POTENTIAL COMMUNIST IMPACT ON ITALIAN (DELETED) DEFENSE POSTURES

Created: 1/27/1978

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

5

FOP PELEASE DATF.: 4

8

Inpact on an

ftsua* and Fvldonee

aro

thai tight arite froa conoun1st

partlclpolIon In tho govornaents of Italj

partly by the different institutional position* of thecountries nit Mil the KATO alllsnccT)

(Ttaly,atters Integrated military structure, has direct access to sensitive NATO lntoillgonco, dofonso pl-ns, an' nuclear planning information. Any potential for coaaunlit arcen to lM* information, even If seemingly unlikely In cIrcumstancos of limitedin the Italian government, probably would resultutoff of key information and planning data to Italy andarp reduction of Itallan-MATO defense cooperation.

/

Qvl dunce on tho de tense policies ot tha Italian and French Communist parties cones Iron tho public record of statements and writing* of tho parties

^Conflicting pressure! to maintain their Harxlst-Lenlnlst credentials and at tho sane time appeal to ai wide spectrum of Kest European opinion often causes the CoHDiunlsts to "straddle tho fencer" on defonsooor basis for judging what their governing policies would be. o offer the followingthoughts 'concerning Italy

A large segment of Italian society Is reserved In Its support for NATO and Italian defense policies, and Communist (PCI) attitudes on defense questions aro generally shared by Socialists and other parties of the Left. On some issues, the

rci lias supported ihe Christian Democratic Tarty against tho posltluns taken by other leftist parties, 'nd ofipoal tion to th* governaenl.'s defense prograas and NATO Issues is led not by the PCI but by Falco Accaao, tho Socialist chairman of tho House Defense Coonivslon.

y> The chief effectlnor PCI involvement in the Italian governaent (for Instance, control of two or three non-sensitive ministries concerned with Italian Internal matters) would likelyightening of restrictive trends

uxlonslon, Italianwith SATO and tho US.

Theie Includo: Increasingly closenentary control over military budgets and policyenerally skeptical approach toward nuclear weapons and facilities;tvndoncy to distinguish between Italian Interests and needs on the one hand and those of NATO on thespecially with reference to programs which are Instigated

oraal share In power, the PCI would more actively work to place syapathetic and "reliable" persons 'n iapor tant posts--Including senior military ones--throughrut the I

evertheless is unlikely that the PCI would atteapt to undi-rr-ino nllitary discipline or capabilities, or to

legislation to Inprovo livini* conditions and wages and to ilrcngthrn kuldlrrs' civil right* and liberalise disciplinary regulations, tlie Party ha* oppoied sllltary unionism at Inconsis" nil wltli the ro^uirooentt ofdiscipline. ll also haa stopped well short of support of protest nover.ents and aWtaoaat ra-tons Involvingfficers lhat havo beenr iileft-wing fringe groups. Moreover, tho PCI has generally supported paitagw of funds for allitary oodernliatIon program, especially when Italian Jolii aro at slake. PCI parilancntarian* frequently question specific dofonso needs or program, and last 'all they suggested delaying pis.ago of prccuroaent funi. which had not yet been coaaltttd to prograns--yet ihoy hava not played an obstructionist role.tna ex cent lhat ih*s noutrallied lha nilitaryource of oppoiition, it appear* to have succeeded by convincing tho hulk of Military officers. Hko other Italians, lhat PCI In (he government Is a) Inevitable, and

b) r ic-ilarly dangerous

/

.7

ie PCI wcro lo hate? subsf.mt ial control ineuro far-reachingre possible. taken In tho near-tornCI govornmuntho heavily dependant on tho sttltudus andItaly's HATO allies. Tim Party has said that itItaly's nenbcr&hlp in the Alliance andout all commitments. It would probably reviewi; any new or additional conaitoents ln theIt* rnnpl icatod attitudes toward the East-WestEurope/ini opposed to Atlantic or lent at ion, itsto nuclear weapons, and sout lt wouldreluctant ionodiatoly to withdraw units committeduiiMiiT., close down NATO and US facilities,greed NATO weapons progrnns. If, however,deny Italian access to classified Information orNATO /acllitios In Italy, PCI ambivalence towardlikely be resolved, leading to'some kind of break

fnrtrir

Original document.

---

---