Wc-mnq
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION UnouthomedSubject to Criminol Sonctiom
orwornNo* toftMMobt*onrocton or
WorwiohcrivparhMnti OrJy
Oil lamination ond Extraction ol Information
< onhotod by Original or Thii Inlor motion Ha* Boon(or
>tlNM
DlSSfMJNATION CONtIOt ABBMVUTIONS
NOfOBN-MOCONTHACI
PftOPfH-NFlBONlY-OBCON-
copy of rht. document iwrrofebl*
printedtier*
et NFACIn *inWor prinitd far*o baii. angod through
THE9 EVENT
FOREWORD
On the basis of available information, we cannot determine with certainty the nature and origin of the event onhe conclusions reached in this memorandum rest largely on circumstantial evidence and on the assumption that thereuclear explosion.
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation in responseational Security Council request It was coordinated at the working level with NFIB representatives in the Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation. V
ft-
KEY JUDGMENTS
DISCUSSION
A* requested by the National Security Council, thisused on the aaurnption thai the event detectedortion ol the southern(see map ony optical sensorsela satellite alT on9uclear ei plosion Civen the assumptionuclear explosion occurred, tbe purpose of thao.estimate what countries may have been responsible lor, t* Involved in. the evenll
2 Technical information and analyses suggest that
An riplrxi'jn wu produceducleardetonated in the atmosphere near the earth'i surface.
Itield equivalent lo lesstrotoos.
It took placeroad area, DcirnariJv oceans, thai was generally cloudy.1
arious typM of nuclear device* couldthe equivalent of kmilotons ofSuch yields could have bent obtainedcareful designeapon with that yield,reduction of yieldurner yieldby partial failureigher yield device.lermv the testinguclear device atnot have needed In Involve more than twoships or aircraft. Including several dozenand technicianslh appropriateinstruments, they could have set up thea few hours, rlrtnnslod the device,data within minutes after the explosion,within another few hours,
4 In addition to the five countries that arenuclear weapon stales,believe that there are five other states that have inesigned devices suitable for nuclear testing Of these, we befseve that only Israel. India, and South Africa have rccrr.il, had Ihc fujala material as well as the other components needed lo fabricate nucleardevices In contrast. Pakistan and Taiwan have probably lacked sufficient limit material foringle nuclear explosive device. Several advancedstates, such as West Cermany. have possessed both the maiertalj and ihe technical exper-lise; none of them, however, has had an incentive, on balance, to develop nuclear weapons, much lest toevice. Other states lhat might have nuclearas Brazil. Argentina, andcertainly locked the fissile material and oonfioue components required to fabricate and .test nuclear explosive devices. Neither France nor China hat agreed to refrain from testing in the atmosphere, but they have recently had no known technical or pontics) motivation to test clandestinely in the southern Indian or Atlantic Oceani'The Soviet Union would have had to assume inordinate political risks in Its relations with the United States to haveovert nuclear explosion in violation of the Limited Test Han Treaty (LTBT) for any purpose. | |
The Defense Intelligence Agency believe*thai If an atmospheric lest were in tbe technical interest of the USSR, an anonymous test near an unwitting proxy state such as South Africa could have provided an attractive evasion method. Tho Depart-menl of Energy believes that, while the Soviets have had the capability lo test clandestinely, they have recently had no technical reason or motivation to do so. The Department further speculates thatest could have been seen as serving Soviet politicalby disrupting peace efforts and further polarizing mode rale elements in southern Africa.
An unintended firing anduclear weaponilitary exercise could also have produced the signals lhat wereThe multiple safety measures that would have had to be negated, however, and the absence of any known weapons carriers in the area oneptember would have made such an event guile unlikely. The explosionuclear weaponeapons carrier would have been even less likely, because the yield of an accidental detonation almost certainly would not have been sufficient to produce tbesignals. Moreover, no nuclear weapons carriers are known to have been misting and no associated
secVt
Seatch-and-rescue operation! havr hrrn noted. Finally il is very unlikely lhal any known sub-national entity could haveuclnr expiation oe would have been motivated io do so' So the following assessment consider* ihe eapahilitiei and rnotrratioco oiose five "neev nuclear-weapon stales" lhal might have attempted losecretly inretnote ocran area oi the southern hemupnete
Aail by South Africa-.
foreign respect for South Africa's military strength in all likelihood would have resonated with PrimeBotha and other South African officials. Botha hadubstantial buildup of South Africa'sforces In the,ecision in theo achieve self-sufficiency, in arms. Because of his personal convk+iom atell as his official responsibilities, be has advocated more than any other Cabinet officer the militaryof South Africa's strategy for coping wilhexternal threats. He has regorded the West as unwilling to support Soulh Africa against foreign threats that he has perceived to be growing. Moreover, he has probably sympathized'with views thai nuclear weapons might ullimalcly'be needed. However, he probably has not foreseen any Imminent military requirement for nuclear weapons or any political advantages lo disclosing particular dements of South Africa's nuclear weapons capabilities at this time. Nevertheless, he may have been persuaded thatbut undenled nuclear weapons would have an Important psychological deterrent effect that Soulh Africa could belter achieve through testing.
o. in late ivti tne vonwr Bovenurww suspended preparation) lotrong US pressure and other international reactions appeared to haveSouth Africa at least temporarily from testing. The setback probably compelled Vorster and the key officials In the nuclear weapons program to review iheir whole approach toward weapon* development and testing. Statement* made by thehat time did not permanently foreclose future options for testing. Rather than completely slopping their weapons program, the South Africans could then have decided to prepareuture nuclear.lesi more securely. In any cose nuclear testing was almost certainly not feasible until8 at the earliest, when sufficient quantities of highly enriched uranium could haveeeled to becomeIn short, the Vender od mini si ration may well have deferred any decisions on whethet or when to teil.
olha'i Policy. Arguments that nuclear testing could make an Important contribution to technical confidence In and. to the extent it was disclosed.
1 SnS Utrlltaod ol AiltmUrd AfQumifan ofViriab SyFomjn TVnorurntt ihe l'mied iitiei (otveiillv ihe wehon da "AcomWiBn and EwkMIMtoa ot Nucleu1
prior detection snd ultimate proof by foreignbecause it probably would have requited site preparations and left tangible Indicationsuclear ei plosion* Botha's security advisers might have warned him that, if South Africa were discovered to have violated the LTBT. it might suffer more serious, sanctions than if it tested underground. On the other hand, they would have raised the possibility of another international uproar and more serious threats if new underground test preparations were detected, and the likelihood of more serious sanctions if South Africa proceeded to test under such circumstances.otha probably would have decided to minimize the risks of prior detection and certain attribution by testing secretly at sea rather than within South Africa.
s Defense Minister. W. Botha very likely supported the developmentuclear weapons program. Including military preparations for nuclear testing. As Prime Minister, Botha has retained the Defense portfolio and has continued to keep closer counsel with senior military officers than with other government officials. We have no specific evidence (hat senior military officers perceive any imminent, or an eventually important, role for nuclear weapons.!
SECJ
n9 some ipecial securitywere put into effect which indicate that certain elements of the South African Navy were exercising or on alert oneptember. The harbor and naval base at Simorisiown were declared,ubliconugust, to be off limits for theeptember. The US defense attache gathered from several reliable sources that harbor defense exercises took place tbere during thishoughlosure might not be requireduclear lest at sea, it could have screened sensitive loading or unloading operations as well as ship movements Also,Saldanha naval facility, whichaval starch and-rescue unit, whs suddenly placed on alert for Ihe, September. The alert was not publicly announced, no explanation for it was given to naval personnel, and no activiiy was observed in Or' around Ihe port. While ihe Saldanha naval alert appears unusual, we are unable to slate withwhether such an alert has ever happened before. Furthermore, at Ihe same lime. General Ma Ian. Chief of South Africa's De tense Force, wasto be touring South America, when he might have been expected to be in Soulh Africa or at Use test observation point during such an important event. | |
rime Minister Botha has avoided publicon the issue since the US disclosure of Ihe Vela indications. However,ays afler therovincial congress of the ruling National Party that "Sooth Africa's enemies might find out we have military weapons tbey do not know about" His enigmatic remark prompted speculation in ihe Soulh African press that he had undeclared nuclear weapons In mind.
he US dHcloiurm of the lechnical indicalionsof aPrime Minister, addressing an anniversary dinner attended by past and present members of the AEB as wet! as member* of the local diplomatic corps, reportedly paid tribute lo Ihe South African naielear scientists who had been engaged In secret workature. He reportedly sakl thai, for securityheir names could not be mentioned and thai they would never gain Ihe ireogniliori in South Africa ni ahrikid Ihat
they deserved.*!
>
oarM African Reiponict to Nuclear Teal AlUattio'w Soulh African official commentary Unce the United States disclosed the Vela indicaitons ofnuclear event have been consistent with Pretoria's longstanding practice of cloaking its nuclear intentions Ina weapons capabilitysaying anything that wouldase (or tightening InlernalWnal sarsctions against South Africa.
nly one official has categoetoilly denied Southnvolvement. Onctober, Immediately following the announcement In Washington of the Vela indications, larobus de Vlllien, President of South Africa's Atomic Fnergy Board, lold Ihc press, "II (here was anything of the sort, my fint reaction would be lhal some other power might hatea lest, but it wa* definitely not Southeho hod been directly involved indesign work at the PellncUba nuclear research center before has prornotion to Preside nl ofB inlmost certainly would be wilting if Soulh Africa hadeal eiprepared lo parry press queries ifnt were detectedovember, Deeport of periodic atmospheric samplings lhal had been conducted by Ihe AEB, ihe report lorscluded. "It I* considemd most unlikely ihat an atmospheric nuclear test has recently been conducted in thi* region,'
nctober the Commander of the South African Navy made allegations we believe lo be fake
oviet nuclear submarine had been in the vicinity of the Cape in late September, implicitly denying lhat the South African Navy was involveduclear test conducted at sea.
oreign Minister Roelof Botha'i publichave been especially ambiguous For instance, onctober he ridiculed speculation that South Africa hadlosion, but aho declined under questioning to say uiseoulvocally lhal South Africa had not done so andsd not intend to acquire nuclear weapons.ovember the Foreign Minister,iscourse on Soulh Africa's foreign policy presented to all the foreign ambassadors in Pretoria, said he was dismayed hy alienations In the UN General Assembly that South Africa had violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and distributed the AEB report on atrnospherie samplings as evidence lo (he contrary But he did not take the opeoetunity to deny thai South Africauclear weapon* progiasn.' |
A Secret Test by Israel
i
yond this, the Israelis mighteeds for more advanced weapons, such as low-yield nuclear weapons thai could be used on the battlefield. Or tbey mighlmall tactical nuclear warhead for iuarl'i short-range Lance surface-to-surface monies Israeli strategists might even have been interested In develneang the fission trigger for aweapon If ihey were to have developed reliable nuclear devices for any of these weapon* withoutu tested designs, moreover, Israeli nuclear weapons designers would probably have wanted to testow-yield nuclear lest conductedat sea could have enabled them to make basic measurements of the device's performance
owever, Israeli aulhotitles could not have ignored Inevitable security risks. The danger! of being discovered would have posed for them seriousparticularly an adverse US reaction, which could damage the special relationship between Tel Aviv and Washington. The Israelis also would have had lo lake account of possible Soviet reactions, including ttepped-up mililary assistance to Aiab stales, tlie likelihood of serious damage to the peace treaty with Egypt, and an erosion ul tupport among traditionally friendly West European stales The Department of Energy believr* thai for Israel toevice off Soulh Africa's shore and allow South Africa lo lake ihe blame it not consistent with Israel's policy or attitude toward[
In short, farad may well have had requirements to test lhal have been in conflict with Hi basse poise* of avoiding any overt oernonstratsonuclear capabihty. We heheve this pokey has been very important to Israel, and we doubt that its incentives to test would have been tuffkieot to overcome itsas long at Ihe leadership perceived any substantial probability of unambiguous attribution to Israel However, thbon would not have ruled out the possibilitylandestine lest conductedemote ocean area. Indeed, of all Ihc countries which might have been responsible forvent. Israel would petto biy have been the only one forlandestine approaeh would have been virtually its only option, f
A Secret Test by 5outh Africo ond Isrod
l Ihe Soulh African* had considereddesign* In eichanga for Israeli lechnicalthe benefits of cooperation would haveweighed by both parties against iheinherent in such joint operations. On thethe Israelis would have calculatedariah stale In need of reliablehave had every reason to preserve securityremain silent kn ihe Ioca of Inevitableits oomptscStv with Tel Aviv. The Israelishave countedigh probability thaifor any nurlrnr leot in ihe area underwould be attributed so South Africa. On theunless the Israelis had offered advancedlechncJogy, South African weaponsprobably have preferred to lest theirbefore incurring security rtsks in testingdesign The Defense Intelligence Agencythat Soulh Africa would probably haveconfidence In Israeli security to considera joint test.
sraelis have not only participated In certain Soulh. i.esearch activities over the last few years, but they have also offered and transferred various sorts of advanced nonnuclear weaponslo Soulh Africa So clatveterttna arrangements between South Afrvca and Iteael for unit testing operations might have been negotiable.
risk* of detection, attribution, and sanction* by foreign powers. | 1 |
Bureau of Intelligence and Research.of State, believes that, while South Africaall probability embarkeduclearhas by this time acQuired sufficientfot the fabrication of several nudearmay be wilting to take the risks ofthere are sufficient political motivationsthe Botha grjveriiinenl from undue provocation
. of international criticism at this time. .Thethe Untied Stales nnd other Westernto deter South Africa from proceedingconstruction operations at the'Kalahari site arevalid: unless South Africa .is willing to relinquishas well as overt'nuclear weapons option,to Western technology and uraniummight be terminated.
State/INR differs particularly with the premise Ihat Prime Minister Botha's government has been more ready than ils predecessors to develop nudear weapons. It points out thai all Soulh Africanhave sought ihis option, but lhal until recently South Africa lacked the relevant technology and fissile material. Even now. the political constraints would outweigh technical incentives In South Africa'sotions, and therefore il is'unHkdy thai South Africa elected touclearhe amblguily lhal surrounds South Africa's nuclear situation hasit with substantially the samewithout theif il had in fact letted Elusivrmess serves Soulh Africa best al Ihis juncture,n line with its previousto confirm nor io deny allegations about its nuclear-weapons-relaled
In sum. State/fNR finds the arguments thai Soulh Africauclear lestnconclusive, even (hough,uclear explosion
* occurred on that date. South Africa is the roost likely candidate for responsibility.
The Defense Intelligence Agency believes thai
he purposes inest at seaavailablensufficient to estimate how
cover of clouds and darkntas would have beenSouth African officials have ba la need the Incen-
matimige pretest security and lo reduce iheand disincentivesuclear test.!'
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: