NIGERIA: THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY AND CIVILIAN RULE

Created: 8/3/1978

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Nigeria: The Evolution

of Foreign Policy and Civilian Rule

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Nigeria: The Evolution

of Foreign Policy indj Civilian Rule

NIGERIA) THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY AND CIVILIAN RULE

CONTENTS

Page

FOREWORD

PRINCIPAL

DISCUSSION

The Setting

Basic Factors for theAssets and.

Human Resources

Material Resources

The Nigerian Military EstarjUshinent

Aspirations, Interests, and Civilian Role

The Impact of thetrorunerit

Nigeria and the United States

FOREWORD

Thr turnover to civilian rule In Nigeria la scheduled forhb development, and those related to the period of transition which Is about to begin, raise questions of how Nigerians Involved in this processeir Interests and role In International affairs and what thr main emphases of Nigerian foreign policy are likely to be.

Analysts are generally aareed that list uncertainties surrounding the transition are so great that they cannot predict firmly that civilian rule will. In fact, be Installed. They believe, however, that the oddswcxt-ssful transition, particularly because the Nigerian military leaders themselves appear still strongly committed to their own timetable. This paper, therefore, approaches the foreign policy issue from the standpoint that civilian rule will be achieved bylthough we have also consideredurbulent passage toward that goal could have significant repercussions.

It Is too early to attempt to forecast In any detail the personalities who will lead Nigeria or the specific courses these leaden might follow during ensuing years. In one sense, then,n Interim report. We would emphasize our belief, however, that the basic factors that limit the range of Nigeria'a policy options willelatively high degree of continuity, and we have, accordingly, examined In some depth these basic background factors.

PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

We believe (hat (he Quality of Nigerian relation! with the United States during the nextonths or so will depend primarily on US policy,trong but not completely exclusive focus on US policy toward southern Africa. Other Nigerian concerns In relations with the Unitedprices, availability of development capital and technology, North-South and nonsligned Issues, Inter-African security problems, perceptions of Soviet and Cuban activity Inbe secondary.

Nigerian policy will remain relatively straightforward on the southern African problem. The Nigerians will continue to support negotiations In the southern African context, but only as long as these negotiations hold serious promise of achieving the objective the Nigerians hold in common with otherdismantling of white minority governments In favor of rule by or In the name of the black populations. The Nigerians will simultaneously support the liberationnot by significant direct militarythe tactical flexibilityigerian regime shows in Its day-to-day relationships should not be allowed to create the Illusion that Its objective has moderated.

On the secondary issues, we expect to continue toood deal of pragmatism from the Nigerians. The amount of pragmatism, however, will be Influenced by the atmosphere created by perceived US action or Inaction In the main arena.

We do not nowivilian regime doing much to alter these basic approaches. Whileertain toubstantial amount of vocalwill be sincerely felt regarding southernfundamental elements In Nigeria's economic, social, and demographic situation argue for continuity and compromise as against sudden and radical change.

In our view, the odds stilluccessful transition to civilian rule In Nigeria, meeting the9 deadline to which the military leaders remain committed. There will surely be turbulent periods during this passage, and we nuke no forecast now as to how

long civilian rule will last once It is Installed. But we believe that the process will have at mosteripheral effect on Nigerian foreign policy during the comingonths.

Specifically, we believe that the Nigerians:

Will work with the US and UK on the Rhodesia problem, but will not accept any arrangement that Is not also acceptable to the Patriotic Front and will do relatively little more under present circumstances to persuade the PF leaden to moderate their positions.

WIN work similarly with regard to Namibia (South-West Africa).

Will view with grave suspicion any appearances that the United States Is expanding areas of eventration with South Africa In anyeconomic, or nuclear.

Will gradually become more uneasy about the role of Cubans and Soviets in Africa but will be reserved toward efforts to construct an International African security force.

Will not turn further toward cooperation with the USSR In International arenas unless Western efforts In southern Africa collapse utterly.

Will continue in their domestic affairs to function sothe limits Imposed by naHons list ic politicalwill attract foreign Investment and assistance.

Will In the United Nations, tbe Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, and other International forums, seek ways to make visible their sense that their country, given Its sir* and resources, should continue toeading role In African and Third World affairs.

a

DISCUSSION

Setting

he conduct of foreign affaln in Nigeria undrr military rule has been only one aspect of an effort by the leaders of the armed form toeir counteasonably honrst, retatlvefr cummocoensible. and effective within the limit* of the pentblr. At the sum tune they have sought toense of dynamic, unifying, and purposefultowardbright future ecramerourate with theice and resource*

1 The lone and content of Nigeria'shaveail of these asoirariorav The prraorul willingnes* of meat of the top ir*<im to engage repeatedly In serious attempt! to mediate among other Africans, even when the prospects for tucretsful mediation appear remote, feeds Ihe Nigeriam' vrnse of their own present and future Importance. Practicality.

concrete problems of foreign economic reUtkmhlps. For example, the Nlaerian* are now aucccwdufrr adjusting oil prices and predurtlon to lis* realities of the liHermltooal competitive amjanon,eriod of conflation compounded by thru* fears lhat they were bring "had" by the ouuor European and American private companie* with which ihey ara. In effect, partners.

1 At Ihe guise bnsa, the Naarrtana an capable of Indulging themarfve* la Ihe rhetoric ofaiming at phanlajmagortc as welt aa real-life targetsocal minority, capitalism tends lo be synonymous with corruption, while socialism equate* vaguely withuch more seriously, then common with other Africa na. are offended lo the wry depths of their perches by the racist attitudes and practices of ihe South African Government and Ihe white settlers In Ahodeata. The frustrations and Indignitiesolonial past can be focused on these Issues at relatively small cost to relationship*om pin real world. Even here, however, underere hasense that day-today coraJdrratfcww affecting domestic development lake some measure ofover attitudes arising out of foreign affairs:

ndare accepted fairly readily, for example. If they have the effect of enabling Western companies doing business In South Africa to continue lo ccmribute Importantly lo the Nigerian economy.

Iimilar vein, Nigeria has given relatively uncritical support to Ihe Third World approach lo Ihe com plot of Israel In the North-Southut In areaspecific Interest Isas In actual negotiation of technology transfers and In arguing the Question of Jurisdiction over seabed economic tones Nigerian d* legation* moderate their practice and their diplomatic position*.

n the light of these gets of attitudes, twoabout current Naserian foreignseem possible. First, foreign affairs per *eperipheral lhan central In Ihe eyes of ihepotential Nigerian lea den. Second, bothand the IdeobaScaJ sides of Nigerianfeeling about where the country stands Inare com pa rati rely "fixed" andNo Nigerian la ltlrly lo argue for aaltitudes toward while rule fas southern Africa,to likely to debar* seriously at tins timeof oil income fay Nigeria's economicdevelopment, no Nigerianurge Uwg

Nigeria should deaert the cans* of the less developed countries (or follow that cause tlarishry when Nigeria ha* Interests of Hand no Nigerian to llkery lo contend aerioualy that Nigeria's Internal problem* are to pressing lhat It should abandon cUlms lo the leading role la black Africa.

oth than* coociusioea are central to our *trw of howreUtioae wilh the present Mprrpoweri have evolved Nigeria's baric attitude* have remained Largely constant; change* In the reUtlneohlpB have derived from shifts (or at feast shifts as perceived by thaas ihe attitudes andr the degree of activity In African affaln, of iheIl Is they who move, not the Nigerian*.

he USSR has appearedelatively favorable light, deriving historically from ihe mponar the Soviets made In supplying mililary equipment to the

Nlaerlan Federals AtrXrm. the Simian dvtl war. Sine*he USSR alone wrtb East Europeanas participated In scene of the more arandtasr and visible protects which the Nterrtam lend to are aa public fymbofa of then- status. Moceovtr, lh.and. moat actively, thesawqsjiuiafly asmrlated Ihenwrves with the overthrow of whM* racial cWnaHoo In tanhm Africa. When, however, the SnMrti/Cubans come closer to home, aa with their prnrace In nrhuSborlna Benin, the Ntaeriana' auspl-rion and roecern are inwd There has abo ben eMclenc* recently that the Ntsrrtara areimmer view of Soviet and Cuban hyperaclivny hi Afnea aencrally.

H Over the past IS months, what the Mmiin have perceivedramatic shift In American official attitudes hashanae In Ihe cllmale ol US-Nhrertan rrUrlom. Ai seen Inhe US leadership hot moved stanlftcanuy toward adoptore crenel (lhat to, more Nlawrtan) view of the probe, uu of smrlhernas shown HseH more attentive il not more responsive to the needs and preterms of the less dneloptd ccwntita, and cenmlhy hoi ftiin htaher priority tount lure that Nayert-ana would saea at InportwiLrret new day of US-Nharrian reUttore has not dawned for Nk

ftosk Fectort fee the rWeind Lkatsatiee

Humaa iVtcaarcet

ft In Africa, math of the Sahara. Niaerla Handstimval giant In sheer tire ofover twice ihs numbers of Ethiopia aad nearfr three Hrnes Ihnae of lis next nearestouth Africa and Zaire. It tah meet populous country on iheta theetlmate uted by the United Nenem* Bat Ntaeria to oho one of the moat ethnleally divert* statu inere are more than tSOo etaeJe braruea* to wokenafcwtty of Ihe people, and. while thetoreret ethnicHs-jat- Fultnl of Ihe north, and the Yeewoo and fbo of thoop beet percent of the total peewktioo, therehh population of morealf million each.

ditceTTi ktr^ t i

N

MllhatbialWlM fnr rumpl*.I*

in Dhruc retnforeed by rritoDooa diff. .am. the African Sahrl from the

hot Ions come to dominate la northern Niaerla and ta moving southward. CeeaUl and othe/ peoples of the aouthern rcajona, particularly the active and aaarruv* fbo, hove adopted and adapted Qirto-tlanlty from Eureoean and America. moAtk. to ihe estent that aboulthird of the peculation ta mam iN^*Kf lo ctalar lo be,ifth of oD Nigerian, retain anusustnd practices wnkh are wtthevt potbcaJ asoUf tranceart* tente bat whichervasive influence on the lone of doily hfe in ail parti of ihe eountry.

II. Thtarowing rapidly-el iheercent annuaJ rate (the US rate UOMl II will double Ineanbo youthfuloar of othernation* aboutnderean of aae,ecllan aaecf lew thanthe US rrwdian aa* to MX Moreover, theae trends are still oVveeoptng; ihe growth rate has been rising steadilythe IMOa, while the preenrtkm of active adults,ecome* smaller Eve* with the current UN eatimale. I* lh*hece wiTIVlsertana. stillttuV better than half of themean of ate.

IIfrends have specif* pontics! ecemqtnutea, at least potcmiehY There ta torn* evidenc* lhat the Muslim north ta fatter then the rat of the coaster, that has re*nere or temptation (at to Lebanon, ice example) to manipulate the flaw* for cteitoral twrpeeea Orleo (there ore IS bcasdetith popukllom of) are dearly growingueerate than the rest of the ceamtry.etuh urban servlcea are notortovaty behind rirrnenul cVwncta. Nlaerla'it men bv both eehscateel Nkaertana and fotvtaai vlaMors. leedt to beby vtatble luiiauveumiU In urban sanitation, traffic ecenrol. teaponan to atreet crime, and other uol unfamiliar

heof the popuktlce. aboBrim economicf Ihe ktfaeJ to full.

Of the more 0

labor forceifbon leealXrv even eapeeted to obtata paid toba. aeeeedlng totowrian oV.tluwui plan.mm. tome tOQOOn become lechnicalh unemployed, while most of ihe real auttatkaOy dbaemnar Into the subaWence eren. omy. Moreover, the trneruhaM of Income distribution ore erowina. while reel income pre caplU to oVcllnlnaesult of Inflation In ihe faceeneral waa*

but Hie paradoxes encountered in assessing nigerias hunun resource* an? mod evident in rducatlon bv black african regional stindardsouthcorwury-schnrjniversity graduate* thai mgrrla nroduecs unnmlly handigantic achievement and an unrqiialed mmrtr of talent and proajcslvo activity. as compared with the perceived needs of the country, however, the results area continuing shonacr of skilled and semiskilled workers and managers; an over-abundance of the unskilled and, thoughesser degree, of the supereducaled who have chosen fields, like law. which are already crowded, or who are trained to work in an environment that does not estst in the present stage of development of thetechnical infnusructure. in education,ere evidently are serious regional disparities within the country: soutfternrrs generallyuch higher literacy rale thanisproportionate number of igive another example, thb time from within theattended universities in western europe or the united states.

taken bv theinsefves, nigeria's demographic statistics surety do not carry any certain meaning for foreign policy- nevertheless. ii seems possible to suggest some influencesonsciousness of such statistics may have on the individuals and groups who finally shape nigerian attitudes in foreign affairs

the sheer size of the population tends lo drown eittrembt rnovements and tendencies thai are primarily ideological rather than ethnic or regional at their base the countryhneet certainly too big and too diverse in ms bigness to be stampeded by new radical doctrine.

the diversity (as well as the recent history) of the country argues foe caution and corn prom be among itserious division, pushed to extreme, spelta secwaon of one or another of ihe ma lor fegjona the influence of thb situation on foreign affairs would appear to be thai it create* an almoaphere in which compromise and caution are more normal bvhavior, on moat matter* of moat importance,em bm.

despite ihe two basic influence* towardand continuity, the demographicyouthful population, wide dbpartttet between rural and urban milieus, desperate overgrowth of cities, rampant unemploymentajor educationallo the demagogue. in or out of of flee, lo us* against foreign influences in specificven though the eibtence of each of these onwelcome phenomena abo argues that technical asthtance from outsidessential ifo be made against specific problems.

most directly relevant lo foreign affairs in the more formal seme, the giant stir of the political packageontemporary nigeria cannot fall to haveffect on the thinking of nigerians, other africans, and non-africans shout ihe country's place in tse world. thesbtecantribuies to the nigerian leaders' sense (or illusion) that ihey are leadersontinent, not justountry, that ihey have broad respcesibirlties in the world al large, and that ihey have assets which, if properly moralized, can five effect to their policies. but the same sis* lhat inspires nlgeriana creates anilety outside nigeria the giant among snsaflcr. less well en sowed africanften. in ihe eyes of toes*umbling, brash riant outside africa, the country's size contributesendency to exlofl nigeria's potential but deplore its actualities, to take ihe nigerians seriously when worm are important or valuable hit to ignore ihe nigeriara when thehe focused deployment of economic or military power.

material iu sources

IS. the ambivalences and ambiguities in the reactions produced by nigeria's stae are not much mitigated by contemplation of us material resources.

il has been ihe dcealnant, over-wselming factor in the caicuhllom of nigeria's leaders regarding the country's future. it account* forercent of groat domestic product.erceni of foreign exchangendercent of all pubhe revenue*ca* second to saudi arabiaource of us oil imports, and thebo the biggest single customer, taking about half nigeria's

ia taken together with its butgeoning population, theseffect define the terms of nigeria's dilemma in any attempt to make economic policy serve foreign policy lirtrrests. forot saudi arabia: the nigerian leadership not only needs oil

, aw thbtwl stammmheieaatnge-n*a* tartam awtwit-araway (taljaaatis twvm**iiw Vrmmi ktaajwamm if navh ii pment al twaorbxercwattanrw. ii prrrrntohl awl frame* Ctaporbl tw aw ittt fan***

Income to latter other economic development and lo create public services. It cannot do without something close to present leveb of income and/or produclion. And Nigeria Is aware lhat Itslntte resource, at current product km rales (betweenillion Harrrh per day) ihe currently estimated JO billion bamii ofill last noi much more than anotherean, unless new fields are formd and Oevrlnceu, that limitation will Hand

Nigerians have mHuremaximizing the benefits from this oVplrtlngfnllowed. until recently, an asxreeUve policyproduction ccenbtned wflh unilateralto hike revenue per barrel Therefused to play: Investment la newnuUnteeaanre of eibring setts fell of!further drops In production, andwas opened lo lower cunt competition fromSea and Alaska. During the past year,ihe past Hi months, the Nigerianslo work more eleeefy with theattention to their market feeecsabireducing prices to meet ihe competllkmhght crwaes lhat an?

experience does not encearrage using oilinrirurnent of foreign poller, thedevelopment ambitions leave themand bargaining powerracticalare stuck la partnership wtlh the Industrialandorld wide oil shortage becomnthat tbey can choose among potentialI Usot barer to emergekrof this paper. If then.

tl. Moreover, the Ilea that band to the industrial Wet* are not confined to oil liana have been made lo develop Nigeria's liquefied natural gas (LNC>ircet, but not only are foreign com pan in toard of Ihe cost of the (ingle LNC facility now on the drawing boards bat ihe Untiedring counted as the ante market, an expectation lhat saay wen be tonhe light of Ik* Untied Strict' own energy program. The buildingn roc hem teal Industry, lo provide, among] other products, an Incrraaed supply of fertiliser for NigerianVpenchignificant degree en foreign Invertmcnt and technical support.

e do not believe that Nigerians are likely Inadical socW^pollllcai^eonomle course In any fnreweable future.ajor renunciation nf pros row as understood byoncerted compulsory beck-to-lhe-UndInvolving major social dislocations on ihe Cambodian model would liberate Nigeria from the network of relallonshlpt that nowo Western Industrial capitalism. The costs. In human lives, would be erastrnoua. forlreadyotential food crisisesultecline in agricultural productivity Bine* lh* etrilecade ago. Formerly the world's leading peanut ei porter. Nigeria now Imports peanut oil; and. wheres? In 'V-t was (he world's second Unseat cocne onourth.

ut continuing part kipet loo in ihe WeHeia netwevk don net mean that the reUitonahlps with Western Eurooe and the Untied Statn will be easy Nigeria sen the Oreniemtton of rVtrolewm Caporting Countries, theete noire, as aa ertrrmetS important and brnefkial foreign association, despise its disappointment with ihe dimness of Arab, Iranian, and other OPEC support for southern AfricaH rugate for majority rule. And the Ntgeriam are able, to some decree, to shift developenent contracts aboul among the firms of more lev

TW Nigeria* Military EsUbllikaaial

efore any ha lance of Nlgertas liuman and material resources eaa be if ruck, account must be taken of one of lb untque features- aa ovenlre. underirained Army Inherited from the civil war and pci served by the social need to keep manpower off ihe labor market and by the pollbruem ofarge force outelatively privtlrged position Nigeria has lh* ktrreH suHtary force In blackoughlyam*

hb overHard and unctmmplovcd force repre-aenU an overriding political factor with which any government must come to terms. Plant for reducing the ttrength of the tunedeceaHiy If lh*o become more efficient and effective, hove In ihe past been ihe cause of al beat one roup attempt. Furthermore, plant for ihe country to be returned lo crriHan rah* may weflosrd by thoae officers who feel they have not yet received their financial reward from military nth*.

he eibtenc* ofmportant bauevon and return la civilian rule, meant lhat ihehreat lo the governmentositive instrument of foreign policy Thbnlikely lo recede one* civilians take power, because

1ooa. rtaw. xrm ahaeae

Ihe baste1 rem*in.he new cirillanerceivedpursuing pc4irin Inimical lo Iheefamcnti ofchancesew military takeover will irscreaae The threatoup from disgruntled fart torn within theices ta likely to remalo an lilnJeflned ret imps in ut factor arguing against bold action In both the domewlc end foreiga potVy fields

he Nlaertan military cstabhshrncnt depend*rmltmilral flow of Imported materiel; it will depend on the maintenance of economic reUHonshlps with Ihe Westerned Dehorn to pay for lhat materiel unless the Nigerians wish to depend more clearly on Ihe USSR and Eastern Europe lhan ihey do now. and we ae* no atom of thb.

civilian rule or during tha process of rraoaHloo to iu even though Niasrrians thtnaaiKga are rvea now volubly dttcuaung partlcuUr assort and Nafrrtas role In regard lo them.

3ft la terma of ernotlonal commttmeut, ending white minority mat gad arsartlseid ag soon aa ouaslbie In southernirst among Naacria. aaptratkeia Nigerian leaden use thb bane, which ihey areoral one, to trseaasare mucheir rebttortshtp wilh otherand partlcutarry wilh ihe United Stall* They believeeir country, as Ihe most powerful black stair,ey row to play in thb struggle, ah hough they wo* consplrwsentary rather than competitive to 'Var played by the frontline tUtea and libemn..

While Nigeria could employ force Immediate neighbor* it hi lib highly Unilateral aca afield at thbrecluded by lack of capability. On the other hand, participation In multilateralealistic possibility, and the most likely way that Nigerian military power would be aged beyond inhile on occasion Nigeria has provided logistic support and military materiel to irsssmtentt in southern Afrtca. the country's leaden are determined lo confine any overt and large-scale military activity to the framework of Inlernatioral oegininttocrv the United Nations Inigerian contingent contributed significantly to the UN peacekeeping operation In the Congo (now Zaire) dwrtng Ihe, and recently an Infantry bartsKon haa been arwt to pin trnogo from ether ratnoea forming the UN Interim Fere* In Lrcasson However.bility to contribute major forces to sustained asssh!lateraleverely csjeeatrained by leadership, logistic, and maintenance deficienciet as well athortage of Iralrwd msnpower. Simply put, despite the huge sire of Nigeria's armedrobably could not field and support moreew effective ground force bahahons at any on* lima.

Asplrcmeen. Iiytgeanrt, end ChHBan Hula

o doubt amorsg observers lhat Nigerians aspire lo an Increasingly influent ul rule, at least in Afriee-and through Africa In the world al And* front the rsoruVSeuth dialogu* and the Igned movement, hossever, Nigerians havelo focus their Interests strongly within aa African regional contest, and w* see little likelihood thaiask aspirations will change either with the arrival of

heseavr (he potential for friction withited Slate* and, probably rare*cSoaer cefbbrestton with USSR la specific, limited coissexts. such asor liberation aawuausu While few Nigerianserms of rtwrtutg lo an od embargo of their own against tha United Stales and Europe to force ihe West Into mere militant supporteir southernhey would certainly call for the Imposition of UN sanctions against South Afrtca,an on all nuclear cooperation andInvestment aa well sa aa oil embargo. Indeed, each threatened breakdown In aeasnsatloaa and each fresh osjtiaats perpetrated by the South African* alreadyurther strain obsrsmalw and the leadership haa aheady. in Us own op substantial credit with ether African and the Thard World generally by acceding to US reonesti to help the aaooWate. Lb UN drafting

U SJrsc*igeria bas publicly staled its Intention loecoedWy gad tertiary boycott of foreign firms lhat deal with lh* Rcpuohc of South Africa. Nigeria haa for soars* timerimary boycott with respect to South Africa, but ta date haa mat frjrmaJry cstaonahad rggnlgtarns torcondary/tertiary boycott policy This rwbrv haa bean applied MseeBvelY and Infrswrurntly. depersdlrsg on Hs effect on Nigeria's economic ae*d* Al Irsat two US Urn hav*sked to sarn coasrracts which inchaded boycott ekuat* Both refused, rilingUS laws and rrsusallpssa, aad La bath rases the offending language was reaaoved, Pragrnatists, eially the civilian burrsucra'v have opesosr applkatlu. of the secondary boycott policy foe fear thal It would discourage foreign Irade and Investment

In Nigeria more then II wouldSouth Africa. However.failure of other mcevuie* lo bringhange In southern Africa may Irvrrase peessure lo Implementolicy. Again, such Impiemenlallon would not be relaled lo ihe Instalbtlon of civilian in place ot" military role.

ii more strictly nhteral terms. Nigerian*greater potential kinship for the United Stales than for any other developed country. The danger Inhai perceived failure by ihe United Stales lo show affinity furhusore seriously by ihe Nigerians lhan,imilar failure by the USSR,erceived to hare relatively little lo offer NigeriaiUteral cortfevt Previous daanpointmcnt* with US attitudes have tended to merge,ith the Nbrrrians" general hvprrsensitlvity toward the nxsnomlc power and what ihey Imagine to be the subversive potentud of foreign elements. East and Wert.

ot csear to us lhat there are any particular trends here, the asp*rations and Interest* we have described appear so basic lo ihe Nbrrlans' situation lhat there would appear to be little room for new course* lo develop. Any ad hat merits we would eipect lo see In Narerian arrategse* toward southern Africa would be marten of liming and lone rather than subatanremportant to tote, however, that thblready "radical- from the perspective of conservative opinion In Western Europe and ihe Uniteda ihe Nkgcriaae' view, US policy has shifted toward their position, and while Ihey havee*porae by moderating their rhetoric and poatponlng some specif krew poatttoa ha* not shifted substantively.

ur view that (he range of foreign affairs behavior lo beofelatively narrow In substance though swry possibly broader Inreinforced by some corgSaeratkai of the character of Nigeria* fatfign policy leadership, present and potential.

nder the military regime, the principal acton hare hern the membrri of the Supreme Military Councilhich drab with all aspect* of government. The Ministry of Ei'.emal Affaln (MEA) Is subordinate to an ad hoc group which Inetisde* not only the Mead of State, General Ofaasanio, but also al load General Danjuma, ihe Army Chief of Staff, and Brigadier Yar 'Adua, the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters. Despite reported differences ofand certainly of tornperantent on Ihe part ofhe net attitudes of Ihi* group have appeared lo be very dose lo those we attribute to Nigerian* of the elite group arnerallv.

he prospects forchange of foreign policy' leadership under civilian rule do not argue for ami change* In directionumber of the senior civilian offbetab of the MEA may retire with the advent of civilian rule on the ground thai the "politicians" are likely lo Install their rnsnars In the good lob*any would seem likely lo stay on the chance thai their Influence though net ibe efficiency of the Ministry) might tarrewte under the new drcntnstancrs.

3A. One complication under civilian rule will be the existenceational Ajaeenbfy. another will be the resurgence of political parties. Wc believe that, while radicals he'd by some strident* and listener-tuab favoring mere doctrinaire forms ol socialist anddeology, will probably be represented In the National Assembly, ihey are not likely to have much Influence on national policy. Including foreign policy.ighly likely lhat civilian Irsdrrship will favor continuation of Nigeria's mlsed economy, thai business Interest* will be well represented andragmatic approve* will generally prevail to the extent thai emotional commitment to the southern Africa problem makes thb possible. Certainly, we do notivilian guvcriiment dominated by Ideologicalhay well be eves* more driven by domestic political cocaudenlkr*

ossibility thai ihe leeintigence of political parties, and ihe regional partkulsrwlhat these reflect, will complicate ihe foreign policy decisionmaking process. Thb could begin during Ihe transition period, eapeciallr IfInitiative* regarding southern Africa should stall because the mililary gov* mm* aten bo vuhscrxbi* to criticism for having supported those Initiative* Similarly, If these Initiatives have notait before ihe Installationivilian lovenvnent inhe civilian* might find ii harder to continue lo support negotiation* than ihe mililary have. But the military ihenuehn may well have reached thb point much earlier.

Regional particularism may wellarger rolo la Nigeria under civilian rale lhan ii has, al least overthr. under Ihe military In thb ctmnrctlen, rate point that needs to be kept Inhat, to thef the conarrvatlve Muslim north, the Influence of "westernisation"evolutionary, even though the traditionalist In this region mat be

more personally receptive lo the ei patriate advisrf orthano theed, educated southern Nigerian. Amceei younger, educalrda very sm?lltakeshauvinistic, xenophobic cast, although we have not yet seen evidence that the kind ot* militant Islamic political teleology espoused by Colonel Qedhafl Inaking hold in Nigeria. If. under civilian rile, such northern elements become more prominent or vocal they nay ihe Nigerianore militant and suspaetoua tone.onger term, such elements might, by alliance with "progressives" (rem other regions,ore Influential group than we now anticipate. Beyond thb matter of tone, however, the Influence of ihe Muslimikely lo remain essentially negative on foreign policy; It limits what the nalional leadership can do, and northerneed to be taken Into account, but the northern view of (hirers does not ta itself take policy fas new directions.

While other major ethnic groups do have some Special Interests in Nigeria's foreignoruba minority Us rartghboring Benin, forInterests are not likely to Impinge on Nigeria's relations with the United States.

Aa we Indicated In the foreword to thb paper and In the lugaaneota, wv continue to believe that the edda favor the sehieveascnt of civilian rule on achedule. At Ihe same tune, we recognize that there are possible developments that could delay or disrupt the process. These include serious ethnic disorders produced bycale that thedershlp would feel compelled to postpone civilian ruleime or usdeflnltrry.oup or coup attempt by disenchanted middle-grade officers who fear the Impact of civilian rule on their percrubttes and poaltlom aa well aa on Ihe body politic. While these dsrtloccmnti would be distracting to Nigerian Iredera, and In that senae afreet their ability to focus on foreign policye do not see themundamental change of

The Inspoct of the Inteenotional Environment

should emphasize that the cenHr.-l'lesIn Nigerian foreign policy assume continuitiesintemalional environ men!hich thband ihH is notaferegard to Africa. Along with other African

Iredera, the Nigerian leadership currently appears to feel thata fact witnessing new developments:

The French-Inspired concept of en Intervention force to protect essentia fly Western Interests In Africa,

The growing rob of the StreieWCufagm In African affair*.

The ihreotencd collapse, under tntrmaJ and outside pceauzres. of tetobleeard though not mn warily admirable regimes,n Zaire being the most peomlnest rumple

So far. the Nkerrian official reaction has been to Ires! these uioblen* In establishedffect denying lhatnything new here lhat deraendr any new approach Thus, the French concepts are definedontinuing form of ncocoloeualbcn. not new forms; theule in BhJopta aadcceptod under the formula that sovereign states ran invite In whomever ihey please, provided foreign presence don not become permanent; androblem Insserted to be eachadvety aa Internal one so be met from Internalhkough even Mobutu techrucallvright" to caD for hth> Military auUreeotioa haenilfiaail to favor of Iravbtg Africans to reaorv* African protases*

e beJJeve that thb krad of reeetion wiB continue to typify Nigerian isaj saia, the Nbsrriana wlD be ort leas**rsvurtaat tort of pragekasj which la effectontinuing corress-tton of tatiarces with winch they are familiar one In winch the "good guys" and vlfiaim each have we*know* Haws and hi which the Uniied Stairs plays the roleheavy" whose heart may be In the right place but who needs constant retnJnders to Im en the track.

ossible that some fresh ncunton Into Africa by the Sovlets/Cubsr* wouldhange in Nigerian altitude*eveteeaneat would, of course, have to occur outside lh* soul hern African contest; In that arena. Soviet/Cuban assistance to the liberationelcomed. Ehewhere, thesee the United States and the USSR aa needed fundamentally to balance each other,eir ownoelationship with the USSR that provide* themseful, ah hough limllrd,to the predominant position lhat West Europeans and Ibe United Stales occupy as sources of capital, lechnolory. and oevelcpment assistance toner-

man ponoamlry rteeptlva to th* npetriat* adMaert thanoducatedNba-rUn. Among ycwnaer. odueated north-

baee not yot mxn evid>nce that the kind ol mlfatant Idam*deology rapocood by Colonel Qadr*J( inaking bold fee Nitarkt. If. wader crrihgn rale, nek trorthani ajgceaaati baconom muuu>cut or vocal ihey may |tva twaaTJatlore mlbtaw*etewttfa might, by iiaanri with "pragteaahwi" fromxnr* tribtnytaal iroBp than we Beyond tha* matter of tooe, bowever. the trdhMTioD of the Mmoankety to ramam eaaentlaDy org*ben on fotrign policy; it limit> what theaaaap cant do, andaNtrl-baa need to be taken into account, bat the aerthera vane of rhb*g* doe* not In taff take policy in new

hile other major atlauc sreanja do lane Kane apackal liwuiiah la NfcanVi fi*iilgiie re. bYornba miaerty lalia, Benin, fortut* net* art act hkafy to tarpinaje on Nbjcriai rewJloni with the United State*

l we Indicated ba tha fceeword to thb paper and ha the JaWiiinHi, awconttnoa tobehave that the odd. favor the achkeoiueat of civilian rale onAt the ataaa bate, are recocniia that there are perntoWluLinatai that ccadd oVarr or i

pcodrjced by aaWwatva prawJcghaj naeale that tha military liaJiidiip womld fed ccenpefWd toihaa mlaia* or Indefinitely,oap or coup irfapt by dtwinlmitadcBoaei who fear lh* Impact of ctrlHan rule nei theirliatii aad poaBloran lh* body poUOc Whale the*.ll-rgnah would be dl-tracting to Nlgarian LwUeihaiJJ*ct on forwam pnhey aauaa^wadooot

Tha -npoct of hS* kn^nemW Bwhwatatirl

ajhtata* that the eeartuatheafau forabja pofcley *aw*menatiootl auriiuuuwnt la wkach thb poaeyndotafe aaawiuakt with retard to Africa, Along with other Africanhe rvTgertan leaydardrip cuaraatiy appeari to fem thatb hi fact iMniigng bp

Fierjcn-iraaptred concept of aabn fore* to protectWntara latin all aa

Afrit*.

-Tha

MobcaV* ta Zaire

growing rolo of the Saibb/Cwban* ra Afriraa aflatr*.

So far, tha Nbjwalli offarial rwarttoa baa been to treat that* mckliwi ta lairhmirl tarraa, ta effect oWagapproach. Thua, tha French cane continuing form of ueocoh jd*iu. not newW Scrriet/Coban nal* In Ethiopia aadccepted tinder th* feeemaa that atntnlggcaa brrito tm whomever theyiuvldcd foreign pecwrooe don not bocotn* iawiaaaeut, gad Mobatapreterm ba StatbaklaaaafwjdlaM

teeeaacalhrright- to caB feg Iwkp. Military kaiailiaiaul to favor of Afrkaaa to igaohw Africa

-IBll mill pcanrion* which in affect boa of

In -bach lh*Dm- and Vkaewa flnn aud ha wkach tha UaJtodlay* uW rot*haatvy'* wbea* kaari inay b*

totbari^paacebwtwaa ta

im on th. tmck.

tkat

t at

Airica by lh.otwr- wouldn Naawtaa attanadmlnannl waald. of r* to occurtha aaataara Afrkaa aa that arena. acanWQafawo tha hoerationliaiii Bnkm tha Nagfri-ggg em th*aa> gad th* UKRad raadganaeaaJhr to baataee *aoh ot her. tadarn1 II ith tha USSR that

aJtaeaattv* tacejeaoa and lh* United Stetm occupy a* armrcm capetal toc'htiology. and dtvekapeaaatt i

Alb* Nigerians ttaapry do not see that an upset of dirt brtfffKtIn ibe cnh bul If denrtorancsaj la Africa aSoajU appear In be loadingh toward tha Soviets, thrwoaldk to US and Wot European action to restore, but only lo restore. vqiaJabrlsas ai tbey uaderstand it.

it*hr Myrrun.he tnohahoa of tha aombrgwd sasiiiiau* as aeor*Tirjuboa lo habere aan* which msy

Their actMty

Groupnd regarding the nJecth-Sneth thee serves not oner artnardiate ohgeettves but breeder aJOtik To the

chenajrarrtanhb respect, ret expect porrse tradualof their on the raastaej

(especially OFEO aa baa as these appear aad Nigeriaother

urch ia the dlrectlcei ofKn Nlgeetaa foreign riuacy. ft at raors oaety tube the Third World than toward th? USSR,e hsrder. ws tassa,vuasa

ospfaei pnlll kaJty tha hkghty technical

rnoajrlo and tha) Uhrhadj Shaven

t i

ihai that illn aaasfiiaiar distant frora what w* bebeve tha Nlcarlaa vhnr to bas that tha future oaauaty of US-Ntss-riaji icwtiuiahius depends nroch aaora on the acikwa of the Uirrirden o. any hhefr erwzsaes la Nujrrtan rxafcey. US successes or failures, especssQy with respect to roo*pern Africa, wu ret ibe (cear. Wherever ccrlrsrtreai thesve to brine ima- aaoien aad ahahsn they will

thatldadef

believe thai risk iso not ftguaiaaming to ihe USSR ke gayaa gsWrsaovs pertneresult of over soother* Africa.

Original document.