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he Implications of Brezhnev'sfor the Soviet Political Succession,-

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The Implications of Brezhnev's Cadre Policies

for the Soviet Political Succession


l HaUonat Foieifi Aueumenl Center


Key Judgments

is substantial evidence that Leonid zhncv, as leader of the Soviet Communist ty, has been more constrained than his predc-iors in appointing his supporters to key bu-ucratic slots:

Turnover within the party's central elite, the Central Committee andud.ting Commission, has decreased with each party congress since Khrushchev's removal.

Elites holding important positions within the party's republic and regional organizations also have enjoyed substantially improved job security.

'he marked reduction of elite turnover has ited the opportunities for politicalf party cadres by Brezhnev or anyoneppears toonscious policy in ction to Nikita Khrushchev's frequent and, at cs, capricious use of the cadre weapon. The :zhncv leadership has sought also to prevent itical conflictacancies in key positions:

There hasubstantial decline in the forced removal of individuals from office for political wrongdoing or incompetence; death and retirement are the leading causes of removal from the central elite.

Replacements for those vacancies that do occur usually have been selected from among the subordinates of the official being replaced; thus it has been difficult formembers to maneuver their proteges into areas or institutions not connected with their own background and experience.

Although Brezhnev has maneuvered someout of the Politburo and Secretariat and thereby secured key assignments for allies and supporters, the evidence suggests en alteration of ground rules in the game of Soviet politics. He has not attempted to remold the elite into one beholden only to him because:

He did not push sweeping policy orreforms that would have generated significant opposition within the party establishment.

He understood that excessive cadrebreeds insecurity that can fuel politi-

j cat opposition.

recognized the advantage in associating the central elite's own well-being with his continued tenure in office.

Continued cadre stability in the post-Brezhnev era could be promoted by:

The natural desire of Politburo members to limit the new general secretary's ability to exploit the powers Inherent in his office.

The support of elites who now dominate the Central Committee andestedin maintaining .he current approach.

The prospect of political advancementAn aggressive new general secretary who

{ officials now in key subordinatepowers inherent in bis office to staff

; can anticipate under existingpositions wilh his supporters.

Pressure for politicization .of cadrethe political sensitivity of cadrecould grow1 these conflicting pressures will probably 'vgij'" 1 he divisions within the post-Brezhnev-leader-

Theesult, formationew political

whose career pmpceU haveQn djfficull and (hc succcs.

by prolonged stability! at the jonrotrflCtcd. The political bal-

The belief of some Politburo 'leadersin tbe Soviet elite, nevertheless, appears to

major policy changes are required to"stability of cadres.'* If it is maintained by

a return to one-man rule significantly inhibited.

to push through such, .

with numerous, long-avoided problemsnew leadership, the institutional supportnew top-to-bottom leadership ioollective leadership would be strengthened and


This memorandum examines lhc future implications of Brezhnev'scontrasting cadre policies" ' -

A statistical presentation of some of tne

information:from the data base contained in the charts and graphs in the appendix. :j



The Implications of Brezhnev's Cadreor the Soviet Political Succession

.; A"

:Soviet politicians have traditionally hadbalancing theirontradictory preferences for strong centralized 'authority and collective leadership. While the decisionmaking systemollegia! one on paper; ih practice it has more often than not evolved into one-man domination, if not dictatorship. Tbe] evidentof Soviet leaders to constitutionalize the rcsponsi bill lies and prerogatives of certain politica offices and functions has been areason for this. Quite purposefully, thebetween major institutions haveill-defined and thenherent in most political roles ambiguous.

onsequence, the powereneral secretary is as dependent on his political ability as it is on the authority derived from his insiitr.-tional position. Khrushchev was ;particularly adept at maneuvering within this adaptableenvironment. He skillfully manipulated personnel assignments, organizational andreforms, and policy priorities to expand his own power and to undercut that;of his rivals. Wh-le these tactics; proved beneficial, tlieand resentment bis policies engendered among his immediate colleagues, as well as lower level officials, contributed in the long mn to tbe erosion of his political support and to his eventual

1 J 1 V"

Khrushchev's successors were not content with

merely removing him, however. They alsoto repeal some of the policies associated with his rule and to prevent certain abuses from recurring In thoadre policy loomed particularly large In thlsleffort. Underfrequent personnel shifts and demotions, even of his staunch supporters, wereLocal party organizations were oftenoutsiders as first secretaries. Few could feel comfortable or secure in their jobs. This insecurity was institutionalized atd Party Congress1arty statuteixed rate of turnover in the party's leading organs. Khrushchev war ihus provided withopportunities foi maneuvering supporters into key positions and opponents out, creating in theolitical balance congruent with his power ambitions.

Codro Policial

learly wanted to preserve some flexibility in assigning cadres to key positions while at the same time mollifying supporters of increased cadre stability. Atd Parly Congress6 he endorsed the call to repeal party rules prescribing turnover, but he also argued that the party shouldeneral provision requiring systematic "renewal ofalong with continuity in leadership and thai young and energetic officials should be promoted more boldly. In spite of his expressed objective, however, stability and continuity of leadership in the Brezhnev era have clearly prevailed over systematic renewal of cadres. As the discussion in the appendix shows, job security andpromotion practices have been the normhe turnover rate for key national, republic, and regional officials has been reduced substantially from the level established by Khrushchev. Death and retirement, rather than political expulsion, have emerged as the principal causes of removal from the elite. And vacancies have been filled primarily from among the ranks of the departed official's subordinates.

Manipulation of cadre assignments, of course, has not disappeared entirely from the Soviet political scene. Us use, however, has become


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more selective and localized chiefly within the highest levels of the poliiical establishment-thai is, within the Politburo and the Secretariat. Brezhnev has skillfully created and usedin both institutions to transform them into groups more favorably disposed toward him. Some of Brezhnev's colleagues in the Politburo have employed the same tactics, Kirilenko, for example, probably had much to do with elevation of his Sverdlovsk associate, Yakov Ryabov, into the Secretariateningrad |party boss Grigoriy Romanov, the youngest member of the Politburoossible Brezhnev heir, appears to haveumber of recentto lower level positions in the bureaucracy.1 jr{-'. I

As prcviojsly noted, however, there has been no return to the flagrant manipulation of Isrgc numbers of cadres that was associated with Khrushchev. In view of the considerable personal power he has acquired, Brezhnev's failure to challenge this creeping depoliticization ofpolicy seems incongruous. Severalhave probably shaped his passivity on this score. First, ihe new policy was enacted during the early years of Brezhnev's lerm. before he had sufficient powerrevent it. Herecognized that if he supported continuation of extensive cadre turnover while he was relatively weak, his position would beHe chose, therefore, to associate theinterest of the elite in enjoying the fruits of increased job security with his continuance in office, therebyotential weaknessource of strength.

Second, both Stalin and Khrushchev needed great personal power to carry out ambitious and often controversial policies. defeating their opponents could their programs beBrezhnev, on ibe other hand, hasavoided sucu controversial initiatives and has

I '< fi'i .

1 SmnI ol Romanov'*luocliia hiva been MM MS

tpOfttBl PCIIIt ObUll OWTlul IhTM ft* V. N.

If miof tn* obfcam (ilw obiait puny

ourn* iflrjt Mcrtury of VoroMfh obkomhe mayor of Lenlnirad, V. I, Kaiakor, wiieputy chairmen of tbt RSFSR Council ot MMitin ia It7ft; ind.* obkom aacond aacrcury,ppointed ambawdoioland In April oTiklieadership style lhal balancesinterests rather than challenges keygroups. This middle-of-the-road course has inhibited the emergence of widespread opposition within the elite and the corresponding need for any systematic replacement of personnel.

Third, Brezhnev himself may have,with the desire of many party workers for increased cadre stability and continuity. Asnoted, he gave this idea some support in his report tod Party Congress, end he did so again ath Congressn addition,ublished account of Brezhnev'sin Kazakhstan during thethat he preferred to leaveiven post until their assignment could be successfully concluded, even if this meantromotion to higher level work.

Afrtr Brttthntv

Despite the sharp decline over the lastears in the use of cadre manipulation to achieve political advantages, Brezhnev's successor, in the absenceonstitutional limitation on the use of leadership power, could decide or be given scope to rejuvenate the central elite.there has been definite movement toward creeping institutionalization of Soviet personnel policies during Brezhnev'selatively predictable formula for achieving andstatus in the elite has emerged. Shifts that threaten these expectations and calculations would almost certainly encounter seriousIn fact, personnel practices associated with the Brezhnev era have probably become sothat only severemost likely, from gross mismanagement of the Sovietbringhange in approach.

At the same time, present cadre policieshave not benefited all equally. Threeelite constituencies are discernible. Thebeneficiaries of these policies are those senior party and government officials who occupy top managerial positions ir. their respectiveThis group, although the smallest of the three, Is naturally the most politically significant and powerful, Mosi were born0 and

nd recruited into the party's ranks8hey dominate the CentralThe cadre policies of the Brezhnev era have served them well and extended tbe length of their service at the pinnacle of the Sovietsystem.esult they clearlytake in perpetuating the status quo. During theperiod they will probably unite in support of the leadership faction most closely identified with this objective. ;

The second, and by far the largestwithin the elite establishment, is formed by party officials who, for the most pa.t, entered the party after Stalin's death and now hold leadership positions below the central and republic levels. The high degree of stability engendered by the current approach lo cadre policy has limited their advancementThe result has been frustration, resentment, and perhaps even alienation within the ranks.

These younger officials reportedly hope the changes caused by the passing of the Brezhnev generation will produce some additionalThey would be inclined to ally themselves with the younger more ambitious leaders willing to advocate change on the ground that the Soviet political system is suffering from "hardening of the arteries"cds new approaches to some of its systemic problems. Leningiad party leader Grigoriy Romanov, for example, who hasargued that 'an excessively long stay in the party apparat in the 6ame position can frequently cause loss of interest in the work" and that attention should be given to how such individuals "cane used in theould attract support from this group.1 |

Therehird constituency, however, neitner totally swayed by power and privilege nor com-

1 Romis-cr haa icihaty Impermaeted iMi pfclJoaopby dariniu party lesdsr In Lealnfrsd.0 he bunew obkom secondn obkom Mercuries,(partyai lb* dty rival) fiut Mcrattrlca,wooed aecrsUrice. and ulna forkern Mercuries. Forpari, however, these chutes have not occurred ithadtpanJna IncsmUnt offidaU. None of Iha ulna oirtomhave chanted iocs bu been eleerly demoted, end only titIS oily offtcUUti/fcTed from the personnel iblfuof then aU had lahUIly received

Romanov'i temiri).

plclcly frustated by its inability to advance quickly, that will probablyey role in determining whether the current approach to cadre policyermanent feature of -Soviet politics. Individuals in this group,mainly from the post-World War II generation of party members, haveeached ths career takeoff stage and hold key subordinate positions to the ministers and obkom first secretaries who now form the core element in the Soviei political elite. This group will profit from existing procedures and thereforetrong reason for supporting the current system. On the other hand, in view of the lengthy apprenticeship they must endure, cs well as the reported concern among younger functionaircs generally about the need for fresh ideas and revival at the top, members of this group might sympathize with the needeadershipA Politburo faction committed to reinvigor-'ing Soviet policy might be able to draw on this ajnstituency for supportuccession as its members obtain senior elite status.

On the whole, the political balance reflected in the career objectives of these thrc. elitefavors stability. Only if an overwhelming Politburo majority believed that change anu rejuvenation of Ihe elite was essential to the health of the system would the status quo bias of the seniors in Ihe Central Committeeroad consensus, of course, is not very likely in succession politicking. Theof cadre questions alone would makedifficult. However persuasive the logic forelter method for circulating elites, no Soviet leader is likely to accept suchin view of the consequences ofhange for his political future. Moreover,n the leadership who are not so ambitious and powerful have an obvious interest in constraining their more aggressive associates and will almost certainly resist any attempt toeneral mandate for change. Wherehe leadership probably will seek to narrow the choice to generally acceptable candidates from within the established elite.

Cuncnt cadre policies arc likely to bein tho post-Brezhnev era. They could be

modified, however,esult of the increasing debate and conflict within the leadershipumber of serious and difficult economicsagging economic growth rates, insufficient agricultural production despiteinvestments, and looming energy shortages. These problems and others'are'evident now, but there is no indication that the current leadership is willing to tackle them bead on. Potential solutions are too controversial and the prospects for success too uncertain for Brezhnev to risk much political capital at this stage.

I This passivity is not likely to continue after Brezhnevecade of partial neglect has already complicated the prospects of corrective measures, and the implications of further delay Should be evident to many members of the Soviet elite. Nevertheless, considerable controversy over what needs to be done is likely. For some older and; more senior leaders the present priorities, organizational forms, and managerial techniques have virtually become enshrined as dogma. These leaders are likely to argue that change should be directed primarily toward making the existing system more efficient throughtinkering.

Younger and less senior leaders, however, may feel no particular loyalty to the conventional way of doing business; rather, they would probably prefer to definessue in terms of correcting ills and stimulating development through major policy departures. Clearly, the proponents of radical change have the more onerous task. Proposals to shift priorities and revampwould stimulate considerable controversy and threaten the existing institutional anddistribution of power. The ensuing debate, moreover, would force party officials to make choices that could endanger their political future. These suggestions would surely provokenot only from those who were ideologically committed to the present system but also from those Imperiled by the. j

Finally, the prospectsore politicized approach toward personnel policy in! the post-Brezhnev era would growarticularlyand clever leader who believed, change was essential became general secretary. The office's powers could be exploited to curtail severely the collective's control over policy in general and cadre matters in particular. Since the Secretariatpecial role in verifying the fulfillment of party directives and in assigning party cadres to

;key positions throughout the Soviet bureaucracy, ihc general secretary isnique(position to

j direct these activities.

; .The new general secretary Is likely,o inherit tbe post with diluted authority.ion bas always initially ledegradation inthe power of tho general secretary relative to that of his predecessor. Moreover, each successor has been more limited than his predecessor intactics for expanding his poweris the collective. Khruschev gained power in part on the premise that he would not use it to terrorize his colleagues. In addition to this limitation,ev has notree hand to manipulate cadre assignments. Quiteew general secretary's colleagues, guided by the lessons learned from Brezhnev's use of the position, will attempt to odd new restrictions, further limiting his tactical options.


Against the background of conflictingfor continuity and change, "stability of cadres" will be one of the more difficult issuesew leadership must face in the post-Brezhnev era. The political sensitivity of this question, however, is much greater than for most other domestic problems since it is closely related to the quest for greater political power. Debate on this issue consequently will probably intensify the political cleavages within the new leadership. Policy formulation in other areas may become more contentiousesult.

The outcome of the debate over cadre policy remains uncertain, but political forces favoring continued stability appear to have the upper hand. Aspiring leaders should be able to garner the support of the entrenched establishment andignificant advantage over otherin succession Infighting who would challenge the status quo. It seems likely, therefore, that the

present upprmch to cadre assignment will

inimumcvelopcicnt wouldignificant step toward institutionalizing power relationships within the regime. 'The colle&ial aspects of leadership decisionmaking would be strengthened. Overcoming oligarchic barriers to greater personal rulee! difficult and policy formulation would, as now, reflectconsensus more than individual dictate, In this environment the leadership style pioneered by Brezhnev would become the model forleaders lo follow. Although (his strategy would not prevent the emergencetrong generalBrezhnev hasdemonstrated the power potential inherent inparty leaders would, like Brezhnev, find the political system much less subject lo their control than the one faced by cither Stalin or Khrushchev.

The author of this paper Is

Office of Regional ana Political Analysis, comments and aueries are welcome ind should he directed tc

by Soviet officials in the early; post-Khrushchev years indicated thatsupport existed Tor increasing job security and. implicitly, for limiting the ability ofPolitburo officials to manipulateto their political advantage, (Yet,formulation atd Party Congress suggested that he was trying to maintain some of the top leadership's traditional flexibility inmatters. Which viewpoint has prevailed? More specifically, to what extent has job security increased? And what factors now governfrom and promotions to hieh-level elite positions?

Ifcbitry of CocWt

Cadre stability has reached extraordinaryduring the Brezhnev years. Members of the Central Committee and Central Auditingfor example, haveery good chance of retaining their leadership status within the elite (seetability within these groups has been higher at each of the three party congresses since Khrushchev's removal than it was in6oreover, the rcclec-lion rate has steadily increased throughout the Brezhnev period, advancing fromercent6 toercent

While increased political security is evident for virtually all segments of the elite,lso show that certain segments of the elite have benefited more than others. Khrushchev's purge of the central elite1 did not givetreatment to those with higher status;Commilice members were only slightly less likely to be replaced lhan members of the Cen-

Reelection Rates of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission

.; I ' .-


itsi/st i Year tUrrtaoVRaaaiciad :j

NOIEi lo fhii graph, rmlection reran to the perrrmtogo ol eoch group, olive ot the time or the next congress, who were elected to either theommittee or the Centrol Auditing Cornrnlipon at that congreti. Hence, the data reportedar memben of the CAC mean that aemortercent ol im memben1 itX oOve6 were elected ot memben of the CAC or oi concfidate rr fvd memberi of the Central Committee In

It is equally obvious that representatives of the party apparatus have received more favorable treatment during the Brezhnev period than have their government counterparts. Governmentin turn, huvc been retainedigher rate than representatives of the military or other groups such as workers, peasants, andThus, when examined closely the data show clearly lhat even the meager turnover rates achieved under Brezhnev have been Inflatedisproportionate turnover in groups not close to day-to-day political administration.

i i

The continuity observed in the representative organs of the national elite can also be found in similar institutions at lower levels of the party


NOTEi Ihe elite wot dMded Into lour cotegoriei! Party(Including individuali holdmg potti In the Komsomol, the trode unlonf, and Other publicovernment officio!iBtary leaders, ond symbolic elitei (worsen, peasants, foctoty monagen, and sohe reelection rate refen to the percentage of eoch group elected ot one congreti and itil oEve at the rime of thecongreti who were elected tohe Central Committee or Centrol Auditing Commliiion.

apparatus. Turnover of political leadership in republic politburos occurred at twice the rate in the Khrushchev period as compared with the Brezhnev era (seclthough ihcrc is considerable regional variation, cadre'stability has increased inf theepublicsen of theepublics averaged annually over two removals from their politburos during the Khrushchev period, whereas nine republics have averaged one removal or less during the post-Khrushchev years.

The same trend is apparent in the republic party secretariats. Secrclariat turnover wasercent higher under Khrushchev. Forf the



republics, lhc average yearly turnover'rate-in' the secretariats was higher in the Khrushchev period than it has been-sirvcel his!Iremoval (seen fact, all republic-secretariats in tbe. Brezhnev period haveurnover: rato of less! than one member, as compared with-thehev years, when onlyercent[fell into this i


iFinally, the post-Khrushchev leadership nasi; opted for unprecedented1!continuity in positions! that are the backbone of the: party and govern- jj mcnt administrativehe ,USSR Coun- j; cil of Ministers and obkom first secretaries. Only j;emovals in the Council-of Ministers haveccurred ineriod, andf; these were due to death and an additional nine to retirement onj'*

l*rhe contrasting tumOTer'rates'for theeadership arc particularly striking. Overall, the removal rate under Brezhnev is less than half what it was under Khrushchev. On the average, there wre almostemovals from obkom leadership positions per year in the Khrushchev years as compared toemovals per year under Brezhnev (see

While the degree of decline in obkomturnover varies by region, every republicower rate in the post-KhrushchevIn the Russian Republic (RSFSR) continuity has bordered on constancy. Since Brezhnev took office2 percent of the oblasts in the RSFSR have noteadership change, and anotherercent have changed only once. During the Khrushchevhe figuresndercent, respectively.

There, is no republic-level party organization in the RSFSR, and the obkom first secretaries in theblasts of that republic answer directly to

ToWe 2

Avroqc Yeorry Turnover of RopoJwtorloti'

oo preterit

Republic epublic


and arc appointed by the central partyMoscow. Most of these obkom leaders, inex-officio status in the central partystability of the RSFSR oblastto theirmanifestationhenomenonproximity to the center of powerthe chances for retention forunder

f Turnovat

In spite of the high level of cadre stability

he current leadership is not the same

as the one Brezhnev inherited. Gradually, almost

imperceptibly, over theears since tbe coup .against Khrushchev, the leadership in the various

republics, the Council of Ministers, the oblasts,

Under Khrushchev, it was relatively rare for

and the central elite has substantially changed.This evolution has not had an unsettling effect on Ithe leadership In general, however, because of

tbc marked decline in politically motivated re- individual obkom first secretaries to die in or

movals and the Increase In regularized promotion retire from office. Political demotions,oooortunities.'quite common, accounting for almost 50

Table 4

I !

a: refers tomade under Xhnnhchcv5 toefcri to appowtmenti made sine* OctoberTho*concept!clear Iv involve subjective analytical fudemmti. Ininneral. an assignment waseerndividual transferred lo other work with nof leal loo offrom cihrrcentral elite alatui after beingndividual assigned lo lower level republic position In party apparatus orlevel dots In the governmentexample, deputy minuterinistry or deputy heedentralAn enlcnmenl was conshlered toflirruihe IndMdual'i political aulas was notnother nbiorc. lo an ambaasadeeshlp, or torank wttbin tbe Council of Ministers IKi category.wairomotion If the Indlrtdual'i status wu Improved AssJejvneots each as Central Cornrnlller ordeputy chairman of Ibe USSR Council ol Ministers, and chairmanshiprpobbe council of mlaistcn were. . ,

.Only obtests that eiiated during both administrations were used In Ihese calculations.

Career De^oprnerrl of Obkom Flat Secretarieshrvtbchev and Breihnev (rVcentogoi)'



ot nlre-

' -1





of mnovab




of all transfers from this position. The situation has changed dramatically4 (secnder Brezhnev, death oras the cause for removal from the obkom elite has increasedercent; demotions have declined byercent Of the five republics examined, moreover, only the Ukraine is at variance with this pattern. Tbe factional dispute between Brezhnev and Ukrainian party chief Peir Shelest within the national leadership and the Utters eventual purge from the Ukrainian leadership and replacement by Brezhnev sVladimir Sheherbitskiy,umber of shifts that account for this variation, j

Even more important, reliancenatural" process of cadre replacement has beenevident within the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission during theyears (see. Although death and retirement accounted for onlyercent of the removals of party and government officials from these organizations6 (the first congress following Khrushchev's0 percent of the departures were attributable to these causesemotions; on the other hand, declined by almostercent during the: same period.

Tefab 5

Reason* for Removal of Party and Governmenttho ControlPorconlogM)'


Parly Congren Year



Rrason for Removal al Party Congress


Demoted Number of esses

10nly party and government offklab were Included In ihU analysts..'

Consequently, as the removal rate from the central leadership has declined, nonpoliticalhave become the most important reason for those departutes that do occur. Elites who have attained Central Committee or Central Auditing Commission status, therefore, can confidenlly expect to maintain their status until they reach retirement age,erious political miscalculation.

The deemphosis on partisan politics in filling vacant posts in the central elite hasecond and equally powerful barrier against

ploilalion of gradual leadership turnover foradvantage. Since most of the Council of Ministers and RSFSR obkom first secretaries arc ex-officio members or candidate members of the Central Committee, vacancies in thesecould ultimatelyramatic impact on its political makeup. The power to I'ltcrmine replacements in key administrative vacancies would allow an ambitious leader eventually to alter the composition of the Central Committee and totrong base of factional support.

;The evidence clearly suggests, however, that for the most part such manipulation has not occurred. The data on new appointments to the Council of Ministers (see tablendicatelear preference in filling ministerial vacancies has been given to those in secondary positions in the respective ministries or closely related ones. Overall, almostercent of those appointedost within the government bureaucracy prior to their ministerial assignments, andercent were in positions closely related to the post they filled. Moreover, almost SO percent of all top ministerial assignments made2 have gone to individuals in leading positions


within -the ministry that they were selected io head. Leading work in the party apparatus, on the other hand, has become less relevantrior experience for new ministers, accounting for only sl'ghtly more than one fifth ofeplacement,

A similar pattern of in-house replacements is apparent in assignments to certain key obkom first secretary positions (seeof local officials within the RSFSR rose fromercent under Khrushchev to almostercent subsequently. This rise paralleled the virtual abandonment of the Khrushcheviteof cross-posting first secretaries from one obkom to another in the RSFSR and the sharpercent) in selecting replacements from within the ranks of the Central Committee apparatus.

A different pattern is observed, however, in obkom first sec.etary assignments in the other four republics examined. Recruitment from within obkoms has not significantly increased in any of these republics, and in Belorussia and the Ukraine it has substantially declined.cross-posting of obkom first secretaries increased in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the Ukraine, while Belorussia drew primarily on cadres at the republic level for its obkomThese variations probably reflect the greater autonomy enjoyed by republic leaderss well as the factional struggle that rocked the Ukraine during this period.

Nevertheless, the key factor affecting selectioneplacement in an obkom position appears to be the effect the choice will have on Central Committee membership. In cases where theleader is virtually assured of being elected to the Central Committee at the next partythereefinite tendency to fill the slot from among the subordinates of its formerAlmost all the RSFSR obkoms have this status, butprinkling of obkoms in the other republics do. Even outside the RSFSR, however, those obkoms which have attainedleadership status are more likely to have their leaders picked fromercent) than obkoms not having suchercent).

TobW 7

Loctrtton of Prtvlo-ji PoUHoo for Obkom Ftrtt SacretorleiU.tder Khruihchev ond Breihnev (Percentagei)

Republic Appentui




Repubbc pent e

National .

Number of

. 4L0


I > :8

kj Ukraine













1 11

refer, to

made under KJuinbeberoefen to appointment, made Uncef aartenmena from cUffereol obkiti

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