The Invasion of Afghanistan: Implications for Soviet Foreign Policy
National Foreign Assessment Ceo for
The Invasion of Afghanistan: Implicationsfe; j; Soviet Foreign Policy C
An Intelligence Assessment
Research for this report was completed onl, ;
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This nssessmcnl was prepared byj
< 1' the Office or Political Analysis.
II has been cWfamated wilb the NationalOfficer for USSR-Eastern Europe and the. National Intelligence Officer for Near Eastin rnmmcnu mav be addressed
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The Invasion of Afghanistan: j.
Implications for
Soviet Foreign Policy* ]
KeySoviet decisions on the scope and timing of the intervention in Afghanistan
were dictated largely by the situation in that country,decided topresumably anticipated geopolitical gainsbeyond Afghanistan. The naked display of Sovietmoreover, will generate opportunities and costs thai will affect
! Soviet foreign policylobal basis.
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;n moving into Afghanistan, Moscow probably calculated that, in viewhe decline in Soviet-American relations in recent years, it did notuch to lose in its relations with the United States. The Soviet tradershat they would have torice in their relations with the West andheir actions would create deep suspicions about Soviet policy withinhird World. Past precedents, however, probably gave the Soviet "of whom participated in the decision to invade 'reason to believe that, over time, their willingness to use military force in Afghanistan would enhance their efforts toheir worldwide influence.
'.Moscow will attempt to show that it can wait out any US retaliation by
'! turning to third country suppliers of embargoed or restricted goods.lso undertake some retaliatory steps of its own, such as increased pressures
on dissidents, harassment of US citizens in the USSR, snd efforts to isolate
the US politically from its allies and from the Third World on the issueIn the face of increasing US pressures, it might take further
t-Cuba, Berlin, or on armsexacerbate relations with the
'; United
.In tie near term, Moscow will seek to consolidate ils sains in southwest Asia
and attempt to minimize the costs elsewhere. To date the Sovietsj surprised by the forccfulness of the US response which, together withgeneral outrage expressed by most non-Communist nations, may be giving
, Moscow reason to believe It underestimated the wider effects of ils actionsfghanistan.
There is no reason to believe that foreknowledge of these responsesave altered the Soviet decision to intervene, but Moscow may have to give more attention than it had thought necessary to its relations with the world
, community. In Europe, for example, we would expect the Soviets to appear
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to be more accommodating on disarmament issues while portraying the United States as the principal obstacle to progress. In the Middle East, Moscow will attempt to divert Arab attention away from tbe Soviet attempt touslem insurgency and back toward American support of the Egyptian*Israeli peace process. Elsewhere In the Third World, the Soviets will try to counter the damage to their image among the nonaligned states. The Afghan invasion has already embarrassed Moscow's Cuban surrogates and caused Havana's withdrawal from considerationeat on the UN Security Council.
From Moscow's point of view, the most worrisome potential consequence of its Afghanistan adventure is the prospect of closer Sinc-Amcrican security cooperation. Soviet actions in Afghanistan will make the soon-to-resumc Sino-Soviet talks even more difficult. Moscow will also be watching for signsore aggressive Chinese stance toward Vietnam now that the USSR has, for the first time,ountry that borders China.
The foreign policy fallout of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will beong-term Soviet presence in Afghanistan and continued involvement in the conflict will probably lead to increasingly unfavorable reverberations for Moscow's standing throughout the Islamic world, particularly among Afghanistan's neighbors who are opposedhange in the balance of power in the area and are apprehensive about the dangers inherent in Soviet-American rivalry being played out in their region. Indeed, the longer the Soviets remain in Afghanistan, tho greater the temptation will be for Moscow to take more active steps lo influence the behavior of Iran and Pakistan.ong involvement in Afghanistan might alter the terms of detenteay that could tempt the Soviets to challenge US interests in the Middle East and the Caribbean more aggressively.
Tho Invasion of Afghanistan: Implications for Soviet Foreign Policy {
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Moscow undoubtedlyied that tbe introductionforces into Afghanistan would poisonfor detente. In deciding to goMoscow appeals to have concludedof tbe objectives which it had sought(for example, relaxation of USand increased trade) had not beenwere not likely to be realized in Iheeven if thc USSResstoward Afghanistan. Soviet commentarymonths has suggested, for example, thatwith the United States have becomeand that little change in theae relations1 at Ihe earliest. Thisplaced the blame on Ihe United States,public stateincnli show no recognitionactions have contributed lo thisMoscow argues that Ihc United States,and by omission, has underminedof detente established in thendUSSR has little reason to expect that thewill soon seek io reestablish a
Soviet statement, moreover,onviction that SALT was In deep trouble In the US Senate and lhat Ihe objectives soupht In arms control negotiations were not attainable under present clrcumstancca.Dobrynin may have reinforced this appraisal when he returned to Moscowecember. We do not believe that Moscow's decision lo invade Afghanistan means that it has written off SALT II. but the Soviets may have concluded thai NATO's Long Term Defense Program, the MX. Trident II. cruise missiles, and NATO's decision to deploy long-range TNF In Europe had all gravely undercut Moscow's objectives in pursuing arms control negotiations. Moscow had hoped the negotiating process duringould
inhibit Western arms modernization programs and particularly American strategic programs. By now Moscow may have concluded lhat these goals have been gravely Impaired in the short- lo medium-term and that iu actions in Afghanistan would not.set back any immediately attainable objectives in arms control talks with lhe United States. |
Economic relations with Ihe United States have been another source of disappointment for the Sovieis. The trade boom that Moscow though! would accompany detente has not materialized. Thc Soviets wereon access to US technology, as well as participation by US firms in major developmentby US Eximbankmost-favored-nation (MFN) tariff itatus. The Eximbank window, however, was open only for twoalf years in the, MFN trade status was never granted, and most of the big projects have never
Moscow by now must have little hope of obtaining US trade benefits. Moreover, thc Soviets have been able to meet nearly all of their needs for norugricultural imports in Western Europe and Japan, wherehave lent strong support for trade wiih the USSR. The Soviets have mlnlmlrod Ihcir dependence on US sources to blunt ihe impact of abrupt changes In US trade policy, such as the8 controls on energy equipment
Since Ihe USSR thus appears lo have resigned itself to Ihe failure of arms control to limit US military programs and to the failure of economic relations to develop, it probably decided lhat it had Utile to lose from its actions in Afghanistan. The Soviet leaders may have also calculated that another result of the general decline of detente was to lessen Soviet ausccpti-bilily lo US pressures. Moscow may have esiimated lhai since SALT II waa moribund and trade ond technology transfer were unsubstantial, there was not
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much that the United States could do to punish the Soviet Union Tor its actions in Afghanistan. Moscow may havo believed that domestic political andconst minis would make It difficult for the United States to cut off grain shipments to the Soviet. Union in retaliation for Soviet actions in Afghanistan.
Those arguing in Moscow for intervention inmay have supported their case by citing the effect on the West of Ihe invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union was able to overcome relatively quickly the opprobrium it earned inn fact, those leaders favoring action against Afghanistan may have argued that positive steps in the, such as the Quadripartite Agreements, SALT I, Westreconciliation treaties wilh the USSR and Poland, plus the whole atmosphere of detente, were facilitated by Ihe decisive stabilization of Moscow's position in Central Europe achieved by (he Invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The USSR may have calculated that its intervention In Afghanistan would strengthen its position In South Asia over the longer term, particularly against the interests of the United Stales. The Sovici leaden may have reasoned that rebellion in Afghanistan invited Western exploitation of the situation there and thus could have weakened Moscow's international position. Decisive action waa probably thought necessary to strengthen that position, especially In view of Soviet inaction during China's Incursion Into Vietnam earlier
The China Factor
Moscow probably anticipates that China'a res pome to the Invasion of Afghanistan will be potentially moat troublesome over the long term. The Sovleta unddubt* edly recall (hat their invasion of Czechoslovakia8 led, at least indirectly, lo Sino-Sc*iet armed clashes along the Ussuri River (he following year and contributedhe Sino-US rapprochement that beganoscow's expanded presencemall segment of border withwill be even more alarming than the Czechoslovak experience for Beijing and Is certain
to become another major irritant in Soviet relations with their most intractable geopolitical opponent. The Soviets surely anticipated that Afghanistan would dominate the discussions during Secretary of Defense Brown's visit to Beijing, and during Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua's visit to Pakistan later this month. (
The Kremlin must be concerned that in ihe aftermath of Afghanistan both Washington and Beijing will be more inclined to agree on security cooperation as well as infusions of US technology directly helpful to China's military efforts. Washington's decision lo seek MFN status for China separately from the USSR had previously fueled Moscow's suspicions that the United Slates had overcome its earlier ambivalence aboul playing the "Chinaear ago. President Brezhnev had cautioned President Carter lhat the USSR would "closely follow" whether the USof its benign intentions in establishing relations wiih Beijing were kept in
The Soviets could also be concerned that Beijing might decideake advantage of Moscow's preoccupation in Afghanistan byecond Invasion ofSince the first Chinese invasion inhe Soviets have increased Iheir involvement in Vietnam in order lo deier another Chinese attack. The Commander of Ihe Soviet Navy. Admiralecently visited Hanc* to add credibility to ihis deterrence and presumably to gain increased access to Vietnam's naval and air
Moscow's actions in Afghanistan wilt make Sino-Soviet negotiations more difficult than they already are, particularly the political talks lhal are supposed lo redefine Ihe Sino-Sovlct relationship following Beijing's abrogation of the Friendship Treaty lait April, These talks are expected to resume in the spring. The river navigation talks are tentatively scheduled to begin in February, and the annual trade talk.*gel under way In March or April. Anyat the navigation talks would Increase chances for Incidents on the river frontier, and the abandonmentomprehensive annual trade agreement wouldismal atmosphere for the Sino-Soviet political talks.
Ever since Ihc border clasheshe Soviets haveertain amount of political capital maintaining
ialogue with Beijing. The Soviet* see some advan*
tage in portraying themselves as conciliatory as possible with the "intransigent" Chinese, and they
t have long wanted lo paper over their differences with China in order lo strengthen Moscow's hand in dealing
j with tbe United States and others. But although China apparently is trying to Insulate Its bilateral relations
* with the Soviets from the rapid shifts in political atmospherics in the region, Chinese hostility toward the USSR is bound to become even more implacable, if possible, in the wake of the Afghan invasion. Sino-
j Soviet relations will also suffer if the United States and
' Chinaay to cooperate on getting military assistance to Pakistan. In any case, Moscow's position within the Sino-Soviet-US triangle will become even more vulnerable, and the terms governing therelationship itself will become more unstable, j
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South Asia
Apart from the Middle East. India has long been the most important target oT Soviet attention in the Third World, both to help contain China andoi nerstone of Soviet influence with the nonaligned movement. The return of Indira Gandhi lo power will be reassuring to the Soviets, who will expect the new Indianto express continued Interest in close ties with the USSR and opposition to the United States. Any Indian Government would be apprehensive about Soviet intervention In Afghanistan, but Indian dependence on the Soviets for economic ond military aid remains considerable and should mute Indian criticism of Sovietlong as Soviet territorial ambitions arc confined to Afghanistan, j | l '
Over the long run, however, the removaluffer between the USSR and South Asia could cause the Indian political elite to explore alternatives to its dependence on the USSR, This attitude might be reflectedesire to reduce Indian arms dependence on the USSR or to reexamine the Soviet-Indian friendship treaty in view of Moscow'* useimilar treaty with Afghanistan to justify the invasion. Although Increased concern with the Soviets will not drive New Delhi into the arms of the United
States, even Indira Gandhi's government might be moved to improve relations with the United States^or to reopen the dialogue with China, as It did beforeJ
India, however, will be far more sensitive to anychange in US-Pakistan relationsesult ofintervention in Afghanistan. India fearssuperpower involvement in thesignificant US arms sales toprospects for regional if-.tability andDelhi has already expressed "grave concern"possibility of new US arms deliveries tomight acquiesce in limited US arms aid andbe willing to provide some arms aid loGandhi government might also recognizeof reducing tensions with bothBangladeshesultrotractedin Afghanistan and increasedin the Indian
Whereas Moscow is counting on India's dependence on Soviet military and economic assistance to limit New Delhi's reaction to the expanded Soviel presence In Afghanistan, it is probably assuming that its show of force will serve generally to intimidate neighboringparticularly those, such as Pakistan, thai are preoccupied with internal problems. The Soviet invasion will certainly increase Islamabad's fear of the USSR, and the Soviets will probably resortombination of blandishmen' and pressure toPakistan from Increasing did to the Afghan insurgents. Moscow is already trying to persuade Islamabad thai it is "not too late" for Pakistan to cease all aid to the rebels, and Soviet officials in Pakistan have threatened that Islamabad's security position will be difficult if It does not.
Soviet success in discouraging Pakistani aid to the Insurgents will be determined in part by actions taken separately or jointly by the United States and China. If Washington and Beijing supply large amounts of military assistance, the Pakistanis will be more likely to resist Soviet pressure and probably will increase aid to the insurgents. Pakistan will exercise extreme
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caution, however, and will be careful tn ensure that its own security concerns are guaranteed beforeitself tog the Insurgents. In the absence of such guarantees, Islamabad mayit has In (hea policy of improved relations with Moscow.!
The Soviets, for (heir part, are likely to lakethe weak antral authority In Pakistan. Ifopt to Increase aid to Afghanmay try lo intimidate the Pakistanisthe Afghans to heat up thc campaignindependent Pushlunistan or by encouragingof such anti-Pakistani tribal groups asPakistani Baluchistan has been inagainst Ihe central government forsome Baluchis reportedly believe thainow be more interested in supporting theirsecure an independent Baluchistan. Amilitary presence In Afghanistan willtensions between Afghanistan andwill, in turn, increase the Soviet temptationthe Baluchi and Puihtuniitan Issue against!
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The Middle East
Moat Third World stales ore physically andfar removed from Afghanistan, butof the Sovietof Prime Ministerhaveresonance among Soviel clients,thaioviet militaryhaveriendship treaty withA prolonged and presumablytroy ihe Islamic insurgency inhave continuing repercussions on tbeof these states, particularly those thai :
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The Islamic community Is clearly divided In Its response to ihe Soviet invasion. Mosl conservative Arab stales either signed lhe Initial request for an urgent Security Council meeting or have expressed indignation in some other form;eportedly preparing lo take some antl-Sovlei measures, auch as reducing the size of lhe Soviel diplomatic mission in
Cairo. Among radical Arab states, only South Yemen and Syria have sent congratulations to the new regime in Kabul.
The Soviets are probably counting on rad'al Arab opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, and suspicion of the US sponsorship of that process, to preclude public opposition to the invasion. The creationalestinian state Is still more important to these Islamic states than events in Southwest Asia, another factor mitigating against criticism of the USSR. Algeria and Libya are remote from Ihend are dependent on the USSR for military assistance, and are therefore unlikely to criticize publicly thc use of Soviet weapons, even against Muslim insurgents. Syria, which shares these concerns and is also faced with internal instability and renewed enmily with Iraq, presumably feels too Isolated to risk alienating the USSR and needs Soviet support against the current peace process. Nonetheless, basic Syrian suspicions of Soviet intentions will have been fortified, and Syria is even less likely in the wake of (he Afghan coup toreaty of friendship with thea Soviet objective, f
Iraq's strong public condemnation last week of lhe Soviet invasion is an indication of the basicin the area over Soviet intentions toward the Near East. Iraqi suspicions of the USSR will be further strengthenedevival of antigovernment activity by the Iraqi Communist Party, whichecent decision by the party's Moscow-based leadership to begin rebuilding its shattered organization. The Iraqis are also reportedly angered by their belief thai (he Soviets are providing indirect support to the Kurdish movement. Baghdad may decide to reexamine the language of its own treaty with Ihe USSResult.
Iraq, as well as other Arab states, may becomeopposed lo current efforts by the Sovietstheir posilion in the Ycmens. For thegeneral, the Soviet move In Afghanistan could,long term, make lheessto Ihe United Stales.hift
attitude could lead lo tome softening of the anti-Egyptian posture adopted by moat of the Arab worldelaxation of Ihc post-Camp David polarization.
Iran's initial reaction haa been leas anti-Soviet than Moscow might have feared. After stronglythe intervention and resuming mediaof theehran has made it clear that the United States remains Iran's main enemy. Over the longer term, however, Soviet problems with Iran could be more severe. Ayatollah Khomeini Is notosition towo-front crisis with both the United States and USSR, but his distrust of the Soviets and antipathy for Communism will have been reinforced by the Soviet action in Afghanistan. If and when Iran emerges from Its confrontation with the United States, the Soviet presence inparticularly if the Soviets are conducting operations against Islamic guerrillas in thatwell prevent thewith Iran that the Soviets have sought.
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The Soviet action in Afghanistan could damage Moscow'a efforts to cultivate and promote anamong West European States to pay greater deference to Soviet interests In all-European affairs and hi the framing of national security policies. Some West Europeans may conclude that the Afghan invasion marks the end of Ihe era of detenteeturneriod resembling ihe cold war. This attitude might lead some Europeans lo view the USSR's actions in Afghanistan as evidence of the need for greater support for NATO's modffor theater nod oar forces. Moscow's actions could also complicate the USSR's proposals onsecurity Issues that it Intended to set forth at the CSCE session scheduled for Madrid later this year.
Initial West European reaction belies this thesis, however. Tbe allies insist that detente Is still alive and that arms control progress must parallel theater uclear force (TNfl nwderalutlon. As Afghanistan fades from memory, the cost of the arms race and the fear of hostilities could In fact complicate NATO's fforts to gain public support for weapons procure-
ment. Leftwing parties in West Germany and the Netherlands as well as many West European socialists and Communists will continue to insist on the primacy of arms control despite Ihe Soviel presence in Kabul.
The Soviets will do their bestapitalise on this sentiment. They will attempt to persuade Westthat detente with Ihe Soviet Union in Europe is after all compatible with defense against ihc Soviet Union in Europe.esult, Moscow may be more accommodating than It has been In the past to the French proposaleparate conference onIn Europe subsequent to the Madrid meeting, | j
From the initial reactions of ihe major Eurocommunist parties, it does not appear thai the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will produce Ibe kind of traumatic split that occurred among European Communist parlies following Ihe Invasion of Czechoslovakia or even the differences that followed Soviel support for theof Kampuchea. Tbe West Eu ropeen Communist reaction has been mixed and does not portend an ideological struggle for the Soviets in coming months. The French Communist Party has echoed tbe Soviet line on Afghanistan and has dispatched party leaderrena is tothat reflect the evolution in the French Communist position toward Moscow in recent years. The Spanish Communists have buried their criticism of tbe Soviets in broad polemics assaulting recent US and NATO activities. The Italian party, while mora forthright In attacking Soviet actions, haa tried to explain them In terms of general global tension, including theecision. This lino will reinforce fears among Italians regarding the Communist party's reluctance to break ita ties with Moscow on fundamental foreign policy issues. Q
In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Invasion haa revived tbe tame fears that are aroused whenever Soviet troops march across national borders. These concerns are easier to detect In Yugoslavia and Romania, but tbe same unease is probably present in every country of the Warsaw Pact The Yugoslavs have condemnednvasion openly and forcefully; Mlloa Mink, ihc
member of [he Yugoslav party presidium responsible for foreign affairs, reportedlyroup of associates that be views the Soviet actionbl ueprim" of what could happen In Yugoslavia after President Tito dies.
m have expressed their ccncersV asd |
tdirectly referring to thecriticized tbe USSR in his annual New Year's message to tbe diplomatic oorp*
Poland and Hungary have been leu supportive of the Soviet Invasion than East Germany andprobably because of their generally favorable relations with tbe United Slates as well as their special sensitivity to the prospect of increased Soviet pressure on their own delicate interna! situations. Evenspokesmen have expressed the hope that Sofia would be allowed to stay out of the line of fire on this particular East-West issue.
Pr aspects
Moscow presumably has given some thought to tbe use of retaliatory measures If the United States were to continue to take steps in response to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. These couldeduction in Jewish emigration. Increased pressures oa dissidents, harassment of Americans In the Soviet Union, refusal of visas to Americans wanting to visit the USSR, and tbe further curtailment cf economic relations. Moscow probably realixea that these measures are of limited value but nevertheless would convey the message lhat the Soviet Union can take steps In response toctions and can turn to Western Europe and Japan for technological assistance denied by the United States.
Furthermore, the Soviet leaders may bellcvj that tho most effective policy Instrument they have at present Is the apparent Indifference they have displayed about the effects of their laurvcntkm In Afghanistan oa the course of US-Soviet relations. Their Security Council vote on Iranian economic sanctions will be another measure, moreover, of how far they are prepared to go In opposition to US Interests In other areas. Mean-white, the Soviet media will complain bitterly about
how their actions in Afghanistan are beingby Western propaganda and will attempt to present Secretary Brown's trip to China at the "real threat- to Asian ru^kjaa-P
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' Moscow will ultimately regard US actionshallenge that must be answered In tbe political sphere. The Soviet response could Include efforts to undermine US positions In the Middle East and South Asia. In those areas the USSR will attempt to combine Arab opposition to the Camp David process with the Intimidating effect of Its invasion of Afghanistan to expand Its Influence and undermine pro-Western regimes. Arms aid. as In tbe past, will be used wherever possible to expand Soviet influence at US expense.
The USSR will probably also seek to separate Ihe United States from Its allies on the issue of reprisals and to hold out the prospect of significant economic and political gains to be (derived from passing over Ihe Afghan issue in silence. Moscow will also hope that it can weaken allied unity on the long-range TNF issue if it ean del sen the allies from tbe United States on the Afghan issue. Moscow could even attempt lo ease relations with China in order to deny an option to the United States, but the prospectsignificant Soviel gesture toward Beijing appear remote.^
If the US-Soviet bilateral relationship shoulddeteriorate, then the Soviets might take mora far-reaching measures. These would Include theof US response* to inertased Soviet Involvement In the Caribbean as well as threats againsl allied flag patrols la East Berlin. The Soviets could also threaten lo ignore SALT provisions with regard lo such things as dismantling of certain strategic weapons orthe encryption of telemetry In Ibe testing of new ICBMs. |
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