NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

Created: 8/31/1979

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Near East and South Asia Review

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW (U)9 CONTENTS

Iraq: Governmentary Eye on Shia

Dissidence (U) . . . . ! . . . . .

Shia Muslim opposition to the Baathistcontinues to command the attention of Iraqi authorities.

Iraq: Coverry.cntary Eye on Shia Dissidence (U)

Shia Muslim opposition to the Baathist regimeto command the attention of Iraqi authorities. The Iraqi Government, which is dominated by Sunni Muslims, hasullyarrot-and-stick policy toward Iraq's Shia majority, and seems to have quieted religious unrest for the moment. Although we lack information on the depth of Shia feelings against the government or on the scope of Shia dissidence, we believe that religious-based opposition to the Baathists will continue to vex the authorities.

Although overt dissidence has subsided,to be fueled by antiregime literaturevarious groups claiming to represent or speakIraqi Shias. The literature hasfor the overthrow of the Baathist regime,Ayatollah Sadr of Najaf as the leader of theand emphasized the ties between Iraqi and

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Although the success of Iranian Shias in deposing an unpopular government has given heart to at least some Iraqis, the Ayatollah Khomeini's example cuts two ways. Despite the concentration of power in Sunni hands, Iraqi Shias have benefited materially from Baathist rule, when they look at the political convulsion and economic deterioration that their Iranian coreligionists aremany must feel some reluctance to stir up or participate in anti-Baathist activities for fear of giving rise to similar chaos in Iraq.

The government's willingness to apply whatever force is necessary to quell disturbances was apparent this spring and probably actstrong deterrent to would-be Shia activists. The Baathist attitude on this issue was clearly reflected by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, whoestern journalist, "If there are those in this country who seek martyrdom, my government is prepared to accommodate them-all of them."

The government's Shia policy, however, does not rest on force alone. Serious efforts are made to recruit Shias into the Baath Party. umber of Shias remain in senior government and party posts despite recentand convictions. Moreover, the government'ssocioeconomic programs have done much to improve living standards in the predominantly Shia southern half of the country.

This month the Baathist government granted pay raises to all civilian and military government employees. The flat sum raises will provide greater proportional benefits to lower level employees, many of whom are Shia. More importantly, the government has announced price controls and increased subsidiesariety of goods andove that should appeal to the less well-off Shia The government's improved image for having boosted

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the income of the average Iraqi may be somewhat offset, however, by the impact of increased spending power on already .existing shortages of agriculturalonsumer goods.

President Saddam Husayn alsoersonal effort during the month of Ramadan to placate Shias. Saddam's public remarks during this period have had an unusually strong religious flavor. In addition, in what has been seenignificant conciliatory gesture, Saddam hosted an unprecedented iftar {the breaking of the daytime namadan fast) at the presidential palace for Iraqi religiousid-August. Saddam has also accused the Iraqi judiciary of becoming too jogged down in legaland not paying sufficient attention to social equity. The new President told the judges that in the future he expected their decisions to be guided by Islamicas well as Baathist principles.

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Original document.

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