conditions. Seoul's first priority in missile work, therefore, has been to extend the range of the Nike Herculesurfacc-to-turfice mode so it could be targeted on Pyongyang from positions well behind Ihe demilitarizedangeilometers, the goal Seoul sel4 for its missile modification program, would embrace Sinuiju. the Yalu River city where key supplies from China enter North Korea, as well as ihe cities of Hamhung and Anju. Most military oommand centers and equipment concentrations would fall within this arc.
In addition lo Ihe strategic nuclear weapons potential ofelivery system, the South Koreans see conventional, tactical missionsurface-to-surface missile. For inch conventional applications ihey are working on the development of an improved cluster munition.
Korean officials are interestedounter-force weapon to North Korea's FROGs'm artillery. Atlhough the South has bask mililary equivalents to both these weapons. North Korea's weapons can reach Seoul, whereas the Souths rockets and nrtillery cannot travelilometers to Pyongyang. The present government is obsessed wilheans of threateningthe political more than pure militarythe degree that the North can threaten the South.
President Pak4 reportedly was also interested in acquiring missiles so South Korea could retaliate in tbe event of limited aggression from the North. His immediate concern was linked to North Korean attempts in3 through4 lo establish claim to waters surrounding the northwestern consul islands.
'AliboonvRitonil wuiaaa" (al North KorealKu ihii each rode* hiiiios Scootkintopk The Soaikoover, bava leaded lo *kw <h* FROO aa aweapon of Knur
Nueloor Program DovolopmonfRob of NlkW Powor
South Korea broke ground1 for its first power reactor, initiating one of the developing world's moat ambitious nuclear energy plans. According to Seoul's most recent projections.uclear power plants are to be constructedrovidingercent of the country's electricity-generating capacity.
Seoul believes that nuclear energy is the most promising means for it to reduce its heavy dependence on imported energy sources, especially oil. At present, oilfrom Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, andaccount for aboutercent of Korea's energy consumption. Seoul's policy options, however, are constrainedack of domestic resources- South Korea has do known oil or gas reserves, aad its hydroelectric potential ishift to greater use of coal-fired thermal powerSeoul isrequire imported coal.
The nuclear power capacity Seoul is planning1 is equivalent tof oil. Last year. South Korea's oil imports were. Energy demand is likely to continue to grow aboutercent annually in line with Korea's rapid economic growth, resulting in some modest reduction in its relative dependence on imported energy supplies.
Seoul's nuclear power projections call for bringing onegawatt plant this year; six plantsotal capacity; and eight plantsombined capacityW ineriod. The firstight-water reactor (LWR) designated KORI I, is undergoing final icsts. while construction on another LWRANDU heavy-water reactor is in progress. Early this year, Seoul awarded contracts lo Westinghouse for two additional LWRs (KORI III andids for Korea's sixth and seventh power reactors, which will round outhase of construction, will be tendered
Given the high cost of power reactors, foreign financing has been crucial and, so far, has accounted for aboutercent of total construction costs. Domestic capital needs also have been substantial Seoul now estimates that its overall power development program will eatercent of gross investment over the next five years and an even greater percentage thereafter. About half of these funds will be tagged for the nuclear plants.
B.wcrth6
Through theorea's nuclear research program waslimited lo Ihe study and production of radioisotopes.4 the Korea Atomic Energy Research Instituten affiliate of the Ministry of Science and Technology, began negotiations toanadian NRX-
type heavy-water research reactormall French reprocessing facility. The following year, KARRIoan with the Belgian Government for the purchaseesearch laboratory for mixed-oxide nuclear fuel fabrication.
The reprocessing facility would have handled onlyercent of the spent fuel produced by Koreas first power reactor, but this could have separated out enough pluionium to fabricate one nuclear device per year. Acquisition and operation ofilot plant, moreover, would have helped Seoul gain the expertise needed to constructarger,reprocessing facility. The Bclgain facility would have given Korea the last key technology of the back end of nuclear fuel cycle. With it. Seoul could have used the outputeprocessing plant lo fabricate mixed-oxide fuel elements for its power reactors. This would have decreased Korea's need for outside supply of enriched uranium and reduced long-term operating costs of power reactors.
This ambitious attempt to work with the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle soon foundered. Following India's detonationuclear device made with plutonium generated by an NRX-type reactor. Ottawa suspended its negotiations for the saleimilar research reactor to Seoul. Then, under pressure from the United States and Canada, which used the leverage of pending power reactor sales and credit approvals to bolster their case, KAERI dropped its plans for purchasing both the reprocessing and mixed-oxide-research facilities.
Following these cancellations, Koreaix-year program to design and build its own NRX-type reactor, togetherompanion small-scale heavy-water production facility. For this purpose, Seoul in6 created the Korea Nuclear Fuel Development Institute (KNFDI)ubsidiary of KAERI. This program was itself canceled in
The facilities that KAERI was hoping to purchase were an integral part of the institute's long-term plan for nuclear power development. Planners at the Blue House, moreover, viewed themecessary componentovert program within the military touclear weapons capability. Beginning inone physicist assisted by an explosives technician had workeduclear weapon design at the Agency for Defense Developmentemi-independent adjunct of the Ministry of National Defense.
4uch expanded, dedicated nuclear weapons program took shape, combining missile design work with nuclear and chemical warhead researchroject" ADD's executive vice president was charged with oversight of the program. Below that level, strict compartments!inn was apparently enforced, and the project did not survive long enough to see any integration of effort among the three work teams. The
three programs were budgeted for and administered on noncoordinated time schedules of differing lengths.
President Pak reportedly authorized the nuclear weapons design clementnollowing this, ADDecruitment effort to repatriate Korean scientists trained and employed abroad. The design team took clear shape inhen it was divided into three substantive subgroups working on warhead structure, high explosives fabrication, and computer codes. It is believed that the total warhead design effort employed no moreew dozen scientists holding doctoral degrees, backedomewhat larger number of technicians. Little information is available on the warhead design(s) investigated, but it is known that the group suffered fiom internal squabbling and technical incompetence and apparently made little progress.
The chemical warhead team, apparently established at ADD inmployed aboutrincipal researchers. Byn contrast, the missile team reportedly employed moreesearchers and technicians. In addition to several administrative units, the team encompassed five substantive divisions: propellants, mechanics, electronics, testing andand computer support.
Raseoreh Programs: Present Status
In late6 President Pak ordered the immediate suspension of all activities related to. He made this decision following conclaves with top Blue House and Cabinet officials who convinced him that the weapons programajor irritant in relations with the United States. His willingness toas strongly conditioned by the poor performance of ADD to that time and by the lack of any immediate need for nuclear weapons development.
The suspensionontributed to an ongoing reorganization of Korea's nuclear research organizations that had begun when Seoul dropped plans for tbe reprocessing plant. Over the past two years, Seoul has taken particular care to keep KAERI, which oversees Korea's bilateral cooperation with the United States in tbe peaceful uses of atomic energy, generally open to foreign scrutiny by keeping it out of sensitive fuel cycle work. Tbe institute baa been ordered, moreover, to reorganize itself into teams of applied technology experts supporting the power reactor program and to downgrade the role of self-initiated, theoretical research undertaken by individual scientists.7 KNFDI was ordered to convert its facilities to thatilot-scale fuel fabrication center based on ihe acquisitionrench nuclear fuel research facility. This facility, to be completedill enable KNFDI to perform some post-irradiation testing, but not reprocessing, of fuel.
The reorientation of these two institutes reflects South Korea'sof its nonmilitary nuclear research activities along lines proposed by
f
Ihc Uniied Stales inajor research efforts today concent rale on uranium mining and ore conversion, the fabrication of fuel elements for light-water reactors, and the developmentapability to manufacture power reactor components and plants. They pointedly avoid work with irradiated fuel in the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Al ADD. the nuclear weapons designers once assigned torc now working with high explosives in Ihc agency's Warheads Directorate, while ihe old chemical warfare group is reportedly engaged in research with nonoffensive chemical agents in ADD's Matcriab Development Directorate, It is not known whether these nuclear and chemical warhead researchers drawnemain discrete groups within the larger work teams to which they are currently assigned.
Although there is no evidence of nuclear weapons design work being conducted at this lime, more effort is being directed al high-explosives research and production. This has legitimate conventional weaponsbut an established high-explosives capability would also be advaaia-gcous to Koreauclear weapons progam were resumed. Some of ihe research is carried out by ADD's Warheads Directorate, where over half of theesearchers are believed assigned to thegroup.
Developing the high-explosives system needed toymmetric, spherical implosion is the mosl difficult part of nuclear weaponsRefinemeni in weapons design requires extensive testing of high explosivesite thai consistsiring pad and bunker, along wilh elaborate instrumentation, for example, ultra high-speed cameras,ay systems, and oscilloscopes. Seoul has acquired some of this initrumentation, but we are not certain where lhc equipment is installed.
Certain types of laser systems thai Korea has been purchasing suggest tbe beginningimited laser isotope separation (LIS) program. Wc have no evidence that uranium itself is under study although some of the laser research is being conducted by KAERI. There is no evidence of Korean interest in developing the technology for cither the gaseous diffusion or gat centrifuge methods of uranium enrichment.
Mhilla
Today ADD's missile researchers are divided among three of the six directorates of the agency's Advanced Weapons Center at Taejon.One handles propulsion work; Two, acroballistics research; and Three, electronics and guidance and controlewly established group, whose authority cuts across the boundaries of the sixs responsible for testing and evaluation. It controls, among other facilities, the missile flight test range ai Anhung.
These groups arc building upon the missile work begun ino develop by8 the technologyilometer surface-to-surface missile. That earlier effort, like the present one, usedasis for its development the Nike Hercules.
As of6 the initial design of the improved missile was near completion. Only its control surfacesortion of the hydraulic system would be replicas of the Nike Hercules. The rocket motors, airframe, control system, and onboard guidance system would be dramatically upgraded or entirely redesigned, Using French assistance for both propellant andtechnology, ADD succeeded ineduced-scale motor. Static tests on these motors confirmed inoreas ability toarboxyl terminated poly butadiene-type propellant.
After rejecting more sophisticated options, ADD bad decided toa command guidance system that would modify that of the Nike Hercules to extend its range and accuracy. Modifications to tbc tracking radar via technology obtained from American firms were believed by ADD to run tooisk of exposing the program. Seoul, therefore, looked to improving the onboard guidance system by making extensive use of solid-state electronics rather than the vacuum tube technology of the standard Nike Hercules.
The agency had notrototype missile byhen Pak suspended, of which the missile program was part. Following this setback, it was not until7 that ADD officials apparentlyreen light to renew long-range missile development work.
Current development efforts are primarily directed toward test firing an improved Nike Hercules for President Pak innitial test flights began in April. Although the performance of this missile will not differ significantly from that of the standard Nike Hercules, the ADD prototype is toew rocket motor using French propellant and motorodified missile airframe, and an improved, all solid-state command guidance package.
No production of this missile is planned, but ADD telieves the program important and is using it togive the illusionability toong-range surface-to-surface missile. The agency hopes thereby to win presidential supportix- to eight-year project to-ilometer missile. In its ongoing development efforts, ADD apparently hopes 'to incorporate French propellant technologyritish inertia! navigation system. If itreen light for this project, the agency will place initial emphasis on the acquisition of advancedfrom abroad and developed atwill consider the developmentrototype4t is not yet clear whether this longer range program would also focus on improvements to the Nike Hercules.
Warhead Daiign
Specific information on the type of nuclear warhead that ADD might contemplate developing forissile is not available. However, since the agency's developmental work has so far related to the Nike Hercules, it might reasonably be assumed that the size and characteristics of any nuclear warhead would be strongly influenced by lhat missile's requirements. Korea's possession of the US-supplied Honest John rocket might further support this development route since this rocket was originally designed for the same nuclear warhead as that fitted to the Nike Hercules.
The Nike Hercules originallyesign payloadilograms, and tbe Honest Johnilograms. In both cases, however, the diameter of the warhead compartment would limit the weightasic nuclear implosion systemilograms. (Fuzing components, power supplies, casing,ould easilyilograms to thisn initial device might well be larger than this, but with testing, the South Koreans probably could meet the constraints.
The warhead probably wouldimple conservative design with the fissilea solid ball surroundedranium tamper. The high-explosive system would also be of conservative design,ast high-explosive lens system and cast inner charge. Warheads of this type are relatively easy to design and fabricate and make reliable, serviceable weapons. In the size class under consideration here, however, they have the disadvantage of relatively low yieldsiven amount of fissile material. Even so. depending on the type of fissile material available andumber of design variables,arhead could have yieldsew kilotons up to several lens of kilotons.
A warhead as described above could be adapted to non-missite-delivery systems without changes made in tbe basic design, an important considerationmall-weapons program. The weight and diameter would be small enough to permit external carriage on several of the fighter aircraft in the South Korean inventory.evice would also lend itself readily to use as an atomic demolition munition. The South Koreans might conceivably be able to develop even smaller implosion weapons, but only at the cost of reduced nuclear efficiency, greatly increased technical investment, or both.
Inlornalwnol Nuclear Exehanga*
With the supplier nations unwilling to sell Seoul certain sensitive nuclear technology that it desires. South Korea has explored the possibility of technology exchange with other developing countries. It turned first to Taipei,o far the only joint Southaiwanese effort under way involves prospecting for uranium in Paraguay. An agreement apparently reached in6 to share some missile expertise may have been made obsolete by Korean purchases of missile technology from Europe.
Major areas of nuclear cooperation that might be exploited cooperatively by South Korea and Taiwan include heavy-water production, spent fuel reprocessing, plutomum handling and processing, large research reactor design and operation, and the construction or light- or heavy-water power reactors. Seoul's assessment or the political pitfalls inherent in cementingensitivethe potential reactions of Taipei ilself, given the Korean interest in eventually developing tics with mainlandlimit Ihe pace and scope of any cooperation.
Korea has also sought aid from India. Here Seoul's inieresi lies primarily in heavy-water production technology and ihe operation of facilities using heavy water. Inearly two years after the subject was broached, New Delhiillingness to provide technical assistance in the constructionANDU heavy-water power reactor in return for favorable trade concessions from Seoul. Korea, however, may now feel lhat it can acquire this specific assistance directly fromproducer of the CANDU.
Otherwise, Seoul's nuclear dealings wiih the developing world focus on securing uranium and sharing experiences in the management of power reactor programs. Further progress in Korea's own nuclear development could increase ihe potential for more meaningful exchanges of technology, as could expanded precedent for cooperation among nations that have nuclear programs bul not weapons.
Pattsrns
Managing Nuclear Piogramt
Policy planning for Korea's suspended nuclear weapons program was erratic, even haphazard. Cabinetdiscussions involving atart of ihereportedly begun as earlyut the decision toeapons program in4 was made by President Pak without formal Cabinet backing. Pak authorized the program solely on the basisnspecific briefing heritten study assessing the pros and cons of developing, deploying, and using nuclear weapons was not, and still has not, been produced. Untilasack of regular consultation among Blue House, Cabinet, and research institute officials delayedespeciallyof foreign reaction to Korean nuclear activities.
Pak's refusal to assign oversight responsibility for the weapons programubordinate in the Blue House or an intermmistcrial teamost of managerial decencies. His belief that the nuclear weapons program was loo sensitive to allow the delegation of supervisory responsibility was only partially accountable for the casual management arrangement. Ineriod nearly all of the Korean research institutes had undertaken developmeni projects beyond iheir competency and means, and they were
operating essentially as unguided rockets. ADD, for example, in making its strategic weapons development fund requests, had the overriding objective of maximizing its budget allocation. To this end. it intentionally exaggerated its own capabilities and depreciated the difficulty of organizing sophisticated programs.
In6 in tandem with his cancellation oft ADD and the NRX-design project at KNFDl. Pak transferred responsibility for guiding Korea's nuclear programs and overhauling the work of its research institutes to Blue Houseon-chol. O, the second senior secretary for economic affairs, oversees industrial and scientific research activities related both to nuclear affairs and to conventional arms production.
as placed top priority on channeling the work of the overt side of the nuclearandareas deemed acceptable by the international community. He has also stressed the need to direct research activities away from the realm of "pure" research. He believes that Korea lacks Ibe capability to pioneer new technology al this stage and that its limited monetary and personnel resources can be better invested in inducing technology transfers. On this premise, the research institutes would serve primarily to handle technology transfers and apply them to the nuclear program.
To lessen the power of the institutes to determine their own researchas sought to gradually transfer planning responsibility for nuclear research workabinet forum. His primary tool of control is the budgeting process, and he is submitting individual researchauthorized earlier byCabinet review. Ins attempting to have planning for Korea's nuclear power and research activities approximate the coordinated decisionmaking process used for long-term economicprograms.
The Perception ol Foreign Reaction
Korea has failed to give much thought to what the strategicwould be in northeast Asia if it were touclear weapons program. Instead, Seoul's .concern wilh foreign reaction to its nuclear activities has usually focused on tactical questions such as Western tolerance of specific research and development programs.
In initiatingovert weapons and delivery system work, ADD carried the burden of argument, concentrating almost exclusively on technical issues in presenting programs for authorization. Its arguments, as well as those propounded by other elements of the scientific research community, follow several typical lines.
* At this stage, Seoul should not assess the utility of nuclear weapons or address the question of producing them, but should concentrate on
developing minimum research capabilitiesedge against an uncertain future.
likelihood that procurement of sensitive technology from abroad will become more difficult in the future dictates that Korea start gathering expertise and equipment now.
observers should appreciate lhat Korea establishes thresholds in its weapons work. In the case of ihe chemical warhead program, for example. ADD rationalized lhat there would be no adverse US reaction if research were confined to bench-scale synthesis and testing, and stopped short of constructionilot manufacturing facility.
ADD, KAERI, and KNFDI have not been insensitive to the risk to US-ROK relations lhat their weapons, research reactor, and reprocessing work have posed, but they have been willing toigher level of risk than have other elements in the government.
What patchwork attempts were made to assess the political implications of the nuclear weapons programed Pak and some of his senior advisers to conclude that Washington would tolerate this work. Blue House staffers at that time drew an analogy between the .cases of South Korea and Israel. The United States, they reasoned, provided Israel with billions of dollars in defense assistance, including the most modern weapons in its inventory, even while Washington suspected Tel Aviv ofuclear weapons program. The Koreans went on from there to conclude that the Unitedopposing short-term weapons work ineventually recognize and tolerate Korea's need to have an independent nuclear capability.
In an area less controversial than nuclearofKoreans also recognized but initially played down the potential risks. KAERI, for example, believed reprocessing to be justified on economic grounds, even while admitting the political sensitivity of this activity.onsequence, it sought to block US knowledge of or involvement in its attempt torench facility.
A serious focus on US reaction to these nonmiliiary programs did not develop untilhen Washington began to press Seoul on the reprocessing issue. At that juncture, elements of the Korean Government that had passively accepted work in weapons development and tbe back end of the fuel cycle emerged as bureaucratic foes of the nuclear research community. This group, although not formally organizedobbying force, generally has comprised Blue Houseon-chol, the Economic Planning Board, Korea Electric Company, and the Foreign Ministry. As noted above, the United States dissuaded Korea from proceeding with reprocessing by linking the issue to the sale of power reactors. In convincing Pak to suspend the weapons program in0 Won-chol, as spokesman, argued that ADD's work threatened Korea's relations wilh the United States.
Nwritxirn ond Choices
Vvberobiry
Planners in Korea recognized from ihe outset that the development of nuclear energy couldulnerability as well as an asset should their country opt for nuclear weapons, in thehe potential advantages dominated their calculations, although the power reactor program itself was initiated for economic reasons alone.
The operation of power reactors, in the first instance, provided the impetus for moving from purely theoretical nuclear research to an applied technology program that would justify and cover the basic cost of work in various aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Seoul envisioned the operation of power reactors leading to reprocessing that would provide the opportunity to recover plutonium for possible use in weapons.
Having failed toeprocessing capability, Korea today gives equal importance in its thinking to the potential vulnerabilities of its power reactor program. In addition to fearing the suspension of reactor fuel supply if foreign nations do not like the direction of iu nuclear development. Korea is concerned that the supplier nations cannot be relied on,imple commercial sense, to provide adequate fuel supplies.
To minimize iu long-term dependence on outside fuel supply, and possibly also to maximize iu future freedom to reprocess, Seoul is in the preliminary stages of considering reliance on heavy-water reactors for iu second generation of power reactor development Eight planU are scheduled to come on line7idding on these reactors may beginwo years ahead of schedule,
The attraction of heavy-water reactors is that they use natural uranium fuel instead of the enriched uranium fuel needed for light-water reactors. Were Seoul toeavy-water-production capability together with the ability to fabricate iu own heavy-water reactors, it would achieve eventual independence in constructing and operating new power reactor uniu. To this end. Korea is discussing with both the Canadians and West Germans the possibility of signing contracttumber of heuvy-wiicr reactors, with gradual localization of reactor fabrication in Korea. KAERI, the main advocate of switching to future reliance on heavy-water reactors, hopes lhat Korea would attain by completion of tbe fourth reactor the ability to duplicate additional uniu with only limited assistance.
Along with iu discussions on heavy-water reactors, Seoul has raised the question ofeavy-water production facility. The Canadians have already refused this request because of iu sensitivity, and Korea expects Germany to do therivate Korean enterpriseontractanadian firm for an economic feasibility study on the construction of a
small-scale heavy-water facility, however, and this study might provide Korea sufficient technical data lo build its own plant.
For the generation of reactors that will come on lineorea has made little effort lo select technology that would lead to greater independence. Early this year, Seoul contracted for its third and fourth light-water reactors, and il is expected to choose similar models for its sixth ant) seventh units. Thus,hen bids for this first generation of reactors should be completed, Korea will probably have committed itself to light-waterby extension, to outside sources ofenriched uraniumfor all but one of its first seven reactors. Tied up in these six plants will be an investment of roughly SS billionenerating capacityW, almost the equivalent of the current power supply.
Obtaining Hull* MoMrlal
Should Korea decide to develop nuclear weapons, the most critical question facingterms of technical feasibility and safeguardsbe the acquisition of fissile material.
The route requiring fewest facilities, in number and type, to produce weapon-grade material would be uranium enrichment. Korea, however, lacks the technology base to make any of the major methods of enrichment possible5 orn thinking about fissile material, therefore. Seoul probably would focus its sights on plutonium.
Weapon-grade plutonium is obtained by reprocessing irradiated fuel.
Fuel irradiation occurs in the operation of either power or research reactors.
If reprocessing is overt, plutonium can be stockpiled under safeguards. Then, when conditions warrant the violation of safeguards, it can be used in the final stage of weapon fabrication.
Planners at KAERI in theecognized the importance of reprocessinguclear weapons program, but they were primarilyin reprocessing as it related to long-term nuclear power development. An institute flow-chart current5 called for the acquisition ofa reprocessing "research facility" to begin that year. The initial operationommercial-scale reprocessing facility was forecast, wilh some of its processed spent fuel being used in fast breeder reactors78 onward.
Korea has suspended attempts over the past two years toeprocessing capability, but the role that working with irradiated fuel played in early planning suggests that the reprocessing issue could be raised again. Seoul is not legally barred from reprocessing if safeguards of theAtomic Energy Agency apply as required by Korea's ratification of the Non-proliferation Treaty. The possibility always exists, however, that foreign
threats to withhold aid in nuclear or nonnuclear areas could force Scon) to drop plans for overt reprocessing.
eversal in the trends of US opposition to the spread of plutonium technology and of supplier nations' caution in exportingfacilities to the developing world, Seoul's hopes of acquiring afacility would appear to hinge on itslant itself Korea probably couldmall facility, perhaps of the size it hoped to buy from France, within three or four years if it encountered no major stumbling blocks in procuring components.
Overt reprocessing of irradiated power reactor fuel would require the identification of fuel that tbe original supplier was willing to have Seoul reprocess. The United States and Canada not onlyeprocessing veto over the fuel they have supplied, but are alsoeto over any fuel irradiated in their reactors. It is not yet clear whether such stringent controls would apply to reactors that Korea might purchase from France or Germany. Seoul wouldreat deal more freedom to maneuver if il could both build and fuel reactors itself, most likely byeavy-water development route.
The diversion of spent fuel dements from power reactors to support clandestine reprocessing or to bypass full accounting in the case of overt reprocessing would be very difficult To obtain enough plutonium for one weapon, for example, two complete assemblies would have to be secretly removedight-water reactor in which each assembly is individually safeguarded.eavy-water reactor such as the CANDU,uel assemblies would have to be diverted. Since only nine or so assemblies are normally removed each dayANDU, diverting even oneontinuing basis wouldigh risk of detection.
Seoul would be free to reprocess irradiated fuel if it, overtly or covertly, constructed and provided itself the fuellulonium-prcducing reactor. It could probablyarge reactor of this sort within four or five years. If Korea followed this path, it would be likely toeavy-water research reactor, expecting to use the expertise in fuel handling and reactorgained by operating at least one, and possibly up to nine, heavy-water power reactors.
Option, and Decisions
Although President Pak in4rogram to develop nuclear weapons technology, he had not decided lhat Korea would actually build bombs. He probably did not expect to confront the need or opportunity toecision on the production of either warheadselivery system for at least several years. Similarly, in thehere ta no perception of immediate needs or opportunities for acquiring nuclear weapons.
Al the outset, Korea viewednd efforts toeprocessing facility as precautionary measuresolerable level of
lb
potential risk. Even officials who thought the development of nuclear weapons imprudent or unsuitable for Korea's defense needs were willing to tolerate the experimental research at ADD. Only later, when relations with the United States seemed imperiled, did they find that work intolerable.
Today Seoul places the highest priority ontrong alliance with the United States and to that end seeks to minimize potential points of friction. Pak and his military colleagues recognize that they still need Washington's support to:
Serve as the most effective deterrent to war.
Offset Pyongyang's ties to Moscow and Peking.
Increase Moscow and Peking's interest in maintaining stability on the peninsula.
Assist in the modernization of the South Korean armed forces.
Nevertheless, while hoping for the best in terms of long-term support from the United States, all planners in Seoul recognize that they will have to keep assuming more responsibility for their own defense. Someconcentrated primarily in ADD and KAERI. but apparently including atmall part of the military asthat such "self-defense" may eventually require nuclear weapons development.
Given the sophisticated technology requirements set by the type of nuclear weapons system Seoul has considered developing, some planners believe that their country should do more than rely on advances in civilian nuclear technology to shorten the lead timeomb. The strongest pressures in this regard arise quite naturally from the nuclear research community. SinceDD, KAERI, and KNFDI have been only marginally successful in winning authorization for the lines of research they would like to pursue. Nevertheless, even the restricted work of these research bodies is moving Korea part of the wayapability to lateredicated weapons program.
The research includes ADD's work with missile technology and high explosives and KAERl's examination of the heavy-water route for future power reactor development In the view of many in Korea, these activities arc justified in terms of civilian power and conventional arms development. Although not supported by all important elements of the Korean leadership, this work is tolerated because it keeps Seoul's options open withoutinto any kind of commitment to nuclear weapons.
More criticalas the stockpiling of fissile material and warhead design, to say nothing of weapons fabrication ornot under discussion at present. Even those officials who see military utility in possessing nuclear weapons concede that decisions on the proliferation question will probably not be made before the early or.
A choice between proceeding with weapons production and forgoing the nuclear option may not be necessary even then. Nonetheless, decisions and assessments lhat will likely be made in iheould affect the future leadtimeouth Korean decision to produce nuclear weapons and iheir actualumber of these decisions will be made in the normal evolution of nuclear power development.
If ADD wins approval this year or nextong-range missile development program, it would be ready in theo propose the productionrototype. Seoul might then have to decide whether to produce missiles in quantity.
The selection of heavy-water technology for future power reactor development could strengthen Seoul's interest ineavy-water production capability. Attaining this, in turn, would facilitate the independent operationeavy-water research reactor.
Seoul will have to decide what to do with tbe substantial investment it has in nuclear research personnel at ADD, KAERI. and KNFDI. It is not yet dear whether these scientists would seek or be diverted to employment in the private sector if Korea continues to eschew work in the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle and weapons design.
The sheer growth of its power reactor program, coupledrowing spent-fuel disposal problem in the, might provide Seoul with the rationale for reprocessing.
The most important factors in Korea's calculations regarding nuclear weapons will not be questions of technical feasibility. Rather they will be successive reassessments of the US security commitment, the threat posed by North Korea, and Seoul's success in building its conventional arms strength. If the United States completes iu ground troop withdrawal in the, Seoul will be forced io weigh Pyongyang's near-term incentives for attack. Irrespective of tbe ground troop question, however. South Korea will continue to question whether the United States would employ nuclear weapons on ils behalf. Waning confidence in the US nuclear umbrella, particularly if accompaniedecline of US influence in Seoul, would strengthen ihe hand of those who want touclear weapons option.
lb
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: