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Soviet Attitudes Toward Confidence-Bui Id inn Measures. In European Arms Control Q
goals for an expanded agenda on confidence-building measures (CBMs) are fundamentally political. (
The Soviets see in the West European desire to engage the USSR and its alliesroadened discussion of arms control in Europe an opportunity tosymmetries between US and West European security concerns. They also sec iteans of undermining NATO's efforts to reach consensus on security issues and of highlighting the "divisibility" of detente in Europe from the US-Soviet relationship, j j
The Soviets probably will continue to emphasize measures designed to restrict NATO's military exercise and training activities and to dilute Western proposals that might constrain Warsaw Pact miliiary flexibility. They might be willingroad forum related to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to accept an extension of the geographic zone for voluntary use of CBMs.
Under certain circumstances, they might even be willing to accept mandatory CBMs suchaneuver ceilings and advance notification of exerci>cs and troop movements at levels that have greater military impact on the West than on the East. But they would continue to insist that any "intrusive" inspection measures be restricted to verification of actual troop reductions and therefore be confined to the Vienna talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
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This memorandum was prepared byof
Political Analysis. It was coordinated with tbe National Intelligence Officers/orEurope ond for General Purpose Forcer, with the Arms Control Intelligencewith the Office of Strategic Reitarch. Research for this report was completed on 9Comments are welcome and should be addressed to
Sorler Attitudes Toward Confidence-Building Measures In European Arms Control
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During the negotiations leading up lo the signature of thc Helsinki Final Act inhe three principal issues relating to CBMs were the zone of application, lhe threshold for thc advance notification of militaryand whether CBMs should be mandatory or voluntary. After initial reluctance to discuss CBMs at all, the Soviets proposed that they applyiromeler (km) zone of territory contiguous to other CSCE signatories, that the threshold for maneuver notification be at the "army corps" level, and that they be voluntary.
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Western positions varied, but in general thc NATO countriesEuropean" zone of application covering thc USSR west of thcumerically specified notification level for maneuvers and troop movements, and mandatory CBMs.
As it became apparent to the Soviets that the price of Western cooperation at CSCE on the key political and economic issuesore forthcoming Soviet position on CBMs, Moscow's intransigence began toroposal by thc neutral and nonaligned participants in lateJ that the maneuver parameters0 troops, andays' advance notification was seized upon by the Soviets as thc basis for an East-West compromise^ ,
The Soviets remained adamant, however, lhat CBMs be voluntary innd the basic Soviet negotiating tactic became an offer to acceptxplicit limits on the size and advance timing of maneuver notification as well as an extension of thc zone of application in return for Western assurances that CBMs would indeed be voluntary. The eventual Soviet compromise position was reflected in the Finalm rcne including the Baltic and Black Seaaneuver notification level0 troops, andays' advance notification. The Soviets also agreed to provide tion for "major" troop movements within the CSCE-dcfined zone.
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Moscow's initial reluctance to discuss CBMs prior to and at Helsinki probably flowed from Soviet uncertainty as to how MBFR would evolve relative to CSCE, andoviet desire lo limit the CSCE exerciseholeiscussion of all-European political and economic cooperation. The Soviets hoped noi only to legitimize the political-ideological division of Europe but also to avoid encumbering the process of enhanced Soviet interaction in Western Europeotentially divisive exchange on issues directly relating to the European military balance,
The Soviets were probably satisfied withutcome of the Helsinki discussion on CBMs. They were able to capitalize on neutral and nonaligned sentiment in favor of an incremental process of mutual military confidence-building to blunt the more intrusive CBMs proposed by the NATO countries that related in part to enhanced intelligence and warning.
After Helsinki, the Soviets apparently began to see some utility in CBMseans of inhibiting NATO's exercise and training flexibility.s reflected throughout5eries of harsh Soviet mediaon NATO's practice of conducting maneuvers that were much larger than those of the Warsaw Pact. In particular, the Soviets charged that NATO's adoptionew practice of integrating Allied Command Europe exercisesingle program (Autumn Forge) was incompatible with the spirit of the CBMs envisaged at Helsinki. The Soviets also recognized lhal West European interest in an expanded CBMs dialogue with the East might be cxplot'cd not only to shift the focus of subsequent CSCE discussions away from Ba'xct III measures concerning humanitarian issues but also to play upon West European sympathies in favor of promoting "Eurocentric" arms control talks in which Moscow wouldey
This shift in Soviet attitudes toward CBMs was signaled in President Brezhnev's speech onrezhnev raised the possibilityeparate forum for the discussion of CBMs in the form of "special joint consultations" among CSCE participants lo be held "parallel" lo the MBFR talks. In retrospect. Ihis proposal can be seen as the genesis of what became the9 Warsaw Pact proposalonference on Miliiary Detente (CMD) in Europe. <
Other proposals voiced then by Brezhnev were formally introduced intoelgrade CSCE Review Conferenceo-called "action program on miliiaryhe "action program" reiterated previous Warsaw Pact proposalsreaty on nonfirst use of nuclear weapons and ihc nonexpanston of military alliances. It alsoaneuver limit00 troops and the extension of the Helsinki CBMs to "the countries of the southern
j Largely because of the sharp East-West confrontation over human rights, the Soviet "action program" did not receive extensive attention at Belgrade.
j During the later stages of the corfcrcnce the Soviet press charged that the Westthe French and West
i that the United States had overemphasized thc human rights issue to the
J detrimentotentially more fruitful exchange on CBMs. ^
The Conference on The French proposalwo-stage Conference on Disarmament inIn Europe first appeared in preliminary formhethe Post-Belgrade conference and aimed at agreements on CBMs in thetageconventional weapons reductions in thcxl the Soviet
perception of West European dissatisfaction with the US approach tond CBMs: In their conversations with the French, the Soviets objected tothe proposed zone of application for (he CDE, "from the Atlantic to thend to the proposed exclusion of nuclear weapons and navalrom consideration. Nevertheless, the Soviets were careful not to rejectrench idea, seeing inolitical opportunity to accentuate the commonality of Soviet-West European security concerns independent ofourse of US-Soviet relations. I-
Subsequent to Belgrade, the Soviets became increasingly explicit in their willingness to engage in an expanded European discussion of CBMs:
In8 the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee reiterated the "action program" and proposed that CSCE signatories conclude an agreement on nonuse of force, nonfirst use of nuclear weapons, and nonexpansion of alliances.
In9 Brezhnev proposed that CSCE signatories give advance notification of "major" naval exercises when these were to be held near thc waters of other CSCE participating countries.
Inhe Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers added prior notification of "big" air force exercises to thc Eastern agenda. They reiterated Eastern proposals for the nonexpansion of political or military groupings in Europe and, more severally, stated Pact support for measures such as "thc nonincrease of troops and arms on the territory of othernd thc renunciation of thc threat of using nuclear weapons against states that renounce both thc use and the basing of nuclear weapons on their territories, Thc Pact Ministers called also for the conveninguropean conference on military detente to discuss these and other measures.
Inrezhnev proposed that thc CSCE maneuverthreshold be lowered00 men and thai CSCE participants five "timely notification" of ground force movements involving more0 men. He alsoeciprocal maneuver ceiling00 men.
Inhe Pact Foreign Ministers proposed that prior notification of troop movements and exercises be extended fromays to one month.j
One of Moscow's reservationsDE is that it might conflict with Soviet objectives in MBFR. In MBFR, the Soviets apparently accept the fact that any negotiated troop and equipment reductions would require certain verification-related measures, including on-site inspection. In late March the Soviet Ambassador to MBFR indicated lhat an exchange of lists cf units to be withdrawn from the MBFR area and of temporary observers at designated entry-exit points might be acceptable to the USSR ond its rllics. The Soviets apparently wish to avoidDE, however, thc inclusion of the more substantive issue of armaments reductions (as proposed by the French for the second stage) because this could lead to Western demands for more intrusive CBMs relatederification end inspection.
onfluence of Soviet and French views on CDE has become lesshas pressed its advocacy of the Warsaw Pact's own CMDmay to some extentiplomatic tussle between Parisfor pride of authorship. It is also likely, however, lhat thethe CMD proposaleans ofoulmaneuvering the French forof other CSCE participants for an agenda morecond.cive to
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Although France's European Community partners have generally supported CDE,notably WestMoscow's reservations with respect to the potentially adverse impact of CDEFR. Moreover, substantial disagreement exists among West European states over the extent to which specific CBMs should be discussed at the Madrid Review Conferencelink that the Trench wish to limitimpleover thc utility of voluntary measures, j'
Sovietbidding against the French for West European support on the agenda
question, the Soviets have several options open in their searchrump card. They could express willingness to discuss extending the CSCE-dcfincd zone of voluntary CBMs. During the negotiations over the Helsinki Final
Act, they at one point seemed to be considering an extension of the CSCE zonem in exchange for Western agreement to voluntary CBMs. Militarily! an extension of the CBMs in the Final Act. or of those proposed by the Warsaw Pact,TOO-km zone (or even to the Urals) would havearginal impact on Soviet training and exercise practices r
The question, of course, is what Moscow would ask for in exchange foroncession. In return for extending the zone, the Soviets would probably want the zone to include portions of US territory (Including US Atlantic coastal waters under any navalhe Soviets might also ask for the inclusion on the conference agenda of such Pact declaratory proposals as nonusc of force, the nonexpansion of alliances, and nonfirst use of nuclear or conventional weapons. They could even advance such measuresreeze on the miliiary forces of any participating state on the territory of anotherimit on the introduction of major naval surface combatants of nonlittoral states into the Baltic and Black Seas.
Although it is less likely, Moscow may be willing to consider accepting certain CBMsandatory basis. Once again, whether Moscow would be willing to taketep would depend upon the anticipated politicaland upon their potential impact on NATO's military flexibility. Such measures could include notification of all troop movements involving more0aneuver ceiling00 troops, and notification of combined maneuvers involving more00 troops.
Accepting mandatory CBMs, however, wouldharp departure from Moscow's past policy, and any Soviet consideration of binding measure* would probably be accompanied by demands for Western concessions of disproportionate political and military significance.
Original document.
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