National
Assessment Center
Dissidents in the Arabian Peninsula (u)
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This assessment was prepared by
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Il wascoordinated with the Directorate of Operations and the National Intelligence Officer
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Dissidents in the Arabian Peninsula (u)
Encouraged by ihc overthrow of the Shah of Iran, dissidents in the Arabian PeninsulaArabia. Kuwait. Bahrain. Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, andseeking to build their own assets.
Most arc beginning from relativelysitions and at this stage arc concentrating on recruitment. Some arc also trying to build their subversive capability, with military and financial help from South Yemen and radical Palestinian and Lebanese leftisteftists in several Peninsula countries arc trying to broaden their appeal by adding reforms demanded by Shia leaders to their own demands for political liberalization. The criticisms of existing regimes leveled from left and right arc remarkably parallel, particularly on the issue or corruption.
Several constraints limit dissident efforts to expand their organizations. Most dissident groups arc headed by exiles who have relatively small bases of support in ihcir own countries. Leftist liberation from groups, which proliferated in the region through the. arc particularly affectedistory of inept leadership, government penetration and arrests, membership defections, and institutional rivalries.
The potential threat from religiously based dissident groups now seems greater than any current threat from traditional leftist groups. The extent of Shia unrest is difficult to estimate, and Shia demandsharangue the ruling families for ungodliness and corruption, but so far have stopped short of callingevolution similar to Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution in Iran. Like the leftists, they urge political and economic reforms and release of all poiilical prisoners, but above all they insist on the establishment of an Islamic government based on close observance of religious law and custom. Shia populations in Saudi Arabia. Kuwait. Bahrain. Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates arc heavily representedariety of organizations, both secular and religious; some Shia leaders arc appointees of the Ayatullah Khomeini nnd have tics to religious figures und militant organizations in Iran.
Conservative Sunni groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood, also urge the overthrow of corrupt. non-Islamic governments and the establishmentnified Islamic state, bul ihcy appear so far lo be focusing their activiiic* outside the peninsula.
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South Yemen. Iraq. Libya, tltc USSK, und Palestinian factions ore giving aid und encouragement lo boih leftist and religious di&idcnls, while Ul ibc same time Ihcy arc trying to expand their own base* of operation in Ihe region.
Peninsula leaders anticipate increasingly serious difficulties in light of ihe challenge posed al Mecca nnd the attempt by Iranian religion* figures to export iheir rcwyution. In response, peninsula slates will probably move toward closer cojperation on securityexchanges on diviidcnis. improved military cooperation, and tightened internalch leader will alsotois Islamic credentials and will probably support npplicmion of Islamic laws previously ignored.
DittidcnK in the Arubliin Peninsula
Iranian rcvolulion has revived ihe hopes of clandestine dissident factions in the Arabian Peninsula thai ihcy too can organise cffccti'c opposition to Ihe region'* ruling families. Orgnnizaiions that hud been languishing since the end of the Diofur rebellion in5 ore showing signs of life md new interest in forming alliances with ethnic and religious elements once scorned as politically unreliable. Al the same time. South Yemen und radical Palestinian factions arc encouraging leftist dissidents lo escalate iheir attacks on ihe regimes while they try to widen their own base* of operations in ihe peninsula. The main purpose of this study is to describe these organizations rather thanstimate iheir chances of success or to analyse Ihe vulnerability of various peninsula govern-menis.l
Reporting on the various croups is sketchy, and wc cannot confidently measure the capabilities of many. Most of the dissident iroups appeare headed by exiles whose aim is to channel discontent umong Shias, students, workers, nnd civil wrvunu into broadly based opposition movements. Platforms include objectives such a* the restoration of representative Government, relaxation of repressive security laws, and release of political prisoners. Secondarily, they are trying toubversive capability on Ihe peninsula nnd are seeking military training nnd financial support from South Yemen and radical Palestinian and Lebanese leftist factions.)
Uflht Croups
A variety of leftist groups have operated In the Arabian Peninsula during the past iwodecades. Beginning in Ihe. dissident organizations multiplied al arate, encouraged by ihe growing strength of the leftist rebellion in Oman's Dhofar Province and by the British announcement8 that il wa*from the small shaykhdom* on the Gulf.ew years, however, most of the dissident groups had disappeared. Some had merged lo form a
single organization, the Popular Front for theof Oman and the Arab Gulfwas intended by South Yemen, itslo spearhead coordinated nllucks tinfamilies of the peninsula stales. Thisand4h-nge of tactics.dissolved and replaced by severalliberation fronts individually targetedin Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, llicEmiratesnd Saudi
Other groups were seriously weakened by government penetration and arrests, internal disputes, widespread defections, and inept leadership. Saudi Arabiaarge number of dissidents, including disaffected military officers, following coup attempts9aaih Party chapters in Saudi Arabia and the other peninsula states lost both members andby thes they split along Syrian-Iraqi lines. Neither Buathist faction evererious threat to peninsula regimes. In4 Qatar nrrcstcd. dismissed, orovernmentTor their involvement with the PPLOAG. while Bahrain and the UAG uncovered, with Omaniextensive networks of Soulh Yemeni and PPLOAG agents ihe following year. Communist panic* have ncvei won popular support; their tendency to analyze peninsula problemsmpcan Marxist jargon hud little meaning to citizens of ihe oil-rich states or to the largely expatriate (and easilywork force. Small Saudi and KuwaitiParties still exist, bul neither is active inside their country.
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Coordination among Icfi.si group* uncrating in ihc hu* been minimal because of leadership rivtilric*and institutionalui thi* may be changing. Leftist* in Kuwait have Issued slalcmcnl* In *upporlahralni poNitonlnd mml ncnliKuht leftist* have talked about eiUblWllwj links with Shia dissident* and have indicated ihcirfor certain Shiaontinuinc conuraint i* theeluctance lo all) ihcimclvc* organizationally with then Wc ShiaTor fear of ciposing 'heir member* and ofganiralium lo infiltra-lion bv Uale security service* and because they believe the Shia. wouldha support leftist poui-.il guaK-
The
Two type* or religious-politicalgroup* have branchc* in the peninsula-one represent*Sunni Muslim interest* and predates the Iranian revolution, while the other represent* Shia Mu*lim* and is probably supported by Iranian religiousnformation i* fragmentary on both type* ofand we know little of their size, influence, or involvement In ant (government activities. Wc have no information on theof pro-Khomeini Shb urganiMtinn* prior to the FebruaryIranian revolution.
The Muslim Brotherhoodonservative Sunni organization founded8 by an Hgyplian schoolteacher, lla**an al-lfcinna. The Brotherhood has n* it* goal ihc overthrow of all non-Islamicnnd the establishmentnifml Islamic slate according to the tenets of Ihc early (Sunni)ore equit.ibk sharing of wealth, and use of Mamie law as ihc sole basis of legislation. It oppiKC* the *prcad of Wc*lern influence in llic Arab world. Theisctive in Lgypt and Syria, but there are chapter* in Qatar. Kuwait, and the L'AL. There i* no known chapter in Saudi Arabia, bul Ihc Saudi* arc major financial backers and provide safe haven for Brotherhood leaders csilcd from other countries. An offshoot and sometime rival of Ihc Brotherhood, the Islamic Liberation Parlyas chapters in Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, and possibly Ihc UAH. It was founded in Jordan in ihc IvMhJ
succession; moving lhe capital from Riyadh to Mecca; und removal of Western influences, such as iclcvisiun. radio, nnd ihc employment of
eninsula regimes arc most concerned over Shin ofgunizat'onv fincoumged by the full of the Shah and the establishment in Irancar-thoocruiic govern-rnent. peninsula Shia leaders arc demanding lhal lhe Sunni rulers inuilulc political reform* aimed at returning government and society to the path of Islamic fundarncnulnni- Sriiaclaiming anointment bythe Sunni Arab regimes inc sermons and private meetings for ungodliness, and distribute leaflets, cavvcllcs of speeches, and petition* demanding religious and social reforms.^
The seizure in November of the Great Mo?queecca,hobcsi shrine,eligiously mini-vutcd dissident gioupunderlines Ihc iltrcat tuch group* poseive Saudi regime. Details arc *par*e. bul lhe group of several hundred well-armed di**idcnl*with the royal family's political rule, which ihc. ui as corrupt and illegitimate, and with Wahhabi religious leaders, who they believed had devinted from the pure Islam of the Prophet. Their demands included recognition of ihcir leader a* ihc Mahdi. oreturn to government accordinghe practices of Ihc Prophet Muhammad: an elective
External Support lo Peninsula Dissident*
Pcnin*ula dissidentandexternal tuppon if they are to seriously challenge peninsula rulers. The form of assistancemilitary aid and advtcc to Ihe PPl.O: guerrilla training in special camps in Iraq. Libya, and South Yemen: offers of safe haven, coupons, propaganda, and use of diplomatic pouches for transfer of weapons,nd fundi.
All the Shia organisations have lies to religious leaders! in Iran, but there is no evidence that they have received money or material aid from the Iranian Government. The Shia dissident organizations could, however, provide Tehran or individual icligious leadersechanism for regulating the activities of Iranians in the region, channeling funds to Shut dissidents, and pressuring Arab Sunni regii.es that Khomeini views with disfavor.
Paletuman Support
Palestinianthe more moderate Fatah through the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) of Georgehave long maintained contacts with peninsula leftist dissidents and urc now establishing links wilh the Shias as well. They arc also seeking to expand their own
organizations in the tegionj
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has hadi office* in each of ihe peninsula sluies since the. In each slate, it act* prinvwily as liaison between the substantial Palestinian aenmoniiK* and the government. For theart, the PLO confine? its activities lo id drumming up .upport for Palestinianocal office chiefs are selected with regime approval and are mora concerned with protecting their links to the ruling families than with challenging the rulers. In several of the states, particularly Ihe UAE. Palestinians have been allowed considerable leeway, and the government has looked the other way while Ihe PLO established training facilities, smuggled arms, and provided safe haven for peninsula
South. Yemen over the yean has rivr&cd ihe nw -atensivc support lo kftnlt in the ptnimiiU. It often tramini facilities, ufe haven,and pompons andonduit foe Soviet aid. Il* revolutionary government ha* long supported the PIT.O. although ihc levels of aid fluctuate according lo lhe *talcof Aden'* relation* with the moderate Arab government* in the peninsula. Aden restrict* PFLO activities when prospect* for normalizing relations wiih Omanand encourages Omani dissidenccit wants lo pressure Ihe Saudis and the Omanis. Adenfunnels arms and money for other liberation fronts through its limbussics in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In addilion, Aden work* through Yemeni expatriate communities scattered throughout lheund attempts to infiltrate police, mililary. and local administrative units. South Yemen'* sponsorship of subversion and its links to the USSK serve to intimidate and frighten the peninsula's moremlcrvf-
Outlook
Because of lhe skcichincM of the information on dissident strength and activity in the Arabianit rs difficult to asses* the potential threat the organization* pose to Ihc Sunni Arab regimes. For the moment, most of the groups arc concentrating their efforts on reorganization and recruitment and taking rcw risks of exposure. Lcflisi dissidents arc being especially cautious. They have ma Jc ge-.lurcs of support to disaffected Shias. students, and workers and are attempting toooperative image in order lo broaden ihcir base of support, but they recognize an inhereni com ran" >ci ion between leftist and Shia Islamic goals. Leftist leaders preler lo wail, believing lhat time is on their side, thai the Iranian situation is inherently unstable, and lhat the Khomcini-lcd clericalwill be replaced by leftist* who will aid then the peninsula.
The Shia* of ihe penin*ula ahoan for clue* to future development* Lmboldcned by ihesuccessofthe February revolution and impressed by thehe mullahs, pcmntula religious leaders areid
olitical role in the Arab Male* lining the Gulf. While Tew of the Shia cleric* udroeutc ihe overthrowtheir Sunnireat many arc pressing Iheir governments for social and economicheir effort* arc hampered by ihe lackoherent noli'ieal program and by rivalry among the Shin leader*recognition fum Khomeini. T
Peninsula leaden have been slow to respondhe new dissidence Traditionally, the oil-ricn state*d lhe'rw;allh toco-opt the politicalThey have been las in applymg security measure* and willing lo overlook arm* tmuik'ing activities byhey have been especially tolerant of Palestinian groups. There arc suns, howes'cr. that this tolerance ha* reached its limits and that the peninsula slates intend more stringentounter the insurgency threat:
Representatives of Saudi Arabia. Kuwait. Bahrain, Oatar. the UAE, and Oman met inid-October and reportedly agreed to exchangeon twbvcnivc activities in the area, improve military cooperation, and make an -extraordinary" effort lo improve relation* with Iran.
Kuwait and Bahrain arc ckncly monitoring lite activities of Shia and leftist dissident* In the past several months, both countriesut restriction* on public gatherings, clo*cd some Shu meeting houses, nnd increased securityn September, Kuwait arrested the son ol tranian-born Shialeader Sbaykh Abbas al-Mihri,ipped the family of its Kuwaiti citircn*hip. and dcr*.ncd it to Iran. Shia di*sident leader al-Akri rcnv.in* under arrest in Bahrain, while Shaykh Muhammad Hadi al-Mudarrnsi was deported fromAIi and
Bahrain, Arrest* and deportation* of Shia lender* because nf their outspoken criticism of the rulingservearning toother Shu and leftist spokesmen to keep their comment* and political activities within "reasonable"ihri and Mi iwere bolhf Khomeini, nnd their deporlation* underlined Kuwaiti und Huh-mini apprehension* about Iranian attempt* to export the revolution across (lie Gulf.
Saudi Arabia, concerned about cfforl* by Iran to export it* revolution nnd stir up0 Shins in the kingdom, cracked down on Iranian agitators visiting the kingdom for ihcllajj. the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca Saudi officials, who reportedly had information that Palestinian pilgrim* were involved with the Iranian* in demonstration* against the Al Saud family, prolcslcd the poJiticiralfon ofo Iranian uulliorilie* nnd ordered all Iranian pilgrims lo leave the country immediately. Paradox-ically. the Saudi* are aKonwrc closely wilhn Ihe security field.
result of the attempted takeover of the Great Mosque in Mecca, Saudi officials will now require security personnel to be present in mosque* during
I rid j> prayers, will permit only officially authorized imam* or their reprc*cmjtivc* to speak, and will intensify monitoring of student groups.
UAE security official* have alerted military, pvlicc. and intelligence personnel to ttghlcn security at ports ofentr>n Ha* al-Kha>mjh. where UAE official* are concerned alvvt*mu;E'ini; into Iranianind Oman
Bnhriin, Abu Dhabi, and Duboi itavc banned the snlr of ufiuhnJic bcve'.'cc* in most publicrohibition <ong *oughithe Saudi*.
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain. Qitar. and Kuwait are culling back on their hiring of Palestinian teachers and arc moving Palestinian skilled worker* in the oil and other key Industrie* inensitive job*.
Kuwait and Bahrain arc giving pe-fcrence to hiring non-Arab foreigners for specific jots* and duration* to reduce the number* of foreigners *vho stay in the country.
Kuwait and Bahrain are talking aboutnational assemblies, and Kuwait has formedto revise its constitution. Althoughcountry is cipcctcd to widen theto native-born maleto any new power-sharing arrangements, ilShia* will receive more lovcrnmen:
External events have obviously aided attempts by Gulf dissidents to rebuild Ihcir llrength. The revolution in Iran Arab rejection of the Camp David Accords, the deterioration of US influence because of its role in arranging those accords, ihc isolation of Egypt, the demonstration of Soviet military power in Afghanistan and poiilical power in South Yemen, and lheoflhc Saudi Arabiun Government by all these, plus the takeover of the Great Mosque in Mecca by Saudi dissidents, have all reinforced lhe view that the smaller Gulf states arc more vulnerable to political desiabilization. Gulf leaders at Icasl sec ibe dangers, bul it remains questionableSet her their response will be rnsxc innovative lhan simple repression.
Original document.
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