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Iran: The Shia Revolution and Iran's Neighbors (u)
An Inlclliacncc Assc*incnt
Information availablt as of9 has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paperprepared in ihe
^Office or Political Analyst. Comment
and queries are welcome and may be directed lo lhc Chicfl
This paper was coordinated wilh (he Office of Struiccic Research, Ihe Office of liconomic Research. Ihe Dirccioralcof Operations, and the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia, (u)
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Iran:hia Revolution nnr! Iran's Neighbors in)
KeyKhomeini and-some influential members of Iran's religious
community clearly arc encouraging and in some cases assisting Shia dissidents in neighboring stales.
Khomeini's focus on establishing an Islamic Republic, the continuing chaos in Iran, and the counsel of secular government officials, however, probably will be sufficient io prevent adoption of an official policy of intervention.
The statements of radical ayatollah* will keep Iraqi and Gulf suspicion*igh levelan Iranian Government move to silence theseprevent significant improvement of relations between Iran and its neighbors. Iraq will oominuc to meddle wiih Arab dissidents in Iran's oil-rich Khuttslan Provinceounter to Iranian encouragement of Iraqi
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Iraq also will use Iranian encouragement ofdulfShias to noserotector or the smaller Arab Gulf states against Persian imperialism. Iraq hopes in this way lo extend its influence al the expense of Saudi Arabia.
The smaller Gulfsiatcs will increase security cooperation among themselves and with Saudi Arabia in recognition that instability in one will affect all. The larger issue of regional cooperation lo protect the security of the Gulf region will rcmair unresolved because of the mutual suspicions and conflicting ambitioas of Iraq. Iran, and Saudi Arabia.
n: 'I he Sliln Revolution and Iran's Neighbor* (u)
demands Tor religious, economic, and political reforms have steadily increased in Iraq. Kuwait, and Bahrain since the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. In Afghanistan, the tribal insurgency against the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul has been encourage' by the Iraniun example, and in nl Icasi one case. Afghan rebels appear to have adopted tactics perfected during the Iranian revolution.elative absence of trouble, government authorities in Saudi Arabia, where (hereignificant Shia community, remain deeply concerned about the potential for scriom Shia dissidencc. Saudi concern was reflected introng Saudi message of support for Bahrain and Kuwait in the wake of Iranianof Shin unrest in ihosc states.[
The Iranian hierarchy is divided over the policy it should adopt toward Shia communities abroad.
nomie disarray, and ihe lack of an effective mililary force coniinuc to militate against an active,foreign policy in support of pan-Islamic goals. The radical impulse of the Iranian Shia clergy lo export ils Islamic revolution also is constrained by the more cuulious altitudes of civilian officials who presently make up Iran's provisional government and ihosc who will coniinuc to participatelergy-dominated government. I-
Iranian Relations With Iraq
The potentially most explosive link between Tehran and coreligionists abroad is the lie with Iraq's Shias. Khomeini spentears in exitc in Iraq, residing aleligious center for all Shias. From here he maintained contacts with Shia centers in Iran and plotted against Ihe Shah.esult. Iranian religious leaders have numerous lies to the Iraqi Shia clergy lhat could serve as channels of support should sectarian tensions in Iraq again flare into open hostility. Each statement by an Iranian clergyman complaining of Shia persecution elsewhere strengthens Iraqilhat Iran intends io meddle in Iraq politically. Iranian interference alsoause around which Iraq can rally the smaller Gulf stales in pursuit of ils own leadership ambitions. This, in turn, is likely to spur Saudi Arabia to action lesl Iraqi influence grow too great.I
Despite Ayntofluh Khomeini'* demand for nIslamic" foreign policy, there is no evidence that he has compelled the Iranian Government loolicy of providing materiel or financial assistance lo religious dissidents in the Persian Gulf stales orran's continuing political Instability, unrest among its ethnic minorities, ceo-
MtMluni Mmpmtimit population r* AtfhanMlan: Sowti Mutllmt,Ctni. (u)
The secular figures in Iran's provisional government sec the dangers of risking confrontation with Iraq and ofntied front against Iran in the Gulf.
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YaadiIranian rclwioii* leaders sec oppot lunily. even iluiy. They huve cncouraccd ihe "dcmon*tratmn effect" of lhc Iranian revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini explicitly advanced this effect when he revpttmlcd in April tn ihc Iraqi President'* mewne of confirm ulalwni by twill Ihc barely wiled threat thai Iran'* revolution imuinsi the TnMnvi tlidutorvhip" hadwarning to nil lhc arrogant" from "the weak and oppfewcd."J
The connect ions bc.ecn Iranian religious leaders and Shi as in Iraq arc furthered by lhc presence in Iraq ofhias of Iranian ancestry. One of Iran's moM respected clerkal leaders. Ayatollah Kliot.in Najaf. In June the Iraqi Government arrcsicd Iraqi Shin (cadet Ayandlah Bnqr Sadr. apparently to
prevent him from lending budding religious-based antigovcrnmenl dissidencc. Baqr Sadr has strong support in Iran. Khomeinielegram in support of Baqr Sadr following Ihe arrest, and several other leading Iranian ayatollnhs sent messages lo Khoi. urging him to mobilize demonstrations for Sndr's release. Sadr's arrest sparked demonstrations in many Shia areas of Iraq
The Iraqi View
Baghdadtable relationship with Iranof the pcJiticitl or religious orientation of the group that controls ihe government in Tehran, The Ba'lhisis were ableeach an accommodation with ihe Shah and probably would like toimilar deal wiih ihe Islamic Republic dcsnilc their aversion for ihe Ayatollah Khomeini. Attempts lo arrange an exchange of high-level visitors, however, have foundered. More-twer. last summer's agreement to end hostileaitacks has begun to fray as both Baghdad and Tehrun have engaged in public recrimination*an Iranian-inspired flarcup of Shia dissidencc in the smaller Arab states of the Persian Gulf.
Iraq's sensiiiviiy to ouisidc meddling with its Shin community reflects the long history of religious tension andween Iraq's Shia majority and the ruling Sunni minority. The Shiu-Sunni split, which beganispute over the successor lo the Prophet Muhammad in the 7th century, still stirs strnng passions in Iraq someenturies later. The Sunnis regard the Shias as ignorant, superstitious throwbacks to an age besi forgotten. The Shias see Sunnis as heretical and materialistic and arc ill at case with the pan-Arab Ihrust of the Ba'th Parly, which they regard as threatening to swamp themunni Arab sea. q
The Shias' sense of clannishness is reinforced by the highly emotional annual commemorations that mark the martyrdom of All and Husayn, whogardedIhe rightful successors to the prophet. In addition. Iraqi Shias regard themselves as special because Shias
from all over the world look io Iraqenter of religious learning, shrines, and pilgrimages. The tombs of Ali and Husayn. for example, arc located in Najaf and Kcrbala.p
Iraqi Shia* conMtlute iS petccnl of Ihe population and nrcood pmiiion to chum: trouble for the predominantly Sunni Ba'lhitts should they adopt the Iranian experiencelueprint for revolution. The Shias ate concentrated in both urban and rural areas throughout southern Iraq. Baghdad itself may be a* much as one-half Shi j. Major oil pipelines pass through the Shia provinces Strategic installations such as the port of Basrah, the Persian Gulf oil terminals, and the southern odficlds are hcovi'; dependent on Shia labor Shias arc also strongly represented among the lower ranks of the police and the military, though the officer corps is dominated by Sunnis.
The Ba'lhisi responsehe dissidents' poleniial for disruptive activities hasixture of generous applications or welfare benefits wiih harshly repressive moves when cajolery and patronage fail, Although the military was used to put down religious Holing in Ihe Shia holy cilics of Najaf and Kcrbala inhe most noticeable effect of Iran's revolution on the Iraqi Government has been to stimulate special efforts by Baghdad to conciliate the Iraqi Shia community. Development plans feature heavyto housing, health care, and education, and the government has provided generous financial assistance for Shin religiousumber of Shias remain in lop government and parly posts despite recent political changes that saw ihrec Shia members of the Revolutionary Command Council executed foragainst the regime.i
President Saddam Husayn. not noted for his piety, also hasersonal effort to placate Shias. Saddam loured southern cities and villages early ihis year to meet wilh Shia village elders and inaugurateprojects. Saddam's public remarks during the recently concluded month of Ramadan also have an unusually strong religious flavor. I
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The extent of Iranian support for the Shia dissident* in the Gulf slates is unclear. Iranian Governmenthave assured representatives of both Bahrain andlaic asIran seeks nothing but friendly relations with iis neighbors. An Iranian Foreign Ministry official slated in early September lhal the inflammatory remarks of Iranian religious leaders did not have Ihe endorsement of the provisional government or Ihe Revilutionnry Council.I
Lenders of the Persian Gulf slates ore concerned, however, lhal Iranian encouragement of Shia dissidents is more extensive lhan Tehran officials acknowledge',
Arab Charges of more extensive links between Iran and rebellious Gulf Shias may be
In Kuwutl, which haselatively low level of Shia dissident activity, contacts with radical Iranian Shia* may be less extensive man in Bahrain. The Kuwaiti Shia community, however, numbersrercent of the population, of whom0 arc expatriate Iranian* who could provide numerous link* to Iranian clerics. According to press repot Is, Ayatollah Khomeini metuwaiti Shia delegation in late August and, following thif. meeting, called for lhc creation of an international "Parly of lhc Opprt**cd"arty would provide Khomeiniechanism lo regulate theactivities of his supporter, channel funds, and put pressure on regimes thai he might view with disfavor J
Elsewhere in Ihc Gulf. Shia dissidcncc has been relatively minor, in purl because Shias in Omun. the United Arabnd Qatar make up lessercent of the population, 'li)
The Gulf regimes generally have moved from conciliation to firmerahrain's Amir Isa instituted minor reforms nf (he Inner taw* but warned lhc Shu* nol to meddle in nolilics.V
Sympathy for lhc Islamic rcft-rms demanded by Shia ayatollah* i* not widespreade Gull Gulldc*(Htc lhc strain*of rap>ddevelopment. show Uttlen giving up lhc benefits of modernization in favorbODCralk society *imilar io that contemplated by Ayalollah Khomeini. A* long a* Shia activists focus narrowly onissue tin ifprobably will be limited.'
The potential for significant unrest ha* increased substantially, however, because rc'igiou* demands arc being .'ombmcd wilh alls lo correct political injustice* or alie* economic paltcrn* such a* discrlmlnalory hiring practice*roader appeal attract* both political leftist* eagerxploit Shia discontent and disgruntled member* of the large cspairiatc labor force who. like manyuffer from political and social drscri mi nation. Newly educated youth, inchafe al lhc almost total lack of popular representation in ihc Gulf monarchic* and contribute to current demands for popularly elected ancmbllcs. freedom of the press, and equal political
The Gulfside from increasing existing security coordination, have unenviable options in countering ibe criticrm. Theyhe danger* of political repression and regard itrincipal reason for the Shah's ouslcr. Both Kuwait and Bahrain aicdiscussing plans lo restore popularly elected assemblies lhat were dissolved in theollowing leftist lobbying which ih; regimes regarded as threatening Yci, politicalnecessary io prevent an explosivelikely to fuel demand* thai will erode royal authority furiherj
itn govern--
menl* huve issued stern putjuc warning* ngainsl further agitation.
Prospects
Irunijn Foreign Minister Yardt has acknowledged tfie ambiguity in Iran's relation* with its neighbors The Foreign Minister and other government officialshave stated thai Iran's foreignasede principle of noninterference in the internal uffair* of other slates. Yardt said on IH September, for example, thai Iran neither wants to export Itsnor send armed men lo fight foreign regimes. Yardi noted, however, lhat Iran could not prevent the influence of its Islamic revolution on other coj nines Moreover. Ya/di appeared wilting to pay lipservice to Khomeini's messianic Islamic radicalism, asserting that it would be Iran's duly lo take the initiative "to spread genuine Islam and genuine Islamic revolution throughout the world."
One important effect of continued Iranianof Shiamatter howbe lo encourage Iraq to play the role of protector in the Gulf, thereby sharpening differences between Iraq and Iran. Should ihe dancers become immediate. Guff rulers would have few alternative* to acceptingIraqi protection: Saudi Arabia is loo weak mllitanl> to help, and closer security lies to tbc United States and Ihe West may not be politically
The mosi important restraint on Iran, however, is likely io be its own vulncrabiliiies. Disarray in the government and ihe economy, ihe lo* level ofreadiness of the Iranian military, and the pressing need to resolve domestic problems of political instability and ethnic unrest significantly inhibit Iran's abilityursue an activist foreign policy whatever the stripe. Foreign Ministry officials arc likely lo continue to seek accommodation wiih states confronted by Shia dissidents supported by Iranian clerical leaders.'
activities of Iran'* semiofficial clerical leaders in support of Shia dissidents in neighboring slates arc likely to continue. These activities, primarily confined to expressions of support, though possiblyow level of financial assistance,ignificant threat to the internal security of al km one siaic.Jotential threat in Kuwait and Iraq. The messianic. pan-Islamic radicalism of the Iranian clergy will coniinuc to strain relations between Iran and these slate* and to siimulaic cfforis by Arab stales tooordinated response.
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Original document.
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