SOVIET LONG RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

Created: 4/6/1978

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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S * *

r * SwiftNuclear Forces* 1

lone-range nuclear forces have Ionsan iarportant part of the Warsaw Pact's capa-

bility to execute nuclear strikes ag linst Ten years ago theseasured bothof delivery systens and on-targetcomparable in magnitude to Soviet inter-

continental range "central systens."

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:

--The present mix of nuclear systems which the Soviets can bring to bear on the continental United-States and European NATO, reflects the emphasis they have placed on the deployment of modern intercontinental range weapons. Dramatic growth has also taken place, however, in Pact medium-range theater nuclear forces, which have more than doubled

--Growth in LRTNF over the pastears has been less dramatic. In fact,number-of delivery systems oriented on European* NATO has actually declined9 and Currently standsevel of0 missiles and medium bombers. However, the number of deliverable bombs, air-to-surface missiles and warheads has increased somewhat and currently totals

fkm-nd subsequent working groups havehe NATO Nuclear Planning Group usage with respect to theater nuclnar forces. hroughout this text. Long-Range Theater rvudear (forces (LRINF) are those theater nuclear systems with missile range or aircraft radius of0 kilometers. Medium-range systems QKTNF) art? those with ranpe or radius of0 kilometers, and short-(pmge systems (SKTNF) are those with ranges of lessilometers,.

Comparison Kith NATO:

Magnitude of Soviet UtTNF witL, re meet to

orc" h" changed significantly,to even though the Allies-notably the French--

The US Has alsoH aircraft to base* in.

Graphic II

-Currently the nuaber of ln-place Soviet LRTNI" delivery systeas--as well ai weapons -exceeds NATO's

b?utof the

NATO and Soviet forcehowever, M

by the share of Soviet

weapons carried by

f* ofconcern the

US and NATO and will be the focus ofontrol

efforts. In addition, it is the NATip tRTNF set rcpre-

II*Mch prejently heins

considered for enlargement and modernization.

oseidon RVs to SACEUR. The aissiles which carry these weapons are already SALT constnlnednotubject if '

Other long-range forces not represented on this graphic include the FB-lll ardium boiiber force

any LRTNF negotiations.

the US

not repres

UR !r SACLAVT-assigned and other

US aircraft carrier nuclear strike forces.

Q

Iitportance of Pact HRTKF

force, hiscd

and Eastern European operated nediuai andopposite NATO havebited

stantiaj jrovtfi They are ef in*realfin#

considering the numerical balance of Pact arid NATO theater Bticlear forces.

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L

Comparison of Pact an NATO Theater Nuclear Forces in Furopc9

Ey !

NOTE: For all line items, the first figure indicates number ofdelivery systems, and thehe number of weapons.

ORA. l

(jysteins Over0 Iffl)

Mediun-Range

(Systems lpn KM0 KM]

SLUM

KS/IKSH

Aircraft Total

Soviet

3

I8)

AVrtTKtH

Other

Short-Range (Systems UnderM)

)

..i

Rockets

Tubes,

Other1

Total

ui

288

72

952

NATO

ll.ii

Hill

Concap* ,uaad lal al

not Included.

aoqraphlc area Included In European WATO. iMtim europe. tha eloht weetern-inoet military dlatrleta ofUnion, the two western LRA commands, and tha three wtstern Soviet flaat if;

ncludaa rraneh' U>

Some "central tyatewi" alsalleUK arid*

Excludea

TeawaltMd to SACCUR. but already taken account of aa central eyat

a. tn accordanceIRM-Sa. only "SACetlR nuelear-taafced aircraft ir* counted rather than nenuJially nuclear capable. Tor tha Fact, only thoae aircraft for which nuclear trained pllota are currently available are counted. Counting baaed -jpor. nominally nuclear capable aircraft would reault In Pact/Wo totals ofdelivery ry items, respectively.

LO* laonch rails on Soviet ships, submarines and missile

a. Hlke-nwreulee *Am modified toonrijiri ly capable of butfecn-tc-aurface strike*.

the recent. Soviet deployment-of nuclear -the Pact has enhanced it?nuclear forces, which now slightlythose of 7

--Soviet and Pact MRTNF now exceed tbi in-place medium-range forces of NATOatio ofn delivery systeas,n weapons. In numbers, the Pact possesseselivery systems capable of deliveringeapons. Over half the delivery systems are dual-capable tactical aircraft, most of which have been deployed within the pastears.

--The significance of asymmetricalis illustrated by the factforward bases in Eastern Europe.can strike practically every targetin Western Europe, while NATOreachew aajor targets on the

western fringes of the Soviet Union.

--These Soviet and Pact medium range sfstemsin arms negotiations which are

defmitionally restricted to LRTNF. tnthe Soviet tactical aircraft are deployed

thr Soviet Union, and are hence not presently

treated in the mbj'r forum.

Projections in Soviet LRTNF

on Soviet LRTNF... As noted earlier,

1 UT

will continue, and it is projected that0 rbe dferaiioRa]

the actual number of delivery system* in this category has decreased This decrease

projection* are based upon the moderate level of effortpattern described inSresultigher level of effort than anticipated retention ofs in the force for arms cditrol

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o .

GRAPH! II

I i

an

of Soviet LRTNF Opposite NATO by Service

i Dy Type oT Weapon/')ro j

i

0

l.otg -

Delivery System by Service

284

307

(45

FT?

233

575

lytTy 9 TW!

4t

!

I

*

*

ALCMi

Missiles RVs

Includti only thott LRTHForSjtnted on Europiftn HATO li ProlfQtlona artvflth Hit

Graphic 1IT

These relatively modest quantitative changes in Soviet LRTNF ere overshadowed, however, byconcurrent qualitative changes in the Soviet force. Principal among these, aredeployments of the Backfire artrjiuni bomber and theRBM.

There are presentlyackfiresth. the Soviet Northwest and Southwestand the three Western fleet areas .owill probably be operationally deployedareasS, and will beequally between Soviet naval andlargely as replacements for older

The low altitude and supersonic capabilities of the Backfire, as weJl as its improved avionics, and its stand-oftf AlCM armament, reader it particularly suitable in the naval strike role, oromplement to ballistic missiles in the land attack role.

The firstRBM launchers probihly became operationalnd aboutre nay thought to be oriented against Europe. It is projected thatill be arrayed against fl|ATOS.

Its three to four independently tar||etableare significantly more accurate than the singlearhead, and its mobile basing mode renders it vastly more surviva^le. It uses solid fuel, and for this and other veasonsaster reaction time than the- The systen probably will ultimately be deployed with two refire missiles.

Graphic IVImportance ofefires

Given currently planned NATO TNF modernizationoviet LRTNF--even withoutSfactor

7 * U 0 ;

of Soviet and NATO LRTNF in Europeith ande<ires',"

WTE: For all line items, the first fiirure indicates the number of delivery systems, and^he secondhe number of weanons.

SS-20

Withefires"

Aircraft

LRTNF

(Tenye-tm Supplemente

fdtal

S

ou(ttm+)

Aircraft LRTNF

Central Syitem Supplements

! j'

i I

BE ,

oviet Projections ere baied upon.ATO TW modemon programs of currently foraaeabla character and nac*.

rojectionefires perauncher. Xt ia fait that that dr tna TO^ZQ torca viTX ba equlppeOinv varheaoe.

projected ehanaea In rraneh thaatar nuelear Invantoriaa. ixthwill probably ba operational, and will provide an additional le mieailaa.

j. an unknown number of Soviet ICBKs and intercontinental ranqe SLBMs may ba targeted on Europe.

a

n on-target weapons. When Tefire aissiles are incorporated into the analysis, this.ratio increases.

Inclusion ofS Poseidon RVs into this comparison is offsetnkn(.wn degree by the "central-system" ICBMs arid-Sl,BHs'which he Soviets are believed to have targetted against Europe.

Graphic V

Implications

-Improvements in Soviet and Pact theater nuclear forces at all levels are important in several ways...

-The growth and modernization ofNT enhance the Pact's ability to vuc war in Central Europe at whatever level NAIO or they themselves choose, without, resort to USSR based bomber or atiss&le forces.

-Once the mobiles deployed in. larger numbers, the increased survivability character-istics of this force will render it practically

This in turn will

enable the Soviets to behave with greaterand restraintear-nuclear conflict.

-If USSR-based TNF are employed, the large number ofarheeds--including retires--and the high accuracy characteristics of that weapon wouldigh probability of prompt destruc tion of targets in Western Europe.

4a*

-In theory these developments increase substantially the Soviet/Pact ability toariety of limited nuclear warfare options--in contrast to previous strategic doctrine whichassive nuclear pre-emptive strike, or response to NATO's first use. In recent years, Soviet planners have been examining such nuclear options and contingencies.

Implications of Soviet/Pact TNF Improvements

--Increased ability to wage nuclear war in Europe withoyt escalating to USSR-based forces.

--If USSR-based TNF are

survivability characteristics ofill permit the Soviets to behave with greater confidence and restraint*

numbers ofarheads/refires and high accuracystlca insure high probability of prompt target destruction*

theory these j

'Enhance Soviet capabilities to execute United nuclear options.

Soviets are presently exploring such

--Currently, however. Soviet planners appear pessimistic about prospects of containing intensity and geographic scope of any nuclear conflict.

--Crowing Soviet/Pact nuclear superiority at all levels could cause Soviets to believe that NATO might be reluctant to employ nuclear weapons in (responseonventional attack.

NATO TNF moderniration programs would.not be viewed as altering these trends.

t j

-These doctrinal reviews notwithstanding, Soviet writings and other evidence indicate that Soviet planners see little prospect afthe intensity and geographic scopeonflict once the nuclear threshold has been crossed by either side.

-Perhaps the most significant isrplication of the growing Soviet and Pactperiority--at all levels--is the prospect that the military advantages to NATO of introducing nut learinto coabat have decreased. he Soviets may believeincreasingly--that NATO might be reluctant to employ nuclear weapons in responseonventional attack.

-Currently programmed NATO modernization steps would probably not be viewed as altering these fore seeableor the Soviets*-favorahle nuclear force trends.

o

Original document.

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