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Inlet national Terrorism7
This paper drawsonceptual frameworkin two earlier studies: International anil Transnational Terrorism; Diagnosis and Prognosis; and6.. Itsignificant trends over the past year in terrorist activities, in governmental support to terrorists, and in internaiional efforts to curb terrorism, and examines tbe implications of these trends for the remainderS.
ii the definition of terrorism remainsreaders of the previous studies will notebetween statistics presented in tbe present study and its predecessors. Improved data have ledonsiderable expansion of the listings of incidents, as wellumber of deletions (particularly in the case ofounted hijackings in Eastern Europe, which are now viewedn terrorist inMoreover. Icttcrbombings.ingle campaign, arc now treated asincidents. While acquisition of follow-on accounts7 incidents may over time moderately affect last year's annual tally, no furiher large changes in the overall data banc ure anticipated for the near term.
Developments relating lo International terrorism7 showed several major patterns and trends:
* For the yearhole, thereecline in the number of international incidents and their attendant casualties (seehis decline was
For ihe parpen* of Ibis tfavuUoo. laifwiioaeJefined in ibe threat orvsoteatefor potiiicajuch action is intendednfluence the tiUlude and bcnai-iorofutfci group wider than iu immediate .leairro, aad(l) lisiraeacend national toordarici (is tbe retail, for example, al the aataanalrt) or foreara ilea of itsthaat Haor baanaa ncxisrav na an-dared ocjoarvea. or ihr machanict of iu reaoltfUon).
probably in large pari due to increased securitytaken by previously victimized governments, coupled with political developmentsait-and-see altitude on the pan of terrorists. Dunng the second half of the year, however, the frequency of terrorist incidents jumped lo nearly the previous year's record levels. Several spectacularas the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and Lufthansabombings protcsiing the Baader-Mein-hot suicides and ihe Sadal peace initiative occurred toward the end of the year.
- In geographic terms, terrorists continued to prefer operations in the industrialized democracies ofEurope and North America. More than half of all incidents were recorded in these regions (acendn the appendix).
There were fewer attacks than the previous year, both in relative and absolute terms, on US citizens and property (secncreasingly effective preventive measure! taken by police and by USand business officials were probably Ihe
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks Dlrocted Against US
USSR/Eastern Europe 7
main reasons for the decrease. American human rights advocacy may also haveart by making US alliens andoreand less inviting target than in previous years.
Terrorism in the Middle East stayed at relatively high levels and again transcended Ihe Arab-Israeli conflict. Asttacks on fellow Arabsthe bulk of fedayeen-related international terrorism. Bombings of Egyptian overseas facilities contributed to an overall increase6 in ihe number of fedayeen-related attacks
While terrorist organizations at limes carefully planned and coordinated complex operations, tbe vast majority of reported attacks continued to be row-nsk endeavors, such as bombings, arson, and murder (sechis decline was accompaniedhift away from well-protected targets io more remote ones not heretofore subjected to attacks, lor exam* pie, US facilities in isolated rural villages werewhile hijackers used smaller airports as their embarkation points.
Terrorist! continued toack ofor perhaps ability, to master and useweapons and technology. Terroristof such devices and mining in their use isreported, but this has not led to theirdeployment. While ibe West German Red Army Faction threatened io shoot down Lufthansa planes wilheat-seeking missiles, so far il has nol followed up its threat.
The behavior of hostage takerseightened sensitivity toihc tendency for sympathetic psychological bonds to form between captor* and hostages over lime. For example. South Moluccansto talk to their hostages: Japanese Red Army hijackers wore masks, used numbers to refer toand initially instructed passengers not io
look al them; Ihe Lufthansa hijackers deliberately mistreated passengers and killed the pilot.
Activity or Major international Tcrrorril Groups
The Palestinian issue continued to be ai the heart of most terrorist incidents in or related to the Middle East, with members of the Haddad wing of the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) being the most active Arab terrorist3 the Palestine Liberation(PLO) has disavowed international terrorism (but not attacks within Israel or the occupiedand has focused on more traditionalmethods in iu quest for internationalEven the leader of the PFLP has found itto deny thatnvolvement In hijackings engineered by the Haddad factionwithin the PLO, however, have seriously threatened Yasir Arafat's leadership of theand may be successful inothe PLO's focus to openeturn to international terrorist operations.
The comparative peace experienced6 fromby transnational anarchists ended abruptly7pectacular return to the scene by the Japanese Red Army. Iu hijackingapanese airliner in Bangladesh embarrassed ihe Japanese Government, secured the release from Japanese prisons of new operatives for the organization,S6 million in ransom for the group's coffers, and inadvertently servediversion for an abortive coup in Bangladesh Alsohe JRAthai il hoped toevolutionary base among ihe Japanese people and appeared loback to Japan" movement. Iu tentative moves toward join! action with Japanese radicals on domestic issues should not be interpretedign lhat tbe JRA intends to forsake international operations
West German terrorists, including remnants of the Baader-Meinhof Gang and its offshoots, overcame the arrests of major leaders and conducted several SDcctacular attacks within West Germany and, inwilh foreign radical groups, in other counines The kidnaping and murder of prominent West German businessman Hans-Martin Schlcyei may signal the developmentew capability by West German anarchists who have previouslyto engage in bombings.'
Coordinated action by Palestinians and Westanarchists, dramatically demorssualed in Ihe Luflhansa-Schleyerrkderlined tbetrend toward cooperation between international terrorists. Nonetheless.ho led ibe PFLP team that attacked the OPEC ministerialin Vienna5 and has been instrumental in facilitating contacts between terrorist bands, did not surface He has apparently been unwilling toin or engineer any operations since the Vienna attack.
International terrorist attacks by groups thai are either based in the United States or have stronglinks to certain segments of the UShave caused considerable difficulty for the United Stales Government. Attacks conducicd7 hy two such groups Cuban and Croatiannot as frequent or as serious asctions by these groups can be expected lo increase, however, if US-Cuban relations improve and/or if domestic conflicts flare upost-Tito Yugoslavia.
Violence-prone members of the Ananda Marg. an Indian religious sect, conducted attacks on Indian dipiomaU on several continents, including the United States. To date, the group has ool usedother than knives, although several of iuin Asia have been detained on charges ofpossession of explosives. The group has nol attacked non-Indian citizens, but its international membership suggests connectionsarflung support apparatus, and iu future actions could involve unintentional victimization of other nationals lis idiosyncratic, parochial motives, however, make itthai ihe organization would be willing lowith other terrorist groups.
! Them Ub) watt Haddad. -ho reportedly died of att-BSBl caaae* ia aa East Cerasaa hcacaial at*
1 The bdaapan ol Schleyer demanded the rekaac erf ihcir cornradea from iwuon Until then, kidnapers of businessmen generally or-marxicd ransom, limiting) dernandi for the retrain of prisoners ioUaces when they held government officials as hcatages
"eptember SchleyeraMucicd by racmtxtt of Ihe Rod Amy Facta*rhansa jtt oot of MaHorca. Sraaaa. toeieei atth-trassal prastar* oa the Wear German (nnanment for the release ot inorcecated lerrornu and theuable ramom
Nationality of Victims
of International Terrorist Attacks'
Eastern Europe .
nlal SHppon for Terr oris Is
Direct governmental support, mainly by radical Arab states, for trarorist groups continued to be most evident and most extensive in the case oforganizations. Several Third World nations that had previously granted safe haven to radicalorga iii/.tiwns. however, Appeared to be backing off from such overt aid. In these cases, pragmaticof self-interest led to reappraisals of past behavior Algeria was especially concerned aboul the unfavorable world reaction generated by itsasylum to the Japanese Red Army hijackers. Somali cooperationest German antitcrrorisi unit thai stormed the Lufthansa plane atwas another example.
MidOle Eon ana
otalnder tho total
i that -enici
Pereontaoaa sum to more than 'CO duo so .ncdent* in ivnicri -teams ware litrn several regions.
Detflopamii of Antiterroriit roimtermcasure*.
The devclocrrneni of paramilitary teams to rescueand counter terrorism in generalource of domestic pride and international prestige to several governments in Alia, Europe, and theKuttl encouraged by the successes of the Israeli mission at Entebbe6 and ihe more recent West German action at Mogadiscio.
Such special learns and tactics, bowever, have only limited applicability in coping with ihe problem ofterrorism. Mostarsons,over too quickly to allow effective use of such groups. In cases involving hostages, the government's desire for international prestige together with domestic pressure ma> leadescuein inappropriate circumstances, yieldingresults.'
government coopcralion included training of security and antitcrrorisi personnel and the sharing of inlelligence. Despite Cuba's abrogation of an anti-hijacking agreement with the United Stales onpril. Havana continued to refuse safe haven ioand there were no successful diversions of US aircrafl io the bland. Finally, several developing
' Paradoxically, ibe growing unoillingneu ol LDCs lo grant safe haven io lerrarau ftot her limits goeernmental freedom or at lion by ruling oui one nonoalent resolution of terrortii incidents and thus incteaWng pressure for the ate of force.
counines aided Western antiicrrorist efforts by denying asylum to hijackers, versing as mediators iniege in Washington, grantingto conduct rescue operations, and aiding inairport security.
At the multilateral level, pressure by aInternational Federation of Air Line Pilots'to Uniled Nations action. Spurred by the threatilots' strike to protest the killing of the Lufthansaat Mogadiscio, the UN General Assembly and the International Civil Aviation Organization passed resolutions condemning hijacking. The move may have set ause ofleverage for international antiterrorismest German draft of an international convention against the taking or hostages was less successful and was referred back to the ad hocAssembly committee. The Council of Europe's Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, calling for extradition or prosecution of terrorists, came into effect7 when it was ratifiedhirdThe treaty allows, however, for severalto the extradition clauses. While these measuresrowing realization of the need for aapproach to countering terrorism, obstacles tointernational cooperationdisagreements regarding "just" resort to political vtotencc.
7 experience with international terrorism, compared wilh historical evens, suggests two basic observations. First, relatively wide fluciuations in the nature and intensity of violence remain evident. Second, ihe number and character of the groupsIn international terrorist activity have been constantly changing. Although terrorism has risen' levels,eem to havea cyclical pattern in terms of overall numbers of incidents. Most terrorist campaigns do not appear to be sustainable for moreew months, asadapt to terrorist tactics, group leaders arc arrested, and logistic problems arise. In time, bow-ever, new terrorist recruits appear and develop newtbe cycle continues
These oscillations and uncertainties in the pattern and level of terrorist activity render predictionsalthough it is dear that tbe threat willWhile the precise level and nature ofterrorist activity over the next six months or vo cannot be forecast, past experience suggests that:
patterns of victimization and location of operation* will remain unchanged. Representatives of affluent countries, particularly governmentand business executives, will continue to betargets Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East will be the primary arenas of attack. While US official and corporate security willto deter potential attackers overseas, American persons and property will continue to be attractive targets.
Terrorists will shift to alternative targets, rather than retreat from the scene, if their primary goals are unattainable.
as of terrorism related to the Palestinian issue will almost certainly continue. Extremists will seek to demonstrate their rejection ofa political solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, even if this is accepted by the mainstream of the Palestinian movement, the PLO. Recent terrorist activities in the Middle Kasl haveon President Sadat's overtures to Israel, with Egyptian facilities becoming prime targets.seen by the Palestinians as contrary to their interests could induce even more moderate groups, such as Fatah, to resume terrorist activity outside
in other areas, such as separatist sentiments in Europe or apartheid in South Africa, could motivate terrorist organizations indigenous to the arena of conflict to carry their battles abroad to gain increased international publicity for their cause.
The vast majority of incidents will continue tobombings and incendiary attacks, which will be
aaUaasatacine ia preauna to-err-ratnii for more effective protective rneaanrea
' Austria. Satden. and weal Germany have camplclcd ralifimuaa.
International Terrorist Incidents
Ei plosive Bombing
0 II I,
L Total: 4S
l-l I I
l 1 1 1 1
I I I I
70 73 74 76 8 70 73 74 76 8 70 72 74 76 8 70 73 7a 76
70 73 74 78 6 70 73 74 76 8 70 72 74 76 6 70 72 74 76
Indudva mooing aiot tradponaiivi "or ait. aaa. or lam.ce-cai.cn tthevinocaouw .an peace and <
of little immediate risk to the terrorists.
Commemoration of radicalasBaadcr, Mayir Cayan, and Chethrough the use of violence will continue. There are also likely to be incidents designed to protest Specific national or international political developments
The development and implementation of moreinternational countermeasures will continue to be impeded by differing moral perspectives amongroad resistance to the perceivedof sovereignty in any curtailment of the right to grant political asylum,atural reluctance on the part of many states to commit themselves to any course of action that might invite retribution-cither by terrorist groups or by states sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.
The coming year is likely to be characterized by some discontinuities and new developments as well, including:
potential use of standoff weapons, such as heat-seeking missiles, to avoid direct confrontations with authorities. One or more groups maytheir present tactical limitations and moral qualms to master and employ such technologies.
A further upsurge in West European radicalAlthough the original West German anarchist leaders are dead, their organizations remain athreat. Difficulties experienced by police insuspects involved in major kidnaping? andhave demonstrated the existence of well-organized support networks willing to aid suchThe suicides of the Baader-Meinhofas well as the deaths of the Mogadisciohave provided the radical leftew group of martyrs whose deaths may be avenged by future operations. These may be primarily directed against the governments that aided Bonn inradicals who had fled West Germany.
In sum. the decline in the frequency ofterrorist attacks is expected to level off and may even be reversed. Tbe roaoy issues that haveindividual terrorists remain unresolved, and new causes will arise. Although added securityat sensitive facilities and the use of paramilitary rescue squads may deter spectacularattacks, these measures clearly cannot protect all potential targets from simple hit-and-run operations.
on International Terrorism
This study employs computerized data lhat are based solely on unclassified material published during the last decade. While this technique promotes aand comparative perspective, the tallies should be treated with caution. The sharp rise in recorded terrorist incidents over the past decade may reflect noteal increase in such activity, but also more comprehensive and systematic reporting by the press. On the other hand, many incidents probably have not been reported.
In addition, there are many significant gaps in our knowledge about specific incidents and groups, and even those terrorist organizations and actions on which there is reliable information do not always fit neatly into the typologies that have been created for
oreover, the number of incidents underis so small that inadvertent omissions orclassification couldtatisticallyimpact. In many cases in which the perpetrator is unknown, attribution to terrorists may beThe action may have been undertaken bypsychotics. or revenge-see king individuals with specific rronpoiiljcal grievances.
' The cnieruth* prraeat ttadv are auveadabry arbitrary The uiiun citladc trfrorut itiaihi or. ISd pernr ad aad lasuUaiican dttna*ladochiaa tWbci They ahathe iBuuutiea aad (reaa oorekr literatim awociatedthe Arab- Israeli conflict, uafeaa ihoa* undents eiibcr victam-iad oooGombauat nationals cr* dates cellule ihe principal area orcunDiei or became lh* object ol iMaraatioaa) eceiixovmy The fignrta alsoeiclbtic bocnbinii ihcllingi. and mcurtiOM byforte* Related bul Mpuriuly tarjeieel actions andcrtaa-ennite lenorul (roup art counted ai Individual moderns, even when lbey acre ataiodon ttic urn* day and in dote proiimity to one another Tcrrorsst opcraliona lhat mlttarrWd (aa opposed to those that uere abandoned or count*rod during the planning or stagingre counlrd.
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Inchirlo. occupation of lad litterI boutwnmic. rhootouUpolice, andn jir prrcmuar*he total accounted for by eachOriginal document.