WARSAW PACT FORCES OPPOSITE NATO (NIE 11-14-79)

Created: 1/31/1979

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELUGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following mtetigenco organizations participated in the preparation of thc Estimate;

The Ceohol IntrrCgence Aoency, lhe "nleeoene* crfooriioftoni of lhe Deport fnents ot State ond Defense, ond ihe Nolionol Secvirv AQcncy.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief ol Sfolf foe Intelligence. Department of the Army

The DtVectoe of Novol Inlellioence, Deportroonl of the Novy

The Assistonl Oiief ol Sloff. InteUigence, Deportmenl of Ihe Are Force

9

WARSAW PACT FORCES OPPOSITE NATO

PREFACE

This Nalional Inielligence Estimate wai prepared ptitnarily to satisfy the need eipressed by US policymakers and plannerseference document that would record current estimates of Warsaw Pact forces and intelligence judgments about lhe way these forces would be employedar with NATO. It is intended toaseline for any fuithcr studies comparing NATO and Pact forces.

This NIE is the first comprehensive cslimate of Warsaw Pact forces opposite NATOt is the first to attempt an analysis of Pact campaign plans for the European theaters of miliiary operations and the first to integrate naval forces inlo these campaigns. It deals primarily wiih conventional forces and operations; it describes nuclear forces but provides only limited treatment of theater nuclear operations.

The NIE is in two volumes. This volumeummary of thc Estimate. Volume IIetailed discussion of Pact doctrine, theater forces, and operational concepts for war in Europe. It abo describes the main developments and trends in Pact theater forces and discusses those issues which bear most directly on the capabilities of Pact forces lo perform their missions.

CONTENTS

SCOPE NOTE

KEY

PART A. WARSAW PACT POLICY AND DOCTRINE FOR THEATER

Ceneral

Military

Chemical

KcJogical

Electronic

PART B, TRENDS IN WARSAW PACT THEATER

Crounr!

Airborne

Equipment

Air

Tactical Air

Helicopter

Miliiary Transport

NSWP Nalional Air Defense

Ceneral Purpose Naval

Maior Wartime

Theater Nuclear Forces

Tactical Nuclear

Soviet Peripheral Strike Forces

Forces for Chemical

Forces for electronic

Warsaw Pad

ARSAW PACT STRATEGY FOR INITIAL CONVENTIONAL

OPERATIONS ACAINST

Warsaw Pad Command and

v

SUM4 -

The In,m| Campaign ui the Western Theater of Military Operalioos

The Cround

The Air Offensive in Central Europe

Naval Operations in lhe Baltic

Initial Campaigns Against NATO's Hanks

The Southwestern Thealer of Military Operations

The Northwestern Theater of Military Operations

Naval Operations In the North

Potential

PAIIT D. THEATER NUCLEAR

Tactical Nuclear

Nuclear Strikes Against NATO by Soviet Strategic

PART E. PROSPECTS FOR WARSAW PACT THEATER

Factors Affecting Futon

Soviet Perceptions of NATO's Military

aderAip

Economic

Demographic

, ,

Sino-Soviet

Implications for Future Pact Theater

Ground Forces

Air

Ceneral Purpose Naval

Theater Nuclear

Support Systems and

SCOPE NOTE

National Inlelligence Estimates concerned wiih Warsaw Paci forces lhal are available for use againstt assesses the presonl and future capabilities of these forces for conventional, chemical, and theater nuclear warfare. It generallyeriod of five years in its future considerations but extends toears where the information allows. The Estimate does not provide detailed treatment of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border, thc Soviet Pacific Fleet, or other forces in the Soviet Far East Soviet military operations in distant areasATO-Warsaw Pact war are considered in an annex to volume II.

The Estimate treats the following elements of the Pact's military

forces;

Grouod Forces. The ground forces (including airborne and heliborne forces) of thc USSR. East Germany, Poland,Hungary. Romania, and Bulgaria and their organic air defense and tactical nuclear systems.

Air and Air Defense Forces. Soviet Frontal (tactical) Aviation, Military Transport Aviation, and the bombers of Soviet Long Range Aviation, as well as the tactical air and national air defense forces (including ground-based systems) of thc non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries.

Naval Forces. The general purpose submarines, surface ships, aircraft, auxiliaries, and amphibious forces of the three western Soviet fleets and the NSWP navies.

Soviet Ballistic Missile Forces for Peripheral Attack. Those Soviel land-based (MRBMs, IRBMs. and ICBMs) and submarine-launched (SLBMs) ballistic missiles which are available for use againsi NATO in the European theater.

*Po> (he. of Iht) Efllmate, Pact tcneral parpcaeround ind air forcervillaMc lot eariV against NATO Indvdc thoae located In ihe non-SotterPact (NSWP) natlorohc USSft'rBeloeuuUn, CupattUn. Leedoorad.Kiev. Nodi Ciueaoo, and TtunvanB Miliury DiBHel. Foroca In lhe Moacwr. Voler, Oral, aod TurfcwUo Miliiary Diatrfcu could be. aaal atrdn* NATO or eUcwltcrc Abo Iriehided In (hii Katimate are Pact ceneral punne naval force) la (he (hra rat erafleet Ineludlne lhe Mediterranean Squadron, and the NSWPell at Se-id tmicdc force* otikh could be ernnloycd loilrut European Urcrueripheral attack rolr-

hose activities and organizations which support and integrate Pact forces, such as command, control, and communications systems and logistic services.

Other recently completed National Intelligence Estimates and Interagency Intelligence Memorandums contain comprehensiveof some issues thai arc given summary treatment in this document.

, Soviet Coats and Expectations in the Clobal Power Arena, describes the broad strategic and political considerations which shape the Soviet defense posture.

arsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications for NATO Warning of War. assesses Pad attack options in Central Europe and lhe intelligence basis for our estimate of NATO's warning time

there.

oviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the, and. Soviet Strategic Forces for Peripheral Attack, contain detailed estimates of Soviet stralegic forces available for use against

NATO.

oviet Military Capabilities To Project Power and Influence in Distant Areas.

Nl. Indications and Warning of Soviet Intentions To Use Chemical WeaponsATO-Warsaw Pact War.

TtiS

KEY JUDGMENTS

Warsaw Paci Policy and Doctrine for Theater Warfare

It is Soviet policy lo acquire and maintain forces capable of successfully fightingonventional or nuclear war in Europe and lolear numerical advantage over NATO in important military assets. Soviet leaders stress the need for large, combat-ready forces to be in place at the outset of hostilities. They intend any future European conflict to take place on Western, not Eastern, territory.

The Soviet Union views control of its East European allies as vital to its national interests. The East European members of the Pact provide sizable forceserritorial buffer between NATO and the Soviet Union. (Seehe presence or proximity of large, well-equipped Soviet forces gives the Soviets considerable leverage in exerting control over these countries, thus safeguarding the integrity of the Warsaw Pact The Soviets also value their military strengtheans of influencing European domestic and foreign policy decisions and deterring political or military developments which might alter the balance of power to their disadvantage. They do not, however, measure the military balance In Europe in isolation from the larger, global balance and, accordingly, arc inclined to be very cautious in lhe use of military force in Europe,)

Our analysis of Soviet nuclear policy and doctrine has led us to the following judgments:

Thc Soviets believe that the initial stagesonflict probably would be conventional, and they would preferATO-Pact conflict remain nonnuclear, but they expect that it would eventually involve thc use of nuclear weapons.

There is evidence that "the Soviets nowore flexible policy for tlie use of tactical nuclear weapons, but they apparently have not sought to match NATO's capacity for accurate and selective use of very low yield nuclear weapons, and they remain profoundly skeptical of. the posriblity of controlling escalation.

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Wc cannot piedicl how lhc Sovicls would respondimited and selective NATO use of nuclear weapons or the conditions under which lhe Soviets might initiate nuclear operationsATO-Pact war.)

Preemption continues toeature of Soviet nuclear doctrine.

Improvements in the USSR's forward-based nuclear forces would permit the Soviets toactical nuclear war at relatively high levels of intensity without having to use USSR-based systems. Nonetheless, the Soviets" continued modernization of USSR-based peripheral strike systems^

"^argues that they still expect to have to resort lo the use of these weapons at some stage of theater nuclear war.

lie Soviets are clearly planning against the contingency that chemical weapons might be usedar between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Theyontinuing, vigorous program to equip and train Pact forces for operationsoxic environment and haveariety of chemical agents and delivery systems. We are divided, however, on the question of Soviet policy for the first use of chemical weapons. Somehat it is unlikely that the Warsaw Pact would initiate offensive chemical warfare before the advent of nuclear war. but that the Pact's first use under these circumstances cannot be entirely excluded. Othersheretrong possibility that the Soviets would initiate chemical warfareonventional conflict.f volume II contains the rationale underlying these views.)

Trends in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces

he past decade was marked by vigorous modernization of Soviet theater forces facing NATO. This modernization wasby some increase in thc manpower of thein thcnd earlythe number of weapons in units was increased and as support requirements grew to accommodate more, increasingly sophisticated hardware. Modernization of thc Soviet theater forces is evidently continuing at much the same pace, along with modest, commensurate growth in manpower. The non-Soviet Warsaw Pad (NSWP) forces have shared in the Soviet buildup, although at a

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Secu-ltu Aienev: and lhe Senior tniMiteneel eaeh ol ihe cniioon,

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slower pace and willi uneven results, especialfv in llie more expensive tactical air ind missile forces and in ground force armor replacement program* (VI. ])

C. Motivated bv the prospectonnuclear phase of hostilities and iheir recognitioneed for strong conventional forces even in the event of nuclear war. the Soviets have especially sought to improve their conventional force capabilities. Since thehey have significantly increased manpower, tanks, artillery, armed helicopters, and air defense. They have been equipping (heir tactical air forces with aircraft having increased performance and load-carrying capacity. During this period the flexibility and conventional war potential of Sovicl naval forces also have been improved bv the acquisition of more capable ships, submarines, and aircraft.

At the same time, the; Soviets have continued to increase the sire of their theater nuclear forces and Improve their flexibility. Since thehey have Introduced nuclear-capable artillery systems, increased their surface-to-surface tactical missile launchen in Central Europe, assigned nuclear missions to additional tactical aviation units, and areew-generation intermediate-range ballistic missileew bomber. Thc Soviet Navy has also added systems which improve its capability to wage theater nuclear war.

Pad theater forces have emergedecade of change with their fundamental orientation on the tank intact, bulore balanced structure for conventional war and with both conventional and nuclear firepower greatly increased. These changes, along with an infusion of more modem technology, have made Soviet theater forces competitive with leading Western armies in sophistication ofand equipment.

Our analysis of ihese developments permits thc following additional conclusions:

Soviets are aware of the improved technology and growing numbers of NATO antitank weapons, but this awareness has not led to any diminution of their tank forces or any major change in the way they see ihese forces performing. Indeed, they have made even further increases to their lank strength and have begun producing new tank modeb. (II, 7)

Soviets areigorous program to Increase thc effectiveness of their air munitions to. exploit the enhanced capabilities of their newer aircraft. Tlie role of Frontal Aviation for delivering tactical nuclear weapons clearly is expanding. (II,)

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The Soviet Navy in the past decade has significantly improved its capability to participateact-NATO war and now can undertake combat operations at greater distances from home waters. The introduction of new classes of submarines. Backfire bombers, and new missile systems has especially improved thc Soviet Navy's strike capability against NATO surface)

Since thehe Pact hasnified command and control doclrine and has begunodernize ils command and control procedures and

Pact ground'force logistic capacity has also been improved, notably by large additions to motor transport and tlie development of improved support organizations and equipment.

e have also identified the following significant weaknesses which could adversely affect thc performance of Pact theater forces:*

Pact tactical air pilots ire not as effectivelyUSthey should be to exploit fully thc capabilities of the airframes and weapon systems of the third-generation aircraft currently In operation.

Lack of automated equipment, or other means for timely ond accurate location and reporting of mobile or semimobtle targets, is believed tourrent weakness of Soviet

USSR's antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities on thc whole are such lhat its forces in most wartime situation! would probably be unable to detect the presence of US and most other NATO submarines before attacks on Soviet surface ships. Crucial shortromings are lack of long-range submarine detection devices, high radiated noise levels of Soviet submarines relative to those of the West, and lack of seaborne lactical air cover to protect deployed surface ship ASW forces.)

Warsaw Pact Strategy for Initial Conventional Operalions Against NATO

he USSR has developed conlingency plans for military operations on all Pact land frontiers. The Soviets clearly expect Central Europe to be the decisive arenaar with NATO and assign it the

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liighcsl priority in tho allocation of military manpower and equipment. The Soviet* alio have plans for offensive action in other NATO regions, bul we have little direct evidence on the Pact's view of the timing of these flank offensives in relation to an offensive in Central Europe. Wc judge, however, lhal the Pact would be unlikely toar by mounting maior ground offensives against all NATO sectorsTo do so would unnecessarily extend available Pact forces, airlift, and air and logistic support and would complicate command and conirol at the Ceneral Slaff and Supreme High Command levels. Moreover, there would be political considerations that would lead the Soviets to defer attacks on some NATO counlries in thc hope of encouraging their nonbclligerence.)

believe that lhe need for unfettered naval operationsNorthern Fleet bases would almost certainly cause the SovietsNATO facilities in northern Norway, and probably to attemptsome territory there, and that the urgency of this needthem to do so concurrently with starting an attack inWe would also expect concurrent atlacks on US naval forcesMediterranean. None of thc other poteniial flank offensiveshave that degree of urgency, although the Pact would be likelyagainsi the Turkish Straits earlyar. (IV, 5)

Warsaw Pad's success in achieving its wartimedepend on its ability to control and coordinateoperations of great complexity.^

Pad's command and control system

assessment of the system's strengths and weaknesses leads us to fudge that it is adequate to alert forces and control mobilization, and to conirol combat operations. This assessment is discussed in detail in chapter HI of volume II.

he ultimate authority for the direction of lhc Soviet military rests with thc Politburo and the Soviet Ceneral Staff, but wc believe thatar occur between the Watsaw Pad and NATO, theatcr-lcvel commands would be established and exercise dired operational control over fronts and fleets and at leas! some degree of control over those strategic assets allocated to support theater operations. Unlike NATO, the -Warsaw pact does not have theater headquarters in being in peacetime, allhough hardened command posts have been constructed for at least some Pact wartime headquarters.)

rrangements for exercising control of Pad forces within what the Soviets call the Western (or European) Theater of War have been evolving over the last few years. Wc now'have evidence that indicates

the commander in chief of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact would control all Pact forces in this theater in wartime. The Soviets plan to divide thc Western Theater of War into three land Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs) in which they expect Pact and NATO forces to come in conflict. These wouldorthwestern TVD (the Leningrad Military District and the Scandinavianestern TVD (East Cermany. Poland. Czechoslovakia, and the western USSR in the east and West Cermany. lhe Benelux countries, Denmark, and possibly France in theouthwestern TVD (Creece, Turkey, and probably northern Italy andn area in the Norwegian Sea north of the Crcenland-Iceland-United KingdomK) gap probably would bcaritime TVD. and would include the Northern Fleet. Thc forces of the Baltic and Black Sea Combined Fleets initially would Iw under the control of the Western and Southwestern TVDcalled High Commands by the Soviets. Thc senior field command would be thc front, an organization which is similarATO army group in size, level of command, and function and which consists of three to five ground armies and an air armyircrafL

ur consideration of likely Pact operations in the Western TVD during the initial phaseonventional war has resulted in the following key findings:

Soviet military strategy callsassive and rapid ground offensive into NATO territory in Central Europe to defeat NATO forces, disrupt mobilization, and seize or destroy ports and airfields to prevent reinforcement. (IV, 7)

Except in extraordinarily urgent circumstances, the Pact would prefer to prepare athree-front force before initiating hostilities in Central Europe. Wc believe the Pact would begin to organize at least five fronts for use in Central Europe from the time of the decision to go to full readiness- There is virtually no chance the Soviets would attacktanding start*)

planners regard early attainment of air superiority and destruction of much of NATO's tactical nuclear forces to be critical to the Pact's chances for victory in the theater. The Pact plans to achieve these objectives byarge-scale, theater wide conventional air offensive during the first several days of hostilities.)

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Tlic broad objectives of Pact naval operations in the Baltic would bc to gain complete control of the Baltic Sea and access to tbe North Sea to sever NATO's lines of communication in thc Norlh Sea. and deprive NATO of potential launch areas for carrier strikes against Pact air and ground forces in thc Central Hen ion. Failure to obtain air superiority and sea control probably would force (he Pact to reconsider its planned amphibious operations in the western Baltic.

s for operations in the Southwestern TVD. our conchrsions are as follows.

Pact would confine its initial ground operations to the Turkish Straits area, Austria, and possibly eastern Turkey, ln addition, at the onsetar. air and naval attacks would almost certainly be mounted against NATO forces In these areas and in the Mediierranean.)

The Pact views early seizure of the Turkish Straits as crucial to the success of Its maritime strategy in the Southwestern TVD.)

While the Soviets mightimited offensive into eastern Turkey, wc have no evidence that they would undertake operations against Iran during an initial phasc.)

Soviet naval operations in the Meditenanean would begin at the startar and would be aimed primarily at the destruction of Wcslern ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and aircraft carriers.)

the most immedialc threat would come from Soviet ships and submarines already deployed in lhe Meditenanean, numerically tlte most sizable threat to NATO's naval forces there would come from missile-equipped Soviet strike aircraft, despite the fact that they would bc operating without fighter escort)

e have good evidence that as part of the offensive by the Pact's Maritime Front the Soviet Black Sea Fleet would attempt to secure control of the Black Sea, support lhc movement of Pact ground forces along the western littoral, and assist in seizing the Turkish Straits. To assist in thc achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the amphibious force, the SovieU probably would retain in lhc Black Sea at least sortie of lhcir available larger combatants equipped for ASW and wiih surface-to-air missilesas Moskvas. Karas. Kashins, and Krivaks. There is disagreement in the Intelligence Community on thc numbers of larec surface combatants which would be retained in

Black Sea rather lhan deployed lo lhe Mediterranean before thc oulbreak of hostilities)

n the Northwestern TVD our information indicates that:

Initial Soviet objectives jn the Northwestern TVD center on ensuring freedom of aciion and uninhibited access to the open ocean for Soviet naval ships aiK| ai,Craft and on maintaining (he forward defense of the extensive complex of naval bases and stral^ic installationsn lhc Kola Peninsula.)

-Initial operations by Soviet land forces probably would be limited lo northern Norway. We have no evidence indicating that the Soviets planeneral offensive against Finland or Sweden earlyar.)

amphibious ships carrying upegiment of Soviet naval infantry probably would attempt to seize limited objectives along the northern Norwegian coast. Initial amphibiousprobably would be confined to the coast of Finnmark. under conditions suitable for an early linkup with tbe ground forces.)

Soviets probably would notarge-scale airlwnc assault in northern Norway, because the demands for air transport elsewhere against NATO probably would preclude early useormation as largeomplete airborne division.

oviet strategy in the North Atlantic calls for theof control of the Norwegian and Barents Seas andImplementation oftrategy probably wouldo. the Northern Fleet's submarines and virtually all of theand aircraft in an effort to exclude NATO forces from tbeSoviets probably also plan some submarine operations fartherNorth Atlantic to prevent transit of NATO carriers andgroups and to divert NATO naval strength. The Sovieisto neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and inSea before they could launch their missiles. To this endwould initiate submarine and air operations againstforces as they exit their bases in Europe and possiblyfrom US bases as well. In addition, at least someattack shipping engaged in resupply and reinforcementearlyar. There is disagreement in thcover the extent to which thc Soviets would wagecampaign and over their capabilities for doing so and II. '

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Nuclear Operations

he primary objective appears lo bc lhe destruction, of means for waging nuclear war. appear toain concern

in Soviet tactical nuclear planning military targets, particularly NATO's Limiting collateral damage does not

Prospects for Warsaw Pact Theater. Forces

n thU Estimate we do notetailed analysis of theactors lhat motivate thc Soviets' military policy toward Europe and the development of their theater forces. These factors are discussed in detail in, Soviet Coals and Expectations in the Cbbal Power Arena. We proceed from the premise thai the developments we currently observe in Warsaw Pact theater forces opposite NATO represent thc sorts of activities necessary to maintain and gradually improve the capabilities of these large standing forces. They are the activit.es necessary to replace obsolete or wornout equipmenl and to tncorporalc new weapons and tactics which flowigorous Soviet research and development program. They portend no large, short-term change in lhe general size or character of ihese forces. (VI.lthough we believe this loalid premise, we haveumber of factors which conceivably could alter :t: -Nothing in NATO's currcn. or foreseeable defense programs is likely to precipttale any major change in the level of Pact efforts

'Crm-arge-scale deployment by NATOew theater nuclear delivery system (suchround-launched cruise missile) could cause an upswing in Pact efforts, especially in air defense. (VI. 4)

Soviet leaders will undoubtedly emerge from the ranks of lhe present group, which is responsible for creating current Pact lorces and is committed to maintaining Soviet military strength in Europe. The new leaders will likely seek to avoid moves that would antagonize large segments of the military. (VI, 5)

the decline in Soviet economic growth and the economic difficulties of such NSWP counlries as Poland andwe find no evidence that suggests the Soviets will cut back resources for theater forces. Indeed, we have reliable evidence lhat some NSWP countries plan modest increases in defense spending. (VI. 7)

During the next decade thc number of young people reaching draft age each year will decline in most Pactrend that will complicate the allocation of manpower between thc armed forces and industry, but this manpower squeeze is not expected to produce any decline in military personnel strength.

Despite continuing scientific advances we foresee nobreakthrough that could leadajor change in either the

size or character of the Pact theater forces.

llhough the expansion in manpower which characterized Pact theater forces during thendas slowed, we expect some gradual increase in manpower in Pact ground and air combat units opposite NATO over the next decade as ongoing programs are implemented The overall number of ground and air combat units opposite NATO is expected to remain at or near its current level,odest decline is anticipated in lhe number of general purpose naval ships and submarines.

Pact nations will continue lo improve the weaponsIn their theater forces opposite NATO. Majorand deployment programs which are clearly inexpected to continue. In addition, the Soviets will no doubt seeksome entirely new weapons and support systems. Certainsystems, such as laser or television-guided munitions, arctesting. Still other Pactas enhancedand advanced cruiseemerge in reactionweapons programs or force improvements.

Forces. Barring an agreement on mutualforce reductionshe number and disposition offorce divisions opposite NATO are likely to remainthc period of ihis Eslimale. allhough expandedand the formation of new nondivisional unitsaccount for moderate increases in manpower and equipment.no development over lite nexl several years whichalter the basic Pad strategy of an armor-heavyNATO in Central Europe. Despilc NATO's substantialcapability for antitank warfare. Pad planners will continuethe tank as the backbone of their ground assault forces.

actical Air Forces. We believe thai thc number of fixed-wing aircraft in Soviet Frontal Aviation opposite NATO will remain essentially unchanged over the next decade. Efforts to improve the quality of Soviet tactical aircraft and munitions are likely to coniinue, although thc rale of new aircraft deploymenl is expected lo slow as the

Soviets meel their current force objectives. Furthermore, we eipect the Soviets to continue improving their support and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioeiectronic combalnddata link systems. Wc expect in the next decade that several additional Soviet and NSWP combat helicopter regiments, primarily Ior ground atiack, will be formed. No major changes are expected in lhe number of fixed-wing aiicraft in the NSWP air forces. NSWP equipment modernization will conlinuc to proceed gradually and be driven largely by economic considerations.

eneral Purpose Naval Forces. During the next decade, developments in Hie Soviet Navy willorce wiih improved capabilities to perform its peacetime and wartime missions. The Soviets will have mixed success with programs to correct shortcomings in submarine detection, fled air defense, logistic support, andDevelopments over the past decade have been so rapideriod of time may be required lo integrate and consolidate advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. Weodest decline in the overall number of Soviet general purpose naval ships and submarines but newer and more capable units will, be replacing older and less effective ones.

Nuclear Forces. Over the next decade the Sovieistheir ongoing programs to improve their peripheralforces and to eliminate the imbalance in battlefieldthey perceive in thc European theater. Forceoul to date and ongoing deployment of new systemsthe flexibility wiih which the Soviets can employnuclear forces. The introduction of nuclear-capable artillerylow-yield tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systemsaccuracy to permit employment in close proximity

Control, and Communications. We estimateone week currently would be required before the Pact'slinks could be established to thcater-lcvc)to supporting, strategic commands. Communications,and the fronts and within the fronts, to conlrolby divisions and armies could be effectivelya few days. However, thc Pad has two programs undercreationentralized command structure and thca unified communicationsduring thc period ofcould shorten thc time required by the Pact to getand control system prepared for war. Tlie Iwo programslo establish in peacetime thc theater-level (High Command)

ISSUES

During lhe preparation of this Estimate disagreements among NFIB agencies aroseumber ofkey. mostof which are contained in this section. Parenthetical references at the end of each gist are to chapters (Roman numbers) and paragraphs (Arabic" numbers) in volume II of the Estimate.

of Soviet Initiation of Chemical Warfare inWar. All agencies are agreed that, oncewar began, the Warsaw- Pact would not be constrained in Itschemical weapons. With respect to the question of Soviet policyfirst use of chemical weapons before thc advent of nuclearare two views. CIA and State judge that It is unlikely theinitiate such use, although the possibility cannot beDIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Fores believe that there ispossibility of such use.)

of Soviet Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRDs)an Independent Tank BattalionSA, Army^andbelieve that all MRDs in Eastern Europe have an

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wartime. DIA and CIA estimate that two-thirds of the Soviet MRDs in pastern Europe have ITBs but that few. if any, in thc western USSR do.

of Soviet Career Noncommissioned PersonnelAll agencies agree that the Soviets are seeking toto serve as career noncommissioned personnelof their mandatory service. CIA, NSA. and Statethe Soviets have had little success because of the harsh conditionsservice DIA. Army, and Air Force believe that thereevidence to support conclusions about the planned scopeSoviets' recruiting programs or their success in implementingalso believe that,ombination of incentives on theand pressure from the political organization on the other,should be able to overcome any difficulties in recruitingpersonnel.)

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c. Soviet Capability To Activate Reserve Submarines. CIA estimates that no reserve submarines with their crews could be brought to combat readiness in less thanays. DIA and Navy estimate that six toeserve submarines could bc brought to operational status in SO daysotal ofoubmarines inays.)

Long-Range Airborne Antisubmarine WarfareCIA and NSA estimate that theircraftoperational radius ofautical miles with three hourstime andm with no on-station time. DIA,Air Force hold that.the maximum radius with three hourstimem.)

Emphasis, and Timing of the SovietAgainst NATO Sea Lines of CommunicationsNSA, and State judge that the Soviets would not likely attemptSLOC interdiction campaign unless they hadNATO carrier and amphibious forces without losingNSA futther believes that the extent and degree of ancampaign is largely scenario dependent and that En awhere the outcome is in serious doubt, thc attractiveness ofin advanceonflict goes up. DIA and Navythe Soviets consider SLOC interdiction of such significance,submarine inventory of sufficient size, as to warrant usenumbers of altack submarines in this efforttheir other missions.)

Capabilities ToLOC IntcrdicliooCIA and State estimate that the USSR's ability toships in the open ocean would bc significantly constrainedtorpedo loads. lack of replenishment opportunities,time, long transits, combat attrition, and limitedDIA and Navy judge that these limitations are sensitivetiming, manner, and level at which hostilities begin, but inare noi sufficient to prevent the Soviels from mountingSLOC threat.

i. Torpedo Capacities ol Soviel Allack Submarines. In suppori of its posilion thai Soviet SLOC interdiction capabilities ate cxmslrained by submarine torpedo capacities. CIA hnsable (tablehich assumes that all submarines carry torpedoescnlimeteis in8 metersIA believes lhalemong) probably could Ik? substituted for each of up to six of the longer torpedos in most classes, thereby substantially increasing wartime torpedo loads.

J. Role of Ihe Backfire Bomber. CIA, State. NSA, and Navy estimate that tbe performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, .and exercise participation nf thc Backfire, as well as Soviet statements concerning this aircraft, point lo peripheral strike as ils primary mission. DIA, Army, and Air Force estimate that the Backfireong-range bomber with the capability to strike US targets on unrefueled range and radius missions. They agree that it will have significant peripheral missions but note that the Soviets have tlie option to use the Backfire's intercontinental capabilities. Thus, in their view, the Backfireignificant threat to the contiguous Uniled States as well as to areas on the Soviet periphery. The reader is referred toor information on performance data.)

k. Capabilities of Soviet Motor Transport in Wartime. CIA and State believe that the peacetime shortage of cargo vehicles in Category II and III divisions and in army- and front-level motor transport units and thc heavy reliance in wartime on mobilized civilian trucks and reservist drivers point to potential weaknesses in the wartime logistic system, particularly in the early stagesonflict. DIA and Army believe that the Estimate understates the capability of wartime Soviet motor transport. In support of this position they point out that thc mobilization system provides for filling out lower category units with vehicles and drivers for war, that civilian trucks are often identicalhose in military service, that Soviet vehicles designated for mobilization are inspected by military teams, that reservist drivers would be performing duties related to their civilian occupation, and that the Croup of Soviet Forces In Cermany alreadyift capability that exceeds its requirements.)

I. Warsaw Pact Personnel Replacement Syslem in Wartime. CIA. State, and NSA judge that unit replacement is thc Warsaw Pact's preferred system for replacing combat personnel. DIA and Army believe that thc Pact would use both an individualnit replacement system and that the system usedarticular case would depend upon thc situation. They further believe that individual replacement would be used primarily in cases of steady, attrition-type

16

riZSiWn.

ftl UW.

losses, while unit replacement would be used primarily in cases of large, sudden losses.)

m. Pact Initiation of Warwo-Front Posture Alter Four Days of Preparation. All agencies agree lhat. because lour days would allow only minimal preparations, which would entail serious risks, the Pact would initiate war from this posture only in extraordinarily time-urgent circumstances. CIA and State believe (hat the Pact would lake such action only if il perceived (he threat of an imminent NATO altack DIA. NSA. Army. Navy, and Air Force hold lhal the Soviets might choose to attack with the two-fiont forceariety of urgentroader treatment of (his issue is given in)

n. Likely Effectivenessarsaw Pact Air Offensive (the "Airn Central Europe. CIA and Stale concludeassive Pact air offensive at tlte outsetar would do considerable damage to NATO's air and air defense forces, but probably would not be so effective as to prevent NATO's air forces from being able lo deliver nuclear weaponsarge scale DIA and Air Force believe thai no judgment with any useful level of confidence on (he effectiveness of an air operation is possible at (his time because wc lack adequate analysis of the factors involved which apply to both NATO and the Pact and of thc interaction of the forces of both sides.

o. Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air Superiority and Sea Control ia the Baltic Sea. CIA. NSA. and State conclude thai the allocation of mos( Pact tactical and LRA bomber aircraftargescale Air Operation in West Cermany and (he Benelux countries would severely reduce (he probability of the Pact's achieving air superiority over (he Baltic in lhc initial stagear. Also, Pact ASW foices would be unable to prevent NATO submarine attacks against Pact amphibious forces. DIA and Air Force believe lhat there has been insufficient analysis of thc factors and assumptions which would supportonclusion. Navy believes that the achievement of air superiority is but oneumber of factors which, taken together, will determine (he outcome of tho Pact's Baltic campaign.)

p. Augmentation of Soviet Naval Forces in the Mediterranean by Black Sea Surface Combatantseriod of Tension Prior to Hostilities. CIA and Slate estimate that (he Soviets would deploy few, if any. combatants to augment their Mediterranean Squadron because the ships are needed more in the Black Sea for fleet air defense and ASW in support of Pact operations against the Turkish Straits. DIA. NSA, and Navy conclude that the Soviets would augment with at least a

17

-lop-S*

lap fa^Htft.

lew. and possibly udodern Black Sea surface units because (hey would be of greater value in the Mediterranean than in the Black Sea {IV,U4)

q. Number of Submarines Soviets Would Employ in lhe North Atlantic SLOC Interdiction Role. CIA. NSA. and State judge that aboutubmarines would be dispersed in North Atlantic shipping lanes for rr-connaissance and atlacks against shipping and naval targets of opportunity. Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling off major NATO naval bases to report on NATO movements and attack major warships. DIA and Navy believe thai,ypical initial wartime deployment, someubmarines would be positioned astride NATO's sea lines of communication to attack warships and ships carrying critical materiel to Europe fn the initial phasear. The number of Soviet submarines dedicated to this effort would bc scenario dependent.)

r. Potential Effectiveness of Soviet Naval Operations in the North Allantic.f chapler IV consider that thc evident technical limitaiions of the weapons and sensors on Soviet ships, submarines, and aircraft could impact significantly on Soviet efforts to control the Norwegian and Barents Seas, allhough the mutually supportive aspects of some operalions may offsel certain technical weaknesses. DIA and Navy believe that these paragraphs shouldore balanced appraisal of poteniial effectiveness and that, as now phrased, they lend to overstress the weaknesses of Soviet platforms; thev tend to give inadequate consideration of strengths, induding the operation of these platformsutually supportive force; and they tend to assess effectiveness in tactical contexts which are unrealistic.)

s. Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges that, under certain circumstances, nuclear operations al sea would not await employment of nuclear weapons on land. All other agencies estimate that the USSR would bc unlikely to initiate the use of nuclear weapons at seaar was being foughl with only conventional weapons against NATO in Europe)

t. Speed of New Soviet Nuclear-Powered Atlack (SSN) and Nuclear-Powered Cuided Missile (SSCN) Submari ncs. DIA and Navy estimate that tlte maximum speeds for some of the new SSN and SSCN classes could reachnols. CIA estimates that these submarines will be capable of speeds up lonots.

Htj ityj

u. Effectiveness of (hc Soviel Aircralt Carrier Kiev and lit Impact Upon lhc Evolution ol Soviet Naval Missions. CIA and Stale believeew ships of this class do notignificant improvement in Soviet capabilities toar with NATO. Thev. and NSA. believe thai, although it mayafor turning point in thc development of the Soviet Navy, it is premature to judge the impact of the acquisition of carrien upon thc evolution of naval missions. DIA and Navy hold that the introduction of the Kievajoi watershed in llie development of the Soviel Navy, has influenced thc acquisition of other future ships, and lias alreadyignificant influence on naval operations.)

v. Propulsion of Large Combatant Being Fitted Oul inCIA believes that the evidence Is loo ambiguous to classify the ship as to propulsion. DIA and Navy hold that this ship probably is nuclear powered.

Jop-Swet-BUff-

PARI A

WARSAW PACT POUCY AND DOCTRINE FOR THEATER WARFARE

Consideroliont

1 ll is Soviet policy lo acquire and maintain forces capable of successfully fightingonventional orr In Europe and lolearadvantage over NATO in importanl militarySoviet leaders stress the coed lor large, combat-ready forces lo be in place al lhe outset ol hostilities They intend any future European coo (bet to take place on Western, not Eastern, territory.

The Soviet Union views control of lis Eastallies as vital to Its national interests The East European members of the Pact provide sizable forceserritorial buffer between NATO and the Soviet Union. The presence or proximity of large, well-equipped Soviet fotces gives the Soviels considerable leverage In exerting control over these countries, thus safeguarding thc Integrity of the Pact The Soviets abo value Iheir military strengtheans of Influencing European domestic and foreign policy decisions and deterring political oi military developments which might alter the balance of power to their disadvantage. They do not, however, measure the military balance In Europe In Isolation from the larger, global balance and. accordingly, are inclined to be very cautious in thc use of military force In Europe.

Soviet expenditures for general purpose ground, air. aod naval forces, as well as for those strategic attack: forces directed primarily at Eurasian targets, arc an important Indicator of the USSR's emphasis on developing and maintaining Its theater forceThe Central Intelligence Agency estimates that, ol total Soviet defense spending during tlie. almostercent was devoted toand operation of theater forces. (Seeoughly throe-fourths of these outlays can be directly attributed to those theater lorces arrayed opposite

1 For in eiptndrd dbeunSon of Ssilrt biISUiv poller InCoauCnxvUHdiu tn iht CtoUl

NATO. Dunne ihu period, procurement of weapons, equipment, and spare parts accounted for more than three quarters of the USSR's outlays for theater forces.

/vuTitory Policy

trong. In-depth defense of thc liomeland is basic to Soviet military doctrine. Moscow'sstrategy also dictates that Warsaw Pact forces protect the Soviet homeland and lines olso that an offensive or counteroffenslve could be successfully carried out We find no evidence of an intent on the part of the Soviets merely to defend territory. On the contrary, the hallmiri ot Soviet militaryffensive action. It provides the motive force behind the Soviet emphasis on high combat readiness, the desire to seize (Im Iniiiallve, and the requirement for substantial numerical superiority In the main battle areas, backed by strong reserves, to ensure the momentum of lhc attack. Pact theater force developments over lhe past decadenterna tic effort lo meet these doctrinal requirements forconventional and nudear offensives in lhe European theater.

Soviet leaders conclude that the Initial stagesATO-Warsaw Pact conflict probably would be fought with conventional weapons. We believe that they would prefer thatonflict remainin order to avoid the catastrophic cortscqucssccs oi nuclear war and to lake advantage ef theirIn conventional ground forces In Central Europe. Nevertheless, theyigh probability tliat war would Involve thc use of nuclear weapons initiated cither by NATO lo avoid defeat In Europe or by the USSR if the war were going badly for the Pact. We believe that Soviet doctrine emphasizes counlerlorce rather than countcrvalue strikes.

Int was Soviet policy to retaliate against any NATO nudear initiativehea-terwide strike. Byowever, the Soviets had

Estimated Soviet Expenditures lor

0 Rubin*

TO

C Pccenua. DlHribuUon

of Eallrnatad Total CapendlHn-aa.iatT-rr

wbto.

10S7 aa

o- So-*.

Ten;,

Si'ilegic An.cl ind Oefente Fore, a

Supportllack Fofcca

o.wnh US

B. Irtde. of Growth of Estimated TotalProcurern.nl and Operation ofGeneral Purpos.In

Capandliuraa ahown ir, chart. OandCj

or.and opvrallan of ganaral purpoae, porinh-

1rad horn ourrll. dalaloyadnd lha coal, aaaociiied with thatah.n

in NIEhichap.ndi.ure*

al .flirt tore,aod-^a,ot

m aipan-Seures to-pu.pow .nd penpNeral

lorcr shown bins

mibarying, and

,:- Warat pvrpoaa or poripharal al-lack loica

l nucWwoapoo, allocaiad lo ceneral purpoi. and panpnard arlaek. LUeiWM moat of lha nu-claar waapona ara uUUad t- w. atratagicl nuoWa. weapon, coataaan includad -an bSoaaudaar waapon. toulfoinrt .ipondHur..

ol auppori (orcaawnn Generalndack forcaa

n-

policywe ol* raueleac

weapons againsi NATO Alternative responses thm liaveeast been examined include:

responses to NATO's (im. small-tale use of nuclear weapons.

Responses at the lower end ol lhe nuclearwithI' strike* br lor ward-based sysiems rather (han with thcatetwitle strides In-volvinc USSR-based systems

Escalation of lhc mlrnsity of nuclear strikes over time.

espite the Soviets' havingolicy lor thc more flexible use of Uctical nuclear weapons, and notwithstanding the impressive Improvements thev have made in forward-based lactical nuclearthey have not sought to match NATO'sfor accurate and selective use of very-low-yield nudear weapons. Although they have evidently been working on nudear artillery for at leastears and have nuclear-capable artillery tsnlU in the western USSR, they do not appear to have given high priotily to fielding It In Central Europe. Abo, iheir armory ol tactical nudear warheads hutrong trend toward higher rather than lower vleltkL

though the Soviet! now have Ihe necessary forces and employment doctrines to conduct limited nuclear war in Central Europe, we believe that they remainof thc possibility of controlling escalation.

n sum. we cannot predict how the Soviets might respondimited and selective NATO firstuclear weapons or to their perception of NATO's preparations (ot the imminent use of nuclear weapons. They might conocivably continue purely nonnuclear operations, or they might respond with small-scale nudear strikes of their own They might alsoheatcrwide nuclear slrikeC

either can we be certain of lhc circumrtanco under which the Soviets might themselves Initiate nuclear operationsATO-Warsaw Pact war

C

72

_i

reemption continues toeature of Soviet

theater nuclear duel tin

e have considered whether lhe Soviets havetrategy of "decoupling- nuclear wti in Central Europe from the cmplcytDent of peripheral systems. We have found no direct evidence oftrategy In lecenl Soviet militaiy writings orfrom other human sources. However, theIncreases in the number and Quality of Pact tadical nuclear sysiems In Central Europe havethe Factapacity to conduct nuclear war ihere at relatively high intensities without having to resort to USSR-based systems. LT*

nuclear, although restricii"ci lo lhe ihreater level It not tilled out Tlte Soviet! probably ice an advantage in limiting llie use ol nucleai weapons lo lhe theater level, bul tliey continue to plan and ptcpaie againstikelihood lhat theater nuclear war would Involve itrikei on Ihe USSH and escalate lo intercontinental conflict 1

Chemical Warfare

he Soviets are clearly planning for thclhal toxic chemical agents might bc usedar between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Thevontinuing, vigorous program to equip and train Pact lorces (or operationshemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) environment In addition, they haveariety of modern nerve agents and have the delivery systems and tactics necessary for the large-scale offensive use of these agents, but wc do not know live site or the composition of tlte Sovietof chemical agents and filled munitions

he Soviets categorize chemicalthev do nuclear and biological"weapons of mass destruction" whose Initial use must beat thc highest political level All of theoperational stocks of chemical weapons and agents are believed to bc under Soviet control in peacetime-Some are Stored In Central Europe. The control and release procedures foe chemical weapons are not necessarily lhe same as for nuclear weapons, and ihere is some evidence that, once released, chemicalwould be subject lo fewer restriction* onuse than nuclear weapons. In addition,security over chemical weapons appean less rigorous than for nuclear weapons and is believed to be as much to prevent hazardous exposure as to prevent unauthorized use.

IS. In the extensive body of available Pact writings dealing with the likely natureuture war in Europe and addressing thc broad strategic andconsiderations for conducting conventional, nuclear, and chemical warfare,o discussion of Pact Intentions or plans to Initiate chemical warfareonnuclear conflict, ln other writings which deal wllh tactical and technical problems of combat

' Thf potential effmS ot InpravrmaMi lor pcrlohcnl attack. In canorrt wttb kiproovoaoia bl

SootnMitt*(b* pomtbtmt of iW dim ihoatar nudear war Iraaa tfcmHioaWaamotaJ i-

ootrtomflu* rW,fk lhe

without eaplicii reference to the overall situation. Pact writers do treat the use of chemical weaponsPad field training for offensive and defense chemical operations continues^"

1

hatever the circumstances of initial use. once offensive chemical warfare had been authorised, the Pact's employment doctrine would lead it to attempt to achieve surprise and to employ chemical weaponsarge scale in the hope ol catching NATO troops unprotected. Prime objectives, for example, would be to disable airfields, nudear ind logistic depots, and command and control facilities. Other Importantmight indude reduction of NATO's anttannor capabilities aod air defenses or stopping amphibious landings.

Once widespread nudear warfare had begun, the question of whether to use chemical weapons would bc largely tactical Pact writings on theater nuclear war usually assume lhat chemical weapons would be used abo. In fuch circumstances, chemical weapons are thought toaluable complement to conventional aod nuclear weapons because thdrcan be more widespread ihan conventionalns and they present fewei troop safety problems and produce fewer obstacles to friendly troop maneuver than do nuclear weapons.

With respect to thc question of Soviet policy on the first use of chemical weapons, there are Iwo views within the Intelligence Community. Somehat it Is unlikely that the Warsaw Pact wouldinitiate offensive chemical warfare before the advent of nuclear war, but that the Pact's first use under these circumstances cannot be entirely excluded. Othershai theretrong possibility that the SovieU would initiate chemical warfare la aconflict, (For the rationale underlying these potilioru, see chapter I. volume IL)

holder, of ihu Mno an (Ar Atmai

end tht Director. Burma of laidfjtetrce ond Keooonk,

"ml of Stole.

heUm el ihu ettw ere thoriest Ingency: theNltomolArmey; ana* the Senior Intetuetna Offleen ef etch of the mliltar*

-Wff-

War (ore

llPact countries have tinned the Biological Warfare Convent ion prohlbitine lheitorage. and use of biological weapons. There is no evidence thai any of them have violated lhe treaty, like Convention permits defensively oriented BW programs wliich the Soviets arc known to have.

""available evidence do not Treat offensive use of biological weapons. We assume, however, lhat lhe Soviets are continuing research on biological agents, and lhat they have facilities which could be used to produce biological weaponsecision were made to do so.

r fore

he Sovietsroad-based policyelectroniccombat" in

tho Soviethave madeundamental patl of their baltle planning at the tactical and strategic level. The Soviet concept of radtorlcct route combat is considerably broader than lhe US concept of electronic warfare. It encompasses jammirtfLconcealment and deception, and operations to destroy NATO's intelligence and electronic control systems, especially those for nuclear forces, while protecting the FJSS8'a own systems and forces. Soviet rietioeledronic combal abo includes reconnaissance and signal Intelligence efforts lo identify and locate NATO's electronic control systems and to determinelnci abilities In the Soviet view, radioetce-Ironic combal is to be integrated into all phases of warfare, and we expect lhal NATO's Intelligence and 'electronic coo Ind systems at all levels would be subject lo concerted electronic and physical attack.

24

PARI B

TRENDS IN WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES

Warsaw Pact forces arc predominantly Soviet, but non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forcesignificant contribution and indeed are critical lo Soviet strategy (or conflict in Europe. Pact forces opposite NATO can best be described in terms of major groupings:

Ground, tactical air. and air defense forces in Eastern Europe and In the military districts of tbe USSR opposite NATO, and possibly these types of forces in the Moscow. Volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts.

Naval forces of the three Soviet European fleets and thc NSWP countries

Most medium- and intermediate-range and some Intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces.

Most Inter mediate-range and some long-range bombers of Soviet Long Range Aviation,

This part ofummarizes tlse current status and trends of Warsaw Pact ground, air. naval, and theater nuclear forces opposite NATO. Volume If of the Estimate contains additional details of current Pact equipment acquisition programs for these forces, weapons characteristics, logistic capabilities, and forces for chemical and electronic warfare.

Ground Forces

Warsaw Pact ground forces opposite NATO numberillion men. The Soviet Union accounts for roughly half of thc total or justillion men. About half of these Soviet forces arc stationed In Eastern Europe and half in tbe military districts of the USSR that are opposite NATO. (See

Although the number of Pact divisions opposite NATO bas remained stable since the, the units have received additional men, weapons, and support equipment. Forces in Central

Table I

Warsaw Pact Ground and Air Forces Opposite NATO*9

Foots

and

Unb

penonnd onicis

r*wr

Forces:

aircnfl

ind support hdkoptwi

air defame bttorwtfton

M

ailra

nMOhim aad heavy

aircraft (VTA)

Sovlrt and Eaat European forces lo th"Fart (NSW) cc-aolrk* (Ext Ccrrauir. rotand,Iluncirr. Roraula. and Bulriria) and'Soviet form InBelorussiaa. Carr-lhUn. Leraftgnd. Odeaaa. Kiev.andMilitary Oirtrku of lhe USSR.onler-of .bank lafomaUoi for Fact croud and atr (orccala. and BJ In .cine. B

our informalion isIncreased more than forces opposite NATO's Ranks. For esamplc. Pact eround forces manpower In the area has increased byW menepict several of lhe more Important trends In Pact ground forces in Central Europe (East Cermany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia).

ank and motorized rifle divisions are the basic tactical units of Pact groundhe Pacta grand totalctive tank and motorized

t airborne diWitoni in-,, li

4HH4-

Trends in Warsaw Pact Ground Forces In Central99

NSWP

j

UoMvl

Major AnUI.nl. Weapons Armored Fighting Vehicle. ArtiUery

'"

allm

.m afadlnoraalw OtaA SCO Mm

L*cl<nM> Viaand In.

HUP.

tqr and

locVal

paalwa

6 Soviet andast European) al varying strengths in its peacetime ground forces The number of such divisions opposite NATO stands at IS* (Seeesides those forces earmarked for use against NATO the Soviets have an additionalank and motorited rifle divisions in the Moscow, Volga. Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts which could be used against NATO or elscwl

n peacetime. Pact divisions are mair.talised in various states of readiness suitable for the conduct of limited combat operations oo short notice and for generating large forces through rapid rxHobdiuuoa We dasnfy Pact ground force divisions according to our cslimate of their peacetime manning andlevels. All divisions In lhe Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe and eight NSWP divirigm

Jta Caere! IMaT

ground units with personnel ami equipment from the civilian economy. These systems have not been lestedroad scale, although local tests occur often. The base of trained personnel and equipment In tlte Pact countries is adequate to support Pact mobilizationOrganizations and elements al army and front level, particularly rear service unils, require longer to mobilize Ihan the combat units winch they support. In addition, significant portion! ol the Soviet and other Pact rear services required for wartime operations do not esist in peacetime. Major elements, such as some medical and transport units, would have to be mobs-hied from the civilian economy.'

'aei armed forces depend heavily en universal conscription to meet military manpowerIn the USSR, conscripts male up roughlycrcenl of total active strength Terms of service vary by nation and branch of service but generally are two to ihree years. The Soviets Induct their conscripts semiannually, usuallywo-year term of service. The Soviets haw upgraded iheir ground force training in recent yearsesult of two factors. Theamount of com piei equipment entering theusuallyore highly trained soldier to Operate or maintain ll. Because lheterm of service is now two years, the Soviets are faced with thc requirement to provide more training in Ins time for their largely conscript army. This has prompted tlse Soviels to modify iheir Iraining system to Include increased emphasis oo production training,specialist training, and inlcnsiiied unit training.1

Airborne feces

n addition lo tank and motorized riflePact also maintains Urge airborne forcei These foices. which have remained relatively constant in numbers over the past decade. Include eight Soviet divisions (onerainingne Polishand smaller units In each ol the ether non-Soviet countries. Soviet airborne divisions are centrallyby Airborne Troops Headquarters In Moscow and are considered strategic reserves of tbe Supreme High Commandoviet airborne divisions could be usedariety of wartime situations

VoiixnrmU Jillitl.tr trrtuy atnar emcmlnf fact

motor tniUBort oopotCUUt.

' VolmrmoiAuaiali. orU qfcagjaha Sa tho/.'Hi ia trralri r" *Ji-v. 'I

4Vn4*vnTnfi thrnfiotrrr iwiff>mmUA^fiJ-

73

PqaceUmc Location ot Warsaw Pact Ground Force Divisions Opposite

ranging from operations under (he direct conlrol ol Ihe VGK lo tactevel missions Thr Snvict division! also have important potential uses other lhan wat In Euiope, such as intervention in Third Worldipm-(i1

act giound lorces are well equipped wiih weapons either of Soviet origin or patterned alter Soviet models Thc equipment inventory is being continually modernized with the iniroduclion ofImproved combal vehicles, support equipment, and weapons designed to inciease loobihly andater, more accurate firepower. Despite impressive modernization programs, however. Pact ground forcesiituie of old and new equipment. Although Pact forces are considerably rnore standardized lhan NATO's, items such4 andanks, thcnd earlier models of BTR-CO armored personnel carriers, and various older models of field artillery and antiaircraft guns, are still operational and contribute to diversity within the Pact weaponsAlthough most Pactf Soviet production and design, the share produced by the NSWP countries is increasing.

ents. Armor continues to dominate Pact ground forces. In all Pact forces opposite NATO have0 medium tanks at theirhile Ihe SovieU arc aware of tlse improved technology and growing numbers of NATO antitank weapons and have dernonsliated this awareness In modifying theit forces and tactics, such adjustments have noi led lo any diminution of thc tank foices or any major change in the way they see these forces performing. In recent years two new tanks,4 andave been intioduced into tbe ground forces. Both tanksbetter armorm smoothboic gun. an automatic loading system, and anpossibly laser, rangefinder.r anversion, will probably be tbe main production lank well into5 remains thc main battle tank of the NSWP forces.

rtillcru. Pact artillery Is still predominately towed, but is being improved by the addition of four new self-propelled modelsew multiple rocket launcher. The Sovieis are replacing thcm

O for dotal, al Sovietalbiary (owr aad laAaeara la Castaa* arm

afwwif Aft At nrfiln of Saatrl

ifle tbaartatM ujilr* kaeei Independent tailonialntA 'nf aotariM ll.

howliiers wiih self-propelled models in iheirtille regiments, while lhemmhowitzer has replaced lowed pieces .in lheesimenis of several moloriied rifle and lankm sell-propelled gunew "adell-piopclled mortar, boih nuclear capable, are being deployed in Ihc USSR. We estimate ihai they will be deployed eventually wiih Soviet forces in Eastern Europe In addition lo equipmentSoviel artillery units In holh lanl and motorized rille divisions are being eipanded. Modemizalion and some expansion are under way in NSWP arhllery units, butuch slower

rmored Personnel Carrien and Olher Combal Vehicles. Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe have Iheir full complement ol armored personnel catileu. Significant shortages remain in SovietIn the USSR, however, wiih some lacking as much as two-thirds cfC complement One-hallhirds ofoviet APCs opposite NATO aie now modern amphibious models. The rest are older models wllh relatively poor cross-country mobility. The Soviets continue to replace these APCs withB and lhe BMP. TheB is an amphibious,C which provides good mobility and armor protection Irom small aims and shell fragments. The BMP It an amphibious, tracked vehicle designed lo operate closely with tanks and has greater armor protection lhan lheB. ll is equippedmm gun, and the Siggef antitank guided missile launcher. It alsoBR protective system to allow operations Inloiic or radioactive environment. The NSWP ground lorces. on the whole, are slUT predominantly equipped with older APCs.

round Force Air De/emeact ground forces opposite NATO aie equippedariety of tactical surface-to-air missile (SAM) and anliairciaft (AA) gunrogram to replace gun systems and older SAMs with more mobile SAM systems was begun in lhend continues, with Soviet units In Eastern Euiope and along Ihe Sino-Soviet border receiving highest priority.of the remaining Soviet units and of the NSWP forces is proceeding more slowly.

M Arililanl Weapons. The Soviet arsenal of anti-lank weapons Includes both guided missiles and aitll-lery Antitank guided missiles (ATCMs) are heliborne, vehicle mounted, and man portable. Improved models of lhe radso-controlledwatter and wirc-gulded

AT-3 Sagger with semiautomatic guidance are mounted on modified scout cars and behcopters Tne Saggci can alto be mounted on lhe BMP and BMD and Ii availableanpack version. Some first-gcn-eralion Swalters and Saggers are slill In service Throe new ATCM Systems are abo being deployed with Soviel lorces. Thepigot man-portable ATCM, thepandrel vehicle-mounted system, and thepiral heliborne system have all been observed recenily with Soviet lorces in Kasl Germany Antitank (AT) guns and rccoilless gum have not received the priority in developmenl and deployment lhat the ATCM has in receni years NSWP forceside variety oi antitank weapons. Including recoilless guns, AT .Minrumm, and ATCMs. Exceptew Czechoslovak produced weapons, all are of Soviet origin. NSWP forces are gradually improving their antiarmor capabilities by acquiring more ATCM launcher vehicles and manpack ATCM sets.

urface-to-Surjace MiiiUtM andhe Pact arsenal of rockets and surface-to-surface missiles includes free rockets over ground (I'TlOGs) and short-range ballistic missiles. All Pact ground forces are equipped with FROC) andcuds, which arc capable of delivering conventional, as weB as chemical and nuclear warheads. The poor accuracy of these systems would make Ihemonventional role against point targets. Soviets forces also have thecaleboard and its follow-on. theew missile, thes being deployed to Soviet units asreplacement for thc FROC. The FROC,nd possibly thelso canluster-munition warhead.

Air Forces

3G. The Soviet Air Forces are divided Inlo three functional components- Long Range Aviationrontal (tactical) Aviation, and Military Transport Aviationhe primary missions of LRA are intercontinental nuclear strikes and conventional or nuclear strikes in support of theater forces. Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, reconnaissance, electronic warfarend helicop-

oH dfUlUd dlKUiKQ ot Tad lactealand Biiuilfv tea paracraphlid fli.

" fX.ih of ih< rot*tapabiaOet ot IJU and Sovietl-aa la thafcn mmi air dnoaavd SaD (oaaraan U. IV. and VI Sa-tai aUatorV afcr ertrrarart dctcwal la NIE

ter ground attack and troop lilt. The primary mission of VTA ts the transport of airborne assault lorces

ll NSWP counlries hive air forces lor national air defense. In addition, Poland. Czechoslovak ia. ind Bulgaria have tactical air forces. East Cermany has one ground altack unil and Romania has Iwo Norse of lhe NSWP air forces have sullictent transport aircraft to support olher Ihan small-scale airlift operations The Current personnel strength of lhe Soviet air forces opposite NATO is estimated to bend lhat of the NSWP air forces stands athows the current geographic disposition of Pact air lorces opposite NATO.

loclicol Air Forces

areUed-wing combatin Soviet Frontal Aviation andtactical air units. Although there wasIn Soviet Frontal Aviation during (heprimarily because of the buildup againstsize of Pact tactical air forces opposite NATO hasrelatively liable since theixed-wing combat aircraft.

Pact began reequipptng its air forceswith fighter unils receiving Initialishbed andlogger Bintroduced lo replace earlier model Flshbedsunits. Modernization, of thebegan four to five years later, withloggernd someaircraft replacing therescoFiller A. Ught-bomber units also beganIn tliey acquiring theeplacement for therewerhas progressed more rapidly ioIn the NSWP air forces. Newer aircraftlor aboutercent of the Soviet lorce.of the NSWP force, and two-thirds oftactical air strength opposite NATO. (See

ne ol the most significant developments In Warsaw Pact tactical air forces la recent yean has been their modernization through the Introduction of new aircraft. The new aircraft have greater ranges, can carry creator payloads, are equipped with better, more advanced avionics, and are armed with better, more effective munitions These attributes combine lo gfve ihr I'act'i air forces the capacily to deliver moie

Modernizatlon Trends

in Warsaw Pact Tactical Air Forces

Opposite

feiecni ot TotH toi

andercent of tbe force it equipped withoctet ll. which hai an all-aspect intercept and limited lookdown/ihooldown capability.all Pact fighlei-bomben relied on ground-batedaids or dead reekorting. which would have forced there lo navigate over NATO leuiloiy al vulnerable medium altitudes. Al lhat time Beagle and Brewer light bomben provided the Pact's only autonomous adverse weather bombing/navigation capability.there are abouterceni fewer aircralt (Brewers and Fcncen) possesiing this capability, but lhe le*er numbers have been more than offset by an increase in lhe number of fighter-bomber units. Now also, someerceni of the aircraft In Pact fighter-bomber units can navigate accurately al lower altitudes In adverse weather uang only onboard avionics, although ihey still have to acquire ihelr targets visually for precise weapons delivery.

9 the Pact, with Iu short-range, low-pay-toad aircrafl. hadew tactical aircraft capable of conducting air-to-air or ground attack missions west of the Rhine Today, large numbers of Pact tactical alicrafl can operate well into France and tlie Benelua countries with larger payloads.epicts the payload and operating radius cf selected Pact lactical aircraft.

lthough recent improvements haveenhanced the capability cf the pact's tactical air forces to conduct long-range offensive operolions. thc basic tole of ihese forces remains unchanged. Theactical air forces continueave iwo primarydefense and ground allack support of the Pact's ground armies. Tbe continuing emphasis on ait defense is indicated by the high priority In equip ment modernization accorded fighter units.

effective firepower under a greater variety of

condition!

9 someercent of thc Pact's tactical fighter* were unable to conduct aerial engagement! under advene weather conditioni, all attacka had to be performed from the tear hemisphere, and tlie lighten had virtually no capability to intercept low-flying aircraft. (Seeoday, nearlyercent ol Pact lighten aie uble to operate in adveise weather,

ilot Training and Praficienev. By USlhe Soviet Frontal Aviation flight trainingis more conducive loilot's basic flying skills lhan lo preparing him forypical Soviet pilot spends four yearslying school and an additional three to four yean training in an operational combat unit before he Is consideredby Soviet standards, lo carry out the fuD range of combat missions assigned to his unlL In conducting operationaloviet tadical pilot flies ap-proiimatclr lhe same number of sorties per year as his US counterpart, but the sorties are less lhan half as

p. Sscrel-SIIJfF-

Trends In Warsawa

Toctical Aircraft Opposite99

Number of Aircraft

fig hAtr-lo-Alr

Hemisphere,ViaualOnr,

Haa/ Hemisphere, Adverse Weather

All-Aspect.

10GQ

Limited looidown/ Shooo

Fighter-Bomber end Light Bomber Oomblng/NavtgaUon Avionics

"

Umiied Navigation,isual Bombing

Autonomous Navigation, Visual Bombing

lone io duration and Involve far fewer combat-related training events

espite increases In the number of pilotsto Soviet units in tbe forward area, the overall

- CttiHrr IIflHJtnl'i arena, otna* On tlw amountiaf'lUttd training

bvtactUmt pii>u

combat capability of ihese units continues to be hampered bv5 percent of the totalare not qualifiedonduct night or all-weather combat missions. Moreover, pilothas not progressed suflieiendy lo eiploit fully lhe capabditaes of lhe airlrames and weapon systems of the tlii rd-general ion aircraft currently io operation. The Soviets acknowledge that their combat pilots are not trained as effectively as they should bc, but, for reasons that are not clear lo us, ihey do not appear to be taking maior corrective measures to enhance the quality of (raining itiindlcafitly. Such steps would includeroatci share of training time to the performance of com bat-related tasks and iotroducing more realism by exposing these pilots to enemy tactics and simulated hostile air defense eoviroriraenls.

oar Structure. The Warsaw Fact has an ex -lensave airfield network Irom which to launch and sustain military air opera Dions, ba thc USSR west of the Urals there arective military airfields; the Soviels also operateilitary airfields in the NSWP countries. Eighty-four airfields operated by the NSWP air forces complement lhe Soviet base structure. There are hundreds of otherfactory flyaway, and unoccupied (Includlni dispersal) fields, highway strips, and field) with temporarycould be used by military aircraft

he Pact nations have completed construction of at leastew military airfields, started construction of at least nine others aadimproved the runway capabilily atilitary airfields in the MSWp countries aod the USSR west of the Urals. All major military and most civil airfields In the Pact counlries have been or are being equipped with modern lighting. Improved navigational aid equipment, more adequate snd Improved refueling systems, and other ancillary support facilities.for the storage, testing, and handling of alMo-air (AAM) and air-to-surf ace (ASM) guided missiles have been identified at most military airfields which have aircraft equipped with these weapons.helters (hangarcttcs) have been built since theo protect aircraft at main Pact operating bases la the USSR west of the Urals and la the NSWp counlries. Other defensive irarsroTernents Include hardening and increasing POL sad ammunitionfacilities. Iiordening command and controland establishing pipeline systems to servicein shelters

int

adius and Payload Capabilities ol Selected Pact Tactical Aircraft-

ALIO -J. Minion.

I. MO TOO BOO

rVoN RaoWa

Ground Altack

OC-tBSI)

lnc Ion o' bomb*

SIM* Fencer A )

n;uhl IukJiui (nm|

-fligW radii ahown lo. . ml.aio.ia. load*

MSTMlU Flight nflfor' oroumJ .ruM mtaalont war* cakul.iad

u.tng mtwimwmr-ch do not m

/-

-toy.

bat support roles, induding rescue, contra uri teat ions relay, airborne command posts, artilleiy spotting,warfare, andignificant development in recent yean has been Ihc Introduction of heavily armed helicopters. Figurehows the increase tn the number of Pad helicopters opposite NATO

M.Slory Ironaporl Aviolion

SO. VTA operalesedium and heavy transport aircraft. Most ol these alrcralt arc based in the western USSR. The primary mission of VTA is lo lift Soviet airborne forces but other missions Include (he movement of troops, equipment, supplies, and nuclearission which has been espanded recenily is the delivery of ecooomic and military assistance material to Soviet client stales la the Third World. Although the total number of VTA transports has remained relatively stable since (he, the overall capabilities of the force have clearly boa improved through tbe Introduction of new aircraft-Civil aircraft from Aeroflot provide supplemental support to VTA and includeedium' and long-range transports.

he movement of all unit equipment andersonnel assigned to an airborne division would require lhe entire lift capacity of VTA. Assuming an aircraft serviceability rate of aboutercent,otal serviceable fleet probably wouldull division lift. In combat operalions. however, airborne units would probably leave behind their administrative personnel and some equipment such as trucks. We calculate that VTA could lift the assault elementi of two airborne dlvuiocsincluding combat and combat supportwith some transport, rupplics. and supportWith nearly all VTA airlift assets and Soviet airborne divisions deployed in the western USSR. VTA's airborne assaultearly targeted toward Central Europe and NATO's flanks.

NSWP Notional Air Detente Forces "

ach of the NSWp countries maintains aair defense force consisting of fujhter-Interceptor units, surface-to-air missile units,adar network.*

l Soviet BtrWafle .Ir ddW oapaWtOo. awB-7S

-lop. Sccrf-

In effect, these fofcesemion of Sovici slialrgte air defenses. The SAM units aie- with SA-2t, but some countries also havehe interceptor components numberighter aircraft, which, in addition to their primary mission of defense of the national airspace, could provide limited support to spound forces.

General Purpose Naval Forces

Soviet Navy his in the pail decade orImproved its capability to paiticipate inwar. In addition to providing tuppoitPact's Kround forces and delendinc thcIrontleis. the Soviet Navy can nowcombat operations at greater distances Irom

general purpose naval forcesarc from the Nortbern. Baltic and Black(See) Toe Northern Fleet carriersburden of operations tn tbc Barents andSeu and in the Atlantic The fleets In theBlack Seas, together with navies of fourare tailored primarily for control ofseas .ii.il for the support of land operationsalong the shores of and at the entrancesseas For operations in the MediterraneanBlack Sea Fleet furnishes most of the surfacethe Northern Fleet thc submarines.

Pact general purpose na*al forcessubmarines, surface ships, andhe general purpose submarine forcecruise missile and torpedo attack submarines.surface combatants are about equallybclween frigates and larger ships of missileand cruiser size. The role ofis clearly emeiging in the Soviet Navyconst iuct ion of three Kiev-class aircraftthe (wo Moskva-class helicopter shipsihe inventory in theombatant* include mine warfare ships,chasers, and missile-armed palrol craft.Aviation (SNA) has three principaldistinguished by roles antishipand electronic warfare, andwarfuierends9 Inol Pact general purpose navalNATO are shown in figure 12

Tabic 2

Warsaw Pad Ceneral Purpose Naval Force* Opposite NATO'

9

Dtiiroa submarines

aiiullr

attack

craft carrier!

ihlfn

fetcno

k-rifd min* nifttee eoaibaund *

iltp,

Brecon

aircralt'

. omber

Tuod-wtM

hdtooctcn

NSWP aavia and lha SavSo lores anlfnrd la lha Nortli-ern. Batik, andea Floatsl ordot-of-batUV daU for

these andidfic Fleet naval (ami anIraInf uliea IL

t^rtud*fiackaadumciwl

nHn (nanbaiaaiu lipr la mm natia.l nadaane II't arete* otrwi on Saolrl oeoabehnn to acrltalrnWnadsri.

'A aooond Klev-daa alreiafl tank.In tha DUcfc

utliava It -til depfor to

..iiJu'irm mine wailaraad aibraa agjataaassl cairol .1

aOera, asa-Ce londer* neaar aVtaa,rn

'In addtlWa. Ihere arc aboul ItO transport aircraft

m-irr hrltooottn which Mpoart Soviet Naval Aviation.

Majorosks

he wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's gcncial purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control ia waters from which NATO's sea-based air and ballistic missile strike and amphibious forces can reach thc Soviet Union, to support and protect Sovietmissile submarines, to eieroisc sea denial In the sea lanes necessary for resupply and reinforcement uf

Soviet Naval Forces

Opposite99

Three Soviet Western Float;

NuclearSGNSN

Cruise Missile sort Torpedo Attach

Mafor Surface Combatants

' Halicopter

Cruisers |

J

a*T'

trover* j

Tonnage of Major Surface

Alrcra ft Camera

CcoJinn

Holicoptor Cruiierc

Crv'tcn

mm

'At

mm

Destroyer I

iiiiivi vivta.

bCombatani*ona, aidvding ivaorva

Europe IromUnited Slues, and to proiecl power ashore in aupport of Pact around foices Although the relative emphasis thai would be placed on each of these missionsonflict would depend upon the war hostilities were Initialed aod the course of the war. the Soviets in their maior exercises have focused on ASW and attacks on carrien. cruisers, sndtask forces.

nliuMithio Cspobilitiei. Soviet Navycapable of acting to counter NATO's surface naval lorces include missilebombers,and surface combatants which ore supported. by ocean surveillance systems, includingnd radar satellites and aircraft, lor detecting. Identifying, and tracking potential surface targets. The maior weakness of the Soviet ocean surveillance system is its heavy reliance onmissions from potential targets. When NATO forces implement mission(KMCON) conditions, which occur during NATO exercises, Soviet surveillance capabilities are Impaired, sometimes drastically.

Soviets haventiship cruiseIn iheir western fleets for deploymentAtlantic and European theater area. Fourantiship cruise missile (ASOM)operational, each capable of deliveringor nuclear warheads. Deployedcarry an equal mil of high-ea plosivewarheads. They probably also carry atnuclear torpedoes

addition to cruise-missile submarines,western fleets IncludeUussubmarines. Most Soviet nuclearespitenoise radiation, could be effective InSoviet long-range diesel submarinesslower than the nuclear units. They aresusceptible to detection when soorkeling. butsubmerged for eatended periods. Inare medium- and short-range diesel unitslikely be employed in areas closer lo the

Soviet Navy haaaircraft opposite NATO for antishipIncludeadgers aad *omeThese aircraft carry four types ofvarious flight profiles and speeds andof fromom (ISOm).

are abo aboutlinder A'% which could be used for bombing aod mining. Navaladgers, which first entered servicere relatively large and slow-moving bv current standards. Thev tie highly vulnerable to modem air defenses suchose of well-defended alrcralt carrier task groups. The improvement* In their missile andwarfare systems, however, have maintained Ihem as fimline strike aircraft

hc introduction of tomeackfire bombers into tlse Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date has significantly improved the strike capability of tlie Soviet Navy against NATO surfaceecause of the modern, higher speed alr-tosuxface missile Itts variable flight profiles. Its maneuverability, and IU high-speed capabilities, the Backfireigher probability of penetrating NATO naval air defenses and attacking targets in tlie open ocean than docs the Badger. Also,ir more capable than the Badger of crossing potentially hostile land areas, such as Turkey and Creecc. and operating over the Mediterranean,

n the ontiship role, wartime operational cons id -eratioru probably would tend to dictate the use of backfires lor itrikes against important NATO warships in certain key areas. These areas would Include the North Atlantic at least at far south as the Creenland-leeland-United KingdomK) gap, lhe North Sea, and the Mediterranean. The operationaltending to limit the use of Backfires include mission planning allowances for combat maneuvering, and requirements fo: routing around and penetrating NATO air defenses. Aerial refueling could add flexi-bility for tbc employment of Backfires, however.

he three Soviet western fleets have Hsurface combatant ships aimed with antiship cruise missiles Six of these ships have0m,m) missiles. To fire these missiles accurately to their maiimura range requires that these ships obtain externa! targeting support Other Soviet surface combatants opposite NATO which are equipped with antiship cruise missilessomeissile patrol boats. Except for theeries, all current Soviet antiship cruise missiles are believed capable ofuclear or a

-Ja* HIT.s.l.it

r*al baaaaaa*4ftl>t*l>rirr*i

conventional warhead. The surface-lo-alr syftems aboard tomeoviet principal surface combatants can also be used against surface ships.

The Soviet naval air lorces opposite NATO have in llie past few years added somehore-basednd somearrier-basedTOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) aircraft which improve iheir overall capabilities against NATO naval surface forces. There bevidence lo judge how the Soviets would use either of these aircraft against ships at sea or how effective they might be In wartime. Mart Forger training thus far has been of tlie kind useful for attacks against ship* at sea. Tbe Fitters, however, all of which are based in the Baltic, are probably intended for ground attack in support of ainphiblou* operation* and antiship attacks.

Although the Sovietsarge inventory of ships, submarines, and aircraft capable of conducting attacks on NATOhe successful acccmplbhrneril of such itrikes under wartime situations dependsariety of factors. Among the most sigrnficant are the effectiveness of Soviet ocean surveillance andwaif are. the number of launch platform* avail-ablo for antiship use, tlie achievement of stralegic or tactical lurprise. and whether nuclear weapons arc used by ihe Soviets or NATO. With accurate targeting and the use of nuclear weapons in surprise attacks, the Soviet naval forces normally deployed in peacetime wouldevere threat to NATO carriers and amphibious task groups In European waters- Timely warningoviet attack, however, would allow NATO losk forces to lake action which could enhance their survivability.

Antiwbmarine WarfareATO-Warsaw Pact conflict-tbe Pact'swarfare tasks would be varied and eitrernely difficult. Tlie Pact navies must seek out Western ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and counterattack submarines. Atlacks on Western SSBNs would have to be undertaken In their worldwide patrol and base areas. The task of countering attack submarines would be markedly different forTact forces In Uie approaches to the USSR, on tlie one hand, and for lhe protection of Soviet naval operations in more distant waters, oo the other.

Poet ASW carubilitKs oa ibe whole orelimited. Tlie crucial Soviet shortcomings are lack of long range submarine detection devices, the

Top-6*

HUff- -

iiidiated noise level* of Soviet submarines relative to those of the West, and the lack of seaborne tactical air cover to protect deployed surface ship ASW forces. Nonetheless, virtually all modern Soviet surfacecany ASW weapons and senwn. and largef Soviet aircraft arid lielicopieri are fitted for ASW operalions.

'he forces opposite NATO which are most capable of ASW operations beyond coastal waters include aboul SO Soviet principal Surface0 nuclear-powered torpedo attack submarines, and aboutiied-wing ASWhehips with helicopters (those of Ihe Kiev, Moskva, Kara, andlasses) and the Krivak frigates are equipped -Ilh long-range (IS tom, orom) ASW weapons. Only the Kiev- and Moskva-class unitsihese featuresone-range (typically less thanm) active sonar and more than oneSoviet ASW helicopters, however, ate limited In their ASW operations at night and in bad weather.

ther Soviet forces oppositeprimarily for coastalmuch more numerous, but their individual capabilities arcpoorer. These includeinor surface combatants with sonars, abouthort- and medium-range diesel submarines, nearlyhort-range flied-wing ASW aircraft, andhore-based ASW helicopteis In addition, lhe Polish, the East Cerman, and.easer decree, lhe Bulgarian and Romanian Naviesariety of units which aie trained for coastal ASW defense and are being integrated into the combined Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.

hc quietness of Western submarines, thecharacteristics of the Pact equipment, and Pact signal-processing capaei combine In most cases lo icsuict sevetely lhc ranged

which Western luTjlnarines can be detected. Locating data could be provided at gieater ranges through detection of periscopes or other masts with surface search radars (especially in low sea states) or thiough HK/DF (high-frequency direction finding) of radio transmissions In the cases In which they occur.

n waters beyond (lie Pact's coastal legions, Soviet ships and submarines, including those best

- af lhcaaln. KrarSa-lt. Kara. gaaSla. ataj-gaira-.

i claan.

-II^VlU-MIKflpfer "If rwrflneagencyai lU oditUbI md'liil e/ lhe TV-HI UtmfF* ASW anwa/l.

equipped (or ASW. are vulnerable to attack by NATO submarines. I

evertheless, there arc situations, particularly in their own coastal waters and ocean areas over which they have temporary control, in which Pact ASW forces might be able to prevent NATO submarines from disrupting key maritime operations. Soviet and combined Pad amphibious and convoy exercises often include substantial numbers of units employed at ASW screening forces, and La wartime such tactics could well bein areas accessible to Soviel air lorces, or In operations against the less capable NATO submarine forces.

aoabillUei lor Eierciiing Sea Cenlrol In lhe See Approaches fe ih* Sooiei Union. In theater, hostilities inigh-priority task cf the Pact navies would be to ensure that their sea approaches were secure and open to Pad use. Pact strategy calls foi establishing sea control In the Norwegian and Barents Seas and In the closedBaltic and Black Seas -thus denying these waters to the enemy. The Pad navies maintain lhc bulk of their naval forces in these areas, including some principal combatants, and large numbers of smaller combatants, submarines, and ASW aircraft. These forces continue to receive, new ships with the latest attack and air defense missiles, sonars, torpedoes, and mine-warfareThey can be supported by fighter and attack aircraft of the Soviet Air Defense Forces aad Frontal Aviation The Pad has abo concentrated coastalmissile and artillery batteries to defend ports, bases, and oilier critical facilities

n addition to using the forces described above to aitack approaching NATO naval forces, the Pad would probably by defensive minefields, particularly in keyrough there li little specific evidence from caercises or military writings, lhe large number of ship; loiwell .as the submarines and aircrafl iJttible of Layingthat tlse

Sovicis probably plan to conduct mine warfareonsiderable scale. Additionally, naval exercises indi* cate thai the Pact expects to conduct countermine operations against NATO mining in approaches to Pact countries.

apabilities /or Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea Lines of Communication. In wartime,Soviels probably would attempt some sea denial operations in NATO's sea lines ol communication bv ^tucking noncnmbalantvessels ami navaltlte high seas. Striking ports and harbors, and mining heavily traveled waters. The extent of the commitment of forces to an interdiction clfort would dependumber of factors such as tlie emphasis on operations against carriers,ships, and SSBNi; the course of thc conflict; the level at which it is initiated; Soviet expectations as to the degree and pace of escalation: and the extent of Pact and NATO mobilization. See the Inset on pagesndtsCTission of differing agency views of Soviet intentions and capabilities for exercising sea denial in NATO's sea lines of communication

mphibious Capabilities. The Soviets haveen In their Naval Infantry forcesNATO. The basic unil is the naval rifle regiment, totalingen in three infantryank battalion, and supporting units. Three regiments have been identified, one in each western fleet area. The Naval Infantry depends heavily oo Its tanks and armored vehicles, but is constituted primarily for mobility rather than for firepower. Its tasks are to spearhead amphibious assaults against mainland and island beachheads and to attack In the rear of enemyboth cases in support of tbe ground campaign, in some cases. Naval Infantry units would be immediately reinforced from Ihe sea by ground forces trained for followup amphibious landings.

he amphibious elements of NSWP countries would be available to augment the Soviet Naval Infantry forces. In the Black Sea area, the combined strength of the Soviet, Bulgarian, and Romanianforces totalen. However, the Bulgarian and Itomanian elements are not nearly as well trained as their Soviet counterparts and do not have sufficient lift capacity to carry all of their men and equipmentingle assault operation. These countries do not usually engage In combinedexercises with the Soviets. In the Baltic, however, where large combined operations recently Iiave oc-

curred, lhc Soviets, Poles, and East Germans have the equivalent of four naval infantry regiments totalingen. Allhough the Polish and EastNavies ate capable of transporting less than half of tli.ii assault troopsingle lift, turnaround lime for subsequent lifts could be rapid.

of the airspace over anarea in Europe wouldrerequisitea beachhead. Because (he maiorityWarsaw Pact amphibious objectives wouldthc range of Soviet or East Europeantactical aircraft could be made availablethe assault forces. Tlie Soviet Fitterin the Baltic Fleet Air Force and someFresco aircraft of the Polish Navysupport amphibious operations in the

Theater Nuclear Forces '

nuclear weapons which could bea theater war against NATO are of twotactical nudear weapons in the hands ofpurpose forces and Soviet strategic(See

Table 3

Warsaw Pact Theater Nuclear Forces Opposite NATO9

ES03

Soviel NSWP Total

ircraft

Miotic Uonehen Artillery

S

forces:fc

Land'based mimic launched

Lone Ranee. Submarine Uurs-VJ ballistic

* tnduda Soviet and Ea* fannu loron la ibe non-Soviet Wanaw Tact (NSWP) oountiim (Castotaod, OcrHado-vakla, Huntary. Romania, and Baliirla) iad Soviet lores la ibe IVJUc.Carpathian.I. Odena. Kiev.i>: ill. of lha USSR.

B. only linae Sovtet rtnlrcl- formri(*Wtl EriV-wUcii an chieflyATO.

' tlii.i- irflo.li oivitalnir almal liar aunaUotial lUlut ol* two>

i'.i'attacks on noncombataol (him al ft would depend primarily on ihr i> aitabdHy amil Soviet atlack oibnu'inei for thii million TV conabai radii of Sonet ASM-equipped naval aircraft would iule out theiroperating out ol Sovielovnt of the length of the more souiherlv sea lanes lo Great Britain and France Thev have some capability near Cieal Britain, bul unless air defenses there wereeb sirikei could1 be more costly than the erpeoied rental ntia+ri

The Soviets currently maintain an active inventory of about ISO tiune-missile and torpedo attack lubanarines in iheir westem lleets. Of ihese, lheong-range units based In tl* Northern Fleet, the only flee- In the western USSR with largely unredrtcted access ro lhe North Atlantic sea lanes,otential nni* lorce for lofcrdanioa. The demand* ptaced on resources by the Soviet Navy's ether mlistoni would limit the number of submarine! available for Interdiction because large numbers of Soviet naval force* would hivee devoted to controlling the lta hie. Sea. the Blacr. Sea, ami much of the Norwegian Sea, a* well as their approaehet. against incursion by Western earrlen, aotphib-ious forces, andndortion of ibe Soviet atlack submarine force probably would be committed to operiltoni against NATO naval bases and In tlie open

There Is disagreement wiihlnInielligence Gommunlty concerning live ertenl, emphaiii, and limine ol ibecampaign. Somehat lhe Soviet* wouldaome ol their submarine fleet to aa intcrdaclioabulire- portionthey had earlier detested NATO carrier and amphibious feroH without loiinat many of (heir lubmailnca. Olher* bel>cvek that (he SovieU would regard Interdiction of USo Europe to be of such tignlllcancc and their submarine Inventoryffieaent tlte to warrant use of aabrtaniial numbers of attack fubmartnea In lets effort whilecOOrnp'ahlnr. their otber minions.

Those holding ihe former view believe that the SovieU would be deterred fromtng tociploll the West *

tmmltni-mt IruMirtmn Out it*

rwrasa M- Mw

a mimmm

1t - m ta*

n HIIM ii.oft Iwa

fm

WJ"i rtrm tit-

tmJ (AaHtml NiatltfiM.tlNa**.

dependence on long tea line* of communicationWesiernlhe threatnuclearand raroieetton forces Accordiacthe presence of NATO carriers in or near(he Norwegian and Mediterranean Sut would causeto comarge forces in counteraction, heavy Iresult, and (he Soviet* would lack the stibrnarineitimullaneouifv in stiooc arMifleaK andThose holding lhe latter vie- bei-ew thaiand eatent of Soviet interdictoperatioruupon the disposition aod tactics of NATO navalupon Soviel intentions anda* to lhe course

of lhe conflict, ihan upon the prior aettievcrnenf of other naval talks Accord,ng lo lha* view, etrcmnoioca as IDrtalcrnatc in Central CwooeATO decisionto deploy carrier and amphibious forcei Immediately InTo lhe Norwegian Sea would lead the Soviet* toubtUnllal Interdictioo effort during the early phaseonflict when NATO would be eon-oyioc critical war material. Induduig rerrvrnU of US divisions and their ectotpeneM. ts Europe.

There are also dliagreomeoti over Soviet capabilities to eaecuie an Interdiction cam pa lan. Irreapectlve of the Soviet commitment to interdiction. These ditarreemenU stem from diflerent hidgaieriii and leterprrlalioni of evidencetoped* loadv rrpleniibmenl Oooorlunities, twnaround- ditlincr. combat attrition, and larget informlion.

J

Torpedoccording to Ihe f'ni view. Sovier naval atraletv arcttet lhe likchhoodhorl nuclearand (he importance of sinking ahigh-value targetstorpedo carsacatiet of Sorterr-tthii uralrgY. but would severely limit ihe number of attacks an inn rnerehanl thlpt the mbrnirines could.make whiletation during an interdiction campaign. Soviet cruise miiille lubma-rinea. which contrilule nearly ease-third of the USSR's fleet of lane-range general purpose tubmannea, carry

fe"

jThe second

view bold* thai the Soviet long-range attackmost likely to participate Inampaign (principallylass,lasi) dearly

lorrieoo reloads, r

i

carry sufficient Mprdces totgaaficaBi numbernack* onJuppartg Adaiboaatly. the loading ol Individual submarines would be contln-ir nl On assignedutwiailoei would not neee*-

Urilya mil olim In wartime

ustomary in peacetime

Opportunities. TV find view holds

lhal Soviet lubrnarinr* would have to returnome watersuppty. that Soviet naval atroport ship* panuaUy would doiii.de Smrt-controlled water* because ihev would be vulnerable lo attack, and that any Soviet merchant ihlpt at tea when war began piobably would not be available by the time lhe submarine* rihausted their torpedoes. According to lhe second view, Soviet long-range< . can operate (or period) of work* without having to refuel and.oold lake on iuol frora Pact merchant ships, and an Individual nibmarine would probably have lufllctenl lime lo aitack tu target* before having lo return to base lor torpedo reloading.

Time. All agree lhat Soviet rubrrurtnea would have lo spend aome time In port between patrob. The lint group believa it anight be a* long atayi. whleh wu lhe Cerman experience in World War IL The tecond believes the lime could be com-preaaed to tea* than TS dayi. crpcctallyeriod of intense conflict.

Traaiit Distance, Holders of the first view believe that the effectiveness of Soviet submarines would beby the distance belweea the Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North Atlantic teahey point out lhat. il NATO convoy* were routedto reduac (he danger from Pact alieratt. Soviet submarine* would have to (ravel iSCO0 nm; rrurJear-powered lubmarinei traveling at lt knot* would spend aboutay*ound0 nm) lo the seahile diesebnots would spend St days la iranitt. The others note that, despite the long transit distances, Soviet Ling range attack submarines have the range Id undertake patrols an the North Atlantic tea lanes of lulfiriew duration lo have ample opportunity loumber of Western ships

-Combat Attrition. All agree lhal Soviet submariner based ia the Northern Fleet would have lo Iravd through the Norwegian Sea and ihcOi-UK rjp. areas which favor NATO ASW efforts, andven "hen these submarines are oa nation, their operating areas would be continuously within range of NATO's Und-

batrd ASW aircraft, ai well al of other ASWThe lint view is thai the retwhant combat attrition would be prohibitive The second it that, although Soviet tubmailne* would be particularly open lo aiiael bi Western ASW force* at several poI hit

Ihieal would be reduced by Soviel allacks againsi NATO ASW aircrafl andn StOlNT facilities.

andii-es ot the US sound surveillance tyllero

(SOSUS).

Target Information. The firat (imp briwvei lhat il

would be diffieuk for allack submarines to identify high-value tiupt inail io containing many ships of law value. This group aotaa that, uodei North Atlantic combat aad weather rnoditioni. attacks on merehanl ship* would be likely to result In little more (haa random mjcccb) at destroying ihipa loaded wiih military cargoes irotead of ships loaded with civilian irv.hiUi.tl fx other good. The second group hidiei that tbeprobably would have clandestine report ing.ai>ed Infortnattoa on cargoes and ship depaiture times, al well as locating dala fromotlectioo, Inerludiog radar and CUNT ocean aeeecr-naiiaance satcOifes and loog-rknge HF/DF. Aecotding lo ihuthe cornblnallon of those aiseti would liketr provide lhe lalelfigence neeeaary to direct tllackion the more valuable convoysship*.

Seere*

Toctieoletos

ince Chehe tactical nuclear forces espec.allyericnccd important change in both size and(See) These change, have included:

Significant increases in (he Inventory of tactical nuclear delivery systems In Europe. Thehas already includedne-third increase in the number of tactical surface-Ie-sur-lace missile launchersripling of nuclear delivery aircraft in Central Europe

Increases in tlie number of tactical nuclearthe Soviets plan to use In Centra) Europe-Nuclear weapons allocations

riticalhave

in the warhead yields of tacticaltc-surta.ee missiles. Tbe inotivation for the larger yields is unclear, but the Soviets mayequirement for greater areas ofto compensate .for the relatively poor accuracy of their current missile systems and the lack of timely, accurate reconnaissance data on small, mobile targets.

and deploymentewof tactical nuclear delivery systems with characteristics superior to those of theirNewer models of Soviet tactical aircraft have greatly improved range and payloadand more eflective tactical surface-to-surface missiles are being deployed.

he Sovietsariety of tactical nuclear delivery systems In tlieir ground and Uctica! air forces deployed opposite NATO. Nuclear weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's general purpose ships, submarines, and aircralt. The SovieU have given their East European allies reason to believe that they will be provided nuclear weapons in wartime The NSWP national commands, particularly tlie Polish and Czechoslovak commands, evidently train and plan for thc eventuality (hat_ ihey will receive nuclearin wartime. ]_

*1'ddition, we havethat NSWP warplans may include procedures for the transfer of Soviet nuclear warheads to NSWP missile units. Thus, while we have no direct evidence regarding Soviet inlenlioi.s. we fudge that NSWP

Tactical Aircia tt

lOCO

9 0

on-

tactical aircraft and missiles, as shown in tablerc likely to be used for nuclear operations In Europe,

actical Aircraft. Numerically, the mostnuclear delivery systems In Eastern Europe are Soviet tactical aircraft. Virtually all Soviet fighter-bomber units io Eastern Europe conduct training and exercise activities whichission of deliver-ing nuclear bombs. Asowever, only about one-third of the pilots In these Soviet units were qualified by Soviet standards to drop nuclear bombs. We expect (hat the number of Soviet tactical air units In the USSR which have nuclear rnlsstonj will increase as the Soviets continue to reequlp units vdth new, nuclear-capable aircraft. Thc role of Frontal Aviation ior delivering tactical nuclear weapons Is expanding.

actical Missiles. Cround force nuclearsystems consist mainly of tlie FROC, Scud, and Sealeboard missiles The Soviets haveROC battal-lora withaunchers andcud brigades

aunchers in Knit cm Europe. They have anotherHOC0 launchers) andcud0 launchers) tn their militaiy districts opposite NATO The Scudange ofm and lhe FROC aboutm No Scaleboardkm range) ate believed lo be localed in Eastern Euiope, but wc estimate lhat sti Scaleboard units withaunchers are part ol the foices in the USSR earmarked for use against NATO NSWP forcesHOC and Scud buncheis.

he Soviets are improving lhe quality of then lactical ballistic missile forces. Theew missilem) roughly compaiable to the US Lance, is now with at least one division In the western USSR. If offers mayor improvement! in tangc and accuracy over the FROC, which il ishevidentlyluster-munition warhead in addition to thc standard nuclear, chemical, andhigh explosiveluster-munition warhead would significantly improve thesdining conventional warfare against soft targets such as personnel and equipment tn the open or NATO air defense and electtonics installations Theeplacement missile for the Scaleboard.operational last year and probably has already been issued to some Scaleboard units in the USSR lt is similar to the Scalcboaid missile in range capability, but probably has Improved accuracy and warheads

uclear Artillery. The Sovietsuclear-capable artillery pieces in their forces in the western USSR.mgun howitzersm self-propelledhave been identified in two heavy artillery units there. Five other heavy artillery units there arc equipped withmmNo Soviet heavy artillery units have beenoutside theew exercises in Easthowever, have had notional allocationm nuclear roundstm rounds with yieldsr_ These exercises suKKCSt that nuclear artillery units may be Introduced into Soviet forces in East Cermany eventually There

" The accuracy of the SS tl it eatunatrdi circular error probable (CEP)oftn at two-thirds the maximum range of IMilometers. Thisignificant Increase in accuracy over the FROCfmeters at Iwothiidi the nuUrrwm range ofilornrtm CEPonventional Indei of accuracyhe radius ol the Oicte centered on the intended target wiih in whichen*nl probability lha' an arriving missile warhead will fill

is no reliable evidence lhal the Soviets have nuclear rounds form artillerylargesthe forces in Central Europe.

aval Forcer. All fleets In the Soviet Navy are also equipped wiih nucleat-capable weapon systems for use in theater warfare Virtually all ol the USSR's operational submarines carry at least two nuclear torpedoes, and at least half of the missiles aboard Soviet cruise-missile submarines are equipped with nudear warheads This loading reflects the Soviet belief that, although wai could begin conventionally in Europe, il would be fought under constant threat of escalation lo the use of nuclear weapons For example,eater-dedicated submarines in the Northern Fleet, loaded with their normal complement ofand nuclear weapons, alone would carry collectivelyactical nuclear warheads

oviet Nuclear Weaoom Storage Silei in Eastern Europe. There areoviet storage sites in Eastern Europe at least serine of which almost certainly contain nudear weapons Eleven of them are located at Soviet lactical airfields, andre isolatedlot the storage of warheads for tactical missiles and rockets. (See) We do not believe that the NSWP countries operate or control any of (he nuclear Storage sites in Eastern Europe

epcndinc on the type stored and storagethc storage sites in Eastern Europe couldactical nuclear bombs,ROC and Scud warheads. Missilecapacity in Central Europe appeals(he higher estimates of capacity atebomb Borage capacity appears to be insufficientthe requirements for tactical nuclearThc

Soviets arc estimated to have storage capacity foruclear bombs in East Germanv,n Poland, andon feechosiovakia They probably plan to move additional bombs andinto the forward atea (rom the numerous tactical nuclear weapons storage sites in thc western USSR before or during hostilities. We have Identified bunkers atoviet tactical airfields in Eastern Euiope which may be Intended for nuclear bomb storagerisis or in wartime Although ihese facil itdo not appear lo be active in peacetime, ihey probaUy could be readied wilhin hours lo recene nucleai bombs transferred from the USSR

46

Soviel Periphero! Strike Forces"

lement* of all lhc Soviet sitatcgic allackRocket Forcesong Range Avialionnd lhe Sovieltheof carrying oul nuclear strikes againit NATO targets. Theseedium- and inter-mediate-range ballistic missilesRBMs andndRA bombers (Badger,andnd II ballistic missile submarineslasselatively small portion of Soviet ICBMs and modern ballistic missileis likely lo be used lo strike targets In NATO Europe, and the ISO strike-configured Bear and Bison bombers in LRA are intended mainly formissions.

strategic forces the most significanthave been the deployment of theand thentermediate-rangeThe Backfire is well suited for themission and greatly improves tbe payloadcapabilities of Soviet bomber forcesagainst NATO. The mobileorce,deployed, will have greater survivabilitypower than the present peripheralWe expect thai eventually lheillSoviets' oldernderipheral missilesby the, ll will be the mainstay ofballistic missile force for peripheral use

Forces for Chemical Warfare

SovieU havefor chemical warfare (CW) since World Warthey remain in the forefront in CWPact forces generally are welltrained to operateBR envfronrnenLforcesariety of systems capablecliemical agents which would enablecover large areas of Ihc combat rone fromedge of the battle area to at leastbeyond. Airdropped munitions providefor large-scale strikes against NATO,against enemy nuclear delivery targcU.systems alsoheater chemicalcapability against ships at sea. points offorward storage sites, and amphibious

etailed deKnixloa al lite deployment patterns and Inimical

iriaraelrriittci ot iheie interna li contained In KIR. Smtrt flralrfie Forcer lot Feilptietclnd In volume II. chaitferi II. IV.l (hit Fjttmi'e

facilities in Warsaw Pact counUiespostivcly identified as currently producingagents in militarily sienificant quantities,several in the USSR and in somehave historical association with CWand may still be engaged Innature of CW agent production is suchidentification of production facilities withinchemicalirtuallyknowledgeable human sources.

is no question that the SovieU andEuropeans cither have ptodueed or are capabletoxic agents, inasmuch as theirarc already handling most of lhe rawto produce these agents. We believe thatchemical Industry can easily handleto maintain current Soviet reserves ofagents, plus whatever additionalrequired to replace agents consumed bydeterioration. The quantities Involved aresmall, and large-scale production ofnot be

the present time there areuuorin the USSR believed to be associated withof CW toxic agents, filled munitions, ortack of evidence precludes determining the sizeof the Soviet CW agent stockpile,Because wc know that thc SovieU have developedof toxic agents and delivery systems, andfor their use. and because we haveevidence on some field depoU forwe do not doubt that they haveIncluding some In Eastern Europe. Weinclude nerve agents such as CB (sarin) andand unthickeneds well asof agenU such as hydrogen cyanide,the mustard-lewisite mixture. Research relatingagents, such as the hallucinogen BZclosely related to il, is abo continuing, butno evidence that any agenU of this type

Forces for Electronic Worfore

the Soviet concept, electronic warfare Ispart of overall planning and mustinto all phases of combat operations.adioclectionic combat (REC)was created within (he Stall of the Foices of lhe Pact lo promote electronic

ami to ensure standardisation of equipment aiid procedures anions 'he Pact armies. RECwere alio created within the Soviet Ceneral Stall and in tome of tlie military district! opposite NATO. By the. REC staffs patterned alter the Soviet model had also been eitalJished in the East German, Ciethoslovak. Foi is!nd Hungarian forces.

ver thc pail decade the Soviets haveroad series ol programs io modernize and eipand their already significant offensive and defensivefor REC in the European theater. Some of these programs are still at an early stage ofhowever, and will not be completed before then addition, the Pact is seeking to improve the organiration, procedures, andof REC units, and the abilities of Pact ground, air. and naval forces to operate under jamming ersnditions.

act ground force elements for REC include SICINT collection units and active jamming units. SICINT units are found at division, army, and front level, whereas lamming units are found only at the front level but may bc assigned to army commands lo support specific operations In lhe Soviel air lorrea

opposite NATO, transport and combat aircraft have

bean specially equipped to conduct electronic warfare missions. Tlie Soviet Navy has deployed electronic

collection and lamming equipment on combatants.

intelligence collection ships, and naval aircrafL

e are unable to determine the eitent to which the equipment of Pact lamming units meet Soviet standards, but the Soviets have stated that production of newer systems Is lagging. The bulk of the lamming equipment currently deployed represents tedioology ofnd the. More modern

equipment first appeared in the, but representative models of litis more advancedare only now appearing Ira the Pad. primarilyoviet units Several types of new equipment will not be deployed fully until the mid-lOSOs While lhe Soviets do not have sufficient lamming equipment to support electronic warfare on thc scale called (or in their doctrine, even selective use couldroblem lor NATO.

Warsaw Pod logistics

arsaw Pact exercises, classified writings, and other evidence indicate that the Pact Is planning logistic supporteries of short campaigns of high intensity, involving the rapid ichievcrnent of aand advance to strategic ehrectivea In the NATO rear. Wanaw Pact logistic planning factors are evidently based on Soviet Wodd War II experience, and updated In acejxdance with changes In tactics, force structure, and equipment. Our Information In thii regard dates from the. We have no way lo fudge the soundness of these Pact planning factorsuture war as they relate lo the attrition rates for equipment and lhe consumption rales of expendables such as ammunition. ^

"^Our estimates of the levels of Pact ground snd air ammunition and POL supplies are based onof lhe capacities of identified Storage facilities, adjusted to take loading factors inlo account These calculationsiscussion of Soviet naval logistic capabilities are contained in volume II, chapter IL of this Estimate."

" Volume II oltotna on rhe Fedpenoniwt

48.

PARI C

WARSAW PACT STRATEGY FOR INITIAL CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO

Ihii pari ole summarize our understanding of Warsaw Paci command and conirol and of likely Pad objectives and operations during thc initial conventional phasesar with NATO. Volume II of the Estimate contains additional,Intelligence information and iodipriefits. and our estimates of the likely allocation of Pact forces to campaigns tn Central Europe, against NATO's flanks, and in the North Atlantic.

We do not have access to the Pact's war plans, but we can deduce their general nature, at least for the opening phasesar, from military exercises, from Pact writings on military tactics and strategy, and from the current disposition of Pad forces. The USSR has developed contingency plans for militaryon all Pact land frontiers Our information on Soviet concepts for miliury operations is best for offensive operations that would be directed against NATO, especially In Central Europe. The Soviets clearly expect Central Europe to be the decisive arenaar with NATO and assign it the highest priority in the allocation of military manpower and equipment.

c have considered the question of whether the Soviets could rely on their Warsaw Pad allies to participate willingly and effectively In hostilities against NATO and have concluded that no categorical answer Is possible, The extent of reliability in non-Soviet Wanaw Pact countries would depend chwfly upon the circumstances under which NSWP forces became engaged In war with NATO. The period of tension before hostilities would allow the Soviets to manipulate popular attitudes and political leaders. In addition, the Pad's mobilization would be set in motion and Its momentum would carry militaryforward. Refusal on the part of an NSWP country to participate at thb stage could be dealt with by force. In sum, the East Europeans would feel they had little cliolcc but to fight on behalf of the Pad.

49

Wor sowc-Tiiiif.riii ond Control

he Warsaw Pact's success in achieving its wartime objectives would depend on its ability to control and coordinate multinational. Joint-serviceof great complexity. In peacetime, tliePad headquarters does not control thc armed forces of member states. Each state controls Its armed forces through its national command auflsority. which is made up of key party, government, and military leaders. Operational control of national forces isby each cixsntry'i general staff. Overall Pad defense planning is coordinated among Pad members, but the process is clearly Soviet dominated-of the Pact wartime commandot autorruitic. ll entails authoritative release of forces from national control and their subordination to the Pad's high command. Political and militarybetween senior Pad leaders would be necessary to coordinate preparations for war.

he ultimate authority for the direction of thc Sovid military rests with the Politburo The wartime role of the Politburo is unclear, but its involvementroup would probably be limited to only the most crucialulaset of thc Politburo, theCouncil, establishes military policy and makes fundamental decisions regarding the employment of military forces. We believe that the Defense Council would form Ihe nucleusargely civilian national defense command organ. Thb body would consider all defense issues and provide broad guidelines for the conduct of miliiary operations

Vezhncv, predeslgnated as Supremein Chief, wouldupreme High(Verkhovnovtdrawn from elements of Iho Ministry of Defense. (See figurehU command would constitute theleadership over all Pact militaryagainst NATO. TV VCK probably Includes at least the three first deputy ministers of defense and

Primary Option tor Operational Control ol Warsaw Pact Forces

Supreme High Command <VGK)

East European National Oe tense Councils

Stall

High Command ol Ihe Combined Armed Forces ol the Warsaw Pact*

I I

I

Defense Ministries

Assigned Stralegic

haalei ol Military Opoiaii

Command, Southwestern Theater of Military Operations

i

Northern (Polish) From"*

DanubeHungar>an) Frontc

(Soviet Easiiont

Fleet Elements i

OpF'Jt-jnjI li-wltfll

- CoivOinal*'.

Ihu neaOqva'IC'S may also lunclieAIlia So"rl iwt.it. an lha Highi Uie Vvcatcn theater of Wai

onala Soviet General Suit

c From rnuti) baore

theateriia'y Dperat-om

anl aalumot comol

ol anCWrman army uiylar Gerla'Ac*n

Combined Blue* Sea Fleet

(he commander, in elite! el thc five components of thc Soviet aimed foices. One of the Soviet first deputy ministers of defense (currently. Marshal Kulikov) is the commander in chief of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states. The SovietStall is the eiecutive agent ol the VCK and. as such, is the focal point lor operational control of Soviet armed forces and those of the Pact la wartime.

IOG We believe thatar occur betweenthe Warsaw Pact and NATO, theater-level command* would be established and exercise direct operational control over fionts and fleets and at leas) some degree of control over those strategic assets allocated lo support theater operations. Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact does not have theater headquarters in being in peacetime llardened command posts have beenfor at least some Pact wartime headquaiters, however.

rrangements for exercising control of Pad forces within what lhe Soviets call tbe Western (or European) Theater of War have been evolving over lhc lasl few years. Although ultimate control of all Pact operations continues to be the VCK and the Sovid Ceneral Staff, we now have evidence that indicate* the com minder in chief of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pad would control all Pad forces in this theater in wartime. Wc arc less certain of how he would dolhe High Command of the Warsaw Pad wouldomponent of the Sovid High Command with the responsibility for operational control over forcesthe Western Theater or whether it wouldeparate command entity.

nuture war with NATO. Soviet strategists envision widespread combaterieornpassing all of Europe and extending into the North Atlantic. Accordingly, they plan lo divide the Western Theater of War into three land Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs) in which they expect Pad and NATO forces to come in conflict. (See)

The Northwestern TVD. Rased on the Soviet Leningrad Military District, this theater would encompass the Scandinavian Peninsula andadiacent waters

The Westcrn'TVD. This theater would include, on thi Pad tide, Soviet and Kail European forces in Kast Cermany, Poland, and Czcclwdovalia

id Soviet forces in lhe western USSR and. on the NATO side. West Cermany, llie Benelux nations. Denmark, and possibly Fiance and northern Spain Pact operation* in lhe western Halite Sea also would be included in this TVD.

The Southwestern TVD. Soviet planners Cnvl-lidri miliiary operation* against Creece andand probably northern Italy and Austria. Thi* (beater would also include the Black and Mediterranean Seas

he Soviets abo eipecl maior naval operation* against NATO 'in the North Atlantic to occur in coniuncllononflict In Europe. Tlic equivalent of the TVD ia Soviet maritimehe MTVD. the Maritime Theater of Military Operations. We are less certain about tbe approximate boundaries of MTVD* than we are aboul those of TVDs. Operations, exercises, and documentary evidence sucgest that the Soviets would regard an area ln the Norwegian Sea north of the CreeiiUrW-lceland--Unitcd KingdomK) gap as an MTVD.

he Pad's com ma rider in chief would control the Western and Southwestern TVDoften called High Commands by the Soviets--which would in turn exercise dired control over assigned fronts, flotillas, separate armies, aod those strategic forces allocated to support TVD operations Wc are unsureVD command would be formed to control operations against NATO's northern flank or. If established, whether ll would be under the control of (he Pact's commander in chief or directlyto ihe Soviet Ceneral Staff. In any case, Soviet members of tbe Pad's military hierarchy havelhal lhe control organs for TVD Highstaffs, communications, and commandestablished in peacetime.

III. Regardless of what echelons of command arc created to integrate wartime theater-level andoperations, ibe senior tadical command would be the front. Although not directly comparable to any Western organiialion. the front would be similar to Ihe NATO army group In size, level of command, ondront would usually consist of three to fiveground armies, each including three to live tank or motorized rifle divisions, and an ait army of as many as several hundred lacticalroot operatingaritime sector mighl also control any naval elements which were chiefly devoted tu lhat front'* mission. Thc ground (nrrex of the dont would also

-lop Secret -

inli mw

Tnf. SgcrcHHrft'-

numerous separate com Kit icvl combat-sup port elements loch as lank, artillery, miiiile, and air defense units. Ijrgc service-support dementi would provide the front with transport, maiotcnance,aupply, and medical aupport. The Soviel front in East Cermany could total moreen alter fullore typical front would have

n wartime, the Pact would havepposite NATO the Baltic and BUdt Sea Combined Fleets, both under Soviet command. The Combined Baltic Fleet would consist of elements from thc Soviet Baltic Fleet and fiom the Poliih and East German Navies. Tlie Combined Black Sea Fleet would Ik formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the Romanian and Bulgarian Navies. The Soviet Northern Fleet and the Soviet 5th Squadron (Esladra) In the

Mediterranean would support Pact operations under

the control of the Main Naval Staff In Moscow.

although in some cases control niight beby

continental theater-level commands.

e believe that the Pacts raatnrnand and control system Is adequate to alert forces and control mobilization and to control combat operationsapidly developing crisis, deploying and activating the Pact's entire wartime command and control system would requireeek. Tbe system for theater operations has Important strengths:

dominance of the Pact allows the USSR to control almost all aspects of Pact operations.

Pacttandatdkaed command and

control doctrine.

The Pactignificant degree of flexibility In the resuboidination of giound armies andfrom one command to another. Indudingation ol these units from one nation to the command of another

Each echelon of command lias thc capability to control both its immediate and second-echelon subordinates.

The Pact command and contiol system Isby redundancy, hardening, mobility, and dispersal As such, the systemigh degree of survivability,

forcesigh degree ofsecurity, both in opera ting practices and In security devices

The Pact is demomtratinget caring degree of interoperability in communications equip-nt.

Pad mobile signal units have backupequipment lo replace lhat damaged or destroyed

IH Our judgments regarding these strengths are tempcied by Information Irom Soviet classifiedwell as from defectors andilluminates Pactome problem areas within elements of thc system. Problems noted (ndudeof poor-quality staff arid comaiurua lionslow Russian-language proficiency on the part of aome Pact stalls; shortcomings in quantity, capadty, interoperability, maintainability, and security ofequipment; and failure to fulfill doctrinal requirements for camouflage and distance between communications centers and command posts.

ecause command, control, andare essential in modern warfare, any serious degradation of these functions would have anmpact on the effectiveness of combat operations. Systematic analyses are under waydetermine the degree of susceptibility of the Pact command and control system to destruction and degradationdetailed resulu are not available, wc can uiake several important judgments about Pact vulnerability.

Because ol Pact efforts at hardening andserious degradation of Pact command and control functions probably would not occuresult of collateral damage from weaponsat other targets.

Although the destruction of all major command and control targets would require hundreds of weapons, selective and repeated attacks onfacilities could reduce Pact combat dfec-livcncss and possibly stall current or futureoperations

effect of destroying different command posts would vary according to thc echdonFor example, destruction of tbe front's main or rear command peats, where mostoccurs, may not have as peat an Impact on current operations ts on subsequent operalions. Destruction of army and division forwardposts or regimental command posts,would likely have an immediate disruptive impact on operations

c

Thc Initio! Cornpoign in theooter ot Militory Operotiom

Ih* Ground Offensive

oviet military strategy callsanive and rapid cround offeiui ve into NATO territory in Central Europe to defeat NATO forcea, disrupt rnoUlitation. and seize ot destroy ports and airfields to prevent reinrorcement. Because this strategyighly fluid battlefield and high rates of advance, ['act planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO forward defenses rapidly to prevent the Western Alliance Irom strengthening its defenses and using the time gained for mobilization and reinlotcement. They rctcognize that this strategy would bc complicatederiod of political crisis and tension that almostwouldar and provide Impetus to NATO preparations.

o achieve the force ratios deemed necessary to accomplish its objectives, the Pact has evolved mobilization and altack concepts that are intended to maahnlzc initial combat power, on the assumptionar in Europe would be short, and therefore decided largely by forces in being or quickly available Accordingly, the Soviets plan against tlie contingency that Pact forces based In Central Europe, about hall of them East European, might be required toact offensive campaign and, bypassing strongcarry the campaign wdl into NATO territory before reinforcements would arrive from the western USSR

act planning fot tlie Western Theater of Military Operations evidently envisions initialalong aies of advance In three destinotcentral, northern, and souihwestera. (See) The Pad probably would seel to organ lie Its initial attack forces in this TVD into three fronts which would correspond to these areas of responsibility. In8 (Warsaw Pact Concept, and Capabiltlies far Going to War In Europe, Implications few NATO Warning efe evaluated various attack options which Ihe Warsaw Pad mighl consider for launching offensives In the Western TVD. should it deride toar wiih NATO. These options definedways in which the Pad might orgarviie Iheoviet and NSWPn Central Europe and tlseoviet divisions in tlie three western military districts of lheummary of lhe condustoos of that evaluation,iscussion of Pact concepts for breaking through NATO's defeases and subsequent ground operations in Central Europe, are contained In volume II of this Estimate

hile the SovieU regard most of thdr allies with habitualat one lime or another most of them have merltod dirt rust by rebellion or polilicalSoviets have rievertheaess co-trusted thdr allies to carry out wartime functions potentially critical lo thc Pad's prospect! lor successonflict with NATO. Tlie East Europeans provide more than hall the Pad combat divisions Inurope, and lhc Soviets count on attacks by Polish units in the north and Czechoslovak unils in the south to tie down large NATO forces and permit the concentration of Soviet and East Cerman lorces in thc critical centra! secior. Thc major lines offrom the USSR run through Poland. Eastand Czechoslovakia, and national! of these countries are chiefly responsible for operating and maintaining them. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pad forces are intended to provide forward air ddense for theUSSR and to protect tlie Pact's logistic and rear area support All of this suggests that the Soviets have reconciled themselves to whatever reliability problems ihey envision and havealculated decision lo rely on effedive NSWP pedormance in lhefor which they plan military operations.

oncepts for lhe Offemioe. Tlte Uctlcsby the Pad to overcome NATO defenses will be based on its perceptions of bow strong those defenses are The Pad would prefer to employ forces on multiple asea. moving in ladical march columns to

defense pcihlioni through gam.points, aod osicn flanks, lelying heavily on speed andIn areas where (he Paci believed lhal ll must penetrate strong, continuous NATO dele rises, it would mount breakthrough operations on each principleol advance. (Vpending on ll* importance of the ails of advance to (he overall (healer oflemive plan and Ihe strength of lhereakthrough attempt might involve the major forces ofront or an army.

f the Nate/car Transition.

Soviet military writings confirm that Warsaw Pact plannersilemma in the prospectat wiih NATO could be nonnuclear In Ihe beginning and escalate rapidly lo large-scale nuclear war On the one hand, if faced with Strang, continuous NATO defenses, the Pact planners would have lo mass largeof forces in places of their choosing to attempt breakthroughs. On the other hind, they fear lhat NATO might take advantage of their vulnerability while massing for an attack anduclcat strike. The dilemma has led the Soviets toarge-scale nonnuclear air attack on NATO's air and nuclear facilities to which they would commit the bulk of the Warsaw Pad tactical air force and much of the Soviet LHA bomberan attempt to eliminate most ofeater nuclear potential si lhe very outset ol hostilities

he Pact's plans to (educe the vulnerability of ils attacking ground forces duting bieaIthrough efforts call for dispersed units to convetge rapidly near Ihe point of contact wiih NATO forces, attack,reakthrough, and ihcn disperse, continuing theor exploitationumber of different nxes. This tactic is designed to minimize the time during which Pad forces would be eiposed to nuclear strikes, ll is also intended to complicate NATO's use of nuclear weapons by having the Pact units come together for the assaultoint as close as possible to NATO lines so that NATO cannot effectively employ nuclear weapons without endangering its Own troops. Tlie Sovieis recognise, howevet, lhat thc breakthrough operationomplex and risky maneuver. This ii apparent from the considerable attention Sovietcontinue to devote to the coordination and com-. munitions problems associated with moving large attacking foices covettly, committing them from the march, dispersing ihem. and providing replacements and reinf or cements for them

hc Soviets place considerable Stress on efforts lo anticipate NATO's intention lo uie nuclear weaponsarge scale In time toad preemptive attack To ihis end. Ihey etped lo keep ihcir own nuclear delivery systemsigh slate of teadlness and toigorous reconnaissance andcollecting campaign againit NATO's nuclear units and facilities, as well as ils communications networks, lo delect signs which might presage thc imminent use of nuclear weapons

anks Venui Anlileok Weapons.se the-type of offensive the Pad planners envision In Central Europe is highly dependent on thc mobility and shock effed provided by large numbers of tanks, the Pact Is concerned lhat lhe proliferation in NATO forces of improved antitank weapons has greatlyNATO's capability to stop Pact armor.esult, llie Pact has modified its tactics and Initiated several force improvement programs In an effort to cope with NATO's antitank threaL

ad doctrine has traditionally stressed the role of artillery on tlie conventional battlefield, and the Pact now has in Central Europe more than twice as many artillery pieces as NATO. Pad artillery doctrine sttexaes preplanned, massed barrages, which provide lhc high volume of flic requited in nonnuclearoperalions against tebtivcly static defenses, especially against lot ward antitank defenses. The large number of multiple rocket bunchcrs deployed with Pad forces could be particularly effective In this role.

ork to reduce the vulnerability of tanks lo antitank guided missiles (ATCMi) has been under way in the Soviet Union since at least the, most of it dileded ai de!eating the highexplostve antitank (HEAT) warheads which virtually all Infantryweapons in both NATO and lhc Warsaw Pact employ. To provide better protection, particularly against HEAT ammunition, thc Soviets havecomposite or laminated armor arrays In their42 tanks. The additional tanks which Ihe Soviet* have assigned lo their divisions in the past decade may be intended to compensate for the heavier losses lhat Soviet planners eipect to sustain from improved antitank defenses and to enable assaulting units lo overwhelm these defenses by sheer numbers. The addition of an Independent Unk battalionot ori red rifle division provides the division com-mander with in additional maneuver force lo committllical point in lhe battle.

ubteauent Oovmliani. Ifmajorwere accomplished by ibe foices of live Soviet-East Cerman Front, tbe Ihree tank armies of ibis front probably would launch rapidperhaps aided by airbornean attempt to secure ciossings over the flhine near Essen. Ftankfurt. and similar points, and continue the advance lo at least the French border. The Polish Front, upon breaking through initial defenses in its area, would befor advancing both into Denmark and across northern Cermany inlo ihe Netherlands TheFront would move into southern West Cermany. and advance toward crossings over the Rhine south of Mannheim

he roles of tlie reinforcing fronts from the western USSR would depend on the progress of the initial offensive.

Ihe Air Offensive in Control Europe

act planners also consider NATO's tactical air forces In Centralormidable threat to Pact ground, air, and nuclear forces during the initial, conventional phase of war. and one of NATO'smeans for delivering nuclear strikes in Europe. Consequently, they regard thc early attainment of sir superiority and destruction of much of NATO'snuclear forces to be critical to the Pact's chances for victory in the theater. The Soviets regard air superiorityondition In which NATO's air and air defense forces would cease toerious threat to the operations of Pact ground, air. and naval forces. The Pact plans to achieve ihese objectives bya large-scale, thcaterwidc conventional airduring the first several days of hostilities. The Soviets refer to this ofleiuive as tlie Air Operation. (See

57

he goals and principal characteristics of the Air Operation (P

The Pact would commit most of its tactical aircraftarge number of its Long Range Aviation bomberscries of air assaultsto achieve tactical surprise at ihe outset of hostilities and lasting for the first two to four days of combat

Each assault, consisting of Iwo tn three waves nf alrcralt. would beginoncerted effort io destroy or suppress air defenses in corridois through which attacking aircraft would proceed to strike airfields, nuclear-weapons-associatedand command, control, andfacilities.

LRA bomben would constitute the primary force for attacking airfields. Most tactical air forces would be used to suppress air defenses, especially HAWK missile batteries. They would also be expected to provide lighter cover for attack aircraft, to provide reconnaissance and REC support, and to attack surface-to-surface missile units and some NATO airfields. NSWP national air defense fighters would escort Soviet bombers over Pact territory and provide strategic air defense of their homelands.

Some fighter-bomber and bomber aircraft would be withheld for use in nudear operations,mall number of tactical aircraft would befor direct support of thc ground forces.

Pact planners would regard attacks against NATO airfields as the principal way of gaining air superiority. They would Intend such attacks to damage runways and other airfield fadlitict and thus degrade NATO's ability to operate its air forces effectively. In Its dfort to achieve nudear superiority, the Pact would probably concentrate its attacks on those bases from which NATO nudear delivery aircraft would operate.

Thc Pact hasacticalational air ddense fighters,RA bombers available-for use in Central Europe. Pact writings and exercise scenarios lead us to estimate that, of ihese aircraft,RA bomben andactical aircraft would be made available for use in the Air Operation. The remaining aircraft would be used to defend Pact territory and to piovide direct combat support to Pact ground forces.

Some of tire lem-.rMnt aircraft would .bo be trot(oe lhc (ratssition tonum-

bee of aircrafl avaibble for the initial assault of an Ai. Operation would vary according loeni to which thc Pact mobilized and moved additional tactical aitwithin ranee ol NATO targets"

e have no direct evidence ofecta-tlons regardine aircraft losses during (he AhWe believe, however, (hat the Pact probably would not measure ihc success ol the Air Operation in these terms. Substantial Pad losses might be viewed as tolerable lo Pad planner,hort,conflict, even if (be Air Operation managed only lo keep NATO's air forces preoccupied with fending for iheir own survival during the first few days of rwslllities. With their attention so diverted, NATO's air forces could have difficulty countering Pad ground lorces during.the most critical pluses of (bear initial ocert UeaHhrougb and penetration of NATO's forward defenses. How the Pact would meas-ure the degree to which the Air Operation would contribute to Pact nuclear superiority it less clear. Pad stratearisu may regard this obicdive as being subsumed under that of air superiority because theyATO's air forces as ibe principal component of NATO's theater nudear capability.

he abilily of Ihe Pad's air forces to reduce significantly the effectiveness of NATO's air and theater nudear forces would be affededariety of factors. Chief among (hem are Pad eapabililieschieve surprise, effedively coordinate theof large numbers of aircraft, suppress NATO's air defenses, and destroy aircraft and crater runways and tatiwayi at NATO's airfields. Other important factors include the proficiency cf Pad aircrews and the abilily of Pad air forces to perform their primary missions In poor flying weather. Our assessment of these factors is contained in volume II, chapter IV.

ome In the Intelligence Community believe that, onact Air CIperatioH would do considerable damage to NATO's air and air defenseut probably would not be so effective as to prevent NATO's air forces from being able to deliver

-apbv-avent option, .of lilel.(or and combatrtiw aa Air Optra ton ara

eontaUed la volume It. chapter IV, ol thu EbWic

99

nuclear weaponsarge scale" This coradusion is bated on the evaluation of Pad rxefreicAdei and weaknesses contained in volume II. ley poinls of which arc summarized below:

Pad is unlikely lo achieve slralcgic surprise because of lhe extensive preparations lhal it would feel compdled lo male in order lothe prospects for successeneral offensive in Central Europe

Pad's ability lo orchestrate an Air Operation requiring precisely limed, multiple sorties by Soviet bombers (lying out of the USSR and the tadical and national air defense forces of several different nationalities operating from wilhin Eastern Europe is open to question

Pact will have difficulty suppressing NATO's air defenses because the tactical aircraft assigned ihis responsibly arc currently equipped mainly with direct attackwhich means that NATO's HAWK surface-to-air missile sites would have to be visually identified by Pad aircrews before they could be attacked.

The Pad capability to destroy aircraft protected by shelters and to break up runways is fudged to be limited because of thehe force thc Pact apparently intends to commit to this task, and the ladies If apparently Intendi lo

Pact tactical aircrews generally arc not wdlmeasured by UScombat in the hostile environment ihey would likdy encounter in executing lhe Air Operation

ircraft generally ore not equipped to navigate at low altitude nor are they able to attack targets in poor weather, so visibilities in excess cf several thousand mden would befor ihc success of thc Air OperaUon.

thers believe that no judgment with any useful level of confidence on thc efirxtlveneo of an Air Operation is possible at thishey believeonclusion such as expressed above should of

" The hotf Ihu nVar an (heutet>e* Agmcp and IheSureaii cf tatratlgeno* and ReaaarcA,ol Stale.

olier, af IhU etaw art lhefanev.hief ofhteHlfne*.

ol Ihe At. Faroe.

necessity be basedigorous analysis ol lhe faclois involved which apply to both NATO and lhe Paci. and the interaction ot thc forces of both sides. They observe that no such analysis has been oflcred lo support the conclusion They further believe that the sensitivity of any such analysis to assumptions which have to be based on meager evidence- Pact weapon allocation and delivery tactics, formate lhe validity of such an analysis open lo question.

Naval Operations in the Baltic

arsaw Pad naval operations in the Baltic would be conducted in thc context of the overall campaign in Ihe Western Theater ol MilitaryIn Central Europe, and would conform with the timing and objectives of the Pact's ground and air forces. In particular those of the Polish, oi Northern, Front of that TVD. This front, composed primarily of Polish forces, bul with the support of the Combined

Baltic Fleet, would be responsible initially fornorthern West Cermany and Denmark (Sec)

he broad objectives of Pad naval operations would be to gain complete control of the Baltic Sea and access to the North Sea to sever NATO's lines of communication in the North Sea, and deprive NATO of potential launch areas for carrier strikes against Pact air and ground forces in thc Central Region. Control of the Baltic Sea would also facilitate subsequent amphibious operations against Denmark and West Germany, adefensive buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of communication from NATO attack. The major Pact forces involved would consist of thc Soviet Baltic Fleet reinforced by thc naval lorces of East Germany and Poland, thc Soviet Baltic Fleet Ali Force, Long Range Aviation, and elements of the Pact's national air defense and tactical air forces.

Illustrative Warsaw Pact Naval and Amphibious Operations in the Western TVD

Soa

ir

C dekJmaijk.-y" ^>

' SWEDEN ft

Sea denial operations

Sea,?

USSR

assaults

POLAND

Polish (Northern) Front

AimlfiloitO

EAST }

GERHAHV '

G[ftMANY

an

-lon-Wel fluTf

ain oblecfive of (he Pad's initial naval rarseralsons in the Baltic would be to destroy NATO submarines, fail patrol boats, and mine warfare unlit because ihey could interfere with Paci shipespecially west of Bornholm Island, and with amphibiousad planners recognize lhat the elimination of these lorces in lhe Baltic wouldifficult task. Accordint toilabilily information reported to NATO, tlvc Danes and West Germans probably would have iesel-powered submarines andast patrol boats.f lhe btler missile armed, aller two lo four days ol preparation. Obviously. it would be preferable for the Pad lo destroy these ships al their bases,eriod ol tension would provide time for them to deploy and disperse, obliging lheto locate and destroy them at sea ot in concealed anchorages. This would require cffedlve coordination of all Pad forces, an which Pad planners acknowledge would be difficult

HQ. Air superiority wouldritical Irigredient lo Pad Baltic Sea operations. As part of the effort to gain overall theater air superiority at the outsetonflict in Central Europe initial Pad air operations in the Baltic would be directed against West Cerman and Danish naval bases and airfields and against NATO naval units already present In the area in an attempt to establish sea eontiol and air superiority for the protection of subseouent Pad amphibiousPact air forces probably would also operate against NATO naval forces in lhc North Sea. Initial strikes by Baltic Fleet bombers against NATO air defenses In Denmark and northern West Cermany might be part of air opera lions in Central Europe or at least would be coordinated with those operations. Such strikes would facilitate the overflight of Soviet naval aircraft en route to NATO naval targets In the North Sea. Achievement of air superiority over the Baltic would depend largely on the success of the Pact's critical offensive Air Operation In Central Europe.

ML The SovieU probably would find it difficult to deal with West Cerman and Danish subau>rines Id the Baltic, particularly If these forces were weDNATO boats have good sliallow-watcrcapabiL'ries, are quiet, and have well-trained crews. Moreover, the Soviets would find it difficult to conduct antisubmarine wai fare operations without air superiority. Under the dJficult hydrolosicaJthat generaDy characterize the Baltic, we believe that Pact ASW sensors would be inadequate to detect

61

submarines at useful ranges eacept possibly in harbor entrancesew close-in coastal areas. Efforts to use moored acoustic buoys have had little success thus far. Furthermore. Sovid shipborne and airborne ASW forces in lhe Ratlir have been unsuccessful In iheir attempts toup contads.

H2.C

Jwe believe thai if initial sea control and air superiority operations were successful. Pad forces In (lie llaltic would then concentrate on supporting the Polish (Northern) Fronts offensive across northern West Cermany and into Jutland. Combinedand airborne landings are planned against the Danish islands. The Soviets consider tenure of ihese Islands, especially Zealand, to be necessary to prevent naval use of the Baltic by NATO, to permit passage of Soviet naval forces lo and from lhe North Sea, aid to be able to carry out suliscquent amphibious operations against southern Norway. Early airborne or amplilb-ious operations are abo planned against Bornholm bland to neutralise NATO intelligence collection fa-cllllles there and prevent its subsequent use by NATO combat forces.

mphibious operations In the Baltic would involve ships from the Soviet. Polish, and East Cerman Navks, plus mobilized merchant ships Assault forces would be drawn from thc Soviet Baltic lied naval infantry regiment, live Polish sea landing division,pecially trained regiment of an East Cerman motor-lied rifleolish mechanized division which has received some amphibious training aod Soviet motorized riflefrom the USSR could be included in follow-on Undingt The amphibiouswould be coordinated with the ground offensive in Jutland and with airborne landingsolish division and perhaps Sovid airborne troops. Becausehortage of NSWP landing craft, some Polish and East Cerman amphibious assault forces probably would use Soviet transport forces in the initial assault

I tt. Pad planners recognize that the amphibious operation would require thc multinational Integrationariety of forces. Including tactical aircraft and mine warfare, ASW, gunfire rapport, and logistic ships. Thii continues toroblem for the Pad In its combined Baltic Sea amphibious exercises. Wethat failure to attain air superiority and sea control of the western Baltic, especiallyonventional war. would alrnost certainly cause the Pact to reeonrider the feasibilitylanned

-lop-Socrct HUff-

operations. If ihe amphibious assaultscanceled. Tact planners would also have lo decide if any airborne operations could be conducted independently.

MS. Pad planners believeey clement in all Baltic operations would be to thwart NATO ing operations bv destroying mine stockpiles and minelaying ships before they deploy. We have reliable evidence that Pad planners would consider NATO minefields off thr Danish and German coasts loet (uus ihreal to (heir amphibious operations. The task ol clearing paths through Urge fields of contad and influence mines, particularly if opposed by NATO air and naval forces, would be viewed by lhe Pad as eaitemely difficult and potentially quite costly. In addition. Pact mine-clearing forces have nothigh level of proficiency In exercises or other peacetime operations such as in the Culf ofonetheless. Pad naval forces In the Bahic haveine warfare ships and craft of all types and routinely train in mine-clearing operations.

ccording lo one view In thc Intelligence Community, the allocation of most Pad tactical and LRA bomber aircraftarge-scale Air Operation in West Germany and the Benelux countries would severely reduce the probability cf the Pad's achieving air superiority over thc Baltic In the initial stagear withithout air superiority the Pad wouldow probability of sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully defending the amphibious force against NATO missile-armed fast patrol boats It is further believed that Pad ASW forces probably would be unable to prevent NATO submarine attacks against the amphibious forces. This conclusion is based on the judgments contained in.

n alternative view holds lhat the Warsaw Pact's achievement of air superiority over the Baltic would depend on many factors. Including theof Pad naval aviation aircraft lo suppression of NATO air capabilities In the Bahic area, tbe degree of success the Pad forces migbl achieve in these air operations, and (lie speed witb which they achieved It" The holders of thb view believe that tlie conclu-

rAe hMen of ihu oUro an Ike Centra/ Intelligent* Agency; Ike Director, NaUonal Security Apmoy; and lhe Dlieetor, flumeof Intelligence and Reua>cK Dipatmcnf of SlaU.

- The holder, of ihle oUw ate lhe Director. Or/cue Inlettltenee Agency, and ihe AuUiani CltUf of Slaff, InlaOlgenee.

of ike All Forte.

sions expressed above would be highly sciuilivoumber of additional (actors, including asaumptiont aboul lhe inlet ad ion of NATO and Pad suifacc and subsurface forces, as well as about (he timing and urgency which the Pad attached to prosecution of the amphibious operations. They observe that analysis of all tliese factors has not been sufficient to support any conclusions, explicit or implied, as lo the probability of success or failure of Pad amprslbious operations, or (he degreehich lhc Pad could defeat NATOoperations, in lhe Bailie

hird view holds lhal the achievement o( air superiority it but oneumber of key fadors which, laken together, will determine the outcome of the Pad's Baltic campaign" The holder cf thb view considers lhat allocation of considerable air assets to tbe Pad's Balticikely but believes thai other fadois of equally critical importance include the extent of Pad success in countering NATO mining and submarine operations in lhe approaches to the Danish Straits.

n addition to the initial naval operalions in the Baltic Itself, other operations would be conducted in the North Sea to destroy Important NATO maritime targets, especially aircraft carrier ot amphibious forces, to prevent NATO naval reinforcemenii from entering Ihe Baltic, and to sever (he Lines ofthrough the North Sea to (hc EUuopeanEvidence indicates that air operations against surface ships in the North Sea and ib approaches would be conduded primarily by mblilc-equipped aircrafl of the Baltic Fleet and possibly some from the Northern Fleet. Pad planners envision (hat operations from Baltic airfields probably would require the estab-lishinenl ol safe flightusing some of tliese same missile-equippedor northern West Cermany. They abo probably believe lhal airstrikes by way cf the Norwegian Sea would require suppression of Norwegian- and UK-based all defenses. If lhe Tact's Initial ail defense suppression operations were successful. Ukxsc surviving strike aiteraft not on nuclear alert would then be available to allack NATO forces in lbc North Sea. Initially,eriod of conventional warfare, as much as one-thild of lhe Baltic and Northern fleet naval aircraft probably would lie vrithheld for nuclear operations.

- The holder of Ihu clew Ir ihe Director of Neoal /nirfdgenor,

Dlgertment of Ihe Naes.

intend loew Baltic and Northern Fleet submarine* to lhe North Sea before tbe outbreak of hostilities to complement the aniuhip operations of Pacteployment from the Baltic, however, would Provide warning indvalions to NATO. We believe lhat deployment of surface ships inlo tbe North Sea prior lo hostilities would be unlikelythe Pact would lack air cover there earlyar.

tnitiol Campaigns Agoinst NATO's Flanks

he SovieU also have plans for offensive action in other NATO regions. |

3

c have little direct evidence on thc Pact's view of the limine of ihese flank offensives In relation to an offensive In Central Europe. We judge, however, that ihe Pact would be unlikely toar by mounting maior ground offensives against all NATO sectors simultaneously. To do so would unnecessarily extend available Pact forces, airlift, and air and logistic support and would complicate command and control at the Ceneral Staff and Supreme High Command levels. The planned Pact air offensive in Central Europe would He up tlie bulk of the Pact's tactical air forces and Soviet inter mediate-range bomber forces for al least the first week, and the Soviet airlift could not simultaneously support two major airbornesuch as those contemplated against the Danish and Turkish Straits. Moreover, there could be political consideration! lhat would lead the Soviets to defer aliacks on some NATO countries in the hope of encouraging their nonbelllgerence.

ISO. We believe that the need for unfettered naval operations from their Northern Fleet bases would almost certainly cause the Soviets to strike NATO facilities in northern Norway, and probably to attempt to occupy some territory there, and that the urgency of this need would lead them to do so corscurrently with starting an atlack in Central Europe. We abo would espeet attacks on NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean to occur at Ihe onset of hostilities in Central Europe None of lhe other potential flank

A3

offensives appear lo havedegree ol urgency

although the Pad would be likely lo move against the' Turkish Straits earlyar. Even if lhe Pad did not begin ground offensives immediately In some flank areas. It would almost certainly make feints or conduct holding adions intended lo keep NATO from shifting forces from the flanks to Central Europe, compel commitment of NATO reserves, and weaken NATO lorces on the flanks in anticipation of further operations

The Sovthweiiein Ihootte ol Mm tat, Operoik-n

IS* We have good evidence lhal the Soviets are concerned about lhe sizable groupings of NATO forces in the south and especially the threat of air and nuclear strikes which Ihey espeet would be launched against Eastern Europe and the USSR by tlse US 6th FleetATO-Warsaw Pad war. Accordingly, the Soviets assign high priority to the dcstrudlon of Western ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) andcarriers In the Mediterranean earlyar. They also place great Importance on capturing the Bosporus aod the Dardanelles.

he Pad views early seizure of the Turkish Straits as crucial to lhe success of Its maritime strategy in Ihe Southwestern TVD for the following reasons

Il would bc necessary for wartime augmentation of Sovid naval farces In (he Meditenanean bv naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would permit the rrturn of ships to tlic Black Sea for repairs and resupply.

It would deny entry into the Black Sea of additional NATO shins and submarines.

It would deny NATO use of tlse Straits area for launching any attacks against the USSR or Pact forces in tlie Black Sea. and perrnlt Pad use of the area to support attacks into the

n addition. Soviet writings stress the strategic importance of Austriaink between the Western and thc Southwestern TVDs and cite the Importance of being prepared to counter any NATO threat laurichod across Austrian territory. There ls abothat the pact has plansajor attack on northern Italy and deep offensives Into Crcoce and Turkey. Pad theater esactses In the Southwestern TVD have depicted the bunching. In response to NATO attacks, of multifront Pad offensives against all

fop-Oecct BWf-

aforemenlirined objectives simultaneously wiih themiirjp campaign. We believe lhal lo achieve ll> more impoilanl objectives, howevci. the Pad wouldnitial ground operation] lo the Strain area. Anuria, and possibly eaUern Tuiln In addition, al lhc Onset ol war. air and naval it lads would almost cenainly be mounlcd acairul NATO forcei in time areas and In lhe Mediterranean

round Operolioni. Q_

11st Pjci has coniingcnct plans for offensive operations in thc south directed against Austria and possibly northern Italy, lhe Bosporus, the Dardanelles, Creece. eastern Turkey, and possibly Iran.)

"^Yugoslavia as neutralATO-Pact war, but conceivably the Pact might attempt tothrough Yugoslavia to attack northern Italy. The success ofove would depend primarily oo the attitude and political position of the YugoslavIf the government authorized lhe transit of Pad forces through Yugoslav territory, the Pad would have shorter and quicker access to northern Italy. Ifremained neutral,.any Pad incursion probably would prompt armed resistance and defense of the homeland by the Yugoslav armed forces, which could seriously detrad from the Pad's main efforts in Central Europe. On balance, we judge il unlikely that Yugoslavia wuuid grant the Pact permission to use its territory ur that thc Pad would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to atlack northern Italy. This judgment is qualified, however, by our uncertainly concerning future political altitudes and developments In Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era.

n wai it me. four Sovid divisions in Hungary and the sii divisions of the Hungarian Army would be subordinate to the Danube Front. (Seef

I thii front would movelo protect ihctlank of the Western TVDdestroy any NATO foices lhal might haveinvasion is pre-

Pad

s that it would take about two weeks to defeat

ceded byest Cerman or an Italian incursion into Austria. In any case, we believe lhat lhe Pad would invade Austria at the startar to secure llie southern flanl ul thc Western TVD.

apects

the main bodies of Austrian and NATO forcea In Austria and beosition to advance Inlo nortltern Italy. Civen ihu liming, we believe lhat lhe Pad sees an invasion of Italy primarilyossible folic-wup

bl

operation and not essential lo lhc success of the Initial campaign against NATO- Moreover, an early move toward Italy couldifficult piublcrn For Pad commanders, inasmuch as the main objective ol lhe Danube Front, at least during lhe first week of the war. would be lo protect the flanl of ihe Western TVD.

ICO Before Initiating an assault agaiiut the Turkish Straits, lhe Soviets plan lo move ground and air forces fjM lhe Odessa Military Dislrid into Bulgaria, wiih most of ihese forces transiting Itomania These foices. probably augmented by Bulgarian and Romanian forces, would form lhe Odessa Front, consisting of as many asivisions. Thb front's objectives would bc to destroy Turkish forces lo eastern Thrace, to break through llie fori If tea lions protecting lhc landlo Ihe Turkish Straits, and lo seize the Straits. Amphibious and airborne operations, using primarily Soviel forces--probably one motorized rifle regiment and one naval infantrya Bulgarian naval infantry bstultoo, would probably be conducted loorced crossing of the Bosporus by elements of the Odessa Front The Pad wouldthe timing and location of amphibious landings with both airborne operations and the movement of the Odessa Front along the southwestern littoral of the Black Sea Soviet surface nival forces would almosi certainly bc used lo establish sea lines oflion lo augment lhe relatively poor landlinesthe Mintime Front

161 Timing lhc seizure of the Straits would preseni Pact planners with special problems'

Operations to seise lhe Straits would require Soviet cround forces fiom the Odessa Militaiy District Once these forces were mobilized we estimate that ihey would requireeek to be in position to launch an attack from Bulgaria, tf tliey wereove before (he startar. this movement would provide warning to NATO in tbe Sooth western Theater and elsewhere as well.

Tlic ground campaign to seize the Straits would be difficult and time consuming and would provide NATO time Is obstruct the Straits and thus deny their immediate use after scuure.

The Soviets probably would consider lhat (he airborne division and naval infantry regiment which would bc available for joint auiplu'bious

Illustrative Warsaw Pact Operations in thc Southwesternso

airborne assaults would not be lame enough to overcome Turkish defenses and secure the urea without timely linkup with the Maritime Front. Airborne operation! in thii theater would alto compete lor lift resources with operations planned in thc Westernhaswould thereforeto await the accomplishment of thesen the western flank of the Odessa Front, the remaining Bulgarian forces, consisting of four to si* motorized rillc divisions and three tank brigades, would form the nucleus of the Balkan Front. This

front might also include some Romanian forces,it Is more likely that the Itomanlanstheir own national front In theechelonmusion of the

Balkan Front is To" break trtrocgiTCreek fortifications and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into the main part of Greece. However, corisidering the size of the Balkan Front and the questionableof Rumanian forces to the offensive, we believe that the Balkan Front would probably confine lis actual wartime operations to engaging Creek foices in the Thrace area and to defending lhe western flank of

c

the Maritime Front's forces attacking the Turkish Straits.

TwhUc

the Sovieu mlitliiimited offensive into eastern Turkey, we do not believe that they would undertake operations against Iran during the initial phasear

here are Important constraints on initial Pact ground operalions in the Southwestern TVD:

The Pact probably would not be able to achieve general air superiority or cripple NATO'swar-fight lug capability In the theaterconventional conflict. In the Balkans the Pact lacks sufficient ground attack aircraft forair attacks against aircraft carriers. NATO airfields, and Important air defense,and command and control targets.

The Pact would abo face difficult terrain in most of the Southwestern TVD which would impede rapid force deployment and resupply and facili-tale NATO defense. Soviet writers qtacattOri the Pact's ability to overcome the legion's mountains, water obstacles, limited transportation network, and prepared NATO (unifications^

Soviet forces areonsiderable distance from their wartime aieus of operation. Prehostilities deployment of forces would alert NATO and permit defensive preparations, not only in this secondary theater, but In Central Europe as weU.

Romanian forces, as well as Romanian operation and defense of lines of communication, would be vital to sustaining Pact offensive operation! against Greece and western Turkey. Romanianey to sustained Pactoperations In (he area.

evertheless, Pact land operations in ihese areas, if successful, would offer potential benefits. Seizure of lhc Straits would give the Pact fleribility in committing units from the Black Sea Fleet anda more secure line of communication for lhc Mediterraneanact advance Into Austria

would thiealen NATO force* in southern Germany and norlhern Italy, while an offensive into eastern Turkey would tie duwn Turkish force* in lhc area.

nitial Naoal Oparaliont in lhe Black Sea. We have reliable evidence lhat as pail cf lhe offensive by Ihe Pact's Odessa Front, lhe Soviel Black Sea Fleet would attempt to secure conlrol of the Black Sea. support Ihe movemeni cf Pact ground forces along the western littoral, and assist in serine the Turkish Straits Pact air and sea superiority in lhe Mac! Sea would be pailicubrly critical lo lhe Pad's capability to provide air and ASW defense lot lhe amphibious force designated lo aid in seizing thc Turkish Straits. To assist in lhe achievement of ail and sea superiority and to protect (hc ampliibious lorce, lhe Soviets piobably would retain in (he Bbck Sea at least some of their available larger combatants equipped for ASW and airas Moskvas. Karas, Kashins, and Krivaks. If none of tliese newer and more capable Soviet units were available to support Pad naval operations in aupport of the ground offensive. Pad capabilities to defend ther operations against NATO might prove inadequate.

nitial Mr andOperation! in Ute Mediterranean. An important initial mission of Fad ladical air forces would be to suppress NATO's forward air defenses in southern Europe, thusthe Overflight of Long Range Aviation and naval aircraft heading for lhe Mediterranean The Pad may also have plans loonvenlional Airusing tactical and LRA alicraft against NATO airfields in the Mediterranean area, but ils abilily lo condud such an operation would be constrained by the concurrent requirement for LRA bombers to conduct an air offensive in Ccmial Europe and by the limited number of Pad fighter-bombers in theTVD Pad air support of the ground forces would probably be confined largely to key areas, such as the Turkish Straits

oviet naval operations In the Mediterranean would begin at the startar and would be aimed primarily at lhe destruction of Western SSBNs and aircraft carriers. Forces used would consist of surface and submarine units in lhe Mediterranean at the outset of hostilities, as well as Soviet naval and perhaps LHA aircraft operating from bases in the Soviet Union and possibly from NSWr countries.

aval deployment pat-

terns indicate that the Soviets eiped most activity by

of *

w-Swvet-lUIH1-

surface forces to be concentrated in theeast wfinitial attacks by Soviet ships and submarinesMediterranean Squadron almost certainlyoccur before Pact operations began In otberlite theater The Olacli Sea Fleet Air Forcewith strikes using air-to-surface missilestactical aircraft and Soviet naval free-fallwere Suppressing NATO air defenses Sonicespeii.rily mlssile-arnsed nluulrri andmight ivarlicipaie in raids against carriers,most of LRa probably would beCentral Europe

hile the most immediate threat would come from Soviet ship* and submarines already deployed in Ihe Mediterranean, numerically the most sizable threat to NATO's naval forces there would come from miswIe-cQuipped Soviet Strike aircraft, despite the fact that ihey would be operating without fighter escortonventional war the USSR-based Black Sea Air Force could sortie aboutSM strike aircraft, carrying as many as SO missiles, whkh could attack througliout the eastern Mediterranean. Thc Soviets would probably hold anotherSM strike aircraft withissiles in reserveedge against escalation to nuclear war. Backfire strike alrcralt can cover virtually the entire Mediterranean from Black Sea airfields Badger aircraft can carry out attacks In most of the eastern Mediterranean from Black Sea or NSWP airfields

he Soviets normally keep eightncluding two cruise missile units, in thein peacetime- The cruise missile submarines

"^probably would beosition to attack at the outset of hostilities- In wartime the other submarines probably could monitor Western naval movements near major choke points and possibly near some of the main NATO naval bases. By Itself, however, the submarine force normally deployed in thc Mediterranean is not large enough to attack all Western aircraft carriers and other potential NATO naval targets there at one time Rdnforccrnent from the Northern Fleet would take almost two week* for nuclear-powered submarines (more than three weeks for dinseb) and provide NATO with warningIf conducted before war broke out Because of competing tasks elsewhere, limitations on the of submarines, and logistic constraints, we eslinmte that the submarine formation In the Mediler-

lanean piobably would not be reinforced before the outbreak of hostilities

here is evidence that Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean would eipend torpedoes only in sell defense or against high-value tiigetv. especially aiicralt carrier task groups, amphibious task groups, and US nuclear-powered submarines. Sovietbecause of their lack of survivablepoints, would probably not.atter nf course, fire thru torpedoes against merchant ships in Ihe Mediterranean until ihey had succeeded in (heir atlacks on high-value targets or were returning lo base.

oviet surface forces normally in theconsist of seven lo nine combalants anduxiliaries. These forces would conduct ASWand serve as target spotters and trackers for strike* by submarines, alrcralt, and olher surf ace ships. They would also provide command and ccntroJfor Soviet submarines and aircraft These ships almost certainly would be operating In anIn which NATO had air superiority, however, and. along wiih Soviel submarines, would be the targets for someATO submarine!

here arc divergent view* within theCommunity on whether or the ealcnl lo which the Soviets would augment their surface forces in thc Mediterraneaneriod of tension preceding Ihc outbreak of hostilities. All agree that thcevidence and other consider al ions which bear on (his Question include lhe following.

We have no evidence Irom Pact military writings of plans to augment the surface force in lhe Mediterraneaneriod ot tension before thc outbreak of Inutilities. One referenceto augmentation of lhe Mediterranean force suggests thai it would occur after Pact seizure of the Turkish Straits. Other Soviel writings, in stressing the importance of ASW and anticarrier operations at the outsetar. imply that the Introduction of additional surface ships into lhe Mediterraneanar began wouldogical step.

Of somerincipal surface combatantsavailable in lhe Black Sea Fleet seven to nine are normally deployed lo thc

The Soviets have sort led maior surface warships Irom thc Black Sea lo augment the Mcditerra- '

nean Squadron during major fleet eiectand in timet o( cum Following3 Arab- Israeli wai. (or cample, lb* Sovicii almott doubled the tile of the Medilcirancan force andllw capability In augment lhe force Quickly.

Such ao act wouldlear warningil could be cotinieiproduclivc. dependingreaction. On Ihe other hand, ill bi4 wai dcnaumlrale

theii resolverisis

The Sovieis lecognite NATO's capability to block the Tuikish Straits, and must consider that such operalions could occur earlyar. Consequently, Soviet planners could not count on unobstructed passage to or from theafter tlie outbreak ol hostilities.

omehat Ihe Mediterraneanprobably would be augmented by atew. and possibly upf lhe Urge surface combatants in the Blackas Moskvas. Karas, Kyndas, andtlse outbreak of hostilities. Othershat the Soviets would deploy no itioreew. if any. large combatants from the Black Sea before the outbreak of hostilities The difference in judgment turns on whether the main purpose of the Olack Sea Fleet is to provide air and ASW defense lor operations against the Turkbh Straits, or whethero augment the Mediterranean Squadron The holders of thc fiist view believe thc Fleet is in excess of requirements for tlve defense of local waters in live Black Sea and offensive operations against Turkey and judge lhat. in any event, augmentation of theSquadron would not jeopardize an assault on the Straits. They argue thai the time required to seize and clear the Straits and general uncertainty attending such an operation militate against the Pact's holding its forces in (he Black Sea. risking theii delusion from use In the Mediteiranean Holders ol the second view point out lhal naval units sort led during periods of tension could be trapped In the Medilerranean. where they wouldhighly vulnerable to attack. They judge lhat Pad planners would view seizure of lhe StraiU as moie importantodest augmentation of the Mediterranean Squadron.

Thc holder, ol IhU vUw arc Ihc Pnwrov. Dcfemc UieBttencc Aeenevtha Oiredor, National Security Agency: aad the tXrcctoe of Naoal InleB'tmat. Department of ihe Naov.

The holder, af ihuare the Cenlrol mergence Aeeneu and the Director. Bureau of IntelUsencc andmen! of Stale.

the Norfhweilrrrn Theater al Miliiary Operations

17ft Inatiat Sennet rabiedives in the Northwestern TVD center on ensuring freedom of action andaccess In iho open ocean for Soviet naval ships ,irxl aircrafl and on maintaining the forward defense of lhe eaiensive com plea of naval bases and strategic installations located on the Kola Peninsula.nitial operations by Soviet land forces probably would be limited lo northern Norway. We haveulriicr indicating lhal lhc Snvids plannteral offensive againsi Flnbnd or Sweden earlyar.

aoal Operalions. Soviel eaercises suggest (hat. with lhe opening of hostilities, lhc Northern Fleet would attack Western submarines, aircraft carriers, and amphibious task forces ddeded approachingarents and Norwegianome LBA bombers and Fiontal Aviation fighter-borate it- supplemented by naval bombera, whenwould strike NATO naval facilities, airbases, communications sites and surveillance posts In northern Norway. Soviet amphibious ships carrying upegiment of Soviet naval infantry probably would attempt to seize limited objectives along the northern Norwegian coast After thc naval infantry haduitable port, follow-up Smid giound forces from the Pechcnga area could be landed from merchant vessels.

e do not anticipate any large-scaleoperations because the Soviets arc limited in their assauli lift capacity and their capability to overcome ddermlned resistance from the beach. Initialotter atrobably would be confined lo lhc coast of Finnmark, under conditions suitable for an early linkup with the ground forces. The Soviets probably would, however,arge number of smaller combatants to an escort role In support of operations in northern Notway.

round Operations in Northem Norman. Because of the limited availability of giound forces and tactical aircraft in the northern LeningradDistrict and tlse high priority given to naval missions against NATO naval strike forces, we believe an initial Sovid ground offensive would be limited to the Finnmark area. Potentially strong NATObeyond Finnmark and the risk cf drawing In far greater forces lhan eabl in lhe Kola Peninsula area would probably deter major Soviet ground offensives

The Winn beginning it parnnoli ISt rSiieuiia Sovirt rani nor'at torn in lliw nm

fhe north until art acceptable outcome in Omul Europe had Ixvii achieved. Moreover, the beiicind moreterriloiv south of FiniinvtrL is at the eittcinc limits of Sonet tactical air oovetaee

ISO Soviet ceroses indicate that initial coimd operations against northern Noiway iirnhalily ivould be made by elements of thc two Soviet division' (Vclvenga -md Kandalaksha. We believe thatodci.Hiui^ could e'icnd us farromui andi<urc nf Norwegian bases in live Tmmm area earls in tin- war would hi- irripoiiaiil to the

;iri" rip &n i it,

for their nanlhe Norwegian Sea Initially we could expect small-scale airbutiic nr amphibious raids against thesen ran attempt In ihsiuin NATO operations We wnuld dsn chh-CI Ivninbimt

jitjets jujiiist them by available LHA andioniix-is Itulwould nut eipecl initial large-scale .urlmi in- nr amphibious assaults vn this area btCiuisr of llie luck nl jtfi^ualt jii cover or air arid iimpliiliiiiu* lift, and the doubtful ability of ground forces gdvanc-um acniss Fiiiiuvuirk to effect early linkup

ISI The Sovicl moliiri/td rifle regiments from lhc two non hern divisions arc specially structured andfm operations in the Arctic Althnusth ihi-sc Mints can easily traverseam in northern Nm way. Inn's nl mmm ii ni cat ion over landIk-I'-illiciili tn maintain because only one major toad nm. ilitiiiikili lhc area. There is some evidence intlicaliiiK ih.it thet to alleviate this shortcomingnn>lyini'. wronnd forces by sea. We do noi believe llt.it lhe Sonets wouldarge-scale airbnrintin nnrilierii Norway because lhe demands foi

TT.TlWz-.T'*

-lap. Seerct-fiurf-

transport elsewhere against NATO probably would preclude early useormation as largeomplete airborne division. The Soviets might attempt to insert small teams to sabotage transportation,and intelligence facilities, however.

ir support for the Soviet ground forces tn Finnmark would come primarily from therontal Aviation ground attack and reconnaissance aircraft in thc Leningrad Military Dls-tiirf.fj

3 There are no Frontal Aviation fighter regiments in tlie Leningrad Military District, although fighters from three regiments of the Soviet strategic air defense forces on thc Kolacould provide air coveristance ofilometers over Norway.

e have some evidence that tlie Soviels would use LRA bombers in an attempt to destroy or suppress land-based NATO air defense forces In tiorthcrn and central Norway, probably toath for naval strike, reconnaissance, and ASW aircraft flying against NATO carrier forces and submarines In the NoiW sian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-based air defenses, they would route transiting aircraft north of North Cape and then down (he center of the Norwegian Sea. Such routing would reduce theof thc aircraft to land-bascd air defenses, but it would decrease significantly the combat radius of the aircraft, the time they could spend in their operating areas, and the promptness of anticarrier strikes. It seems unlikely that many LRA bombers or even tactical aircraft would be made available for strikes against Norwegian air defenses, given tlie requirement for large numbers of these aircraft in the Central Region.

Novo! Operations tn lhe North Atlantic

n wartime thc SovieU evidentlyNATO to deploy aircraft carriers, ballistic missile submarines, and large numbers of attack submarines against Soviet surface and submarine force* operating in the North Atlantic In addition, lhc Soviets^

elieve NATO would attemptlandings in northern Norway and use (beSea aslaunch zone for carrier-based itrikes against the USSR. They abo expect NATO to establish antisubmarine barriers in thc Crecnland-Iceland-

United. Kingdom gap and off northern Norway to prevent passage of Soviel submarines. The Soviets' concern for penetrating NATO naval barriers is

lie Norwegian Sea. especially its southern half endinz alK gap. is central to Soviet naval strategy in lhc North Atlantic. While thc-Soviet* clearly cipcct naval engagements throughout the North Atlantic, lliey reckon (hat by far the heaviest combat would occur near andaritime (heater of miliary operations (MTVD) which they evidently would establish north ofK gap. Soviet operations in this MTVD would be intended to prevent NATO naval incursions into an ocean area the Soviets consider critical lo successful defense of their homeland, especially the Kola Peninsula.

18G. Soviet strategy calls for the early establishment of control of the Norwegian and Barents Seas and their approaches. Operations farther into the North Atlantic to prevent transit of NATO carriers and amphibious task groups and to divert NATO naval strength are probably also planned. The Soviets would attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their base* and in the Norwegian Sea before they could launch their missiles.

The establishment of control of the Norwegian and Barents Seas and their approaches probably would involve most of the Northern Fleets submarines and virtually all of Ihe surface forces and aircraft in an effort to exclude NATO forces from the area. The Soviets probably also plan submarine and airagainst NATO naval forces as they exit their bases In Europe and possibly against SSBNs from US lases as well In addition, at kast some submarines would attack shipping engaged in resupply andof Europe earlyar." .

Soviet plans for controlling (he Norwegian and Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consisteploymenl in depth. (See figure

flae Soviets plan to weaken or Oereat NATO's naval forces In the Norwegian Sea ortbe area from the United State* and thc United Kingdom by success ve and coordinatedby submarines, strike aircraft, and surface com-balant ships.

" See rAe fn.rt on paraa dlf/rrt.robw on SoolerttUuut for tnUrJlttto*ma of axtmunlcallon.

-

I'l O'AllJ KOI1'1

Ys

! Western naval bases olt which Soviet V< submarines might be deployed

Because of ranter and lime-on-station con--tramis on naval slrike aircrafl and the miner ability of Sovici surface combatanli when operating oul of area, lhe Soviet atiack submarine force would be lheelement lot sustained opeialioru in tho North Albnticeaperalionalcrurse missile and torpedo attack submarines in the Northern Fleet, ban aboutercent aie in various stages of repair or workup at any one lime Thus, aboutubmarines (with varying degrees of combat effective neast would be available for operations at the outset of hostilities If aboutl these submarines conlinuc! IO be committed lo operalions in lhe Mediterranean and the Soviets did not augment ihcir forces there

eriod of rising tension, someubmarines would be available foi opotalions in thc Atlantic This lorce would be subjected lo heavy demands inand tbe Soviets probably -oukl not have as many attack submarines as ihey deem necessary to perform all important naval mnruom

e do notcnely how the Soviets would apportion their naval fortes among their several tasks in the initial stairsar wiih NATO Information available regarding Soviet objectives,and force deploy menu does, however, provide lhe basis for estimating likely initial lorce allocations We recocnije that Soviet naval deployment* could br

largely contingent on NATO operations at lite outset ol hostilities. If the Soviets were lo perceive lhal NATO did not intend lo send aircraft carrier! into or near lhe Norwegian Sea. for eiample, large numbers of submarines could bc dedicated to missionsEven il NATO carriers deployed into or near lhe Norwegian Sea. Soviet force allocations could shift, depending on Ihe outcome of the initial engagements For eiample. successful Soviet atlacks cadi'at on NATO carriers and amphibious task groupsnnilh ofK gap might encourage them loore active subseciuenl role in lhe Atlantic soulh of Iceland On lhe other hand, should Soviet forceserious reverse, they would be likely to continue to concentrate their efforts in the Norwegian and Barents Seas

PoUnliol EflVe'Jveneti "

In conducting thesesubmarines would be present in largethey would be limited by their pooragainst Western ballistic missile andThis makes it unlikely that Sovietwould be able to solve Ihe initial ASWtarget location and would make it difficulithemselves from NATO submarines.

Sovicl* considerey butfor their attack submarines during thcphasear would be the protection ofIrom NATO ASW forces, particularlysubmarineslass. foronly is much noisier than Western nuclearbul also, in order for itsissiles loin lhe United States, must operate init is subject to detection by the USsystem (SOSUS) and where it wouldor no tuppori fiom other Soviel forces.probably wouldew of iheirsubmarines lo provide escortlassWestern SSNs can launch lorpedoesdetection envelopelass submarines,probably could not prevent at least someSSBNs from being destroyed

or anticarrier warfare, llie Soviets' rdiance on eatr-rnal targeting support could effectively restrict

- See firs. ictttne forth an ottenoitoe etea of the Director. Br/mr tnteBtemee Agency, and* iho Director of Haoat Inialhgenee. Department ef ihe

the operating areas of their long-range misiile lubrna-rines, such asI andlass, to area* within range of theircrafl In addition, these submarines muit surface to launch llieir missiles and hence would be vulnerable Thc morelass wouldore serious threat In distant waters, but those submarines probably would not be able to keep up with fast-moving carrier strike forces. Moreover. Soviet eraise-missile-armed submaiines normallylicd load of nuclear and con vent tonally armed missiles, thereby reducing the number available foi conventional strike*

irCrmjL The success of antiship attacks bv naval or LRA aircraft would hinge primarily on the capabilities of the aircraft and their cruise missiles toeries of NATO larid-based and fleet airhese defenses include land- and ship-based aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, and electronic counter measures systems to confuse, decoy, or disrupt the sensors of incoming aircraft or cruise missiles.

J If

Soviei strike aircraft successfully pcnctraled orNATO Und-based air defenses, they then would have lo deal with formidable fleet air defenses

rie first line of licet air defense typically would be an outei tone drfciided by carrier-based early warning aircraft and interceptors, ll couldmoreautical miles from lhe fleet, well beyondm ma aim urn missile bunch range of the best Soviet air-lo surfaceoviet alrstrikeATO task group Including two US aircraft carriers, for eiample. might have to confront more ihanarrier-bated interceptors- Soviet strikeespecially theadgers, would be highly vulnerable to atlacks by interceptors as theylo bunch their ASMs Although individual Badgers would be vulnerable because of iheir slow speed and bek of ettertsive electronic counterrrveas-ures (ECM) equipment for self-defense, one or more Badger ECM aircraft probably would be part of each attack formation- The Backfire would be better able to survive because of its high speed capabilily1 near Machat highmodern ECM equip ment. although both the Badger and lhc Backfire have Urge radar cross sections which would make them

lop

J

easily delectable. Ciuiie missiles, flying il speeds ol Machnd lauriched by aircrafl which successfully pcnelialcd lhe interccptoi tone, would lace shinborrie SAM. gun. and ECM systems.

urface forces The ericetiveneu ol Soviet . i combatants in lhc Norwegian Seaunction not only ol thcii capabilities ai individual ships, but also of iheir cooperaiion with each other and wtth submarines and aircraft. As individual units. Soviet surface ships would be particularly weal; In providing area air defense against US and UKaircraft and protection against low-flying aircraft and cruise missiles. Thdr ASW capability suffers particularlyimited sensor range. The ranges at which thev can reliably delect attacking submarines are less than the range al which the submarines can detect and attack lhe surface ships. ASW sensor range is also less than (hat of such primary ASW weapons as the. making it eitremely difficult for an individual Soviet ship vdlhoul ASW helicopters to exploit the poteniial of such weapons fully.

he weaknesses of individual ships areto some eilent when ships, submarines, and aircraft operate in concert, as thev presumably would In (he Norwegian Sea. supporting and complementing one another with sensor and weapons coverage. The presenceiev, with its multiple sensors, weapon systems, and command and control capabilities, wouldignificant addition to the capability of the other surface forces. For eiampie, operations bv theTOL (veiucal/ihort takeoff and landing) aircrafl would be valuable in thwarting fair-weather attacks from slower NATO aircrafl such asnd in limiting the operations of AWACS (airborneand conirol system) aircraft.

ccording to an alternative view,houldore balanced appraisal of potential effectiveness, in substance as well as in

he holders of (his view believe theselend lo everstrea* wrakriesses inherent In Soviet platforms, such as the relative noisiness ol submarines, without oflsetling consideralion ol Inlscrent ttrcnulhs, such as ihctr relatively high speeds Thev further note thai any assessment of ihe potential effectiveness of Soviet submarines, naval aircrafl. and surface ships should include consideration of iheir operalionutually supportive force; that this is only -partially achieved in

ccordinghis view,, in addition to an essentially negative treatment of Soviet platforms, assess their effectiveness in tactical con'eats

which convey an impression of NATO capabilities that

is maiimal and unrealistic C

^Realistically, the potentialof Soviet strike aircrafl should be measured In termsadar coverage, as well as fighter coverage, that would have suffered some degradition In the early stages of hostilities. Likewise, the US sound surveillance svtternL

^slwuldbe expected lo sufferespecially In view of lhe detailedof and concern aboul Its capabilites.links of the,

SOSUS have,umber of occaswrisTbeen cut and temporarily disabled by unknown shipping.

inally, lhe braiders of this view note thai these paragraphs reflect insufficient regard for evidence of demonstrated Soviet naval effectiveness^

3

' The holder ef ihu4X4 the OorcWr. Defeiu*Afencv. end lhetmf iMea^mce. Draurlinrnl ef lhe

rVeuv.

PART D

THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

Pact nudear opeiations against NATO In (he European Ihealrr could Involve:

nuclear weapons aligned to Soviel ground and air forces in Eastern Europe and in tlie USSR and lo Sennet naval forces in lhc three western fleets.

stralegic Systems (mainly medium- and inter mediate- range bal link: missiles, bombers of Long Range Aviation, and some ballistic missile submarines) which arc based in the USSR and intended chiefry for use against NATO.

c have reliableuclear force posture, eiercise scenarios, andon Soviet concepts for nuclear operations againsTNATO. Although almost all of our information pertains directly to Soviet nuclear operalions inEurope, we believe lhat the general operations described below also would apply to Soviet nudear warfare on NATO's flanks. In any ease, lor both lactical and strategic systems the primary mission would be the destruction of NATO's nuclear forces

?XG The scope and specific targets of Padperations would depend on Soviel campaignihc scale of NATO's nuclear use. and other circumstances The followingonfined lo the likely general characteristics of large-scale theater nuclear operalions bv the Pad.

from storage sites lo delivery units Nuclear warhead probably would be mated to most tadical ballistic missiles al lhc startar and up to one-fourth ol HnviH tactical aircraft itenbably would be withheld from conventional operations atmictcar alert force.

nce the decision to use nuclear weapons was made, all tadical systems probably would come into play and the timing and targeting of tactical strikes would be planned to take advantage of thc special characteristics of each system. Tbe primary objective in Soviet tadical nuclear planning appears to be the assured destruction of military targets Limiting colbt-cral damage does not appear loain concern because the numbers cf weapons Incorporated in Soviet nudear strike plans have increased over time and the yields of these weapons, particularly for tactical missiles, have increased significantly

lse higher yields and greater numbersappear consist-

207

ent with The Soviets' targeting philosophy, which calb for multiple strikes against high-priority fiaed targets, mobile targets, or those lhal are not precisely located. The Soviets mayequirement for greater areas of destruction lo compensate for the relatively poor accuracy of their missile systems.

c

Nuclear Operations

he Pad tactical nuclear arsenal consists of aitcrafl. missiles, artillery, submarines, and surface ships Although nuclear weapons ate normally carried aboard Sennet submarine* aod some surface ships during peacetime deployments, the Soviets do not maintain nuclear-armed tactical missiles ot aircraft on alert during peacetime During the period of tension that probably wouldar in Europe,and during any initial conventional phase ofar, the Pad would lake steps to ready its tadical air and missile delivery systems for nuclear operation* Warheads and bombs probably would be dispersed

3

to

make tentative Judgments about now the SovieU would plan to destroy NATO targets during an initial thcaierwide strike Very high yields. In some cases totaling morellotons. would be delivered by all types of ground and air systems againsi individ-

ual NATO tactical nucleii uniu lochPershing missile battalions Typically eight loactical alt Strikes woulderloniATO ground force division. Fighter-bombers ind bomben wouldn be used in this role Smaller number* ofisslles, often only five or tin. could deliver aniloforuATO division. One to four warheads wouldbe alloealed against smaller Isiget* such asposts, air defense systems, airfields, and depoli

oordinated, targe-scale initiallaciical missiles probably would beair defense sysiems Tactical missileprecede strikes by lactical aircraft by IS toSoviet*,

would use aircrafl mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably because tactical aircraft are mote versatile and better able lo locale mobile targets than missiles and because tbe Pact currently does not have nuclear artillery In Eastern Europe. Q

C

IS'li would be unlikely lo initiate the useweapons at seaar -as beingonly conventional weapons against NATO

predilection of Soviet military policymakers to focus decisions on the developing: situation In Centraland to avoid actions elsewhere that would leopard lie the campaign there or that would cause an escalation to nuclear warfare Nevertheless, Soviet general purpose naval lorces are normally armed with nuclear weapons during peacetime deployments and would be prepared at thc outset of hostilities to conduct nuclear operationsecision were made lo do so. Once authorized, these operations would be directed mainly againsi important NATO surface ships, submarines, and possibly selected land targets.

n alternateaintains that Sovietoperalions at sea would not necessarily await

76

Jop-Jtec'et-

- rV keUf a/ iMihe Dbttti of" fV.eW .WHlgc-or. Prm'tmenf el l'i fVaiv

C

213 Tlie prime objective of .Soviet nuclear forces in wartimeo destroy NATO* mram lot waging nuclear war.ypical laniel list for Ibe Soviet strategic force* would include NATO nuclear missile sites; airfields uied by nuclear delivery aircrafl, nuclear weapons storage sites, and command, cnntrnl. and com muni cat inns facilities Other airfteMi. air defense fucililics. large Irooiind conventional slorage depots probably are abo tatgeccd. as well as some political and economic centers In all Instances, strikes by (hc strategic forces would be coordinated with ihose by the Pact's lactical nuclear forces.

n Europe there ere several thousand military, political, and economic targets in ihese categories which the Soviets might wish to cover. Military targets range from ihose lhat have been extensively hardened to those that are highly vulnerable We estimate that there arc feworiardcned targets ofmiliury value In thc European NATO countries About half of these are slightly hardenedas nudear weapons storage faeUilies. some POL storage facilities, and ground force depots. The remainder arc moderately hard Instalbtions such as command posts and the French IRBM tiros. The great majority af potential targets in Europe ate soft area

targets, including NATO airfields, ports, and airfacilities

hc Strategic itoekel Forces wouldey role during bice-scale nuclear opcraUons Althoughrneditirn- and intermediale-tange ballisticwould beariety nl Strategic targets, some sources have indicated thev would be primarily used lo destiny NATO airfields, air defenses, and command and control facilities beyond the reach of ihe Pact's fnrward-based tactical systems In addition to ihe MltDMiOMs, some of lhe Soviel ICBMs might be used against NATO Urget* in Europe Dallistic missiles bunched from the C-lass submarines are not as accurate as most of the land-based missiles and probably would be used against large targets such as ports.

he long Range Aviation bomber force would also be used both during the initial nuclear strike and lor followup strikes against targets not alreadyor attacked. As much as one-third ofA bomber (orce would be withheld from use Inoperations in anticipation of escalation to nude ar conflict. All LRA bomben based in thc Weslern USSR could reach most potential NATO targetsfrom their home airfields carrying either bombs or air-to-sutfacc missiles. For most of these targets, the unrefueled combat radius of the LRAufficientermit the use ol indirect routing and low-level (light profiles to evade NATO air defenses

77

PART

PROSPECTS FOR WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES

Affecting Future forces

n tins cs iiiuir we do notetailed analysis of lhe (actors lhal motivate lhe Soviets'policy toward Europe and the development of lhcir theater forces These factors are discussed in detail in, Soviet Coali and Expectations fn the Glolial Power Arena. We proceed from the premise that lhe developments we currently observe In Warsaw Pact (healer forces opposite NATO represent the sorts of activities necessary to maintain andimprove the capabilities of these large standing forces. Tbcy are (he activities raecessary to replace obsolete or worn out equipment and to incorporate new weapons and tactics which flowigorous Soviet research and development program Theyno large, short- term change in the general stir nr character of these forces.

lthough we believe this loalid premise, we haveumber of factors whichcouldhis examination is summarized In lhe following paragraphs.

Soviel Perceptions of NATO's Milirory Copobi'iiei

he Sovietseen perception of NATO's forces and military programs and regard its capabili- -tics as substantial and technologically challenging. Wc believe that ihey will see current developments In the Western Alliance asontinuing strong NATO defense posture, with good prospects forespecially In the critical Central European area. The Soviets are likely to be especially concerned aboul expected improvements In NATO's precision weapons and nuclear systems. Nothing In current or near-term NATO defense programs,ikely to precipitate any major change in the level of Pact efforts. Over the longer term, llie large-scaleby NATOew theater nuclear delivery system, such as ground launched cruise missiles, could cause an upswing in Pact efforts, especially in air delcnsc.

Soviet teodersKip

hange in Soviet leadership within ibe period of this Estimate Is inevitable At least In Its eady phase. Itowevcr. the change Is unlikely to alter thc priority given to theater forces. The new lead-rs. whoever they may be, will undoubtedly emerge from the ranks of ihe present leadership which are responsible forcurrent Pact forces and which are committed to maintaining Soviet military strength In Europe. The new leaders will likely seek to avoid moves that would antagonize large segments of the military.

Cconomie Coniideeotioni

otal Soviet defense spending, which accounts foroercent of the USSR's gross national product, has grown at an avenge annual rateercent. Spending for Soviet theater forces opposite NATO has grown at roughly the same rate and probably will continue to grow into. This lodgment ts supported by several trends In Soviet defense programs, the increasing costs of new. mote complex military hardware, the large number of weapon development programs currently under way. and the continuing capita! investment in defense industries.

e have taken note of the decline in Soviet economic growth and the economic difficulties of such noei-Soviet Wanaw Pact countries as Poland and Cieclioslovakia. Despite these difficulties, we find no evidence that suggests the Soviets anticipate cutbacks in allocating resources to theater forces. Indeed, wc have good evidence that some NSWP countries plan modest increases

DemooropK'* Joe ton

22S. In every Warsaw Pact country the military manpower procurement system depends onConscripts provide up loercent of the manpower assigned to the regular armed forces, the border guards, and some elements o! tlie internal

security force* During lhe ncit decade, however, lhe number ol young men reaching drallach year will decline in most Pactrend that will complicale the allocation of manpower between the armed forces and industry.

act military manpower requirements areto increase only modest It In the neatears Kvcn so, Ihere may be slrortfalls in avaiUhie military manpower. The Pact countries could meet suchby rhanaxt in then manpower procurement syvtcms. They might also attempt to penuade mote conscripts to extend their service.

e do not believe that the manpower sQuccir will lead to any decline In future Pact military manpower We expect that most Pact eou nines, the USSR included, will meet their prcaccted military manpower needs by some combination of available options. Some are already calling reservists who had previously been exempted lo active duty for up to six months. Fewer deferments are being granted, and the grounds for medical exemption have been defined more clearly and strictly.ew Pact countries, those persons found unfit for combat duties are being placed in sedentary military positions rather than being exempted.

rechnotooy

e foresee no lechnolctgicaI breakthrough that could leadajor change in either the size or character of lhe Pact theater lorces during the period of this Estimate. New technology, whether developed, purchased, or illegallyxpected to lead to improvements in individual Pact sysiems and help redress major deficiencies, but no one development orombination of technological developments in the foreseeablexpected to revolutionize modern warfare orecided advantage to Pact lorces

Sino-Soviel at (lotions

he size of the Soviet forces oppositenearlyercent of thc total theatera potential for some impact on use (orce* facing NATO.o evidence, however, that the burden of maintaining forces against China hasconstrained Soviet military posture in the west In recent years, and we do not anticipate such an effect in the foreseeable future Shortapprochement with China, which could release some resource* for

7<J

defense In the west,ar with China, which would,inimum, absorb much of the Soviet troop and logistical reserve* in the western and central USSR, we believe the Soviets can continue la support both efforts at present or even modestly greater leveb.

Implkalions for Futureooter Forces

lthough the eapansion in manpower which characterized Pact theater forces durings andias slu-ed. wr rued some gradual Increase in manpower in Pact giound and air combal units opposite NATO over the nrul decade as ongoing programs are implemented The overallof ground and air combat units oppositexpected to remain at or near its current level,odest decline ii anticipated in tht afaaaaVal ll ftVaaaYaa1 purpose naval ships and submarines.

arsaw Pact nations will continue lo improve the weapons and equipment In their theater forces opposite NATO. Major weapon production andmen' programs which are clearly in midstream are eapectcd to continue In addition, tbe Soviets will no doubt seek to develop aome entliely new weapons and support systems. Certain of these systems, such as laser or television guided munitions, are already in testing. Still other Pactas enhanced radiation weapons and advanced cruiseemerge In reaction to NATO weapons programsorce Improvements."

s Ihe modernization of the Pact's theater force* equipment progresses, we eipect continuing standardizationor example, the Soviets are currently producing three different medium tanks while retaining older models io lhc inventory. Thb situation leads to other problems in lhat Ihe mil and growing technical com pies Ity of models in the forces require additional mechanic and operator training and more elaborate logistic arrangements.

Ground Forces

arring an agreement on mutual and balanced force reductionshe number and duoosition of Pact ground force divisions opposite NATO arc likely to remain stable during lhe period of thb Estimate, although eaparvded divisional organizations and the formation of new nondivisional unitsore eomntcf rJueuadonj af apoilleair. naval.

ilwaio udor ryrtcwuarr Qrlraware aryvkx ever

ll* rvcrl decadere rontalnnl In volu.ru tt. ckapf VI.

4ep Ge-am-PUff-

tion of2 is capeeledew Unk,s e> pec ted lo enter service by (he, but our evidence on its currenthe NSWp armies will remain largely aland-ardired on

iM. Pact concern with increasing conventional firepower in general and with the neutralization of NATO antitank defense In particular ii ei pec ted to result Iu continued increase In numbers of artillery pieces as well as improvements In weapons, target ar-juisilion capabilities, and ammunition Theof Ihe artillery battery In the Soviet motoriied rifle regiment to an artillerymeasure already well underimproved the regiment's capability to suppress or neutralize antitank weapons as well as other targets. As (owed artillery is replaced by self-propelled (SP) models, ihis capability will grow further because thc new systems have better mobility, are more responsive, and provide better crew protect ion.

he new SP heavy3 mm gunsm mortars) will continue to replace older towed weapons in Soviet heavy artillery brigades and may supplement or replace lighter weapons in armyregiments and in artillery divisions. NSWpImprovements will lag behind (hose of the Soviets, llie number of SP guns in Ihe East Cerman,and Polish Armies will increase, but (owed models will continue to predominate

e have fair evidence that the Soviets are working toward development of improvedmunitions (ICMx) for their tube artilleryWe estimate that by thehey will field ICMs with thdr larger caliber weapons.

Sovietrograms for antitank weapons are Iseing directed toward development of misiile systems incorporating semi automatic or automatic guidance to relieve the gunner of guidance(hereby increasing hit probabilities and reducing gunner vulnerability. These programs are expected lo result in the fieldinghort-to-medium-range, .man-portable system incorporating remote guidance by theimilar helihorne system somewhat earlier.

The Soviets are likely to continue the advances which they have made in air defense weapons over the last decade. Enisling systems will no doubt undergo modification andollow-on to the

r-flW

Forces

actical Air Forcer. We believe lhat the number ofg aircraft In Soviet Frontalopposite NATO will remain essentiallyover llie next decade. Efforts to improve the quality of Soviet tactical aircrafl and munitions are likely lo coniinue, although the rate of new aircraft deployment is estpected to slow as the Soviets meet lhcir current force objectives. Furthermore, we espeet the Soviets to continue Improving their support and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioeleclronic combatnd reconnaissance data link systems. No maior changes are expected in the number of fixed-siring aircraft In the NSWP air forces. NSWp equipment modernization will continue lo proceed gradually and be driven largely byconsider al ions.

roduction of thelogger probably will continue well intoariant of tlic Flogger with an Improved radar designed to giveetter low-altitude intercept capability is beingand could be deployed with the Soviet Uctical air forces by the. Production ofishbed variant* Is abo expected to continue at least into lhe. NSWP tactical fighter units are expected to receive mainly FToggcrs and late-model Fishbeds over the nexl decade

onger lerm' improvement* In Sovietiabilities could arise from the introductionotally new aircraft The Soviets are testingeast Ihree new or highly modified fighter-type aircraft, one of which it Intended for deployment with the Soviet slrategic air defense forces. Should either or both of the other aircraft be deployed with the tactical lorces, they would not be available in significant numbers before lhe

e eiped deploymentew ground attacktheIhe Soviet Air Force0 and believe that it will be purchased by some NSWp countries. Thewin-crtgirae, subsonic, heavily armored aircraft, presarmablyfor close air support of ground forces. The aircraft apparendy does not incorporate advanced technology and is cnruaderahJy slower andeaser combat radius than thendlogger D. Bul it will lac armed with guns, rockets, bombs, and tactical air-to-surf ace missiles, and will almost certainly handle better at low speeds than the other Pact fightu-brxmbcrs.

Soviet ground attack units opposite NATO will be totally equipped with newerD.. andthe. Within five year* over one-half ol llie aircraft In NSWP ground attack units probably will be more modern types. Thend Flogger will be the main ground attack aircraft in NSWP air forces by the end of the next decade.

Military Air TrantporL Soviet Military Transport Avialion (VTA) wiU coniinue to bewith newer aircraft, but iheilxe of the force will not appreciably change. Although overall lift capacity will Increase, thc Soviets do not appear to beorce capable of simultaneously lifting much more than one airborne division or the assault elements ol two divisions.

heub medium-range transport will remain the mainstay of the airlift force, at least Into the, although its numbers will continue to decrease as theandid enters the force. The Soviets will continue to rely on tbeock, which is no longer in production, lo lift ouulied military equipment We also expect lhe Soviets to continue relying on Aeroflot for airlift ausm-ntnion. and this capabihlv will Increase a* the civil air fleet is modirr nixed.

f-

A new transport, lheill probably be operational in Frontal Aviation units in thehii aircraft, which it optimltcd for short-haulations from unimproved airfields, will enable caiRo and personnel to be delivered close lo deployed field forces

SW I' National Aire have good evidence lhat non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries plan lo undciajor program to reequip iheir national ail defense forces The urogram is scheduled lo run into thend is designed lo remedy what lhe Pact considers In be the growing obsolescence of its surface-to-air missile arid interceptor forces. Though Intended primarily to improve defense against low-altilude targets, the modernization effort would also entail the introduction of systems that would eiteod the range and ceilings at which targets could be engaged.

lae Pact's early warningcheduled lo be reequlpped with newer radars having improved capabilities for target information handling and data tiansi and greater tea (stance to electronicSome Pact countries might abd receive radar-equipped ships or possibly aircrafl to eitend early warning coverage over water approaches to Pact territory. NSWPndystems are to be upgraded with equipment more resbtant to electronic jamming and possessing better capabilities to engage targets with small radar cross sections. Theong-range SAM system thai has heretofore beenonly In thebo being considered for deployment in some NSWP countries. The mostdevelopment affecting Pact interceptor forces would be the continued Introduction of Floggen equippedire-control radarimited lookdown/shootdown capability. While ihu aircraft and late-model fishbed wiD be the mainstay of the force. Pact planners are also considering equipping some NSWP Interceptor units with theoibat.

ur evidence of Pact plans to deploy the Foibat andith thc NSWP ab defense forces indicates that both would be Intended primarily to counter the growing capabilities of NATO's air forces for standoff alr-to-surface missile attack. The evidence also suggests that these systems might be used to engage such NATO aircraft asA AWACS.

-Se.8 T8tal ihr SM* internedeftw iorm

82

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Ceneral PuepnM Noval Forrti

uring lhe nest decade, envelopments in lhe Soviet Navy willorce with improved eapabililies to perform ils peacetime and wartime minions The Soviets will also press forward wiih programs to correct slwtcomingi in submarinefleet air defense. logistic support, aadIndeed, developments over the past decade have been so rapideriod of time may be required to integrate and consolidate advances and eiuure that combal potentiab are lully realized Weodest decline in lhe overall number of Soviet general purpose naval ships and submarines but newer and more capable uniu will be replacing older and less effective ones.

e eipect (lie Soviet Navy within tlie neat decade to continue concentrating on tbe missions outlined in volume IL We also anticipate that its current rotes of sea control In limited areas and support of Soviet overseas policies will continue to evolve Improvements in antiship. amphibious, and antisubmarinewarfare (ASW) capabilities are also likely. Moreover, we foresee thai by lhehe Soviets have made some progress in such current problem areas at logistic support and the ability to conduct sustained operalions. The result of thb process willomewhat more capable Navy which will remain an intearal dement of Pact planning for war In Europe. We believe, however, thc Soviets willto have problems in detecting enemy submarines, in defending their surface ships against air attack, in providing targeting assistance for the effective use of many ASW and antiship weapons, and in replenishing ships at sea.

hc Soviet Navy will abo continue to devote resources and develop tactics for preventing theof NATO's carrier task forces or Other major surface ship formations into waters contiguous lo lhe European theater. As new erobe-missile-equipped ships, submarines, and aircraft repbee less capable units and the technology of cruisedvanced, we eipoct the Soviet capabilities against those NATO forces to improve. Reliance on eiternal Urgetinc will, however,erious deficiency in beyond-the-horizun attacks.

ntisubmarine warfare willerious concern of tbe Soviet naval leadership Soviet ASW eapabililies will Improve somewhat with the acqubi-tlon ol new classes of surface shim, submarines, and

aircrafl and as new (echnolocv ind better operating (echnkjucs lake hoM- These capabilities will continue, howevcf. to be greater in areaj closer to ihe Soviet homeland than in live open ocean. Although ihere are gaps In our knowledge of Soviel ASW developments, we have no evidence of any maior breakthrough thai would give the SovieU confidence in their ability to neutraliic Western submarines in lhe open ocean.

he Soviels are also commiltedrotecting lhcir own submarines front NATO navallass SSBNs operating in the Barents and Norwegian Seas and other areas. This mission has received attention In Soviel naval literature^

We.eipect lhc Soviets lo continue working to Improve iheir capabilities to support and protect their SSBNs.

upport for ground forces in the contesteneral European war wiD continue to be anmission of the Soviet Navy's general purpose forces. In addition lo protecting the seaward flanks of lhe ground forces from atlack by enemy sea-based air or naval lorces or by enemy amphibious assaults, the Navy lias the role of providing gunfire support for ground forces and launching amphibious operations against enemy flanks. This role will have somealbeit limited, on lhe fuiure composition and force levels of Ihe fleets. Some older units will be retained and some new systems, including air-cushion vehicles and hydrofoils, will be allocated to these flank support missions.

2GI. Soviet capabilities to interdict NATO's sea lines of communication (SLOC) by attacking ships at sea ond by mining and airstrikes against European porl facilities probably also will improve. Thb will result from the increased capabilities that will likely exisi in future Soviet general purpose submarines, mine warfare ships, and naval aircraft. Some agencies believe, however, lhat Soviel capabilitieserform this mission will nonetheless remain limited. Other agencies believe that Soviet capabilities for SLOC interdiction currently are and will continue to be significant"

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03

have coiisidered what lhe acquisitioncarriers portends for the future of lheand can arrive at no sgieed estimate.carriers are operational,hirdbunched and will probablyourth carrier nfthlscUss Is being built We

-abo have some Information suggesting that uponof the Kiev-dass program the Soviets will begin conslructionew and brger class of aircraft carrier, possibly incorporating an arrested bnding capabilily.

Kiev clearly has capabilities in ASWother areas of naval warfare such as antishipair defense, and perhaps support forWe do not know how the Soviets assessvalue of the Kiev inasmuch as theits aircraft are limited. It willengthytime for Soviet crews to become proficient Inprocedures of carrier flight operations andappropriate tactics for carrier operationswith other ships. It is apparent thathaveommitment to tlseaircraft carriers, although general purposeconstruction will absorb wdl over half of whatIntelligence Agency projects will beexpenditures for general purpose shipsthrough the.

here Is disagreement within tlie Inielligence Community, however, regarding lhe extent to whichhe Kiev enhances current Soviet military effectiveness and regarding the impact of Soviel acquisition of carriers upon the evolution of naval missions.lo onehe introduction of thc Kiev mayajor turning point In the development of the Soviet Navy, but it is premature to judge the impact of the acquisition of carriers upon tlteof naval missions. Some holders of this view" further believe that one, two. or three ships of ihis class, because of their limited capabilities lo detect NATO submarines beyond torpedo attack range and to defend against NATO air attack, do notignificant improvement in Soviet capabilities toar with NATO. They also believe that the Soviet naval leadership has chosen an

older, of Ihit etev ore iht Cemtrel lateGleence Agency; lhe Oii'dor. nationalnoy; and ihe'Direttor. Bureau of tnlettleenee and Rtuerch. Oeparlmenl of Suit.

" The holder, of ihurt lhe Central Inietkgfnee Aeonct and thrAureau of Inlttllgenet and Ptaearth, Depart-menl of Slote.

Thtee Soviet Scud brigades in East Cctmanv have already been increased fromoauncheri If all Soviet Scud brigades inrope are similarlyprobably will be thefoice will liave an additional lib launchers, bringing lhe total therecud launchers We are unable to predict whether Scud brigade* in the USSR will be eipandcd. We liave rcccni evidence that the Soviets plan lo increase the number of lactical missiletn ihcit divisions from four to ail as theeplaces the FROC system The increases in both Scud andaunchers would provide lhe Soviets with greater firepower and flctlbilily duiing conventional and nuclear operations

robable replacement for the Scud, thes in an early stage of development. The first flight test of thU missile was observed In? This system, which is eipected to have improved accuracy and reduced reaction time over the current Scud systems, could reach operational flatus

tbe Pact lactical air forces, the potentialdelivery is eipected to grow as thepiograms progress over lhe neatIn addition, lhe availability of low-yieldimproved alr-to-surface missile guidanceinduce the Soviets lo field anmissileuclear capability duringpart of.

number of pilots in Soviet unitsdrop nuclear bombs it also eiprxted toin thc fighter-bomber regiments, atof pilot etperience and proficiency increasesdelivery training is broadened We dothe number of such pilots in the NSWP unitthowever, because nudear deliverywill continue to be confinedewdesignated units

he Soviets are eipected lo continue reequip* ping iheir heavy artillery brigades in the USSR with lhcm self-propelled gun*m self-propelled mortars. All sli such brigades opposite NATO are expected to complete the reequip-ping process wilhin the neat several years It also seems Iileiy that the Soviets will deploy some nudear artillery to Eastern Europe during the period of this Estimate The Soviets probably have the technological capability totn nudear artillery round, but we have no reliable evidence (hat they intend to develop and fidd such a

and ilium

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nioie derailed liralmcnt ol lhe paliArral mil*ih* laapLraibMSoaabW rajK.auALTpioiecUiHu ol lutuic penpiKnl rartleee NIE. SeWi SHatirlc fcxxxi for firlpne-tl Arrant.

otiu* mt mmlMI aaobably have eawin-tenevot ncnpheial mrOt.aWaf aider balluiicI- lulimirineii>heril iiiliO.au dWtino, lomelaiacf omic mar be mad byilaiV MaaawriMS

ur force prosections assume lhal the sire of lhe Long Range Aviation bomber lorce with aattack mission will remain about the same as al present. Some aging Badgers and Blinders probably will be retired as Backfires are assigned lo LRA in increasing numbers By Iheackfires could bc In service wllh LRA If lhe rate of production increases as protected. One constraint be-tne considered at llie strategic arms limitation talks (SALT)imitation oo lhc rate of Backfirei in If ihis enters IntoIA could haveackfiresf whichould be deployed opposite NATO In the near term, we espeet Uackfires to be deployed primarily with LBA units in the European USSR, enabling some Badgers, especially those capable of delivering both bombs and air-to-sor-faoe missiles, to be transferred to lhe Soviet Far East. -

he number of older balhstie missilefor peripheral strike probably will declineperiod of our protections The Sovietscontinue lo convertubmarines tospecial-purpose submarines or retire themthat some ofI lubmarines, whichagainst the peripheral areas, will be inuntil the, but thebe deactivatedhe future ofsubmarineallistic missile system is inof the constraintsrospective-

s the number of older ballistic missilewllh peripheral missions declines, some of lhcircoverage may be assumed by modern ballistic missile submarines The range of lhe missiles carried by these modern SSBNs gives (hem greater targeting (tcribilitv than the G-lanes.

Support Systems ond forces

ommand, Control, and Communications. Wc estimate that, currently, about one week would be required before the Pad's wartime communications links could'be established to theater-level headquarters and to supporting slrategic commands.belween Moscow and lhe fronts and within (he fronts, to control combat Operations by divisions and armies could be effectively establishedew days. However, the Pact has two programs undercreationentralircd command structure and Ihe establishmentnified communicalionsduring lhc period of this Estimate.

Sana*.

-Top Swtt-BUFf-

shorten (lie lime requited by (he Pad to gel lit commaixl and control system prepared (or war. llie two proclaim are intended lo establish in peacetime lhe theater-level (High Command) resources needed Iu control Pact forces once they are released from national conlrol We estimate lhal lhe centralized command structure could be complete by lhe. The unified communications system couldlo improve the Pad's command eapabililies by lhe, but it is not scheduled ioc completion

hile llie Pact is expected toore centralized command system through the creation of permanent tliealer commands, lhe SovieU probably will not control the day-to-day peacetime operations of NSWP forces. The centralized control structure would, however, enable ihem lo assume more Quickly wartime control of Pact forces, once authorized by NSWP leaders. The theater commands would also

plan wartime operations and control forces during eierctses. Hardened command and ecmmunicaiioos centers which could be used by theater commands have already been constructed, and more arc planned.

he Pad made llie decisionreate by0 an integrated communications system lo provide high-capacity communication! for Pact forces, to Include (heater commands. This new system-refened to by the Russianivilian network which abo will provide lhe Pact with ils lirsl integrated communication system with the increased communications capability and connectivity necessary lo support the developing centralizedstructurc The VAKSSn ambitious one. however, and may meet some resistance from NSWP could delay completion, even though most of the developments specified (or VAKSS probably arcthe Soviet and NSWP technological capabllitiea-

86

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Original document.

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