MEMO FOR MR. ROBERT R. BOWIE FROM WILLIAM A. CHRISTISON RE REPORT ON ANGOLAN LE

Created: 12/29/1978

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

FIRST DI PAPER TO USE ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS

The attached paper,Angolan Leadership: Current Perspectives and Prospects Aftarwas the first Intelligence Assessment to employ alternative scenarios. It was published by the DI (then NFAC) in Documenting this factote from Bill Christison,RPA to BobFAC recornonding this new approach to analysisesponse fron John Hicks, DO/NFAC to Dick Kerr,RPA endorsing the concept. The "boldness" of this departure from traditional analytic techniques requiredpecial Lpilogue appear at the end of the paper noting that the three scenarios discussed in the paper "did not exhaust all possibilities."

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The Angolan Leadership: Current Perspectives and Prospects After Neto

An iBleillsenct Assessment

This paper was prepared by

ihe Office of Regional and Political Anal) (is and coordinated within CIA. Questions and comments may be addressed to the author. Randy Phcrson.

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The Angolan Leadership: Current Perspectives and Prospects After

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by the

the OfHce of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated within CI A. Questions and comments may be addressed to the author, Randy Pherson,

The Angolan Leadership:

Current Perspectives

and Prospects After NETO

Judgments

Angolan President Nclo appears firmly in control despite serious economic, political, and militaryon his regime:

Neto has increasingly consolidated power io his office. Most decisions are made by him andsmall group of trusted advisers:

While Neto's inner circle has traditionally been dominated by mulattoes. thosetronger role for blacks arc gaining influence.j

If Neto left office, the manner in which he departed would greatly influence who and what type of regime succeeded him:

Although there are occasional, unconfirmed reports of plotting against the government in the mililary. the party, and toe urban slums. Neto so far has kept dissident aclivity in check:

oup were attempted, the mosl likelywould be memberslack-power factionaining support in the parly and possibly within some military circles.

Neto appears to have this group well under control, but it coulderious threat to Ihc regime if it gained tbe support of key people tn the military and the internal security service

The more gradual and predictable ihe transition, the better the chancesulatto-influenced faction retaining power and governing in much the same way as Neto. Efforts to improve relations with Angola's neighbors and tbc West would continue.

If Neto left office suddenly, lhc trendlack-dominated, more nationalist, and possibly more leftist state wouldegime probably would be directed, ifjwt controlled, by the military!-

The Angolan Leadership:

Current Perspectives

and Prospects After NetoF

President Agosunho Neto appear* to be firmly in control of his party and government Since the aborted attempt to overthrow the government inetoeliminated or detained thousands of dissident* in the party, the government, and the military lie has increasingly consolidated power in his own hands atcnsc of other top government officials. All important decisions are now made by him ormall group of trusted advisers. Nevertheless, Neto's overall position could be undermined at any time given Angola's serious economic and social problems, his possible ill health, and the government's dependenceubstantial Cuban military presence to maintain internal security and to cope with the political and military* threat posed by three separate guerrilla

the Inner Circle

Most decisions in Luanda are made bylack,mall group of close advisers, including MPLA-Labor Parlycio Lara, the director of the internal securily service Rodrsquesnd. until his dismissal this month, former Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento. lara, aMarxist-Leninistulatto, ii widely regarded as the paiiy's leading theoretician. While generally considered sympathetic to Ihe Soviets, he has taken an independent stand on occasion. Lara's style is to manipulate events from behind the scenes: he has never held an important government post.lack, derives much of his power from his position as director of ihe internal security service Although ii was rumored earlier this year lhat the deputy director in effect ran the service, more recent reporting indicates that Ludy is firmly in control and possibly gaining influence with^

lack who ruid long been consideredmosl important own in Angola, wasPrime Minister and dropped from thein early December. Nascimento lackedpower base and recent reportinglhal Neto no longer trusted himwas pari ofa major party andlhal involved Ihc abolition of thepost and all three deputy primeNeto reportedly may move Nascimento toand less influential post as "Minister ofas pariore general effortpower in his

Party foreign affairs spokesman Pascual Luvualu, former First Deputy Prime Minister Jose Eduardodosnd Defense Minister Henrique Telesrc also pari of, or at least close to, Neto's inner circle.lack, has gained considerable responsibility and exposure as Neto's "rovingarticularly since hisear ago as an alternate member of the Political Bureau. Luvualu wasull member of the Political Bureau early this month when Nasamento and former Second Deputy Prime Minister Carlosmulattoiliumlost their government and party positions. Doslack, is considered strongly pro-Soviet, in part because beovici wife He has received extensive training in Moscow and has beenwithone of the Soviets' favorite candidates to succeed Neto.ulaito,lose relationship with N

^ personal

jHe may be forced to step down as Defense Minister because of allegations thai surfaced during recent investigation of corruption in the Angolan Government .) |

DuriBf the liberation titanic, many Angolan leaders took "noma de guerre" which most of ihem telained alter coming- in Luanda]

rcuin nil positionull member of

The apparent decline in the fortunes of many high-ranking mulattoes can be attributed in part to growing black nationalist sentiment in the party Many younger party members contend that blacks arc inadequately represented at (be top levels of the party andand that the mulattocsisproportionate share of power and of Ihe sweeter fruits of Ihe revolution. The blacks made tbeir first major inroads into mulatto control over the party al Ihe December partyear ago,ubstantial number of black civilian* and military officers *cre elected to the Central Committee and tbe Political Bureau Although the mulaiiocs seem to haveominant position so far, those that espouse black nationalism probably can count on growing support at the grass-roots lesxl of the party, and possibly wilhin some military circles

After Neto: Three Scenarios

table it

Neto left office, the manner in which he departed the presidency would greatly influence who and what type of regime succeeded him. Generally speaking, the more gradual and predictable the transition, the better the chance*ulatto-influenced faction retaining power and governing in much Ihe same way as Neio. If Neto left office suddenly fur health or other reasons, ihose whoore radical, black nationalist, and pro-Soviet line would betronger position.egime would be directed, if Dot controlled, by the mililaiyj

This paper wilt explore three possible scenarios that could develop:

Neto's hcallh problem; become dcbiliiating and he arrangeseaceful and orderly transfer of power.

Neto dies suddenlyajor power struggle breaks out within the top leadership.

The regime is brought downoup or popular uprisingew government is established

Peaceful Transition

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is highly unlikely Neto would ever relinquish power voluniuiily. Moil member* of [he inner circle would want him lo remain in office as long as possible because Ihey owe iheir positions to him and would lose influence if he slcpped down Nevertheless, il it possible Nclo might become seriously handicappedeart attack, drinking, or oiher health problems. Inircumstance, those closest to Neto probably would strongly urge him louccessor,in the hopeember of ihe inner circle would be chosen.

Although the mulailocs' position would be weakened if Nclo relinquished Ihe presidency, they probably would retain some influence. Should Neto ignore strong pressures in the party and military iolack and insteadulatto as his successor.nlikely the new president could maintain his position for longompromise was reached allocating tome of the powers of the presidency lo other offices under Ibe control of blacks, if the mulailocs believed there was little chance for one of them lo gain the top spot, ihey might propose Ihe establishmentollegia! form to government- -if onlyransitionaluntil agreement was reacheduccessor lo Neto. This could be accomplished by shifting responsibility for governing from Ihe presidency to Ihe party Political Bureau, where the mulailocs now control about one-third of the scats. Another possibility would be to name several vice presidents to share responsibility for governing wilh the president. Underlack could be established ai president, whilecontrol of the government remained in ihe hand of his mulatto deputies.

If Nclo optedlack successor, likely candidates would be the director of the internal security service Lopes or forma Firsi Deputy Prime Minister Dos Santos Dos Santos is close lo the inner circle and still appear* lo be on good tcrrm with Neto. Lopes probably isetter position lo draw on ihe support of blacks in the party and military

If Neio died or wereajor power struggle would almost certainly break qui. Thewould be dictated in targe part by the cxlenl lo which Ihe military and the party's rank and file emerged as factors in the struggle

At' December partyoncerted effort was made to involve the military more directly in the political process In an effort to broaden Ihe party's base, overercent of ibe seats in the Central Commit tee wenl to Ibe military.hird of Ihe Political Bureau was also drawn from military ranks. By bringing the military into the system, Neto probably hoped he would be able toloser watch over

JIk Infusion of large

numbers of young blacks, many wilh militaryat the December party congress last year should haveadicalizing effect, bul so far there has been no direct reflection of this at lbc top kveb ot* ibe party|

Neto's sudden departure doubtless would place many high-ranking mulailocs in highly vulnerable positions.

Many, if not most, mulattoes. however, would opt to slay. Some, including Lara, mosthe necessary ideological credentials to retain influcnccj |

like Political Bureau member Antonio dos Santosnd alternate member Henrique de Carvalhoight

4

Antomo dot Santoi Franru

otnWfui! rfr Canmho Sandx

emerge in stronger positions, primarily because of their stronger ties with tbc military. Franca, aa outstanding miliury commander from the Benruela region who is believed close to the Cubans, has served on the party's Central Committee since the civil wtr. Henrique de Carvalho Santos, also from Bcnguela. was added lo the Political Bureau as an alternateear ago. in pari to improve its geographic balance. Santos was educaicd in Havana and at one lime was said to be Ihc Cubans' candidate to replace Neto In recent months, however, he appears to have fallen into Havana's disfavor J-

If the parts emergesominant factor in tbe succession struggle, tht chances of Lopes or Jove Eduardo dos Santos coming out on top would be strengthened. Attention doubtless would also beon (he other black Political Bureau members, bul some of these would have major obstacles to overcome in order to emerge as Neto's successor. Black Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of Staff of ihe Armed Forces Joao Luiss very popular with younger blacks in ihe party and the military, and he has long beenprime contender for Neto's posiilon. I

Amb/otio Lukoki

uheparty foreign affairs spikesnun Luvualu because heakongo from Ihc region of northern Angola from which guerrillas of Ihc National Front for theof Angola draw their support.'^

Minister of Education Ambrosio Lukoki isakongo. He was elevated to lhc Politicalear ago, primarily to irnprove the racsal and geographical balance of that body, andtrong personal power base Both Luvualu and Lukoki spent severalugoslavia as students and are considered by some iooveore nonaligned style of government similar lo that found in Yugoslavia.j j

HncMPLA traditionally hin drawn mod of lit support from Ihe Kimbundu tribe anich it centered on Ihe Luinda/Mabnje axii.ap shooing the location of the various ethnic eroups in Angola appears ai the end of ihb nwrnorandurn)]

Another Mack in Ihe Political Bureau,Commissioner Pedro Mariahas good rapport with the military,iserious candidate for Iheheabindan While he is consideredstar within party circles.iirong popular base ofDomingas oeSilva.lbc com-

mandcr of ihe People's Defense Organization is abo worth watching, although he is not in the Political Bureau. He comes from Neto'i hometown of Calcic and reportedly is being groomed by Neto as Joao Luis Nelo's replace men

Violent Overthrow

Manuel Pedro Facmira

there are occasional, unconfirmed reports of plotting against the government in the party, (he military, and the urban slums, Neto appears io have kept dissident activity in check. Popular discontent willontinuing problem, however, so long as the country remains plagued by critical shortages of food and consumer goods. The decision early this year toown Ihe Roman Catholic radio stationtrong public reaction, and the Church could emergeajor channel for dissident expression. Q

oup were attempted, the most likelybe membersadical black-powerenjoys some support within the parly andthis faction succeeded in preventingfrom being elected to the Politicalthe Central Committee at last December'sits efforts generally were not wellpurported leader of theMinisterManuel Pedrofailedelected to the Central Committee

}seems to enjoy some popu-lar support, particularly among young blacks. Pacavira has long been out from in criticizing the regime for its dependence on mulailocs. whiles, and foreign

Party official* suspect that Pacavira is involvedroup of Mack radicals from Caiete thai may be plotting lo overthrow the government. Included in this group arc Parly Commissioner for Luanda Mendes de Carvalho. Minister of Foreign Trade Roberto Anionio de Almeida, and Provincial Commissioner for Cuanta Norte Lorcncoendes de Carvalho, like Pacavira. is ambitious and quite popular with black Angolans Some observers have even-described him ai the next Nito Alves of Angola.'

Neto apparently has long suspected many of these individuals and probaMy is aware of their activities.

Almeida would be dismissed onf corruption and thai Carvalho might be named as ambassador to an East European country.!-

The "Caicte group" woulderious threat to the current regime if it succeeded in winning the support of key people in the military or the internal socuriiy service. Although there have been sporadic andreports of possible dissident activity in ihe

" Ahnniotir ofpruidpal Ofcsairm of tbc7 upruinf. Itdml Nelo, much of ho support an fromBUcto in the whan alamn and fiucn radicals in (be tnUlury.j

armed forces and ihe security service. J

Resentment of the Cuban presence in Angola could serveallying point in bringing these dissidents together Angolan soldiers have been critical of the Cubans because they have refusedngage guerrilla forces in the field. The Cubans are also resented for their involvement in the black market and for stealing Angolan property. Some radicals in the party are abo strongly opposed to the dominant role Cuban and Soviet advisers have assumed in some government ministries.!

Policy Directions ia Ihe Post-Neto Period

If Neto is succeeded by some member of ibe inner circle, domestic aad foreign policies, al least initially, would be little changed. Efforts to transform Angolaarxist-Leninisi state doubtless wouldbul with no greater intensity than has been the case so far. The campaign io improve relalions wilh the West and loapprochement wilh /aire might lose some momentum, but it certainly would not be reversed. [ |

Over time, pressure from militants in the party and military mighthift toa more nationalistic, and possibly more leftist, policy There would be increasing calls to rid the government and party of corrupt, incompetenl, and ideologically "impure" leaden While tome mulailocs in key posts could easily tall victims ofampaign, most probably would retain iheir positions. The trend, however, would be lo

Icfforts because they believe Western econotru'e aid will decrease the coals of their own involvement and possibly even alleviate growing anti-Soviet and anli-

'Cuban sentiment. Even so. the regime would become increasingly selective in choosing companies andwith which it agreed to do business.

If Neto died suddenly, the trendlack-dominated, more nationalist, and possibly more leftist stale would be accelerated- perhaps dramaticatly. The new regime most likely would seek stronger lies wilh |hcbu ind other socialist tafxtl Although Portuguese interests in Angola doubtless would suffer greatly, (he West probably would still be allowedlay some role in Angola, particularly with regard to economic development.egime probably would also be much mure enthusiastic in its support of the various southern African liberation groups staging operalions from and receiving training within Angola

If Neto were deposedadical black-power faction, the mulattoes would beighly vulnerable pcailion The Portuguese wouldajor target. Ii is possible the new rulers might also insist thai other nonblack advisers, such as the Soviets, leave the country. Althoughegime probably would still be dependent on the Cuban presence for internal security, it might insist thai Cuba remove all its nonblack advisers, I

The call for the expulsion of Cuban and Soviet advisers from Angola has longajor demand of Jonas Savimbi's guerrilla forces, which alsotrong black nationalist line. Chancesadical black

would maintain its close relations wilh Ihe Soviet Union und Cuba. Although growing criticism of the substantial Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola might lead to some reduction in Ihe number of civilian advisers, this could be offset in part by an increased East European involvement.

Economic needs plus the desirestablish the political legitimacy of the new regime would argue for continued efforts lo improve relalions wilh the West. Moscow and Havana would probably not oppose such

ideological differences. Savimbi. in fact, probably would shun negotiations with any group lhat seized power rrom the Neto regime in the expectation that he might beositionontrol of Ihe country militarily. His chances of success would depend almost entirely on how willing the Cubans, andesser extent the Sovicls, would be to support the new regime.|

Secrel

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These ihrec distinct scenarios should Ncio leave office do nol exhaust al) possibilities. Neto's demise could be followederiod of political chaos and disorder,ewildering succession of unstable regimesuick assertion of mililary control Given the degree of racial and tribal factionalism in ruling circles, it is also possible lhat one scenario might follow the other in rapid succession, or lhat all three scenarios might play themselves out simultaneousiy.f-

Cuba and the USSR doubtless arctrong position to influence the play nf events.!

Original document.