SOMALIA AND INSURGENCY IN THE OGADEN

Created: 5/9/1978

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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La snd Insurgency la tag Ogaden

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g body of evidence that the Scaaalla axe stepping .- orient, acd are_ce^etahllshlae tha clo./-

priorhe Somali

. few weeka. jflSureent

livit^in the Oyaden haa again begun to look aa If It la an organized

rathereries ol Isolated attacks.

The Somalis have reopened ar least oneinsurgent, base cseo fnomalia which vas cloeed last fall during the Ogadao conflict.

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stillofficers In as they have been in the past.

There In also fragmentary evidence that the Soouall svllltary

nary be transferring insurgent emits pressed into the regular a srsry last year beck to guerrilla coeaaend.

general haa taken cc/essand of guerrilla operatlona.

Is trying to laprove ccrairunlcationa links with the

Some arm* and material support is being provided by Somalia to tbe Insurgents, but this is Halted by shortages ln the Somali unite '

Ethiopian sideersisting, significant

level of insurgent activity. The Ethiopians have anuuted counter insurgency rps in the Ogaden and in Bale and Sldano provinces; they have also

flown occasional retaliatory air strikes against targets inside Somalis.

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defeat the guerrillas and restore government tboricy ia Che Ogaden.

logistic

hortage of transport andIo the Ogaden are so great thatforces are currently incapable of undertakingagainat Somalia, as the Ethiopians havedo if that Somalia continue to support the guerrillas.

Siad appear* to ba trying to have it both ways: supporting and encouraging laeurgeae activity in the Ogaden while attesrptlng toforeign critics of Somali lrredentisa by declaring his inability to controlrllla*.

Siad say

he

that since guerrilla activity ls the only to use against Ethiopia, he oust use lt as

Somalia' pride and their desire to show continued opposition to Ethiopian control of the Ogaden undoubtedly bat* weighed in Siad's attitudes, but doatestlc political considerations also influence his actions. Siad hasoup and faces military and popular unrest

in tbe north. He probably fears sore trouble If hethe guerrilla cauae, and be probably could not > force tbe guerrillas to disband even if he wanted to.

failure to consolidate security ln many parts of the Ogaden haa also encouraged the Somalia to believehat, they can kaerp up sizeable guerrilla activity.

In continuing to support the Insurgents. Siad mav he reng.itf tha waa ml3calculation* that led to defeat in the Ogaden last March.

guerrillas canuisance to Addis Ababa, but they will be unable to gain control of the Ogaden by military activity or even to pose enoughhreat to force Ethiopia to make concessions to the Somali inhabitants. Siad's actions could serve, however, as an indirect assist to tbe Eritrean Insurgents.

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