Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the
[nteUiewe Estimate VolumeEstimate
HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
THECENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WAiKINOrON,. MSOJ
Notional Intelligence Officer)
*MORANDUH FOR: Holders of
Sheet for Volume I, Surnmary Estimate
OVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
CONRICT THROUGH THE, Dated8
h?Pen-and-.nk correction should be nade fnf
'ties for Strategic Nuclear, datedebruary
. "Quantity and Quality of US and Soviet fTj^Rr^-RETTRlCfEO OATTTo the TOP SECRET Classification.
Robert R, Bowie Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
'*-tiTPirtiiTiai
1
J
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT THROUGH THE
VolumeEstimate
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following mteMtgence orgontiarions pottkipoled in the preparation oi the Est
The Centred InteBgWKe Agency and tke in'eifcaenee wcaruiahoni ol lhe Deportment) of Stale. Energy, and Detente, ond lhe Notionol Security Agency.
Abstaining;
Ihe Special Auhtant lo llie Secretary lor National Seturity. Department ol Ihe Treasury
Also Partidpoting:
Ihe Anidance Chief ol Stall far Intelligence, Deportmenl of the Army
The Direclor ol Noval Inlellioence. Deporleienl ol "in Novy
Ihe Ai lit-once Chief of Staff. InteD-gente, Deport men! ol lhe Air forte
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p-6te
SCOPE NOTE
Tliis Estimate assesses present and future Soviel capabilities for slrategic nuclear conflict. It estimates the numbers, lypes. and characteristics of Soviet offensive and defensive forces for strategic nuclear conflict and of their supporting elements over thc nexlears. It summari-^es Soviet policies and doctrine applicable to strategic nuclear forces.
The Estimate differs from lhef the past few years in two important respects:
This year thc section of lhe Estimate covering Soviel policy and doctrine is confined lo those aspecls applicable to ilralegic nuclear forces. Questions concerning lhe relationship between, on lhe one hand, Soviei forces and policies for strategic nuclear conflici and, on the other hand, broad Soviel national and foreign policy goals and expectations will be addressed in lhe forthcomingoviet Coals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena.
This year's Estimate addresses for the first time Soviel slrategic forces for attacking targets on the Eurasian periphery in addition lo Soviet forces for intercontinental attack and slrategic defense.
Thus, Ihe Estimate treats lhc following elements of Soviel military forces;
Intercontinental attack: intercontinental ballistic missilesubmarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).bombers, and long-range cruise missiles.
Peripheral attack: inlermediate-range bombers, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs andnd certain older SLBMs.
Strategic defense: ballistic missile warning systems, antiballistic missile (ABM) and antisatellite (ASAT) systems; surface-lo-air missilesighter inlerceplors. and supporting systems for defending Soviet territory againsi aircraft and cruise missiles; antisubmarine warfare (ASW) systems for use againsi nuclear-powcred ballistic missile submarinesnd lhe Soviet civil defense program.
lev 0'
In addition, the Estimate assesses those activities and organizations which support and integrate Soviel strategic nuclear forces. Notable among these are the Soviet command, control, and communications system, the readiness procedures and alert status of forces, and research and development programs.
To meet the needsariety of consumers, the Estimate consists of two volumes. The firstummary Estimate, which presents our analysis of prospects for the strategic environment, summarizes the main developments and trends in Soviet strategic programs, and assesses the implications of future Soviet strategic forces. Thc second comprises five chapters addressing Soviet strategic forces and programs in some detail, along with relevant aspects of Soviet doctrine, policy, and operational concepts. The second volume also includes an annex which discusses our future projections in further detail.
The cutoff date for information and analysis in thc Estimatee have extended this cutoffew instances, however, in order to take cognizance of more recently acquired evidence and preliminary analysis which could affect our judgments about future Soviet ICBM capabilities. These new developments and their possible implications are addressed in the notes followingndnd on
WI-WH-
CONTENTS
Page
PART I: PROSPECTS FOR THE STRATECIC ENVIRONMENT
A Recent Trend* in Soviet Stralegic Program!
Soviet Objectives for Strategic
C Genera! Forecast (or tbe Neatears
PART II MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AND
A. Military
11 Economic Considerations
In Offensive Foices
Land-Based Ballistic
Sobmirine-Launched Ballistic
Future Ballistic Missile
Long Range
long-Range Cruise
in Stralegic
Ballistic Missile Warning and
Antisatellite Systems
Strategic Air
Defense Against Ballistic Missile Submarines
Civil .
Advanced
E- Operational Factor*
Warning and
Command and Control
Targeting and
Degradation of US Intelligencelng
PART III FUTURE FORCES AND THEIR
A. Soviel Policy lor Future Forces
B Frojecltons of Future Soviel Strategic
C Significance of Fulure Soviet Intercontinental Offensive Forces
Quantity. Quality, and Destructive Potential of
Counterulo Capability and Prdaunch Vulnerability of Soviet
Tup Secret
Prelaunch Vulnerability ol SLBMsiombcfs
Itnidual Capabilities of
D. Soviet Peripheral Attack
Capabilities and Limitations of Soviet Strategic
ballistic Missile Warning and
Antisalellite
Strategic Air
Defense Against Ballistic Missile
Civil
Advanced Technology
fflffiSS-.
SUMMARY ESTIMATE PART I
PROSPECTS FOR THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
believe the Soviets look withon the progicu they have made innuclear capabilities over tbc pastears orsee this progress as having provided them withdeterrent and as contributingajortbe recognition of the USSRuperpowerthe United Stales. They probably see theirattack lorces as roughly equal lotheir most formidable adversary, the Unledsee iheir peripheral attack forces as superior toforces of all likely
A. Recent Trends in Soviet Strategic Programs
past yoar Soviet strategic offensiveprograms have continued to displayscope, vigor, and pciibtcncc lo which weattention in previous estimates. Sovietproceeded much as forecast but year
In Ihe offensive field, major currentactivities include: the rnoderalcly paced conversion of ICBM silos to newearly completed phase of SSBN construction; actual or imminent deployment of lhe USSR's first SLBM wiih multiple independently target-able reentry vehicles l. Millprobable initial deployment of mobiles, and production of Backfiie bombeis al somewhat increased rales. Thereomewhat better than even chance that silo deployment of theol id-propellant ICBM has begun, but mobile deployment is evidently stillvelopmental activities include work at various stages on severalor follow-onew. largeaponew aerial tanker andew long-range bomber; ami cruise missiles which may have ranges in eicessilometers For the second conseculivr year wc have concluded that the current gencta-
liou of Soviet ICBMs is somewhat more accurate lhan we had pieviously estimated. In addilton, some of lhe modified or follow-on ICBMs under development are approaching the flight-test stage
In Ibe defensive field, the Soviets' primary recent stress has been on reaearchctivities are under way in ABM and antisatellite systems, giound-basedarge airborneradar, low-altitude air defense fighten and SAMs, ASW sensors, and directed-energynotably lasers Thb year the Soviets have continued working to improve their ballistic missile launch detection, acquisition, andcapabilities. They conducted flight testsigh-acceleration ABM Interceptor. In addition, wc identified far more civil defense shelters than had been known tu eiUt.
B. ProboMc Soviet Objectives for Strategic Forces
n the basis of recent trends, II appears that the Sovieis have largely completed llie expansion phase which established tlie site and compost lion of the stralegic nuclear forces they now possess.ew phase emphasizing technologicalell under way with, as yet. mitedUnkingm ballistic missile technology but, as far as we can tell, little success lo date in advanced HAD in defensive fields, ll alsolhe growing diversity of Soviet command, conlrol. warning, und Other systems to suppori lhe conduct of nuclearthat lhe present phase stresses operational fleiibihty while maintaining highly centralized control
4 We believe thai in pursuing this new phase of force Improvement the Soviets probably have lhe following general objectives for Ihetr stralegic nuclear forces for llw nexlears
1
Coniinuemprove overall war-lighllng and war-survival capabilities, Including what US strategists would call countcrfoice and damage-Umiling capabilities In the Soviet view, such capabilities constitute the besl deterrent. Inthe Soviels sec large, powerful forces as having political ulility and as contributing lo their long-term goals in the competilion with thc West
Ensure that Ibeir strategic fotces and supporting elements will appear powerful In comparison with those of other nations (singly or inwill support thc perception that tltebalance is continuing to shift in the USSR's favor, and will increase the chances that the Soviet Union could emeigeuclear warelter position than the United States. The Soviets piobably do not expect all requirements to be fully satisfied during the period.
Emphasize quality in strategic weaponsanil deployment, bul go slow on sacrificing quantity. The Soviets want to competelo catch up with and, if possible, surpass (lie West, and in any event to avoid falling behind. Tliey will try to achieve quantum leaps in selected technologies.
Improve operational warning and command and control systems and increase readiness, targeting, and atlack assessment capabilities The objective of these ef foi is is apparently to enable lhc Soviels to employ limited nuclear options in theater warfare, lo launch their intercontinental fotces eitherreemptive attack ot in response lo tactical warning, and, if necessary, tocvastaling retaliatory attack- The SovieU seek lo be able lo control their strategic fotcesuclear war which they consider may last for some time.
C. Gcnerol Forecast for the Nextears
vailable evidence and our understanding of the trends in Soviet strategic programs lead us to conclude that:
forces fot intercontinental attack willmore powerful and flexible. Even under constrainls along the lines now being negotiated in the sttategic arms limilalion talksoviet inleiconlincntal offensive strength will grow in relation to that of the United States between now and lhc. Aflcr lhe. Ihe USSR will continueain In some
aspects of strategic offensive potentiaL whilethc relationship between Soviet andwill lend lo stabilize as thcof each side increases. Underadvantages will probably
The Soviets will coniinue to place primaryfor intercontinental attack on ICBMs. Thc threat to US ICBM silos [wsed by Soviet ICBMs will become severe within thc next few years. The vulnerability of Soviel silos will not change much unlil at least the. Alter that, il could increase considerably if the United States deploysCBMomparable system. It is possible, theiefore. that ot some point the Soviets may shift emphasis more toward SLBMs and perhaps mobile ICBMs They might increase their reliance on launching iheir forces upon receipt of tactical warning.
Thc USSR's capabilities for nuclear attack against our NATO allies. China, and other areas on tlte Eurasian periphery will Increase and will remain superior to ihose of its potential adversaries.
Tlie Soviets will almosi cenainly remain unable lo pievent US alert bombers and at-sea SLBMs from being launched.
We expect the USSR to respond to the US cruise missile threat by stressing defenses againsi il. Nevertheless. Soviet capabilities lo counter large-scale air attacks including bombers, cruise mis* Hies, and shott-rangc attack missiles (SRAMs) almosi certainly will remain low thioughout the period of thc Estimate
Soviet forces will temain able to inflict massive damage on the United States and on areasto Ihc USSR in either initial oraltacks At Ihe same lime, il is extremely unlikely that Soviet forces will be able to prevent massive damage lo the USSR from retaliatory US attacks. US forces survivingurprisecounterforce strike would comprise several thousand bombs and warheads having large lethal area and hard-target potentials.
or thcnd beyond, these judgment* arc subject to considerable uncertainty because of the unknowns about future Soviet programs and because present US planning is in flux. However, il .seems clear that, for at least the next few years, the general picture will be oneoviet Union continuing both to
Boer**
and lo develop improved systems whichUs overall strategic capabilities, while the OS effort remains largely developmental. The actualsignificance of increases in Soviet striking power may be debatable, specially in view of the many Soviet vulnerabilities and the retaliatory power of thc United States. But there is likely to be aof
continued Soviet momentum and of strategic trends unfavorable to thc Uniled States and its allies. How and for whal purposes the Soviets might seek lo exploit this perception to their poliUcal advantage will depend on the course and thrust of Soviet foreign policy during lhc period in question. These issues will be examined in the forthcoming NIE IM'
3
- tup Gui.c
PART II
MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS
The development of Soviet strategic nuclcai forces has been and is influencedariety of faclou. some more variable than oihers. Among the more variable factors are thc Soviet leadership'sof Ihc scope, and vigor of developments in US and third-country strategic nuclear capabilities and doctrine, as well as lhc technological progress thc Soviels anticipate in both thc United Stains and the USSR The more permanent factors Include;
A leadership whose strong commitment tomiliiary forces stems from historicalin which such forces have succeeded in defending the USSR, in expanding its influence, and in turning it inlo an acknowledged global power.
A weapons developmenl and procurementwhich stresses continuity and an incremenlal approach to improving slrategic capabilities.
The institutional interests of thc several branches of the Soviet armed forces, design establishments, and military industries.
A military doctrine which calls for ever-beller war-fighting capabilities, supportedolilical perception that strategic nuclear power is central lo the USSR's securily and national aspirations.
A. Military Doclrine
S. Soviet military doctrine calls for capabilities to fight, survive, anduclear war. According to this doctrine, il is essential to acquire and improve countermilitaryIs, weapons capable of attacking nuclear and other forces, command and conirol facilities, and supporting elements. It is also essential to provide for thc active and passive defense of the homeland. Soviet developmenl of haid-larget offensive weapons, continued strengthening of already extensive strategic defensive forces, strategicand civil defense programs are all consistent with ihe main tenets of this doctrine.
he Soviets recognizetale of mutual deterrence is an operative reality loday, but they
publicly reject US notions of slralegic stability and sufficiency. They appatcntly perceive "mutualdestruction" asesiiableasting basis for the US-Soviei strategic relationship They believeuperior Soviet war-fighting capability, including what US strategists would call counteiforce and damage-limiting capabilities, is thc best type of deterrent. To our knowledge, however. Soviet military doctrine docs not meaningfully describe the conditions which would constituteuclear wat, and no Sovicl official has asserted in this decade that nuclear conflicteasible ot practical means forSovicl policy.
lash Involvir
Thc predominant impression conveyed bystatements and actions is that lhc Soviet leaders sec nuclear warisaster lo be avoided if possible. For the foreseeable fulute the Soviets evidently tegard the likelihood ofar as low. They apparently see little chanceS fitst strike, although ihey do nut exclude the possibility. WC believe Soviet initiation of an unprovoked, deliberate first strike against the United Stales is also highly unlikely.
Nevertheless. lh* Soviets arc evidently striving lo beosition where, if nuclear war docs occur, lite USSR can fight and survive il and emerge from itetter position than lhc Uniied States. They areariety of ways thai nuclear war could begin and arc sltucturlng their strategic nuclear forces in ways designed to Increase thc options available to lhe leadership under widely varying crisis and conflict circumstances.
12
Fifteen ot so years
iJassumed that any clash InvolvingStatesand the USSR would immediatelyto intercontinental nuclear war and thatwould be inseparable from thai largerintercontinen-
tal conflict as beginning eitner by escalationheater conflict orassive US surprise attack. In thc first of these citcuinstances, which is clearly considered the mote likely, lhe Soviets envisage an indeterminate period of large-scale conventional war-
Top frmmt
ATO decision lo begin theater nuclear operalions In their view, escalation to the intercontinental level would be likely at any point during the theater conflict, although restriction ol the use of nuclear weapons to the thealerot entirely ruled out. In the second and. in the Soviet view, much less likely circumstance, conflict would beginarge-scale US intercoi.tinenlal strike followed closely by theater nuclearthreatening period" in advance of hostilities bthought likely, at least in lhc first circumstance. Allowance for lhe absence ofade in thc second.
oviet forces and supporting elementsare expected lo be able lo begin strategic nuclear operations in any one of throe ways: preemption, launch on tactical warning, and retaliation Thclow day-to-dayUSSoviet stralegic nuclear forces is consistent with the Soviet-view that stralegic nuclear conflict most likely would occur under circumstances in which there would be"time for increase* In readinessvidenceubstantial portion of the Soviet ICBMapable of quick reaction, even if not routinely maintained at high readiness, and lhat thc Sovicls are making efforts to improve tactical warning capabililies-l
3
B. Economic Considerations
he sheer site of Soviet strategic programs ears be appreciated by estimating what they would have cost if purchased In the United States. In dollar terms
The procurement and operation ol Sovieloffensive forces would have cost about Iwoalf limes what the United States spent, although about one-third of it would have been fur Intrrmediate-range forces having no dllWl US counterparts
Procurement and operation of defensive forces, deluding ASW and civil defense, would have cost aboul seven times what tbe United States spent
- Research and development supporting lbc entire militaryarge but unknown portion of which is applicable lo strategic sys-
tems, might have cost roughly two-thirds more than whal the United States spent.
These dollar cost estimates measure neither the elfec-tlvcness of the Soviel programs, which is mixed, nor their impact on Soviet human und material resources, which is burdensomc-
l.'i. As we noted last year, the Sovicls have longeacelime burden of miliiary expenditures thai is extremely high by Weslern standards and much greater than wc had previously understood. ThcIntelligence Agency now estimates thai lhc overall Soviel defense budget absorbs abouterceni of the Soviet gross national product, as comparedercent for the United States. When measured in rubles, expenditures for lhe procurement andof Soviel stralegic offensive and defensive forces6 constituted about one-quarter of Sovietexpenditures. (Sec figuren Ihe coming decade wc expect thc growth rale of thc Soviet economy to decline, thereby making choices in lhc allocation of so*ice resources more difficult. In Our iudgmenl, however, il is unlikely thai ihere will be any decline in thc recent growth ratecrccnl evident in overall defense spending Were lhc Soviets lo decide to slow llie growth In defense outlays in favor of accelerating economic growth projects, we think it would nevertheless be highly unlikely that planned future outlays for strategic forces would Ire reduced.
C. Developments in Offensive Forces Land-Based Ballistic Missiles
he SovieUCBM launchers atcomplexes asf thaiCBM launchers wereere under conversion, andere in the process of being dismantled as required by the SALT InterimSilos continue lo be converted for lhe newndCBMs at the overall moderate pace projected last year. All three of these new ICBMs have been tested with MIRVs, and most of those deployed are believed to be so equipped. At the beginning of January Ihe Soviets hadilos with these newof them with the heavy SS-ISs. SALT limitations aside, the evidence available to us indicates that the Soviet program has called foruch silos to be operationalALT II limitations would reduce ihis. The program may also include tlie conversion of lheilos for the new solid-propel la nl
Figure i
Estimated Soviet Expenditures for
Estimated Total Expenditures
0 Rubles 70
Research. Development, TesUflfl, Evaluation
C. Percentage Distribution of Estimated Total Expenditures (Calculated0 Rubles)
Slntegtc Force*
u
ttubdlna (uUliuBmoln*ll (itTmit)
urpose. Forces
Support Forces
B-lot.
B. Index ot Growth ol Estimated Total Expenditures for Procurement and Operation ot Strategic Attack and Defense Forces (Calculated0 Rubles)
Strategic Defense Force*
7f;
StraleflfC Altiitk Forces
mc
WWi ij'imi vara
H
a,lainlu-inIlialalata* (ato*all-all.a law So-tn Oa'a-aa kdri
famine
aatina. iM
niMtotal awKava-arai
Hblli^'l 'm^ii-Buiil Ifl tailinl
,, muaai on . lot aa.
a [im (a- aisaa
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has iroi been tested willi MIRVs io date.hows selected characteristics of Sovietvote; Wc have assumed in ouriimted projections of Soviet forces for intercontinental attack that,imitCBMs ol typos counted as MIRVcd. Ihe Soviets would deploy aOS launchers equipped withith.ith SSl7s. (These projections arc addressed inf this SummaryRecent evidence of construction activity at Soviet ICBM complexes suggests that the Soviets art! planning to deploy awhichewerorehan assumed in our projections. For thc implications ol this difference, see the note following
or thc second consecutive year, we have been able lo refine our estimates of thc accuracies ol thc new ICBMs and have learned lhat they arc somewhat more accurate than previously estimated.^
accuracies of these Suvicl ICBMs probably will conlinuc IO be improved somewhat Over the next lew years
hcndave also been icsied with large, single reentry vehicleshese sini-lo-RV variants have good capabilities against hard targets such as US ICBM silos and launch conlrol centers. Tlie individual RVs ol lhe MIRV variants have considerably less hard-target capability because of Their lower yields, but they have more llexiblllty for use against either sofl or hard targets lhan does thchich stillarge share of lhe ICBM force- Our new estimates of Ihe CEPs and yields of thendndicate lhat the MIRV variants of ihcsc two systems have hard-target capabilities thai are about equal to each other and aie somewhat greater than the capability of thcIRVed va 'iant
IA. If thc Sovicls are able to large! two of iheir MIRVs againsi each US silo, they could significantly enhance the hard-target capabilities of their ICBM
Estimated Characteristics of Soviet ICBMs
IRUs
1 RV or . lRVer 1
* MIRVs 0 MIRV* IRVs
c
,3
"TI
im)'
r
MnjI
o Sir nte :
Number ct BVb
Yiotd leach RV) CEP
m)
Operational modo Trlpla Silos Singleo Sinclo Silo Singlo Silo Single Silo Singlo Silo SmgleSllo"
Year operational
"See the ten fe> aol thesums ol ihe
IIJHf-
icoups of SO) ot
1
furce. We estimate that al least the MIRVed variants ol theridould be used lo conduct two-on-onc targeting by either ol two methods: Irom the some booster (in line) or from different boosters (crossll agencies believe that thc in-linewould bo feasible for use in large-scale attacks. Tho use of (he cross-targeting technique would result in sonirwh.it greater damage expectancy against hard target* It would, however, present Ihe Soviets with difficuli but not insurmountable Operational problems Wc have no direct evidence of Soviet intentions lo use cither technique. In this Estimate, therefore, wc treat two-on-onc tatgeting againsi stlosariable lo reflect out uncertainly, and we use tlic cross-targeting technique in out calculations to establish an upper boundomparison of damage expectancies against hard targets using onc-on-one and Iwo-on-one targeting by these and othei Soviet ICBMs, sec figure 3!
ivergent view is that two-on-onc cross-targeted atlacks with near-simultaneous impacts (lhal is, about five toeconds apart)ncrease the probability of the destructionardened point tatgel an: not oitvrationaliy feasible. The holder of ihis view believes that thc two-on-onc cross-taigelingused in this Estimate overstates Soviet hard-target capabilities and that Soviet planners, because of thc large uncertainties involved, would find live high risks of such an attack unacceptable.1
continues to be uncertainty regardingof thcolid-propellant ICBMevidence indicates thai lhe missile isproduced, thoughow rale. Recenius lo believe that thc chances arcthan even lhalave now beenperhapsilos al modified
lOn the other hand, while we cannot confirmcr ot not mobileeployment has occurred, we coniinue to believe that such deployment has been deferred, in part because of SALT considerations. Continuing construction activity al tlte Plesetsk missile test center appears, however, lo be related to tlteobile program, and deployment there could begin quickly.
Soviets have been preparing to deploymobile intermediate-range ballistic missile,initial deploymentew launchers has
The hdde' of ihuhe Auuruni Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Department of lhe AU Foeee.
probably now occurred at llie Insl uJ nine identified mobile ballistic missile base* under consltuction The Soviets havef"
launchers for the SSnd equip each unit with multiple missiles fot refiie put poses. Given the pace of activities to date, ihis deployment progtam is likely lo be completed in lhc caily IttSOs We etpect this modi mote effective MIRVed miuilr eventually to replace most, if not all.e current force oflder IRBMs and MRHMs, thereby improving lhe Soviet peripheral atlack capabilily even though lhe number of launchers will be fewerhowsoverage capabilities and charactetislks of thchcRBM. and IheRBM.)
he range of theould lie extended if the Soviets chose lo do so The greatest eitension could be achieved through the addition of the third stage, pcothocot vehicle, and single RV of thehich in effect would convert lheo anCBM In view of the evidence that theorce is afor existing Soviet MRBM and IRBM forces, we think it highly unlikely lhat the SovieU would plan to modify it for use against the Untied Stales
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
hc USSRarge, versatile, and flexiblle SLBM foice for useioad range of soft taigels, primarily in the Unitedhows characteristics of Ihe principal Sovicl SSBNs andshe SovieULBM launchers onuclear-powered ballisticsubmarines and on Iwo diesel submarines modified lo carry modern missiles Uf these,odem SSBN's and all ofLBM launchers were SALTtlie ceiling permitted lhe USSR undet tlie Interim Agreement. (Thc Soviets also haveiesel submarines equipped wiihaunchers fot older SLBMs. Neither thc submarines not thearc SALTight unlu of tlie new versionf the latest class of SSBN have beenate operational and two are fitting out. These unitsotalaunchers for thc Soviets' fits! MIRVed SLBM. thehich is now or soon will be operational. SALT limitations aside, the SovieU willotceodern SLBMs andodern SSBNs byhen thclass unils remaining in thc construction pipeline have become operational. The presentextension of lhc Interim Agreement may have delayed the start of sea trials ofll and could delay sea trials of one or more others
1
lop Sc-cc*
Figuio 5
ll
o :t
D-l
Y-l
Estimated Characteristics ot the Principal Soviet SSBNs and SLBMs
l
s-ruMt
The Soviel Navy continue*maintainmall number oformally aboutoperaUonal patio) al any given lime. But patrolare being ill versified, evidentlynhance the flexibility and survivability of the force. In addition, since the missileslass submarines can reach the United States from lhe vfdniiy of their home ports, die number of Soviet SI.BMi within firing range of the United Stalesay-today basis has increasedlass units have become operational (Seee do not expect the Soviets to increase the numbers ol modern SSBNs continuously on patrol by more than one or two units within the next several yean. The operation nf ih- nMnIsi- submarines probably will continue Io be limited lo occasional open-ocean patrob or local operalions. Theseprobably aie assigned peripheral targets inEurope and the Far Knit,
26.
SS-NX-10
RV
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r
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Ballistic Missile Systems
8
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mprovements in Soviet ballistic missiles will ) not stop with the currentodifjcd SS-18 IRVcd ICBM (called theJ tested for the first timen addilionQ lot- or modified ICBMs evidently arc sulficienlTy far along in RAD to begin flight-testing within Ihe nrtt few years Modification of sdos ai the Tyuratam missile test center begun in tlie past year Indicates that. SALT limitations of Ihree of these systems is scheduled lo beginear nr so. We believe lhal these and other new Soviet ICBMs will incorporate improvement! In many Icch-nicalnrcas. parlicularly in accuracy.
c also believe thai new ICBM systems beyond those we have identified to dale are being developed for flight-testing withincats.|
jjNot all missiles developed and night-tested will necessarily be deployed.ummary of estimated Soviet strategic nuclear land- and sca-based ballistic missile developments through thc. sec
c continue to accumulale evidenceew. large SLBM is being developed and that an associated new. large ballistic missile submarine is being built. This newystem could reach initial operational capability (IOC) by1 at tlteeapon system IOC date2 is believed more likely; this is two years later than forecast last year. Thc Soviets continue toolid-propellant SLBM. thcsinglass submarine. This SLBM could be installed in additional such SSBNs if they are
1
Estimated Future Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missile Testing Programs Through the'
first ten
Medium.Uie. solid-pioprtlant
Medium-site, liquid-propelunl
Ltigc fiquld-pfopelUnt ICHM {foBowoii id
Modified ot fellowon
olW-enilSSl
m liqutd-propcllint ICBM (tlie clou .wiUin))
IRBM
SO)
luge
omSind/oi
i-oiuideiinK ptntiMc
hehe
imitations
IntendedettauMm lyjfm
' Tfii Director of Ndcel Intelligence. Depi'iirieni of ihe a'si-u. Mleitei iliai !
'fvp Genet*
1.1
-fop-Seeee*-
comparably modified The Soviets could develop and deploy follow-on missiles lor retrofitting into Y-asa SSBNs in
one of thc SLBM systemsor being, tested have or aie expected tu attain thc accuracy and yield combination needed to threaten US hard laigels In thehe Soviets probably will have SSBN navigational and SLBM guidance system,ar with those currently employed by the United States. It is unlikely, however, that anySoviel SLBM system will have the combination of accuracy, yield, and numbers of waihead. sulf Icienl tohreat to large numbers of hard targets during the period of this Kstimate.
Long Range Aviation
song Range Aviation (LRA) Included someisonear aircrafl (of which aboul five Bean are configured as recon-naissancc aircraft andisons as tankers) and aboulackfire bombers. The remainder of lhe LRA force consistsadger and Blinder imermedlate-range bombershows key characteristics of LRAe continue lo believe that over Ihe nexlears iho Sovieis willelatively smallbomber force to complement their large ICBM and SLBM forces and that tbey willuable intermediate-range lumber force. Thebomber loree probably would be used to follow up Inilial ballistic missile attacks on lhe Unitedith strikes primarily againsi pteasslgncdThe inlermediatc-range bombers would bo used primarily for strikes against targetsrope and Asia
The Backfiie bomber continues lo be deployed to Long Range Aviation and Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) unils Asackfires had been built, and production had increased as expectedate of aboutircraft monthly.ormal product sun leatnii* curve and no change in the present allocation of plant capacity, we believe the Soviets could complete somewhat moreackfires byALTgreemeni ihey maintain the current production rale,ircraft would be completed by then We believe that future Backfire defcver.es will be about evenly divided between LRA and SNA
No new evidence which would have helped tn resolve our uncertainties regarding the Backfire's pci-formancc has been acquired during the pjst year, and thc differences of opinion within the Inlelligence
Iimmunity have nut been narrowed. Differingof llie available evidence and differing (ethnical assumptions made by the concerned agencies result in eslimant which range from an aircralt capable of interental operations without air-to-air refueling to one with maiglnal inleicontinenlal en liabilities under the same conditions. 'Althoughreanalyils hai been performed and efforts to resolve lhe differences will continue, we arc not confident that we will be able to narrow thesignificantly, noi are we confident thai we will acquire addilional information in lhe nexl year or so that would resolve thc issue.hows lhe results of the differing technical analyses within thc Intelligence Community.)
ll Backfires observed to date have refueling probes. Air-to-air refueling operations with Bison lanknr* were conducted as part of llie Backfire lesl
use of air-to-air refueling would enhanceapabdit.es for peripheral attack aod naval missions and considerably increase its capability lor Intercontinental operations, even in thc case of the lower estimate of ils performance Rcccni evidence supports thc viewew aerial tanker is being flight-tested and may be In production, the aircraft winch il wdl refuel is not known
There is no direct evidence aboul currenl oi future Soviel inlcnliotu to employ lhe Backfire In Inlercontinenlal nperalions. We believe thai it is likely that Backfires will conlinuc to be assigned to theater and naval missions and thatorrespondingly unlikely lhat they will be assigned lo intercontinental missions We cannoi delude the possibiliiy lhal some irtl tirowing Backfire force would beagainst largeis in lhe United Slates, although ll is more likelyew inlercontinenlal Umber would be deployed for such use If the Soviets decided toubstantial number of Backfiresntercon-tincntal attack, they almost certainly would upgrade lhe range and radius performance of lhe aircrafl otorce of compaltblc new tankers tolitem
A divergent view ts that the available evidence on employment of the Backfire Indicates only that peripheral and naval attack are ils cunrnt primary missions. Since the Sovieis could uie tlse Backfitc's inlcrconiincnlol capabilities al llielt initiative, ihu view holds lhat the Backfire clearlyhreallhe United Slates, even without the deployment of a
compatible tanker force cx the upgrading of the aitctalt's peiforinaoce' There it an additional view that Soviet planners will devwe Backfire missions to use the full capability of the aircraft. Consequently, ln this view, at least part of the Backfire force will have preplanned missions against targets in the contiguous United Slates.*
s we noted last year, there Is limited evidence that Ihe Sovietsew loog-tang* bomber in lhe preflight stage of development,rototype has not been observed and no flight-testing has been detected.ew bomber prototype were completed in thc neai futute and If Ihe Soviet! followed past procedures, the fitsl unit might be opetallona) in lheuch limited evidence us we have suggests that3 would be more likely, but there is considerable uncertainty as to whether the SovieU will actuallyew iiitercontinental bomber
Cruise Missiles'
ho Soviets have considerable experience in Ihe ileveltipmenl and deploymenl of cruise missiles, moslly wllh ranges of lessilometers,ariety of tactical and some strategic applications.0 they began to equip LRA Bear bombers wiih the largeit-lo-su tf ace mosaic (ASM)
Jthesystem tangc of thes crtimalecTlo beilomclers. which could makeALT-aocount-ablc air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) It should be noted, however, thatC
Soviets may aiguc lhat it Is not SALT acceptable
fforts by the Soviets in SALT to impose Ught constraints on long-range cruise missiles suggest that Ihey believe lhal US deploymenl of large numbers of such systems would severely stress iheir ail defense, thai lhe present technological advantage in suchrests with lhe United States, and thatand olhei asymmetries between lhc United Slates and the USSR nuke cruise missile limitations favoi-
f do csw t" lU* lntrikgt*ct Of/Wr.ht AufUM CkttfSuff fcuv Arm,.of Suff.of the Av Font
JU Md- of Ihuottmulht AitUUmr Ckuf of Suff.U Alt Femt.
l thisonemenu inOM nmtlcalranee lunii.-iranit SALT
able to Ihem The Soviets do not appear to have strong miliiary reasons to develop dune missiles with tanges on the ordct0 kilometers for use against the Uniied Stales, although Iheyd them useful for peripheral missions.
Countervailing consider al Ions oould at some stage persuade thc Soviels lo develop and deploy new. long-range ALCMs. If evolving SALT limiutlons leave Ihe USSR wiih the option to deploy some number of ALCM carriers at no sacrifice in other weapons (as now seemshis could contributeoviet decision to develop and deploy new long-range ASMs Thus, it Is possible that some portion of lhc Soviet intercontinental bomber fotce may be equipped with such missiles
f the Soviets decide to add long-range cruise missiles to their arsenal in the neat lerm. they could do so in two ways, either of which could result In cruise missiles with hard-target capabilities- They mighl modify any one of six existing air- and sea-launched cnnse missilesodified system could be operational by thelternatively, by thc early to inld-lOSOs they couldew. large long-range ctuise missile. Recent evidence indicates thai the SovieU arc preparing to teal one or more new cruise missile systems which may have ranges In excessilometers, but our infotmatson is ^sufficient to determine whether any will haveange capability or lo determine then tnlended missions or launch platforms. We believe thai small, highly accu-talc, long-range cruise missile* similar to US designs could not be deployed beforeeriod.
D. Developments in Strategic Defenses Ballistic Missile Warning and Defense
he SovieU have completed the deployment of Iheir original scries of ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) rlcleclion and tracking radars Work is now in piogress on four new. large phased-array radar facilities which will expand and improve BMEW coverage of lhe current missile threat as well asossible future gap in coverage (See figurehc Soviets also are working on two additional aiiack warning systems, one comprising over-the-horizon ra dais and lhe other inflated launch detection satellite* Wc believe that, in combination, these Iwo additional systems will provide reliable launch detectionS ICHM attack, bul they arc inciiiMble of providing thr accurale Hacking data obtainable ftom theBMEW radars
BEST COPY AVAItABLF
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- lep-Secec*
he onniiiiom and locations ui all of lha lout new phased-array tailar facilities ate consistent with previous Soviet deploymenl ol BMEW radars. Tliey are located oo the periphery of the USSR and ate directed oulwatd. Wc are cancel tied, however, lhal in addition lo the BMEW tote, tlic new radars could be given lhe capability for ABM battle is. the capability lo provide Hacking and prediction dala lo support trie- operation of an anhbal-liilic-miMile system We believe that al least two of lhc facilities could be given thb technical capabilily The other two are col oca led with existing BMEW radars, which are vulnerable to blackout by nuclearand apparently will operate in conjunction wiih them For this reason, there ts considerable question whether these other two new facilities couldiable ABM battle management capability. Aview it that all four of the new facilities have been designed lo acquire data of sufficient quality lo use for battle management purposes and will be capable of operating Independently of existing BMEW radars. In this view, all four could provide battle management Informotlon for luture, widespreadmissile defenses.'
e cipect more radars of one ot both lype* lo be constructed. Wiih lhe kinds ol dala we can acquire, wa are not likely to learn positively whether such radars ate designed specifically toIM battle management functions- If tlcy ate, ihey could constitute long leadtiinc preparations touture option to deploy ass ABM system lhat requites battle management dala.
ABM Research and Development. Research and development activity al Ihe Sary Shagan missile test center includes an ABM systemhich offers lhe possibility of much mote rapid deployment than tlie present Moscow ABM system (lhatite could be fielded in months rather than years) Its picst-nl interceptor docs not have sufficientto awail utmosphorlc filtering of penetration aids before its launch. The interceptor may be capable ol loitering lo allow extra lime for diicri mi ruling perv Iration
wouldapability against reentry vehiclesradar cross sections (such as those carriedWestern SLBMs. IRBMs, Titanrovided that battlewere supplied to it. There is disagreementit would have any capability againsi
he Soviets may intend toigh-acceleration missile with the
ighl tests ofissile havesincef the Soviets Incorporate the high-acceleration missile into lheystem and modify the engagement tndai. Ihey wouldneed about five years for development and testing. An alternatehal such developmenl and testing could require as few as thiee years* The system would have an improved capability against current ballistic missile reentry vehicles, including thoM? accompanied by chaff. The capability of lhe improved system against ICBMs using advancedasdi cannot be fudged on the basis of present evidence and analysis.
Despiic the limitations of theystem all agencies agree lhal. with the preseni interceptor, it
TU hoUtm of thu. vtrw art thetojtme Itutllieenceond tht Stnto, tnuHieence Chief,each ol ihr three
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' The kaUtr ol ihuU Director,mtffUonM Slcencv
i
here li evidence al Sary Shagan of renewed interest in silo* which appeal lo be intended for Ibe protection and launching of ABMpea jibly Ihc hlgh-accclcialion mlulle. The silos may be integrated Inlo theystem. In which case they would considerably increase the time required to deploy an Individual site. However, these silos may alsoew ABM syslem
ther developments at (lie Sary Shagan missile test center include[_
a
These developments may or d. One interpretation is lhat each of the above activities probably isa,or Soviet ABM research and development cffoit.f
3 According lo this
c,ear evidence that
,livcrse' and hlghj irioiity
program* Another interpretation Q
best
indicator of the slatus and vigor of Ibe Soviet ABM program is lhcffort, which has been slow and uneven for lhc pas! Ihree years."
he sue and number of the activities al Sary Shaganajor Soviet investment inBAM If all or even most of them activities are ABM related, the Soviet ABM effort is much greater than otherwise indicated Othet than lheowever, the major activities now under way at Sary Shagan do not appear to represent the development o( rapidly dcployablc equipment.
' rhe holleu of tKutit iht
'i SentawChlefirack of ihe Senate i
19
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- The holder of ihUhe Centralgrne,
Q!'YY/+
Anlisalelllte Systems
he Soviets have continued to improve the performance of their nonnuclear orbital anlisalellilo (ASAT) syslem We believe thai this system has been capable of use against US satellites In low- and medium-altitude orblls since theew phase of teiiing which began6 hasincreased operational flexibility During the coming decade, wc etpect lhe Soviets to underlain other efforts lo improve the capabilities of ihcir orbital interceptor, which could include nonnuclcai of satelhtei in icmlsynchronoui and synchronous oiblls- The Soviets are believed now toaser at Sary Shagan which could damage some USsatellites. They are expected to continue work on bolli ground-based and space-based Users for anlisatel-Ute applications Finally, existing and future Soviet electronic warfare facilities could be used against certain US salelitles wllh some degree of success.
Strategic Air Defense
he Soviet strategic air defense force currently has morearly warning and ground-controlled intercept (CCI) radars located atadar sites, slightly morenterceptor aircraft stationed at about SO airfields,0 surface-to-air missile launchers deployed at fixed launch tiles, andround-bated jammers.hows current SAM coverage and Interceptor bases in thee believe that,risis, the Soviets would assign available tactical forces to tlraiegie air defense tasks, but Ihey probably would not tely heavily on such forces because ibeyompeting primary mission. Tactical air defense assets within the USSIl includeobile SAMighter Interceptors, andround-based jammers.
The Soviets have not yet devised an effective defense against the US Irrw-ahitude bomber thaeat. even though il has existed for moreecade. Soviel writings and exercises of recent years sliow that the Soviets, facing not only US but third-country ihreais, have been expecting aerodynamic allackcrs at all altitudes Moreover, the development of anlarge-area, low-altitude air defense is lechnologi rally very difficult
We |udge lhat present Soviel defensesood capability againsi allacks by aircrafl at medium and high alltludes. Against low-altitude threats, the delensesumber of deficiencies, including gaps in radar coverage, deficiencies in CCt equipment and
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Figure
Soviet Strategic SAM Coverage and Interceptor Bases
Coverageeters
ateters
an Insufficient number of CCI sites, lackook-down AWACS (airborne warning and controlackookdown/shooldown interceptor, and poor low-altitude SAM coverage and performance Thc new US cruise missile programs will probably cause the USSR to intenufy Its efforts lo combat the low-altitude threat. Nevertheless, lhe Sovietsix of US strategic bombers and ciuise missiles, forward-based systems, and third-country lorces which will no! Id them concentrate exclusively on one aspect of lhe threat, however critical.
nown and possible fuluie Soviei developmenls include lhe following:
ground-based alt surveillance radars have been under developmentut we have-no Indication that any of them are in production These radars probably will provide betterdata more effectively than existing airradars New CCI and command -ndequipment will coniinue to he deployed
An alternativeupplement to widespread CCI improvement would be the introduction of an AWACS lhal could detect, track, and direct interceptors against targets at all altitudes over both land and sea. There is evidence of Soviet developmenlarge, airborne surveillance radar which could indicate an AWACSefiort. We lielieve lhat the Soviets might be able to deploy an AWACS capable of detecting targets over water in lheore advanced, overland AWACS could probably not be deployed until the,
A modified version of the Foxbat high-ahiJude interceptor is under development Itsweapon system performancelow Ii is superior lo that of tlie Flogger interceptor, but lhe system still falls short of thc look down/shoot down capabilily of modern US Interceptors. We anticipate that thc modified Foxlial will flisl become operational In0 Future versions nf lhe Flogger may be filled with the sameimilar radar system.
The Soviet technology base should be adequate to support the development and deploymentew long-range tighterook down/shoot -down capability comparable to that of current US equipment In the midlS80s-
The Soviets are developingnew strategic SAM system, theiih low ahiludc capabili-
71
ves
ties. Previously, we projected the initialof this systeme now estimate that deployment could begin as earlyhcs currently configured will have capabilities against low-altitude 'bombers and could have some capability to engage cruise missiles. It probably will have po capabilily againsi SRAMs.
Defense Against Ballistic Missile Submarines
The development of an effective defense againsi lhe US SSBN forceajor Soviet objective. In recent years the USSR has been increasing the size and improving the quality of its antisubmarineforces. Nevertheless, these forces still do notong-range submarine detection capability, they lack sufficient shoit-range reconnaissance systems to search rapidly the potential US SSBN patrol areas, and they arc unable toS SSBNong period even if II is detected.
To help overcome these deficiencies, the Soviet Navy has beenumber of nonacoustic techniques for delecting and tracking submarines by their
^The Soviet Navy is alsoassive acoustic linear array. We believe ilial this testing could lead In the initial deployment of towed-array sonar systems by lhe. There appears lo be litlle Soviet effort toixed acoustic system, similar to thc US SOSUS system, to monitor submarine movements continuouslylikely ateas of US SSBN operations. Soviet ocean surveillance efforts will probably focus on the use of many platforms and sensors with relatively short-range detection capabilities, rather than on the use of fewer systemsroad ocean surveillance capability.
Civil Defense
oviet civiln ongoing, nationwide program under militaty conltol. Il is focused primarily on protect:"ii ofleadership, essentialand lhe general population, in thatcontinuity of economic activity in wartime, andftom the effectsS nuclear attack. (See figureisting of Soviet civil defense objectives andhile il isrash effort, the pace of thc program, as indicated most clearly by shelter construction stalls in urban areas, increased beginning in lhc, and improvements have been made
Objective, and Priorities of Soviet Civil Defense
Objcctivos Protection of Human Resources
Priority Tasks
Shelterlm] end Relocation of the Leadership Sheltering and Dispersal ol Essential Workers Sheltering and Evacuation of Urban Population StockpJmg Food and Medical Supplies
of CM Defense and economic UoMoarion Plans RaeM Shutdown otacWues
Permanent and Hasty Hardening of Installations and Ecrinpmr-nt Crisis Retocation of Economic Enterprltes Stockpiling Reserves of Materials Geographic Dispersal ol Industry
or Consequences of Enemyof Military and Civil Detente Formations
Training In Rescue and Recovery
Preparations for rxsinbution of Food and Essential Supplies
virtually all facets of ibe program. However, like program has been market! by wide variations from area lo area and year lo year. In both the rate of shelter construction and the total number of shelters, by bureaucratic difficulties, and by apathy toward civil defensearge segment of the population. Most progress las been made in providing shelters for the leadership and essential personnel
While total civil defense costs are unknown, cost estimates have been made of three major dements of the Soviet program:ull-lime civil defense personnel, operation of specialized civilmilitary units, and shelter construction. Thc cost of these elements0 amounted toillion rubles, lessercent of the estimated Soviel defense budget If the Soviet program were lo be duplicated in the United Slates. It would have cost aboul tZ billionith about three-fourths of this representing manpower costs. These cost estimates are al best very rough
Programs for protection of Ihe leadershiplo be well advanced.ie present time most, if not all, of whal wc estimate to be an essential core of leadership elements al all levels) could be accommodated in command post shelters. Counting all shelters, includins- those found at economic installa-
tions to proiect the work force and in residential areas, we estimalcinimum ofoercent of lhe total urban population could be sheltered al present. Despite thc scope and pace of sholier construclion. large-scale evacuation away from target areas remains the key to any marked reduction in tbe number of casualties.
e estimate thai Soviet measures to protect the economy could not prevent massive damageS altack designed lo destroy Soviet economicThe Sovieis have made little progress inindustry by hardening and geographic dispersal The program for dispersal of industry appears lo bo offsetontrary tendency for investments In new facilities to be inside or near previously existing installations- The SovieU appear to have given greater emphasis to sheltering and dispersal of essentialand equipment, and to rapid shutdown of facilities. These and other measures could contribute IB maintaining and restoring production after an attack We have not, however, analyzed the Soviet potential for recovery.
he effectiveness of civil defense in reducing casualties and in coping with tlie postalfack period would depend primarily on lhe lime available to make final preparations before an attack. Using ibe resulls of
analysisingle-wave attack In whichS weapons were used to destroy selected economic targets, we estimate that:
Under the most favorableeek to evacuate cities and to protect the evacuated population. Soviet civil defenses would reduce casualties from prompt effects and early fallout to aboutillion and would assure survivalarge percentage of the leadership elements. Withew days'prompt casualties could be aboutillion
Under woist conditions, withew hours or less to make final preparations, prompt casualties wouldillion. Many leaders would probably be able to reach shelter.
Thc critical time for preparation appears to be about two or Ihree days, during which the Sovicls would liave lo evacuate their urban population to have any hope of averting massive losses.
arge peiceiitage of essential personnel sheltered al economic facilities would probablyS atiack, lhe Soviets could not prevent massive industrial and economic damage.
The casually levels noted above could rise if the United States attacked while an evacuation was in progress, increased thc number of targets, stretched out the aitackonger period, structured thc attack to produce more fallout, or If an evacuation was less expeditious than planned or was impeded by adverse weather nr (ransporation deficiencies. Inthe protection provided by their civil defenses, thc Soviets would take account of these uncertainties.
Advanced Technology
here-are several fields of advanced technology which hold promise for solving deficiencies in current Soviet air, missile, and space defense systems Of particular note ate lhc fields of lasers and particle-beam weaponsigh-energy lasers arelhc closest to being available for weapons. One Soviet laser facility may now possess lhe capability lo inflict damage lo some low-oiblling satelliles. Orbital anlisalellile laser capabilities are possible in the mid-to. Wc estimate lhal Ihe developmentoviet laser with sufficient capability to destroymissile RVs is at leastears away, if feasible at all. While lhc Soviets could deploy ground-based or airborne laser weapon systems for air defense during thc period of this Estimate, wc do not believe lhal such
systems would markedly improve their overall defenses.
last year's Estimate, we stated lhat we hadevidence lhat lhe Soviets werea PBW program. Although we still believeare far fromeapon, thereesearch effort for which the mostis particle-beam weapon research.US PBW investigations lo date, we aresuch weapons are feasible. We believe that,Soviel PBW concept showed technicalhort-range system prototype couldfor testing would be theiew isrototype of awould beew years sooner,feasibility were proved"
E. Operational Factors Warning and Readiness
have evidence that lhe Soviets caninterpret enemy force postures, alterations ofsituation, ancf"*
sufficiently well to recognize Ihe changes lhat SovieT1 doctrine anticipates would likely precede an enemy atiack. They probably would not be able, however, to differentiate confidently between US preparationsimited and ihosearge-scale nuclear atiack, because preparations for boih would be virtually identical.
Despiie these capabilities. Soviet forcelhat thc Soviets arc not confident thai strategic warning would be timely enough in all cases lo allow for necessary preparations before Ihe startuclear war. This possibility underwrites thc continuing development of Ihe Soviet tactical warning system. Present ballistic missile early warning radars can provide Moscow up toinutes' warning of ICBM reentry vehicles and fromoinutes' warning of SLBM RVs targeted againsiExisting radar coverage can provide aboutinutes' warning of attack against thc Soviel land mass by US IxHiibers. The USSR's new launch detection systems are designed to iiKreasc warning of an ICBM atiack lo aboutinutes and possibly could add about two hours lo the warning time of bomber attacks along some penetration routes.
Although most Soviet strategic forces aremaintained at readiness Icvcb below those of US
"Tne holder ol thtihe Anuunr Chlel olntelligence, Oepaitmtni of Ihe Ali force.
foices, newly available evidence and lurlHri analysis Indicate llial significant portions nl tlse Soviet ICBM force arc capablo of quick reaclion Wlililn the time provided by current Soviet tactical warning systems, ICBMs with lhat capability could be launched before tbe impact ol enemy weapons. With lhe continued deployment of newer weapon systems, lhe limeto move lorces from day-lo-day readiness to full combat readiness is eipected to decreaseoviet capability for launch on tactical warning is becoming feasible lor larger portions ol the strategic nuclear forces.
Command and Control
make effective use of their largethe Soviets haveomplexand conlrol system. Fundamental to lheand operations of this system tt an cmphasacentraliied control of all forces. Tbedispersal of fined command posts andcenters, and thc introduction of airbornemobile command and comniiinlcalionsdesigned to provide flexible eonlml of forcesvariety of conflict scenarios.
analysis indicates that the Sovietconlrol systemigh degree ofsystem's capabilities for controlling strategicforces would be degradedueleai war. butdireclly attacked lis baltle managementwould remain largely intact. We believe lhat.subjectedirect surprise attack. II wouldof supporting Soviet efforts lo launch astrike Destruction of several olevel command andfacilities would complicate and probablyprocess of isiuing initial combal instructions lo(assuming such insm-ciiom had not yetDestruction ofenters wouldthe Soviets" capability for battlereconilllulion of command.
Targeting and Retargeting
vidence frommiliiary
writings indicates lhal the primary targets of Soviet nuclear strikes in peripheral areas would be enemy nuclear delivery systems and storage sites, troop coo-cent rat iom (especially armorednd ma,or command and control facilities In an inter continental attack. Soviet taigeling objectives evidently would be: (a) thc weakening of the US capability In atiack the Soviet homeland and military forces by strikingweapon systems, command and conlrol facilities, and supporting elements, (b) lhe destruction ol those
industrial capabilities which could contribute to the US war effort, as well as major economic and control centers, and (c) tbe isolation of lbc Uniled States by attacks on conventional forces, use nals. and depots useful in tbc resupply of US forces overseas. We believe the Soviets can retarget man^ of their slrategic weaponset of preselected targets before, during, and after an initial intercontinental strike.
here is no evidence that Soviet targetingwould differ whether strikes were preemptive or retaliatory *_
^intercontinental nuclearprobably would be massive. Were lhe Soviets to consider allacks on the United Statci thai were more limited in scope, we believe they would not reduce the she of those attacks below that necessary toide range of US nuclear capabilities and command and control Soviet military planners probably woulddecapitation" attack (that Is. an attack directed solely against US command and controlto be inadequate in terms of their established war-fighting objectives-Degradation of US Intelligence and Warning Capabilities
oncealineni and deception techniques are an integral part of Soviet military doctrine Although many of the techniques which we detect appear to be experimental and are often crude, some have been fairly successful. f_
selectivity and sophistication of concealmenfand deception measure* applied to Soviet strategic forces haveduringnd arc likely to Increase in the future.
uropean crisis, we believe lhc Soviets would use concealment, deception, andto obscure their Intentions and mask the sire and character of any preparations they were making for the possibility of war. Selective electronic Interference with Western reconnaissance systems would probably be employed The Soviets would continue lo use concealment and deception measuresuropean crisis were to evolve into conventional war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.uropean conflict appeared imminent or had actually begun, thereigh likelihood lhal the Soviets would actively interfere with US and NATO inlelligence and satellite reconnaissance systems
p-Se
PART III
FUTURE FORCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Sovicl Policy lot Fuliwo Forcoi
ho Soviet leaders will continue to regardnuclear power a* central lo their lecurity and nationaln general, they will continue to seek lo improve thc capabilities of their forces to fight anduclear war so that lhe USSR could emerge fromaretter position than the United States- Tliey will seek forces and supporting clomenls which will give them the options to execute preemptive strikes if they become convinced that Intercontinental conflict is inevitable, to launch iheir forces on lactlcal warning If an attack is under way. and. If necessary, to retaliate after being struck first. They will also seek lo be able torotracted *ar in whichld'i. an important role
of Sovicl programs for strategic nuclear fotces will continue to threaten elements ol UScapabilities Al the same time, the Soviets will tend to assess US developments. Including certain features of programed US forces, as threatening to their own urategK posit ton. Some pteaent Sovietexample, hardening of ICBM sites and deployment of mote survivablethb concern Others, like Ihe mobile ballistic missile and ABM HAD programs, probably constitute Soviet hedges against possible future US ihieait as well as deterrents to US withdrawal from SALT agreements. They could also represent effotts to give lhe Soviet leaders the fuiure option to break out of suchif they conclude lhat the situation warrants it.
he Soviets see lhc strategic competition as long lerm. They proltably view the main US strengths in this competiltun asemonsltated ability to translate economic and technical superiority Into rapid development and deployment of advanced weapons, and (b) an industrial base that could support more and larger strategic arms programs than II doe* today. Tne Soviets probably see themselves as eiuOytng telativc advantages such as (a) the ability through iheir command economy teadily to channel resource* and efforts into militarily significant areas, and (b) the latitude lo pmsue stale goals without lite difficully thai derives from lhc play of plural intctesls in free societies.
the Soviels, the greatest concern incompetition is likely lo be the prtMpectUnited States will move with dispatch inpose challenges that are difficult for themwith Their greatesthat, inSovicl ideology, the United State* willIn staying power over the long liauicircumstances, thc cautious Soviet leadersto continue lo seek to slow Ihe United Slatesaccommodation in SALT while pressinglong-lerm force improvement programs
B. Proiections of Fufuro Soviet Strategic Forces "
estimating future Soviet strategic forces,two general types of uncertainties, especiallyperiod five loears from now. One lsImprovement* trial Ihc Soviels will makesystems and supporting elements; Ihc otherquantities they will deploy under circumstancesihey ate. constrained ot not constrainedagreements
light of these uncertainties, we projectSoviel forces foe Intercontinentalon diffcting assumptions about"and success and about levels of deploymentpresence or absenceypothetical SALTTwo of these forces, called ModerateModerate No-SAL, reflect our best estimatesrales, of technical chaiadctiillra, anddatei for haw systems. Thc other Iwo, calledand High No-SAL, postulate the earliestwr consider possible, high rate* oftechnical charactetistics at Ihe moreof our range* of uncertainty.ummarytout alternative protections, seea
ort eg ic alt defense, we protect two forces illustrating inodcrale and high levels of effort Both reflect greater deployment of air defense systems
" See volume tl far further details on lhaeand for their relitiomhip iu ixop-ciiofii published in the DefriuePrwediinu fur Winning (DIM1).
Alternative Projections ol IOC Dates
of Soviet Systems for Intercontinental Attack
SAL
No-SAL
SAL
Ne-SAl
toMowen 'CUM.
n rplSowon ICBM,
ICBU
wttt, MeHVi
SSBN/SIBM rviuxn
intereontlnentel bomber
NoldepiovM Infore*.
la counlei low-altitude aerodynamic vehicles lhan we projected last year, due largely to ourthai the Soviet! will react to US cruise miuile programs
onsidering Ihc high offensive and defensive forces as packages, we believe them to be upper boundary cases and thus highly unlikely. The SovieU probably would have difficulty sustaining such high leveb o! deploymeni and almost certainly could not achieve such high technological success on all fronts limuhaneoosly through theyear period Individual elements of each high force are plausible, however.
Hypothetical SALT II Aoreemont
We assume for purposes of our SALT-limited projectionsALT II agreement enters into force8 Aggregate stratesne nuclearvehicles are assumed to be reducedyurther reductions implcmenled by mid-ltml. Launchers for MIRVcd missilesM carriers are limitedotal.ublimit on MIRVcd missile launchersurther sublimitn launchers for MIRVed ICBMs. Three-year bans on the testing of MIRVs or. new ICBMs and on testing and deployment of ICBMs on mobile launchers are also assumed These bans are assumed to lapseut the other aspects ol tbe hypothetical agreement remain in forceackfire producllon is assumed lo be limited to thc current rale
Alternative Soviel Offensive Force Projections
In all four projections, wc assume thai lhc Soviets continue lo emphasise iheir land-based ballistic missile force because It Is the primary contributor lo lhe counter miliury capability Ihey seek- In the SALT-const rained forces we protect tbe deployment of MIRVcd ICBM launchers up lo agreed limits and lhe introduction of follow-on 'CBM systems We postulate that to comply with SALT limits lhe number of ICBM launchers will decrease somewhat, resulting in the retiremcnl of some modern ICBMs Wlihoul SALT limits, wc protect that lhe Soviets would not ietire any modern ICBMs, that ihey would deploy mobile ICBMs. and. in the High No-SAL force, that they would build some additional flied launcheri for heavy ICBMs In all th* forces, wcontinuing Soviet deployment of ICBMs and SLBMs with nonMIRV as well as MIRVin Ihc SALT-cotiitraincd forces, lhc flight-tesling ofarheads on new ICBMs docs noi begin unltl lhe three-year ban lapses. We alsoew more SSBNs of therogram to construct new large SSBNl. wiih compensatory retirement of older systems in the SALT-constrained rases Finally, in al)we assume the deploy men!ew intercontinental bomber, although there isuncertainly as to whether lhe Soviets would actually deployomber.
27
Alternative Soviei Defensive Force Projections
Tbc Moderate force is intended to represent steady improvement and is our best estimate of Soviei levels of achievement. In the High fotce we assume high rates of deployment, the earliest IOC dates for new systems that we believeand technical characteristics at the more threatening ends of our ranges of uncertainty. We also assume in thisreater effort against low-altitude attackers than wc do in thc other larger numbers of new surfaoc-to-air missiles are deployed, lookdown/shootdown and long-range interceptors are fielded in larger numbers, and greater AWACS capabilities are introduced by the end of the period- For alternative projections of Soviet low-altitude air defense systems, see table 2.
In both defensive force projections wc assume that thc Soviets adhere to the ABM Treaty. We project that they will construct additional ballistic missile detection and tracking radars and, in the High fotce, that they will deploy additional ABM launchers around Moscow up to thc treaty limit. Wc also anticipate steady but modestin Soviet ASW fotces along the lines of recent years; no projection is made of ASW forces intended for use againsi SSBNs because wc arc unable to separate them from general purpose forces.
oviet uncertainties about the future strategicto some extent our uncertainties asaffected by thc prevent highlynature of US planning for iho mid- to, particularly concerning the site and pace of cruise missile deployments and ihe development andofomparable system In our analyslS of fuiure Soviel intercontinental attack forces and strategic defenses, weingle fulute US force. (See) This force is based on the Department of Defense Fivc-Ye-ar Defense Programc have aibittaiily assumed certainto this program to comply with theSALT II agreement, and we have not includedCBMomparable systemecision for full-scale ptogram development has not been made. The actual US ptogram will undoubtedly differ somewhat from that assumededuction or slowdown in the US erulse missile ptogram could significantly alter some of our findings, as would the future deployment of. We believe thai, out of prudence. Soviet planners, at this time would make generous assumptions about what the United Stales can and will do with respect to these systems ln the future. They would at least be considering theof the possible deployment ofor the capabilities and survivability of their own ft
C. Significance of Future Soviel
Intercontinental Offensive Forces
his section is Intended to illuminate some of the implications of thc projected Sovietforces over Ihe next decade. Of primary con-
2
Alternative Projections of Soviet Strategic Low-Altitude Ait Defense Weapon Systems
Force Levels*
ii
SAM olea
AWACS
AWACS
Flogger interceptor
Foibat Interceptor
interceptor
Daici for New Syitemi
I08S
Ovei-ater AWACS
Overland AWACS Improved flower inleieeplor Modified Fot bat interceptor
de-
inlciixiaur
pot include etniinxir defemivr lyitrtnt with nunc limited taw-iliiiwJe capabilities, or lyiirtnt auijned to tactical iir
ense (oron
Assumed US Forces for Intercontinental Attack
Force Levels
Tola I
Delivery
vehicles
MIRVcO Launchers.
l CM
Center*
Bomb* it and AlCM Carrier*
IOC
1
8 SRAMs LCMl
COPY AVAILABLE
its
Fioure 12
M
It!
M
A
IOC Dates lor New Systems
Minuteman Ml with improved
Mmuteman III with new
Trident SSBN/SLBM system (8
Now US torn P'oiKi.uft. vi Batedel Oetr-tM
maidlui'MK io-AirshouldBM US'o.e Uf* iseca kliy
KBI
is how the prospective trends regarding such forces may affect:
Thc viability and stability ol the US deteiienl.
The USSR's evaluation of tu comparativecapabilities and vulnerabilities.
Perceptions of relative power in lhe United States. Ihe USSR, and elsewhere
To shed light on these issues, this analysis examines the (trilling power and vulnerability of Sennetoffensive forces, and compares ihem with ihc assumed US forces in Ihe following ways:
Quantlly. quality, und destructive potential of total furces
ICBM eountcrsilo capability and llie prclaunch vulnerability of ICBMs and other forces.
capabilities of the forces after asurprise or precmplive counterforce al-lack by ICBMs
Quantity, Quality, and Destructive Polenlial of Forces
he first comparison deals with tbe sue and striking power of total Soviet and US intercontinental offensive forces before any attack. Manyof the forces are relevant toomparisonisplay ill which seem to provide Ihe most useful indeies Two arc lhe simplest and most often used:
Numbers of delivery vehicles.
of miiiilc reentry vehicles and bomber weapons.
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ough quantitative indca, these measurei are not fully indicative of destructivebecause they fail to take account of qualitat'vc factors which are critical in determining; how much area or how many hard targets can be dcstioyed. Two additional measures introduce these qualitative factors Inlo the comparison:
Equivalent megatonshichough assessment of the theoretical capabilities that yield and number of weapnns provide against soft area targets.
Average force accuracy, whichough indicator of technological level andey contributor to thc theoretical capabilitiesotce against hard point targets
Tlte indicators of quantity and quality can then be combined, along with weapon system reliability, to give some measure of thc destructive potential of forces against broad categories of targets. EMT and reliability nan be convertedimple formula into the drtltuetive capabilityorce against soil area targets, if all weapons in the force were uied
exclusively lor that purpose. Accuracy, yield,and number ol weaponsorce can beto measure the total number of hard point targets it could destroy, if all weapons in thc force weie used exclusively for that purpose Suchrepresent prclaunch potentials againsi purely notional target's of nominal hardness; no provision is made for specific target complexes, force employment plans, attrition by defenses, or other operationalThe measures used ate;
atea potential, which providestough assessment of lhe theoretical atea within whseh the nuclear effects of missile RVs and bomber weapons inflict severe damage on reinforced concielc
n
potential, whichough jsiessmenl of the theoretical capabilities ofRVs and bomber weapons against hardened point targets
3
6ecee*-
are olher measures which could beexample, numbers of MIRVed launchers, miotic throw weight, and missile throw weight plus bomber payloadwe believe that those cm-ployed above best reflect the total striking power of deployed forces.
n. we compare thc four alternative Soviet foices with the single, assumed US force. The trends are generally similar to thoselast year" Thc figures show that:
In total delivery vehicles, the two Soviet No-SAL forces exceed the US force throughout the period of thc Estimate,ALT II agreement reduces the Soviet advantage In.
In on-line missile reentry vehicles and bomber weapons, the US force exceeds the SovietSAL force over the period. The High No-SAL force overtakes the US force in thc, and Ihe High SAL and Moderate No-SAL forces come lo match the US force by the
In equivalent megatons, all Soviet forces come to exceed the US force by even wider maigins than today.
In average force accuracy, the High SAL force exceeds the US force in, while lhe other Soviet forces are equal or about equal lo the US force by the end of the period.
In lethal area potential, as in on-line equivalent megatons, all Soviet forces increase iheii lead over the US force throughout lhe period of the Estimate.
In hard-target potential, the two Soviet Moderate forces arc about equal lo the US force In, while the High SAL and High No-SAL forces exceed ihe US force by substantial margins.
It should be noted that if missile RVs alone were considered in lliese comparisons. Soviet gains would lie much more marked because of thc USSR's greater emphasis on ICBMs. For example, in lhe. Ihe hard-target potential of Soviel missile RVs in llie
" It should be recognitcdiilute of SALT II or the emergence ol Soviel programs along the Lines of our Fifth proyc-tions could lex! the Uniled Slates to undemke new weapon
progumi or to idguimi which would
ehinse these reUtkmihips
yes aosioi-rfyf
SALT-conslralned forces would be iwo lo four times that of US missile RVs.
hen tlie Irends in the SALT-Umlted forces of both sides are compared In terms of numbers of missile RVs and bomber weapons, lethal area potential, and hard-target potential, it can be seen that the USSR will gain relative to the Uniled States until thc. Throughout the period, however, advantages will probably remain mixed. In terms of bomber weapons and missile RVs. the SALT-limited US force remains ahead of the Moderate Soviet force over tlie nexlears; thc lethal area potential of both Soviel SALT-limited forces comes to exceed that of thc US force by oven wider margins than today: and the hard-target potential of the US force falls between the High and Moderate Soviet forces until the, when the Moderate Soviet force comes to be about equal to the US force.
Note: Recent evidence and analysis, described in the notes following paragraphsndbove, suggest that future Soviet (CBM forces may be different from those forecast in our protections in (be following respects:
The SovieU are likely to accomrnodatcALT II limitIRVed ICBMs by deployingewerorehan projected in the Moderate SAL force.
A new PBV, overcoming certain mechanical limitations on the accuracy ofIRVs, may be installed oneginningather lhan awaiting deploymentollow-on heavy ICBM2 as projected in thc Moderate SAL and No-SAL forces.
-c
3
The calculations which wc summarize in this section were performed prior to these recent indications and do not take ihem inlo account Wc have tested the sensitivity of our findings lo an alteredix and to thc possible installationew PBV oneginninge find that these changes would only slightly affect lhc results ol our calculations of Soviet missile RVs and bomber weapons. EMT. average force accuracy, lethal area potential, and
hard-larget potential summarized inhe combined changes would also slightly affect our residual calculationslaler in this section. They would, however, significanily improve Soviet counlersiloIn the, as illustrated in
C
J Preliminary analysis of the potential for accuracy Improvement
"^suggests 'hai the accuracy of SS-ISs andould be still furtherresulting in further Increases In Soviel counlersilo capabilities and hard-target potential in thend beyond.
Counlersilo Capabilily and Prelaunch Vulnerability of Soviet Fixed ICBM Forces
llh respect to dclcirence, the vulnerability of inlerconlincntal offensive forcesirst strike can be critical. The weapons most relevant to asvuing Soviet first-strike capability and tbe vulnerability of Soviet forces lo atlack are ICBMs The significant hatd-tatget potential and relatively short flight limes of ICBMs make them particularly well-suitedirst strike againsi fast-reaction opposing forces. Bomber weapons generally have good Iu id-target potential, bul take hours to teach their targets SLBMs. though timely, have poor hard-target potential. Moreover, because silo-based ICBMs makearge portion of projected Soviet fences throughout the nexlears, tlie Soviets would have to he especially mindful of Iheir potential vulnerability
he calculations which follow do not reflect operational consider al sons In particular, no provision is made for launching ICBMs while under atlack rather lhari "riding out" an altack; thisorst case assumption fiom the polnl of view of ICBMWe accompany the calculations with anof how lhe many uncertainties which unround our estimates of those keyexample, accuiacy. yield, andlhc counlersilo capability of Soviet ICBMs.
ounlersilo Capabilities ol Soviel ICBMs.llustrates the results of out calculations of the hypothetical counlersilo capabilities of lhe ICBMs in lhe (out alternative Soviet forces, in terms ol the number of Minuteman silos surviving and the number
ot IIVs on Ihe missiles In thoseigutehows lhe degte* to which uncertainties aboul lhe per-forinance of Soviet ICBMs affect our estimates Out calculations indicate that over lhe nextean Soviet ICBMs will pose an increasing threat to US ICBM silos As shown in the figures, the time when ihit threat reaches major proportion! dependsumber ofpecifically:
Thc ICBMs in tlie Moderate SAL and Moderate Nu-SAl. forces wouldajor threat to US missile silos in thessuming one on one attacks, or9 assuming lwo-on-one attacks.
The ICBMs in lhe High forces would alreadyajor threat lo US missile silos, bul Ihis Is considered highly unlikely because thc High proiections assume that all Soviet ICBMare at tho most threatening ends of our ranges of uncertainly.
ecause we have revised out estimates of Soviet ICBM accuracies, ihese major threats are projected to occur aboul one yeat earlier than we estimated lasllven the large numbers of RVs in allfuture Soviet ICBMSALT-llmilcd orcalculation of the threat lo US ICBM silos isunction of tbe quality of Soviet ICBMs and of our uncertaintye
" In liar ralevUiioniealariable to rrlWi uocertalnlv
Ihe qumlinn olltWi can tie mgrled wiih atif-
flcientlr prnM liming (ihai u_ aboul fix loeeoadi apart) aa aitcl miilual Interference betwaan the warheaea and to increaK lhe ptobabdity of the destiuflioaTio prior lo lhe launch of iu ICHM We have no evidence lhal lha SovieU intend In employ thu twoonone tactic, bulbelieve lha' al lead two ut thru new MIRVedrtm have thecapabislr laoed TTaeat ivilnaa cavld he eard lotlarfOoc either Iron lhe aarae booaae (Io line) aa laoa*ooalera (eras Urgeunt) In ow cakvlattonsutr the Hum inert .rig irchruqut.umole dlffk'ullbylliBWr bef.ri renrlU ami lliuian uppei bound ^
l>ar|ant view ihai Soviet planum
-until aaaaTtlpi twroaoae nam tarf*tiri( with near-nrr.ijl'anroui
to be operaionali mlrmuiU Tha tfiicrfnaf new la held mmon Mar Chtef mftrtaaStenaer. Dtr-tmtnt ml lhe
"foi lurpoaa of tbltaiot tbreat uai ihe prospective deilruraion ot all
IOI
Counlcrsllo Capabilities of Soviet ICBMs
Comparison ot Force Projectionslnutornan Silos
Two-on-One Cross Targeting
-
High FotcelSAL and No-SAL
Midyear
Uodtrale Forces
SAL aad Mj-SAL
HighAL and No-SAL
aa
Iwo-on-One Cross Targeting
-
o/
34
believe lhal lhe Soviets themselves would be uncertain aboul the results ol attacks on US silos. Wc exfiecl uncertainly lo influence both US and Soviet views of ICBM survivability throughout llie period of this Estimate.
Vulnerability of Sovietlhe Moderate SALT-constrained foice asthe calculations illustrated inhat Ihe vulnerability of Soviet ICBM silosby US ICBMs will remain relativelythe nexlears unlessCBM orsystem is deployed. It also shows that,absenceeployment, the number ofwarheads in the Moderate SAL forcehypothetical attack by US ICBMs will doublepeiiod. This is because lhc near-term effect*III Improvements tend to be offsetSoviet conversion lo harder silos andwith MIRVs Bui from the USSR's pointa very unfavorable trend in Soviel ICBMwould begin6 if the United Stalesstart deployingCBMyslemaccuracy, yield, and number ofshould be noted thai US cruise missiles will alsopotenlial capability to inflict significant damageICBM silos Because of their relativelythey probably would not be viewedirst-strike threal, but lhc Soviets mightmissileshreat to any ICBMs in fixedplanned lo wilhhold as parteserve forceSovieU contemplate the possibility oflate in thc period, they mayeedaway from vulnerable fixed ICBMs tosystems. Their options would includemobile ICBMs, Increasing iheir SSBNplacing more SSBNs on patroL They mighttheir leliance on launching iheir forcesof tactical warning.
Prelaunch Vulnerability of SLBMs and Bombers
Since both the Uniled Slates and lhe USSR maintain triads of intercontinental attack forces with widely differing attributes, wc also assess lhevulnerability of bombers and SLBMs Thc potential of lhc USSR to reduce ibesc elements of thc US triad, and lhe vulnerability of the comparable Soviet elementsirst strike, depend in considetable measure on whether or noi live bombers and SSBNs arc on day-today alert or mi increased alerl.
The Soviets maintain no bombers on alcrl and keep the bulk of their SSBNs inaking these
elements of Iheir strategic nuclear forces vulnerable to surprise atiack. They are, however, building tunnels which could afford someeasure of in-port survivability. If strategic warning wercavailablc, they could disperse mosl of iheir bombers and send abouterceni of Iheir SSBN lorce to
3
launched Irom close lo US coastlines.and perhaps some SLCMscruise missiles) couldoreto the US alert bomber force. Inof submarines lorurpose,would have to consider US ASW andcapabilities and the dispersal andthe Uniled Slates could employ lo makeon bombers more difficult. Thus, wethe SovieU would conclude that US alertsurvive throughout the period ol thisbecause of thc different flight limesICBMs and SLBMs. Soviel planners couldon maximizing Ihc prelaunch destruction ofbombers and ICBMs
Residual Capabilities of Forces
assessmenu of Soviet ICBMand ICBM prelaunch vulnerabilityfiguresndo not illustrate thc degreethe ICBM forces of an attacking side wouldby employing themounlerforcedo not indicate the destructive potential ofon Ihe olher side lhat would survive thedo ihey illustrate llw additional conlributionRVs and bomber weapons would make Iocapabilities of each side. The trends inforces and destructive potential,highly relevant to detcnencc, strategicand perceptions.
herefore, we nexl provide calculations of thc destructive polcntial thai would remain available Iu each side after hypothetical ICBM counlerforceTo illustrate lhe Irends. we measure lhe Soviet Moderate SAL force and the assumed US SALT-
Tep Otiir*
limitedr both thn United States and the USSH. wc examine alternative first-strikeurprise attack, thatatching the other side on day-to-day alert;reemptive attack, that is. assuming the other side is in an alerted posturerief period of tension The ealculaiions are made in terms of what we call residual forces For the attacking side, residual forces aie assumed lo be those ICBMs ne* used in tbe atiack andSLBMs and bomber weapons which ran he generaied. thus, theoices are ihose available for other missions, either at the lime of (he fust tliikc or later. For lhe side atlacked, icsidua) forces are those intercontinental attack forces available for letahation aflei tlie find strike is absorbed They include 'ihose ICBMslo survive hypothelical eountcrsilo allacks. as well as thc proportions of bombers, on alert and SLBMs al sea noted above. In our calculations we assume that alerted bombeis and SSBNs al sea are not vulnerable to first si rile attacks
It should be recogntxed thai Use calculations are limited lo analysis of hypothetical ICBM attacks by one side on the ICBM silos, bomber bases, and SSBN bases of tlse other side There are analyticallo limiting the calculations in this way. In particular. It permits us to avoid sneculalion about the discretionary aspects of force employment, such aslacker's perception of his requirements to strike other military and economic targets as well as the scale and nature of letahation by the side attacked But the artificialities should abo be recognized For example, Soviet plans evidently call fee using more than just ICBMs and for inoie lhanounlerforce attack: no major US atiack option uses only ICBMs against Soviet strategiceal conflict probably wouldetaliatory attack. Further, thcignore the possibility lhal either side might launch ils ICBMs on lucltcal warning. Finally, we make no attempt to factor In llie degree lo which defensive forces might be able lo degrade thc residual capabilities of either side.
Our assessment of residual forces providesrough measure of lhe potential for destruction and survival of intercimliisental striking forces It illustrates important future trendi and tlie key factors driving the trends It sheds light on the implications of the size, quality, and compaulton of ibe forces of each side and. more importantly, on bow these forces may be viewed by an opponent It is not.imulation of tbc lactic* and targeting which would actually be employed by either tide, nor isrediction ol the outcomeuclear eichange. The
38
TCS khVIQi
results arc noi definitive or comprehensive enough to be usedasis for detailed US planning. Aassessment of comparative US and Soviet war-fighting capabilities would involve both initial and retaliatory strikes It would require the use of all force elementsroad range of targets, would employ actual US targeting doctrine alongange of Soviet attack options, and would consider operational factors and the interaouons betweenlorces to thc maiimum extent possible It can be argued that simplilsrd assessments based onof only initial ICBM counlerforce Strikes, wiih no reflection of retaliation, could give an erroneous picture of future capabilities and trends, especially if firm conclusions about Ihe slralegic balance snd lhe value of first strikes should be drawn from such assewmcnls alone Accordingly, one view in IheCommunity ita lhal incomplete assnssmenlsshoit of the comprehensive approach discussed aliove probably do not provide any insights into Soviel perceptions and should not be included in ihisA comprehensive net assessment, however, is beyond tbe scopeational Inlelligence Estimate.
hc results of our analysis of residual forces are summitized and illustrated in.e calculate tbe residual capabilities of both sides in terms of number of missile RVs and bomber weapons and in terms of lethal area potential and hard-target potential, assuming that the lesiduah arc used ciciuuvcly lot one or lhc other of these purposes. The figures show that, for ihc SALT-limited forces:
The general trends in iclative lesidual forces in most cases will favor the Soviets over lhc nexl few yeais, largely because of their continuing program of conversions to unproved ICBMs, especially ihose caiiylng MlftVs. Thcbetween Soviet and US residual forces will tend lo stabilize or become more favorable to tlie United States in some cases beginning in thc, primarily because of US ALCM deployment
Except in the caseurprise Soviet attack. ;he United States willreater number of residual missile RVs end bomber weapons, due primarily to the many US SLBM RVs and. after the, cruise missiles
Except in lhe caseurprise US countertoree attack, lhe Soviets will have much greater re-
" Tht ha/den e/ lAli Mrwerr tfce Minor. Ht/tnieend ihr .Senior Inltlltgttu*fht ihttt
r
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stdual lethal area potential than the United Stales. This is due to theit concentration on ICBMs with relatively large MIRV warheads.
in the caseutprise Soviet attack, thc Uniied Stales will have greater residual bard-target potential This is largely because o( the accuracy ol US systems, including bombereiuise missiles in
iih respect to the surprise attack.how lhat (or thc SALT-iimited lotces:
-The Soviels could expeel thai, il* the United Slales struck (irsl wllh surprise, their residual hiid-largct poteniial would continue to Increase over ihe nextears bul in the mid- andould be much less than thai remaining to Ihe United States. Their residual lethal area potential would also increase and would come to excted the US residualmall margin by. In general, substantial Soviet forces would survive ihioughout thc period. Forthc number ol sutvlvlng Soviet missile RVs and bomber weapons would grow to. and substantial lethal atea poteniial would sutvivc.
The Soviets could expect that, if they sltuck first with surprise, their residual lethal area potential would greatly exceed the US surviving poteniial. They could also expect iheir residual missile RVs and bomber weapons and hatd-targct potential lo become aboul equal to trial of thc Uniied Slates in lhcnd lo sutpass that of thc United Slates later In the period
Any Soviet temptation lo initiate nuclear warrisis before the United States aletted its forces, however, would be countered by the site and destructive poteniial of the prospective surviving US forces For example, in thc caseoviet surprise attack, lhe number of US missile RVs and bomber weapons surviving for retaliation would be no lewerthroughout thc period, and substantial US lethal ateawould survive.
igurellustrates in more detail Ihepotential and composition ol tlie US forces which the Soviets would have lo expect tourprise. Soviclunlerforce atlack. For the assumed SALT-hmited (orce il shows that:
the. US tesidual capabilities will remain fairly constant despite the growing
threat lo US ICBM silos posed by rhe Soviet buildup in improved ICBMs with MIRVs. Thc effects of increasing US silo vulnerability tend lo be offset by the following factors:n accuracy and yield will increase the hatd-targct and lethal atea potentials of most surviving Minuteman III warheads; andLBM HVs with increased lethal areawill start lo be deployed.
in the. US residual hard-tatget potential will begin to climb sharply, followed in thcy an increase in residual missile RVs and bomber weapons. These changes are due largely lo US deployment of
aix;ms
percentage of US residual capability in ICBMs will decrease ihioughout lhe next 10
years.
vehicles will account for about one-th.td to one-half of thc US residual lethal area potential. For hard-target potential, about one-half of the residual capability resideserodynamic vehicles, and the Introduction of cruise missiles will cause this fraction lo increase subslatiiially in the mid- andehicles would be subject to attrition by Soviel air defenses
igurellustrates in mote detail lhe deslruc-Uve ixaential and composition of the forces which the Soviets might expect lourprise US ICBM countcrforce attack. For lhe Moderate SAL force it shows lhat
The Soviet ICBM force will continue to make hy far the largest contribution to surviving Sovicl weapons, lethal area potential, and hard-target potential ihioughout lhe nextears. Tlic changes apparent in figureesult from: (a) Minuteman III accuracy Improvements. offset by continuing Soviet conversion lo hatdct silos and new. MIRVed ICBMs; and tb) Minuteman III yield increases. offset by follow-on Soviet ICBMs with additional MIRV warheads.
Tlie conltibution of Soviel SLBMs lo lethal area potential, while never moremallof ihe total, will about double during the period, largely because of the deployment of MIRVs and thc new. large SLBM expected in lhc. Thc contribul.on of SLBMs to thc hard-tarr.i'l potential will be negligible Ihrough-
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out thc period because of their accuracy limitations
thb calculation, Soviet bombers male no contribution to surviving Soviet capabilitiesthe Soviets keep no bombers on alert and, hence, we assume that none wouldS surprise attack
here are important limitations in thisesidual forces.
It examines only hypothetical ICBM counter-force attacks
It considers neither thc employment of oilier weapons nor strikes against olher targets
It measures destructive potential in terms of nominal sofl and hard targets rather than specific target sets
It does not take inlo account the possibilityide under attack would Launch its ICBMs upon receipt of tactical warning
It does not consider tho possible effects of Soviet defenses
ny suchlso affected by the great uricertaintses in intelligence protections of Soviet forceseriod as long asears in the future and by the present state of flu* In US force planning for thend beyond. In particular. USof the MX ICBMomparable system, if it occurred, would significantly affect thet could cause Soviet residual ICBM capabilily to drop off markedly and could begin to reslote tlie ICBM component of thc US residuals. Uncertainly about bolhcratlonal capabilities of one's own current forces and the fuiure programs of the opponent is likely to affect the calculations of both sides throughout lhe period of this Estimate.
oviet Peripheral Attack Forces
I OS The Soviets' efforts to enhance iheir peripheral forces have included assignment of some ICBMs to peripheral attack missions, relocation of older ballistic missile submarines to bases chaser to potential target areas, deployment of ibe Backfite bomber, and thc initial deploymenl of lhe MIRVedobile IRBM Extensive deployment of Ihcill allow the Soviets lo reassign any ICBMs currently targeted against peripheral areas to intercontinental missions The total number of bombers and missile launchers in ih* peripheral forces ptubably will decline However.
Soviet capabilities to conduct strategic nuclear strikes in Euiope. China, and other parts of Ihe Eurasian periphery will be greatly enhancedof the increased capabilities of thc newer weapons and. in lhe case of thehe availability io each launcher of multiple missiles for retire. Asf, eaistlng Soviet rystcms, the Backfire wiil.be better able to penetrate European defenses and theill be more sutvivable because of its mobility
E. Copabililies and Limitations of Soviel Strategic. Wc do not compare strategic defensive forces Ini,i- manner as intercontinental offensive forces. For one thing, partly because US and Soviel strategic doctrines differ, the USSR has developed and deployed massive forces fot lhe defense of tbcw tier cat the United Slates has not. In addition, wc have not tlius far been able lo devise useful measures of defensive force effectiveness Rather, we make general Judgments about the ability of Soviet strategic defenses to defend lhe USSRS strategic nuclear strike.
In most of our analyses of Soviet strategic defenses, we begin by assessing the capabilities of individual defensive weapon systemsystem shows promise of at least some technical capability to defendhreat, we cslimate the number thc Soviets mighl deploy and then judge lhe quality ol lhe defense these weapons could provide for the areas Ihey would be likely to defend Relevant lo these analyses is the fact that today, and In the foreseeable future, thc large numbers of offensive weaponslo lhc United States and the US ability lo determine lhe location and tactics of atlack make the task of Soviet defense very difficult
We find lhat even when we make optimistic assumptions for the defense, weaknesses often still upixuir when wc examine lhe capabilities of individual systems and force elements In such cases, Il it perhaps less necessary to lake on thc much mote difficult task of asvising the effectiveness of an integrated defense. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously In conncciioo wllh offensive fotceefinitiveof such effectiveness probably could not be made short olwo-sided wat game which would take into account the tactical i. .vractions between US and Soviet forces.
Ballistic Missile Warning and Defense
now is in progress on new. Urgeay tadai facilities which will expand, Improve, and
TCSloeceei
emaining gap in lhe Soviet ballistic missile early warning network Wc are corvcerncd, however, that these ladars and others which may be built could be given Ihe capability to perform ABM battlefunctions. If they are, this could constitute long Icadtime preparations touture option to deploy an ABM system that requires battledata. The Soviets arc also working on two new launch detection systems which together wouldreliable warningS ICBM attack shortly after launch and could thus contributeoviel opllon lo launch offensive forces upon receipt of taclical warning.
with lbc ABM Treaty wouldABM defenses insignificanl, but ABMdevelopment will continue. Thchas been under development could bemore rapidly than the Moscow ABMlike llie Moscow system, it wouldarge ballistic missilepenetration aids Ainterceptor, which began flight-testing insubstantially improve the capabilities ofThe Soviets probably would needyears to incorporate and test thc newtocessary modifications to theradar. An alternate view is that suchand testing could require as few as three yearshave no reason to believe the Soviets arcabrogate the ABM Trealy or that they will docircumstances approximating lhal of thepoliiical and strategic relationship. InSoviet goals in ABM BAD arc lo deterStales from abrogating the ABM Trealy, toUSSB itselfosition to abrogate theit so desire, and to deploy quickly in thcUS abrogation.
Antisatellite Systems
expect Ihe Soviets lo continuecapability of their nonnuclear orbitalpossibly to modify this system to permitUS satellites in synchronous andThc Soviets also have some presentelectronic interference with retlain satellitesexpect them to continue to develop it. Duringdecade the Soviets arc cxpecied to continuelasers for use in antisatellite applications,laser ASAT weapons, which would be
" The holder of ihuhe Dorr ror, Def/me Inictti&nce Agency
more effcclive lhan current orbital interceptors. It Is wilhin ihcir technical capabilities lorototype available in lhe mid- to.
Stralegic Air Defense
he recent US cruise missile program will probably cause the USSR to accelerate" ils efforts to combat the low-altitude threat. Wc believe, however, that there will be no significant improvement in the present very limited Soviel capability for defense against manned bombers at low altitudeshe improvements wc foresee have Ihc potential of making (ow-alhlude penetration by today's bombers considerably more difficult by the, or perhaps somcwhal earlierigh level of effort. The Sovicls probably would not have high confidence in their capabilities against bombers, however, because of such factors as penetration tactics,nd electronic counter-counter-measureshe Sovicls are unlikely to have the capability to defend againsi thc short-range attack missile through Ihe period of this Estimate.
ith respeel to defensearge-scale, low-altilude cruise missile altack, live technical charac-terislics of thc SAMs. AWACS. and interceptors which thc Sovicls arc likely lo have in thc period7 lead us lo judge II unlikely lhat they can deploy sufficient defenses to cover all of thc areas they would wanl to protect. AWACS aircraft could probably provide shori-lerm coverage of major overwatei approaches and penetration corridors. Technical and operational weaknesses, however, will leadoor quality of defense againsi cruise missiles for those corridors and target areas that arc covered. Thus, while it is difficult to quantify lhc degree of protection the Soviets could achievearge-scale cruise missile threal In lhe mid- lo, we believe that overall defense cffecliveness will beivergent view is that Soviel defensive potential against cruise missiles is somcwhal understated i" the foregoing text. This view is based on preliminary estimates which indicateubstantial number of targets could be provided withow-altilude SAM coverage bclween now and the. Given this deployment potential and the exisling uncertainties about llie performance of thcnd other low-altitude systems lhe Soviets are now developing, ihis view holds thai il is noi yet possible to assess fully how effective their deployment might be againsi lhe first generation of US cruise missiles. While the degree of protection provided lor lhe entire Soviel target base would probably be low, thisconcludes lhat llie Soviel defensive efforts
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cruise missiles might prove significant enough in some target areas to complicate US force structuring and force application tactics"
he combination of US air attack forces would be considerably more difficult to defend against than any one of its elements alone. US penetration tactics and ECM. as well as the degradation of defenses by ballistic missile strikes, would continue to weighagainst the overall effectiveness of Soviet air defenses. Wc cannot, however, assess lhe full effects of these and other operational factors
" The holdet of ihithe AuMant Chief of Staff, Intetltfenee, Department of the Ate Force.
Defense Againsi Ballistic Missile Submarines
oviet antisubmarine warfare forces are not now an effective counter to US SSBNi We believe lhat Soviet ASW capabilities will improve over tbe neatears Introduction of the Trident SSBN. with expanded operating range, will compound the Soviets' problem- (See) From our understanding of therograms in thc Uniied States artd the USSB. we believe thc Soviets have little praspect ofnew systems capable of effectively detecting and track ing US submarines in broad ocean areas during the period of this Estimate.
rom ptesent evi-
Search Areas for Soviet ASW Operations
47
dence. we conclude lhat Soviet ASW capabilities againsi US SSBNs In confined waters will improve during lhc period ol thb Estimate. Despiie Ihc likely Soviet ASW improvements, we expect that virtually al) US SSBNs on patrol would be able lo launch Iheir missiles.
Civil Defense
o date, the Soviel program to constructshelters for civil defense is estimated to have provided shelter space for most if not all leadership dements al national, regional, and local leveb andarge percentage of essential personnel alinimum ofoercent of the Soviel urban population could be protected in shelters; wc arc confident that mote extensive analysis would result in an upward adjustment of this figure, but we are unable to say by how much. This concentration on shelters for protection of thc leadership, essential personnel, and (hc generalthatconsistent with stated Soviet civil defense priorities. Policies lo protect industry by dispersal and hardening have tiol been effectively implemented, however, and it appears thatuclear war the Soviets could noi prevent massive damage to ihcir economy and thc destruction of many of their most valued material accomplishments.
Despite their extensive shelter construction, if the Soviet leaders huped lo avert massive human lossesuclear war, ihey would have lo evacuate lhe majority of their urban population Our tentative estimate is that witheek for evacuation and other preparations, casualties due to prompt effects and early falloutS retaliatory atiack designed primarily lo destroy economic targets could beto aboutillion people. Wiihew days for preparation, prompt casualties could be about SO million, and with Ihc lime limitedew hours or less, moreillion. Many circumstances could cause these estimated casualty levels to rise, suchS attack while urban evacuation was under way. an attack stretched oulonger period, or one designed lo maximize fallout. In assessments of thc effectiveness of ihcir civil defense, thc Soviets would piobably take into account uncertainties aboul thc nature and size of lhc US attack and olherabout weather, the lirne for evacuation, and lht> availability of transportation We have noi analyzed lhe Soviet potential for postattack recovery.
Thc Soviel leaders almost certainly believe thai thcii present civil defenses would improve their
46
TCI
ability lo conduct military operations and wouldthe USSR's chances ofuclear war. Civil Ihc many uncertainties attendantuclear exchange, however, llicy cannot have confidence in Ihc degree of protection that would actually beWe therefore do not believe that their present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately to expose lhe USSRigher risk of nuclear war.
A continuation of present trends In theSoviet civil defense program would,ncrease lo abouloerceni the proportion of the mban population which could be sheltered and would further improve thc protection available to thc leadership and to essential personnel Considering the projected growth In urban population, we foresee no reduction in Ihe Soviets* dependence on evacuation for population protection. Improved transportation may somewhat reduce thc time required. Thc prospects arc thai over the nextears thc Soviet economy will remain about as vulneiable as at presentarge-scale US attack directed against il. We have no present reason to anticipate any significant change in (he Soviet leaders* perception that civil defenseto the USSR's capabilities for nuclear conflict, or in their uncertainties about its actual effectiveness. Nevertheless, the Soviet civil defense program, In conjunction with otlter Soviet strategic offensive and defensive programs, couldotential impact on both lhc reality and perception of the strategic balance in thc coming years,
There is an additional view which goes beyond thc foregoing and holds that available evidence clearly demonstrates that civil defense makes an important contribution to lhe Soviet stralegic posture. In this view, thc comprehensive Soviet planning, training, and organizing efforts devoted to civil defenseafford thcignificant potentialOvci lhe Uniled Stales in dealing with nuclear waifare conditions. In pariicular. lhc Soviet ability toarge infrastructure of leadership cadres at all level* in hardened command post shelters under conditions of short warning greatly enhances Soviet ca[ability Io support military opeiations, restoreindustrial production, and speed recoverya nuclear attack. Further, the Soviets' ability to evacuate and shelter the bulk of theiiew days' preparation, thus markedly icducing expected casualties, enhances Soviet strategic capabilities. Finally, Ihe continuing Soviet investment of considerable resources and skilled manpower in thc program clearly demonstrates thc Soviel leaders' own
perception thai civil defense eruiances (lie overall strategic capabilities of the USSR"
Advanced Technology
rograms are consistentesire both to avoid slipping behind tbc United Slates and to gain thc lead in the technology of strategic offensive and defensive forces, particularly if US programs falter During the nextears, the Soviets willrowing potential for significant and perhaps novel developments in weapons andsystems. P_
nent of ihchehief ofnr.iage-.ce.*fM' Flnet'
e continue lo examine closelyrograms and prospects for major advances that might seriously erode US deterrent capabilities We give particular attentionpplicable to directed-energy weapons for use in air and missile defense, and to Ibe detection and (lacking of US ballistic missile submarines. The Soviets are working actively in both fields, and there are gaps in our knowledge of this work. The available evidence, together with outof the physical, engineering, andhurdles which must be overcome, leads ui to rate as small the chances thai thc Soviets can sharply alter thc slrategic balance through such technological advances in the nextears. But Soviet efforts In advanced technology applicable to strategic defense merit very close watching.
'op
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