Brezhnev Trip
This paper examinesyear-old man who has justinter of uncertain health would enbark in late Marchday, bone-rattling trip by rail from Moscow to Vladivostok.
It concludes that the trip underscores the importance the regime attaches to its resource-rich provinces and reflects tho genuine concern that exists in Moscow over reports of wasteful mismanagement in these distant regions. The trip also provided an opportunityirst-handof the state of civilian and military morale in these remote outposts andhance to review combat readiness of forces positioned to counter any future threat from China.
As important as all these reasons are, the paper questions the need for Brezhnev to have become personally involved in such an arduous journey. It speculates that Brezhnev chose to go because ho perceived theinter of rolative inactivity--to demonstrate his ability toigorous leadership role.
This memorandum uaa prepared in the Office of Regional and Polltioal Analybto. Lommtnza an i: are weloome and may be addreeeed to
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There was some risk that these procedures would work against the image Brezhnev was trying to establi At least twice during the trip, local party officials seeking to meet with Brezhnev had to be turned away.
Brezhnev's long winter indisposition was potentially more politically damaging1 because it followed mounting concern among Soviet officials at all levels about the state of the economy. This concern boiled to the surface at the December plenum, which by all accountsery critical assessment of the situation.
The plenum approved an economic plan8 whose goals for industry implicitly acknowledge that manyfive-year targets are beyond reach. Thisof the limitations besetting the economy isin tho tenets that Brezhnev, according to Pravda, advanced for mooting the situation. First and foremost, Brezhnev urged "the careful, rational use of all that we have at our disposal" and the conservation of metal, raw materials, electric power, and fuel. One active measure of tho plenum that has come to lighthift ofto oil and gas development in Tyumen Oblast at the expense of enhanced recovery operations in the older Urals-Volga fields.
In retrospect, it seems likely that the plenum also decided that the party shouldore direct role in the management of government affairs. After the plenum, the role of party secretary Kirllenko in the oconcnic sphore became more conspicuous, and his actions further raised tho status of the partyis the government in this area. Three conferences of party and government officials that were convened in the Central Committee and chaired by Klrllenko, for oxample, rovealod new party
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assertiveness in government affairs. They examined construction, the development of fuel-efficient engines, and the railroad system, focusing particularly onand an inter-sectoral approach to problems. The conference on railroads was accompaniedentral Committee resolutioneningrad initiative to improve transportation by allowing local party officials to coordinate economic activity acrossjurisdictions.
At this point, it appears that the increase in party involvement in government matters is more an exhortative effortrelude to new major economic decisions or actions in the near term. Brezhnev's performance during the trip seemed to typify that approach. He did not offer his audiences, in the speeches available to us, any new answers or proposals for dealing with their economic He gave the impressionoaderact-finding mission who wanted to rally enthusiasm and discipline in the Soviet Union's far-flung economic outposts. In response to complaints from local leaders about economic conditions, he offered some strong admonitions, directed as much to ministerial officials in Moscow as to officials on the spot.
It is possiblo that certain elements of the Soviet leadership sense that some changes are needed but are stymied because j;
--they cannot agree on what should be done, or
--they are meeting strong resistance from vested regional and organizational interests to any change.
Under these circumstances, Brezhnev might havethat he would beetter position to understand, referee, and contribute to any future decision after he had made first-hand observations and contacts in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. If tho economy continues to flounder, as seems likely, the pressure to 'do something"ime when Brezhnev's political stamina may well be declining.
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Military Aspects
The high-level military representation in Brezhnev's entourage was indicative of the high priority assigned to defense-related aspocts of the trip. The military cast of the group also had political connotations. The presonce of Defense Minister Ustinov--the only Politburo member to travel withraphic impression of unity of views between the two men. This picture of unity underlined the General Secretary's ties to and support from the military, an important element in his political strength. In addition, Brezhnev's speech from the deckruiser off Vladivostok once again dramatized the General Secretary's role not only as chief spokesman for detente and SALT but also as Defense Council chairman, providing implicit reassurance to the domestic audience that Soviet defense capabilities would not be unacceptably weakened in treaty negotiations.
Ustinov's presence on the trip also gave riseew Moscow rumor that he is being groomed to replace Premier Kosygin, who has repeatedly been reported asto retire. Kosygin is not actingan who.to retire, however, having in late March made his own inspection tour of Nest Siberia.
The military "whistle stops" of the trip, meanwhile, seemed sufficient justification for the presence of Ustinov and several flag officers in the Brezhnevumber of defense installations wero visited, and at least three exercises
Unlike Brezhnov's comments to industrialremarks at defense-related sessions
gave tne impression that tho Brezhnev party was fully satisfied with what they saw. This is in accord with tho Soviet leadership's reluctance to admit any kind of military weakness, but Brezhnev and Ustinov undoubtedly loctured thoir military hosts on the need to tighten discipline and on the importance of training and urged them to place more emphasis on the conservation of fuel and other rosources.
- I The morale of the military personnel stationed in the Siberian hinterlands was not mentioned, but we suspect it is an issue that .troubles the Soviet leadership. from tho HIG pilot who defected from Siberia in6 indicated that living conditions for Soviet forces there were harsh and, when combined with their dreary day-to-day routine, had contributedery low state of morale.!-
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Brezhnevidid address this problem in appearances before civilian audiences during the trip. He told party leaders in Vladivostok that it was necessary toreat deal about "how to secure cadres in the Fare complained about the "fluctuation of cadres" caused by shortages of housing!and other amenities and urged local leaders to make warm clothing and other goods available for those who must work in difficult climatic conditions.
It seems likely that these issues were also discussed in private with local military commanders. This theme has lately figured prominently in military propaganda, bothajor military conference over which Ustinov presided in late December and in speeches Brezhnev and Ustinovon Armed Forces Day in February.
The China Angle
Brezhnev did not publicly address current problems in Sino-Soviet relations during his travels.C
3
This show of fotce amounted to an unspoken warning to Peking of Soviet determination to protect its territory along the border between the two countries. It took place only four days after; an authoritative editorial article in Pravda had rejected the PRC's latest demand that the USSR pull back its troops from Mongolia and all along tho Sino-Soviet border and reduce its military strength there to levels that existed in the.
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Conclusion
ftlC is -obvious tihat'the USSRargethe efficient' development of its naturalSiberia*and the Soviet Far East. It is equallythese resources must, have adequate militarythat the region's proximity to China makes thisof special concern. For these reasons alone,leadership must have felt compelled tointerest 'in an active way in the.specialand security problems that the populationregion
It is more difficult to explain why Brezhnevneed to bocome personally involved. The argumentmade that to convince the people who inhabitregions that they are not being neglected andsame time impress upon them that the centralbe monitoring their performance closely, nothingas effectiveisit from number one. Whilesome merit 'to thisisit by otherthe leadership'-particularly those who could bringlocal.problems--probably Would have
:
'Brezhnev has done almost no domestic travellingpast three, years, and never has herip ofand duration. The closest analogy wasir to the .Siberian grain fields, which later wasa successful-effort'to rally maximum efforts totheven neasurod by the standards ofup as an unusual lour de
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that the overridingecision to go on the longest train Iride offhis^life^'was to enhance his own political stature.^'AfteT'-'a'period' of semi-detachment from normal leadership activities, he became--as if :to quiet rumors about^his-reduced-capacities--superinvolved. Perhaps to convince-those who! might', still have harbored lingering doubts about his endurance, Brezhnev showed up at the open-ing;ses"sionVOfiVtheupreme Soviet the morning aftereturned fromf*-; ' :i
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rezhnev's trip!to tho other side of tho USSR offers 'not^nlyvan:immediate payoff in his popular image, but -'- also an opportunity?ern, political dividends.'
Hp is likely to expnnd thfi Siberian theme in' future pro- ;
nounceaents--perhaps!entral Committee plenum'that I;
night occur later thistreat itajor
element ineadership role. He is nowosition;
to take credit for the economic growth that is bound to
occur.in Siberia and the Far East and for the contributions
ake to the -country's economy.-i
'if Brezhnev did feel vulnerable before the trip,military features of the journey, andpresence, offered considerable comfort. isplay of military support of thishis personal political advantage. He also Is awareheavy anti-Chinese sentiment that exists in theof the party, and the govornment, as well as ofapproval that his travels along the disputedhave evoked back home. Finally, Brezhnevreturning to'Vladivostok--the site of hisdisarmament' achievement--not only to remindof his past accomplishments but to restateon SALT prior to the Vanco-Gromyko
In the end, the trip proved that Brezhnev still can be as active as any Soviet leader needs to be. There was no hint, however, that'he Is considering major decisions orout new ideas to solve the particularly difficult economic problems that, are on the horizon. In retrospect the tripubstitute for new policieseffective |arid politically acceptable answers are not atrS^UtUa-i!
mcM' Brezhnev's leadership abilities'mayxontinuei to be questioned, but in the aba of new ideas from other elements of the leadership, his position is^not-likely. tD-be seriously challenged is lo as ne is at)le;toeasonably vl por-mii
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Original document.
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