NAVY COMMENTS ON OSR SLOC PAPER

Created: 5/26/1978

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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^^LM^RANDJM FOR: John Bird

Chief Naval Operations Branch, OSR

Rear Admiral J. J. Ekelund, USN

National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces

Navy Comments on OSR SLOC Paper

avy has finally cone through and their full coatnentsThere are several pointshink are good ones

The target system and selectivity of targets, isa vast difference which should be recognized.

TirearB model merely doesVics mathematics, iriate detailsxuoed from^imi*.

Other appropriate detail- -iu eluded from this simpleosses to escorts, failure to acquirewould tend to make SLOC less attractive.

of selectedrepresentative writings.

effectiveness is the decision criterion, thenthe Soviets actuallyssets onknow they can't do-in lieu ofj<

exclude amphibious and replenishincnt shipsmission? The Soviets would likely not hold afor this mission but use forces in the interdictionreinforce the eastern end of the lanes whenthem of amphibious convoys.

of mission priorities. What is the effect

j if the Soviet change priorities in accordance with capabilities. * Perhaps theercent level then is more pertinent.

question the Soviet effort to force dispersal of convoy/

ASW assets. We would accept random South Atlantic and east

we did in WWII--with only token force reallocation,

agree that training against escortedis good training against convoys--and even Our current anti-ship attack training is gained ^jfcthrough attacking escorted military formations. question should focus on how much they train at thatmission oriented training. /} s

Attachment: Navy paperl

Original document.

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