THE SOVIET ROLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: KEY JUDGMENTS (ER M 78-10364)

Created: 5/30/1978

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

MLMOKAHOUM

Atttached fis our contribution to 'The*/Soviet Sole in Southern Africa, which will be transmitted.to Reginald Bartholomew, Acting ^Deputy. NSC StaffIf you have further questions please'Contact

of Economic Research

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As Btated:

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CIA HISTOpf/Vif

Tho Soviet Role in Southorn Africa Key Judgments

The USSR in recent weeks has clearly shifted its attention toei;ianh.order to polarize the fluid settlement situation;there !and to maintain the momentum of recent Soviet successeshe Horn of Africa and in South' Asia.

Soviet's'areore activetransitional governmentand are apparently pressuringto allow on increased Soviet ondin

Soviets also have become increasingly impatient with tho low level of guerrilla activity against President Smith's interim government and are trying to spur military strikes against Rhodesia by the Zimbabwe African People's Union.

Recent emotional exchanges between high-ranking Soviet *

officials and Kaunda and^Rhodcsian nationalist leader Nkomo indicate

t if

that Moscow is extremely uncertain about.the reliability of both

,

The Soviets were deeply suspicious of

travols to Washington and London and did their

est to prevent the visits.

Soviets' are similarly disturbed with Nkomo's contacts .within tlio Salisbury government

and with the West is well as hisclose the door to dome futurethe internalmilitary assistance to the frontline statespatriotic front has also increased in recent months andhave taken on greator advisory and support functionsguerrillas.!;

Soviet arms transfers to BUb-Saharan Africa reached an all time high last year with0 million worth of arms delivered tolack African countriesL

The USSR is now the largest supplier of arms to the area.ew new Soviet arms agreementsurfaced thus far in

Moscow's greatest concern at the moment appears to bo with Nkomo's unwillingness to use hio military forces against Rhodesia and with Knunda's travels to Washington and London. esult, tha Soyiots launched an emotional propaganda exercieo several weeks ago to convince both Kaunda and Nkomo to change tl elr taction and to demonstrate that tho USSRand not the UScan best servo their interests. '<

n early May, Soviet Ambassador Solodovnikov told Kaunda that tho US intended to overthrow

his govormuont whilo ho woa uuc ui tno country.

Solodovnikov's remarks were parteavy-

handed Soviet offer to press Kaunda to cancel his trip. |

The Soviets then told both Kaunda and Nkomo that

the US wasoordinated serlos of

ii.f''. rj" |

military strikes against "progressive" forcos

in Africaparticularly Southern Africa --

that wouldhodesian attack into Zambia

to wipe out ZAPU bases. Other alleged US targets

were Ethiopian positions in Eritrea, Katangan positions in Angola, and SWAPO bases in southern Angola.',

Nkomo was told that the only way.to forceto give up or at least postponewas to launch his own full-scaleRhodesia as soon as possible. assistance in order to launchoperations and agreed to arrangeairlift to ZambiaAPUrecently finished Cuban trainingi; *; i

The chief of ZAPU's military wing was givon the same message and ho agreed to allow Cuban officers to lead the contingent upon their rbturn from Angola,.

may also Involve delivering tho ZAPU guerrillas.iven-ZijPU's poor military performance thus far, j

the Soviets would presumably want'the

f*.'v j,*tf.

contingent;to. bo proservednit and would

favor an immediate military campaign to ensure '!

that the talents of this force were not wasted.

The Soviet fabrications of US intentions in southern Africa,

which were highly emotional and paranoid in both tone and detail,

strongly suggested that Moscow will make every effort to press

Kaunda to accept increased Communist military involvement in Zambia

and to convince Nkomowho arrived in Moscow on Tuesdayto step

up military pressure along the Rhodosian border.

- The Soviets presumably realize that, because

of the patriotic front's poor military performance

thus for, they will havo toreator

advisory.and logistics role in order to provido

a serious obstacle to the internal settlement.

In addition to airlifting the ZAPU guerrillas,

the military equipment on thoay include

air-defonoo equipment, which is Zambia's most

pressing need, or {_

^Ariditionnl Soviet

r

military technicians will soon QLxxvcpresumably to. train Zambianu and/or zapu forces on the use of the newly deliveredoscow would.presumably favor-active hostilities

on the border with Rhodesia in order to make both

'i

Kaunda and Nkomo more dependent on Moscow for

additional military assistance and to limit ZAPU's

political, options.

Moscow would certainly have Castro's support in any effort

to enlarge the Soviet and Cuban role in the Rhodcsian conflict.

The Cubans have already taken up defensive positions

along Mozambique's border with Rhodesia and are

training FRELIHO forces. ubans ore

working'with ZAPU guerrillas in Angola and others

- will presumably join theoho are already

at ZAPU camps in Zambia. An unspecifiod number

of Cubans are also training SWAPO forces at camps

iri Zambia and Angola. .

'We have.ncTevidence to support Kaunda'a contention^

Castro is moving several thousand Cubans

into,Mozambique to man tanks, long-range artillery,

and MIG

Wo do bolieve, however, that if th<3 frontline

statesavana would deploy additional forces

to help defend them and that small numbers of

Cuban-cadres would bo willing to accompany guerrilla

units into Rhodesia from Zambia or Mozambique.

Auresult of Soviet military deliveries, xicoty capabilities of tho frontlino states have been significantly upgraded In recent months and incroased amounts ofow in place for any expanded Cuban presence.

ilitary deliveries to Angola have boonlate last year when the Soviets movedAngolan and Cuban forces foroffensive against UNITA forces. alsoajor entrepot fordestined for SWAPO bases inand ZAPU bases- InDeliveries to Tanzania are expected toyear

Dar

es Salaam is also tho major offloading point for military eguipmert delivered to SWAPO and tho patriotic front.We havooticoable increase in tho size and activityumber of Soviot/Cuban military training facilities in Mozambique, this year. Soviet First Doputy Dofenoo Minister Sokolov visited tho carapo last month. Hecent deliveries include

- Zambia has signedagrcemonts

with tho Soviets during tho past year, prompted in part by Rhodesion raids on ZAPU bases insideecent deliveries have

Recent Soviet commentary defending their interestsouthern Africa has led to intensive criticism of US actions there, including tho revival.of personal attacks against the President which had not been evident over the past several months.

Both Pravda and Izvestia accused thoblasphemy for attempting to thruBtway of life on Africanwhile racial incidentslaceown

Tho central press blasted tho Western military role in Shaba province with tho US drawing the major sharo of Moucow'b criticism despite the more obvious military rolo played by Franco and Bolgium.

Compared to coverage of lost year's events in Shaba, Soviet media are being orjhoctrtitcduch higher and more authoritative koy in

ordor to seize tho propaganda initiative ond to register tho depth of Moscow's anger with tho President's charges. Tho acceleration of Moscow's efforts to polarize tho fluid Rhodesian settlement situation as well as to increase its own role In the crisis there indicatos that tho Soviets aro casting ubout for still another opportunity to consolidate their influencerecarious African situation. Soviet actions thus far do not indicate that Moscow is deterred by tho more difficult situation that it faces in Eritrea, Angola, and now Rhodesia. Nor is it likely that tho Soviets will bo intimidated by US opposition to tholr actions. It is possible that tho Soviets believe that there are compellingfor protecting their oquities in Africa because of such recont setbacks in tho Middle East aa the Sadat trip to Jerusalem, tho failure to consolidate "rejoctionist" opposition to Egypt's policies, and the inability to exploit Israel's invasion of Lebanon.

Original document.

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