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HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS9
Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment8
SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Domestic Politics
March and; April saw Brezhnev monopolize center stage, addressing major domestic and foreign policy problemsay calculated' to show the world at large, includingsome would-be pretenders to his throne, that he isame duck. As has ;been the case since the Party leaderull'work schedule in late January, his health never appeared; to present any real problem for
J Indeed, by carefully pacing hismanaged to project the imagecar-old with little need or desire toimportant domestic and foreign business to
Brezhnev's Trans-Siberian Trip
The highlight of the period was the General Secretary's journey by rail in late March and early April, accompanied by Defense Minister Ustinov and several lesser officials, to remote areas of strategic economic and military importance in Siberia and the Far East. Our views on the variousofday trip were set forth in some detailecent memorandum
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This review ie based on analyaie and reeearoh work completed by CIA'e National Foreign Aegeeement Centsr through Comments on the format and the views expreeeed are solicited and may be addreeecd to
Office of Regional and Political Analyoie,
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In brief, the trip seemed intended primarily toboth at home and abroad that Brezhnev couldigorous leadership role. In addition, it served tothe Party leader's connections with and support from the Soviet military and affordedhance to make first-hand observations on tho economic problems andin theses well as to review combat readiness of forces positioned to counter any threat from China.
way Brezhnev and his colleagues conducted themselves during this period. For; example, West Gorman frustration over Brezhnev's repeated postponementisit to the FRG found expression in statements which may have provided an added impetus for Brezhnev finally to move ahead with this expression of detente policies at work. Thp thrust of these statements,
must represent
was that Kest German Chancellor Schmidt and influential politicians in the FRG viewed the Soviet leadership as old, immobile, and stagnant. At the same time,ere said to believe that new impulses were needed in Soviet-FRG relations and that for this reason Brezhnev and not Gromyko
the USSReeting with Schmidt.
We have no way of knowing the extent to which these statements weighed in the decision, announced while the Party leader was deep in Siberia, to schedule Brezhnev's visit to Bonn for early May. The Kest German trip hadynamic of its own, having been in various stages of planning since
3 This suggests that the West German needleaw nerve. Thus, while the timing appears to have been fortuitous, the dramatic forcing of the issue by Bonn at this particular moment and in this way may have given leverage to those in the Politburo who wanted to push ahead with the visit. .
Other Leadership Developments
It was revealodiin early March that Leonid Zamyatmreleased as TASS director toewly formedInformation Department. This is the firstin the structure of the Central Committeea department with the same name was abolished a AccordingZamyatin's department
will coordinate Soviet propaganda intended ior foreign The resurrection of the Information Department, therefore, mayerceived need to improve Brezhnev's image abroad and to helpagging detente before an increasingly skeptical foreign audience.
This development could well have internal leadership conseouencos, especially in view of Zamyatin's closei.Cis to the General Secretary in recent years. Formation of the new departmentotential competitor of theDepartment, headed by Boris Ponomarev, for the ear of Politburo members on foreign policy issues. Zamyatin is said to be, like Ponomarev, supervised by Mikhail Suslov, who by all accounts is the Politburo member most independent of Brezhnev and most1 skeptical of the benefits of detente.
JOP-SECItE'
esult of these arrangements,to use the Information Department toadvantage will be limited. Theallows plenty of room for frictionspolicy formulation due to the built-inin the two department'sexample, the International Department's mandate tofor "national liberation" movements in AfricaInformation Department's presumed interest incriticism of aggressive Soviet
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Although Brezhnev's trip and the Information Department's rehirth captured the limelight in the period under review, the rest of the top leadership remained heavily involved in their supporting bit parts. Few of the actors, however, stepped out of their accustomed roles, evidentlyto remain as much as possible in the background.
One exception to this was Kulakov's appearance in mid-Aprilajor conference devoted to light industry. The senior Party secretary has given occasional attention to problems affecting the related food industry. He appears to have done so, however, because of his over-all responsibility for supervising agriculture. It may well be that Kulakov has long been responsible within the Secretariat for light industry. Nonetheless, the publicity given to his attendance at the conference last month, though low-key, may have been designed to alter his imagearrowly specialized agriculturalist--an image that Brezhnev played up during an award ceremony in Kulakov's honor last February.
Leningrad Party boss Romanov, meanwhile, continues his rather aggressive self-aggrandizement in the otherwise generally discreet pre-succession maneuvering for position. More than any other Politburo member not based in Moscow, Romanov shows up in the capital to attend ceremonial events and other happenings which do not really require his presence. Such wai the case, for example, at the opening of the Kom-somal Congress in late April, when he was the only Politburo member from out-of-town in attendance.
Romanov also has not neglected his political "tail" during this period. ew days before the Komsomolumber of high-level officials in Leningrad were shuffled
esult of the release of the city's firstresumed Romanov
D The upshot ofis not clear at tnis point, but theresultet gain for Romanov within the Office of
Regional and Political Analysis.)
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Cf.onomic Affairs
Three monthshe Soviet economy remains The overall rate of increase in the growth of
endeinic problems and, in particular, to alleviate the dismal performance of industry and construction.
Energy Policy
An important shift in emphasis has occurred in the USSR's energyallingoncentration of resources on oil and gas Jevelopment in Tyumen Obla.it,
of the Samotlor oil,and Medvezhye gas fields in Tyumen,
the critical rundown of West Siberian oil reserves dueecade of insufficient geological exploration, anU
the steeply rising resources needed to drillmore wells in less productive deposits further from established bases ot support and transportation.
Thohat the regime now attaches to development of its resource-rich provinces was highlighted by President Brezhnev'sday trip through Siberia and the Far East. Brezhnev probably felt that making the trip would put himetter position to understand, referee, and contribute to decisions affecting resource allo-ations in the future if the economy continues to puioorly. j, ,
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To deal with the long-term energy shortage, Andrey Kirilenko, top Soviet secretary for industrial affairs, called for accelerated development and production of light weight, energy-efficient internal combustion engines. These will promote secondary savings of diesel fuel and gasoline which have been in short supply In addition the RED sector has been told with unusual urgency to get energy-saving theory into mass production. However, the results are likely to be disappointing. Recent developments in computers and auto production indicate continuing inefficiency innd increasing reliance on Western technology.
Importing Western Auto Technology
A Soviet foreign trade delegation visited three major US automakers last month to propose joint design,and sale in the Westew Soviet auto. eparture from past Soviet policy which favored the turnkey purchase of industrial facilities. Now, the USSR seeks permanent involvementestern partner who will continuously update technology and provide qualityinspectors. While the opinion is not unanimous, at least some Soviet leaders consider more extensive andWestern participation essential to Soviet productionodern car in.
RYAD Computers
The USSR will soon put intoew family of data processing computers patterned after the. The RYADajor new Soviet advance in general purpose computers, needs advanced integrated circuits from the West to reach full capacity. These may become available if proposed embargo relaxations are adopted. Production of the RYAD II does not cutear technological gap with the US. The gap is even greater when tho variety ofmodels Is compared. RYAD lis will have little short-run impact because the Soviets cannot meet requirements for associated hardware, highly skilled personnel, and proper installation and maintenance at industrial
We believe that in itr push for oil exploration and development the USSR will likely order, this year, Western oil equipment worth up to Jl billion. The Soviets recently8 million dealS firmrill bit manufacturing plant and associated technology.
Rising Soviet oil prices are exacerbating trade and payments problems in Eastern Europe where trade deficits rc-se0 million4 toillionoscow has been helpful in extending ruble trade credits permitting Eastern Europe to divert exports to the West to augment hard currency earnings and providing above-plan deliveries of raw materials and semimanufactures that would otherwise have to come from the West. (
. Office of EconomicResearch.)
Mi 1itary Affairs
Aside from the activity surrounding Brezhnev's trip to the Far East, the military scene was unusually quiet during March and April. The only notable event was the mid-March Kremlin ceremony at which Brezhnev presented awards to top military commanders andarshal's Star on First Deiuty Minister Sergoy Sokolov in connection with histo Marshal of the Soviet Union in February.
Awards were presented to all Deputy Ministers of liefense in commandajor force component except Tolubko, corumandor of:Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. First Deputy Minister Kulikov, commander of the Warsaw Pact Combined Forces, was not given precedence over other Deputy Ministers in the order of presentation but was listed last. Sokolov's promotion was long overdue, Tolubko'sfrom the;award ceremony is unexplained (though he may have beennd the slight cf Kulikov detracts :ven further from the image of fair-haired young aspirant to the top military post that he projected as Grechko's chief of sta.f.
All this is very tenuous evidenceubtle shifting of power within the high command s'nee Ustinov'sas Defense Minister that will bear further watching.
Office of Regional and
Political Analvsis.)
Original document.
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