EVIDENCE OF A RIFT BETWEEN BREZHNEV AND USTINOV (SR M 78-10044)

Created: 2/16/1978

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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:j CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

SUBJECT: Evidencea Hi ft BeU. Brezhnev ond Ustinov

' Signs.ofotween General Secretary Brezhnev and ^high-jranking Soviet military leaders,Minister of. Ustinov, haveover the last three months. The evidence is in two forms: (I) variations in credit for organizing early Soviet missilo and space programsrotocol slightings of Ustinov; The estrangement follows the initial phaseccupancy of the defense ministry when he and Brezhnev appeared to be allies. If this interpretation is valid, the estrangement could: I

--reduce ;the likelihood of Soviet flexibility In SALT-;

( nderline efforts to improve military disciplinc;

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--affect 'other military policy issues;

--influence our interpretation of Brozhncv's assumption of tho title of Supreme Commander-in-Chl'of.

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Because Soviet; leadership Alignments change,on this analysis remain valid for the short

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Ustinov's Alliance with Brezhnev

It con bo;surnisod from sonsitlvc ond public sources that Ustinov ond Brezhnev wore allied during the former's

memorandum una prepared h"

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first months at tho holm of the Ministry of Defense. One report recounted Brezhnev's manouvors to appoint Ustinov in6 against tho preferences of senior military commanders for other candidates. Another report alleged that Brczhnov encouraged Ustinov's most important known Initiative to date--the effort throe months after his appointment:mprove: the officer corps' disciplinary performance. In overt'sources this initiative came under the rubric of "the Leninist style ofhich Brezhnev had emphasized.ath Party Congress inistorical analogy in Pravda suggested that Brezhnev and Ustinov workod (together in appointing Marshal N. V. Ogarkov as Chief of the General Staff in7

Who Organized tho Soviet Rocket Program?

An unusual'account of Brezhnev's andatellite test launchrinted in Red Star onlso supports the surmise of their allianco because it associates Ustinovew phase of Brezhnev's cult. Brezhnev's supervision of Soviet missile and space programs71 firsta regular feature of his official biographies in connection with1the celebration of his seventieth birthday onhe high point of his personality cult. Strategic Rocket Forces Commander General V. F. Tolubko similarly linked Ustinov ond Brezhnevist of those who had mndo "particularly groat contributions" to the formation of tho SRF (Military Historical Journal,.

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out.

If this evidence implies close association of Ustinov and Brezhnev, then two Pravda articles of7 and8 suggest possible differences between them now. The December article praises Brezhnev's "great organizational, work" on the first Sputnik but ignores Ustinov; the January articlo rccognl.'cs Ustinov fora crisis in the early development of the SRr but omitshe January article stands out because of an approving;commentary over Tolubko's by-lino. In the first December issue of the fortnightly Communist of the Armed Forces,oin listswhore:it contribution" to Soviet rocket .This time ho names Ustinov but leaves Brezhnev

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cparturo from recent practice Ground Forces Commander Generaljl. G. Pavlovskii omitted Novorossiisk and Kerchist of important World War II battles in Military-Historical Journal in Since the two cities received tho title of "hero-city"rezhnev's wartime service there hasenterpiece of his military reputation, osscntialoviet lender's personalityavlovskii's unusual omission of these symbols of Brezhnev's valor suggests his possible adherence

tu Ustinov's sidciin tho rift.

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Proiocol

Two pictures .'of Ustinov published7ed Star8 in central Soviet news-papcrs and magazines suggest the kind of uncertainty about his political status that might resultonflict with Brezhnev. The more striking cose is the earlier photography. It clearly shows Ustinov talking to Hungarian First Secretary Janos Kadareception for the military delegates to the session of the conmittee of Warsaw Pact Ministers of Defense, yet the accompanying text and caption mention onlyact Commander-in-Chief Marshal V. G. Kulikov and his Chief of Staff, General- A. I. Gribkov. The snub to Ustinov is underlined by Kulikov's inferred candidacy for the appointment as Minister of Defense and Ustinov's role in replacing Kulikov as Chi of of tho Soviet General Staff.

Tho second photograph shows the Soviet Politburo ot an awards ceremony. The uniformed Individual prominent in the front row next to Brezhnev isoldier but Ministor of Intornal Affairs N. A. Shchclokov, whose personal tios to the General Socretary reach back to their association in Dnepropetrovsk ins. While Shchclokov's prominent position may be explained by his receipt of an award at the corciuony, Ogarkovoro important modal at tho somo corcmony yet is showness prominont position behind Brezhnev. In some publishedhotograph of Ogarkov taken at somo other time was cut into the negative, apparently

because he was obscured by Brezhnev. Ustinov, whose picture also shows signs of tampering, is in thetoo. Tho incronse in Ogarkov's status after Ustinov became Minister of Defense, culminating in Ogarkov's appointment to the General Staff, makes their common standingjin:this picture especially suggestive.

Implications

The admittedly'speculative evidenceiftBrezhnev and his senior defense officials provides only, general indications of the possible underlying policy issues.i These may include SALT, other defense issues, military discipline, or command and control. *

SALT. Any difference between the General Secretary and tReHinistcr of Defense, the Chief of the Goneval Staff, and the Commander of the SRF are likely to affect SALT policy if only by contagion. An indicator of the possibility that the disagreement may stem from SALT in the choice of the history of missile programs tothe estrangement to elite Soviet audiences. eader's past accomplishments reflecton the wisdom of his currentin tnc some policy area.

A* possible conflict between Brezhnev and Ustinov would moke it more difficult for the General Secretary to convince the Minister of Defense of the need for any Soviet concessions in SALT. This difficulty might be particularly acute if the concessions entailedon Soviet military programs as opposed to tolerance of US programs. I .

Other As Ground Forces commander

Pavlovskii hasto do with SALT than Ustinov,

Ogarkov orhis slight to Brezhnev's war

record suggostswith them, then policy of

more directPavlovskii may be in. dispute.

Military Discipline. The possible ostringcmcnt may also have affocteu the Soviet effort, probably sponsored by both Ustinov ond Hrczhncv, to correct deficiencies in

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militaryhis offort manifested Itself after6 in pointed press criticism of the disciplinary performance of the officer corps. If Brezhnev and Ustinov now have differences, they may not both continue to favor this policy.' plit between them would thus allow moro scopejfor(objections to it. This may explain why7 General Yc. Ye. Mal'tsev, Chief of the Lenin Militnry-Folitical Academy, printed an entirely positive evaluation of the state of disciplineed Star. This reversal suggests either that the campaign against the'officer corps is over or that Mal'tsevtrong'body of opinion that it should end. Other rocont articlos corroborate reduced criticism of the'contral command apparatus originally blamed by Ustinov. Mal'tsev's pretense that all is well undermines the rationale for efforts to improve discipline.

Command and Control. The announcement in7 that Brezhnev was Supreme Commander-in-Chief came amidst unusual attention to tho subject of partyof the armed forces and some uncertainty as to his precise title (in September Marshal Moskalcnko referred to him in print as chairman of tho State Defense Committee, which the Soviet abolished aftor World War II). Tho juxtaposition of public recognition of Brezhnev's military authority and evidence of differences with military officials irto at least two intorr.rotations. The announcement procedod tho signs of conflict by two months and may hove been one source of the differences. Brezhnev probably had not. previously been publicly identified as the Supreme Compandor-in-Chief, and tho added authority implied by tho titlo may be at the expanse of Ustinov's legal authority as peacetime oxocutivc of tho armed forces. Alternatively, press attention to partyof the nrmcd forces suggests that the relative authority of the party General Secretary and the military Minister of Defense may already have been at issue. In this cose Brezhnev's assumption of the supreme commandacticontinuing conflict rather than its resolution. Lutcr signs of difforcnr.es suggest incomplete success for tho tactic.

Outlook

As Brezhnev recovers from his illness during the last half of December, he will have mor* energy topolitical objectives and may be able to overcome any differences between him and the military. In the noar future Ustinov mayore subservient attitude toward the General Secretary advantageous. At the same time, the longer. Ustinov occupies the defense post, the more he i3 likely to identify with his ministry's To the extent that Brezhnev must reconcile military preferences with the needs of other bureaucracies,with Ustinov! aro to be expected. In any case the apparent dissolution of the two leaders' former cooperation exemplifies the transitory character of Politburohenomenon that rendersbased on leadership analysis valid at best for tho short

Original document.

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