Created: 1/1/1979

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Politics of the Soviet Energy Balance: Decisionmaking and Production Strategies

Politics of the Soviet Energy Balance: Decisionmaking and Production Strategies (U)

A Rfsmrch Piper' M

Politics of the Soviet EnergyisionmflklriR and Production Strategi

leaders, especiatly those closely in touch with: the economy, have been aware since well bvfore the Western oil crisishat theyar more serious energy problem than ihey were prepared publicly to acknowledge. Nevertheless the7 appears to haveatershed in their Appreciation of just how serious the problem really By that time, the magnitude of the energyproblem caused by the rapidly increasingeficit in the European USSR was becoming fully apparent. The immediate reasons for increased anxiety included the deterioration ofio of oil reservesroduction, the failure of geologists in Westyumen Oblast to meet the plan for increasingeserves, the inability to bring on siream the planned number of new small oilfields in Tyumen, shortfalls in productiononsiderable number of older oil regions, and energy shortages throughout the ccon-lorny. At the7 Plenum of the Central

with Brezhnev's endorsement theSovie

'. leadership significantly altered the energy policyad underpinnedh Five-Yearnd accelerated development of oil and gas production tin Tyumen Oblast,


There lias never existed what could properly beomprehensive and optraiiye Soviet energy program! There have been various studies, recommendations, -and forecasts; Ihcre have been many research(RAD) projects; and there haveompilations of one-year and five-year planhat have naturally involved individual capitaltruction projects with long Icadtimcs. But energy production dec'stonmaking has not been seriously nfluenced by any carefully elaborated andmastercr have there existed operativeerm, Integrated programs (cm sticking suchnergy production problems as Tyumen oil develop-

offshore oil production. Tyumen gas develop-


ment, or Kansk-Achinsk coal development. Theof decisionmaking with respect to these critical production areas is far more ad hoc than is customarily assumed by either Soviet propagandists or many Western analysts.

The center of gravity in energy decisionmaking over the past decade has lain in the Council of Ministers -State Planning Committee (Gosplan) sphere. There is no evidence that the Politburo or the CentralSecretariat has routinely taken Ihe initiative in energy produclion policy matters. Premier Kosygin has been the top official responsible for energy production. Other key figures have included Council of Ministers Deputy Chairmen Vladimir Novikov and Vcniamin Dymshits, who have exercised day-to-day supervision of the energy production ministries; GosplanNikolay Baybakov; and Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology Vladimir Kirillin. Vladimir Dolgikh, the Central Committee secretary responsible for heavy industry, has monitored energy production along with many other sectors of the economy which fall within his jurisdic-lion from the party side. On occasion the pnny Secretariat doe. intervene in energy production policymaking, as it did most recently inundamentally, however, power in energydecisionmaking remains diffused among various leaders and institutions; there is no point at which all the strands of influence come together.

The economic and political system in which energy production policymakers and administrators operate compels them to be highly responsive to short-term considerations at the expense of proclaimed long-term objectives. Top-level policymakers and advisersedge their bets and avoid unqualified commitment to

arty .single policy proposal. They ire sensitiveui rents of elite opinion and avoid overaavocacy or positions that will isolate them or endanger their bureaucratic or poliiical careen. High-level energyare concerned above all with ensuring conditions that will make it possible to slightly overfulfil! the one-year targets for,which they arc responsible. Consequently, they lend io avoid any technological innovation that threatens to set back nnnu.il plan fulfillment


Top energy policymakers are eiiremely dependent on advisers and ipccfalisu. who provide most of the basic Information andritical rale in defining the options, Unbiased advice, however,carce commodity because most advisers and specialists have vested interests defined by the institutions, research programs, and career systems with which they arc associated.

| Policy decisions on energy production customarily 'emergeabyrinth of bureaucratic and personal negouaOn. in which committee discussion and formal rnterorganiMiional coordination play an important role Within tire limits set by circumstances that cannot be ignored, policy isesultant of the play .of institutional and personal interests than the outcome ^fB rational appraisal of the objective situation. On the jvynolc, ihc system tends to respond slowly to new conditions. Although campaigns to meet changing situation* arc often mounted, incrementalismeeply ingrained principle of energy planning.

During the past decide Soviet energy policymakers and odvisers haveange of responses to the growing energy problem. The spectrum of options considered runs from (I) simply increasing oil and gas production,harply raising the share of gas in the energy balance,tabilizing and then gradually decreasing the share of hydrocarbons,increasing the share of coal nnd nuclear power,oing all out for coal. Tbe preferences of 'policymakers and advisers have to some extent shifted with the passage of time.ave always been supportedluster of purty and production officio Iiareer interest in Tyumen Oblast. backed up by some Siberian scientists. It is possible that these officials have received some encouragement over the years from the Central Comriillec Sccretar-


even from Brezhnev.as been favored in recent years by Premier Kosygin, all the top Academy of Sciences energy advisers, GosplanBaybakov. Chairman of the Slate Committee for Science and Technology Kinllin. some ministers, and party and production leaders in Siberia's Krasnoyarsk Kray.as been entertained by some Academy of Sciences figures and supported by certain specialists associated with the coal and electric power industries.

There has been much vacillation and indecision in energy production policy.aith that the share of oil and gas in the energy balance would gradually continue to rise, Soviet authorities shifted in :hco Ihe hopeig leap in gas production might prove to be the answer;roadly based strategy keyed to lil and gas in the present, coal in the middle term, and nuclear rower in the longer term was approved as theine, but by7 policy had changed toarrower, all-out campaign simply to develop oil and gas production in Tyumen Oblast over the next decade. And even the adoption of Ihe most recent line has not stilled proponents of both the caal-nucleor and gasIl is likely that Kosygin. Baybakov. Kirillin. and most Academy ofes energy advisers were unhappy with the way policy was altered at he7 Plenum of the Centnl Committee. While Ihey are probably prepared to acknowledgender present conditions there is no choice but to attempt to accelerate hydrocarbon production in Wcm Siberia, they probably fear that the current campaign will undermine the pursuit of crucial longer range goals.

, The change of direction at the7 Plenum of the Central Committee and the retreat from the strategy ofh Five-Year Plan indicate the estreme difficulty the Soviets are having inalanced response to long-term energy development needs and shori'term demands for petroleum.6 there hasefinite foreshortening ofthe

I energy hori.on and even greaicr fixation on meeting today's needs, come what may in the future.


At the moment the Soviets are engagedelentless struggleoil output in the keyiberian region by increasing drilling and recoverydmotlor and other older Tyumen deposits,to raise the level of output by opening up smaller Tyumen fields. The prospects for success are highly tenuous. Samotlor, which at present produces aboutone-quarter of all Soviet oil, is uctng driven beyond its planned capacity and will thus go downhill more rapidly when it begins to decline in several years,The small fields are; in in<^easingly inaccessible locations, arcless productive lhan Samotlor. and require progressively rising investment. They are not being brought on stream as rapidly as required. The Tyumen campaign may be predicated to some extent uponope that one or more new supcrgianl oil deposits will be discovered either in the Middle Ob region or beneath the gasfields in northern Tyumen. Yet there hasritical lag in geological exploration of the region and Soviet policymakers consequentlyound basis for even guessing whether oil is to be found in these locations. The presence or absence of such oil; has been hotly debated.ajority ofxperts disagree with those geologists now ascendent Who guarantee they can find oil in these places if given the resources.

Over the past decade the Soviet leadership has been unable toechnological breakthrough in even one type of new system that could provide an answer id the increasingly critical problem of transportingiun energy to the European USSR. Given the long leadtimcs Involved, this failure seriously jeopardizes anyslight it may nowlarge-scale substitution of gas or coal for oil in. Whether Soviet RAD organizations will be able to devise means of chilled or liquefied gas transportation in time to have in effect Ins highly problematic. Dcloys in solving the extra-high-voltage transmission problem. In developing either slurry or capsule pipelines, injlmplcmenting any one of several proposed coel-processing techniques, and in producing power-generating equipment adapted to Kansk-Achinsk coal nowossible "coalwell off into. 1'


ignificant increase in the share ofgoing to energy production, it is difficult to sec how the Soviets can do much to transform thearameters of the dilemma that now confronts them. They must moke an increasingly heavy commitment of resources to oil production in Tyumen because they must have the oil; without additional investment being allocated to the energy sectorhole, this will tend to retard progress towardas- or coal-based solution to the energy problem, and delay in developing these alternatives will generate still more pressure to maintain the existing proportion of oil in the energythe day of reckoning that must comeew supergiant oil province is quicklyBrezhnev's speech at the8 Plenum of the Central Committee suggests that energy-related investment may beigheruring the remaining years of the present five-year plan. Because the physical resource demands of energy production fall heavily upon the metallurgical,onstruction, and transportation sectors, pressures may mount to make compensatory cutback* not only in the traditional buffer sectors of agriculture, housing, and light industry, but in military prcduction as well.

The question uf foreign dependency has probably become more acute wilh the introduction of the new party line. The strategy propounded by Kosygin and Baybakovith its stress on nuclear power, coal, and hydroelectric!ty. was presented, in almost so many words, as the Soviet "Projecthe retreat from this strategy in7 may have compromised the longrun objective of avoiding external structural vulnerability in energy matters, By playing down the po'icy commitment to coal and nuclear power, perhaps to avoid cuts in military or agricultural spending, Brezhnev has implicitly heightened the already urgent Soviet needroad range of onshore and offshore oil and gas technology. More important, any slackening in the expansion of coal production and nuclear generating capacity lhat might ariseyproduct of the current strategy threatens to leave the Soviet Union in thend inith an extremely tight energy situation, iferious energy deficit. It is apparently this forbidding prospecteficit, not the question of dependence on Western technology acquisition, thai has most disturbed Kosygin.



! ii Si 1 ! *

In the future the Soviets sre likely to try to reviveas strategy. Provided gas reserves arc even closeeing as large as officially claimedlja quantum leapyumen natural gas utilisation would be the onlyeally rapid increase in fueltild be: brought about. This approach, however, wouldit a'cuw strain on the steel and gas and oil machine-

building industries. Foreifcn supply'cf credits,iameter pipes, and compressors might well prove toven more critical at this juncture than at present.

i The Soviet leadership may also search foriofial solutions to Its energy dilemma. The mostrospective courses of action would be the creationolltburOTlevel committte responsible fornergy pri>blems end/or the appointmententral Isecretary responsible solely forffairs. But neither change would significantlyroVe the leadership's capability for dealing with the energyjl/.jlj!rf

Strategics for Dealing With the Energy Problem




itlcMI-MVr s


This paper examines the way in which ihe Soviets have dealt with energy production issues, rather than quantitative aspects ofthe Sovici energy question. Given the fusion of political and economic issues and of policymaking and bureaucratic implementation in the Soviet system, there can be no tidy demarcation of the "politics" and "economics" of energy production. Essentially, "politics" occurs wherever there is an clement of choice with respect to policy or execution. While such choices are often resolved at the very top, the complex technical nature of energy issues and the strong bureaucratic and personal interests involvedetting in which outcomes may be significantly affected by what is happening at middle or even lower echelons. I

The present paper complements recent CIA analyses of the Soviet energy situation that have focused on the oil industry. CIA projections of Soviet oil output have provoked considerable debate. They have beenless on empirical, technically based grounds than on the grounds that they overlook certain features ofthe Soviet natural resource andenvironment. It is argued, directly or indirectly, that CIA projections:

Pay insufficient attention to the vast potential energy resources still untapped in West Siberia, East Siberia, and offshore.

Fail to recognize the capacity of the Soviet system to

reach hard decisions in energy policy and

EOcommand planning and mass

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Discount the ability of Soviet planners to diagnose their own energy production problem and come upoherent, long-term "rational" energy strategyH

This study looks at Soviet perceptions of the energy resource problem and concludes that informed authorities are far more concerned about energy production than official spokesmen publicly orsuggest. The paper addresses the following questions:

How serious is the energy problem perceived to be?

Who makes energy production policy?

What are the basic motives and features of decisionmaking in the energy production field?

What alternative strategies have been advocated for meeting the energy problem?

choices has the leadership made in recent years and how effectively are present policiesimplemented?

The evidence on these questions strongly indicatesSoviets are not at all sanguine about tappingpotential with sufficient speed tonitary, "rational actor"modeloor basis forhas happened in recent years in energypolicymaking; andoherent,continues lo be lacking. There areto suppose that the situation is not likelyduring the forthcoming Soviet

The study is divided into five main sections. The first explores the evolution of Soviet perceptions of the energy problem in recent years. The second examines the environment in which energy decisionmakers operate and the impact of this on the process ofhird sectionummary view of controversy over energy production policy during the past decade. The fourth part analyzes the impact on policy ofthe7 Plenum ofthe Central Committee and describes what has happenedhe last section discusses prospects for the future. Details of debate over energy production strategy duringeriod are presented in the


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Politics of the Soviet Energy Balance: Decisionmaking and Production Strategies (U)

I. Sonet Perceptions of the Energy Problem

the Soviets have really thought about the energy problem at any given time is not easilyevertheless, there has clearlyrowingbetween ihe mass propaganda line that energy problems cannot occuroviet-style planned economy and anxiety developing over the situation among even moderately wcll-inforrned elements of the population. In Academy of Sciences and intelligentsia circles there has been an awareness of projections in the Westapid global exhaustion of conventional energy resources. However,andful of individuals haveleastthat even the Soviet Union, wilh ils socialist system of centralized planning and enormous natural resource base, is not immune to the "energy

The di/ncuUy irnca is mm becausecirclec*tif*eften*ive and accuiatc apeecuuoo of the overaJ Soviet energy* MHll. and thcac iadrridaais nay wet]r easuaiaai to theouervaa TW" is some qecsUo*to bow enoen dotoruoc of renhtike lUtnucs 'amahed lo energy dectuoarnaktr* Aooraa to use information accessary to reach an informedmerit appears to be inttxird within each production branch, and overview data arc probably eveat more cloviy bead Mali) feigner Soviet olficiali and academics with whom Westerners have talked are un lurii to have had access to such data Moreover, iwareneni of tbcciireme political sensitivity of praiimiuic energv production information has probably led to deliberate distort ion both In public propaganda andommunication! writs foreigners It may be that Informed Soviet authorities hesitate to eipresiabout the energy Situation even among Ihcmielves H

' The trust prominent public eipoewnt of thunew it the famous physicist. Academician Pau ha pitas,has atad the argurrxntby for ijoi rapid development of nuclear power. Citing TVofby Der.no Meadows and oolkagaca. Kapttia observe* thai "Ihelobal energy crisis is no* faly recnpiircd. and therefore the eaaray procnCm hasfa leihrwoo and kicncr problem numberVtstmkap.cS-known coal processing speciaiut. Ziaovu Chukhaaov. hai alio uicd the Academy! yaurnaltgae forcefully, ifut indirectly,ertcau energy crisis is inevitable in the USSR unlcea coal aubstnuiion lake* placearge scaleo.IO9 )PJfBfJ

A majority of informed Soviet specialists havedismissed the possibilityull-blown "energy crisis" on the presumption that vast oil, gas, and coal reserves will be found in Siberia and offshore. The energy problem has been seen fundamentallyransportation problem Bui within this perspective there hasrowing comprehension since at least thef the ever-increasing deficit of fuel-energy resources in the European USSR and the dependence of the Soviet economy on massive ship-menu of energy supplies from Siberia to tbe west. This awareness has been reinforced by frequent electrical power shortages, breakdowns in natural gas deliveries, and pclrolcum shortages that have claimed theof allyi'rDm

Kosygin down.

Particularly vexing concerns since thethe declining reserves-to-product ion ratio inindustry, water encroachment, and the failurenew supergianl oil deposits. Tbe moston this score were voiced by tbe late MinuterValentin Shashin. who from the7 publicly called attention to theto discover new oilfields. Shashin's warningsbeen discounted in some quarters as ato get lower production targets forof Oil. But other people were also makingpoint.



Mounting Concern in

Overall, there have been signsteady increase in lop-level concern over the energy problem, although more optimistic assessments have continued to appear. Atear before the Middle East war and oil embargohe evidence indicates lhat the Soviet leadership was well aware that itajor problem on its hands. Inpeech to the State

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Committee for Supply. Kosygin placed unusual em-phasis on Ihc needonserve fuel-energy resources, and ai the2 Plenum ofthe Centralecision was taken to accelerate the development or electric power, oil,3 because of the threat of an energy lag and its potential impact on the entire economy. At about this sameo-called Big Commission was organized, under the chairmanship of Academician Mikhail Styrikovich, to explore all possible solutions to the energy problem. Subcommissions were established under it topossible courses ofquite visionary.

A year later, int the very moment the Soviet press was gloating over Ihe energy discomfiture of the West, the Politburo was engagedighly critical review ofthe situation in the oil, gas, and oil-refining industries, which resultedecision to take further steps to improve energyhis reassessment was reflected in pronouncements at the3 Plenum of the Central Committee, in extremely pessimistic statements byathering in' and again in Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers

' Itpropoaed. for oimpK. <batf.ti gai be iranaporlcd outSiberiatfoRtetcJint' ottpolyethylene "prptt" anchored to the groundlike tubcommiBiont. headed bv Ihc chairman of theof mm Academy of Snanm NUtolay Chcnkii. oorkM upfcr the cajwik irantra'i -itunl gn Iron Tyumenbur cacoaragedoaaal ot Miarucn rewtailK*a>*been Ml apaaderM*kM*o't mramwm aad vitk ukrptnxi'- c H


' The Wiibwrooii orrumly calked (or an uittnutied aoabiii ofthe energy problem an ur-fcctdrr led etnecilf ihe Academy of Science* dooted lo ihc energy problem waehcid Innd aroand Ihii lime in Institute of Cccnplrx Fuel-Energy Probkim wai calabUibedbe Suit Planning Committee (Goanlan) |

' According to ihe Miniuer of Power and Electrification. Petr Ncporotnniy. ihe European USSR waipowerhere >as imufTicicni fuel lo operate power stations at full capacity. po"CT could act be ahifled efficiently from Siberia lo Ibe western pan of the country, aad comirKikm of newnations wai lagging becamehortfail in capital invewmeoia.r-





Veniamin Dymshits' sharp criticism of Ihe Oilat its annual winter meeting inome of this concern was probably provokedesire to capitalize more fully upon higher world oil prices, but domestic supply shortages appear to have been an equally important factor. The seriousness with which the energy problem was being treated at the time, however, was deliberately masked in the dealings of Soviet leaders with outsidersj

here were more discussions of the energy problem, more signs of concern, and moreall focusing onh Five-Year. Ath Party Congress inhichreliminary outline ofh Five-Year Plan. Kosygin indicated his uncertainty concerning the "reliability" of energy supplies and called for more rapid development of fuel reserves in order toagainst "lack of energy" some time "in theh Five-Year Plan itself was not finallyuntilnd this delay has been attributed by someailure to resolve energy issues. At the6 Plenum of the Centralwhich confirmed the plan. Brezhnev declared that energy demands were outstripping resources and that, consequently, it was necessary to set supplementary targets for oil. gas, and coal production and to "introduce rigid coefficients of [fuel]hortly after theoint Central Committee -Council of Ministers resolution was issued that called for more rapid preparation of oil, natural gas, and gas condensate reserves in West!

Thenceforth,here were consistent indications of high-level anxiety over energy supplies. At the meetinginistry of Oil Collegium inymshits revealed that nonfulfillment of the supplementary plan6 had "created certain difficulties in supplying the economy with fuel" and calledrash pipeline program. Within GospUn, the Soviets explored the question of increasingthe small quantities of oil already beingabroad- Both Caspian Chairman Nikolay Baybakov and Kosyginressing interest in moving rapidly into offshore oil exploration and development. President ofthe Academy of Sciences Analoliy Alcksandrov referred in June lo theof the oil situation and the difficulty of resolving

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i.ltel>ll<HVn IUI

over the proper strategy to pursue. "At the presente declared, "our energy production isery complex stage ofver the longer run,hift to coal, he foresaw that the Soviet economy would "encounter greatnd in November, "fundamental shortcomings" in the fuel energy sector were castigatedupreme Soviet planning-budgctary commission meeting.|

To say that individual Soviet leaders arc awareerious energy supply problem exists is not to say. however, that the decisionmaking process in which they are collectively caught up has beenespond effectively to the perception of danger.!

II. Soviet Energy Decisionmaking

The Knvironment of Energy Decisionmaking

Soviet energy officials workpecial environment and arc compelled to respond to the cues thisprovides, even when the resulting behavior it irrational from the standpoint of the regime's professed objectives, of our own projections of what "they ought tor of the officials' own common sense. In thb respect the sitoiiion in energy is no different from that in other areas of the economy, despite the high priority of energy. The cuesroduct of decp-scaicd structural features of the Soviet economic and political system thai have proved highly resistant to change. Among the relevant economic factors are:

The overwhelming pressure to meet this year's plan or satisfy current needs at theneedlonger term interests. Meeting short-term demands is what determines an official's reputation, job prospects, and material well-being.

The secondary significance ofriterion of individual or organizational success.

1 Akkundruv'i eommemia were primed in VmwtkIJ.

The chronic overcommitment of resources, lack of balance between planned inputs and projected outputs, and certainty of shortages.

The unreliable quality of intermediate goods.

The unreliability of economic statistics.

The risks of major technological innovation.innovation means new. untested dependencies, new unreliable supplies, new personnel patterns, and almost certain delay. Running these risks is not rewarded.

Tbe pervasive rule-breaking and illegality required to fulfill economic plans.

The severe shortage of highly valued goods:housing, quality food and clothing, automobiles, and the opportunity for foreign travel.

To these features of the economic environment must beumber of political factors that arc simply part of the landscape for Soviet officials:

The absence of desirable or calculable career options outside the bureaucratic track. Althoughafe haven in the Academy of Sciences, for most there is only one game toone they arc already iniven organizational milieu.

Vulnerability to "political" charges. Despite the very real "erosion of ideology" that has occurred in Soviet society, officials must anticipate and hedge against the possibility of being victimized by political "label sticking."

Vulnerability of all officials to instant removal from their jobs outside of normal channels through the party-dominated system of personnel control. There

' In the inert) ire* some sins u> beinclude arupardiiing Soviet independence in the international aienj through indebtedness or technological dependence; selling out the mm til lesource patrimony of the country; kowtowing io foreign technology sod "underestimating" Ihe quality ol domestic efforts; railing to rccogniic that the Soviet system of ccnirilired economic planning protect) it from Ihe "energy crisis" of Western capitalism; oe underestimating the impenalitt danger and encroaching upon the reaourocsjagjj. est mint needs of the deftroc sector of the economy

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has been far less of this intervention4 than there was under Khrushchev, but itource of anxiety.

* The omnipresence of informal tion and patron-client relations



construction and transportation On the personal level thereeliberate and intense cultivation ofwith subordinates, peers, and superiors, both for self-promotion anduarantee against adversity.

combination, these two set* of factors evoke certain characteristic behavior patterns that strongly influence energy decisionmaking. The positions Sovietmakers take on nines tend to be responses to immediate role pressures, rather than responsesby "statesmanlike"or otherwise, although these concerns do indeed exist. Because of the constraints imposed onshort-run "departmental" oronstant masking or rationalization of vested intctcjistakes place in policymaking and execution I

Soviet policymakers address immediate demands and seek solutions that will work in the near future; they are compelled tohortrun point of view. As Parly Secretary Vladimir Dolgikb put il,ave toiece of black bread today, rightan't think about what's going to happent the same time theretrong tendency, in the Soviet jargon, tohile top Soviet officials will vigorously push their own departmental interests, in general they seek to avoid controversial policy stands thai could lead to their isolation from other officials By and large this sensitivity to which way the wind is blowing hasrucial element in the career success of these officials. The broadereader, the more cautious and consensus-oriented his behavior is likely toremium is placed upon forging favorable or at least benign relations with olher institutional power centers,through means that verge uponimultaneously, production officials attempt to reduce the dependence of their own units on olherby pursuing autarkic measures in such fields as

ood et ample, which, alto iliualratci the war informal Influence can dutoei ihe tliuctuie of operationalound inlation between Cknptan energy depart menu and the nunUirics Thearger quota of foreign eichangc al-tcaird for iripa abroad thaa ifccu- pautm plaiivng superior, offer piacccacail on drtegaiioaa abroad to promote more aocornrnodaLes reUltonaihoackialtdeoaaena oand tuppiicf are critical fur the miucceaa |


The Structure of Power In Energy Decisionmaking

In analyzing Soviet energy decisionmaking ii is useful to distinguish among three types of power* formal authority, operational command, and influence. Each of these is based on certain resources, and each is significant in its own way. The institutional reflection of this pattern of power is shown in the accompanying foldout chart. Formal authority attaches, above all. to the partyhighest policymaking body in the Soviet system of rule. Operational command is associated with Ihe Central Committee Secretariat and departments, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Gosplan. and to some extent the various ministries involved in energy production. Influence is wielded by the Refeicntura of ihe Council of Ministersubunit within Ihe Council of Ministers'ofumber of ministries, the State Experts' Commission and institutes of Gosplan. the Slate Committee for Science and Technology, the Slate Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy, certain branches of the Academy of Sciences, and regional authoriiies.|

As elaborated below, thereajor disjunction between ihc structure of formal authority and the structures of operational command and influence. Some interlocking of operational command andtakes place by virtue ofthe roles performed by key figures like Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kosygin. Gosplan Chairmanesser extern- Central Committee Secretary Doigikh, who is responsible for heavy industry. The net effect is probably lo place the center of gravity of energy production decisionmaking in Ihe Presidium of the Council ofosplan sphere. However, power in energy decisionmaking remains diffused among leaders and institutions: thereisnopoint at which all the strands come together I

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formal Authority

TW Politburo The Politburo's authority givesotentially decisive voice in energy affairs. It has tbe ultimate right to approve or disapprove policyset before it; it has tbe right to demandand information from all officials: and il has the final say on the promotion, tenure, and demotion of top leaders, including those who belong to the Politburo itself. To some extent it does bring these resources to bear on energy matters. It confirms the basic energy policy lines that are expressed in annual and five-year economic plans, determining in this manner the share of resources to be allocated to energy development. It probably servesorum for occasional top-level discussions of key energy projects. And it may become involved in settling serious intcrorganizat tonal disputes. P

There are. however, real limitations on the effective power of the Politburo in energy matters. Itommittee made up of persons whose occupational responsibilities and organizational base of operations generally lie elsewhere. It divides iis attentionultitude of questions, many of which have had far greater immediacy than energy. It is not known to have any special subgrouping for energyfor example, with its arrangements for handling military-security affairs. Basically it lacks expertise in energy issues.umber of members have had peripheral contact with energy questions as regional bosses, only Kosygin among the full members and,esser extent. RSFSR Premier Solomenuev and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolay Tikhonov among the candidate members, have had prolonged experience in supervising energy affairs. Thus the Politburo is largely dependent upon external sources of information and advice; as an institution it cannoi beource of energy policy initiative. Probably it deals with energy issues only episodically. At best, it chooses from among competing policy options.|

Operational Command

Tbe SexretarUt- Operational command in energy, as in other matters, is shared between the Centralapparatus and tbe Council of Ministers. In principle the Central Committee apparatus spearheads




policy review, verifies ihe fulfillment of policyalready adopted, and oversees personnelBut the available evidence, which is far from adequate, suggests it is unlikely that the Central Committee apparatus has participated very actively in the search for bask solutions to Soviet energy problems. Most of its time is probably devoted to monitoring and intervening in current production activities. I

There is no evidence lhat Brohnev, as General Secretary, has assumed the same kind of sustained operational control in ihe energy field thai he has in military and security affairs, foreign policy, orIn recent years Andrey Kirilenko has been the only Central Committee secretary directly responsible for industrial matters who has simultaneouslyember of the Politburo. While it is known that in the past he has participated occasionally in decisions related to energy production, there is no evidence that he has been involvedegular basis in energy production policymaking in recent years. Kirilenko's main connection with energy problems appears to be in the field of fuel conservation, in which he is currentlyisibly active role.

Only two other Central Committee secretaries deal with industrial affairs: Yakov Ryabov, who handles defense industry, and Vladimir Dolgikh. the secretary responsible for heavy industry. Dolgikh. who also heads the Central Committee's Heavy Industryand personally supcrvites those sectors within it that deal with energy questions, is clearly the

1 he did ot*ike ihe lead in7 in cbangicf the policy line on the energy balance apcroxd6 bys party canfreii. and in the wbveqiacat campaign to promote fatter oil andewttenf in tyumen ottlait and he hu been fcwa on cccasjca i> aava itaacd direct orders ccvncctcd with energy matters bat over lha years he has prnfaably add:cued himself to energy priibieau largely wulun the conceit of broadertscarssaan of annual and five-year plana, ihe general guenicc oleiritieiry of iheecorivmy. the development of rrwmnal proa to-anndelations with eastern fa-ope and (be

west otaajaajaj




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official in the Secrciaci.it primarily responsible for energy production.

Dolgikh's role and that of the sectors for geology, coal, and petroleum in the Heavy Industry Department are among the least publicized in the entire area of energy administration, and our knowledge of them is based on fragmentary information. As the Secretariat's energy controller, Dolgikh has potentially beentrong position to influence energy production policy and implementation. He is the highest party leader dealing routinely with officials in the Council of Ministers responsible for energy matters.

i vigorously sougnt by Gosplan Chairman Baybakov. Appeals related to energy development directed to the Central Committee over the years by provincial party and economic leaders as well as by central government officials have raised both policy and implementation issues. These appeals suggest that the power to issue orders to Gosplan and individual ministers, if not to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and Kosygin personally, lies with theand the Central Committee departments,how actively this power has been exercised is moot- It is probable that significant policy innovations originating in the Council of Ministers or below it are routinely coordinated with the Central Committee apparatus before being brought up for final decision at meetings of the Presidium of the Council of

* Doleikli na metallurgical aiming engineer by training and Kned meal of hi* career In Krasnoyarsk Kray of central Siberia. Hes hit rapid promotion to Ihe Central Committee Secretarial,o the sponsorship of Kirilenko and perhaps of

Breihnevai well. Within ihe Secretarial bis jurisdiction, in addition to ihe energy area (oil. gas. coal, and electricas included Ecological exploration, oonfoel citractive industries, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, ihe chemical industry, some branches of machine building, construction, and transportation |b

" Traditionally, ii has been ihe practice lo call upoo individual republic and oblast party committees toormal accounting of iheu activities before tbe Secretariat, and these account) are preceded by an investigation conducted by Central Committee apparatus personnel. When ihe regions selected have been major bases ol fuel production, ibe lengthy resolution thai customarily caps the entire prcccst in effect setsa party "line" that must be laken into accouni by Gosplan and the branch ministries in deciiiort. related to operationsiven region.


Unquestionably, there have been good reasonsin the Council of Ministers to check firstand the Central Committee Heavyto seek support from them, andet the available evidenceindicate lhat Dolgikh has played asoleproduction policy as one might suppose. Hemade major public speeches on energy issuesthis field. |

I Dolgikh rarely the imuafivcincncrg^^iic^or attended meetings in the Council of Ministers or Gosplan at which energy matters were discussed; nor did subordinate officials in the Heavy Industry Department involve themselves deeply in the details of energy policy.

It must be emphasized, of course, that the evidence here is thin and largely negative in nature. Still, there arc plausible reasons for Dolgikh and his subordinates to have exercised less influence over energy affairs than has been true of Secretariat involvement in such fields as agriculture or ideological affairs. |

Lacking even candidate membership in the Politburo, Dolgikh's personal political status is far lower than that ofultimate authority on energy in the Council of Ministers. Moreover, Dolgikh's span of control has been so broad that he has probably been able to devoteraction of his time to energy matters. His professional experience in the nickel industry, while having some bearing on fuel extraction, could hardly have given him an edge in discussions with Kosygin, who has been dealing with energy issues for at least two decades, or with Gosplan Chairman Baybakov, who spent most of his career in the oil industry, or with any of the energy branch ministers, or with specialists in the Academy or Sciences. Nor is it clear thatpolicy. H

|byougnnooencssiiiB Soviet energy balance than in vodka and young

" Dotgikh has had the ear of Brezhnev and Kirilenko. and hat the responses lily of making policy recommenda lionshe Secretariat, and through the Secretarial to the Politburo itself He lias certainily beentrong position to obstruct actions proposed within the Council of Ministers. And he alio has probablyajor voice in making lop penoonet decisions al the ministrymailer of fundamental concern to leaders In Ihe Council of Ministers. ^thM

6.ttei>ti<!iYrs (C)



r$ (ii)

women. Finally, doubt* may be entertained about ihe quality of advice Dnlgikh may have been getting on energy policy from key subordinates in (he Heavy Industry

Presidium of the Council of Ministers. The scene of greatest operational activity in energy production decisionmaking appears to be the Presidium ofthe Council of Ministers, the "cabinet" of tbe Soviet governmental apparatus. The Presidium consists of the chairman, the first deputy, and deputy chairmen,other members of the Council of Ministers at large who enjoy full membership in the Central Committee of the CPSU. Within thethereelatively liable division of labor, although roles overlap and depend to some extent on the play of personal connections andI

Kosygin's Role. Kosygin has been the top Soviet leader most deeply involved in energy production matters. He has dealt with energy issues frequently since at least thend is without question the best-informed Politburo member on the subject. Within the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Kosygin has taken tbe lead in pressing the search for long-term solutions to the Sovici energy problem. He has made repeated investigatory tripe to energy-producingand has convened meetings in Moscow to discuss energy affairs. He supervises the deputy chairmen responsible for day-to-day control of energybut has the authority to intervene directly and issue orders lo production ministries and Gosplan. It is also within his power to approve recommendations of the Energy Commission for direct implementation. At various times Kosygin has adjudicated interdc-pariment conflicts over energy production.ominant voice in deciding which energy proposals will be placed on the agenda of Presidium

ean, (he credcaiiah of lane official* j> energy iciinn arerty ianeeeaarie toe deputy headattended the" meeting of (he Oil mirutiry CoUctun. vladimir arittapo. aad ooly reentry beta prcceeeed from ike backwater pott of raaenaa of ike Coal WoatcrY uaaoa hat fdk* depaty bead. haa yattrtbovi igmantcd iw tepartaaeal oa lac tame oczanoo. lacks any profeaaaoaal hackf mad in eaera? -hatetn he itparty-bo ha. seen tmp^ed in the party bureaucracy for over jo yean ha oroy oaiabfkatk*appear ioongtiatding aa*ociai>onthe department'* first deputy chief. sergey batkatov. "hoftjrt cei irani ns or professional experience in ihe energy field.

co mil




meetings, and he firmly presides over these meetings and sums up the results. He has special responsibilities in the foreign field, where be is probably thetop surpervisor of energy-related tradeThe combined weight of these various roles probably enables Kosygin to dominate ihc official interactions on energy matters of the Presidium with the Central Committee Secretariat and Politburo and to prevent policy recommendations going forward from the Presidium. |

The Deputy Chairmen. In osse way or another most of the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers deal with energy matters, but some arc more directly involved with produclion than others. It appears thai First Deputy Chairman Nikolay Tikhonov, forhas dealt with power plant affairs and aspects of the metallurgical industry related to energy, and his jurisdiction may expandesult of his promotion to candidate member of the Politburo ineputy Chairman Ignatii Novikov. like Tikhonov an ok) client of Brcrhnev from Dnepropetrovsk, has broad supervisory responsibilities in the construction of energy-related production facilities and infrastructure. Deputy Chairman Vladimir Kirillin. chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology,ey figure in Soviet energy research and developmentnd Deputy Chairman Baybakoventral actor in his capacity as chairman ofut Ihewith Kosygin'sassigned basic rcsponsi-bililies for energy production to two otherVladimir Novikov and Dymshits |

There appears totable, two-tiered structure of authority going back at least ion which responsibility for overseeing the entire Soviel energy sector (fossil fuel extraction and electric powerhas been assigned to one deputy chairman, Vladimir Novikov, while specific responsibility for supervision of oil. gas. and coal production has been assigneddeputy chairman for fuel-energyT Efremovnd (hen Dymshits. In this overlapping arrangement. Novikov has clearly been the senior figure, although formally he does not outrank Dymshits and both report to Kosygin.ililary production specialist and longtime






auoclotc of Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, hat been one of the Soviet Union'* lop foreign economic relation* administrator* and was briefly chairman of Gosplan. pj

Both Novikov and Dymshitsmall secretarial and several assistants, but no separate research or policy planning capability. For these functions they rely upon the Referentura of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, the production ministries and their Institutes. Gosplan. and any outside sources (Academy of Sciences or other) tbey wish to utilize Both can issue orders to ministers and can bring proposals to Kosygin or meetings of the Presidium. They arc probably the normal channel forbelwecn ihe energy-producing ministries and the chairman. One ofis unclearthe Fncrgy Commission of Ihc Presidium. The bask tasks thai they are called upon to perform are policy planning, coordination of energy production with olher sectors of the economy, adjudication of conflicis among energy-producing branches, supervision of im-plemcnlalion of energy production plans, andof Soviel international energy policy objectives. While Dymshits' predecessor, the former party official Efrcmov, participated in policy debates, it appears thai Dymshits has tended to avoid policy stands and to stick lo admin Juration. His circumspection may bepartly by his vulnerability as the mostJewish leader in the Sovici hierarchy and partly by the fact thai6 he held the taxing post of chairman of the State Committee for Supply, where, in effect, be was theholesaler" for tbe entire Sovietike Dymshits, Novikov bat been burdenedumber of other tasks that must have permitted him to devote no moremall fraction of his timenergy

ahairmant quite pouibta lhat he may mil retain tome luperviaory ie*nonilbililici in the mpplv me; nodf have beenOther laaki

" Novtke* baa irjcctal reaeooaibkUiy tor tie Sonet aucEiac-baiJd>B| tact or. ando beer iSauaaa of the Plcvdiex't Commrtuoi for Foreign EcODOmK Oacailoeo- Tbe raeajc of hit concerns apart from rnergy it wggeatee by ihe oaiiuartra he hai ttgrted of offictalt in the fieMi of conuruciioa, foreign trade. Iuhl Industry, the automobile industry, roctel and tpaot technology, banking, flnaace.

ale Uaiislici Mt



The Energy Commission. The Energy Commission is oneumber of permanent functional commissions attached to the Presidium ofthe Council ofts membership is said to include the two deputy chairmen responsible for energy matters, the branch ministers for energy production (Oil, Gas, Coal, Construction of Petroleum and Gas IndustryPower andome of their deputies, ihc chairman of Gosplan (Baybakov) and his deputy for energy affairs (Arkadiyhe Minister of Finance, and at least one outside expertAcademician Mikhail Styrikovkh. There may well be other members. |

Whether Dymshits succeeded Efrcmov as chairman of the Commission when he took over theuties as deputy chairman for fuel-energy affairs on an acting basis2 rs unknown The Commission has no staff of its own bul depends on the Council of Ministers' Administration of Affairs for logistic supporl. The Commission, which is said to meet weekly, discusses the production targets generated by Gosplan and may give them its stamp of approval. In the area of policy il discusses longer terra energy development scheme* and assigns project work to the relevant ministries and institutes. At the same time itorum for ihe preliminary discussion of energy policy proposals and makes general recommendations to the full Presidium of the Council of Ministers. It is likely thai ihc Energy Commission provides an arena for intensive jockeying for resources among ihe energy production ministries and for negotiation between the ministries and Gospian. Decisions that il takes probably tend to accommodate the vested interests of all theministries, and may well be difficult for outside bodies subsequently tochallenge.|

The Presidium. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers reportedly meets every other Wednesday to discuss, amend, approve, or reject draft resolutions that have been prepared elsewhere. Its meetings are attended by members, official* from the Referentura.

" Tbe mutt important, and almost certainly the mostdnetored oammiiaice. La thei uiomtioreign econom

quertioca. CEMA affairs, tapply. raa)or indatmal coauacuoa. aad agrca't.re lint asrendiam Coraranaioe far OperaQtaeuiona. which. Kosygin Mated la Jabaaaa to raaxine and tone current QueMiona of economic buiid'ng and lo implenieoltiitematij^ont'ol over lulfil Intente ValerA badgel."




and officials or specialists called to testify on individual proposals. Kosygin chairs the meetings, and decisions appear to be takenonsensual by Kosygin, without formal voting."

Although the draft resolution* are the product of extensive coordination and negotiationncluding Central Committee depart menu if the mailers dealt with arc important, the discussion of them at Presidium meetings is not necessarily pro forma. At the Presidium meeting, aspectsroblem may be discussed that have not been raised before, or atot raised in Kosygjn's

8,Hel>ll<IS presence. Dissenting opinions can be and arc ev

Claims for additional resource* can be regis-

where decisions lay additional burdens on

organizations And. finally, confirmationoposals provides an authoritative decision that must then be carried out I

ritical function in energy production decision making is performed by Gosplan and its JS chairman. Baybakov. In Gosplan the focal points of activity related to energy production are the chairman himself, ihe deputy chairman for energy affairshe branch departments (Coal. Geology and Mineral Resources. Petroleum and Gas Industry, Power and Electrification.nd the"fl


d Ivan Popyrin. Kotygin's energy referral.do Wey make deciuo

llcMO 0

decisions, do ihey lote?"he said.cion* organization If somebody has real, serious objoctKint. in the* case discussions may take place, but generally tbe Question isYrVeek."

* Within Gosplan. Deputy Chairman Lalayants it responsibletrinspoelltion. and the chemical industry He supervise*departments in these field* and dealt nith theministers. Hemall staff0 people, but reliesprimarily on the department* under his luritdictxinCommission Ihe role ol the departmentsbe mostly technical* drafting plam, arranging chingec midstream, and monitoring plan lullillmcnt.nchiefs, such at tbe current head of ihe Petroleum andJ,tir;iUi Vladimirseem loore achvepolicy (wmation. The Gosplan Collegium consists of'the chairman

heads, offieia It from

Gotplan'sown consultative and research bedict. and chairmen, al' republic planning commissions. Il it dominated by Baybakovandorum for policy review and the discussion of in nova tana in production and management of the economy.

Baybakov's role has been central to the performance of Gosplan. His power stems from both the office of chairman and his own personal prestige. Heeputy chairman of the Council of Ministersthe Minister ofex officio member of all the Presidium commissions, including the EnergyHe has direct access lo all the lop Soviet leaders. It is within his competence to initiate studies and consider analyses of the entire range or energy questions, acting cither through Gosplan or jointly with branch ministries and the Academy ofand he has exercised this authority. As the chief Soviet planning official, he presides over the preparation of plans for the energy sector and is strategically situated










75Vrs IU)


lo frame energy options lhat are set before Ihe Presidium of the Council of Ministers and theitself. His considerable personal influence derives from the good relations he has had with leading Soviet politicians and his extensive network of clients within and outside Gosplan. at well as from the respect he enjoys as an informed expert He has spent most of his career in the oil industry and is probably regarded in leadership circles as one of the most authoritative voices on Oil issues, with which he has dealt most of his

Influential Advisers

Information, broadly defined, is especially critical in the energy field. Top policymakers are so busy that ihey may well not even have positions on energy policy issues; and they are not likely to have digested the technical knowledge necessary to evaluate the merits of various positions. Theo possess or control information in the energy sphere can. therefore, exert considerable influence on policy.|

At the nationalomplex information-generating apparatus complements the structure of operational command. Its main components are the Refercnlura of the Council of Ministers; ihe State Experts'Council for the Study of Production Forces, and Institute of Complex Fuel-Energy Problems of Gosplan; the production branch ministries and their institutes and advisory councils; the Slate Committee for Science and Technology: and the Academy of Sciences.

* Among ihe referents there see hierarchical gradations baaed oneferent is directly' subordinate to Kosygin or simply subordinate to one of the deputy chairmen, whether the referentot bp entire sector of the economy or justeferent is headVparimcnl within Ihe

mi nistry.fercn turn H

5Vrs avaaakl

The Referentura. The Refercnlura of the Council of Ministers is the consultative 'advisory staff that serves the chairman and deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. It consists ofersons, about evenly divided between clerical workers and high-level, full-lime adviser* known as referents. The referents, in turn, recruit outside consultants who arc paider-job basis to conduct research, write memorandums, and draft various documents."!

rs It)

Ivan Popyn'n. head of the Department for Problems of Fuel Energy. Foreign Trade Ties and Domestic Fuel-Energy Supply, is the key referent for energy questions in thee has worked for both Kosygin and Novikov and has dealt wilh Dymshits as well.

constinvestigate solutions to production, transportation and trade problems, and advise Kosygin and NovikovWhile he. like other referents, is not vested with tbe authority to issue commands, be is feared by economic managers because of his irtdepe^sdence and access to the top leadership in the Council of Ministers. He distrusts information supplied by the ministries and their institutes and prefers lo rely on consultants he himself has chosen, whuscjemprandums he forwards directly to

Statemmissinti. In fiuspUn. alo the Refercnlura exists in the form ofExperts' Commission. This commissionpart-time consultants, who in fact carryof its analytic work. The Commission has nobut is responsible for advising Baybakovtopic in which he is interested. Theprimarily concerned with energy matters ischairman, YunyutoffMinister of Gas, who owes his prominent"Kremlin ration" exclusively tone

objaiivenasbeoHoariiicipa^ Baybakov wants or has been inclined to listen lo, and provide that information. |







information, Baybakov has also drawn on the Council for the Study of Productive Forceseaded by Nikolay Nckrasov, and the recentlyInstitute of Complex Fuel-Energy Problems, headed by Sergeyof which fall under Gosplan control. SOPS specializes in the analysis of broad regional planning problems, and Nekrasov has concentrated much of his attention on Siberian (level-opment.|

ower level in the government hierarchy each ministry has its own network of research and design institutes and advisory councils.ompetition of ideas can and docs take place in these forums, their pronouncements to the externalwhen articulated inclosely vetted so as to reflect ministerial interests.

State Committee for Science and Technology. The

State Committee for Science and Technology has the potential for great influence over energy policy, which in practice it may not have fully realized. Its chairman. Vladimir Kirillin. who is also the deputy chairman of

the Council of Ministers responsible for science policy, was head of the Department for Science, Schools, and Higher Education in the Central Committee52 andice president of the Academy of Sciencesiscontacts-bridges the Academy ofommunist Party -government domains. His field of professionalis power engineering, and at his initiative the Institute of High Temperatures of the Academy of Sciences, which is responsible, among other things, for the Soviet program in magnctohydrodynamic iMHD) direct conversion of thermal into electrical energy, was establishedl."|

The main task of the Committee is to elaborate plans for Soviet scientific and technological development, which arc then confirmed by the Central Committee apparatus and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers In generating these plans ihe Committee works closely with the Academy of Sciences, the ministries, and Gosplan. Its prime source of influence lies in itsin concert with Gosplan and the Ministry ofpass judgment onroposals of (he Academy of Sciences and branch institutes and to allocntc (he Soviet science budget. The Committee also closely monitors progressimited number of high-priority projects, some of them in the energy field. It has numerousand councils, including the Council on the Problem of Power and Electrification and theon Renewable Sources of Energy, whichare important mechanismsoordination I

" one of in three fun eetxt' chairmen. ormiriy zrnncria.of ejrctite powerulia. laterminraw of is> usps! end l'ssr gek*aas. aad*i arreted the leadaaguemuuarry ea* power aadkuaubanovskiy power tngincarmg irniiuie ia moscow he law bee*eceanaaoeally ia the fields of mhd devekopearnl and rtsearef on wneroaadactive electricot her of hii drpuiicvleiienko. hat alto speciirned in power generation and trantmiiaion as well at cotrmnnvaiiom eouipment and transportationciporiibk lor ir.ir.eriiower and electrical engineering, and uaiuportation still anotbc: deputy.ntiorman gmhiani. it tctpomible lor the international activities of ihe committor and is also di -eci.ii of thenttitauyitcmi reiearcb ir. moscow, which conduct! some energy related research gvishiani hasortent ol soviet acquisition of western energy technology and ha* been aiiive in energy uade and scientific etchange

8.llcl>in'?5Yrs IUI

_&e. jar.




o.aces. Within ihe Academy ofresponsibility for energy studies is spreadumber of individuals and group* In the Presidium of the Academy, the President. Anatotiy Akksandrov (who is also the director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomicermanent commission lhat supervises the elaborationong-term program for the USSR's fuel-energy complex. He Isorceful advocate of nuclear po*er, although evidently not of fusion energy. The new first vice president for science and technology. Yevgeny Velikhov. is also deputy director of the Kurchatov Institute. Ateksandr Sidorcnko. the vice president for earth sciences, was Minister of Geologynd Vice President Guny Marchuk. chief of tbe Siberian Division of the Academy, has overall responsibilityonsiderable amount of Siberian energy-oriented research. The remaining membership of the Presidiumumber of research administrators or scientists with energy-related interests: Nikolay Inozcmtscv (foreign technologyetr Kapitsa (nuclearikolay Md'olkc* (natural resourcesoris Paton (weldingikhail Styrikovich (MHD and general energynd Andrcy



lee for Scknce andts Scientificfor Complex Problems of Power was organized5 for the purpose of "determining ihe basic scientific directions and most effective proportions and paths of devetopmeni of elcctnfka'.ion. powerand the fuel industryingle branch of material produclion, and also of coordinatingresearch in these .irra

The chairmanship of the Council was shifted6 from Styrikovkh to the former deputy chairman, Lev Mclcnl'cv.pecialist in thermal power stations, is deputy academic secretary of ihe Division of Physico-Tcchnical Problems of Puwcr and4 was concurrently director of the Siberian Power Institute. Since then he has spent all his time in Moscow, where he ha*epartment concerned with energy-related economic studies in the Institute of High Temperatures and has also served as Styrikovich's deputy in tbe Division. Professionally, he has collaborated in recent year* with Kiritlin, Slyrikovkb, and A. Yc Sheyndlin (Director of theuw of Highn MHD research.

(Siberian geology).

research that bears directly upon energy production policymaking is concentrated in several centers of the Academy. The most important of these is the Division of Physico-Tcchnical Problems of Power, headed by Academician-Secretary Styfikovich Styrikovkh. whoaboaboratory at the Division's Institute of High Temperatures and6 was chairman of tbe Division'* Scientific Council on Complex Problems of Power, is oneandful of top-level Academy spokesmen on energy policy issues. The Division has broad responsibilities for managing energy research, which it coordinates with olher divisions of ihc Academy and with ihe Slate Commit-

The second main center of energy-related studies in the Academy of Sciences is the Commission for the Study of Production Forces and Natural Resources, chaired by Nikolay Mel'mkov. which is organized under the Academy's Presidium Mel'mkovpecialist in open-pit coal mining with extensive leadershipin the coal industry. Recently he was appointed director of the Institute of Complex Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Division of Geology,and Geochemistry. Over the years he appears lo have forged strong links with Gosplan, where he has servedop-level advisory capacity. Thehas focused its attention on long-term forecasting

" Accordingoceol lUleoient by Stytikovieh. icalitumII1 witfcia the DrnsaM titoa tbe long.term fuel eaarzy program older the gmdaacc ol AJetuadro'l tornlimine Tbey are uudyng energy appltcarioM jI cWctroohyuca and eSmrcaechaoloty. long-diuancc energy trantmiiaion. deterntnaikin ol the bell sire of equipment for foaail and nuclear aa well ai hydrnacc omit la ting power nations, optimization of ihe country') fuel energy balance for ibeIS yeara; opeimtrailon of the development itrategy and me of auclaar cower, including fit! breeder riaclort; energy appbeatuna of inperccaduclivMy. creation of wipe- power fal mrboarncratcea. MIID generation of power, beai-cicbaagraobet of other nOjeci Tbet altobcanl) larerred in 'oretgn Kieniifx eicaangea (rVriala AS. No T.BJ




rs (Ul



the use of natural resources, including energy production and consumption, with special emphasis on the formation of regional production complexes. With the Commission as his organizational base. Me: ni*ov has emerged as pc'haps the most prominent energy balance expert in the Academy, or at least one of the top three along with Styrikovich and Melcnt'ev.

Other centers of energy study in the Academy include the Permanent Commission for Scientific Problems of Development of Transport, the Division of Economics, and the Siberian Division in Novosibirsk. In the Siberian Division the key leaders have been Andrey Trofimuk, the first deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Division and director of its Institute of Geology and Geophysics, and Abel Aganbcgyan. Director of the Institute of Economics and Organi?ation ofProduction. Trofimuk has spearheaded Siberian oil and gas development, and Aganbegyan hasmathematical modelirig of the Soviet energy balance as well as regional economic analysts of West Siberta and oiher Siberian fuel producing -re-,-

Ihe Process of Energy llecKicM.auikirrg

Tbe capacity of the Soviet leadership to deal with the energy problem is significantly constrained by the environment and institutions outlined above. Certain features of ihe process of decisionmaking that emerge in this context are important:

There is no single center of control over energy production policy. Pieces of control are lodged at various places in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, the ministries, the Secretariat, and the Politburo. No top official devotes all his time to energy questions. While Brezhnev, Dolgikh. and the Central Committee apparatus can and have intervened in energy production policy, it does not appear that the parly bureaucracy exercises light, effective control over this area, nor does it seem that Kosygin has it all his own way either

Policy ordinarily emergesbyrinth of bureaucratic negotiation, although "breakthroughs" can occur. Negotiation lakes place by means of

personal contacu and exchanges of opinion among lop leaders Formal interorganintioaal coordinationwhich magnify tbe influence of "veto" groups, alsoremium on ncfotiation'* And ncgotiaiion is built into the systemollective" sounding boards thai exist al all levels of the decisionmaking process: the insituieegional party bureaus,collcgiums. Gosplan Collegium. EnergyPresidium of the Council of Ministers, and the Politburo itself. The system manifestly evokescoalition formalion. and the co-opiion of potential opponents.

Trends inartly orchestrated from above, but partly crystallizing from belowoviet-style "band wagon "fashion, can influenceespeciallyolicy area in which nobody is fully in charge and the issues at stakeost of uncertainties. |

Theffect of the environment, the motivation of decisionmakers, and Ihe process by which decisions ore made isroduce outcornes that arc more the result of the play of bureaucratic and personal interests than of rational long-term calculation Tbe system lends to generate compromise decision* and to respond slowlyew situations. On the whole, incrementalism is the rule, and is expressed in the energyplanning "from Ihe achievedampaign-iypc changes in the line of march are nevertheless possible and have repealed^ occurred.


III. Controversy Over Energy

How to cope with the emerging energy problem has been seriously debated by Soviet specialists and economic officials since theariety of

ropoul to euabiio

-itrt aspects of weiiae tacaaaWaty had to be coordieated -iir It, different are-vne. before beukf. approved by the Prestdiaai I*JJJJJJ

waw- aad comecev-kr-tJrjf ibe oraaanan. yoaroxmt if you ttrx notJtmrne* and coordinated all rum Nobody ii> the leadPihif sate decoaeaa wi;boa: ikascocadHta-lion He will ash yoa. "Have yoa visa* from NMf"Fromfrom Yanr -We hadand be did not to alona templet fly, bat He agreed hcieha Uanaihie Fte.






strategies have been advocated (sec the appcrtdii furut because of the inherent complexities and uncertainties of energy issues, competing claims on resources, longcsdtimcs. ineffectiveness of economic planning and management, and absence of cohesive political leadership in this sphere, no single strategy has dominated the field Consequently, there has beensubsjaniial Hun and vacillation in energy policy.!

The evidence indicates that, in fact, encrg> production policy decisions have not been dictated by some agreed-upon, comprehensive, and stable long-term program. There have been general notions about desired trends in the fuel-energy balance that have probably commanded fairly broad acceptance in the abstract, and there have been various sectoralrograms. Bul the sum of these has notmastern recent years Soviet authorities themselves have complained, among other things, about;

The absenceong-term program for oil and gas production in Tyumen Oblast.

Lackong-term program for further exploitation of the older oil regions.

program for offshore oil development

The absenceoears) plan for dcs'elopmcnt of fuel-energy produclion

Avoidanceasic decision on the regional paitern of refinery location.

Continued delay in announcing theyear plan for the economyhole.

Uncertain plans for gas pipeline construction in Tyumen.

Neglect of forward planning in energy machine building

treatment of economic criteria. Capital investment effectiveness, and regional integration in energy planning.


Failure toenter for coordinating the administration of tbe fuel-energy comp'ca.

Iuick of territorial coordination of implementation of plans in Tyumen, Komi. Kansk-Achinsk, and other developing energy regions J

Because of the short- to medium-term inertia of the energy balance, it has been of fundamental importance lo Ihc Soviets to adopt and stick to an integrated long* term energy production program. Only the direction provided byrogram can bring about ihe cumulation of incremental shifts in Ihc energy balance thai policy dictates as oplimum.onsiderable degree. Ihc inability to gear planning to this kindrogram arisesailure toontinuing argument over energy strategy

Allrrnatlir Si rat dries

The debate over production strategy has turned on the priorities that should be established among energy resources, the regions thai ought to be developed, and ihe technologies that oughl to be employed. The central question has been: how beat, and in what proportions, should ihe Soviet Union's oil. gas, coal,nd nuclear-power resources be

The key responses given to this question since thean be labeled ihe Hydrocarbon, Big Gas. Big Coal, and Combined Resources strategies. Naturally, they are not flagged this clearly in Soviet sources, and there is considerable overlap between tbe Hydrocarbon and Big Gas solutions, on the one hand, and the Big Coal and Combined Resources solutions, on the other (In the appendix the latter two are treated together) Not arc ihe approaches necessarily associaiedixed group of proponenls, because some officials have supported several approaches simultaneously or have changed their positions over the course of time, and top-level leaders have generally hedged their policy comenu Tbe main features of these approaches are shown on tbe foldout chart at Ihe end of this paper.



the past decade each of these strategies has been more or less constantly urged by at least some authorities, bat has attracted more support and had more of an impact on the "party line" in certain penods than in others. The Hydrocarbon strategy completely dorninated the field until the, remained the official linend thenomeback inig Coal was urged by some ineriod; BigGos was seriously considered; and Combined Resources wji in effect accepted as the new line


The starting pointonsideration of contemporary Soviet energy production policy is the adoption as the official line inf what we have dubbed the Hydrocarbon strategy. Att Party Congress9 the party leadership placed iis stamp of approvalajor shift in the fuel balance away from coal and toward ot! and gas, which were held to be more -progressive" becauseower cost ofact ton. cose of transportation, and use characteristics. In adopting this strategy the Soviets were also emulating the West where oil and gas had displaced coal during the postwar period. Implementation of this decision has determined tbe dynamics ofion up to tbe present day (sec


After Khrushchev's ouster, priority development of oil and gas was reaffirmed as the pony line atrd Party Congress6 and was again endorsed ath Party Congresst the latler both Kosygin and Brezhnev declared themselves In favor of increasing the share of oil and gas in the fuel balance, and the Ninth Five-Yearise of oil and gasombined total4 percent04 percenthb strategy remained the official position until the endew line was introducedolitburo-approved set of directives for compilingh Five-Year. Neserthelcss, the strategy wasuestioned both beforeand0



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roup that included Academicians Mcl'nikov and Siyrikovtch and Minister of Coal Bnitchenko came to the conclusion that the long-term prospects for oil and gas were inadequate to meet future energy rseedi. This group is said to haveeport to tbe Politburo during (he drafting of the Ninth Five-Year Ran which in effect argued the case for Big Coal Kansk-Achinsk should be developed, and coal substituted for oil and gas The Politburo reportedly rejected this proposal on the grounds of excessive cost and decreed that Kansk-Achinskshould be put offoears unless a

breakthrough in transporution occurred in thethus ending any immediate prospect* (or Big Coal.|


By the second half ofhe magnitude of natural gas reserves in northern Tyumen had become apparent, and arguments in favorig Gas strategy began la be voiced. One ofthe earliest proponents of rapid development of these deposits was the then first secretary of the Tyumen oblast party committee (obkom) and present Minister of Construction of Petroleum and Giis Industry Enterprises. Boris Shchcrbina. who has steadfastly adhered to this position up to theen5 Shcbcrbiru arguedig Gas system based on Tyumen gas should be given priority over Central Asian ga> development. Since lhat time he has repeatedlythat natural gasay ofundamental shift in the Soviet energy balance. Along withit successor as Tyumen obkom first secretary. Shcherbina has resolutely defended the


use of natural gasoiler fuel. Over the yHrVs. both

have also lobbied for tbe constructionet of giant

gas-burning thermal stations in Tyumen Oblast truj^^^

would transmit power west over high-voliage it |

In the second half olhere were signs the HclMI'l* Soviet leadership was indeed considering the Big Gasvn optiononstruction began on the "Northcrrij] Lights" pipeline from Medverh'ye in northern Tyumen to the Moscow region. However, gas plans began quickly to be scaled down, and it became clear1 that the leadership had backed off fromharp increase in gas production in ihe Ninlh Five-Year7 J) The questionajor surge in gat preelection was nevertheless still under active consideration.2 tbe Ministry of Gas and other organization* were ordered too-called Big System that would "solve" the Soviet energy problem to the0 byillion cubic meters

(oittldc filial

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ofear to ihc Uralsand European USSR througharge-diameter trunklines. The cos; esiimaiesofihis project ireponcdlyillion rubles iindillion tons ofed to its rapid abundonmcniJ

At this juncture. Ihc searchess expensive means of exploiting Tyumen gas turned io both foreign assistance and technological innovations aimed at reducing the cos; of pipeline transport, tt appears lhat4 the Soviet leadership seriously hoped thai the proposed North Star and Yakutiya dealt involving Western participation wouldeans of acquiring the financial resources, large-diamctcr pipe, and compressors needed to lay the foundationig Gai strategy. Simultaneously. attention began to be focusedroposal to transport Tyumen natural gas in hydrate formapsule pipeline system |

Both idea* were vigorously opposed by Minister of Gas Orudrhcv Of udzhev has persistently tried to slow down gas development in Tyumen in Order to moderate the attendant production and delivery problems, which fall upon ha own shoulders He has rejected the Big Gas strategy on the grounds that gas,aluable nonrenewable resource, should not be burnedoiler fuel but should increasingly be used solelyeedstock for the chemical and petrochemicalHis opposition to the North Star deal was also couched in patriotic terms of defense or" the nationalargument considered specious by knowledgeable Soviet observers, but one which did have some political resonance Otudzhcv came down strongly in Ihen the side of developing Ihe Orenburg gasfield, which, although far smallor ihan the northern Tyumen deposits, involved fewer difficulties because of its favorable location and could be rationalizedesponse to the objectiveof supplying Eastern Paropc with energy Passage of the Stevenson Amendment by the US Congress4 effectively ended Soviet hopes ofig Gas strategy based upon foreign credits. I

Initially, the prospect ofreakthrough in gas transportation by means of technologicalhad been looked upon favorably both in Gosplan and Ihc Academy of Sciences. Baybakov himself in the

eriod stronglyork on the capsule transmission of gas andew multmalled gas pipe As ihc lime drew near to make decisions on Ibe IOth Five-Year. however, the enthusiasm for gas began toon the pan of key Academy of Sciences energy advisers like Styrikovich. Mcrnikovand Melcnt cv. Baybakovto support the idea of accelerated gasbut insisted lhat implementation oftrategy would depend upon achievement of areduction In ihe cost of gas transport |

In the fallf ihc Big Gasapprojcn wasilit sbe

reflectedf the section on gat in the draft document thai set out tbe leadership's economic strategy for the next five-year planirection* of Development of the Economy of ike USSR for thehe preliminary draft

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aid to haveong passage on Urcngoy and developmentapsule system that would transpoei Urengoy gasassive scale to ihe European USSR When ihe draft was published inowever, this entire passage was omitted. Motivated partly by fear of relying on an untested and risky new technology, partly by high invest rr.cn: costs in gas transport and demands on the metallurgical industry, andbyfactors (see thehe leadership once again retreatedig commitment to gas. J

Failure to endorse rapid Urengoy developmentin the five-year planppear* to have left the whole issue hanging6here was clearly an intention to begin production and build some pipeline* from Urengoy during the five-year period, but Ihe evidence suggests lhat uncertainty over the pipeline routes and pace of development existed up to the second half|

This inability toreakthrough in gas mayritical lost opportunity Tor the Soviets. It is possible that the failure to develop the gas industry more rapidly inill substantially constrain the leadership's capacity to deal effectively with the looming energy crunch of the earlyis. toeaningful substitution of gas for oil in the domestic economy and to cope with the tradeoff between East European energy needs and Soviet requirements for hardn the longer run. failure lo move more rapidly on gas inay have damaged Soviet chances of successfully bridging the period until Kansk-Achinsk coal and nuclear poweri*dependence on|

Hydroemrooms. Coml. Wmt Snelear Power

As we have seen, by tbehere aaionviction in some circles that the conventionalof increasing the *hare of bydrocaibons in the fuel balance was no longer viable, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to include mayor devclopmenl of the Kansk-Achinsk coal basin in the Ninth Five-Year Plan



he Poliiburo's rejection of thi* proposal0 only temporarily deflected interest in shifting the fuel balance away from hydrocarbons.

There was no question in the minds of crilics of Ihe Hydrocarbon strategy lhat Kansk-Achinsk coalritical factor. Differences of opinion did exist,over its precise role. It appears thatinority of coal boosters, most visibly represented by tbe scientist Chukhanov. believed that there was no alternative to an exclusive Big Coal approach and maximum immediate reliance on Kansk'Achinsk. The majority thought lhat there was less possibility of substituting coal for hydrocarbons in Ihe short run than did Chukhanov. but much greater scope for nuclear power development in the longer term. From this perspective, development of Kansk-Achinsk coalurrent strategic goal aimed at meeting midterm energy demand, within the contexthased integration over tune of hydrocarbons, coal, and nuclear energy resources While some of the proponents of this Combined Resources approachested professional interest in coalajoritytake in either nuclear power or nuclear and coal-based Ml ID power generation. The latter group included chairman of the Slate Committee for Science and Technology, Kirillin, and Academicians Slyrikovich, Mclentev, andof whom were linked with the Institute of High Temperatures, the peak MHD research organization.|

ntense examination of energy production policy took place in the Academy of Sciences, the State Committee for Science andand Gosplan, andtrong consensus Of Opinion had crystallized among top-level energy advisers thai an accelerated development of coal production. MHD, slow neutron and breeder reactors, and fusion power wasollowing heavy lobbying, this opinion was directly reflected ia the Politburo-approved set of directives for compilingh Five-Year. This documentIhe framework for Kosygin's report on ihe Plan

The relative growth of gas production inas, of course, quile respectable. Given ihe cost (actorstill faster eapaniion. many Soviet authorities were probably quite satisfied with ihe rate achieved. See USSR Dtttlapntra ofihtOnt Induiiry. ER Tg-IOW.1

At Ihe same lime there have reportedly been sharp conflictscommunity over Ihe share of resource* allocated io various elements (for rumple, fusion versos fission poaer) and over tbe control of research atvd development profntm* Combined Resource! supporters in no -ayonolithic Woe




toh Party Congress in6 and for the Plan finally adopted at the6 session of the Supreme Soviet

In his report to the party congress, kosygin prefaced his remarks on the fuel-energy complexomment lhat was later to be frequently quoted by those in favor of an autarkic energy policy. "The Soviete said, "is the sole large industrial state in the world that bases its economic development on its own fuel-energy resources. Thiserious advantage of our economyuite important precondition of its steadyut in order to retain this advantage, Kosygin in effect argued, it was necessary to begin shifting the fuel-energy balance

jlthis five-year plan the foundations will be laid

future growth of our energy potential prinur-

on the basis of hydrocleciricity. atomic fuel

and chcapcoal. As regards oil and gas. the growth of their extraction will to an ever greater degree be directed to technological need* |

Accordingly, the combined share of nuclear power and hydrocleciricity in tbe capacity of new electric power stations would rise fromercent in the Ninth Fivc-Ycar Plan loercent inh Five-Year Plan. Coal would begin to play an increasing role in supplying the country with fuel and electrical energy:

Already inh Five-Year Plan tbe use of Ekibastuz and Kansk-Achinsk coal will beexpanded for production of electrical energy,umber of large thermal electric power stations in the Urals and Volga regions will be converted from fuel oil to coal. For this purpose further development of the coal industry is planned, especially opencast extraction of coal in the Ekibastuz, Kansk-Achinsk, Kuznetsk, and South Yakutsk basins.

Gas production would increaseercentul its use for technologicalopposed to powerdouble. To meet theneeds" of the European USSR and Urals for fuel and electricalig program of nuclear power station construction in Ihc western part of the couniry would be combined with ucecleratedin the easi of large thermal power stations burning

coal mined in Kazahksian and Siberia, the power from which would be transmitted to the European USSR through the Single Electric Power grid. In contrast to his emphasis on coal and nuclear power, Kosygin had virtually nothingtosay about oil production over the next five years. I

The line expressed by Kosygin in6 was reflected in the official resolution of the party congress, and in ihe report that Baybakov delivered upon the actual adoption ofh Five-Year Plan in"7 there were no indications that the official position had changed. With some shadings of emphasis it appeared to be acceptediven in public statements by such luminaries as Central Commitiec Secretary Kirilenko, President of the Academy of Sciences Aleksandtov. and Academician Styrikovich. J

Nevertheless, implementation of the new line was veryundamental problem was how- to go about actually utilizing the enormous potential energy of Kansk-Achinskhere has been generalthat some of the coal should be burned in mine-mouth generating plants to supply power for local needs. Beyond this point, different opinions on the desirable mode of transmitting Kansk-Achinsk energy were expressed both before and after adoption ofh Five-Year Plan. There have been proposals to build large mine-mouth generating stations andelcclric power over supcrhigh-voltage lines to the European USSR; topecial broad gauge coal railway from Kansk-Achinsk to central Russia: tolurry or capsule pipeline; touperconductive cable: and to build coal liquefaction.

- Il tltm-ie resumed itui ibe liar was thaiound wrrk would be laidfnrr increase in ihc share of coal in the fuel-rnngv balance, nor that the share of coal would increase during the Iflih Five-Year Plan In other wortb. the initial objectiveo Sao* do-aad then tubtazc ibe share of oil Thus (be ptai ia facthe share of coal in ibe overall energy balance fromercent5 toercentligfai inrieatr in the ihareofoil from *J0ercent The share of coal in boiler fuelrwiae eapected to drop fronterccnlIigM drop frcecrnmi in ITas projected in the ahare of mlcaraio*t)kh

KeaakAetjoik bjajgag coal has low calrvifK lalgdiweder aad ash content, and lendt to self-ignite when transported oversfiorl dxiancci without enriihir'ii.BJ

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gasification, or scmicoking facilities, with the product cither being shipped west or used as an enriched fuel for power generation.

Each of these variants is extremely costly, and most involve high levels of technological risk and extremelyestation periods. Apparently, the most appealing option has been the constructionilovolt DC superhigh-voltage line from Kansk-Achinsk to the European USSR. However, before this technological feat can be accomplished,rotectedO0-kV DC line will probably have to be studied. The indications arcenter line will not be in operation0 at the earliest!

The notion lhat Kansk-Achinsk development would make any significant contribution to the Soviet energy balance0 was evidently discounted almost immediately afterh Fivc-Ycar Plan wasnotsuch key figures asof Coal Bratchenko. Minister of Power and Electrification Ncporo?hniy. and Baybakov himself. The dc facto strategy that emerged in the first two years of the current five-year plan was to press ahead on Ekibastuz coal extraction, to assign priority to design and construction ofV DC Ekibasiuz-Center transmission line, to develop very gradually the third extraction site in Kansk-Achinsk (the Berezovond to look in the medium runink-up of Kansk-Achinsk with the Kazakhstan power grid by meansV ACwouldoundabout transfermall amount of Kansk-Achinsk power at least to the Urals until the Ekibastuz-Center line goes into opcrationaJJ

Not surprisingly, discussions of Kansk-Achinsk6 have exhibited considerable ambivalence. The decision inh Five-Year Plan to go ahead with Kansk-Achinsk, even though the transportation issue remained unresolved, has led some authorities to redefine the central function of Kansk-Achinsk by emphasizing its role as the hubast energy-intensive industrial complex to be formed in Krasnoyarsk Kray. This point of view, which has been

publicly articulated by Mazover and Nckrasov of Gosplan's SOPS, implies an extremely bullish attitude toward Siberian industrial development, but by the same token suggests that Kansk-Achinsk coal will not solve the critical European USSR fuel deficit in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile,some Gosplanto emphasizeof Kansk-Achinsk energy to the western regions of the USSR I

In practice, some progress has been achieved in Ekibastuz during the present five-year plan, and it is claimed that the technologyV DC transmission has now been mastered and that actual coniruction of the line is about to begin. Reports from Kansk-Achinsk, however, indicate thaiew broad outpul targets have been set. no comprehensive development program for Ihe region existed as lateespite efforts by the Krasnoyarsk obkom to generaterogram and to establish some mechanism for coordinating the activities of the dozens of agencies involved in developing Kansk-Achinsk, the familiar pathology of malcoordination at the regional level has emerged full-blown. Each ministry goes its own way. guided by its Own vested interests, and vital long-term development needs are simply ignored. There is no evidence that the leadership in Moscow- was prepared to intervene decisively to change thisin the period prior to the7 Plenum of the Central Committee, when Ihe party line adopted only two years before was suddenly revised.!

IV. The Present Situation

Tbe December Plenum of the Central Committee

A reappraisal of Soviet energy production policy undertaken in the second half7 was conducted so secretly lhat most authorities were evidently caught


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guard by Ihc change in line ai the December Plenum of the Centrale do not know precisely why this shift in the line occurred, but among the likely reasons are:

lhat the oil reserve situation had become Quite serious. Despite earlier assertions that oilcould be maintained only if giant new oilfields were discovered, none had been foundy tbe end7 there was no conceivable way of bringingiant field in time forh Five-Year Plan. Meanwhile, geologists in Tyumen for the second straight year were failing to fulfill the plan for increasing reserves, and there were reserve difficulties elsewhere as well. Anxiety of specialists over oil reserves7 was already profound, and their concern probably increased.

performance in oil produclion.even oil regions did not fulfill their plans, and the Ministryhole did not fulfill the "supplementary targets" that had been laid on it.7 tbe Oil Ministry failed to fulfill its above-plannd sixtwo in which the Soviets had invested some hope (Perm andnot even meet their plans. In Tyumen the duration of drilling downtime increased twofoldhe plan for transfer to mechanized extraction was not fulfilled, the plan for introduction of new production capacity was fulfilled by onlyercent, and ihe plan for nonproduction construction was also unfulfilled There washarp drop in pressure at the Fedorovo field. According to the

" In lilt July or earlyelegation ciimi hb ol the MioHitrs

of Oil. Gas. and Coasireciion ofnd Gat Industry

efpcuca. other ministerial aad Omul Comnattec officiate, and

probably Goaptaa Cbalrasan Baybakovecret vitii to

Tyoaea. Teata procedure lhat bad preceded Barter pohcy

change* irJsied io Tysraun. Tier*e sons* wenifican:

persoaoel jfctfb6UOriremer

Central Committee ofTioal tripooiibe loru appointed

First Deputy Minister'. aad there appear to bare

been three other toe- mclchasget hi ihe Winmry of Oil. as

umber of changes in the leadcnbipof terriicrial oil

prodocuon administrations. Ywu Fr> r. former head ofthe Tyumen

Geological AdminUtration (GUvtyunsrngeologiya).appointed

Deputy Minister of Geology inhere also seems to

haveayor ihakcup in the Gotptan transpon Department

during the course7ladimir Fllanonkii. formerly of


Tyumen, appear* lo have rcpticnliii ton-lit ;i- Icict r:

Gceptan'l Petroleum nod Gaa Industry


chief of the Tyumen Main Oil Administrationrzbanov. the real problem in Tyumen was to achievehat is. torop in oil output; without "supplementary measures" the attempt to meet the five-year plan targets, he implied,opeless venture.

Possible anticipationore rapid decline than projected In oil output in the older oil-producing regions."

Probable nonfulfillment of7 plan by the Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises.

Possible anticipationore rapid decline than projected in older gasfields (for example, in Central Asia).

general intensification of energy shortages: power plant fuel shortages, petroleum shortages, and failure lo fulfill energy conservation measures.

The Central Committee Plenum and the Supreme Soviet session on the plan and budget8 were held successively inone ofthe speeches delivered at the Central Committee plenum were published, and substantial secrecy still surrounds the proceedings: the main evidence of what was saidravda editorial paraphrase ofpeech, published after the conclusion of the Supreme Soviet meeting.

The general context in which the energy issue was posed was evidently one of extreme pressure on all resources, especially metals, fuels, and investment funds.esponse to this situation was to insist upon ihe establishment of strict prioritiesunneling of investment inio "those concrete links in which, ai the cost of minimalone canaximum and rapid effect.

" Oil production al Ihe Large Tuymazy field in Bashkiriya bid declineday0 over the pan five or ux years, causing gieat concern among petroleum officials. Authorities also foresaw ihe possibilityteep decline in Taiar production. Mt




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la other words. Brezhnev resurrected the old notion of "reading links" in the economy, so familiar to all who had participated ia economic campaigns of the Stalinnotion that contrasted with the marginalise optimizing thinking that lay bchindthe25th Party Congress directives on energy |

The key passage dealing with energy inpresentation of Brezhnev's speech declared

Among the big interbranch problems there is none

more important than the fuel-energy problem.

Over the nextil and gas. first of all from Tyumen, willecisive role in providing the country with fuel and energy. Wc have successfully completed the first stage of the program of the complex mastery of the mineral resources and development of the production

forces of West Siberia. Now with all urgency arises the need to realize the next stage. It is important to concentrate resources and capital construction possibilities on this truly greatproject of our time, to buttress economic with mass-political measures, havingattention to it on the part of tbe Komsomol and the press.

Coal will continue to occupy an important place in the fuel-energy balance of the country in tbe future too. the extraction of which will rise in

illionand atomic

energy will develop at exceptionally rapid lempos.

The "leading links" here were clear: within the nonagncultural economy, the leading link was the fuel-energy sector, within this sector the leading link was hydrocarbons; and within tbe hydrocarbon branches the leading link was development in Tyumen Oblast. The conceptfirst stage" of Tyumen development appeared here for the first time, although it had been impliedeneral way by what Muravlenkoand other advocates of heavier investment in Tyumen had been saying. The purpose of the phrase was precisely toajor increase in the resources allocated to Tyumen The phrase "all urgency" was intended toense of critical need without at the same lime undercutting the carefully nurtured




propaganda image that the Soviet Union was not vulnerableless in the midst of -its own "energyhe references to "mau-poliiicalhe Komsomol, and the press signaled toe initiationampaign. And the tag-end reference to coal, hydroclectriciiy. and nuclear power maintained the facade of continuity withh Parly Congress, despite the actual shift in the whole policy emphasis. The Pravda report, however, was short on details: although it called, in effect,eturn to what wc have called the Hydrocarbon energy balance strategy, it did not spell out how much stress was to be placed on north Tyumen gas ora broadernew policy line was to be implicated *fj

One might have expected to find such details in Baybakov's report on8 plan to ihc Supreme Soviet, bul at most they were merely suggested. Baybakov did talk about the need to increase oil and gas reserves and the need to accelerate pipeline and housing construction in West Siberia. But he also declared that the increase in oil output8 would come not only from Tyumen but from other regions, that gas development would occur in Orenburg, and also in Turkmenistan, as well as in Tyumen, that coal production should be increased in the Donbass, Kuzbass, and Ekibastuz (he ignoredhai work should go forward oncV AC line; that nuclear power development should proceed apace;the needs of other major investment projects, such as Atommssh, the Baykal-Amur Mainlinend non-Black-Earthbad lo be kept in mind. What Baybakov did noi say was even more significant: he did not mention the Central Committee Plenum at all in the energy section of his report; he did noi say that Tyumen had special priority; he did not mention Urcngoy at all. although he specifically mentioned Orenburg three times; and he did noi in any way suggest or imply any changej^kvU25th PartyM)

There washarp apparent contrast in7 between the position attributed to Brezhnev, which was held to be the party line, and the course of action projected inS economic plan. The divergence here could have been explained by underlying conflict over policy, but it might also have arisen from lack of time to meld ihe draft report on the





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onceivable last-minute shift by the Politburo On balance, later evidence lends io supportconflict interpretation. However, Brezhnev's illness in the second half of December and almost all of January and his apparent absence from the scene on many days in November. February, and March cloud the picture.!-

What is clear is that the December Plenum of the Central Committee specifically confirmed nothing morehift in direction of energy policy, and even this was not immediately given great publicity. No detailed program was approved by the Plenum, and the entire weight of Politburo authority appears not to have been placed behind the Tyumen campaign until after Brezhnev returned in8 from his trip to Siberia. Especially in December and January there were signs that the full measure of the forthcoming campaign Had not been taken, even by supporters ofhange."

Crystallization of the New Line

In the interval between the December Plenum and Brezhnev's trip the openness of policy was suggested by intense lobbying efforts on behalf of investment in Tyumen. Two weeks after the Plenum, Shcherbina was the first person publicly to claim that the Plenum had in factew "strategy" for "further development ofn theanuary issue of Literalurnaya gazela, the first secretary of the Writers' Union, Georgi Markov, was one of the first to quote in full theecember Pravda version of Brezhnev's remarks on Tyumen, as heajor literary-propaganda blitz aimed at Tyumen. In

" In an article on Tyumen ail in Pravda onourrufo! favorably predisposed to Tyumen did not even bintTyumen acceleration- had been approved at the CentralPlenum. Likewise, an article by the ardent Tyumen advocate. Academician Trofimuk. in Pravda8 contained no reference to the December Plenum, to Brezhnev's suppo'l for Tyumen, or to Ihe "second stage" of Tyumenajor propaganda "letter" ol the Central Committee, tbe Council of Ministers, and ihe Trade Unions published in /VoWeon I* January failed to refer at all to the Siberian taruii or to Tyumen. Similarly,entral Committee mass media meeting reported in tevesiiyo Coanuary, Kirilenko, who mentioned the December Plenum and Brezhnev's "propositions andid not allude lo tbe Tyumen-first policy: nor "as lbs noted as one of ihe themes sireuedeeting of ihe Council cf Ministers attended by Kirilenko and Maiurov> reported in Pratda onanuary. BJ

the following week's issue of Literaturnaya gazela, the Tyumen obkom first secretary, Bogomyakov, argued forcefully that the December Plenum had indeed usheredew era in energy production policy, although onlyeriod of unnecessary vacillation:

Tyumen workers are orienting themselves to produce not lessillion tons of oilillion cubic meters of gasut what about after that? How will extraction beThis question undoubtedly worries many people. Even quite recently there were notew contradictory judgments in views on the future. The directives of the December Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU determinethe place of the Tyumen complex in satisfying the needs of the country for oil and gas.

Bogomyakov laid the blame for past inefficientof Tyumen and for the need to undertake the present catch-up campaign on Gosplan and various ministries. Other articles in the next few months also assigned blame for delays in Tyumen development, drew favorable comparisons between Tyumen and other energy-producing regions, and calledurther shift of resources to

But the element of uncertainty that remainedthe December Plenum provided room for the assertion of interests that crosscut Brezhnev's evident intentions. Even at the Supreme Soviet session, the representative of the Tatar Republic spoke far less enthusiastically of Brezhnev's initiative at the December Plenum than did his colleague from the Bashkir Republic, whose categorical endorsement suggested behind-lhe-scenes conflict. The Turkmen spokesman explicitly complained of cutbnck> in8 mi pngram.|

Had these speeches simply been insufficientlybeforehand? Theleast in the case ofappeare negative. In early January, Bulgakov, the general director of the Tatar Oil Administration, referred publicly lo Ihe need to rcdrill three out of every four wells in Tatariya. At the end of ihe month, at the annual winter meeting of the

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Ministry Collegium, he dwelt on the need to increase the recovery rate in Tatariya. bring small fields into production, and supply more drillingand he also observed lhat "the problem of holding on to cadres seriously disturbst was precisely at this time that the campaign to dispatch Tatar and other drilling crews to Tyumen was gaining momentumevelopment with which Bulgakov himself was intimately involved.


The ambiguity surrounding the new policy line was not altogether dissipated by the trips in quick succession to Tyumen and other Siberian cities by Kosygin and Brezhnev in March and earlyosygin left onarch and returned on the morning ofarch, while Brezhnev left several hours after Kosygin's return and came back to Moscowpril.

Kosygin was accompanied byumber of USSRhoat least Mal'tsev, Orudzhev. andcomposition of the delegation, whichump gathering oftheof the Council of Ministerssuggests that its mission was to work outdetails of the DecemberThe fact that three months had elapsed


0Cf0re (his delegation departed, despite Brezhnev's admonition (hat Tyumen development should be treated "with alluggests that decisionmaking was held back by the absence of prior contingency planning, conflict over policy. Brezhnev's t'ccblc health, or some combination of these factors.

Kosygin's delegation visited Orenburg (where it dealt with gasyumen city, the two key Tyumen oil towns of Surgut and Nizhnevartovsknd Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk. Press comment on what happened in Tyumen was exceedingly sketchy; ihc only substantive information released was thatrelated to the long-term development of Tyumen had been discussed at gatherings of party andofficials and specialists from the oil, gas, and petrochemical industries. There was somewhat more comment on Kosygin's visit to Krasnoyarsk. It focused

on development of the Sayan Territorial Production Complex, natural resources, agriculture, and the broader pattern of Siberian development There was no mention of

isit lo Tyumen was also treated circumspectly in the press, receiving the least coverage of any of the major stops on his tour despite the paramount importance of the oblast. In his talk with Tyumen party and economic leaders, the pressBrezhnev dwelt on "fulfillment of plans for mastering mineral resources andxpanding the output of oil and gas. economizing on material resources, and meeting capital construction targets. He also issued unspecified "concreteit more information was added in the account of Brezhnev's stop in Novosibirsk, where he was reported to have demanded of the Siberian Division ofthe Academy of Sciences. "Wc expect still more in questions of the practicalof science and in the solution of fuel-energy problems, geological exploration, petrochemicals,building, and in otherong and relatively detailed report of his speech in Krasnoyarsk, there was no mention at all of Kansk-Achinsk, in contrastointed reference to the subject by the kraykom first secretary, Pavel Fedirko.1

Perhaps the unprecedented visit to the sameby two top leaderseek's limeresult merely of the fortuitous circumstancethrough Tyumen is one way to lake therailway lothe Pacific. Having initiatedloward Tyumen" at the December Plenum,argue, it was only natural for Brezhnev to slopoblastirsthand appraisal andepwould reinforce the message delivered byhis associates. From this perspective, thebe viewed simply as an episode withinofthe broader personal, economic, andconsideralions thai led Brezhnev toSiberia: to demonstrate physical andpush Siberian development, focusSoviet military mightis the Chinese,the Carter administration on issuesG B






lausible explanation, however, is that the Kosygin-Baybakov-Dyrnshttsandrepresented two differcn; approaches to dealing withoteworthy anomaly of the tnpi was the near coincidence of the return of Kosygin and the departure of Brezhnev. The timing here would appear to have allowed little opportunity for faec-to-face consultation between the two Had Brezhnev been working in harmony with Kosygin and Baybakov, one might have supposed that he would have delayed his departure long enough for discussion and coordination of his own positions with those arrived at by Kosygin'i delegation I

That there were high- and lower level differences of opinion over Brezhnev's new line, which may or may not have surfaced in the separate trips to Tyumen, is strongly suggestedonvergence of other evidence:

ttitude.ong article onprogress thai was published in January. Baybakov managed to avoid any reference to the December Plenum or to Brezhnev, while stressing the desirability of heeding professional advice. Likewise,uly article on economiche completely ignored the subjects of Siberia and oil and gas

Gosplan-based negativism. One of Ihe most striking manifestations of disagreement with the Brezhnev line was provided by the publication of two articles by Yalrov, the director of Gosplan's Scientific Research Institute of Complex Fuel-Energy Problems. The first, printed iwodays after Brezhnev's departure for Siberia,horoughgoing restatement ofh Party Congress Combined Resources line on energy production, with no stress on Brezhnev's role or on the Siberian campaign, and no specific reference to Tyumen. Without identifying the source. Yatrov included an entire paragraph taken from Kosygin's report toh Party Congress stressing the USSR's status as the only energy self-sufficient major worldecond article, devoted to the offbeat

"Krosnmyt ixtsU JO Mares IS'J Thearticlebrsdettd references in ftrrshnrv sad ibr December PWaooi between reference! to ibe JStb Pany Cong'cuand the7 session of the Supremehich Baybakov had vmnally ignored Brerfcnev'i line) and asserted In onmista sable terms that the line had been set "by ihe JSih Partyhile torching upon Breinnevs theme of the paramount rok of rjfl andin the nest decade, and mer1 ioneil .Siberia (atom with Komi andatrov devoted much more aitcnlion to Kanik-Acjuntk and Ekibovtur coal, as well a* to MUD and nuclei!

subject of gcothermal energy, also ignored Brezhnev and the role of oil and gas. In addition, an article reiteratingh Party Congress line was published in the May issue ofournal, and an article tilledombined Resources approachin the June issueournal closely lied lo Gosplan.

Pravda and Izvestiya editorials.Pravda has often tended to reflect parly-oriented positions, while Izvesiiya has reflectedthinking in the government Council of Ministers. Following Brezhnev's return, Pravda and Izvestiya published their own editorials on the Siberian trip. Overall, the Izvestiya editorial was substantially less supportive lhanhe formal resolution approving Brezhnev's trip adopted by the Central Committee. Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and Council of Ministers incorporated compromise language.

Brezhnev's remarks at Ibe Komsomol congress The tone of Brezhnev's comments on Tyumen in his speech in Apnl to the Kosomol congress was defensive and argumentative. He found it necessary on this occasion to justify the large investment in Tyumen and lo argue thai it had paid off. Tyumen wasead end: "We can siill live off of Tyumen reserves for manye declared. But, it was necessary "to double-treble the volume of all operationse asserted that this would require both new material technicaland on influx of people there, that supply orders destined for Tyumen originating elsewhere in the country should be given the highest priority, and lhat Komsomol groups should monitor fulfillment of this requirement.

promotion of Kansk-Achinsk.eport to the Presidium of tbe Supreme Soviet in May. Kosygin "drew attention, specifically, to the progress of realization of proposals for accelerating theand implementation of measures for setting up tbe Kansk-Achinsk fuel-energy complex, for increasing

" Prtmte cm 1Apriland Inemgo onApril iThe

articleeaker tellelal. .mplied thai lea.esponvereouircd from party meetings and akiivi that would no- dauuaa the implication, of the trip, at rested Ihe JSih Pany Congress, enrphaaiaed tbe need (or regional balance: confined Ihe "new atage" lo tost Siberia; mentionedI; avoided laying thai the share of allocations to the east would increase: and did not lay Ihe blame for logging development upon tbe ministries."H



rs III


reserve of capacities in the energy systems of then his speech ont anniversary of the Revolution in November. Kosygin ignored the7 Plenum and West Siberia. Instead he emphasized raising the proportion of atomic energy and coal in the fuel and power balance, developing the Kansk-Achinsk and Ekibastuz coalfields,high-voltage power transmission, andon gas and oil (the "irreplaceable sources of chemical raw materials").

Esoteric criticism of Baybakov. The most significant implied criticism of Baybakov (and probably of Kosygin aslthough perhaps the most elusive, appeared in Brezhnev's memoir. Rebirth, published inaragraph lhat was partly cribbedravda editorial ofecember and lacked any relation to the historical material in which it was embedded. Brezhnev dwelt on the importance of concentrating resources on West Siberia andthe "leading links" philosophy. Adherence to this philosophy constituted one of the key elements of "the art of planning, and indeed of economic leadership inirect slap at Baybakov appeared during May in the Central Committee's theoretical journal. /Communist, which called atlenlion to the fact that the "Ministry of Oil" had liquidated geologicalin north Tyumenny Soviet reader with the slightest familiarity with the oil industry would have been aware that Baybakov had been Minister of Oil3 and that he was being held responsibleituation with obvious current parallels.

Debate at the roundtable meeting on West Siberian development. Iniscussionoundtable meeting on West Siberian development organized by the Tyumen obkom and the editorial boards of several

journals revealed the persistenceumber of key unresolved issues even after Brezhnev's trip to

Impact of the New Line

The priorities that have emerged in practice from Brezhnevs new line include an intensified emphasis on oil extraction inecondary stress on gas,eemphasis of coal. It would almost certainly be incorrect, however, to say that these priorities arc embodied in some coherent, comprehensive program, following Politburo authorization in7eformulation of the regime's general energystrategy, planners and specialists were faced with the task of generating, once again, branch programs that corresponded to prescriptions set from above. In the meantime, adjustments are presumably being

" The most fundamental issue* dealt with investment, oil resents, planning, and transportation Investment isiues thai were raised included ihe effectiveness (or lack of it. according to some Gosplan officials) of capital investment in West Siberia: tbe desirability of broad (hydrocarbons plus petroc hem kali and chemicals plus electric power plus metallurgy) versus narrow (hydrocarbons) development of Tyumen: the optimum rate of investment in infrastructure and prospects for long-term habitation of the region; conflicts of interest over investment between Tyumen and other regions; and the overall priority to be assigned to Tyumen investment- One. Vaynihicya, was said to have emphasized that "tbe significance of the Tyumen complex is so great for tbe economy of the country, and the problem of providing it with all the necessary reserves is sohat it was necessary"first todrawupa balanced plan for tbe oil'gas complex of Tyumen Oblast, and then include it as one of the basic blocks in the plan of development ofthe economy of the USSR All theof ibe Tyumen program must be satisfied under ail conditions "This proposal, considered paradoiical by (be editors, implicitly called for assigning Tyumenriority equivalent la military production. The issue of oil reserves and production possibilities was touched upon by tbe Tyumen. Nesterov. who called upoo Gosplan to Increase investment in eiploratory drilling and denounced skeptics who doubled ibe existence of further large oil reserves in Tyumen and by tbe Tyumen. GuzhovstJi, who appealed for Ihe "creation of strategic reserves in tbe oil-extraction industry" in order to compensate for unanticipated declines In oil production elsewhere. Guzhavskii was also one of the speaker* who lamented the absence of an integrated program for West Siberia: In his opinion, failure by Gosplan (notoriouily hostile to this idea) lo employ optimizing mathematical models in planning West Siberianwas likely to result in enormously costly miscalculations. Transportation was stressed by Ya. Mawer ofOPS, who dwell on ihe "gigantic problem" of coping with the raprdly increasing energy deficit in tbe western USSR. Maimer's pitchapid acceleration of natural gas production and transportation was seconded by Nesterov. who urged lhat Soviet steel produclion capacity be enlarged inib Five-Year Plan to meet Ihe enormous need for large-diameter gas pipend Ptana>oyeS. No.




made "by eye" in the enisling plan balances, wjih no little pulling and hauling by interested ministries.|

In all likelihood the key factor that ledeversion to the Hydrocarbon strategy wasajority of leaders must have perceivedlear and present danger of slippage in Oil production. The "Tyumen acceleration" in the midst of the current five-year plan indicates that ibe Soviets appearave been unable to meet immediate petroleum rr^uirements whileolicy commitment to longer term solutions to the energy problem |

The Hydrocarbon approach, of course, does have certain positive enticements. Il imposes high costs, bul these arc lower than the immediate cost that would be entailedudden implementation of the Big Gas or Big Coal strategics. Il depends on familiar technology and docs not demand the development of radically new and untested transportation systems. Probably it demands less foreignas-based strategy, as long as it does not include major offshorebo. it lends itself well to tbe technique that can get torn* results under Sovietparty-led mobilizing campaign I


conflict over the precise volume of investment is suggcsled by Brezhnev's ambiguousis8 speech at the Komsomol congress to the need to ^djjubjj-treble" the amount of work in West Siberia.

Constraints in the allocation of resources andfor geological exploration hasore point wilh Tyumen authorities for years.67 there were heavy hints of discrimination against Tyumen on this score,rogram to increase exploration was mounted8 target for exploration drilling by Glavtyumcngeologiynhirdop official of Glavtyumengeologiya indicated in8 that his organization would be hard pressed to meet thisne remaining critical issue was thai of drilling teams for geological exploration, despite the apparent priority assigned to Tyumen by the December Plenum8 there wereeological drilling crews in Tyumen; to meetril1ing plan, accordingop official of Glavtyumengeoligiya. there will have torews. Tbe persistence of com petition between regions for personnel was illuminatedemark of Farman Salmanov. chief of Glavtyumengeoligiya. in

Present Tyumen Oil Campaign

A central elcmeni in the present campaign is the reluctant decision to make substantial increases In investment in Tyumen. Commenting on this issue, the Tyumen obkom First secretary. Gcnnadiy Shmal'. referred in8 to the enormous costs that now had to be met in West Siberian development. The general magnitude of investment demands is indicated by the statement lhat "by the end of the five-year plan it will be necessary to fulfill capita! construction work in West Siberia greater than that at BAM. KamAZ. VAZ and 'Atommash' takenncertainty or

" Soviet concern aiih offshore oil and eatfeated ia ihe creaiM ia8e- Main Administration for Clpknaiion and Development o( Oflihore Oil and Gas Fvclda The establishment of tho unit within ihe Ministry of Gat and the transfer lo It of personnel from the Ministries of Oil and Geologyajor political victory for Ihe Minister of Gas. SatM Orudihev Whether ihe Ministry of Gas Is a> well toiled lo urganitcoffihora production at ihe more ciperienccd Miniitryof Oil, whichargerin it and which haia record of rnorecipediliout handling of foreign trade jnd technology Iranifcr. remaimJ |Jg j|

I'm noty assertions thai there aren't enough drillers. Thererilling brigades in the branch, and so it's necessary toonsiderable part of ihcm there where exploitation will give the largest geological payoff; namely, to us, to the Tyumen land!

Kvcn more crucial in the short run is the need rapidly to increase oil development drilling in West Siberia. In

his was clearly an area of deep concern to the Soviet authorities. Still greater anxiety was suggestedhen the real magnitude of the oil drilling required to meet the five-year plan was disclosed On the basis of data released8 ihe picture of drilling requirements given iname into focus. It il apparent lhat to meet the five-year plan target il would


The pioblemi meeuooed Included major diffkullwi withrepair, uncipccicdly high preiiurei that brought drilling inIn nonhemigh frequency of breakdownopcrniions. The official strongly implied ibatancer*longer term" was not cbaracteriilic of ihe way etpkiiatMn-at being dean with' by higher



CBpvnghted material has been removed.Tlie source elide material Ise milled.


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necessary to do almost three times as much oil development drilling0 as inpj

All authorities agreed that il would be impossible to accomplish this objective with the number of oil drilling rigs and brigades tbat were in Tyumen al the beginningccording to onerilling brigades were required to meet the five-year drilling plan, but as of8 there were onlyn Tyumen. Oil drilling requires highly skilled labor, and consequently the total number of drilling brigades available in the country cannot quickly be expanded. To meet Tyumen's needs it has been necessary toignificant number of brigades from other regions, which has inevitably exacerbated the problem of holding stable the level of extraction in older fields.


Table 2

Drilling Requirements for The Ministry of










lable 1

7 plans were drawn up to transfer drilling brigades from ihe Tatar. Bashkir. Kuibyshev, and Saratov fields to Tyumen, and some brigades were actually dispatched before the end of the year. These plans were accelerated following the DecemberAccordingecision taken by the Ministry of Oil, the so-called tour of duty or expedition system was the model to be employed. Under this system, the brigades would remain under the jurisdiction of their former drilling administrations and would be flown to Tyumen for two-week tours and then flown back to their homes west of the

The first brigades were drawn from the Urals-Volga fields of Taiariya. Bashkiriya, Kuibyshev, and Saratov while later groups were to come from as far away as Stavropol', the Ukraine, and Bclorussia. As of the end of1 of these new drilling brigades had been organized, outlanned total9 it is planned to createdditional drilling brigades in Tyumen. The "flying brigades" were assigned aboutercent of Tyumen's oil drilling planj

From the outsei there were serious hitches inhousing, and production arrangements for the new drilling brigades. Because of shortages and failure by suppliers to deliver sufficient additional drilling rigs, competition arose between the newcomers and

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ill CrjuvrlohTcrJ material has been ramosed.

CoayfiBbied material has been remind

ubordinate tothe latter inevitably the winners. The new brigades are apparently in the unenviable position of being responsible for wort that may really not count toward tbe official plan fulfillment of either Glav-tyucienncftcgazeir base administrations. Not surprisingly, they jrc underfulfilling their quotas so far.p

Similar problems have arisen in implementing the directives of the December Plenum in construction, transportation, and electric power supply, which for years have been chronic bottlenecks in Tyumen development, The crux of the difficulty in all three fields has been intense demand elsewhere for resources and manpower, and incentive structures that motivate the various construction and transportation ministries and the Ministry of Power and Electrification to hold back on activity in Tyumen

Following Brezhnev'i trip, and in response to much criticism. Gosplanell-modulated promise to


increase the capacity of construction organizations in Tyumen90 It followed this move by announcing incries of measuresconstruction, transportation, oil equipment, and scientific research in Tyumen. There were also pledges

by transportation ministries and the Ministry of Power and Electrification, extracted under heavy fire, to do belter by Tyumen in the future. These moves have not quieted criticism from Tyumen, nor arc they likely to do so. The campaign that Brezhnev has set in train cannot help but pry some resources loose from the ministrie? concerned, but it has not changedthe fundamental structure of their interests: and these interests will continue to be expressed ir planning process and policy implementation.!

The same observations apply with even greater force to the campaign unleashed with great fanfare in8 to assign top priority lo Tyumen deliveries from plants all over the USSR. This campaign hasbeen getting some supplies lo Tyumen faster lhan they would otherwise arrive. The prospects for its long-term success, however, are questionable. Theis carried along strictly by "moralhat is to say. it tends to run counter to the natural interests of each and every factory and ministry that




Con rhJtn rial






it* established priorities in order io expedite deliveries lo Tyumen More important still, theoT ihe campaign is limited by the backward linkages to olher sectors of the economy of goods required by Tyumen. For example. Ihc possibility of supplying Tyumen with more and better drill pipe, pumps,arge-diameter pipes,transmission lines, and so on. quickly runs up against the allocation of metal within the economyhole and the capabilities of the metallurgicalThere is very little slack availablehe supply side of the economy, and once it has been taken up Tyumen growth will be directly constrained by the structural weaknesses of the Soviet economy as aIn fact, the imposition by fiat of unplanned changes in the scheduling of deliveries can only have unfortunate ripple effects elsewhere

A central issue in Tyumen oil development in the current five-year plan hasere to concentrate the extraction effort The alternatives have been either to attempt toarger number of new small fields, with all the problems this entails, or to attempt io meet the plan by developing fewer new small fields while increasing drilling and extraction above projected capacity at the older Wcsl Siberiannotably Samotlor The price of the tatter course of action is to reduce the ultimate recoverable yield from the older fields andteeper rate of decline after the four yean or so in which the fcids are produced above maximum efficient

The late chief ofiktor Muratlenko, who diedelt that the only rational course of action left6 was to undertake immediate developmentarge number of small new fields in Tyumen.olicy would maintain growth in oilile preventing further damage toSamotlor. Thus we finduravlcnko was calling for the development during the forthcoming lOih Five-Year Plan ofew deposits in West Siberia. Three months later,ocal Tyumen official implied that ihe five-year plan target was onlyew fields, and then Deputy Minister of Oil Mal'lscv stated that the target was "about""

6 it is asserted in Soviet sources, seven new fields were developed. According to the new head ofrihanov. in order for Tyumencci its planight more new fields had to be developed,otal ofly the third quarterowever, slippage in the five-year ptan target tond tnenew fields indicated that something wasamiss In December it was revealed that7 work had "started" on only four new fields. Precisely how many new fields were actually io production b) the end7 i* enclcar. White Minister of Oil Mal'ise* appeared to claim that all fourfields were brought into operation, another source states that lOnew deposits were opened up. which would7 number only three (assuming that seven new fields were really brought into operation. Inavid Shipler of The New York Times was lold that "onlyields were being worked at this time in Tyumen Since aboutrc sold to have been in operation at ihc endhis would imply that at most nine new fields were brought into production in


Con^denlial CoDVinhled nitfcrial has been remivtd.

ll sources agree thai ihe target8 is eight new fields. Once again, though, the five-year plan goal has apparently been lowered: In8 Arzhanov stated that the target wasew fields, which he reduced toonth later. Later references mentionedew fields. Assumine thaiew fields were brought into production. and that eight will be introducednly four to seven would be left for the remaining twoapparent anomaly that might be explained byof access to these fields.!

rs III)

The revision downward of the number of small fields being developed0 has two implications. First, the halving of the small-field target inlear defeat for Muravlcnko and like-minded proponents of steady Tyumen oil development,the ascendance of the Combined Resources strategy at the time ofh Party Congress. Operationally, itecision to limit investment in Tyumen, while meeting oil needs through more intensive exploitation of Samotlot ineriod. Looked at charitably, this decision represented an attempt to buy time for developing alternative energyore realistic appraisal would probably be lhat itesigned to cut costsegardless of the longer term corisequences: it was another example of energy decisionmaking being driven by short-term expediency. Secondly, the serious shortfall in the opening up of new fields7 and the further reduction of Ihe five-year plan target to onlyoields quickly revealed the lack of realism in the leadership's treatment of ihc small fields. As Muravlcnko and others had been sayingumber of years, there was no cheap solution lo further development of Tyumen. The leadership's about-face sincenn ihcse people *eie nghi

Stabilizing or slightly increasing the level of output al Samotlor through more drilling and some combination of more submersible pumps and gas lift is strategic in maintaining the overall level of Soviet oil production at the present juncture. But the cutting edge of any significant growth in oil production, the key to (he future ofthe oil industry over the nextears (so Brezhnev in effect tellss development ofthe small fields. These fields, which generally lie farther away from the Ob waterway and established lines of communication, in the swamps of central Tyumen, pose acute problems of road building, electric power supply, and pipeline construction. The problems are magnified, and the costs multiplied, by the geographical Isolation of individual fields (see the map,.umber of articles have dealt graphically with the difficulties presented by the smalt fields. These articleslear impression that plans for developing the small fields will be met only



with great difficulty and not onutput at

the few ix* fields developed to date, moreover, is said

to average less than half of the planned initialI



Urengoy GfJ Development

According to Minister of Gas Orudrbev. restraint on investment in the gas industry was enforced. During Ihe course7 increasing attention was paid lo Tyumen gas. including pipeline projects and the Urengoy field. Some work had already been proceeding on this field itselfndwork on the Urengoy-Chclyabinsk pipeline right-of-way beganecisiontaken around the lime of the7 Plenum called for an abrupt acceleration of Ihc whole pace of development. I

he largest known natural gas anddeposit in the world,ilometers long andilometers wide. Its multilayered structure contains (wo main gas pools, with currently estimated reserves ofrillion cubicto total

ecdpresidedn TnrfneiiA typical new fieU. suck aiiktmttcraficau Niihrwiarcoik (Same*lor)utelandof taiga, lakes, aad swampt Hne. at at other do ficldi the "golden -ii .of development thai specifics lhat roads, elecuicity, and pipeline* most run ahead of oil recovery, rather (Kan along "ith it. muchbehind n. wai being violated Povkbovvk was supposed lo go into productionut did not. il would be lucky lo operateg. Tbe owl? way to deliver freaihl lo it waaostly "iMe* road or even more ceaiiy helicopter transport Power wai wWed byeEginea.hird of tbe pipeline designed to carry Ibe eat cm had noi yet been built. To meet development roqtiremeoU In theegwn.aiilometers ol hard-iurface roadt should have been builthe auigncd contractor'! capacity, however, wat barelyilometer* In Tyumenhole, minimum estimate* uf required power tine construction8 were ai least Iwice ibe capacity of the to-crlme construction trust Tbe railway from Tyumen city loSartat andk. tbc'Bccatte'icyc,-waiammed thai one ban after another probibiU tiaim carry ng urgently needed freight from heading toward Tyumen Vitally needed drilling rigs have been lilting foi fac montha somewbefc in Svcrdtovak Oblasi The article summed up:

There will be oil in ihe long tun. theie is no dooN ol this. Bui ihe catruant with which il is no* bong attracted cipcoally at new fields, rerginsreakdown, it baldly (salifiableown. unborrowed, toted caper-

irKi 'J'tctoptoe::.

So wby do we sun over each time, forget una that reliable and 'ailbful >ey> lo Ihe mineral rychct of Tyumen have beet found



US gas reserves less those in Alaska. The decision to move ahead rapidly on Urcngoy entailed an increase in the tempo of drilling and field preparation, aiming at production ofillion cubic meters per year inis. development to almost the level achieved at Medvczh'ycix-year period.inglearge-diameter pipeline was to be laid between the Vyngapur field south of Urengoy and Chelyabinsk, and gas from Vyngapur was to reach Chelyabinsk in the third quarterhis has in fact been accomplished. (The normal time allowed for construction ofipeline is said to be three9 the connecting link from Urcngoy to Vyngapur is to be added, completing the first line of the Urengoy-Chclyabinsk trunk system, which will subsequently be extended to the Volga region. In theine connecting Urengoy with Nadym was to be builtllowing some Urengoy gas to be immediately transported west throughtheNorthern Lights and Urcngoy-Centcr systems. I

The suddenness of the decision, and perhapsover its adoption, was suggested by the way it was made public. At the7 meeting of the Supreme Soviet, Baybakov failed even to mention Urcngoy. but by8 it was being called one of the "largest construction sites of the five-yearhe first public glimpse ofthe decision appears to have been offered by Shcherbina, who stated in an interview at the end of

The Urengoy gas deposit hasain construction site, which in its scale much exceeds the famous Samotlor. The schedule is extremely tight. Never before has the task been set of buildingingleipelineillimetersUrengoy toChclyabinsk.|

In his letter of congratulations in early January to Nadymgazprom, the branch of the Tyumen Gasresponsible for Medvezh'ye and Urengoy. Brezhnev provided what appears to be the most authoritative public reference so far lo the Urengoy decision by observing eliptically at the end of his greetings:

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The Central Committee of the CPSU notes with satisfaction that you are constantly striving to multiply results achieved and already in the next few years intend to solve one of the most importantmaster the unique Urengoy gas deposit.

A decision of the magnitude involved here would have to be madeevel not much below the Politburo. By presenting the Urengoy accelerationatter of local initiative. Brezhnev was deliberately skirting the question of authorization of this move. In contrast, the Tyumen obkom first secretary, Bogomyakov, soon after identified Brezhnev himself as the source of initiative, alluding to "tbe mission set by comrade L. I. Brezhnev to master in an accelerated fashion the unique Urcngoy

Other evidence confirms the abruptness of the policy shift on Urengoy. Completion of the Surgut-Urengoy railway was pushed aheadatherThis schedule will probably not behe head of the Urengoy Gas Construction Administration stated in9 that "literally in several months the tempos of construction grew five times."planners in Tyumen were taken off guard. There also appeared to be more than the usual degreeisorganization in implementation of the decision. I

The immediate reason for the sudden concentration on Urengoy is indicated by the crash construction of the Urengoy-Chclyabinsk pipeline: namely, an energy shortage in the Urals heavy industrial region. Despite years of talk, the "Southway" route had never been developed. As Pravda observed, this wasompletely new outlet direction for Soviet gas. The trunklinc will link ihe Tyumen North with the industrial Urals by the shortestnd Izvesiiya circumspectly noted that there were "growing demands for rTyumengasJ in the industry of the southern Urals."H

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t* 11



longer term Urengoy development plans arc unclear to the outside observer, and probably have been unclear to the Soviets themselves. Even after7 there appears to have beenindecision about when and where pipelines would be built. Although there had earlier been talkeneral way of multiple pipelines along the Urengoy-Chelyabinsk route, only inas it announcedecision had been taken toecond L'rengov-Chclyabinsk line by the fourth Quarter8hird line before the endfter that, there was no clear policy:

There exist other proposals regardingfor the transport of Urengoy gas. The Ministry of Gas, the Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, and other interested organisations must quicklytheir study of this problem so as lo layrecise work program for (he long-rangeof gas pipelines |

Repeated statements have been made indicating that no comprehensive program exists for ihe present crash development of Urengoy. The same source just quoted observes that "scientists and planners are no* studying ihe questionharp increase in the sue of Urengoy" (emphasispeech delivered in May. the chief of Glavtyumengeorogiya,e important problem of framingbased programs both for the regionhole and for the individual most important objects of the complex. Urengoy. in particular, begs forighly critical description of what is now going on in Urengoy also published in May revealed that relentless pressure from above for immediate output8 was compelling administrators on tbe site against their better judgment to repeat all the worsi mistakes committed in the development of Medvezh'ye.

But here ihey are. havingew and enormous job, forced to put it in the old rut. Already this year there must be the first billions of cubic meters of Urengoyneither roads, nor normal housing, nor an industrial base: everthing slipshod, all superfast, as if there were no time lo calculate, to reflect and, finally, to infuse development with all the laws of theend of the seventies of the twentieth century. |

Not only is there no program for the immediate future, there also appears to be no agreed policy for the longer term. Serious reservations were evidently entertained in7 about tbe cisorrnous costs of gasin north Tyumen. Tbe chief of the Tyumen Gas Administration, Allunin, has indicated that thiscould be found in "planning organs, ministries, andlthough Minister of Gas Orudzhevitual declaration in8 lhat the Ministry of Gas "wholly and fully approved the decisions of the] Plenum of the Central Committee and has accepted them for unswervingnd also acknowledged the key future role of Tyumen gas, he probably did so to indicate public accepunceolicy with which he had privately disagreed. In7 he had


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adoptionpecial conservation law that would have cut back on the rate of gas development; in8 Ik spoke privately of the possibility of Soviet gas production peaking in; and in June he restated in Pravda his familiar argument on the need to save gas.

Meanwhile, old advocates ofthe Big Gas strategy were once again presenting their case. The situation, of course, had changed. Urengoy development8 was in no *a> equivalent to the "Big System" considered ineriod: the capacity of (he Urengoy-Chclyabinsk line was onlyillion cubic meters per year,illion. Nevertheless, as additional lines arc added there couldonvergence in practice with what had earlier been

The most comprehensive statement of the Big Gas argument appeared early8 in an interview given by Shcberbina. Sbcherbina admitted that the costs of north Tyumen gas development were huge, butthat thete was no other choice

Inh Five-Year Plan the entire growth of oil andercent of the growth of gas of the country will come from West Siberia. This situation, as is evident, will not change in the foreseeable future. Now it is already perfectly clear that in the longer term many hundreds of billions of cubic meters of gas can be extracted per year. Reserves will permit organiring extractionong period with sufficient reliability. (Emphasis

Shchcrbina maintained lhat in the immediate present there was no alternative to building large-diameter trunklincs, each capable of carryingillion cubic meters per year: "We urgently need them There's no other way withouthe time factor was important here.ear or two was needed toillimeter diameter pipeline sufficient toillion kilowatts of generating capacity, or "more than the total capacity of all the hydroelectric stations now opening on the Enisci and the Angara."


5 Yn IV)

However, the extraction of gas would increase so rapidly in the next few years that preicni large-diameter pipes would no longer be able to cope with the task. To meet the demand for Tyumen gas:

It will be necessary to build two or three dozen super longlines. Their construction will demand many tens of millions of tons of steel and colossal simultaneous capital expenditures. This is unreal. Il is necessary to seek another path for solving the transport problem

According to Shchcrbina. the key wax "unorthodox ideas, the capacity to think originally, to fantasize, and to organize the embodiment of these ideas and fantasies in concrete actions.'

The way out of the dilemma, Shchcrbinanvolved two parallel courses of action. The first was adoption of the idea the "Tyumentsy" had proposed back: building huge gas-fired power plants to generate electricity, which could then bebeyond Tyumen by high-voltagehis system of power stations,00 megawatts (equivalent tooratsk hydroelectricould start with tbe Surgut and Tobolsk power stationshird stationegawatts that should be built in the region of Scrgino. The power plants would burn natural gas and associated gas that was now being flared. The second course of action was to shift inear future" to transportation of chilled gas through the "practically indcstructable" Paton multiwallcd pipes, which would more than double the carrying capacityarge-diameter pipeline. Thisstep would be followed by transportation of liquefied gas.ery complex business" that would nevertheless permit sixfold increase in pipeline capacity.f

"InSheherbina'i words:

be TyumenUybegin-u'ng const ruction in Ibe norui of Ibermal electric siaboos based on local natural gasoiil capacityJO million litownThe idea, ncucal to many.rejected on ibe bawl of ccoaoeuc calcslatioca Ihc cum of UK CbMfK station and high-railage linn htgter than dialoc obyoet.cmi. let tu uatr directly,chiilaitic churjcicc. However, the draftnot





In addition. Shcherbina stronglyhange In policy thai woulduch more rapidof refineries and the pcirochemica) industry in West Siberia, conslruciion of product pipelines lo the European USSR, and expansionariety of energy-intensive, bulk-output chemical industries. "To bee observed, "all of this demands the solutionroad range ofeconomic and social, and the efforts of many ministries and depa rtments- Naturally,ittle time will be spent on this. But nevertheless we have to deal with thesehcherbina obviously saw himself as the leader capable of implementing this vast scheme. i

8 some or all ofdeasbeen put forward by other authorities, mostlong-identified with the Big Gas position.of Gosplan's SOPS and Bogomyakovfor the construction of massive

acceTeraTccigasaeveToi^ iccause ot limited oil reserves and has dwelt on the need to introduce chilled gas transmission, perhaps within five years. Bogomyakov's subordinate in the Tyumen obkom. Shmal'. has echoed the earlier Big Gas visionroduction level in Tyumenillion cubic meters per year. According to Shmar. Urengoy will take the torch from Samotlor and become the rrnin source of energy supply in the. These arc all, of course, simply personal opinions. But ihe very fact that they are being expressed demonstrates the open horizon of energy policy. Especially relevant here is the power plant proposal, which has major negative implications for investment in Kansk-Achinsk coal development. g]

Combined Resources

Combined Resources positions have continued lobe aired sinceut without great vigor. The difficulties of meeting current production and development targets in both coal and nuclear power may have dampened enthusiasm; and the climate is less receptive to longer term stralegies of dealing with the energy problem than it washe case for


Kansk-Achinsk docs continue to be expressed. As noted above, Yatrov, the director of Gosplan's Institute for Complex Fuel-Energy Problems, stressed Kansk-Achinsk in his defense of the Combined Resources line at theend ofnd Kosygin lent his support to the project in mayor speeches in May andThere have also been articles in the press on Karrsk-Achir.sk. However, actual development of Kansk-Achinsk, in particular work on the Berezovo field, is progressing very slowly, and Minister of Coal Bratchcnko has not indicated any expectationudden improvement in the siiuniion.l

8 there continues to be major uncertainly about how Kansk-Achinsk coal will ultimately be used The need for Kansk-Achinsk energy in Siberia alone appears to becientist wrote in8 issue of Sotsialislichcskaya industriya.

Calculations have shown that the rate ofof Siberia is such lhat it is necessary every two years to put into operationower engineering giant as the KrasnoyarskStation. And it will be necessary to do this every year during the next five-year plan! But it is clear thai it is impossible to put into operation [thisydroelectric station of Ihe size of Krasnoyarsk. The only way out is to burn Kansk-Achinsk coal, which is most accessible and economically very profitable.

To help meet this demand, construction wasbegin8 on the first energy block ofin tbe Kansk-Achinsk region. This firstthermal power station, withegawatts, will be the largest ofin the world. However, severe residuefrom the combustion of Kansk-Achir.sk coalstation boilers have still not been solved,suitable boilers yet been produced, whichthe use of the coal even for1rs






Furthermore, as noted above, construction of-V DC long-distance powcrlineto transmit electrical energy from Kansk-Achinsk to the Center depends upon prior successful experience withOO-kV DC Ekibasluz-Cemer line. Construction of that line was scheduled to beginhhough this starting date may not have been met. According to tbe head of the construction administration building the line, tbe work will be done in four sections the first will be completednd the last three7 At this rate it is highly unlikely that construciion of theenter line could get under way duringh Five-Yearven if ihe technical problems proved soluble. It is probable that the Icadlimcs on slurry transport, pyrolyajsorcoaniqiic fact ion arc at least as long longer. I

The openendedness of coal policy was indicated most graphically, perhaps,58 Pravda article. The article questioned the accepted wisdom that Kuzbass coal was mainly for coking purposes and that it could not compete in cost terms with Kansk-Achinsk coaloiler fuel. While Kansk-Achinsk coal was certainly cheaper when burned at power plants in Siberia and converted into electrical energy, thererowing shortage of hard fuel as well as electrical power in the European USSR. To meet this need, two-thirds of Kuzbass coal could be used for noncokingpecial railway could be built from the Kuzbass through the southern Urals lo the Volga region to carry this coal.lurry pipeline could be built. Kansk-Achinsk coal would then be used strictlyuel for thermal power stations, both in the Kuzbass and central Siberia, providing the basis for an expanded development in these' regions of energy-intensive industry. In contrast to the views of some top energy policy advisers such as Kirillin or Melnikov, who probably had considerable influence on the line approved byh Party Congress and expressed inh Five-Year Plan, Kansk-Achinsk was assigned no role at allirect supplier of fuel or electrical energy to the European USSR. The point, again, as in the case of the gas-fired power station proposal, is thatundamental issue could hardly be raised if thereirm official position on where energy production policy was going.



V. Prospects

The change of direction on energy policy that occurred at the7 Plenum of the Centraland the subsequent campaign to accelerate oil development in Tyumen signal the extreme difficulty the Soviets are having inalanced response to long-term energy development needs and short-term demands for petroleum.6 there hasefinite foreshortening of Ihe energy horizon. At the moment, the Soviets are fighting to maintain West Siberian oil output by increasing drilling and recovery efforts at Samotlor and other older Tyumen deposits, and to raise the level of output by opening up smaller Tyumen fields.

At the outset of the current five-year plan the leadership apparently opted to develop fewer small fields in Tyumen and to compensate for this by more intensive exploitation of Samotlor, despite the greater field damage and steeper ultimate dropoff inthis would entail. Clearly, the leadership already6 felt compelled to sacrifice the longer run goalelative stabilization of Samotlor production, either in order to buy time or simply to get the oil without having to pay increased costs associated with more rapid small field development. Soviet officials made the decision with full knowledge that no new giant oilfield to replace Samotlor had beenless developed. The consequences of this short-run approach to Tyumen oil production were intensified by failure7 to develop even the planned number of new fields. Payment for this trade-off will come due inh Five-Year, when greater investment will have to be made both In developing more new fields than might otherwise have been necessary, and in providing gas lift and other recovery equipment for Samotlor.Hj

Meanwhile, the inability of the Soviet leadership over the past decade toechnological breakthrough in even one type of east-west energyon seriously jeopardizes any possibility of large-scale substitution of gas or coal for oil in. |

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The race against time now under way to develop and transport Urengoy gai by conventional pipelines will probably notarge impact on the overall fuel-energy balance, although it may significantly affect ibe local energy balance in the Urals. Whetherrganizations will be able to solve tbe problems Of chilled or liquefied gas transportation in time to have an effect in tbe coming decade is highlyIt may well be that the Soviets have already delayed too long for gas lo play the role it otherwise might have in bridging the gap between the present ind the anticipated era of abundant nuclear energy.

Similar conclusions arc in order with respect to Kansk-Achinsk coal. Delays in mine construction, in solving the high-voltage DC transmission problem, ineither slurry or capsule pipelines, in implementing any one of the coal processing techniques, and in producing power-generating equipment adapted to Kansk-Achinsk coal nowossible "coalwell off intoX**.

These delays are probably now being seriouslyby the Tyumen oil campaign.^

lexecssive funds are Dcingor the West Siberian oilfields, the oil industry is draining manpower needed for gasfield and pipeline dcs'clopmcnl, and the fixation on oil productionetting back peak gas production in Tyumen until the mid- ornstead of early in the decade. Although this comn4nini reflects the views and interests of the Tyumen gas administration, its substance may well be

Despite the grave problem that confronts the Soviets in energy production, there has beenecade of policy vacillation and indecision.aith that the share of oil and gas in the energy balance would continue to rise Soviet authorities moved in tbeo the hopeig leap in gas production alone might prove to be Ihe answer,roadly based strategy keyed to oil and gas in the present, coal in the middle term, and nuclear power in the longer term was approved as the party line; and byolicy had shifted toampaign lhat put the main emphasis on development of oil and gas production over the next decade. However. Ihe adoption of the most recent line has not stilled the




expression of conflicting opinions. It is highly likely that some top officials, including Premier Kosygin and Gosplan Chairman Baybakov, wouldolicy formula lhat provided more scope for coal and nuclear power. And other authorities,yumenare clearly attempting to have an even greater role assigned to natural gas. |

Given this fluidity in the party line, it is not surprising that there has never existed what could properly beomprehensive and operative energy program. To beere arc various studies andthere arc many RAD projects, and there are compilations of one-year and five-year plan targets, which may partly be influenced by an imageistant desired energy balance. Such images unquestionably do exist in the minds of top Soviet economic policymakers and energy advisers. But the evidence strongly indicates thai the process of energy production decisionmaking has not been seriously influenced by any carefully elaborated and stable master scheme. Instead, the system is driven bj immediate supply needs and input constrainuj

Typically, there seems toycle in which studies and recomrnendaiionsolicy shift; the policy shift generates efforts to formulaic an integrated program: but this program formulation is quickly overtaken by changing demands thai evoke counterrecommendationswitch once again in the policy line. The absence of an operative master energy program is matched by the absence of opera-live, long-term, integrated programs for key energy production sectors. Repeated complaints by local authorities suggest there have been no such programs for oil development in Tyumen, for development of Urengoy gas. or for developm ml ofNor has there been an effective program for offshore oil. although creation of the new Main Administration for Exploration and Devclopmenl of Offshore Oil and Gas Fields in8 may have improved matters here. When we ponder what "the Soviets" intend to do five orears from now in some area of energy production, we may overestimate both the extent to which an intention has firmly crystallized and the extent to which an inteniion^venifforrnulaicd, affects currenl


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The effective absence of program-determined decisionmaking is to someroduct of the inherentlyprobably stilldegree of uncertainty characteristic of the energy sector compared with other branches of the economy. Information about reserves is subject to change and is imprecise at best. Long leadtimeseature of development in all energy branches.'And the cost, time framework, and feasibility of technological innovation in such areas as deep drilling, offshore exploration and extraction, gas transportation, coal treatment, and high-voltage electrical transmission arc openended.

Equally important, though, has been the impossibility of isolating the energy sector, despite its high priority, from all the general problems that afflict the Soviet economy. In the absenceerious economic reform, the inevitable disjunction between goals and "success indicators" produces the same short-term perspective, anti-innovative bias, and irrational behavior in energy found elsewhere in the economy. Thisactor thai should not be underestimated. Development in Ihe energy sector is also immediately linked with success or failure in many other key sectors of the economy, including metallurgy, machine building, chemicals, construction, and transportation, where persistent bottlenecks have likewise arisen from systemicof the economy. In other words, the complex linkages between the energy and other sectors of the economy significantly reduce the capacity of the leadership to achieve any rapid improvementroad from in energy through the application of traditional techniques of political mobilization

The absence of effective programsirecttoo. of the complexity of the issues involved and the division of opinion among specialists as to how they should be solved. Top policymakers are especially dependent on the advice of specialists in the energy field; it is an area in which few of them have had experience and in which intuition or common sense cannot take one very far. Yet, as wc have seen, the specialists, guided by personal aims and vested insr.itu-lional interests, tender conflicting advice.


Corifsde ntial

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At the juncture between policymakers and advisers there appears to be no single point at which conflicting advice is analyzed and firm choices made: theof the Council of Ministers, Gosplan, and the Secretariat are each involved. This pattern reflects the division of labor and balance of power at the top of the Soviet system. Divided opinions among both the leadership and energy authorities, combined with the fragmented structure of power and preferenceonsensual style of decisionmaking, have usually encouraged compromise policy outcomes determined by the lowest commonthe December Plenum7 docsapacity lo effect sudden shifts in policy if the situation is deemed sufficiently grave. On the whole, despite increasing anxiety over Ihe energy problem since the, the system in which policymakers operate has dampened andecisive response to the problem, while stimulating the dc facto pursuit of short-term aims. |

ignificant increase in the share ofgoing to energy production and relatedthe economy (for example,t is difficult tothe Soviets can do much to remedy thenow confronts them. In this respect, they haveof maneuver today than they had in theThey must make an increasinglyof resources to oil production inthey must have the oil; without theadditional investment to the energy sector asprogress towardas- orto the energy problem will be retarded;in developing these alternatives will generatepressure to maintain the existing proportion ofthe energythe day ofmust comeewil regiondiscovered. Brezhnev's speech atlenum of the Central Committeeenergy-related investment may indeed be givenpriority during the remaining years offive-year plan. Because the physicalof energy production fall heavily uponindustrial, construction, and transportationpressures may mount to makenot only in the buffer sectors ofand light industry, but in

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ihe Soviets struggle with this problem, grudgingly increasing Ihe share of investment in energy, they are likely to try to revive what we have called the Big Gas strategy. Provided the extent of gas reserves is anything like officialuanlum leap in the use of Tyumen natural gas would be the onlyeally rapid increase in fuel produclion could be brought about This approach, however, would place an acute strain on the steel industry and gas and oil machine building, foreign supply of credits, large-diameter pipes, and compressors might well prove to be even more critical at that juncture than at present. J

The Combined Resources strategy propounded by Kosygin and Baybakov at the outset of the current five-year plan, with its stress on nuclear power, coal, and hydroelectricity. "is presented in almost so many words as the Soviet "Projectbe retreat from this strategy inidstream in the plan period, may have compromised the objective of avoiding external structuralin energy matters. By playing down the policy commitment to coal and nuclear power, perhaps lo avoid cuts in mililary or agricultural spending,has implicitly increased the already urgent Soviet needroad range of Western onshore and offshore oil and gasecision lo shift in the directionig Gas strategy, as noted above, might well accentuate this potential technological dependence. |

More important, any slackening in the expansion of coal production and nuclear generating capacity that might ariseyproduct of ihe current strategy threatens to leave tbe Soviet Union in tbend inith an extremely tight energy situation, iferious energy deficit It is apparently this forbidding prospecteficit, not the question of dependence on Western technology acquisition, that has most disturbed Kosygin If the present strategy continues to be pursued, and development of coal and nuclear power is not accelerated. Soviet energywill hinge even more lhan now on either the chance factor of major new oil discoveries,ig leap in gas production and transportation; without one or the other, faster exploitation of current oil reserves will simply hasten an energy crisis of drastic proportions, with all the attendant problems for Soviet foreign policy J


It would not be unreasonable lo suppose thai Ihe Soviel leadership might search for an organizational solution lo its energy production dilemmas; this hasypical response to analogous problems in the past. As we have seen, it appears that neither the Politburo nor the Secretariat has to date provided the kind of supervision and day-to-day control over energyof which it is capable. Wc might expect to sec the formationolitburo-level committee responsible for monitoring energy problems, which would bnng together an upper stratum composed of Politburo members (for example, the General Secretary, the senior secretary for economic affairs, and theof the Council of Ministers)ower stratum composed of key administraiors (perhaps the Central Committee secretary responsible for heavy industry, the deputy chairman of Ihc Council of Ministers for energy, the deputy chairman for fuel-energy affairs, ihe deputy chairman for science, and the chairman ofonceivablyrouping might come togetherommittee or subcommittee ofandate extending beyond energyore visible change lhat might be anticipated would be the appointmententral Committee secretary responsible solely for energy affairs. H

Neither change would significanlly alter the present situation. There would still be the same conflicting claims of the different energy branches and the same hard choice between ihe claims of energy and other sectors of theere would still be divided opinion on which course to follow. And there would stilliffusion of power and responsibility at the top. Although the appointment of an energy secretary would swing initiative toward the Secretariat, il would not produce an "energy tsar" unless Ihe jurisdiction ofost was extended to all the sectors of the economy that support energy Such an innovation wouldadical restructuring of the entire present system of top-level economic administration, and probably could be pushed thwughonlyueader even stronger than Brezhnev |


The coming leadership succession is unlikely loan individual forward, al leastumberA succession period probably will permitreconsideration of the present policy thanpossible if Brezhnev were still around, becausestrong public association withhift in the line during thebe discounted, especially ifharp change ofinitiated in agriculture, industrialparty management soon after Khrushchev'sbefore the power struggle had beenan earlier policy has clearly failed, there isparalysisuccession setting. Agas production, for example, might wellthere will probably not be aa particular solution to the energyproblem. The likelihood is that successionwill simply reinforce the presentcompromise policy solutions anditat*

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tenia live Strategies for Dealing With the Energy Problem


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Hydrocarbon Alternative Strategy

One answer to the energyanswer currently into maintain the policy pursued sincef priority development ofsimply accelerate the output of oil and gas. This solution, in effect, callsoncentration ofrcsourccs on Tyumen Oblast where most of the presently explored large reserves of oil and gas are located, although it also points to an intensification ofand gas exploration and development farther east in Siberia. As an element of this strategy, it Is urged that Tyumen be developedruly integrated "territorial productionith the optimal balance of complementary industry and adequate provision of infrastructure wherever necessary in this enormous swampy, permafrost-ridden region. There should be maximum exploitation of all of Tyumen's hydrocarbon resourcesarge-scale buildup in Tyumen of the refining, petrochemical, andindustries. |

Proponents and Opponents

Most of the main proponents of this strategy, not surprisingly, arc people who haveersonal role in developing Tyumen Oblast, which is not to say. of course, that all people who have been active in this region support the strategy. Boris Shcherbina,of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprisess the most prominent visible Tyumen booster. As party first secretary in Tyumen during the transformation of West Siberia into the Soviet Union's most important oil- and gas-producing region in the second half ofnd, Shcherbina lobbied vigorouslyroad pattern of Tyumen development, and he has continued to do so in his present job. He has been joined by bis protege and successor as obkom first secretary, Gennadiyative West Siberian, andounger client, the present obkom second secretary

and former Tyumen Komsomol official. Gennadiyhe most outspoken champion of the Tyumen cause is still another client of Shcherbina: the hot-tempered Azerbaidzhani. who discovered many of the big deposits in Tyumen and who is at present head of the Tyumen Geological Administration, Farmanapj

Apart from the Tyumen grouping, the most vocal supporter of Tyumen and East Siberian oil and gas development has been Academician Andrcy Trofimuk, director of the Institute of Geology and Geophysics of the Siberian Division of the Academy of Sciences and member of the Presidium of the all-union Academy of Sciences, Other Tyumen supporters have included the chairman of Gosplan's Council for the Sludy of Production Forces, Nikolay Nckrasov, and Russian nationalist circles associated with ihe literary journal Oktyabr" Almost certainly the Hydrocarbonrepresented by Tyumen development has also found some support over the years in the Central Committee apparatus, although we have no evidence precisely where. The most likely candidates are Dolgikh and perhaps Kirilenko. although Brezhnev himself may well have had some interest in the matter before espousing the cause in' pj

Two points should be noted about the supporters of the Hydrocarbon alternative. First, with the exception of members of the Secretariat, whose backing prior to7 isatter of conjecture, the pro-Tyumen forces have been mostly provincial in their geographical base and limited to the exertion of influence rather than operational command inTyumen development. Secondly, like theof other alternatives, their position has to no small

Footnotes appear at tbe end of tbu append!*


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tended to be directly related to immediate personal interests. For example. Shcherbina'sambition to become the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers responsible for fuel-energy affairs turns in part uponecord for himself in construction work and pipeline-laying in Tyumen; Bogomyakov and Shmal'irect stake in getting more investment and resources for their oblast: Salmanov's sense of personal identity is clearly linked to further oil and gas discoveries in Tyumen; androfessional standing rests on proving that Siberia does indeed have the oil and gas resources he has long claimed it has. These personal career interests should not be confused with regional loyalty, although an element of this too is certainly;

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Opponents of the West Siberian Hydrocarbonhave always been harder to identify thanbut there is no doubt they have existed. The main source of resistanceoot-and-branchof resources to Tyumen appears to have been Gosplan Chairman Baybakov and elements within Gosplan who have taken their cue fromaybakov is well aware that Tyumen is critical for Soviet energy development; he has probably spent more time thinking about this than any other top Soviet leader and has actively sought ways to harness Tyumen resources. The issue for him has almost certainly been one ofatter of balancing Tyumen investment against other claims on resources. Basically, Baybakov has been concerned about the staggering costs of Tyumen energy development and transportation because it is he who has had to find the funds to meet Tyumen's needs and who has had to take much of the heat for cutting back other programs.


CoavngMetl miurul nit nun rtnmd



ells theec mora

Baybakovounsel on energy produclion policy is probably carefully heeded within lop leadership circles. He is said to be on good terms with at least Kosygin. Mazurov (nownd Dolgikh, and to have played an instrumental role in aiding Brezhnev's rise to power. He also has close working relationships with the Academy of Sciences and the Statefor Science and Technology, including strong influence with Mcl'nikov. atooperative tie with Slyrikovich and Aleksandrov,ollaborative relationship with Paton. Having personally worked in and headed the Soviel oil industry for many years, and then having dealt with the details of all energy production branches as Chairman of Gosplan. Baybakov can legitimately claim great familiarity with energy policy issues He is also one of tbe few individuals who tells the Politburo-hat the tradeoffs are in investment

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Premier Kosygin's attitude toward the Hydrocarbon alternative has probably also been one of reserve. What evidence there is suggests that his main concerns have been toubstitution of coal or gas for oil. stimulate nuclear power, hold down hard currency imports (he has specifically complained about the cost of largc-diameter pipe) and in general raise efficiency and lower costs in energy production. He has not been "against" Wcsl Siberia; rather, he appears to have been interested in moving in newdireciions in order to reduce the dependence on oil. |


The late Minister of Oil Valentin Shashin. who diedas probably another doubter ofthe Tyumen-based Hydrocarbon solution to Ihe energy problem. Shashin's position appears lo have been that oilrecious nonrenewable resource that should beas much as possible for future generations and that this circumstance ought to be reflected in the energy balance, the pricing of oil. and export policy. Back9 Shashin staledress conference that Soviet oil exports would not increase significantly due to domestic requirements, and he reiterated this standhashin's preferred go-slow oil policy was probably sincere, but it also reflected the interest of Shashin and his ministry in having realistic production targetsegion that presented themost of extremely difficult nroble

Disagreement in principle with ihc Hydrocarbon solution has probably been expressed mosi forcefully in scientific circles that question the reserve base of Westtopic treated below. Otherregions whose interests may be affected by the allocation of investment funds and scarce resources to Tyumen have constantly tried lo defend themselves by arguing how high the returns are on investment in their particular region, although they rarely complain about Tyumen in public. There are also ministries whose capacity to fulfill plant and meet obligations elsewhere in the country are endangered by tbe voracious requirements of Tyumen, and who arc thus probably not enthusiastic about overly ambitious plans for the region (for example, in ihe fields of electric power, construction, and transportation)J




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Tyumen may be the "discovery of thes the Soviet slogan claims, but its development hasenormous problems and gives riseumber of fundamental issues. The most crucial issue at present is how much oil is left in the region. This isew issue; at every stage of Tyumen's development there have been skeptics who have Questioned the size of the region's oil resources, and this is equally true today.'|

Since the consolidation of the giant oil-producing region on the Middle Ob in the second half of, the key issue has become whether the rapid rate of increase in oil output achievedan bethis depends on how much oil can be extracted from new small deposits alreadywhether there will be future discoveries of huge new oilfields of the magnitude of Samotlor. Those who haveery bullish stance on this questionumber of years include Minister ofof Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises Shcherbina; Tyumen Erst secretary. Bogomyakov; Tyumen chief geologist, Salmanov; Academician Trofimuk:umber of other party officials and geologists. Some foresaw Tyumen oil productionillionear. Their argument has been that giant deposits can and unquestionably will be found at deeper levels in the Middle Ob region already being exploited,the huge gas deposits of northern Tyumen, as well as still farther north on the Yamal Peninsula and beneath tbe Kara Sea (seehe faith that oil will be found in these areas is based partly upon controversial geological theories and partly upon discoveries in northern Tyumen of what some say are traces of oil. but others say are simply findings of gas condensate.1'

6 the debate over whether large reserves of oil exist in Tyumen sharpened, as belated decisions had to be made onh Five-Year.olemical article published by Pravda onalmanovsserted thatcalculations showed that "there arein this region for the reliable and mighty

development of the oil and gasEmphasis added) However:

"Pessimists" have appeared whose thoughts amount to the proposition that the Tyumen geologists have already discovered everything that could be discovered. Such judgments arefalse. To adopt this point of view means to disorient the planning organs. With allI must observe that the Tyumen geologists are firmly convinced of the reliability of the evaluation of resources of oil and gas in our region.

According to Salmanov. oil was to be found on the Yamal Peninsula, in the Pur-Taz region (which includesnd in the western and central areas of the Middleonth earlier Salmanovand the geologist Ncstcrov had complained that skepticism over Tyumen oil reserves was sufficiently great that "proposals have already appeared to provide as fuel for the Tobolsk petrochemical combine (one of the larger industrial projects of the five-year plan) not [assoct-atcdj gas from the Middle Ob deposits, but coal from the Kansk-Achinskrs

Later6 tbe Tyumen party first secretary, Bogomyakov, critically commented that because the oil resources had not actually been pinned down by detailed geological exploration:

Right away there appear many skeptics,semidoubters. and absurd figuresour calculations, the calculations ofthe needs of the country andof the region itself convincinglythat one must not "shut off theof the Tyumen complexrthai0 we willillion tons, but1 (just) bytons. What all this means is that itto fully expand geological work sohigh growth can be provided inrs



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argument was echoed in similar pro-nounccmcnls lhat appeared67 in ihe press and technicaln an article written Tor the literary, the director of the West Siberian Oil Geology Institute, Nestcrov. clearly suggested continuity between the old dispute over the presence of oil In Tyumen and the new dispute over the possibility of further giant discoveries.

I visited Urengoy, of the main northern gjslields where oil is Supposedly to be found, received conflicting information on the presence of oil there but did discover that thisopic of some sensitivity among its Soviet hosts.*

Once again, the skeptics have not been clearlyHowever, the available evidenceather broad spectrum of officials. It seems fairly certain that doubters have been found amidst the ranks ofhey are found among scientists outside of Tyumen. They alsocan be found within the Ministry of Geology, both in Moscow and in the field inccording to Bogomyakov. Erv'e. the chief of Glavtyumengeologia (the Tyumen Geologicalfor many years and now USSR Deputy Minister of Geology, has had his moments ofhich is suggested too by the cautious way Erv'e hastreated the north Tyumen oil issue.'1 And, finally, doublets exist within the Ministry of Oil. It is clear from the lale Minister of Oil Shashin's speeches lhat he. for one. ihoughl that Tyumen's oil reserves would soon have to be augmented by equally large discoveriesin East Siberia. Shashin'sNikolay Mal'tsev. has given no strong public indication that he thinks the solution to the Soviet oil problem lies in Tyumen. One of the oldest specialists in the Ministry. A. P. Krylov. is said lo have been opposed to gamblingajor increase in Tyumen output. Shashin's views may well have been influenced by the outlook of his man in charge of Glavtyumenneftegaz (Main Tyumen Oiliktor Muravlcnko.|

apable and well-informedwho diedadtate of extreme pessimism about oil output prospects in Tyumen" Already3 he had indicated his alarm over the failure to discover large new deposits in Tyumen, lo explore the northern area of Ihe Middle Ob, and especially to look ahead and prepare "dozens"

,V, ,onX rs IU) of smaller fields for exploitation in the next five-year plan period. In an article that appeared between the December publication of the draft version ot Basic Directions of ihe Economy of the USSR for ihe YearsPolitburo's strategy for the lOlh Five-Ycarits confirmation ath Party Congress inuravlenko sel out the scale of work that would have to be performed to fulfill the planhole set of conditions that would have to be melil waswas to be any hope of plan fulfillmc

luravlcnkoathave simply exhausicuaNour futurethe Ninth Five-Yearhehad put tremendous pressure onOil Administration to increase outputlarge and accessible deposits at Samotlor,Ust'-Balyk. leading to production beyondand rapid water encroachment. BJ

jkaid tbat these deposits bad peaTedano were on ihe decline Pointing toa map thatarge0) of small undeveloped deposits. Muravlenko told his audience that the only path left was to start to develop these small fields and to increase the use of enhanced recovery techniques in the already depleted fields. The key smaller deposit mentioned by Muravlenko was Russkoye, located far to the north of theilometers from Urcnguy, with estimated reserves ofillion metriche majority of specialists in Tyumen believed6 that the oblast's main reserves had been exhausted and that there was little hope of increasing production.11


The question arises: how couldituationhich there was so much uncertainty about'?5Yrs prospects of West Siberia have come about? The (CI answer is complicated, but reveals much about the management of Soviet oil resources. It turns partly upon information about production and reserves, and partly upon the allocation of resources amongoil-producing regions. BJ



Copirlgmed material hat been rtmiied

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A possibility that should not be ignored is that production and reserve figures may be significantly falsified, or at least may be so subject to manipulation lhat they could badly mislead lop policymakers.

ibltshcd Soviet statistics on crude oil production were in fact highly misleading.

administrations and the Ministry of Oil had broad latitude in tailoring production reports tosuit their own needs or those of higher authorities. I


loutpul was probably in the rangeillion tons, notillion tons reported in the

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Obfuscation was said lo be especiall; establishment of reserve figures, in this connection, that ofight be approximatelyough estimate, and C, was oftenonvenient fiction. The basic point about reserve figures (for oil or gas) was that they were negotiated outcomesrocess of bargaining among the Ministries of Oil or Gas, Ibe Ministry of Geology, and Gosplan, which reflected the material interests and political weight of each and might haveangentialconnccimn with what was really under theyf/jBaaBBuVtlic unreliability of JWtewKcTve figures also arose from the technical methods of estimation. The inadequacies of Ihesc methods have often been criticized in the Soviet specialist literature, and such writings leave little doubt that dejiberate distortion of reserves is entirely possible. |

More fundamental still in explaining the uncertainty surrounding West Siberian prospects is the absence of sufficient data tending either to prove or to disprove the hypothesis that new giant oil deposits arc located in Tyumen, or indeed in other prospective regions farther east in Siberia. The lack of hard evidence pinpointing reserves hasource of deep anxiety among production officials since the.t the latest, some specialists were convinced that the Middle Ob fields of Tyumen would not suffice to meet Soviet oil needs"3 Minister of Geology Sidorenko. who was shunted into theof Sciencesointed out with alarm tbe impact of current and anticipated rates of oilon oil reserves, and proclaimed. "Wc need (read, do not have) general programs to prepare for the exploration of large prospectiveNorth and Polar Urals. Kareliya. the Kyzylkums. thePlatform,|

ig meeting on geological prospecting In Tyumen held in3 and attended by Party Secretary Dolgikh. Gosplan Deputy Chairman Lalayants, Minister of Oil Shashin, RSFSR Minister of Geology Rovnin. and Academicians Styrikovich and Trofimuk. the then obkom first secretary. Shchcrbina. criticized ihe geologists for their "weak tempos of work


< onfMential


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new, highly prospeclive regions in the north of theew month later Shashin declared:

The present high level of oil extractionof the achieved levels ofbe provided for by discoveries ofperiod. Tbe discovery of new depositsexisting oil extracting regions, even ofones, can only compensate for the declinein old deposits, support thelevel of extraction and in the bestertain insubstantial growih.there arises now as never before thethe of the need to discover newoil-bearing provinces equal toand West Siberia. East Siberia,Depression, and the shelves of oceans, which have enormous potential1lcl>lB*?5 S for ihe growth of reserves, may beBut at the present lime wc are alarmed by

fact that the Ministry of Geology of the USSR

is drilling an iruufficieni volume of exploratory *ells in new prospeclive provinces."

eeting was called by the Ministry of Geology in4 specifically to discuss the urgent need toew oil base in liast Sibcria."|


The level of concern has not receded in Ihe more recent period. Deputy Minister of Oil N. S. Yerofcycv. made the timetable more specificIn order toeliable base for the further development of the oil industry it is necessary already inh Five-Year Plan [that is,o discover and begin toew petroleum province equal to the Urals-Volga or Westetuge all-union geological meeting held in Tashkent int which it was ackrtowledged that "further high tempo* of development of the extraction of od and gas in the countryonsiderable extent depend upon the discos cry of new large deposits of oil andt became apparent that the relevant institutes had not yet even begun tocientific rationale for the most optimal directions of geological exploratory work" in East Siberia, north Tyumen, thepart of the European USSR, the Caspian

Depression, ornd8 article Academician Trofimuk was moved to inform his audience lhat the West Siberian oilreserve situation should not be considered

One reason thai to-called predicted reserves have not become proven reserves in Tyumen is thai geological prospecting in the region stagnated8uring the Ninth Fivc-Year. Glavtyumengeologiya fulfilled its plan for deep prospecting-explc-ralory drilling by onlyercent, and overfulfilled its plan for growth of reserves of "oil and condensate" by progressively less each year. (The plan indicators, by tumping oil and condensatemay well have concealed undcrfulfillment of the target for growth of oil reserves3his lag caught up with the geologists6hen the plan for growth of reserves in Tyumen was not met sssssssVBBl

There are technical reasons for Urn lag. Geologists have been bard put to prepare sufficient areas for test drilling. Soviet geophysical mclhods have beenfor finding potential oil-bearing strata at the deeper depths at which geologists such as Salmanov. Trofimuk. and Nesterov say they ore to be found. Seismic equipment has not been up lo world standards, and major limitations have been imposed bytn Soviet computer hardware and software. Serious problems have also been associated with ibe dcepdrilling needed to explore for oil and gas: industry has not produced the transportable rigs, drill bits, drilling pipe, and other high-grade equipment needed by geologists. Transportation under Tyumen con di-tions has been another enormous bottleneck |


Almost as important as these technical factorsthe sort of exploration deemed to behowever, hat been the impact of the incentive system for rewarding geologists. The "indicator" problems of linking work performed and final results, which are common to any sphere of Soviet economic activity, arc here compounded by the difficulty of determining al the completionlan period the effectiveness of an activity tbe true worth of which can only be known after the passage of time*hastrong material incentive to tolerate the locaiional pattern of exploration that has tended to emerge from these success indicators

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becauseuccess has been measured by Ihelocal results for ihe oblasthole, rather than by an indicator sensitiveeographical pattern of drilling that wouldong-term growth in proven reserves |

A still more important factor behind the tag ineither equipmeni deficiencies or incentivebeen the constant pressure from Moscow forhigher immediate oil production.9 through ato aof all Tyumen geologicalthose of tbe Ministry of Geologyof the Ministry ofthe Middle Obthe counterproductive incentive problem,toystematic progressiongeophysical studies of broad regions,establishmentund of promising sites forto adequate proving of reserves is rooted inof the Soviet economic system. Theabove for immediate output was reflected,in the allocation to ihe Middle Obthe Ninth Five-Year Plan ofut ofexploration groups, in the facteep exploratory drilling was done in the Middlein the fact that northern oil explorationwere rnocepoorlyequipped than those

A bureaucratic power stuggle in this instancewhat wasesult of planners'The fundamental interest of the Ministry of Oil. represented by Glavlyumenneftcgaz. has been and still is to produce slightly more oil each year than called for by the plan. It has not been significantly rewarded for increasing the stock of oil reserves Thus, it has been motivated to shift rigs and crews from exploration to production drilling. Because it isar weightier actor than the Ministry of Geology, it has also apparently managed to get more lhan its share of drilling rigs and equipment out of Gospian.ai (he expense of Glavtyumengeologiya. When the Ministry of Oil has argued that its piece of the pic musi be larger or the critical yearly oil output plan would not be fulfilled. Gosplan has had that much more reason to Irsten .BalllM





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Finally, and most important, geological exploration in Tyumen has been significantly retarded by thechoice of Sovietey ankle published in Pravdaoa7 revealed that:

The Ministry of Geology and Gosplan, beginningade yearly reductions in budgetary andallocations to Glavtyumengeologiya.

Specialized geological exploration drilling trusts had been liquidated in the Ob region and the Yamal Peninsula

In the past decade, oil extraction had grownimes over, whereas exploratory' drilling had "remained at the old level."

3 the RSFSR Ministry of Geology hadpecial decision forbidding any further search for gas in Tyumen Oblast. "considering lhat the already explored reserves were sufficient for many years."

The reequipoing of geologjca^xptoratory parties had de facto been stoppcdM

According to Salmanov. currently chief of Glavtyumengeologiya, the absolute level of capital construction planned for his administration6 was lower than the levelalmanov and other Tyumen-leaning geologists have repeuledlyof gross discrimination against Tyumen in resource allocation. In their view, much too heavy an investment of resources is being made where the potential payoff is far less than it would be inin the Utah-VolgaTheir resentful attitude toward Gosplan is hardly con-cealcd

As we have already seen. Gosplan has been inclined to trcal skeptically claims of potential new supergiant fields wailing to be discovered in Tyumen Oblast. But ii has been accusedjustly ofunrealistically high expectations concerning the capacity of Tyumen's proven reserves and of those Tyumen fields already in production, especially Sa mot lor.ard-hitting article written during the period in which fundamental decisions were being made on the five-year plan, by A. Muran.

l>ll<7SYrs III)

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one of Pravda's two outspoken West SiberianGosplan was accused of failing to look ahead to what would happen after Sa mot lor peaked "in twoomplacency over Tyumen's produclion capacity, premature exhaustion of Sa mot lor through virtually criminally high oulpul targets, and. inignorance ofthe needapid, comprehensive, and integral development ofthe smaller deposits in the MiddleOvcrconfidence" and self-deception may partly explain Gosplan's attitude, but probably more stress should be placedarried weighing of cost factors within the Presidium of the Council of Ministers as well as Gosplan. which has affected not only allocations for geological exploration andin Tyumen, but the general allocation ofbetween West Siberia and the older oil-producing regions. |


It should be apparent that despite the high priority assigned lo West Siberian oil and gas development. Tyumen did not get everything it warned or needed during the. Undersatisfaction of Tyumen demands was. indeed, one of the principles of the Ninth Five-Year Plan. Al tbe1 Supreme Soviet session (hat approved the Ninth Frvc-Ycar Plan Kosygin declared, "Along with further development of exploration work in the easterngeologists must strengthen the search for oil, coal, gas, and other useful minerals in the European pari of thend the plan itself stated. "In the Ninth Five-Year Plan geological prospecting work will be considerably strengthened overall for the country, and especially on the territory ofthe European part of the

A gencrnj restraini on resource allocations lo Tyumen seems to have appeared imperative to Moscow because of the extremely high costs of Tyumen infrastructure development, the serious problems involved inTyumen oil and gas lo consumers in tbe European USSR, and the compciing claims of various large projects incorporated in the plan. One of the complaints of West Siberians has been that planners view the development ofthe region as just one among other big projects such as the Kama River

rs (III


CoDyTiDhlcd material Has been remircd.

Plant. BAM. and Atommash. rather thanualitatively greater magnitudeAs the five-year plan progressed,allocations appear to have become caughtthe overall slowdown of the economy andto this by the Soviet leadership. AtCommittee Plenums in2 and

rs , Brezhnev laid down the line thatbe one of the major goals of Soviet economic

activity, and this dictum tended to translate itselfositive reconsideration of the benefits of investment in the older. European USSR oil-producing regions.

There has alwayseed toalance between the needs of the old regions and the needs of Tyumen. Although these regions have now ceased toignificant contribution to the growih of Soviet oil output, they were still contributing overercent of total production5 and arc plunned to contribute overercentt has obviously been critical for the Soviet leadership torecipitous decline in the older fields, so the question has been one of precisely where to draw the line between allocations to the old as against new fields.

Great attractions of the older fields from Moscow's standpoint have been the existing capital stock,refinery capacity, and available pool of skilled labor, not to mention proximity to consumers. But an equally great temptation to invest more in the older fields has been the prospect of extracting lificantlymorc oil from alreadyields.

r$ (II)

From at0 onward it appears that there have been major disagreements among Soviet specialists Over what percentage of oil is actually being recovered from oilfields. Some officials, like the late Minister of Oil Shashin. have claimed extraordinarily highrates -partly because they may in fact have been convinced of the efficiency of Soviet water-flooding techniques, and to no small extent because they must have perceived the potentiality of the "low recovery" argument to divert resources to the older producing regions. Ath Party Congress1 the Tatar obkom first secretary, Fikryat Tabeev.ig pitch for intensification and for raising recovery rales, and Kosygin hinted at his own position on this issue by



calling for higher recovery in the European oilfields. The Ninih Five-Year Plan itselfong endorsement of enhanced recovery, with the main stress placed on continued water-flooding and the use of steam and hot water. This theme was then stressed by some Gosplan and Oil Ministry officials (for example, chief of Gosplan'* Petroleuiti and OilDepartment. Galonskn. and then Deputy Minister of Oilut not by others (includingrobst of Gosplan'* SOPS or Minister of Oil Shashin himself)!

Soon after tbelenum of tbe Central Committee, at which Brezhnev appears to have roundly criticized the Ministry of Oil. the Central Committee's Ekonomichefhaya.ong article entitled "Task of Economic Importance: How lo Improve Utilization of Geological Reserves ofigned by "Doctor of Technical Sciences. N. K.n his role of oil expert. Gosplan Chairman Baybakovetailed rationaleajor program of enhancedritical factor. Baybakov noted with alarm, was the rising percentage of oil output going simply tofor decline in the older fields:ercent in tbe Seventh Five-Year Plan, andercent in the Ninth Five-Year Plan "In preliminary longer termbe warned, "the proportion of new wells needed to compensate for declining extraction will rise to still greaterroduction just for compensation was becomingeighty factorihatis burdening the economy ofthe branch "I

The seriousness of the situation arose in part from low rates of oil recovery. Despite the historical virtues of the Soviet water-flooding techniqueolitically charged issue attacked only behind closedenormous" quantities of oil were left in wells that had been shut down, or would be left in wells still being produced. The moral was clear:

The national economic significance of raising the recovery' of oil is supported by tbe large economy of capital investments, material and laborIf. for example, one sets the task of extracting additionally at deposits being worked in the prospectivehrough raising the recovery rate one billion tons, or


approximatelyillion tons per yearhen ihe economy from realizing this measure could be evaluated as many hundreds of millions of rubles of capitaleduction of material and labort is necessary to keep in mind that increasing recovery byercent will produceountrywide scale many tens of millions of tons per year ofoil at already created capacities with insignificant capital expenditures and production costs, which is equivalent to the discovery and development of notmall number of large oil deposits I

This recovery effort, which Baybakov indicatedapproval, was to be pushed especially hardEuropean USSR (including Azerbaidzhanhere there were "difficultiessupplying the economy with fuel" thatcostly imports from West Siberia: "Alreadyprevent time it is necessary to transportregions of the country anof oil and gas, whichreat quantity of pipe,for construction of oil and gas trunkand compressor stations, and also largeThe great economies Baybakovwere to come from the introduction of aof artificial lift techniques (submersiblegas lift) and new enhanced recoverychemical additives, thermal methods,mining. Speaking with an authority thathisaybakov ended byMinis(ryjreparing a


Baybakov's article was not the last word on recovery, although in dueong-term recovery program was adopted. Differences of opinion over the issue continued to surface, some directly stimulated by Baybakov's foray.eneral way. the argument tended to pit Gosplan, some officials in the Ministry of Oil (including the present Oil Minister.nd regional officials who stood to benefit from the stress oo recovery (especially from the Urals-Volga area and the Caucasus) against Ministry of Oil officials who probably thought that "recovery" was an evasion ofthe hard investment decisions needed in the forthcoming





Oth Five-Yearome Academy of Sciencesnd production officials who knew that enhanced recovery efforts worked against their own financial and career interests under the existing set of successhe argument that enhanced recovery best reflected the party line on the need for greater "efficiency- was countered by the argument that "efficiency" did not mean counterproductive slashes in budgetary and material allocationsyumen,theintegrated tjevelopment of the oblast which minimized the waste trial resulted from piecemeal development and constant half measures. But lines of disagreement were blurred by the rapid co-option of "recovery" by Tyumen production leaders, who saw large gas-lift projects as nnc of the possible paths out of the dead end into which (hey wereBj

The "recovery" debate was partore general controversy over whether economically rational(that b. "rational" in tiurabranch terms) should govern allocations of funds, resources, and manpower to tbe older fields, or whether the proper policy should be to maintain the achieved production level in older regions at any price with infill drilling, develcfirnent of small unproductive fields, and enhanced recovery. As in other areas of controversy focused upon in the Hydrocarbon solution to the Soviet energy problem, there was to be no clear resolution of the recovery issue in the period up to|

ong-term multibranch recovery program was formally approved,arallel research program in the Academy of Sciences. Implementation of this program was placed higher than theof new oilfields on the formal list of priorities for the oil industry inh Five-Yearpproved byh Party Congress inowever, the program hat been undercut by major delays in implementation, arising partly oat of the disincentives for production personnel to bother wiih tertiary recovery, and partly out of the absence of necessary materials and equipment.

Baybakov'* original interest in enhanced recovery was almost certainly stimulated by US experience (or talk) in this field, and acquisition of foreign technology.



materials, and equipment was implicit all along in the program. Yet cranking up the foreign trade component has laken more time, perhaps, than BaybakovIt is now over four years since Ihe Soviets began to talk seriously about recovery, but purchases have been intermittent and the major West Siberian gas-lift contract was not signed until Ihe fall1

Meanwhile, the record strongly suggestson the broader issue of Tyumen devclopmenl.,

was generally ac-it was not economical to develop the small fields in Tyumen. This judgment was soon overtaken by afailure toiant new oilfield in Tyumen. Erosion of the reserve base was magnified by water encroachment at Samotlor and other large fields in the Middle Ob. Soon after final approval ofh Five-Year Plan inecision was taken to accelerate the discovery of reserves in West Siberia, whichrash program of geological activityhis campaign was marked by the usual lack of coordination between the Ministry of Geology and Ministry of Oil. and did not resolve the uncertainty over Tyumen oil resources or offer any immediate alternative other than further development in ihe Middle Ol

Thus, during the struggle over the five-year plan5tark choke confronted (he policymakers:ajor commitment ofbe made lo commissioningelatively large number of small new fields in outlying areas of the Middle Ob, with very large infrastructure costs, or should investment in the small deposits be restrained, Samotlor and other large Middle Ob fields pushed beyond their planned capacities, and maximum efforts made to keep up production in the Urals-Volgaecond choke, at least in the eyes of Tyumen supporters, wasecision would be taken to broaden the whole economic profile of tbe oblastore rapid development of the refining, petiocbernical and chemical industries, and (as discussed below) the construction of large gas-fired thermal power plants to supply ihe Urals and European USSR |

ei iiiii


Tyumen advocates pressed hard an these points5ut did notnh Flvc-Year Plan the Soviet leadership tried toualitative leap in the already huge investments being poured into Tyumen.notedthe leadership emphasized recovery and maximum oil extraction from the depleted European USSR fields. It talked about developing the small fields in Tyumen, but did not allocate the resources that were required, thus putting still more pressure on Samotlor and other producing Middle Ob fields -in direct contradiction to the strongest advice it was receiving Trom Tyumen. In fact, it even assigned "supplementary" oil production targets to Tyumen over and above those already set by tbe plant didajor commiimen: to development of the petrochemical base of West Siberia by including the Tobol'sk and Tomsk projects in the list of key five-year plan construction sites, but this fell far short of creating the type of "territorial production complex" that many thought necessary for optimal exploitation of West Siberian resources. In short,he leadership took the course that promised the greatest immediate payoff, least immediate cost,Icon immediate economic and political risk.


Ihe BigGasAlternatiie


Since thehe average annual rate of growth of natural gas production has been signifcantly greater than lhat of oil or coal. CIAairly steady annual rale of growth ofercent" Despite problems that have occurred inand transportation, gas has certainlyuccess in comparison with (he record of many other branches of the Soviet economy, and its future growth prospects are correspondingly bright. Yet gasmay be examined not only in ihe context of progress or failure to meet one-year and five-year plan targets, but also in the context of the gap between whal these plans have been and what they might have been if there had been the political will to pursue an "unlas-orienicd energy

The argument for an energy strategy that places far more emphasis on natural gas development than is currently the casetrategy we shall refer to as Big Gas) is quiteas is the one energy branch in which the resource base and level of existingcould conceivablyelatively rapid leap in output. According to published Soviet figures, proven and probable gas reserves are enormous:7 the ratio of reserves to productionar higher than the estimated ratio for oil. There is some question as to the firmness of thesesubject discussed below. Butuge gap exists between output and potential output that could in principlease for "solving" the Soviet energy problem in the near-to-middle term. The bulk of the currently known reserves arc found in the north of Tyumen, although new resources have recently been discovered innorth of the Caspian Sea. In Tyumen high-quality gas is found at shallow depthselatively small number of giant fields. Extraction costs, it is argued, are extremely low. Thus the Big Gas strategy requires large-scale development of Medvezh'ye, Urengoy. and other north Tyumen fields, many of them located above the Arctic Circle. ^




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naving tnc ntfl

The keyhe Big Gas strategy has been transporta-lion of the gas by pipeline out of north Tyumen to the Urals, European USSR, and abroad. Il rs part of the Big Gas strategy that gas be useduel for power plants, and some argue that part of the gas should be used to fire thermal liaisons right in Tyumen, with the transmission of energy over long-distance powcrlincstc the Urals and farther west Once the gas has been transported, there mustajor substitution of gas for oil in power generation, more use of iteedstock for chemical production, and some use of ituel for transport. Gas is seenighly versatile clean, and easil) handled fuel that can release oil for deeper refining and more profitable use. Through its export potential, gas also is viewed as havina the capacity to finance its own developmc



and Opponents

The main actors in the debate over gas consistard core of Big Gas supporters, some outright opponents,arger and more ambivalent "floating" group in the middle. Becauseommon outlook and the geographical location of the main gas reserves, there has been much overlap of Big Gas proponents with supporters of the Hydrocarbon solution. There is no question in the minds of bothaximum effort musi be made to raise oil output in Tyumen; the only question is whether, in addition, an extraordinary effort to sharply increase gas production is feasible. Tyumen political leaders such as Bogomyakov and ShmaP, economic administrators such as the chief of Glavtyumcngcologiya. Salmanov. and specialists like V. S. Bulatov of Tyumen NIIGiprogazand Nesterov have been among the most vocal advocates of Big Gas. They have been supported by academician Abel Aganbegyan, director of the Institute of Economics and Organization of Industrial Production of the Siberian Division of the ACademv of Sciences.pj

In Moscow the most vociferous, and probably the most prominent, advocate of Big Gas has been the Minister of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, Boris Shcherbina. Shcherbina long ago went on record as believing that gas development could bringadical shift in the Soviet energy balance, and he has held to this position. Anof Tyumen's gas industry would have enhanced Shcherbina's role when he was first secretary of Tyumen obkomnd it unquestionably


would promote his personal and bureaucratic interests now: it is hit ministry that builds (he pipelines from Tyumen Shcherbina may have been joined by leaders of the USSR Ministry of Geology, who also have probably stood to gain institutionally from anof the gas industry, and by the Ministry of Foreign Trade Other Moscow-based supporters have probably included former Minister of Oil Shashin. who was interested in dampening the rising demand for oil, and Academician Nckrasov. the chairman of Gosplan'sone of these individuals were centrally located in the energy policymaking structure, although Shcherbina and Shashin had good access to the top decisionmaking authorities, and Nckrasov hadoutside Gosplan in tbe Academy of Sciences, the State Committee for Science and Technology, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers,Central Committee apparaim |




The opposition to Big Gas has almost certainly been strongest where at first glance one might least expect in the Ministry of Gas itself.j^pj^pj

pap^pjjformer Minister of Gas Kortunov wasreluctant'to develop the north Tyumen gasfields. When the former deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers for fuel-energy affairs. M. T. Efremov. insisted prior2 on development of these fields, Kortunov is claimed to have said, in effect. "It's easy foe him to sav doit, but it's hard for me to carry it out.'

uccessorhe Azerbaidzhani Sabit Orudzhev. has been Ihe most vocal opponent of the Big Gasver the years he has consistently rejected all major aspects of thb solution to the energy problem. (Hb views are discussedn this respect his attitude toward Tyumen development has been markedly different from that of Shashin and the Ministry of Oil. who wanted to accelerate Tyumen oil production but appear to have thought that this would be insuffkjenttosustain the Hydrocarbon energy strategy. H

The fact that the minbter responsible for gashas vbibly resisted Tyumen andreference for the more temperaie Orenburg zone, where production and pipeline problems arc not as great as in northern Tyumen, can hardly have been an argument in favor of the Big Gas strategy in the eyes of Soviet leaders unversed in energy matters. Orudzhev, lo an even greater degree lhan his opponent Shcherbina. hashoroughly "political" past. Like Baybakov, Orudzhevharter member of the Sialin-gencration politico-economic elite in Azcrbai-dzhan. And it can only have been through long-cultivated connections in the party Central Committee apparatus that Orudzhev recouped his fortunes in thend got himself promoted from Deputy Minister of Oil to Minbter of Gast this juncture he may have received support from ihe Azerbsidzhan first secretary, Aliyev, or the Central Committee CPSU secretary, Kapitonov, but in the final analysis hb promotion must have been approved by Kirilenko or Brezhnev, and probably both.H



The middle group, larger than cither the proponents or opponents of the Big Gas strategy, has swungillingness and even eagerness in theo consider the gas optiononvictionhat it couldshouldimplemented. This was the "majority" opinion Academy of Sciences President Aleksandrov referred to7 that thought that gas was not the solution to the Soviet energyt includes Kosygin and Baybakov for certain, probably Deputy Chairmen Novikov and Dymshits. and perhaps Party Secretary Dolgikh. It also appears to include virtually the entire high-level scientific energy advisory corps of Kirillin. Aleksandrov, Styrikovich, Melent"cv, and Mcl'nikov. As we shall see below, the Academy adviceincere, but it has been far from Jisinter-rMed.


The main issues involved in the discussion of Big Gas

have been gas reserves and production capacity, the

cost of north Tyumen development, gas transportation,

and gas utilization. These issues have interacted with

broader questions of economic policy {for example.

development of the steel industry) and Soviet forcicn

economic relations.

The discovery of enormous gas deposits in north yumen duringed to increasingly bold projections of future output. It is instructive here to note the escalation in Shcherbinastimates of Tyumen's production capacity.6 he asserted that5 Tyumen could produce as much gas as the entire country didhatillion cubic meters5 output in fact turned out to beyumen Oblast party conferencehcherbina claimed that on the basis of known reserves it was now possible toillion, and in the0 billion. Two years later he stated that the present potential wasillion,uture potential of3 he stated to the Presidium of the Siberian Division of the Academy of Sciences that the reserve base would alreadyroduction levelillion. And4 he was asserting that it would presently be possible toillion,ossibility in the very near futurerillion. Shcherbina was not talking abstractly hereheociically desirable ratio of production to reserves, but about targets at which policy should actually


In all probability the annual capacity figures Shcherbina has employed have not been as hard as he has made them appear to be; that is to say, economic policymakers have probably been confrontedroader range of uncertainty at both the high and low ends of estimates. As in the case of oil reserves, the setting of gas reserves and peak production capacityighly politicized activity that engages the basic institutional interests ofthe Ministries of Gas and Geology and the career interests of their leaders. It has been asserted, for example, that when the annual capacity of Mcdvezh'ye was being negotiated, the Ministry of Gas successfully defended its interestow-peak capacity by manipulating an artificialbetween so-called economically exploitable ibalaiuovye) and noneconomically exploitable tzabalantovyel reserves, leadingudicrously low figure that severely damaged the Ministry of

reserves anOTea! production capacity,one of Ihe factors that permits Orudzhev toa possible peaking of Soviet gas production in

aamaaUtammm 1CI

hat been the crux issue involved in ihe Big Gas strategy; the problem over which the Soviel economic leadership and consultative bodies have most agomred. and the one which they have leastresolved. Here, in concentrated form, arcthe problems of remoteness of sources from consumers, Arctic development, resource allocation within the economyhole, technological lag, and involvement with capitalism in the internaiional economy. The details of pipeline construction hive been treatedhat should be stressed here is the inability of Soviet domestic pipe mills and machine-building plants to supply tbe quantity and quality of pipe, compressors, and valves required for the gas industry, and the continual search by the leadership for some alternative to conventional large or supcrlarge diameter pipeline transport.'



If technical metallurgical problems could in- resolved, the two most logical responses to the pipe production problem would be either to increase total steelmaking more available for pipes, or to reallocate existing oulput among end users- Both responses raise what have so far proven to be intractable political issues. Consequently, the Soviets have been compelled to seek relief by purchasing large quantities of pipe abroad, either with scarce hard currency or by mortgaging future output through compensation deals This has not been comfortable for Soviet leaders. In the eyes of some officials the whole conventional, largc-diamctcr pipeline approach to gas transportation is rapidly becoming untenable. As Shcherbina put ilDespite the perfecting of welding and assembly machinery, and increase in pipe diameters andin quality, the possibilities of improving the traditional technology of transporting oil and gas by pipelines will quickly be

Since ihcosygin and Baybakov have lent their support to attempts to find more cost-effective means of transporting natural gas. The three most promising lines of attack have been in reducing the temperature of the gas (thereby increasing the volumeaising the pressure In the pipelines (thereby increasing thend packaging the gas in solid hydrate form in "capsules" (thereby reducing theesearch has been promoted in each of the three areas, but has so far had no impact whatsovever on the actual transport of gas. |

How to build pipelines has been one issue, bul wherethem has been another. Medvezh'yc,the other large gas fields are located roughlynorth of Tyumen City and the Uralsoblasts of Chelyabinsk. Sverdlovsk,The shortest route to the central, north,European regions of the USSR, as well as togas export markets, liesinefrom north Tyumen through theKomi Republic, bypassing Ihe Uralsindustrial centers far to the south.he issue debated has been whether tonorth Tyumen gas out through thistoSouthway" dropping down toTyumen City and then west to the Urals




One cf ilical issue here has been permafrost, which covers significantly more of the path of the Northway than of the Southway.he initial decision went in favor of the Northway. and construction was completed in) of the "Northern Lights" irunkline running from Nadym (Mcdvcrh'yc) lo Ukhta (Komi ASSR) to Torzhokonnection lo Moscow (see the foldout map at the end of thishe design for this line called for special pipes and supports to prevent melting of the permafrost.becauseack of tbe specified materials, then Minister of Gas Kortunov personally ordered that the line be constructed of ordinary pipe simply bid on the ground. With tbe spring thawbe pipes split open and sank into the permafrost,ayor (but unpublicized)esponsibility for the technical side of this fiasco was palmed off on the hapless director of the institute that had designed the pipeline (despite the design's permafrostand Kortunov was put in chargeewly created Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, which made him responsible again for pipeline construction! The political outcome was that those opposed to the "northern strategy" used the episode to prove that major gas (runklincacross the northern permafrost areas was not feasible and to shift the main focus of attention away from Tyumen gas onto the comparatively small but far more accessible Orenburg gasficld This reduction in the priority of development of the north Tyumen fields may well have implied less interest in export of this gas to the hard currency market. It also probably mirrored an intention to save Tyumen gas for more "qualified" consumers, particularly the Urals metallurgical indus-try. rather than to transport it to regions where more of it would be used as boilerhis objective is simply one facetroader controversy over how natural gas should be utilized.

The outright opponents or Big Gas have argued their case largely in termsarticular vision of gas utilization, articulated most consistently by theof Gas.rudzhev has repeatedly stated that natural gas should be considered an extremely valuable nonrenewable resource; that its price should be steeply raised and conservation measures enacted;


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and that il should not be usedoiler fuel, bul used more and more only for industrial purposes. Not surprisingly, Orudzhev has strongly resisted the North Star project to export liquefied natural gas to the capitalist West, although he has been happy enough to receive imported Western equipment for the gas industry. In this context he and others have argued that exporting natural gas to the West is to sell one's patrimony andoran unpatriotic manner. It is reported that he also harbors such sentiments with respect toafjflgsj mine "fraternal" East European sutes.

Orudzhev's personal interests are well served by his principles. Northern gas extraction and pipelinehave been beset with constant difficulties, and these would be multiplied several fold byig Gas strategy. Unlike Shchcrbina. Orudzhev has probably no higher aspiration than hanging on to his job. To protect this interest, he needs aslan as possible, together with as much certainty and control over the situation as can be attained. His manifest concern over gas conservation mirrors the politically unpleasant role he must perform of denying gas io whole oblasts during interruptions inin the wintertime. Despitedifficulties, Orenburg gas suitedeeds toore comfortable alternative to rapid Tyumen development, and it could be justified in ideologically strong termsesponse lo the objective requirements of economic "integration" within the "socialist commonwealth" even though it made little contributionolution to the larger Soviet energy problem. By the same token,"patriotic" stuck on gas deals with the capitalists, however unjustified in terms of tbe size of declared Soviet reserves, the small amounts of gas actually involved, and the need for Western financial support of Soviet energy resource development, has probablyesponsive chord in some circles of the Soviet hierarchy and has enhanced Ihe political risk of urging deeper involvemenl^ithjnd concessions to the West in ihc gas area.I


CDPfTiglried material has been removed

osition on gas utilization has not gone unchallenged. In the second halfhen the current five-year plan objectives were still being firmed up, the Tyumen obkom first secretary, Bogomyakov, explicitly joined issue with Orudzhevharply worded appealig Gas strategy:

I do not agree, for example, with the Minister of Gas S. A. Orudzhev, who is beginning to play down the possibilities of development of the branch, saying that we ought toong-term program lo reduce the utilization of natural gasoiler fuel. If we do not increase the use of gas for this purpose then there will simply be nowhere to employ it. The growth of gascannot be used just by highly qualified consumers. We must shift more and more gashe production of electricalis where the future of the branch development lies, which has colossal possibilities in our (Tyumen] complex.

Here are some data. Among the depositsin the oblast,ave already been prepared for industrial development. If one were to think today about superhigh tempos of development and doing what up to now the country has not beenincrease each year the extraction of Tyumen gas byillion cubicby the end our century,e could raise extractionrillion cubic meters. The undiscovered potential reserves arc estimated to be two-to-three times larger lhan Ihe discovered reserves. One asks oneself, wouldn't wc benot la useavish gift of nature?

Development of the gas industryecvaluation of theucl.l




By "rccvaluation" Bogomyakov meant elevation of electric power generationtatus equal to that of oil and gas extraction in the Tyumen economy, with constructionmegawatt gas-fired Stations for power generation for the European USSR region.emarkably frank put-down of the Big Coal strategy, Bogomyakov continued:

If youas power plantoym not against developing the Kansk-Achinsk coalfields and building electric stations there. The Krasnoyarsk comrades act correctly when they energetically press the solution of these questions. Let them build coal power stations quickly and provide in this fashion not only for today's needs of the region, but also its long-term future. Let them locate near these power stations much energy-in tensive production. But when they iry to convince me that (he KATEK [Kansk-Achinsk Fuel-Energy Complex] power stations are being built in order (hat their electricity even now may be transmitted to the Urals and the European regions of the country, this sounds economically unconvincing to me. An analogous decision based on Tyumen gas would be more profitable.

To return to the starting point of ourould like to repeat: the indeterminacy ofon the future hinders the creationirm development plan for the Tyumen complex. Because of this our tempos even today are lagging."

The fact that Bogomyakov could so openly call into question an important component of the energy balance strategy enunciated several months earlier ath Party Congress docs indeed point to an "indeterminacy ofut ambivalence over Tyumen gas goesong way. pj


As earlyobbyingupreme Soviet sessionig Gas system that would deliver north Tyumen gas to the Center, Northwest, Belorussia, and the Baltic republics, and favorably contrasting this variant with gas supply from Central Asia. Following the party congress in the spring6 he reportedeeting of the Tyumen


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party aktiv that the Council of Ministers had given the go-ahead for design work to beginig Gas system, and inouncil of Ministers resolution actually instructed the Ministry of Geology and Ministry of Gas to workyear plan for developing north Tyumen gas that would raise output5illion cubicecision was takeno build the "Northern Lights" pipeline from Mcdvczh'yc to Moscow, andgot under way. pj

Despite intense lobbying, however, the momentum behind Big Gas development was not sustained. Kosygin's fact-finding trip to Tyumen in8 apparently did not enlist his support for Big Gas, and the critical9 Central Committee and Council of Ministers resolution on Tyumencalled only for acceleration of oilinistry of Gas delegation that visited Tyumen in9 or early0 lowered5 target toillion cubic meters. Although further attempts were made to reassert the importance of north Tyuments subordinate role for the time being in Tyumen development was confirmed by the Ninth Rvc-Year'By theend25 target was said to be onlyillion cubic meters. |

Despite the drift of plan decisions, though, much thought was being given to Tyumen gas. Hopes had initially been fixed on the extraction of gas from Medvezh'ye via the "Northway" route. When the "Northern Lights" pipeline disaster became apparent in the springusttudy was completed that showed the limits to future growth of oilthe Ministry of Gas and several otherwere assignedystem to transport sufficient north Tyumen gas to "solve" the Soviet energy problem to thehe so-called Big System that was proposed featured the deliveryillion cubic meters of gas per year to the Urals regionillion lo the European USSRet ofarallel pipelinesSouthway" route from Urengoy lhat traversed the leasthe preliminary estimates of this proposal presented to Gosplan in September and2 arc said to haveost ofillion rubleseed for



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illion ions of slcel (approximatelyercent of one year's toial USSR steelhasedumber of years, this would not appear to have been an unreasonable proposition Nevertheless, at thisjuncture, confronted by what they undoubtedly perceived as unacccpubly high costs (especially inconomic policymakers recoiled from tbe notion of solving ihe Soviet energy problem at one stroke with the "Big System" and sought alternative solutions]

One possibility was to finance northern gasthrough compensation deals with the West. This idea went back at least toeriod, following the major gas discoveries in Tyumen II was strongly supported by Kosygin's energy adviser I. A. Popyrin.bwas especially interested at that lime in the hard currency earning aspects of such trade. Two large liquefied natural gas projects were proposed in the second half ofused on north Tyumen and Yakutiyo. Initial negotiations with the French "Gaz Ocean" firm in theell through, but interest in the projects heightened with the growth hendeakth President Nixon's trip to Moscow. Hi


24 the Soviet leadershipseriously hoped that the North Star and Yakutiya deals wouldechanism forthe financial resources, pipes, and compressors needed to lay the foundationig Gas strategy. The negotiations over North Star, difficult to begin wilh, were attacked by influential figures within the SovietMinister of Gas Kortunov and hb successor, Orudzhev.eneralto Big Gas, described above, was reinforced in thb instance by his recognition that he would find himself in the untenable situation of having to answer before the Politburo for written complaints from iheconcerning the delays and foulups which would be inevitable on Ihe Soviet side. When passage of the Slevenson Amendment in4 blasted hopes of getting the targe credits needed to finance North Star, evoking Soviet anger and subsequent rejection of the US-USSR Trade Agreement, it became clear to Soviet policy makers that their energy problem was unlikely touick fix from tbe West, but by thb time nearly three more years had passed. The large gas pipe import deals lhat were



consumated wilh the Germans, Japanese, and others since2 summit compensated for inadequate Soviet pipe production but did notig Gas breakthrough jjbbbbbbbj

Meanwhile, following the rejection of the "Biginther domestic alternatives were also beingecree adopted by the Council of Ministers in2 called for additional construction of pipeline and compressor stations on ihe Centralenier system, as well as work on the Orenburg deposits. And at about this time the so-called Big Commission chaired by Academician Styrikovich was created and assigned (be task of exploring all possible solutions to the Soviet energy problem. |

In the gasfieldossible avenue of attack was pursued, as mentioned above,ubeommission of the Big Commission formed to explore ihe possibilities of capsule transportation of natural got in hydratehe key members of thb group were the chairman. Academician Nikolay Chcrskii. chairman of the Yakutsk Division of the Academy of Sciences, and Baybakov's energy adviser, Yuri Bokaerman. This subeommission workedlan to build the "Big System"apsule system using three pipelines insteadccording to Gosplan calculations the capsule system would transport the same volume of gas as the "Bigutost ofill* rubles investmentillion tons of steel. J

The proposed capsule system was strongly opposed by Styrikovich (who later switchedy some other scientists who disagreed with the principle underlying capsule transportation, by the main gas institutehichested interest in designing its own system of long-dbtance gas transportation, and by Orudzhev personally. After gainingacking and that of Central Committee Secretary Dolgikh, as well as Baybakov's strong patronage and assbtance from Popyrin, ihe capsule transportwas formally approved; first by the Big(representing essentially the Academy of(hen by the Collegium of Gosplan, and finally by the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. On4 the Presidium passed an elaborate rcsolu-





lion over Orudzhev's objectionspecial institute to design capsule systems and setting out somerojects to be worked on, including the Urcngoy*Moscow system.|

3ig Gas remained in limbo. No comprehensive gas program was formulated, as Big Gas proponents argued their case and skeptics voiced various objections.osplan Collegium meeting at the end3 devotedserious discussion" of Tyumen prospects. Erv c, the head ofpresented strong arguments in favor of rapid development of Tyumen gas; and, summing up the discussion, Baybakov agreedlan should be energetically drawn up, provided that new solutions to the transport problem were found which reduced the expenditure ofn the middleravda published an article by Shchcrbina that compared gas favorably withnd5 Shchcrbinaa radically new Big Gas approach featuring gas-burning power stations in Tyumen, low-iempera-ture and liquefied transportation of gas, and rapid production ofthe multiwallcd largc-dia meter pipe sponsored by the president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Borisbe RSFSR Minister of Geology L. I. Rovnin, an old Tyumen hand,that while "the main attention now ison the search for oil. and this ishis did noi mean that the search for additional gas reserves in Tyumen should be halted, since "our country in the near future plans sharply to increase the extraction ol gas and in the shortest possible time raise ilrillion cubichere were also elaborate technical arguments defending the low cost of Tyumen gas, particularly in comparison with Kansk-Achinsk


need to focus on the extraction of gasline that had clear anti-Big Gasnd5 Academician Mcl'nikov dwelt on the rising costs of gas extraction and "difficulties" in supplying pipe, while he ignored altogether the possibilitiesharp increase in gashese doubtshift toward theCombirjcd Resources strategybelow. H

he key issue had become whether or notth Five-Yearould force the pace on gas, There was some reason to suppose that it might, not only because of the presence of large gas reserves and the problems being encountered in oil production, but also because one of two potential technical breakthroughs in gascapsulehad by this time come to be seen as sufficiently promising toe ation of the "Big System."!

Bul. as Shcherbina complained, there was alsoin the evaluation of north Tyumen gas, particularly among the core group of Academy of Sciences energy advisers. In an article on optimization ofthe fuel-energy balance, Academician Melent'ev emphasized that it took almost three times as much metal andimes as much pipe to produce an incrementillion tons of standard fuel from gas as from coal; and he also stressed the long leadtime needed to develop West Siberian45 Academician Styrikovich began emphasizing the

However, when the Basic Directions was published in Pravda ont Ihe time of the prc-Congress plenum of the Central Committee, the document containedague reference to the need to "accelerate scientific research and experimental design work in creating fundamentally new lypes of gastraosportalion."



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It is clear thai, once again, the Soviet leadership hadecision on Big Gas development.toarge commitmeni of resources loan untested and nsky newactor, to Ihe extent that revivification of the "Big System" >voi tied to the capsule system. There was also the investment factor in general. Kosygin's report at h Party Congress suggested that he, for one.

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w.is concerned about ihecosi of gas transportation and the drain it imposed on the Soviet metallurgical industry; the thrust of his remarks was thai gas pipeline construct-on should be constrained inth Five-Year Plan. Bu; there may also have been highly personal considerations involved,in revealing light on Soviet energy policymaking.

Paton's problem was that while impressive claims had been made for ihisnother five years or more would be required to master its masswhich time it might have been preempted by ihe capsule system used with standard large-diameter pipe. At this point. Paton. who wasember of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was viewedtrong candidate for the post of president of Ihe Academy. Moreover, as president of

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PwitJrnr. UItalian Aiodamy olScteneet the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Paton's interests could well have beenperceived to have beenBrezhnev's colleagues in theShcherbitskiy and Kirilenko. Baybakov's desire not to cross Paton stemmed above all from hissh to gel his son. Sergey' Baybakov. acceptedember of the USSR Academy of Science* Shchcrbina, the natural defender of Big Gas, who might conceivably haveeconsideration of ihe decision, apparently held back for fear of diminishing his own chances to succeed Dymshits as the deputy chairman responsible for fuel-energy questions. He alsot;kc in good relations with Paton because the latter's welding institute inmostin theintimately involved inthe technology ofwn ministry. This interpret at ion of the retreat on Big Ga*hile not susceptible to proof, is fully compatible with what is known about the postures of Baybakov and Shchcrbina toward Paton, and is certainly notwith either the technological uncertainty or cost factors mentioned above.""

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While Big Gas was thus provisionally laid to rest by Soviet policymakersonsiderable ambiguity remained as to what in general would be done in north Tyumen, and what specifically would happen to Urengoy. The fad that Bogomyakov's attack on Orudzhev and appeal for large-scaleof Tyumen gas was published in6 suggests, as noted above, that there was as much "non-decision" as decision inh Five-Year

Inrudzhev had mentioned the possibility of building three pipelines from Urengoy ineriod, but had cast doubt on the feasibility of this by observing that existing technology could not cope withask. At an unusual joint meeting of the Collcgiums of the Ministry of Construction ofand Gas Industry Enterprises and Ministry of Gas inn "elaborated program" was approved forystem of pipelines along the "Northway" routeengoy-Nadym-Punga-Vuktyl-Torzhok-atsevich- Dolina-Uzhgorod-USSR border. According to Shchcrbina's deputy, Yu. P. Batalin (formerly in charge of pipeline construction inhiswould transport Komi as well as Tyumen"the most important task of the Ministry of Gas and Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterpriset was to be completedinglecarryercent of the USSR's toul growth in gas output. There was no mention of any other line fromnly two disconnected sections of the line, however, were in fact completednd Urengoy itself was not linked to this old "Northern Lights" routen the meantime, the "Northway" strategy of tapping Tyumen gas had given way. once again,Southway" approach. This shift was manifestedudden decision to proceedipeline from Urengoy to the Urals city^ Chelyabinsk, and to build itingle year.j

Although work on the Urengoy field itself was under wayne presumably well-informed official, the director of the Tyumen State Scientific Research and Design Institute of Natural Gas of the Ministry of Gas, laidsouthern variant" of Tyumen gas development in which the Vyngapur. Gubkin. and Komsomol'sk gasficlds would be produced duringh Five-Year Plan in order to feed the Tobolsk




petrochemical combine further south in Tyumen Oblast (as Orudzhev probablyut in which the adual production date of Urengoy was left ambiguous. This official, P. T. Shmyglya. who did mention that the "southern variant"ystem of trunklines from the northern regions of Tyumen Oblast to the Uralsevertheless placed more emphasis in his article upon the near-term cost-effediveness of reconstruciinghe schedule forUrengoy into operation and the pipeline approach to it appears to have been still undecided as late as" Perhaps the first unambiguous public reference to constructionrengoy-Chelyabinsk lineIn" In November there was an authoritative reference to the construdion of four pipelines from Urengoy: Urcngoy-Punga-Stateorthern Lights"rengoy-Chelyabinsk; Urengoy-Kuibyshev; and Urengoy-Punga-Nizhnayarengoy-Center"ut neither of these referencesime framework or suggested any particular sense of urgency; this was to come only after the7 Plenum of the Central Committee, pj^pj^pjj

Tbe Combined Resources and Big Coal Alternatives

At the present lime the operational implications of both the Combined Resources and the Big Coal strategies converge on coal development. Therefore the two are treated together in this appendix under the rubric of Combined Resources. The differencethe two strategies is that while Combined Resources stresses coal and other resources. Big Coal discounts the early availability of substitutes other than coal for hydrocarbons. As Chukhanov, the leading Big Coal proponent, puts Ithinly veiled reference lo the Soviet situation:

mically justifiat

It is not easy toay out of the situation which has come about- Great hopes are placed in many countriesncluding the USA. in atomic electric stations, but as long as there arc noi sufficiently cheap and reliable breederthe provision of atomic electric stations with economically justifiable fuels isomplex




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Combined Resources emphasizes simultaneousacross the entire range of energy resourcesobjective is "optimization" of the elementstbe energy balance, measured in costobjective is qualified by recognition of the needsufficient "reliability" into the energyis to say. the need toroduction strategy

thatow total costigh probability of avoiding disastrous "interruptions" in energyCombined Resources advocates are sensitive to the depletion of nonrenewable hydrocarbons, but at the same lime they are aware of the potential advantages to be reaped from tbe USSR's current relatively advantageous position in the international energy market. They urge that this comparative advantage be deliberately taken inln account in planning Soviet energy production and consumption. |


Among ihe proponents of Combined Resources are some individuals who were at one time enthusiastic about the possibilities of natural gas. This enthusiasm has now waned, and the medium-term answer to the Soviet energy problem is conceded by ihcmie with coal. Specifically, hopes arc pinned on development of the truly enormous reserves of brown coal in the Kansk-Achinsk basin, as well as the much smaller deposits of tubbituminous coal at Ekibastuz in Pavlodar Oblast, Kazakhstan (seehe Kansk-Achinsk coalfields stretchilometers along the Trans-Siberian railway, east and west of Krasnoyarsk in Krasnoyarsk Kray They havehallow overburden and are thus easily strip-mined. However, the low calorific value, high water and ash content, and tendency of Kansk-Achinsk coal to self-ignite when transported without having been processed pose technical problems that give rise to major policy topic discussed below.


If, in ihc ihon ictm. the Combined Resourcesrecognize the una voidability of heavy reliance on oil and gas, and. in the medium term, the need for coal substitution and slow-neutron fission reactors, in the long term they visualize salvation arising from breeder reactors and fusionew Soviets of whatever persuasion would disagree with this general scenario. The point is, however, that in practical terms the Combined Resources strategy implies assigning high priority todayonnected with middle-term and long-term solutions to the energy production problem, and to actually commissioning Kansk-Achinsk capacities. Keeping all the balls in the air at once is the essence of this strategy; and this translates either into increasing the already high total investment in energy production orransfer offrom hydrocarbons to other

Combined Resources advocates, of course,point to the possibility of at least partially finessing this difficult choice through vigorous energy conservation measures and increased efficiency in the extract ion and utilization of fuels drawn from existingerious attempt should be made, they argue, to reduce the cost of east-to-west energy transfer by developing energy-intensive industry more vigorously in Siberia near Ihe sources of coal and hydropower. In the European USSR there shouldore rapid acceleration of nuclear power. Recovery efforts should be intensified in the fossil fuel deposits west of the Urals, and geological prospecting here should also bepecial effort should also be made to perfect magnclohydrodynamic power generation (MHD),itsubstantial increase in Ihc efficiency of thermal electric plants It should be emphasized, of course, that none of the Combined Resourcesarc "against" oil and gas. Many of them have been involved in high-level deliberations over Tyumen development, and all take ii for grantedigorous effort will be made to increase oil and gas production.

proponents and opponents

Perhaps the most important, albeit cautious, proponent of the Combined Resources approach has beens Chairman of ihe Slate Committee for Science and Technology, and the deputy chairman in the Council of Ministers responsible for science policy,

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be has been strategically located both to influence elite Opinion on energy production policy issues and to participate in policymaking Although he himself has no doubt found it prudent to adjust his own positions to accommodate the perceived views of Politburoand influential figures in tbe Central Committee apparatus, officials below him have probably in turn taken cues fromwhen their RAD budgets have been affected by his decisions.

Kirillin is an electric power engineer by training, and his most important personal professional commitment is to the development of MHD generators. He was the driving force behind the establishment of the Academy of Science's Institute of High Temperatures, headed by A. Ye Shcyndlin, which is the leading MHD research organization in ihc Soviet Union. As noted earlier, both Styrikovich and Mclcnl'ev work in this institute, they both are also electric power engineers by profession, they both have been collaborating with Sheyndlin and Kirillin in MHD research. Ihcy both are longtime friends of Kirillin. and they both arc strong supporters also of the Combined ResourcesHDirect beneficiary of Combined Resources:unded as one of the "combined" palliatives for tbe energy problem, and it is now being designed with Kansk-Achinsk coal in mindasic fuel.ituation exists in which three of the top scientific "judges" of alternative energy strategies upon whom the Soviet leadership must to some extent relyersonal vested interest in one of Ihese alternatives.|

The same observation applies to the President of the Academy of Sciences, Aleksandrov. who involves himself directly in long-term energy planning, and (he Academy's first vice president. Vclikhov. who has overall responsibility in tbe Academy for monitoring energy research. Both are nuclear scientists, and both have worked for years in tbe Kurchatov Institute of Atomicas director, and Veli-khov as one of his deputy directors. Thus bothajor slake in one of the other "combined"power, for which Aleksandrov has publicly lobbied with great vigor "PJJJJ

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other top Academy of Sciences adviser on energy policy, Mel'nikov, has an analogous direct professional interest in the Combined Resources energy balance strategy. He has worked since then the coal industry as an engineer, top administrator in tbe Ministry of Coal, and high-level governmenton coal mining. His particular speciality has been stripsubject on which he wrote his doctor's dissertation. Late7 he was appointed director of the Institute of Problems of Complex Mastery of Mineral Resources of the Academy of Sciences, confirming his status as the key figure for strip mining in the Academy. In his policy'influencing role of chairman of the Academy's Commission for the Study of Production Forces and Natural Resources, it would be surprising if he has not urged what promises to be tbe largest strip-mining operation in world history; he has certainly advocated coal and Kansk-Achinsk development in his public statements.

MeFnikov has been linked with two olhci sources of support of Combined Resources outside the Academy of Sciences: the Ministry of Power and Electrification and the Ministry of Coal. The Minister of Power and Electrification. Petr Nenceozhniy.alwayscoal substitution and Kansk-Achinsk development as well as nuclear power. Zinovii Chukhanov, based in the Ministry's leading Krzhizhanovskiy Institute of Power Engineering,notedthe most single-minded advocate of Kansk-Achinsk, with which his rolecientist has become inextricably linked.'1 Theof Coal. Boris Bratchcnko. has also strongly supported Kansk-Achinsk, althoughhas emphasized the technical andobstacles that must be surmounted before its potential can be realized.. Krichko, director of the Ministry of Coal's Institute Fuels, has likewise backed Kansk-Achinsk.

This core of advocates of the Combined Resources strategy has received support from some individuals in Gosplan, including Baybakov and Yatrov, director of tbe All-Union Scientific Research Institute ofFuel-Economic Problems: from Krasnoyarsk party officials, and probably from some figures in the Central Committee apparatus. It would not belo suppose, in particular, that Central Committee Secretary Dolgikh, the former firstofykom, has taken at least some interest in Kansk-Achinsk. And Premier Kosygin has clearly identified himself with major elements of the Combined Resources line over ihe years

Visible opposition to the Combined Resourcesas already noted, has been concenlrated among the most committed advocates of TyumenTyumen party officials like Bogomyakov, and the Minister of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, Shcherbina There have also been specialists in Gosplan and elsewhere who have doubted tbe economic rationality of transmuting

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power lo ihe West, and who have argued that it should be employed solely in energy-intensive industry in Siberia.'1 The articulation of this point of view3 in the party's theoretical journal. Kommunist. strongly suggests that it has some support within the Central CommitteeSo does the effective scuttling ofh Five-Year Plan line at the end

I sum

Many of the arguments in favor of the Combined Resources strategy have already been indicated above. At the most fundamental level, Combined Resources responds to the insistent question: What happens after there is no longer enough oil and gas? In the shorter term, its supporters claim that It promotes the party leadership's oft-proclaimed goal of cost effectiveness. This point has been stated in its most extreme form by Chukhanov. who argues that only in coal do "threshold reserves"reserves of fuel, theprocessing, transportation and use of which without polluting the environment above defined permissible concentrations does not lead to ruin of the country, to regression,essation of growth in real national income But cost effectivenessey gain also said to be achieved from the optimizing models generally favored by Combined Resources advocates. Still another basic advantage of the Combinedapproach, so its proponents claim, is the greater security it provides. On the one hand, it prevents long-term developmental imperatives from being swamped by short-term supply needs; on the other, it produces the most rational course of action in the face of differential probabilities of failure in various areas of energy production.

Finally, the Combined Resources approach is probably presented by its supporters as having definitefor the USSR in the international arena. Styrikovich has stressed the possibility it provides for capitalizing (for example, through gas sales) on the world energyel'nikov. quoting Kosygin's praise ath Party Congress for the Soviet Union's energy independence, has noted the great vulnerability of Western countries to price fluctuations in the worldthe USSR hasombined Resources proponents might also

they have not done so incoal production, thermal power generation, nuclear powerd reelectcontrast to oil or gasareas in which future progress is substantially less dependent on Western technology, materials, or credits, and more suited for participation by the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) and Chukhanov has. by implication,justified Big Coal in terms of the need to maintain strategic oil reserves

But tbe Combined Resources strategy has its problems too- The central dilemma that confronts it is one of funds and time. Can an approachonger range perspective, one that stresses development across all energy sectors and callseavy commitment of resources to. cope with the urgent demands for more oil and gas next year? Is there sufficient slack in the system to sustain the strategy in the face of unanticipated setbacks or declines in oil and gas production?orsening economic climate, can more resources be provided to cover the day-after-

needs and from whom will ihey be


Whatever the final costsombined Resources energy strategy may be, today's costs will be higher Combined Resources call for rapid development of Wesl Siberia and Kansk-Achinsk, plus heavierin nuclear. While aiming at optimization at the margin of all energy sources, this strategy runs the riskiffusion of effort and delay down the line; of simply being swallowed up by the forces of "departmentalism" and bureaucratic inertia, againstmight(he time-honored technique of highly focused "campaigns" has any prospect of success.

Tbe Combined Resources strategy is also confronted with serious technical difficulties. There are problems and choices to be made in both the nuclear and MHDonstruction of the "Atommash" plant, designed for series production of nuclear power plant components, is lagging behind schedule. But most critical for the ultimalc prospects of the Combined Resources strategy have been the intractable dilemmas of Kansk-Achinsk coal. lc)>IB<?SYrs


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Kansk-Achinsk is locaicdilometers from Moscowm from the Urals Industrial region. If the energy from the coal is to be transmitted westcale capable of seriously affecting the Soviet energyassive transportation problem must be solved Further, tbe poor Quality of Kansk-Achinsk coal, like that of Ekibastuz. has created major boiler problems when attempts have been made to burn it in enisling power plants, and consequently its widespread useoiler fuel is contingent upon serious parallel RAD efforts in power plant teebnrjiogy. |

A variety of strategies have been proposed to cope with these difficulties. It has long been evident that processing Kansk-Achinsk coal in some manner before it is used would be desirable,umber of alternatives have been suggested: the conversion of the coal into an enriched and transportable "semicoke" through the pyrolysis technique championed by Chukhanov. drying: gasification; and liquefaction. Whether the coal is or is not processed, there is tbe option of building enormous mine-mouth power plants and then transmitting Kansk-Achinsk energy west as electricity over long-distance, super high-voltage lines,the more remoteunderground superconductive cables. |

The first difficulty with this option, however, isegawatt units for the power plants tbat will run on Kansk-Achinsk coal Morestill is the actual power transmission: in order to make it economically feasible to send power to the Urals and European USSR. Soviet power engineers must successfully design andV DC superhigh-voltagc system, after having first successfullytill-to-be constructedV DC line from Kazakh-sun's Ekibastuz coalfield to tbe European USSR. Alternatively, processed coal could be physically shipped west. The main variants considered here have been constructioneparate railway all the way from Kansk-Achinsk to the European USSR, slurry pipeline, and capsule pipeline.



In contrast with the Hydrocarbon and Big Gas strategics, controversy over Combined Resources has taken place somewhat more within the Academy of Sciences, State Committee for Science andand Gosplan institute arena than amongministries, and its ups and downs have so far had more of an effect on stated policy intentions than upon the actual allocation of resources, althoughtrategy it does immediatley affect not only the scientific establishment but also the basic interests of the Ministry of Coal. Ministry of Power and Electrifi-cation, and Ministry of Power Machine Buildingl

As early. during the formulation of tho

Ninth Five-Year. somebecome convinced lhatpolicy of reliance upon oil and gas inbalance was wrong, andave begun toagroup,

which used the Transport Coinniisssonofthe Academy ofehicle to express its opinion, included Mel nikov. Styrikovich, ihe chairman of the Transport Commission, Academician Gorinov, several of his assistants, the Minister of Coal, Bratchenko. an economist in the Ministry of Coal. Galperin. Chukhanov from the Ministry of Power andKrzhizhanovski) Institute of PowerNckrasov from Gosplan's SOPS,arty official, Pavel Kovanov. This groupHong report that was sennotnerouiouro at the endhe report argued lhat oil and gas should be conserved as valuable chemical rawand not burned as fuel. Instead, Kansk-Achinsk should be developed. When the proposal washowever, it was discovered that the cost in fsajja investment funds and steel was exceedingly high.H

IC>ll<MYrs TCI


Corintu} filial


Accordingly, ihc Politburoecision0 that Kansk-Achinsk development should be put off foroears, that the problem nevertheless should continue to be studied, and that if, in theode of transportation cheaper than those currently available was discovered then the question could be reopened. This decision was perceivedefeat by proponents of change in the energy balance, but they did see the possibility of reversing the decisionechnological breakthrough. The Politburo decision was reflected in the Ninth Five-Year.s notedthe stress on oil and gas in the energy balance, and also failed to mention Kansk-Achinsk, although it did refer to construclionOP-mega watt power station at

This rebuff did not deter advocateshange in Soviet energy policy.elcnt'cv's department in the Academy of Sciences Institute ofajor study on nuclear power, which included an examination of the availability of all forms of energy over the next decade and the nextears. The study recommended conservation of petroleum resources, cessation of further building of hydroelectric stations, and an intensive program of nuclear power station construction These conclusions were brought to Kosygin's

a nijclkansk^AchinsMevcl-tbiguous: I

iccted to extWc^^WiwnTffl^Wr"

Intyrikovich staled that he had recentlyationwide tour ofthe USSR to survey fossil fuel requirements and reserves. The emphasis he placed upon Kansk-Achinsk coal left no doubt as lo what his recommendations had been. The time framework of anticipated Kansk-Achinsk dcvcl-

was left ambiguous:


rs ICI

Soviets expected -yl*"bf Kansk-Achinsk coal in the near future (roughly ihe equivalent of5 Soviet coal output in standard fuel unils) and that ihey expected to produceillion tonsl was clear thai no decision had been reached on how to transmit the energy. The solution preferred by ihc Institute of High Temperatures (namely, by Styrikovich and Melcnt'cv) was said to include conversion of the coal to semicoke using Chukhanov's pyrolysis technique, briqueiling of part of the output for rural heating purposes, and then at least in the initial states oftransportation of this upgraded product. Il was slated




thai ihe European USSR would have to be using some semicoke for electric power generation

These views squared with those expressed in an article published by Styrikovich at aboul this same lime In the article. Styrikovich called for aof Ekibastuz in the period upimultaneous "forcing" of Kansk-Achinsk to prepare it toayor share of the coal production burden thereafter. He expressed serious reservations aboul ihc possibility of-V DC superhigh-voltage transmission technology (or more exotic superconductivitynd pushed insteadrash program of developing the semicoke process, wiih ihc output then being shipped wcsl eitherew "coal supcrrruinliner by "various types of

Styrikovich's recommendation lhat Kansk-Achinsk be developed was probably taken into accountaybako* directive of4 which ordered SOPS and all the relevant Gosplan departments to draft preliminary plans for developing this coal basin overyear. In contrast with Styrikovich's apparent position, the directive spoke only of the use of Kansk-Achinsk coal to generate electrical energyarge energy-intensive industrial complex that would be created in the region of Ihc coal basin itself.'

Throughout the resi4he Combined Resources strategy gained further momentum, with steeply rising world oil prices and Western economic disarray providing an additional strong impetus. At an important General Assembly of the Academy of Sciences devoted io energy questions that was held inop science idminisirators all arguedhange in direction of Soviet energy productionstislav Keldysh, then President of the Academy of Sciences, lent his support io an increase of coal's share in electricity production, and to MHD. breeder reactors, and fusion power. Kirillin. who gave the main report, argued thai while the old stress on oil and gas in the energy balance had been correct in the









f! IUI

there should rumwitch to strip-mined coal as the fuel for base-load power generation. RAD work-V DC power transmission should be speeded up. In the opinionmajority" of specialists. Kirillin staled, brood-scale co>rUruction of breeder reactors could begintyrikovich called for research on coal gasification and. as he put it. "agitated" for heavy investment in studies on pollution control. And Aleksandrovey policy statement on nuclear power development

Inear after the Gosplan directive notedeeting of advisory councils of Kirillin's Slate Committee for Science and Technology and theCouncil on Complex Problems of Electric Power was held, at which the long-range intention of buildingegawatl power stations at Kansk-Achinsk was announced and plans for boiler design discussed. It was stated on this occasion that "the first generating units should be put into operation at the end of the lOlh Five-Year Plan."'" Latertyrikovich noted that the Academy of Sciences* Division of Physical-Technical Problems of Power had "reviewed and formulated recommendations onthe extraction and processing of coal from tbe Kansk-Achinsk coal basin, and creating powerintended to utilize thistyrikovich. Kirillin, Mclnikov. and other speakers alsowitch to coal at an invitation-only "public" mccti! on energy policy lhat was heldp

These expressions of support forajor shift in Soviet energy policy thai was announced ath Parly Congress and later confirmed inh Five-Year Plan. In essence, what we have labeled Ihc Combined Resourceswas officially approved as the party line on energy production in6 (when the party congress was held) and October (when the five-year plan was finally presented).|

Kosygin stated at the pan) congress that it was necessary to prepare lo shift the energy balance away from ot! and gas toward "hydrocleciricity, atomic fuel, and cheaphat Ekibastuz and Kansk-Achinsk coal would begin toignificant role in power generation evenhai intensified nuclear

power station construction in tbe European USSR would be combined with rapid construction of coal-burning power plants in Siberia and transmission of electricity to the West over the Single Electric Power grid; and thatumber" of large thermal power stations in the Urals and Volga regions would be converted from oil to coal. Subsequently this line was articulated by many authorities'*jj

Yei even while ihc new line was being confirmed, doubts were being expressed lhal il would in fact be implemented. Aih Parly Congress, Minister of Coal Bratchenko strongly supported Ekibastuz and Kansk-Achinsk, but observed:

In the CC CPSU's draft forh Congress, developmeni of the Kansk-Achinsk basin is projected. Bul in the calculations of the five-year plan resources have still not been provided for beginning construction of new facilities. We request that, in revising the plan, Gosplan USSR allocate the necessary material and financial resources, bearing in mind lhat ii lakes lOtoears to create enterprises in new. unpopulated regions. Accelerated development of the Kansk-Achinsk basin willundamental influence on the structure of the fuel-energy balance of the country and will greatly reduce the consumption of liquid fuel.

His doubls were Seconded at the party congress by Minister of Power and Electrification Ncporozhniy, who pointed to the absenceong-term development program for Kansk-Achinsk and remarked:

Il is planned to create unique high-voltagetransmission linesV AC andDC for further formation of thePower system of the Soviet Unionof large flows of cheapfrom Siberia to the central regions ofThe world [sic] has not yet solved|




Over (he years precedingh Party Congress, ambitious forecasts had suggested that0 Kansk-Achinsk would be producing atillion ions of coal, and by thepillionet progress has been slow The lack of any sort of comprehensive plan for Kansk-Achinsk developmentomplaint that was voiced not only beforeh Congress, but after aspart from the usual lack of horizontal coordination and the display of narrow ministerial interests, the key reason for the lackrogram has been the inability of policymakers toecision on the basic issue of bow io transport and use Kansk-Achinsk]

5nd probably more recently aseated debate over this issue conducted in tbe Permanent Commission of Gosplan and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR on the Problem of Extraction. Transportation, and Utilization of Coal from the Kansk-Achinsk Basin The commission is chaired by Mel'nikov, but actually run by Academician Gorinovnotedalso chairman of the Academy of Sciences'for Transport Problems. According io the source of (his information, four different transportation variants were pushed within the commission. The Ministry of Electricity proposed building largepower stations in Kansk-Achinsk and then transporting this energy by high-voltage line to the European USSR: the Ministry of Railroads proposedpecial railway lo the Center for coal transportation; Gorinov, Mel'nikov, and otherslurry or capsule pipeline;roup of Leningrad scientists suggested constructionarge coat gasification facility that would send coal-derived liquefied hydrogen and electric poweruperconductive cum hydrogen pipeline to the westolution (hat would probably take decades to imple-

mcnl) pj

Collateral evidence fully supports Ihe contention (hat this broad range of alternatives was being discussednd indeed had been under discussion for someey question has been the technical feasibility and relative cost advantage or disadvantage of supcrbigh-voltage transmission of electrical energy over the long distances from Ekibastuz and Kansk-Achinsk to the Center. The problem here has been, first, to design andC line from


Ekibastuz to tbe Center: second, to buildV AC line, in order to distribute future Kansk-Achinsk power within central Siberia and lo link Kansk-Achinsk with the Kazakhstan power grid,low of Kansk-Achinsk power to the Urals or European USSR; and third, relying on the experience ofV DC line, to design and-V DC line directly from Kansk-Achinsk to the Center. Technically, these are extremely difficult tasks; the world's longest and most powerful DC line currently in oreranpn isV line on the US West

Solving the tc^^lcal problem of superhigh-voltage transmission has been an elusive goal. Backel'nikov declared that Soviet scientists had to solve the problem "within three years" in order lo begin exploiting Kansk-Achinsk coal in the Nimh Five-Year. Five years later. Kosygin endorsed constructionV DCV AC lines during the Ninth Five-Year. Another five years later, the directives forh Five-Year Plan demanded lhat production of the equipment forV DCV AC systems be masteredut set no-V DC line.

Some high-level energy advisers hasx evidentlyincreasingly doubtful that the problem of superhigh-voltage transmission,-V DC transmission, can be solved in (he foreseeable future.or example, Styrikovich asserted that "by the beginning of" IheV DC line" would begin operation.owever, he pessimistically observed that tbe transmission of electricalilometers

demands the creation either of superhigh-voltage DC0hift to fundamentally new methods of transferringenergy (cryogenic-resistance orcables,either the one nor the other task has been solved anywhere in the world even at small-scale experimental installations, and it is difficult to guess the period of time needed and costolution to these problems.

rs IC1

CHfriihtld matinil In bnnrimmrJ

in the long run. when AESs (Atomic Electric Stations) and ATETs (Atomic Heat and Electric Stations) become the foundation of elecric cower for the entire European part of the country, the maw transport of energy resources overreat distance will lose its immediacy "


5 be was barely mentioning the subject.above, his preferred solution to theapparently been the conversion of Kansk-Achinsk

coal into semicoke and its transportation west either by or pipeline

Other top-level advisers hope, on the contrary, thai ihe long-distance, superhlgh-voltagc transmission problem can be solved. Their public statements suggest that Melent'cv. Aleksandrov. and perhaps Kirillin are somewhat more optimistic than Styrikovich on this7 Aleksandrov declared that he was "very pleased to announce" that the technicalpreventing construction ofV DC Ekibastuz-Center line had been overcome, making possible not only the transmission of power from Kazakhstan to the European USSR, bul "in thestage" constructionansk-Achinsk-Center lineelent'ev observed7 that transmission of power from Kansk-Achinsk to ihc Centeruperhigh-voltage DC lineey element in transferring energy from castest in the USSR, and that it could


not be supplanted by railway or pipeline transport or by the construction of nuclear power plants tn the west. Moreover. Melent'ev suggested, ecological factors would in time dictate the location of new thermal and nuclear power plantsistance from consumers, making long-distance DC transmission technology all the more

Constructionpecial railroad, as indicated above, has been considered as an alternative to the transmission of electrical energy from Kansk-Achinsk. References to the railroad option have appearedecade, often expressed by specialists associated with railwayGosplan's Institute for Complex Transporthis variant has been mentioned, along with electrical energy transmission and pipeline transport, bys recently as7 the director of the Leningrad Scientific Research Institute for Direct Current found itto refute Ihe argument, "wouldn't it be more profitable to send the fuel byven in Ihe context of defending the more tractableV line."p

Pipeline transportation of Kansk-Achinsk energy has apparently been pushed especially hard by Shchcrbina, the Minister for Pipeline Construction, by Gosplan Deputy Chairman Lalayants, and by Baybakov's energy adviser in Gosplan's Slate Experts'Bokserman. although it has also been supported by the Slate Committee for Science and Technology. The main argument in its favor has evidently been thai pipeline transportation is far cheaper than eitherelectrical transmission or railway transport. Beforeth Five-Year Plan was adopted, both Shchcrbina and Bokserman publicly supported capsule pipeline transport, and Bokserman claimed thai this mode washird the cost of railway shipment of

Attention has also been paid to slurry pipelineIn7 it was announcedroup of scientists from Donetsk had worked outforlurry pipeline upilometers long from Kansk-Achinsk to the European USSR, which would deliver coal atimes the speed of rail transport and at lower cost. And inosplan Deputy Chairman Lalayants headed a



slurry-pipeline delegation to the United Slates. Lalayants told his American hosts thai the Soviets planned tolurryilometers long,apacity ofillion metric tons per year.ine would presumablyest before thc Kansk-Achinsk -Center line was undertaken.'* Before this pipeline is built, however, an initial experiment will be madeilometer slurry pipeline designed to move coal from the Kuzbassower plant in Novosibirsk. Preliminary calculations are also being mademillion-ton-pcr-ycar Kuzbas* Urals line. I-

Gosplan supported slurry pipelines. Lalayantsorder lo promote conversion by industrial usersto coal. It probably supported the projectit may well have been convinced byof the joint Gosplan and AcademyPermanent Commission onpipeline transport war demonstrably theto move Kansk-Achinsk energy. Butersonal reason as well. GosplanBaybakov's son, Sergey, is deputy director ofresponsible for designing the slurryand Baybakovhe

project to support his son's carccriirnoilwns,personally with Kirillin to seciWWMl


The final approach to Kansk-Achinsk energyis gasification andSthat visited the key Institute of Fossil Fuels in6 found lhat much of the Institute's work was "intellectually far removed from the commercialhat its work on coal gasification wasnd that ihe work on coal liquefaction was "far from readyove onward to the largerore recent analysis observes that the Institute's liquefaction research has now producedynthetic product nearly competitive in cost and octane rating with gasoline derived from naturalut industrial implementation of this technology would not occur before

mmmM II)

lfl liinful nil



rs IU)

ll is apparent thai solutions to the problem of transporting Kansk-Achinsk energy are not imminent. According to Chukhanov, this situation is explainedixation for many years on oil: "Even in the USSR Academy of Sciences forears now all the most important scientific research on solid fuels has been almost completely|

The notion lhat Kansk-Achinsk development would make any significant contribution to the Soviet energy balance0 was evidently discounted almost immediately after the five-year plan wasnoisuch key figures as Minister or Coal Bralchenko, Minister of Power andNeporofhniy. and Baybakov himself.'" The de facto strategy that has emerged5 has been to press ahead on Ekibastuz coal extraction, to assign priority to design and construction ofV DC Ekibastuz-Center transmission line, to develop very gradually the third extraction site in Kansk-Achinsk (the Berezovond to look in the medium runinkup of Kansk-Achinsk wilh the Kazakhstan power grid by meansV ACwouldoundabout transfer of Kansk-Achinsk power at least to the Urals until the Ekibastuz-Center line goes into

Not surprisingly, discussions of Kansk-Achinsk6 exhibit considerable ambivalence. The decision inh Five-Year Plan to go ahead wilh Kansk-Achinsk, even ihough the transportation issueunresolved, has led some authorities to redefine the central function of Kansk-Achinsk by emphasizing its role as the bubast energy-intensive industrial complex to be formed right in Krasnoyarsk Kray. This point of view, which has been publicly articulated by Mazover and Nckrasov of Gosplan's SOPS, implies an extremely bullish attitude toward Siberian industrial development, but by the same token suggests that Kansk-Achinsk coal will not solve ihe critical European USSR fuel deficit in the foreseeableeanwhile,some Gosplanlo emphasize irans-portation west of Kansk-Achinsk energy.1"




In practice, progress has been achieved in Ekibastuz during the present five-year plan, and il is claimed that the technologyV DC transmission has now been mastered and that actual construction of the line is about to begin. Reports from Kansk-Achinsk, however, indicate thatew broad output targets have been set, no comprehensive development program existed at all. evenespite efforts by Ihe Krasnoyarsk obkom to generaterogram and to establish some mechanism for coordinating theof the dozens of agencies involved in developing Kansk-Achinsk, the familiar pathology of ma (coordination at Ihe regional level has persisted. Each ministry goes its own way, guided by its own vested interests, and vital long-term development needs are simplyhere is no evidence that the leadership in Moscow was prepared lo intervene decisively in the period leading up to the7 Plenum of the Central Committee in order to change this situation. |

1 The journal anticipated by several years ihe current attention Brine laiisbed on Tyumen by various other literary publications, and its editorial board has maintained ties with the Tyumen i

1 ll it. perhaps, ja indicator of Central Committee apparatus favor that Pravda and Sotsialiiiiihtikaya iWwi'nyo. party newspapers.xr the years fairly consattntly published more penetrating accounts of what has beea hj^peiiigin'. the government organ. Iimtira Dotgiti. the secretary rcapotoibtc fee etvergy affairs,saitve Siberian and former rust secretary of Krasnoyarsk Ki ato the raw of Ttumca Kiticnho. -teasfirst secretary ol Sverdlovsk ONait "ii Sbcfcerbaoa) neighbor dunrg the taker's fist yrtr ai Ty&mtnr-ay wed -acting order Brezhnevspaased cm Srschcrbiaa's transfer to the Council of Minister!. although such an eicciie of patronage would not necessarily mean support for Shcherbina's policy views Brezhnev dn) refer favorably lo Weal Siberia in4 electoral speech, and praisedrl titiat lion projects at the5 Plenum of the Central Committee5 tbe chairman of the Tyumen Oblast eseculive committee bragged of Brezhnev's support for Tyumeno ft. pi* IIis report toh Paiiy Congress, Biczhnc* referred to the "priority development of energy, and of Ihe cxroction o( wl and gas."sharp contrast tocoal, pj

' Baybako* has handpiekcd many of the officials in Coiplan who arc responsible for energy affairs including Deputy Chairman Laiayinta; the former head of the Pitroieuai and Gas Industry Derurtmeni. OiVmskii. the der^tyhj depa"me.'t. Kieszd. Use regional planner and former PoMBwro menvber Ptrvvkhin: theollman of the Stale Eipcrta' Canmnsiasion. Boisere-an;babty the erectors of the leaiitsie ol Corsptei Transportationoria. and the1-isMotc of Camples Foe*-Energy



rs (II)

rs (CI

Ihendhe prospects for Tyumen were so discounted in some coinersroposal loydroelectric station on ihe Lower Ob that would have flooded vast areas of Tyumenonly narrowly averted, and (he possibility thai ihe project might go throughhaving lobe taken into account by plannershite thbas being foughtcientist from Saratov in the Volga-Ural* oil region was writing memos lo Ihe Central Committee claiming lhat oil could not possibly be found In Tyumen and accusing ihose who disagreed wilh him of "all the mortal sins and anlBlaicookuni Erv'e. now Deputy Minister of Geology of ibe USSR and formerly ihe respected head of Ihe Tyumen Geological Administration, strongly implied thai Baybakov. white chairman of the State Commiiiee for ihe Oil, was skeptical of West Siberian oilhere are also charges that Baybakov had earlier Mocked geological prospecting for oil in Tyumennd liquidated prospecting in northern Tyumen3 during hist Minister ol Oil Tbe cumulative evidence available suggests thai even after major oil Strike* in (he Middle Ob bad theoretically settled ihe mailer.Baybakov'ssincestill skepttcal. if only because of the difficult physical conditions and high cost of citraci ion in Tyumen. But this outlook should be considered in ibe proper perspective:4 the majority of petroleum geologists were probably convinced lhat it would be impossibleind large quantities of oil in Tyumen

'See D. A. Smorudinskov. torn ucvoy..konomieheskoyatrrdneto5bid a.geologisirumtnskil Samoradak. p.ravda5 (the geotogSt I.nd5 (the deputy director of Ihe Tyumen Nllgiprogaz. N. Sbeahukov).

. I, p. 4.

' The Tyumen obkom second secretory. Sbmal', suited in December

"But nevertheless, even today voices still resnnd. asserting thai Industrial deposits ol oil cannot be found. These assertions are made despite scientific prognoses; they do not lake Into considers lion world practice and (he discovery by oor geologists, for example, of the Rtuskoyc, Gubkjnskoyc, and UrengoySovrtskaya roisiya.) RSFSR Minbier of Geology Rovnin alio weighed in with an assertion tbat oil could be foond in northern Tyumen.rofimuk. Salmanov. Nesterov. and several other geologists called for more geological exploration in north Tyumennd were joined by the USSR Deputy Minister of Geology Erv'eechnical article arguing thai there was probably oil in northern and olher parts, of Tyumen 'Giolotiya nejtiitoza

No II) J

'O. F. Andreev of Ihe All-Union Instiiuteof the Gas Industry said ihal no oil had been foond in Urengoy, Ihe chief geologist atidlB IKhii he was "absolutely otruln" there was oil In Urcre^^TTfBtnhc deputy director of the Tjnmen Gas Administra-lion, Salimenkov. spoke of ihe "probability" of oil in Urengoy.


" The firsi secretary of Ihe Yamal-neneu Okrugkom in north

Tyumen, V. N. Tyuria, has declared:

Today ihe main task is the search for Yamal oil. But among those who are embarking on this difficult search [gcotogbtl] there are notew open and hidden opponents who think lhat the Tyumen geotogun* have discovered everything thai un be discovered, and Ihey advise that one should nouastbey assert, yield lo illusions, but in essence do everything to curtail ihe eiptoraiion of new oil deposits. Such judgments disorient otologists. Yet discoveries do not occur by ihcensches. People make them, and il is necessary to work with ihcm.repare iwvcholi'gicily forif count i> need'l""

. L. .] I' |U


" Llltralurnaya taztta.

" "Tbe main thingo find oil alould like to confirm the point of vie* lhat under ibe mightyecond oilTyumtnskii.

" Bogomyakov implicitly accuses Muravlenko and Shashin of having underestimated Ihe capacity erf Tyumen eveno.p



"According to Muravlenko. IS oilfields bad been developed in Tyumen and Tomsk Oblails since (he opening of West Siberian oil production in. Bui In order to meet the lOih Five-Year Flan.ew deposits would have lo be opened6ome ofilometers from established communicn-lion) lines. In order lo accomplish this task, it would be absolutely necessary to guarantee rapid completion of ihe Surgut-Urengoy railway; build new airstrips and helicopter pads, and rapidly cipandTyumen air fleet; sharply Increase the supply of large trucks; reoquip drilling crews wilh new rigs and drill bits designed specifically for Tyumen conditions, and double the production oforder to be able toillion meters per year;arge indigenous building materials industry in Tyumen, and radically improve housing conditions. iSotslatlsitchtskaya

r$ III






SYrs (II

' As one ipccialid wrote:

Beyond Ihc boundsew oil-producing base most be created in Easto the following| ibe oil resource! of Ihe Middle Ob for further exploding the eiiraciionof oil will be iaiufficleni. Mattery of oil resource) of ihe northern region of West Siberia is being moved io the foreground, first of all tbe Nadym-Punk oiln this vast territory, stretching to ihe polar circle sod beyond right to the Northern Areiie Ocean, one musiew fiuni oil-producing base whkh. in its volume of eel eilraelion. will noi be less than lhat of ihe Middle Ob region. In (heew oil region musi be created in Easi Siberia. The pouibi lilies of thS region are evaluated quite highly.eiptarationtn tbe rut spaces of Easi Siberia it being conduced to far ia an extremely limited mannerand wiihout sufficient sckntiAeJoiiifieaiiori. This cannot but affect ihe result*of rbework. Grayfer.o. ^IfiJJJJj]

"Sottlaustlckukayapeciallsi in Sldorenkos ministry wa* to write shortly thereafter thai Wesi Siberia was "here oil exploration should be concern rated, sod thai piospcciiog capacities should now be transferred there from Tatariya, Bashkiriya, aad KuibyshevOblasi. "In ibe near fulureihe need will arise fundamentally io broaden the oil and gas eilraelion base ofthe country, which is impossible without large discoveries equal or dose in scale to lite discoveries in the West Siberian province Such results are espected ai ihe present lime in Ihc most eastern territories of the Soviet Union (until now still weaklyEast Siberia and ibe Far Eau, and also on the shef/of the Arctic and far easternS. P. Makiimov, Rtsuesy IaaproYUniyarobot mi.p

rVoWoi.oot (his same lime Shchcrbina staled:

I have already noted that the resources of Wesi Siberia sre still not fully studied, and here ii is very important not to rodoce ibe tempos of exploration, not to be satisfied with what has been achieved. In order not to have lo spend estra funds on Siberia, we need now /stUtios/ not simply new deposits, but supcrgiani deposits tbe mauery of which will produce the greatest effect) pjJJJJ

" Wtyenoyeo..or more

ce, the sa me theme by Shashin see Sotsiallsikheikaya

"The meeting was based on the assumption lhaiears Ihe flow of Tyumen oil may slow down tome*hat. while ihe demand for liquid fuel will eomianily grow. Therefore, thelaced oa the agenda ofew mineral-raw material base in ihe easi of theathering of ihe Presidium of the Minbtry of Geology, the meeting brought log ether representatives of Ihe produclion minisiriei (includingcientist* (includingnd party and government officials from Yakuiiya. KrasnoyarskSoOialsiUhtskaya /itaWrwa.

Gtolorlya. No.Groloftyantftio.ittraiurnaya gaieia,


" For ctample.3 the "effectnwiets-of gcJotical esplcration for oil was measured by Ihe ratio of tons of reserves discovered lo meters of eiploraiofy drilling, or simply lo Ihe number of csploratory welb drilled. Obviously,yitem does not encourage the risky and slow business of deep drilling or exploration la virgin territory, but on the contrary rewards shallow drilling in known oil-bearing formations. Or. lo take an example already cited above. Ihe indicatorof reserve* of oil and condensate- has rewarded exploration where large deposit* of condensate are already known loexisi and plan* can more easily be fulfilled

" For Salmanov's complaints and bis cry of discrimination in favor of ihc Tatar and Bashkir regions, see rVowfo,bo Sovetskaya eostiya.oisialisUcneskaya3nd Stwikay* rosslya,U)

" Mttrzin developed his attack:

It is well known that inearseach its optimal regime. Other fuel bases being exploited will atto reach Iheir maximum. The question arises: What will follow after Samoilor? Through what measures can one provideoubling of extraction

In cofusectrtn with this let us look at ho* tbey have proceeded in Gosplanarticular in its Depart men! of Peiroleum and Gas Industry (P. Gabiuxii,hen planning the growth of oil enractWR In the countrylmost Ihe entire increaseoHl million torn will be taken from Tyumen. The dcpuiy chief of ihe department. N.ith Hilly undcritandablc pride notedonversation: 'Now we're relating. Thethey're terrific! Some Other oil regions have lei u> down, bul the plan will ttillut rig hi there, however. Nikolay Ivanovich complained about the oil worker* that although they were heroes and terrific, they were cautious: weertain average well output for Samotloe. bul they insisiuch lower figure. Why? Are ibey afraid for the future?

To answer tho rhetorical question. Martin invoked Ihe words of ihe

obkom first secretary, Bogomyakov;

Many fundamental questions of the future development in West Siberia of the two leadingsod gas-remain inefficiently deeply thought through in all their difficult interrelated compieiity. Ia Gosplan they are not thinking soon enough aboul what would happen inthree years il Tyumen were suddenly noi only not able lo cover for other region, bul began lo slow down in own growth. Naturally, we are convinced lhat this will noi happen. However, we say: No. we don'i need leaps io panning, one should not hive to reduce extraction cither at Samotloranother place.Tyumeo is capable of liable, planned expansion. Of.illion ions of fuel. But under one condition: it is necessary now. immediately, to prepare for ihe commii)ioning of new oeootita and to attack ihem juii as confidently, with all the weapons al our disposal, lo prepareear, to begin the development of big operations However, so far neither in Goeplan nor in ihe USSR Miniitry







Oil ii ibereptccise plin foiiem Yei the volume ol work on tho*economical area.ii Incomparably greater than il hai been in ihe Ob reflect up io now One cannoi delay hate in any way

And Murziaconunnca:

Yet. namely In tha consists loday the qualitatively new situation which hai come ibuul in West Siberia The more necessary it it to think through ihaail of time andcenpechertsivi manner bow and by what mean* efforts and remrces toranples prog'tm fora Kbotlitogorik. Var'ng irwh. Agattk. Maasontovt* and other large deensno. tut in fliinlin they arc tun vetting their hop* jttst on the developed regwav ospcculry on Sanywior. and ibe? -aa: to know.kio produce,ulhoe torn. the* why nothole(ram a? "WeCanX ifdon'tharp oVon-off us the baiic fad gain of Siberia after te*rral yean of duiortrd eairactioe.-the Tyumen people And then there rctonrvd reproaches of anotherlo the geologists, nno art accuted of not being able to discover even one meet Samoilor. These are pctnllrsi reprcatbe* The earth blesses people rarely with lech giants as Samoilor. t regards Ihcverilficldi have been diicovrrod in Ihc Ob region, and there are among them groups of depowti which in their toial reserves are not interior lo the fool giant beneath Nirhncvartovsk. ThM is whai iheboul, these are the ones thai should be reliably brought into operation. The uritutntni (ratay?iw| on ibis topvt has now become eipccially sharp,ertain nonchalance, complacency with respect io Siberian oil can be noted noi only in Gosplan. bul in many ministries and depart menu connected with Tyumen detebipmcnl In sonic Placet, evidently, they think thai ihc main work in Tyumen hat already beenolid bate hai been created in tbe center of the region and thingsgo smoothly In reality everything it Jar more complicated, and tericwSought to be paid lo the teal iiate ofvi as the Tyumen obtain of the CPSII ihou'd rtielf more peruttently Hand up fee statewide portions in determination of the ratef ihc entire region (rVwvwn.

mii itsrifnui ifan rai urnhwpr-cpie waaear later by Baybakov

It'sknown what grant aaiuual economic ugwAcanceof the far. it- materia! bast of ihe Furopean part of ihc country hat Newt hrletv. the USSR MmBtnta of Ol and Gat arc not providing for fulfillment of the targcti (or growth of reserves of oil and gai in these regions. The leadership ol ihesc miniatiiea, and alto the USSR Ministry of Geology muii lake urgent and more effocii'C measures to liquidate back-aril nets in eiploraiion work for oil and gat in the European pan of the USSR,eep drilling, which produce! lb* mail hopeful results (ZmrdaruyB vr'kAoivsogo io-rio SSSH. tot "logo Soiyvo oyaiayaIBivJikabrva ftV.'g./gfuheskit oirhti. p.

" The key figure here was the Minister of Oil himtell.Shaibin Althoughimmed wiih tbe wind and came upecovery program, be never suggested thai it would produce major benefiu and continued to insist that the only solution lay in opening up giant new fields and. at tbe same time, reducing petroleum consumption. See Ntfiyanoy*oittskayaVovrfa. ISS, Ekono-mlcheskayaj

" The key figure here was Academician Akktandr Krylov. chairman of the Academy's Scientific Council on Problems of Oil Deposit Production, with responsibility for directing and coordinating research on oilfield management and recovery. Krylov published two articles immediately after4 EkiuvunUhukayn gateta piece which directly contradicted Baybakov. One was published in Ekonomithrykaya,n elaboration of the issues raised by Baybakov, while ihe other appealed in the Ministry of Oil's journal Ntftyanoy*, No-to play safe, also lepuWished Baybakov't Ekonormeheskoya fozrto article. pjj

" On ihe problem of cocrtierproductrve incentives and the Ministry's attempt to compensate production personnelpecial fund for leases incurred in instituting enhanced recovery techniques sec Ntftyawyeo.Ekonomika neftyonoy prom viao.nd Sotsialistithtskaya Indunriya.

"Seeespeeiallyr'Wa. IIand l_ P. Gurhnovikii.o. 6.

" USSR: DrrrlopoHM of die Gat Industry. 25

omprehensive pieaentatioo of Ihe Big Gas position tec V. S. Bulatov In Izvtttiya Stbtrskoto otdtlentya akadtmtinauk

" Despi le bit dependence on Baybakov. Nckrasov appears to haveomewhat independent stand on the gat issue. See, for example.nd Tnid,ckrasov was joined, at least earlier,rominent specialist on regional economics attached to SOPS. A. E. Probst. (Seep.SS

'Orudibcv graduated6 from the same oil institute in Baku thai produced Baybakov and many other industrial leaders from Arcrbaldihan. He was sufficiently cunning to have raited himself upthenmembership in an Aterbaidrhan Central Committee bureau beaded by Bcriya's henchman in Ihe Caucasus. M. D. Bagirov, who wit shot fallowing Bcriya's down fa II. In the early ande served under Baybakov as Deputy Minister of Oil and then returned io Baku io head ihe Anrbflidilun mi industry as chairman of the Sovnatkhoz9 be relumed to Moscow relatively unscathed in tbe wakeaysr leadership purge to Aierbaldzhan. and soon managed to promote himself back Into the post of deputy under Baybakov in the Oil Ministry, where he siayedne would be inclined to identify Baybakov at one of hit angels, were it noi for testimony that ihelonghim. Kosygin ai one point reportedly calledtechnical reactionary"mcH of Minblert Presidium meeting. Baybakov was, however, one of the main protectors of ihe former Minister of Oil Shathin.


Ynlmk ANo.

lat theS-IOMJ. Jalil97il.pp MMLM

" Theiha Sonet rneuBuTxal iaduttry baa kaca Mkk

or fmott iWauirikiTiof pipe rsstwired.growth uf Ihc Meet industry, priority tuppty of bus-gradeo the military indunnalac IBincentive!

"Oklyobr ItTJ.No.

"bcustion of theled consumer" issue xe ptfedniro kraya..

" For tutemcnit by Orodihevof hit petition ter takiniu labockli.ad No6.So^tikayagggftaa,

" EXONo.

* Sec Sochtrtana ia Cko*om*krtkavBn

ckrasov of Gatptan't SOPS was laid to rune data red

The economic effect alone from the wie of Siberian mural gu willrillionut Ihia it not all By making the maiimum ute of gat. one could rapidly tulve the problem ofenergy to industry, aad agrieuture, purify ihc air batintof nay cilia, and lower the ctprndilaic* of the topula lieu for fuel Calculi torn madeth the aid of compatcrt by the rnerfv InMitateof tha Siberian Dmucc of the Academy of Scsuncca of ihe USSRy Mescnt'e*'t group)thai tha utilization ol each In; cubic stern ol Tyumen gas ia place of any other fuel "illboutillionear in capital and operating i

" The Ninth Five-Year Plan decreed thai the supply of oil from ibe "eastern regions" to (be Urals and European USSR would increase sit limes overhereat gas supply would increase byimes. Oil produclion in the "eastern regions" would increaseimes, but gat by onlyimes. While the gas base here pretunubly includes (he Central Asian fietet, and thii is larger to nan with than (he oil base, the rate of development it certainly well below what advocates of Big Gat were urging. (See Gasmtorufnnyi pyaiilttmiotam... ody.jjjjjjjjjj

he proposed route watKuibythev-Saraiov-Ottrogorsk and (hence via an alreadyline to Moscow. Independent confirmation of ihc ctiuence of tbe "Big System" proposed may be found in D. V. Belorusov et iL, Orrojvnwy* mtflyamrkk matoroihdimlvr rapadnoy.

" This technology has cot been developed elsewhere In the - d. aad almost certainlyigh degree of uncertainty from theof Soviet policymakers fHJJ^pjJH





No. II.


law iW article* by. Butatovits iiWitogootdrUrtyo mkodtmu monkSSSR.

atuk No 4 AltOSMlbc

article in Gaio^yoo. J. Jointly authored by Bulatov, afflliaiod with the Tyumen Gat Heirirch andntitule of the Mimtiry of Gat, an official of (he Tyumen Gat Administration dim of the Ministry ofyumen Party obkom officiI |

3 IgMgatag AN SSSR.a, NoPPlS-1*

" For Stynhoncb't pneaion. aec Inrulym AH SSSR.or Ihe argument that tbit tine to-indict! Big Gas. sec Nesterov and Salmanov in Groiopyoo I, p. 4.

S. No.p.

* In principle the pipe waa claimed lo be able to uiihitand significantly higher preuurei than thetmospfcctt or importedlmoiprlere pipes, thus permittingdoubling of throughput capacity Italtu said lobeiuiiaWe fur eaullcdliquefied ga* Fteajjyjtwas taid to be made of ocwioary. rather than tpeOalued

- Paion'iW pip* mm drbcusaed and apfocd by Got^u'i State Etperu' CommnaionBoksersnaa la ftoimoyrt was then confirmed by IheGuiptin Collegium (namely by Baybakov directly) and nibmilled lothc Preudium of (he Council of Minb(ert, whichecree tn6 calling (or oigsnliaiton of produclion ofthe pipe (fitrarfiw,on ind hii pipe wire lubvequcnily praixd by both Baybakov and his minion BoJocrman (See Hmavoytphcberlnna kept all hit optopen by priaiag both tbe captole syisem.nd Paioa aad as jipe (SmDirf'irvoS.p. M.o- ll.ivheir was no Ug>cal rxntnelktiea here, bacauc ihc captule lystra could be cure bits' with therom Paion'i muituia were reportedly awaic |


"ArupiaananSckby Sidorenko, Firai Deputy Miniaurof Gas, in Trad,howud no pipeline under ccauiruclioe between Urengoy and CbefyatiuM. aaal the teit of the truck did not mearoconhe editorial the Miootryof Comtructior of Petroicuoi and Gatterpmei organ, Strotul'moo I. ditcuatod work on the V'rvoy ftibvo Vuktyl-ine, bul mentioned no Ortntoy-CMyabintk finf 1h< ^irne gfjof Orudiher'i article mffnvrfa. IST.




rs III)


. 4.

- Vtnniko.. Chukhanov clearly impLed

loppry problem

- Itvtsiiya ANo.D.

novowo. 4.

" For ihe ipeechci, sec Kwrart 4jVo 2.

should be empaaaiied that the -Combined Resources'- rubric is an umbrella category lhat encomposesa broad collection of individuals who agreeeneral way about policy aims, but often

disagree on specifics related ioested mteren. (suchto foreign energy sales, empbuUcd more ssreuil vt'taiY.*

allocation of the sc.enl.fic research and developmentnd gas-based energy balance puraVcd in the past hX-ton!

of Sciences Generalnd eliminated Ihe implioaiion ofa

or Mctot'csee/jvesri^ AN SSSR, intrgHtka,o. 3.

vieuuseeo .SSSR.o.asinik AN SSSR

"o.be reference wu presumably to the first generating units in Ihe first power statioa.

Aleksandrov and Vellkbe. alBeaof Kinllm and hss usocu.tes.IHpH No.leksandrov, Vtilmk AN. Brenner

o.tanauayto.o.aprosyo. 5.

entire policyolcinphasmngnr.dThisvolume, entitled "

" V. N. Bogaebev.o.tsMkANo..

ubUshedSee especially IW.ovember

" Izvrsilya ANo. 9.

- Veuniko.. IS.Vestniko.

" See Izvessiya AN SSSR.o.zvestiya tibinkato otdelentya ANSSSR. lenya obskxhestvennogo nauka.nd lz>estiya slbtrskogo OidtleuiyaANSSSRHo... (TO

" See Dally Repon.rasnaya

- For Metemt'ev. seeNo.

* Itvttttya AN SSSR.o..


- Vestntk ANo.n, 3.

" On nuclear problems, see Robert Campbell, Sovietoals. Planning and Organizations (Sa nta MunKa: Rand,. IJHJp^pjiv initial confidence that MHD geneTaWccWc?icTlyTmrtr,ed and thai Ihey would produce targe fuel savings had given way4 to longer term, leu optimistic penpcei Ives

rs (CI




" Inierem in slurry pipeline tranipotl ol coalat leanhen Ihe Suit Committee for Science and Technologypecial Scientific Technical Cammiiuon for Hydraulic Pipeline Tfraniporiof Solid Materials, beaded bylkono*. For more moral comment! tee Bokaennan'ia Pl**ovoyrad Trud.ayami Ptaaavyt tamyeiiivoNoHJ

The target for ssvtMnal .sers -as vtiiinDon of1 nAoaer year, aa amountcoaJd not be handled by the preaent rnJ-ay rntanF)

"" ddeiauoa included Geor|iy Zhdanovich. ihe chief of Ihe Traniprcgrcat Production Adminnlialiixi ol Ihe Mmisiry of Construction of Petroleum andCai Indiwlry Finer-prises, and Ytvgtniy Uoflrokiy. Sergey Biybaknv'l client and head Cil the department rttponiiblc (of capsule pipeline tr asportation in tbe adminittctiion'i inuiiuu. Vaiipiiranipriigma |


V eJ

- See7

A Central Gjcsrmttot CPSU andinisters

- adopted' eotiUtd "Creation ot the Ehibnttai Fud-

1 OO-kVDC Ekibattu-

Center Transmissionfor completion of one poacr plant

in tni*rcond during tbe lOrh Five-Yearn [lie resolution pro|octed an r. cm.il lots'of five plants wilh (

illion kibmii capacity (Ekowamiemrikcya

he Ka tali-Ac haul Kacikbsun- European LSSR

bill upOcnueiJ by ibe Minuter of Po-cr and l'/ii'f.j

NaeCToahnay. in PraWa.5 On the EkiMuu-

OP-hV DCo..

tstmko 7,

ndp I: '

See especially the complaint* by Ibe Krasnoyarsk kraykom fimediiko. In0nd by the kraykoen'. industrialno I.. Also':o. I. p|

" The kraykom md utfrsal secretary.cttspUsnedone imarvicwet:

The ideaingle otgan for administering Ihe territorial production coinplet bangs in the air.id yoa hear how the deputy minuter of Power and Elccuincaiton of tha USSR. Fedor Vead'evsth SapttuDUiov. ended hi report? Create any orgai you like, said he. faU aa long as it doesn'tna ihe pUaatng and icunotntc activity of the ministries,ishat develnpod over decades and interference -nh il hi fraught with oew



For3}nosoye. According to Ntkranov:

The creationighty fuel-energy ban utiliiing the depot hi of the fcamk-Achiniaha foundation for the formation of the Central-Krasnoyarsk energy-industrial axrpMt By theC it -ill be pofbk toeuiaci uparifhoa loan of coal in the Ciairti Krasnoyarsk eoeig*-indauiiil coenptea and to0 fnlhonhours of electrical energy Uliliralwn of Kant* Achimk coal on ihe tpc ui connection wilh formal ion of the Largest baie in lie country for energy-intrnaive production mini become the dtciMvefi*ogo Oidtttniya aJaatnUi *euk SSSR. Noyp.B

ci ample, lee the remark! attributed to S. Uihakovof Caspian's Institute of Complei Traraporiauon Problems at Ihe same6 Krasnoyarsk meeting on KATtK at which Nckrasov made Ihe comments ated in the preceding footnote.

Original document.

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