The People's Republic of Kampucheahe puppet regime installed by Vietnamese forces vhen they captured' Kampuchea's major cities in January, has not been able to establish an effective political system with broad appeal to the Kampuchean people. Most towns and villages were evacuated before the Vietnamese forces reached them, and large numbers of civilians who were moved into theryside remain under the control of Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchean (DK) forces. Kampucheans who are in PRK-con-trolled areas appreciate the abandonment of Pol Pot's harsh policies, but are dissatisfied with the new regime's obvious dependence on Hanoi.
The Vietnamese invaded Kampuchea before they had completely organized their Khmer front organization. They had been recruiting from among Kampuchean refugees in Vietnam since at least earlyut did not officially establish the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS) until earlyhe pro-Vietnamese Khmer accompanying the Vietnameseforces probably numbered fewer0 and they did little or no actual fighting. Some served as translators and others occupied the cities taken by the Vietnamese, but relatively few were trained or organized to carry out effective civic action or propaganda M
id to win support among the Kampucheans, the VietnameseRK cadreumber of popular reforms. Vietnamese troops, who were generally well-behaved, promised that no punitive action would be taken against those associated with the former regime. Invillages, they opened the granaries, allowing people to eat better than they had for years, and encouraged the Kampucheans to elect new village leaders. The Vietnamese and PRK cadre moved on after several days, however, and returning DK forces frequently executed the villagers who
had collaborated with the Vietnamese. As the Vietnamese no doubt calculated, many of the Kampucheans invillages chose to move to areas under Vietnamese
The most prominent leaders of the PRK regime are defectors from Pol Pot's government. Heng Samrin, who serves concurrently as President of the PRK and leader of the KNUFNS, had been the commander andK division stationed on the eastern front until he apparently led an unsuccessful insurrection and fled to Vietnam in the spring The Vicein charge of National Defense, Pen Sovan, had served under Pol Pot in military and propaganda posts, butto the Vietnamese in the. Hun Sen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, hadilitaryand Chea Sim, head of the Interior Ministry, hadidleve] party position in the Pol Pot regime.
Hanoi and Moscow have sponsored the PRK's diplomatic overtures and pressed other countries to recognize it as the legitimate representative of the Kampuchean people. Theations that have recognized the PRK are all friendly to the Soviets and Vietnamese. Hanoi and Moscow have consistently supported the PRK's position at the United Nations and at the international conferences and have facilitated the foreign travel of PRK Recognizing that support for their new regime is very limited, however, they have not seriously challenged the Pol Pot regime's predominant position within thecommunity.
Domestically, the PRK cadre are only beginning to establish administrative organs. reportedly had taken refuge in Battarabang by the end of February, but asideospital staffedingle Vietnamese doctor, no public health, educational, or cultural services had been reestablished. In recent speeches, PRK leaders have candidly acknowledged many shortcomings in their administration, including lack of training, favoritism, elitism, corruption, and thef Kampucheans. PRK leaders have also admitted that serioirs security problems are continuing to hamper their activities. ^
Refugees report that Vietnamese forces are stationed at almost every crossroad, bridge, and village along the major communications routes, and that the Vietnameseeverything, village leaders in "liberated" areas alwaysietnamese Army counterpart assigned to advise and work with them. Where "People's SelfCommittees" have been established, they are staffed by both Vietnamese and PRK cadre, but the Vietnamese make all the decisions. Many Kampucheans were delighted with the PRK reforms, but "once their bellies were full" they began to have second thoughts. Kampucheans who had moved to the cities because the new regime providedare no doubt worried that an eventual Vietnamese withdrawal would leave them vulnerable to DK retribution. On the other hand, the new regime's dependence on the Vietnamese has rekindled historic Khmer-Vietnameseand sparked concern among Kampucheans thatus the DK leaders hadto "swallow up" their country.
Hanoi is sensitive to these problems. Vietnamese forces reportedly have been ordered toow profile and allow the PRK to deal with Kampuchean The Vietnamese have stepped up conscriptionorts inside Kampuchea and increased recruiting among Khmer who have been living for many years in southern Vietnam. Hanoi is attempting to deal with the suspicions and hostility of the Kampuchean people, but refugeesthat dissatisfaction with theRK cadre is widespread and growing. ggggf^gggmmmgmmmm^