Created: 4/2/1979

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

fi rum ii rum





thi' election later this monthlack-led government of national unity in ifhodecut trill bring substantialcr.zure on the us and the uk to recognize the new government and to lift economic sanctions.

bhodeaians vill make an all-out effort to ensure adequate securityarge turnout for the election.

trie zimbabwe african national union and the zimbabwe african people's union m'ZZ try to disrupt the election, neither guerrilla group will be able to prevent it from taking place.

biahop .'uizorewa is the moat likelymerge aa thef the new government.

k to .'onsolidatc hir. pocition bithis relationship with the ts.vi.tvs, establishing greater control over theyside, and inducing defections from zahv and zapu.

may try to split the guerrillas further by offering toeparate deal with zauv or zapif.

doubt, however, that the white leaders trill sAkW enough flexibility to allow tsuzorewa toeal acceptable to cither guerrilla leader.




The electUm of wj goonmmcnt, coupledontittuation of the fighting, will createrd chc'.ccs for taosr. stains moxt clor-sly involved ui!.' the Fhodcaian vrvblcm.

fronttine elates oil'i continue no support the guerrillas, but an intensifixation of the fighting .tould force soiur pmnidenisttdcJ commitment to anjiet and Cuban pyccKcc in their coioitrica.

frontline states might also have to consider the poosiblity of supporting one guerrilla group against ths other in the eventivil war.

If the Soviets and tha Cubans continue to favor ZAI'U over ZAMJ, they risk alienating Tanzania and hiozambiaw.would like to oec more support given to

they agree to support both groiq>s, however, they could become involvedivil war.

eparate deal with the Salisbury government, they might find themselves forced to throw their support behind ZASU. |

Ths US and ihe UK must decide whether to recognize tha newly-elected government and lift economic sanctions.

positive decision aould strengthen iiwition of the new government, butostile reaction from the black African:;.


negative decision would undermine the viability of the new regime, but not deter the Africans from supporting further efforts to reach a

negotiated settlement.

British policy toward Rhodesia is not likely tor..ijorn the upcoming electioniven the paroKOiattcy of dome tin concern* and the reluctance of the Conservative Party io commit itself preir,aturely to any set policy.

Conservative Party, whichood chance of coming to power, would prefer not to get out in front of the US on this issue,leastis not likely to announce any dramatic departures from current government policy.


ill bti utntntLrtg precsur* withii tit:t leaptc^pvttivn tn the internal rcpin: and to liftbu fovmwbtr iAm aanatiota cone up for rwrmul

ir. iKrliamcnt.

Tori/ (ToIWillf Kfif/Af be'ooted to lift OS xarxttiont,'iwi,tznJ Cuban

involit.-rtiw in Afri-xt iwrvtist.'i laarkrdlif, tt'civajor caculation of the fighting.

Frospeot*uccesjful all-parties conference agrrcnmt ok tht part of the internalelectiomicdingly dim.

pixsepeota arce atalematet

fighting certainly milovidi*ui extending opportunities for thehejMMBEf

The Rhodesians making an all-out effort, to ensure adequa'e securityarge turnout for the election. Government pressure and intimidation by the blacfc partiesarv forces should resultairly higr. turnout.

All military aid police leaves have been cancelled during the election period ano all civilian reservists have been called up to provide security and to police the polling stations during the election. He estimateanpewer pool totaling0 Rhodesians Mill be nobilijed. These forces will be assisted by0 ex-guerrillas and local recruits who are loyal to internal black Traders Bishop Nuzorew and Reverend Si thole. I

As the election approaches. Rhodesian security forces will intensify their raids on guerilla canps and staging areas in Zambia and Mozambique and possibly in Angola, Tanzania, and Botswana. (See map ony forcing the guerrillas to relocate their command posts further from the border and to disperse their camps, guerrilla communication links and supply lines will be lengthened,resulting in an erosion of guerrilla capabilities and morale, fjgf^

Although ZAND andommitted to disrupting the election, it is unlikely either can preventrom taking place. ZANU and ZAPU now have atguerrillas inside Rhodesia and several thoisand more guerrillas arc to be infiltrated before the election. Both groups plan to intimidate voters, attack electoral officials and polling station and possibly stage incidents near the polling stations to distract tho security forces. Nevertheless, we believe the Rhodesian security forces will be able to maintain sufficient controljQjrscped with the polling in most if not all regions of the country. |

ZAPU is planning major attacks into Rhodesia along its northern border with Zambia, but we doubtossesses the necessary command and control capabilities toajor coordinated offensive. The number of guerrilla attacks on "soft" targets of psychological and WW economic importance to the whites, however, is certain to increase. I

The Election Process

White Rhodesians reportedly will go to the polls onpril to electhite members to the House of Assemby. Four of these seats are contested by independents, but Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front party should

Formation of Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia

Blacks elecled by black members of Mouse

hiles elected by whites

Council of Chiefs

Chosen by electoral colleoe community of tha member* of House and Senate

of Assembly

Blacks elected by black and white voters

hiles elected by white voters

8 Whiles elected byther new mem bars of parliament from list ofhile candidates selected by theembers o' the present parliament.

Prime Minister

Appointed by President


Selected by Prime Mlnlsler

mnS 'h rtant closes in Hu- new constitutionamended orithout uie approval of allU.ci, ande Berbers of the House of Assembly. ThesehUesth. Mouse. .

to recoaii*

s otsk

thu, guaranteeing theatour positions in the new cabinet

BKSi??lylacii-ledRhodesia, but tney appear willing to give the new" governor

a chance. White emigration dropped considerably this vmrramatic rise last rail-peakinget departures in December


n Top (U)

Bishop Abel truzorewa should emergetrong position ofjth his party winninn atalf the black seats in Parliament. (See chart on page t3 ' lose-

i7IaM,.RttfTndithole, has lost groundecent iwnlhl?

i winMrd of the black seats

ulllr?,rau' the othere internallacks broad popular support but should pickew seats. Chief

^f nuL^ strong political bdse, but M< party could win enough seats toost in the cabinet. P 7

bv auarnPnrTnncontrol overuntrvsid,

S ? exP""din9 the role of the auxiliary forces. SefertSr? Ph! ^'aUraC, T* bJ*Ck supporters-including guerrilla .fS"by ofIenn9 'and and social services. The Bishop is experts toajor amnesty program soon'cfter takinq office that wrnlri


mis. The goverr-wnt is hoping that many of these guerrillas

would agree to join the auxiliary forces. | '

n 3lready cnI?red Jntfl "egotiacions with the vhiton 9 cooperation between their partiesossible nocification of sonc clauses in the new constitutor, chat workisadvantage of the blacks. The Bishop realizes that heeed white

Probable Distribution of Seats in New Rhodesian Parliament

Bishop Abel Muzorewa (United African National Council)

Most likely candidate lor Prime Minister bul would rather place himselfpartisan politics and could opt for the Presidency

Ndabanings Slthole (Zimbabwe African National Unlon/Sithole)

Broke with ZANU eitemal organlretion inopularity acn^arfn the decline inside Rhodes IB.

Chiel Kayisa Ndiweni (United National Federal Party)

Broke with Crurand the transitional govt, early thlt year lode be le based patty- Wouldtalking horse lor rtkomo in the election.

Chief Jerimiah Chirau

(Zimbabwe United People's Organization)

Gen el allystooge" of the whites but recently hasore Independent position calling for an all parties conference before Ihe election and Ihe d'sbanding ol all auiillary forces

support for his nnvernment ando meet with tht- white leaders before the election to discuss possible ministerial appointments, to nlan future government policies, and tooiritstrateavfur obtaining international recognition for the new yovsrnment. |

Once in power, Huzorewa shouic be able to capitalize or. several trends that have becore apparent in recent nonths, including:

eeping political and military rivalry between7APU. With the virtual collapse of negotiationspolitical settlement, each group has cowe increasinglythe otherival in the struggle fora black-ruled

disarray within the ZAPU leadership that has weakened Nkomo's position internationally and within his own organization, making it almost impossible for ZAPU to implement its more grandiose military plans.

--The decline of Nkomo's appeal to whites in Rhodesia

since the downing of two civilian airliners by his guerrillas.

--Growing weariness in Zambia over the economic and political costs of the ouerrilla struggle, which could eventually leadolitical backlash against President Kaundi.

support for the internal settlement in the US Congress and the British Parliament.

African promises to provide substantial political and militaryof militarythe new government of national unity.H

These factors accountrowing confidence amor.'i whites that the internal settlement eventually might succeed. ontinuation of these trends could leadardening of white attitudesrowing

reluctance toolitical deal Kith the guerriI Us. Given the prtibahility that the level ofsid" Rhodesia will escalate, however, most whites probably will continue to support efforts tr, negotiate political sntlfcrnent nth the Marks.


The formation ofblack-led government will open the door toJockeying among the various players in the Rhodesian situation. Muzorcwa, in particular, probably will try to split the guerrillas further bya spp<iratJ alliance with 7JVNU or 7APU.

doshua Nkomo night try to preempt such an alliance by seeking to make his own deal either with Muzorewa, or wUh the whites, thus bringing the fldebeles and the Shonasingle government. White Rhodesian politicians would favoroalition because they see Nromonifying force and regard Mugabe as too radical,

The pressure on Muaabe or Hkumo to consider joining forces with the internal government is likely to mount the more each leader perceives the other as trying to preewt him inettlement. Neither of these rolignaents,ould tip the balance of power in Rhodesi. sufficiently to bring an end to the fighting because each excludes aparticipant who could attract enough foreign support to continue th* guerrilla war. ither could chanqe the complexion the war from one of equilibrium and growing strength on the guerrillas' side-to one of strength for the new government In Salisbury.

Hard Choices Ahead[

The electionovernment of national unity, coupled with aof the fighting, will create some hard choices for the parties involved with the Rhodesian problem. The frontline states will continue to support the guerrillas, but an intensification of the fighting could force Presidents Kaunda of Zambia and Machel of Mozambique into an open-ended commit'Ttent to an increased Soviet and Cuban presence In

their countries. (See yranhic un page II.) Kaunua has consistently resisted any augmentation of the Soviet and Cuban role in Zambia, but he night feel forced to reverse himself if it appeared this was the only way to resolve the conflict and remove the military threat posed to his country by the Rhortesi.fiis. Machel is less concerned about the Soviet and Cuban presence, largely because of his ideological commitment tout he probably isto prevent it frum endangering the pragmatic economic ties he has estjblished withfrica.

In the hope of minimi zing the military spillover into their countries, Kaunda and Machel might consider urging Nkomo and Mugabe toeparate deal with the government in Salisbury. Such ar. approach, however, would risk seriously antagonizing the other frontline states. The frontline presidents also have to consider the possibility of supporting one guerrilla group against the otherontest for power in Rhodesia.

The Soviet and Cuban Role

The common objective of Moscow and Havana is to secure influencelack-ruled Rhodesia, and they have decided that backing ZAPU leader Nkomo is the best means to that end. The electionovernment of .rational unity will not force any inrnediate chanaes on the Soviets or the Cubans. The fighting will continue, and they will support the guerrillas, hoping that the military pressure willettlement favorable to Nkomo. They will play on African fears of Western recognition of the net- government to maintain the momentum of the military option.

Beyond that, the oitions available to the Soviets and Cubans have not fully taken form. They will take their cue from the response of the Africans to efforts by the new government to entice the guerrilla leaders to return to Rhodesia. Should Nkomo return, Moscow and Havana probably would prefer to support him. Even though Nyerere and Machel wouldthe Soviets would weigh the opportunties to Improve their credibility and influence with Zambia against the belief that any friction with Tanzania and Mozambique would only be temporary. |

Nevertheless, Nkono's return to Rhodesia carries with it the risk that Nkomo would cut his ties with the Soviets and the Cubans in the process, thereby leading them to support 7ANU. This assumes that ZAWs military effort does not evaporateesult of large-scale defections to the new government. At the presentoscow and Havana cannot

United National Federal Party

Support Bothd ZAMJ because of the rivalry hf tmjilli then and the potential it holds for an eventual contest between therj Tor power in Rhodesia.

rK cn the uShe UK

The newly elected governmentwill prsRr. the Ml and the

UK to recognize it end liftIt will argue that the

election meets the ucniiids of theUi;ransfer of power to o

black government on the ba^is ofone vot?.|

the new government and lifting sanctions certainly

would strengthen it. Th<?re would be greater white resolve to support the black-led governmentreater willingness amoiig whites in the military tc defend it. Government prospects for attracting large numbers of guerrilla defectors could also be enhanced if the economy improved sufficiently to allow the government to improve social services for the bUcis.

The lifting of sanctions would inprovo the chanevs of stewing Rnodesia's economic decline and would provide substantial economic benefits andajor psychological boost to the internal regime. Worldwide demand hai been increasing for ntany good'; prudur.od by the Rhodesians such as copper, gold, and chrome. I

At the same time,ecision would seriously erode the "special relationship- the US has fostered with black African2diabKin President Kaunda. Tanzanian President Nyerere, end Nigerian President Ouasanjo. They would conclude that the US and the UK had chosen to support the "enemy" and thus would come under increasing pressure fromthc: guerrillas and the Soviets toilitary solution in

asic policy shift would also weaken the credibility of Western support for the UH transitional program for Namibia in the eyes of both the Africans and the white government in Pretoria. In fact, the South Africans probably have already interpreted moves to send US observers to cover the Rhodesian elections as evidenceeneral weakening of US determination to pursue the UN transition program ftr Namibia, giving then more room toinaln their own tarns.

While some African leaders Might support lifting sanctionst were followed by US and UK efforts to include 7AMU or ZAPU in the new government, the frontline African leaders would be further antagonized

allew constitution--providingore rapid transition to full black rule and approvedth blacksne of the fronMine president's resentment, but it would still leave the US and the UK very much in disfavor. |

Pacedefusal by the US *nd the UK to lift sanctions. The internal government would hav? difficulty taking hold, white enigra'iuii orobably would inc.ease as the level of fighting escalated. Whites in the military would begin to question why they were f'ightinn for/ black-led government that was unable to win external support. |

The frontline states and Nigeria would continue to support Anglo-Anerican effortsolitical settlement, on the basis that thewas merely one steprocess that eventually would involveuerrillasegotiated settlement. They probably would remain highly skentical, however, that such efforts would succeed. Meanwhile, regardless of what the US and the UK choose to do, Soviet and Cuban involvement withwith theircontinue to grow. |

Original document.

Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: