SUBJECT: Brezhnev's Announcement of Unilateral Troop ; Reductions: An Interpretation
which in unilatcra represent afforded structure0 the lovol beginning
Thereo our viewithdrawal political ca by ongoing no inen may not the Soviets of the' MBFR
of intelligence evidence ests that Brezhnev's offorf troops from GSFG may pitalization of an opportunity difications to their force urope. Moreover, the withdrawal result in any reduction boloy had in Central Europe at the talks.
Structural Size of Soviet Divisions*
2. For the; past several years the Soviets have boon gradually increasingtrength of their divisions.
* i
The artillery batteryuns) of motorized riflo regiments has been increaseduns).
rhr? cera "structural size" used hero refers to the numberanpover slots, as differentiated from the number of men actually assigned to the divisions. For example, the additionattalionegimont createslots, but doea not mean that there necessarily aro more men. The latteruestion of manning percentages, which could be reduced asrows in ordor toiven level of peacetime active duty manpower,
IIWji
Division, dlnated
Thia memorandum waa prepared inof Strategic Research, butthis office. Co-toents and queries may beg"f"mnr. ftfu..u.
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DEniVATiVE CL BYFHOy
rifle company has been added
i to tho tank regiment of tank divisions.
ortar units have been "added to at least jjlsomc motorized rifle regiments.
There is also evidence that the Soviets [liplan to further increase the .iby adding an artillery battalion totank regiments.
hese increases inf the jiregiments of Soviet divisions probablysome increase inof divisional support elements such as the
maintenance battalion.
Soviet Willingness to Reduce the Number of Divisions Based in Central Europe
astern negotiators at thein Vienna formallyirst-stepwould include reduction0oviet tanks in return for US withdrawalsmenuclear warheads. Thestated that two-thirds ofe withdrawn in the form ofdivisions, with the remainder of withdrawals
to be made up of various units whoso aggregate strength would be comparablehird division. The Soviets also specified that the US should take two-thirds of its withdrawals in the form of complete units, and clearly indicated that they envisaged that those units would be brigades. Finally, the Soviet negotiators explicitly stated that the units specified forwouldat their residual number after reductions.
effect, the Soviets made theirin mind that if the US accepted the termswould have been forced toimit onof their divisions in Central Europe thatless than the number there at present. It is not
likely that the Soviet military authorities would have agreed to this kind of constraint on their force structure if they did not have it worked into an overall force structure program of their own planning, for example, an increase in the size of divisions.
Brerhncy Offer an Outgrowth the8 Eastern Proposal-
0 troops that Brezhnev said the USSR would withdraw would be equivalent to two tank divisions, according to what at least until now has been the normal strengthank division. It seems likely that0 figure he gave refers to the0 that Soviet MBFR negotiators said they would reduce in the form of complcto divisions as part of troir8 proposal,
Furthermore, it is also likely that if the Soviets intend to follow through on their announced withdrawls, they will want to reap maximum political benefit by ensuring that there is no basis for dispute over the fact that "significant" reductions have been carried out. This suggests that they will ensure that the withdrawals are carried outay that can bo readily verlTied by US national technical means. This in turn suggests that the Soviets envisage that the withdrawals would be taken in complete units. Withdrawal of complete units is further indicated by the fact that Brezhnev statedertain amount of other equipment" would be withdrawn in addition to tho men and tanks. We do not discount the possibility that the withdrawals
may be made up of smaller units such as independent regiments and oattalions, or training units. On balance, however, wc believe that the reduction is likely to take place in the form of divisions.
Creeping Growth, of Soviet Manpower in Central'^fif'ly
stated, as he has in severalstotemcnts, that for the past several yearshas not increased the numerical strength of Its
S
forces in Central Curope. Wc do not have direct evidence of the total number of Soviet troops in Central Europe and must derive our manpower estimates by indirect methods. Our information do's show conclusively, however, that the Soviets have been gradually increasing thc seruccurai sizo of their forces in Central Europe, both through adding subunits to their existing divisions as described above and through the addition of new non-divisional units, especially helicopter forces. If there has been no offsetting reductions in thc manning of other units--and we have no evidence of this--wc estimate that thc not increase3 in thc number of Soviet soldiers in Central Europeesult of these changes has been
8. may be that Soviet railJtnry authorities have planned all along to implement their programmed changes in divisional structure without increasing thc numerical strength of their overall manpower. This would fit with thc evidence suggesting that they may have undertaken to enlarge theirut reduce the number. If so, incremental growth in thc overall numerical manpowc strength over thc past several years may bey Soviet military plannersemporary "overage" which would he eliminated when the program was completed. Thus, in Brezhnev's numerous public statements to thc effect that the Soviets have not ,'ncreased their military manpower in Central Europe and have no intent to do so--the latter clause havingart of most of his earlier statements but not Lis latest--hc mav have beer, referring to programmed strength. Nevertheless, they may have seen an opportunity to reap maximum political gajjLfroni thc reduction nccucd to complete their program.
Original document.
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