SECRET SEWffTTIVE Noforn-Noarontract-Orcon
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LETELIER CASE
Central Intelligence Agency Hational Foreign Aaaeaaaent Center
6 Key Judgments
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disclosures In the investigation of the nurder of Orlando Letelier, former minister in the Allendeand one-tine Ambassador to tha US, have raised the possibility that the crime will be linked to the highest levels of the Chilean Government. The sensationalhave evoked speculation about President Pinochet's political survival. We believe that Pinochet has achance of riding out the storm, hut if enoughevidence comes to light, his support from the military could begin to slip rapidly.
Government reaction to proof of Pinochet's complicity in the Lateller slaying might take one of several courses:
attempt to institute awith charges that the US is trying to destabilize the regime.
n effort tocapegoat who wuuld draw fire away from the President. .
acknowledgmentonnection with thewith tbe explanation that the actionbecause Letelier was plotting
ecognition that Pinochet is guilty, foliatedilitary decision to force his removal.
Pinochet would not be deposed unless discontent became widespread in the army and even then only after much soul-searching by its leaders. There is no easily identifiable
candidate in the wings, but an army general would most likely be named to head an interim junta. While military leadersstrive toonsensusuccession formula, the present junta leaders would probably beto step aside also.
A new president would probably attempt to heal the wounds cau.ied by the scandal, but divisions might, occur within the armed forces over the appearance of bowing to external pressures. Nevertheless, planseturn to constitutional norms would probably be advanced. Public outrage ovar the revelation of transgressions by high government leaders could leadore rapid transition to civilian rule.
President Augusto Pinochetotentiallychallenge to his continued leadership as the complex Letelier assassination probe continues to evolve. Letelier'e murder in Washington raised immediate charges that Chilean intelligence agents vere behind the incident. Recent developments suggesting that the death might be traced to high Chilean officials have caused shock waves in Santiago. Describedunta member ashileanhe controversy threatens to engulf thealong with intelligence and security officers. If tbe president's complicity is proved, it would have grave political implications, such as triggering militaryfor Pinochet's resignation and compelling Chile's generals touccessor.
At present, Pinocheteasonable chance of holding his ground. Although there is grumbling among mid-level officers, the army does not appear to bedissatisfied with the President, and most military men appear willing to accept his claim that his "hands are clean." Only if the scandal reaches considerable magnitude, with indisputable evidence'of high-levelwould thereubstantial shift of sentiment against Pinochet. As long as the army remains behind him, there is little chance of his being unseated. Over the past four years, the Chilean armed forces have strived to preserve internal cohesion in the face of difficult social and economic problems and worldwide hostility. So far, dissent has been limited to low-keyed criticism of recant policy decisions. Military reluctance to move against Pinochet would be strengthened by fears ofand unsettling political and economic reparcus-
sions.
Clouding tha outlook for Pinochet is the possibility that former intelligence chief General Manuel Contreras will bo linked directly to the crime. Public disclosure of Contreras'through his own admission or in courtbe almost certain to implicate Pinochet and irreparably damage his credibility within the military. None of the government's critics and few of Its supporters would be willing to Bwallow claims that Contreras acted without presidential concurrence. The former secret police chief is known to have reportedto the President, who had exclusive responsibility for the organization's activities. Some generals mayharbor suspicions about Contreras1 involvement in illegal operations and probably question Pinochet'sin the matter.
' Contreras will be the key to how the Letelier case unfolds. It is problematical whether he will be prepared to tell about the dark side of the regime's activity if tha investigation surfaces information authenticating DINA collusion in plotting Letelier's murder. Past loyalty to Pinochet is no guarantee that Contreras would withhold sensitive details on operations authorized by the President, especially if he thought he were being taggedcapegoat. If Pinochet declared publicly that Contreras had lied to him, thehas now resigned from thebelieve that he has little to lose by divulging closely held state secrets. disclosures embarrassing to Pinochet could rapidly make his position untenable. Pinochet might try to buy Contreras* silence by promising some sort of immunity or arranging his departure from the country. Contreras ia not likely to attempt to shift the blame to lower echelon DINA minions.
Another aspect of the case that could be detrimental to Pinochet is the tie that has been made publicly between the Letelier assassination and the similar death ofCarlosarmyancar bombing in Buanos Aires inhis and the attempted shooting of exiled ChristianParty leader Bernardo Leighton in Rome5 have provoked speculationossible pattern of assaspinations. Opposition elements have accused DINA of masterminding all three operations. Prats allegedly was about toook vilifying the role of Pinochet inonstitutional government. ave charged that Prats was also activelyhilean exiles conspiring against Pinochet. In any case, any disclosure that Pinochet authorized tbe death offormer army commander would create serious doubts within the military about the President's competence and Irrespective of conflicting attitudes within the armed forces about Prats' role in stubbornly opposing interventionany military officers would suspect Contreras of ordering the killing and would havecountenancing the idea of DINA conniving to bring about tho deathellow officer.
Details of the Letelier slaying and other allegations of DINA misdeeds may unfold slowly, but the cumulative effect could be to place Pinochet in an excremelyposition. In the eventull-blown scandal, the reaction could take one of several forms:
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The government could resist pressures to ferret out new leads and attempt to cover upinvolvement. It might also counter by accusing the US Government of instigating an anti-Chilean campaign to destabilize the regime. Some hardline generals already harbor qualms about Pinochet'sin illegally handing over Michael Townley to.the US and presumably wruld be opposed to further concessions that might compromise the government. This course would risk additional damage to relations with the US, but it might find substantial backing in view of the poor prospects for an earlyin any case."
Pinochet might decide to shift the blame to some DINA officials, arguing that the excesses occurred without his knowledge. Ke could buttress this line by noting that DINA was abolished last yaar anderies of reforms had been instituted to guard against further illegalities. Anyoneof criminal actions would presumably be tried under Chilean legal procedures rather than extradited, but even this might expose the government torevelations. Even if the public were to accept Pinochet's professions of his own innocence, there
ia the chancecapegoat would not cooperate and would divulge information harmful to tbeand some of his close advisers. This course would also heighten the chances of military Some elements might worry about their own necks; others would find it reprehensible for their superiors to try to escape responsibility foroffenses.
confronted with incontrovertiblethe government might face theonnection with thebut try to vindicate itself by contendingwas conspiring against Pinochet. Thisa desperate pitch to rally domestic supportalmost certain outburst of indignation in the
US and other countries. More important, it iswhether the Chilean Army or public would accept the story, leaving Pinochet outimb andto growing domestic censure.
the most difficult circumstances,forces might recognize the culpability ofleadership and attempt to force Pinochet's
ouster. Pinochettubborn, canny individual, .however,harp instinct for survival. He can be expected to play off one group againsto protect himself and to'employ deftly the assets of his authoritarian regime. Security officials, chary of opening the dooride-rangingof alleged regime misdeeds and illegal abuses since3 coup, could be counted upon to side with Pinochet, but again, the potential for anmilitary schism would ba high. Pinochet's removal in disgrace -rould undercut the moralof the armed forces. It would most likely so stigmatize them that any new junta leader would be compelled to accelerate planseturn togovernment. The military's efforts would be turned to salvaging what dignity it couldumiliating plight and exonerating the honor of the institution if possible.
Pinochet's ouster would require Chile's austere 'generals toarge measure of pride; it would not be an easy task for them and would require as much soul-searching as tie decision to intervene against Allende. Moreover, should the army move to replace the President, there is no obvious successor in the wings. The choice would be determined in large part by how badly thewas tainted by the scandal. If Pinochet and other senior officials were judged guilty, pressures would grow toore moderate oiricer. Public opposition to Pinochet has not been formidable, and indeed heto enjoy substantial support among the populace, but criticism of his policies could prompt sentimenthange.
'. Navy junta member Admiral Merino is nominally next in line for the presidency, but he is not likely tobecause of the pre-eminence of the army. Air force chief and junta member General Leigh is ambitious, but his chances are likewise not rated high. He is awho has openly aired his disagreements with Pinochet, but apparently has no clear political program and little real following. While the army might feel the brunt of criticism in the event of Pinochet's downfall, we believe that it would still be able to retain the presidency. The other services are likely to come under some fire for their own roles in abuses that occurred after the coup. The public uproar likely to occur ifomplicity became explicit would be likely to reinforce military attempts to maintain collegial unity and to work out an acceptable succession formula.
Pinochet has edged aside most of the potentialfor his job within the amy. The nigh command would probably turnoderate, active dcty general not too closely linked to Pinochet. Corps commander General Nilo Floody and the military rector of tbeof Chile, General Agustin Toro Davila, have been mentioned among the potential front runners, although the field appears open to others as well. 'of these men reflect the conservative viewpoints of the armed forces; they are well disposed toward the US, and General Floody recently served as military attache in Washington.
PinochetGeneral Sergio Covar-
rufciao. chief oi the pfevidential staff, an his heir Covarrubias has little seniority, however, and his nominationtha retirementumber of senior generals. Moreover, whileis respected in some circles for his abilities, he is also looked upon with suspicion by senior officers because of his close ties to Jaime Guzman, an influential young civilian adviser to the President, and the ideological spokesman for the corporatist guild movement that has staunchly backed the military regi-e. They distrustbecause of his role in persuading Pinochet to adopt recent liberalizing measures. In Santiago,|
le President was consideringTeirnquTsnin^orTice favor of Covarrubias. We believe Pinochet jsthis idea in order to intimidate military leadertt critical of his handling of the Letelier case. The Chilean leader may also be trying to use the threatovarrubias presidency to persuade Contreras not to reveal anything incriminating, since Contreras strongly recents Covarrubias, whom he blames for forcing hisfrom the army after widely publicized charges that Contrerasand in the Letelier murder.
If Pinochet falls, the present junta would probably be forced to step aside also. Military leaders might hopeomplete change of faces would give thea fresh start in improving its image. ew president would probably emphasize the interim nature of military rule and promise to advance the process of reconstituting democratic institutions. This is by no means certain, however, because of tbe authoritarian leanings of many officers. Military factions with strong nationalist inclinations might chafe at appearing to crumble under outside pressureapid transition to civilian government.
Residual opposition within tho military totho timetable would probably be offset by thepopular demands likely to emerge once thewere opened by Pinochet's- departure. Thosewould be hardw junta to ignore, especially if its presidentoderate. Critics of the military government such as the Christianolitical opening,offering to cooperate in return for pledges ofmovementhorter period of military otheras democratic laboralsoost-Pinochet atmosphere more conducive to increasing their pressure for broader Greater civilian participation inmight be one immediate spinoffhangeover, as the armed forces moved toublic anxious for their return to the barracks and impatient for fullof the political liberties traditionallyin Chile.
Original document.
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