a *
* SoViet Long Range Theater Nuclear Forcer.
long-range nuclear forces have Ionsan important part of the Warsaw Pact'sto execute nuclear strikes as linst European NATO. Ten years ago these>asured both in numbers of delivery systeas and on-tar^ et weapons-were comparable in magnitude to Sovietrange "central systems."
! j
I
:
present aix of nuclear systems which the Soviets can bring to bear on the continental United-States and European NATO, reflects the emphasis they have placed on the deployment of modern intercontinental range weapons. Dramatic growth has also taken place, however, in Pact medium-range theater nuclear forces, which have more than doubled
in LRTNF over the pastears has been less dramatic. In fact,number of delivery systeas oriented on Europeaft NATO has actually declined9 and Currently standsevel of0 missiles and medium bombers. However, the number of deliverable bombs, air-to-surface missiles and warheads has increased somewhat and currently totals
- kkm ib and subsequent working groups have employed the NATO Nuclear Planning Group usage with respect to theater nuclnar forces. liroiiRhout this text. Long-Range Theater Kuclear (forces (LRTKT) are thosi theater nuclear systems with missile range, or aircraft radius of0 kilometers. Mrdium-range systems QKTNF) art? those with ranpe or radius of0 kilometers, and short-(pmge systems (SKTXF) are those with ranges of lessilometers,,
date:
Cpaparison with NATO:
magnitude of Soviet LRTNF witt, resnect to
orc"chwgedii.nific.ntly,tothough the Allles.-notsbly the French--
The US Sss alsoH aircraft to base* in.
Graphic II
-Currently the nuaber of ln-placeLRTNI" delivery systeas- as well as weapons -exceeds NATO's
T'lll'b?ut 2bl- n* co-position of the NATO and Soviet force differs greatly, however, asby the relatively large share of Soviet weapons carried by land-based ballistic missiles.
f to**ttwhich concern the US and NATO and will bo the focus of ar-ns control
efforts. In addition, it is the NATip LRTNF setphic which is prejently heine considered for enlargement and modernization.
IaCi NATO LRTKF, the US hisoseidon RVs to SACEUR. The aissiles which carry these weapons are already SALTon"_therefore notubject if
Other long-range forces not represented on this graphic include the FB-lll ardium boiiber force
any LRTNF negotiations.
the US
not repres
U8S SJCLAVT-assigned and other US aircraft carrier nuclear strike forces.
Q
Importance of Pact HRTNF
bouber force, based
and Eastern European operated aediust andopposite NATO have recently exhibited
stantial jrowta re of in*realfin#
considering the numerical balance of Pact and NATO theaterforces.
ill
a
Graphic 1IT
These relatively nodest quantitative changes in Soviet LRTNF are overshadowed, however, byconcurrent qualitative changes in the Soviet force. Principal aaong these, aredeployments of the Backfire srfj'iufli bomber and theRBM.
There are presentlyackfiresth, the Soviet Northwest and Southwestand the three Western fleet areas .Owill probably be operationally deployedareasS, and will beequally between Soviet naval andlargely as replacements for older
The low altitude and supersonic capabilities of the Backfire, as weJl as its improved avionics, and its stand-oftf ALCM armament, reader it particularly suitable in the naval strike role, oromplement to ballistic missiles in the land attack role.
The firstRBM launchers probi>ly becane operationalnd aboutre no* thought to be oriented against Europe. It is projected thatill be arrayed against fl|ATOS.
Its three to four independently tar||etableare significantly more accurate than the singlearhead, and its mobile basing mode renders it vastly more surviva^le. It uses solid fuel, and for this and other reasonsaster reaction time than the- The systen probably will ultimately be deployed with two refire missiles.
Graphic IVImportance ofefires
Given currently planned NATO TNF modernizationoviet LRTNF--even withoutSactor
n on-target weapons. When Tefireare incorporated into the analysis this ratio increases.
--The Inclusion ofS Poseidon RVs into this comparison is offsetnknown degree by the McentrakT*ysten" ICBMsthe Soviets are believed to have ta*getted against Europe.
Graphic V
in Soviet and Pact theater nuclear forces at all levels are important in several ways...
--The growth and modernization ofNF enhance the Pact's ability towar in Central Europe at whatever level NATO or they themselves choose, without, resort to c, USSR based bomber or miss&le forces.
Imp]ications
-If USSR-based TNF are employed, thearheads--including retires--andaccuracy characteristics ofigh probability of promptof targets in Western Europe.
IS
'a
o o
>
doctrinal reviews notwithstanding
Soviet planners see little prospe taining the Intensity and geographic scopeonflict once the nuclear threshold has been crossed by either side.
-Perhaps the aost significant implication of the growing Soviet and Pactperiority--at allthe prospect that the allitary advantages to NATO of introducing nuclearinto coabat have decreased. Consequently, the Soviets nay believe--increasingly--that NATObe reluctant to employ nuclear weapons io responseonventional attack.
-Currently programed NATO aodernitatjon steps would probably not be viewed as altering theseand--for thenuclear force trends.
-6-
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: