THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WAlHtMOTttJ.MW
"IMORANDUH FOR FROM
SUBOEa !.
Notional InlillFgtnc* Offktfi
Director. National Foreign Assessment Center
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
Ellsworth/Adelman article in Foreign Policy.Intelligence"
T. oncurhe evaluation prepared for you by OMR. eries of gross overestimates in thenderies of gross underestimateshe middle and, the record of estimating Soviet strategic force prospects inhas been closer to the mark. It has contained some overestimates, jsome underestimates,umber of estimates that aopear now to have been about right. Host important, our techniques of projection have avoided single best guesses, have explicitly set forth the ground-rules and uncertainties associated In the projections, and neve fostered prompt adjustment of our estimates in response to mew evidence and|
2. The OSR evaluationechnical one which does not directly address the bill-board message of the article. ead this message to be that CIAhe principal culprithatever shortcomings existS intelligence estimates. Thisllegedly attributable to the dominance of wrono-headed clandestine service officers In CIA. Thisistortion which falls completely to recognize that:
recent years, national estimates onforces have been prepared by workingfrom the full intelligence communley;
on weapons characteristics likerecent changes In our best estimates ofhave been prepared by WSSICDIA chairmanship; and
c CIA's clandestine services do not participate In preparing these estimates at all. With his long experiencentelligence-related matters, Ellsworth should know better.
Attachment: As stated
owafd Stoertz, Jr.
oemVAT: V
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director. National Foreign Assessment Center
Concents on "Foolish Intelligence" (Robert F. Ellsworth
and Kenneth L. Adelman, Foreign Policy.nd the Subsequent Summary In the Washington Post
have reviewed the articles (AtUchment F) and selectedin this raeraorandum the Issues In OSR's bailiwick.
overall track record of our estimates of strategic capabilities;
specific charges that there were majorstimates (compared to8 estimates) 1nand In ICBM fractionation, accuracy,eliability;
i
estimates of Backfire production have been too
low;
doublingof our estimate of thethe Soviet GNP devoted to defense; and
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p. Our reported delay in recognizing the North Korean if; force build-up.I :j
The following paragraphs summarize our current views on these subjects. Additional Information on each can be found In the lttachments.
Topic A, the overall track record of our estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities.
Ellsworth and Aldeman's statements that the CIA consistently underestimated the projections of the Soviet ICBM build-rup are true for our estimateshe mid- and. s period, our
E
re driven by the mistaken belief that the Soviets would not ant to exceed the numbers deployed by the US, thereby triggering major new US programs. |
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Copy No. Ji_
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he charge'of consistent underestimation does not hold upther times. In thend, the NIEs significantly overestimated the prospective capabilities of the Soviet ICBM force. (_
other direction, our estlmite of the accuracyill be aboutmeters,HIE. The expected IOC for-tre Typhoona year or two. Also, the estimates of expected yields forand SLBM warhcids are being reduced by about f*
ijrleld of theodor excmple, has been reduced
tons to rpkllotons. (Seeor additional discissions of the trao.'record of the
During, ths record has been nixed. Ue have made changes In our estimates as new data come 1n. Assuming the more recent estimates are more accurate, some of the changes reflect previous underestimates of Soviet capabilities. Examples are, the degree of fractionation of ICBS payloads and the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs. Rut counter examples also exist. We overestimated the rapidity with which the Soviets would convertilos for newer systeenvjni wouldew Intercontinental bomberew large SSBN.
He will be making further adjustments to our estimates this year. Again, some of them will behe direction of Increasing the threat. The projected accuracy of the ICBMs will be Increased slightly, and the estimates oforce reliability will be Increased. In the
west Soviet SLBM fl-cers in last probably be
9 estimates
7. Topicpecific charges that there were major changes
compared to6 estimates in forceresiduals
and in ICBM fractionation, accuracy, and reliability.
11
Forcetwo graphs presentedllswortharticle are taken from OoO's annual reports forhich ine taken from the force projection-;the NIE's78 (published8two graphs they chose to depict are estimates of post-strike which, under day-to-day alert conditions, would for thethose ICBMs not used or destroyed and the at-sea SLBM force. of ICBM and SLBM RVs did Iicrease in8 NIE: Estimate has aboutercent more ICBM RVs In thestimate, and about twice as many SLBM RVs In the Nevertheless, both Estimates reached approximately theof on-line weapons by the end of the decade.
TOP SECRET
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8. ICBM8 NIE Initially contained fewer denioyinents or theV variants of the fourth generation ICfcVte. IJSi1 HftiBe2he force during Se
7Sni all?n number of onMn* ICBM Evidence of greater SLBM fractionation for theed us to believe the Soviets wild deploy more MIRVed variants of their SLBMs beginninghe.
ncreased07 *
9- ICBM Accuracy-We did revise our estimates of Soviet ICBM
J^KSiS^8 NIEs' He detected significant new testing In7 that suggested an accuracy improvementand we so notedn7 Estimate. The Improvement In
ut the
projected IOCew years later. By8 Estimate, we hadour accuracv^estlmates and Included them In the force
authors arrived at their figure ofercent
improvement by comparing accuracy of currenteters) with JiJiTJ^ PJ2JecSH for svstems wh1ch would IOC
Z Ldi'in WnS,the est1nate of accuracy LrJ we made7 with those we made If they had, by our cal-
SI lSniSoo8roJeCJ!0ni mad?8 for Sov1at ICBHshe force during
jtinaie. as Mntloiied above, however, we do plan to Increase
t for lidiMe^i'd* 1VK forfncomln? Estimate. (Seeor additional discussions of these issues.)
12. Topic C, Backfire Production Estimates
haveuunJerest1mated the Backfire bomber product.on rateroundless. We have not made any significant
|lMueStP^,eQ ' '
13. Topic D, Percentage of GNP devoted to defense
Ellsworth and Adelman misrepresent the message contained Ineevaluate The factor of two Increase was cltlrll billed as an Increase In the estimated ruble cost of military programs, ands an Increase In our estlmates^tncTphysicfll slzo or
ate thftt tn0 SovietnSustr^i1 ^, " haofesources, and that the Soviet leader*'
3reater'than we had ppev,ouslv
TOi' SICRET
authors shou'd have known better than to makeagainst the Agency. Me took every precaution at theexplain the change, even In our unclassified report ofas briefed to Mr. Ellsworth at the timeor additional
C, North Korean force build-up
Ellsworth and Adelman are correctlaiming that we underestimatedhile the size of North Korea's Infantry force. But the statementisleading In thatoes not even hint at the iserlous concern and excellent reporting we did devote to what we saw as an Increasingly alarming situation. We did report all along on the Increasing numbers of tanks and artillery forces. We noted the growth In naval, air, and air defense forces, and expended considerable efforthe area of Indications and warning. But we had HttU direct evidence of widespread expars^on of the Infantry. This was corrected7 and8 when the Comnunlty, led by Army Inscom,assive study of this prcbler. (Seeor additional Information.)
Director Strategic Research
(6)
of NIEs by NIO/SP
C. D. E. F.
of SpecificProductionof GNP Devoted toKorean Forceon "Foolish Intelligence"
and Washington Post Sunmary of Article
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I A
Tha Overall Track Record of our Estimates of .. SovieTTtrategTc Capabilities
(An assessment written by Hr. Howardn responseenate Request)
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Two Articles from Studies In Intelligence on the Same Subject
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
'I*olienol Hiitlllgfnn Offken "
SUBJECT: Addition to Record of DCI Testimony, Senate9
(Juestfon: Please supply for the record the number of years the CIA hasthe Soviet strategic threat. In light of the record, what confidence can be placedhe estimates?
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1. Itellat In thend e.. NIEs significantly overestimated the existing and prospective size of the Soviet ICSM force, and that in the middle andhey significantlythe prospective size of that force. The initial overestimates were based In part on the pace and success of the Soviet development program, and In part on projections of Soviet deployment capabilities and likely program* madehe absence of hard evidence of actual deployment activity. |
. From the time in thehen satellite photography corrected the(previous overestimates, the Intelligence Community has had good knowledge of Soviet ICBM launcher construction and deployments existing at any given time.
S
he'subsequent underestimates of prospective future deployments reflected the Isteken belief that.the Soviets!would deploy either fewer, or later, onlythe some number of ICSM launchers js thr?In retrospect, thr? MtlMtOTfthinking that ths Soviets would want to avoid triggering furtherof US missile forces, failed to appreciate the depth of Soviet.
'loVtermination to overcome the weaknesses that contributed to theiruban-missile .crisis, end probably over.-eacted to the previous over-of the "missile gap" era. -"
hrohlstctter's articles entitled "Iscglc Arms Race?" (Foreign Pol lev, Suriner andas reviewed by CIA analysts and found to be essentially correct. Wohlstetter hadhat future size of Soviet ICDM, SLBM, and heavy bomber forces was consistently underestimated during. IA "track record" study completed In6 showed that with respect to ICBM forces, the mistaken view of Scvlet
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ive en? _
Uttl
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SUBJECT; Addition to Record of DCI Testimony, Senate Armed Services CcT-itSe,9
j Intentions persisted In retrospect,opears thatstimators clung to their original belief that the Soviets would levelOM launcherdeploymentsevel ranging from somewhat below to somewhat above the IS total until.he Soviet construction program actually exceeded the US level.
6 study carried the record forwardhe review showed that, followbg the belated recognition that the Soviets wouldnly catch up with tie US in number of ICBMs but keep right on going,stimative record Ir^roved somewhat.heears preceding thegreement which froze the combined Sovietumber of ICBMM launchers, the NIE forecasts'compared withoviet performance as follows:
operational ICBM launchers, tho actual leveleachedell within the range forecast In all three NIEs.
! n modereSSBNs, the5 level ofomparedJ,nd ad established the approximate ratelass Haever, these estimates did not anticipate that theunderonditions would be an eventual force ofodernaunchers. Only the non-SALT projectionshigh or
n heavy Ambers, moreover, the NIEs continuedredict retirements of older Bisons and Bears,onstant force level. ["
4 to reas the
I t The- IntelVigftfce Cornnunlty hasLiuLued great Importance to (the quality of Soviet strategic forces as wall as to--theirltrack. record?stuuV-fcvlewed estimates madeith respect to qualitative trendsoviet forces, and found that the estimative record was mixed. On the positive side:
--Tne NIEs ftrecast Soviet development by the early orf MIRVed ICBMs with Improved accuracy and hard target kill capability. They also forecast the Introduction of longer range SLBMs.
--Tn the various fields of strategic defense, thc NIEs were round to have Identified cr.rrectly tho likely lines of Soviet development, althoughla in thehey overestimated Soviet strategic SAM deployment arf overestimated Soviet wlllingnes'. to deploy ABMs despite
Ill l- p
SUaJECT: Addition to Record of DCI Testimony, Senate Armed Services Cora, ittee,9
j the Identified shortcomings of ths available Soviet ABM system. Soviet ASH capabilities against SSBNs have remained very low, as was estimated.
On the negative side:
NIEs failed to foresee that under theimitationswould deployndCBMs having throw-weightsthan that of theould Introduce cold launchthendnd (in the case of theouldmissile volume without increasing silo!J : wl J ! j
uncertainties and disagreements were noted in the estimative record about such critical questions as: whether theCBMIRV system (It was later determined not to have1 j| whether theas an ABM orual-purpose ABM-SAM (it was later determined tond whether Backfire had marginal or substantial Intercontinental capabilitieslon whichnresolved today). | ;
6. Another review of the NIE record, done for CIA in the spring8 for tlie, examined in detail the estimative performance with respect to three topics perceived to be of particular importance. Ithat:
With respect to Soviet strategic offensive force composition under
j imitations,'the tilts of thenderestimated the rate
..of ballistic missile submarine-deployment, overestimated the rate of
|conversion to fourth generatlon-ICBHs, and did not anticipate the number
f diverse types and modifications of ICBMs that would be developed during
* If the period.
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I 1 With respect toccuracy and force readiness, prospectiveSoviet capabilities were underestimated. -The Soviets were found to haveachieved more with relatively crude technology than expected and, later, to have introduced new technology sooner than expected.
respect to air defense systems, In thehe priority with which the Soviets would seek to develop an airborne warningontrol system (AWACS) was overestimated ond tho size of the airnterceptor force was underestimated. Tho NIEs failed5 to establish extensive Soviet deployment of nuclear-capable SAMs and electronic countermeasures equipment (ECM) for strategic air defense, j
p I !
SUBJECT: Addition to Record of DCI Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee,9
o bring the record fully up to date, we have now reviewed the NIEs of the most recent five years. The first two of the attached tables compare forecasts made46 with the facts as known and reportedhese two tables confirm the mixed record of recent years.
jlpntrles on the first table dealing with operational ICBM launchers, HIRVed launchers, and online ICBM reentry vehicles (RVs)ubstantial overestimate4 of the pace at which the Soviets
ould convert theirndilos to the new,nd,onsequent overestimate of the number of ICBH RVs they would | have online These estimates were adjusted downward after that, but6 forecast was still somewhat too high. The estimators failed to foresee that*the Soviets would stretch the conversion program overears. Using historical evidence, they projected Sovietat about the same pace demonstrated In the construction of tho original silos. This was correct for theut not for thendonversions.
CEP entries on the first table show that the pecuracies of the ! presently deployed ICBMs were 'Initially underestimated, but that those estimates were largely corrected Yield estimates also had to be adjusted, but only slightly.
. he second table shows thathe prospective growth in
umbers of Sovlet.SLBM launchers, SLBMs with MiRVs, and online SLBM RVs
orrective upward adjustmentmade
lErSmiSr: tMoteshown ori tn0heiOC datoIRVed SLBM was in fact forecast correctly)
8. The lest two tables' address the difficult question of the likely adequacy of some of our most recent forecasts. Because many of the initial operational capability (IOC) dates shown on the third table are still In the future, as ore all of the quantitative forecasts2 on the fourth table, there Isf knowlnq today whether these forecasts will actuallyorrtict' Wehowever, compare the forecasts made68 to judge whether accumulating evidence has required major adjustments. nnJUn^a-Te the best--an assumption whichot provaule butlausible because evidence accumulatesf past and present forecasts offers some Insight Into the amount of leadtlme thee been ablo to provide to HIE consumers. We nnd that:
^
Addition to Record of DCI Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee,9
of the.IOC dates forecast^5 have not had to be changed much.' j i
" |i 1 alii ' be diversity of Soviet offensive and defensive systems now expected In thsas not anticipated Several new systems now expected were not forecast that long ago. However, the Soviets have evidently deferred deploymentobile ICBM which was forecast on the basisctivity.
rapidity with which the Soviets would develop ICBMs with considerably improved accuracy was underestimated4
rapidity with which the Soviets wouldew SSBNew heavy bomber was overestimatedudging by present evidence.
the last table shows that this year we have increased considerably our estimate ofSoviet intercontinental weapons four years hence, because we believe recent evidence pointsharp upward trend which was not forecastrevious NIEs.
sliji ":
| 9. This review of the estimative record confirms that the NIEs consistently underestimated Soviet strategic force goals throughout most of. It Indicates that Inhe estimative performance has been mixed. Insofar as can now be determined, many recent forecasts have been about right. There have been some apparent overestimates. However, in two Inprotant aspscts of
-Soviet Intercontinental 'striking capabilityhe earlyaccuracy of Soviet ICBMs and thenumber of online Soviet missile RVs and fcorber
believe that in the past few years we were*underestimating. onclusion was reached3 on the basis of newly-acquired flight-testiny and other evidence pointing to sharp Soviet improvements, whereas previously
| the evidence had point ad to core gradual'Soviet^
here- remains the-question* of what*
1 should havo In NIE forecastsight of the estimative record. umber of considerations ore relevant:
' !
presente based on the expectation that the USSR will continue to demonstrate bi.iad scope, vigor, and persistence in its
I 1 " v
SUBJECT: Addition to Record of DCI Testimony, Senate9
strategic programs. Concern about US reactions is no longer assumedthe Soviets' determination to Improve their deterrent andcapabilities, j :
,
general, our historical base and current Information aboutSoviet deployment programsetter than before, but we still have very little Information about specific Soviet plans. Because we are,ffect,forward from recent and current trends, forecasts forar term are likely to be much more reliable than forecasts for the0 years hence.
deployment programs areid-stream and their pace is well established, confident forecasts can extend some years into the future. Periods of changeoviet deployment programs, however, can Introduce substantial uncertainties about even the near term. While the overall pace of ICBM launcher conversions has been fairly steady and predictable for several years, the Soviets have clearly adjusted Its details more than once to prospective SALT II limitations. The Soviet SSDH construction program Is believed even now to beransition fromlnss to the Typhoon class and the program to convert ICBM launchers toill reach the prospective SALT II ceiling about two years hence. Changes in Soviet programing which break historical precedent will remain particularly difficult to forecast.
* respect to new weapons, we usually knoweveral years before deployment. Becausee can be reasonably confident that futureonsist .very largely of types of weapons Identified advance. Examples of forecasts fc: rheevidenceew, solidnt ICBMf, however, the Soviets run Into dlfflcul system, orhey cancel it, we are not likely.to.
their existence
nt lead times
trategic-forces will -several yearsased on developmentaleapon
ty in developing a
have forewarning.
oviet security measures, however, usually prevent us frur.ithe specific characteristics of new weapons and fromto existing weapons until Hte in the developmentsometimes persists until well after deployment hasare our recent confirmation of much-improved guidance systemsSovietand our
continuing uncertainty ond disagreement about the performanceof the Backfire bomber.
Ii' Hi
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Addition to Record of DCI Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee,9
^these limitations, our present estimative philosophyo change oureven drastically, as soon as possible when the evidence leads us to believe we haveew development or trend, or that the Soviets haverogram. This means we accept considerable fluctuations in forecasts from year to year in the interests of giving our consumers as much advance warning as possible.
89
ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL SOVIET
FORCE
1 -
|
mmate
Estimate
Actual
'i 1 umber of SALT-Accountable SSBNs*
60
of SALT-oceountable SLBM launchers
950
with MIRVs
V ] !.
Vs
3 RVs
Vs
SLBM RVs
SLBM CcP
Limited toy SALT I,46 NIEs anticipated itsn
ctual projection, which excludedaunchers on several untquely-:configured Soviet submarines now -rjnted in the total.
89 ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL SOVIETORCES IN
*!
:
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j:
i
; Estimate
Estimate
Actual
Number of launchers at deployment
'iiifields*
Launchers operational with
Launchers operational with
Launchers operational with MIRVs
ICBM RVs
od 1
HIRVedstinated
od 1
iConstruction of new fixed launchers banned hy.sALT X.ncludedobile ICBMs '
I,
89
IOC DATES FOR NEWIF1ED SOVIET SYSTEMS
Estimate
stimate
ICBMs with CEP of
ICBMs with CEP Of
l 1 .
ICBM with MIRVs SLBM with MIRVs
'0'
Typhoon SSBN/SLBM System
* IrIfp-|
j New heavy bomber
I
' -
: Mobile ICBM
: Hobilewith HIRVs)
;ILow-AltitudeJLookdown/shootdown)
8
evidence but capable of doing so)
*
(predictingnewha t
19B0Vs)
8 RVs)
low-attitude SAM
1 Long-rance air-launchedissile
evmenc
i_fa. program)
19B2
(could by)
-
long-range air-launched ! cruise missile
(could in mid- (could in mid) )
Signifies that NIE reported IOC data as post occurrence.he subject of Soviet intermediate range forces was nnt addressed4 estimate.
ll
't
! -ti
*
1M '
J . '1
!| 1
1
y
9
* 1
; ROJECTIONS2
SALT II CONDITIONS
1 Pi1 :
'
i^'i'*1i 'v" 6 7 '
1
f"jl'!jrSvT'l1
"'il!
Estimate
I!'* i' -"
i
Delivery Vehicles
Weapons
1
RVs
RVs
Weapons
| Total
. iJ
*
If
EHT
ICBMs
!11
SLBNs
H
" a
ToUl
T^fvAfl ft-offl
I
V* heaAw ?
i (icnvEu irun>
Included In totals, ijj
.
H'; '
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-1-
::
1
*
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(jronrr
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Chart 1. . Pod.
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Socict veniiUnatcd or unrfcre^rrnafru?
WOIILSTETTER, SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES, AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
1
Thessue of Fiwr/gn PotUtj can led nnrofessor Albert Wohlstettcr titled "Istrategic Armsn the article Wohlstetler took up the question of myths and realities In the "armse sought to demonstrate thit much of the public ilehnteihe imw raceeny myths, among others the myth of merest imatis, tltc widespread belief tha* the Pentagon systematically mcmtlmate*strength of Soviet Strategicsing lite IX-fmwsttiliinnilshi* iiasfa, WoliKleller showed that in fact during thelic tetnleoey was tn underestimate in such things as ICBMs,nd bombers (ulihough earlier, in tho "missile gap" era, the tendency had of course been quite the contrary).
Since the irtido wasave examined Natiomi intelligence Estimates going ban0 to see whether or not the same charge could be directed at the official judgments of the corporate body whoso task it ir. to communicate the views of tlie VS. intelligence community,. Intelligence Board, as set fnrth in ihetce' rd estimative hi*tory as rr cards anticipated qualitative improvements in weapon systems and their predicted operational dates. ^'
I im satisfied on the Ixtis of iny research lhat Dr. Wohbtctter fa essentially correct in the ease of ICBMs during ihe IDfiOs. There are some minor differences between what the intelligence community said and tin* data Wohlstettcr used, but not enough toasr against Wohlstetln's findings.
Tike some exnnjplcs of how the USIB tended to underestimate:
NIEpreadaunchers forhe actual count In mld-'G9.
1 was even morr extreme. Itauncltcrs forho actual count.
Tlw worst of the lot was the NIR issued in lOflfi. Itpreadorhe actual count. With thef (he Initial year, the actiinl count eseeided tlic protected annual spreads over the entire period covered by the estimate. (Secn reading the pastoned hi find some clear rationale for the repeated underestimation. In many ynn the community expressed view*along the lines that the Soviets would not deploy as many ICBMs at tho VS. for fear of touchingew round of deployment tnr that they would bo contentetaliatory force snmesvliat smaller lhan the VS. force.he rationale given for estimates such0 was lhat the
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NIE
mw political and psychological advrmtagci In having in ICBM force roughly Ihr anmcns tltut of lite UJL nml Mini wmto lw tho goal of their deployment pntgrnni. In other years, howrvtrr, no floor rationale wu prorated for the projected numbers.
S, tlw text of tltc NIKmiff Mi of the- range foe the futureaunchers (the nnmlicr operational ami under coml ruction tt thatecause of icvcrnl fat tun that could luflurnrc thc lire of the force, however, It did not estimntc (lie maximumt might reach.*
I thought, when rmbarMngthis venture, that it would be found that wc had credited thc Soviet* with the nblllty to innku rapid stride* In weapons technology (leading lo MlltVt. |Ugh accuracies,nd lhat consequent Improvements in quality would peimit Movow to limit tltc quantity of weapons deployed. But thi* was not lhe. Our Judgments mi when tho Soviet* were lilkcly to Introduce certain qualitative imirrovi mrnis into their lytlcm* fitted pretty well withctu.illy happened.
The 'Missile Cap'
I suspect, tint obviously cannot document Ihe fact, that part of the rcaton for the repeated underestimation of the growth of Soviet ICDM forcesubconscious (orven conscious) overrenction by tlictrrcstimation of Soviet ICBM erowth during tlic days of the "missilehe Intelligenceookublic flailing for
that error of Judgment.
j
The "missile gap" era lirgnn tn7 when the Soviets carried out
the first test firing of an ICPAI. lh.it firing anil subsequent one* served to
arge segment of lhe VS. Intelligence community, a* well a* sizable
clement* of Congrri*n* Department of Defense, thnl the Soviets were
preparing to embark on aneployment program invo* 'Ing large numbers
of missiles. From thc latentillw tocsin was repeatedly
sounded that tin* So< it-it were outpacing tlic United Slates 'n ICi'-'I production
and dq>loymenl. Several statements made by Khrushchev duringears.
both public ami private, seemed to h* encouraging metmissile
gap" was much 'lucmscd durlrig llie Presidential cAnipnlcnnd tha
NIE for lhat yearin part to lell why. (Sec
.ugustcontained Ihree nnmerlcnl estimates of Sovietrrngth for mld-lOGt The Air rorrr. the, and lhe Army nml. St.itr andf Ihe Joint Stuff Haled that they thought iho number would lie somewhere liclween the CIA number ami tltc Air ForcefrMOM ihe actual number ilepUn/ctl uai /as.
InStlLpinion was again well divided. CIA wtlm.iled lhat1 there wouldC11M* deployed; Slate INR's iprratl; Army and Navyl the Air Forte. Bv hiJiMOW Ihc number actually tteylMjeit. The Air
*SMr, DM. 'mi Bar mrtrurv smwlnmtoktr- TVyv.iM b# llie bprrr limit.
NIE Performanc*
ICBM Launchers:GO v. Fact
BOO f-
Chart. Fad.
! i
51
Force,u the rest of ihc, also projected aheadstimating (hat lty; that time ttie Sovietsn the field.6 the actual number deployed. (Sec
Data collected during the late summer1 sltowed the community how wrong Its estimates had been,emorandum to Holder; ofas issued In ScjitrmiWof tliat year. All agreed that there were probablyoCBMs deployed at that time (iln-rc- were aetuully onlynd tliat byhe spread would bo some;; the miudter actually deployed bylose lo the renter of the spread.
The Culton /mpoeii';1 j '!
I also feel that part of the reason for repeated underestimatingack of appreciation on the part of the intelligence community of how bitter Kliru-shelter, and probably others In tlic Soviet hierarchy nt the time, felt about the "facing down" they experiencedesnlt of the Cuban missile crisisAt that time the Soviets had less thanCBM launchers operational, and we knew* Soviets knew they were dealingosition of weakness ond probably at least suspected that we were aware of their lack of ICBM strength The chronology ol the growth of tlieir ICBM force fits very neatly with athot might have been taken shortly after the pullout from Cuba to expand their ICBM force atrapid rate and prolmblyize never originally Intended. Deployment of thendeally started to take off four years alter the
heavy Bombers
Wohlstettcr Is again correct In the case of heavy boinlHTS.0lic NIEs always phased out the RiMm and Bear Immbenaster rato tlian actually occurred. There has. In'fact, been no reduction in tlic heavy bomber force for the past sixtill think tltat the. estimative Judgments were logical, nlbelt erroneous. Why the Soviets would go to the expense of retainingmall fleet uf ol*olcto jcovy liombvn defies well-reasoned explanation.1 j 1 I.
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Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
In the case of Soviet suhinarlnr-launehed ballistic missiles, Wohlstettcr Is lomewhnt wrong in lib assertion tliat the tendency was to underestimate. The NIE history on Ihmc systems Is mixed.1he NIEsThe spreadrojected0 In theIE was exceeded, but only In that one ycai. (SeeIt Is only fair to point out (hat the only NIE Wohlstettcr used for these allegations about numbers of SLBMs wasrotection, and that Isn't cricket.)
The1 estimate erred slightly on ihe high side In Its projection forpread of SI.BMs for that year. The actual count. The projection foreld ot H2nd was pretty good but for the wrong reason; the unpredlclrd advent of thelass7 boosted tlic actual couilt. within the NIE spread. In projecting beyond
"
NIE Por/ormonct
ICBM Launchers:.
Air Forca ..
-
I
000
Hi
Si.(INR)
N.'E fe/lormone*
Tubes:. Fact
il W
300 -
250
; i
150 -
100
- 4
. Foci.
hc ME considered only ihc linlllstle missile submarines, ond did not specify the numbers ofiont. In dotnp so. however, tbo estimate was not too bad. Il projecteduchiK-hidlngew class, forhe actual numberncludingf the new
Mm
Cnir projection6 forellnw Ihc actual count for that year. principally because tag had not yetnxliKtkin rate forlass. ami tin- Senilis Kidof lh.il riass npvratimul by IWI, as onp*Ked to an estimatehe NIE Inaho fell short In ils projection fornd foror the same reusoo. Tlte IOCS estimate was quite accurate In Its prediction, as was the one0 NIE's record for thondas under, under, over,the margin of ciror in each Instance* or less.
The main reason for the overestimate* In SLUM atmqtfh In tbeiart llial tlieof the lull Mk? nuVile Milimiirinr finer rnnaimd staticin*endrmy in rNliiiuIiug winw weapon
NIB Performance
system ii seen corning In Is loontinulnjt gniwlh In ili.it lyttrM ami lo anticipate thc development n( new, improved models. In riHrm|iect, It I* now dear that the Soviets nptisl totlui'r Si JIM fixerikkIiM IrtfH of t'ltrr-tubed C- and ll-dassquipped with &hnct range missiles, until something more nearly approaching (lie VS. Polaris system could Ifccomt-And ItY-chm. fitted withube*.
In sum. thc USIB repeatedly erred after then two out of line categories. No one can claim thisriumph, ami let us hope tlut theprove instructive in llic future. As WohUtrller has cJnerved, however: "PrcJ.ciiiip tlic sl'c andt inUturcotentialeapon deploy -mcnls severalncciard line of work. It e> intrinsicully uucertain, rcversihle by the adversary himself between tlic time of prediction ami tlic actual deployment."
i !
ii
SECRET
I In the prrctilwg* W- layiar matikri ihe mwtttgitatf Ihr Ihriii of Unfimr Albert U'ahUtrtttr that Ihr* b> un6rre>lin>alf rather than ovtrruimair .Wirt Uratrr.it Tajfir Jm*d'frWMilrtltt't /Viii.eilittrCmy dwulraln that Ihr nlimaln /arW.xatn*jnJgmt*tM,
'!/ :Editor
MORE ON THE MILITARY ESTIMATES
1I
Ross Cowey
1 laving worked closely with Jack Taylor in drafting tome of llic National Intelligence Estimates which he surveyed in hit article ill lhe rcbruaryead hi* piece on Soviet military estimate* wiih grealound myself in agreement wiihf hi-ut disappointed by hi* failure to go farther with tome of his analysis.
Tayluminary of thc Estimates reminded me nf an oliKnvntion which Abbot Smith made In an article in the Fall,homeet Shaft*pe could easily makeist of projectionsm the military'estimates) which were too low. another of those which were too high, another of those which were sobttaniially correct.inalihotc which, ihanki mnrr to luck lhan wisdom, were jireckelyainly proves lhe point.
Admittedly. Taylor focused on the quantitativemates rrfrrrrd to by Professor Albertlut his ankle does not thow. therefore,lhat the estimates were rojhl with respectumber of important, non-quantitative judgment! made over the years aLoutforces. Perhaps lhe most significant of these was the repeated judgment through ihe Sixties thai the Soviets could not expect to achieve sirdtcglc capabilities which would make rational ihr deliberate initiation of general war.
Any review of lhe Estimate* written since aboulsince the advent of improved collectionalto shimhe intelligence community hat been able lowarning of lite introduction of every major Soviet strategic weapon lyttcm well before its initial operational capability. We haveeen able io agree among ostriches on the specific misiion of eachtemheissile and ihe Backfire bomlter)Taylorthr pace or extent of it* deployment. Hut we have been able In provide the jihinner with knoulvdtic tuffiekiii for ttenerul guhiinre, If nut lor detailed phuuilu|t,
I wtititd agree with Toylur that part nf llir mami for our repeal.underesiimatri in thr mid-Sixties of iheimpcndini; growth in.Soviet ICIIM hmes was aniimi by thc nnnrnunity to the crosi -vfestimaiei on this tobjcti in ihr hue Fifties, Over-reaction to pa*tleati loto- |Ktltern in ihe rMimaiivrr ovcrntimatr* in ihe
a
Ihnr it<
limattt
f Soviet mtsiilr. iHimbrr. and fishier Mrcngths were followed by unrlcrrMirruttci for each ofform during the Simiet-
Aimltirr arulylirJil syiHlionic workingith may lie even moreourofuture force levels in the absenci of firm evidence, and to underestimate with the advantage of iwh evidence. IXiriru; the late Fifiwa, wv sverr crtip.ini] Ine information on what ihc Soviets were tloiny, as ihey translated the new technology of ihe space age into new military hardware. With the introduction of more sophist iriucd ihtdlnfrnrc colleetioti methods in the Sixties, weuch lielierinm of fynm eapaliililtes lo make use erf thr new Irrhnolot*) iStit lliis morehaw ofo mure conservative analysis, amiiiwilrni uiulcrrMimniiitie. The Iru information wc had,ore we rrmtintnteil; Ihenfnrm.iiin:ihad, Mir nM<ce He mwmlimalrd. Wr hedged against uRerriainty, but felt const rained In- evidence. This is not to say we would have been heller offless Informal ion. What It dors tay is ihni we should ituanl aiMinsi thiso ovcrcsliiiuilc in tlw .iliv-trr of lurd utaVtl.in iinrlrrcsiinuitr in ill pretence. Anotherwhich we vrrmll prey is lhe nne in which WohUtctier refer* in his .irinlr.vlurihr intrinsic, uueeriainiy of jtrrdlrtlnt- the tfrcnnd mUiureleployinent program, hcrausc dreisiunsonr mix sail be reserve! between the lime of our prediction and lhe lime of ariual deployment.or.example,rrstimatrdvirrtH*ih of Soviet firj'tcr forces for ihe early Simies. Iiul lliiv rrsultetl mainly from Klirmtn hev's unanticipated decision in lite Jnterini lu cm barl Sos inpurpose lort e* in favor of missiles.
Indeed, ourg*inhave an imparl un force-level derisions, in Iwihnd the I'SSK. lhe infamousip" gave siromt impetus to CS. siraircV Keapon programs,i-mm iurlirrsily io kltrush)ut itr.ilrxuinto CuIm Soviri embarrassment in Cuba inave im|tnus lu llic I'NSK's strategic weapon proj;rams. The rnsuim; uhdi'rest ii nines of the vtimth in Soviel ICBM force* resulted at least portly from our failureake lull mcnunt of this artion-rraeiion phenomenon Tlw full effect ofintcrauwHi*npredkiaMe, however, a* to make ci>mplcie aecouniini' diflnnh if no|in
In tlte sulmi.irine forceunlilfvrrm prohlem: minor-irn.iv; inIrndrnty InAnwrii.masinrjrn Inure likely SovietU. In iheearlv Sixties, we estimated (without any direct evidenre) di.it tlw USSR would follow- ther.id andililc force of ballistic missile suhmarines. What wc did not recm;iiirehe lime washc Sovieiseeil for more cruise missileu defend ihcitisrlvct againsl L'-S. aircrafttliat lhewere havinv rlifTnutiv rk'vctnpiiiij ,in aocpMhlci H niivsile lul>marinc s> strut llic tesult was lhat full-seiile prnduetiun of modem *Milli*ik' missile Mihiiuriiics did not tian in ihr I'SSK uniil ihr mid-Sis lies, whkh put our esiimaies of ihr early Sixties way over theould like to think lhat Ihr laMf ami curieei livr-yrnr rslimaiesrnm mv ii.iM.ii' wiitieu Ihrui. hut in renlity ihey lesiilfed merely from sti.iiv.lu line pruintions of identifiable imxtuiiinn up to the "inirnir-imased" and mm deiitutistrably tow rsilui.ur of ,t% many Ml nn-liru ImIIisIic mistilrnture wr then bvlimnl in lie ihe ulimui;'
Tbf list of ipiauiii.itivelu-n.omiUm* Mri si.iHisidrritic the iuiiiiIht ilih*nuth*ihr limiinl unMinnt of Mifnrniaiinti avalliiMe in us rti ihc lime ihey were made- oi leau in ihe early part of
rAitilaty Eifimorei
arms treaty will be ihosc watchariety of more will Ik* permitted thank
tc pcriml. 'Mil- ftiiurf ii' ittrt lively In In* any Ix-iglitrr. Wc will innwauling foi >plmiicalfdolkrikm Iml diffirull-to-oWrvc qualitative nprovrntcttts in thei* already deployed will be as important lo ui in ihc future as changes In (be observable number ofwhitlcs have been in the past.
envirjinmem. vAhcic moil of ihe developments prohibitedlch are relatively easy to monitor, we will not only have to the agreement* thrtmclvc* but will liavc lo iry lo follow the
-li>-ti!nrrvrll Soviet wra|KHt systems which
which are likelyroliferate under such at-rccmcms More
intelligence will lie in utwerve ihcai ihc
.1
Savins become more! cognisant of our intelligence sources and meihods. more things are likely to become less observable. j
mm
b
lit -:
ii
SE<
Attachment B
Topic B
Specific Charges that there were Major chanqas In9 Estimates (Ccoiparied to8 Estimates! in Force Residuals and inractionation,and Reliability
! . , t,
i. 'ill
-
-'M
7n
9
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT! Comments onKenneth L. Adelman, Foreign Policy,
1* Ellsworth and Adelman assert that the intelligence community7 did not Imagine the scope of Soviet improvements in fractionation, accuracy or reliability of ICBMs and SLBMa. As evidence they present on page two of their article two charts from the DoD annual reports for
ndhe charts show the relative
i .
capability of Soviet and US forces toiven sot of targetsoviet surprise attack and US retaliation. The charts indicate that the intelligence8 estimate of Soviet capability in thes substantially greater than was estimated in
Comparison78 Estimates A. Deployment of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMsi
2. Trends in Soviot capability as shown on these charts primarily reflect the number of weapons which would not be usedoviet first strike and which would also
ubsequent US retaliatory attack. Under day-to-day
i
alert conditions this would be Soviet ZCBH RVs not used or not destroyed in the exchange and weapons carried on SSBNs
ii ii j
at sea. Our estimate of the number of online ICBM and SLBM RVs increraed in8 Estimate because we judged that the Soviets would initially deploy more MIRVed variants of their new ICBMs and fractionate their MIRVed SLBMs to higher 'iLvels and deploy them in greater numbers than we had previously believed. In particular, we projected8 that i
Soviets woulden RV variant of theeginningn7 Estimate we had
' 'In'1 ' i" i
projecteden RV large ICBM would not appear Moreover, we projected that MIRVed variantsndCBMs would replace single RV variantse had previously projected
i !r ill I
that some single RV variants would remain in the force
'l i '
hese judgments were based on evidence of
extensive Soviet
Soviets would deploy theithMIRVs
i I
rather than three and that they wouldewthe Typhoon with eight MIRVs rather thanof extensive Soviet flight
SECRET
I./ :': .
:Soviets would take full advantage of the subceiling:on MIRVed launchers,and eventuallyMIRVed SLBMs onII and on all newInEstimate we projected thatwouldix of MIRVed and single RVThe Soviets have demonstrated their interesti HlRVed systems with the development of the seven Moreover, their requirements for highRV SLBMs could be accommodated throughof the'nd The rapid growth in.Soviet online RVs whichcommunity identified in8 Estimatewith7
ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers and the,total force. Ourf earlier deployment of MIRVed ICBMs and higher
i I
fractionation of SLBMs result in an overall increase of some
i ' [
Vs in the Soviet moderate SAL force during the
j )j ,
Vs in7 Estimate to
h: ! i
nstimate. The number of ICBM RVs increases
by aboutercentn7 Estimate
i ii : II |f! ;
SLBM force
RVs. By the end of the decade, however, both
itt- !
j ^estimates project!that the Soviets would deployumbers of MIRVed ICBMs. The difference between estimates of
i'S >
total forces is therefore substantially less during this
' f '
B. Improved ICBM Accuracy! jj M he decrease .tin US force capability during thes Indicated by both DoD charts reflects the growing vulnerability of us ICBMs to highly accurate Soviet icumhis decline! is more rapid in the chart from theeport because we estimated8 that new Soviet ICBMs would have better accuracy than we had projectedllsworth and Adelman comment that the intelligence community did not appreciate7 tbe extent of accuracy improvements in Sovietthe Soviets wouldercent improvement in, accuracy over their current generation of|
5. a estimated that future Sovietachieve substantial Improvements in accuracy, eters7 tometers in the late
. Extensive
flight tests
of MIRVed ICBMs with
caused us to revise our estimate and project that the Soviets would achieve these greater accuracies three to four years earlier. This judgment resulted in an ICBM force that was more accurate and had greater counterforce capability during the early andhan we had indicated in the
; * The further decline in US capability during theepicted in the chart from theeport is duelippage in the US Trident program.
stimate, 1
Average accuracy'bf moderate SAL MIRVed ICBMs from thebetter in the early and
!han theEstimate for the same period.
8 Estimate
remains within the- uppor [bound of our uncortainty which we described
C. Force Reliabilityi
I' < ''
6. Estimate of ovorall Soviet force
'reliability was unchanged from theeforci about 80
percent under normal day-to-day readiness and aboutercent under generated conditions. (We note, however, that
-these estimates will be revised upward foro
'
aboutndercent.).
Effect of Current Evidence on Projections
lid'll' 1
J . . The changes In Soviet force projections which are
Lcilted-in the Ellsworth:and Adelman article represent our
! '
response to evidence acquired during the period of - *'
Estimate. We are keenly aware that, injsome cases, major
I changes in the estimate must, restragile evidential base. He remain ready to alter our projections as new data Is gathered. He do not believe our estimates of moderate Soviet forces would be improved, as the article suggests, bygreater Soviet strategic capabilities. He try in
'| !
our moderate Soviet force projections to remain consistent with current evidence, and to explore.
tbe implications of greater potential
'i' ' Ui !1 i
Soviet threats by means of high force projections. In these
j iii* i
high forces we use deployment rates and IOC dates that
MM :
igh level[of Soviet effort and ascribe
o these forces that are at the more
.IU
threatening exti^Tee of our uncertainties. I| ; Ho continually rexamine the manner1 in which we
j'perform our strategic analysis and the impact which new
evidence may have on our force yrojections.
9
78
87
AFTERRETALIATION
i
i
POST ATTACK
POST ATTACK
1
(NDFISCU yea*
0. COUNTERFORCE RETALIATION Dir-to-Dir Alert
IECEN0
FORCES
FORCES
1
I
1 I t M I I I 1 I I I I
81O24ISwAL YEAR -
KEHORANDUM FOR: 9 Foreign Policy Article "Foolish Intelligence'
11. In the9 Issue of Foreign Policy, the authors of the article "Foolish Intelligence" citeailure on the part of the Intelligence Community the fact that our estimates of the rate of Backfire production had been too low. The reference comesaragraph which contrasts Intelligence estimates8hile we continually refine our estimate based on new Information, we have made no significant change In our projected rite of Backfire production.
: The reference may reflect the uncertainty that was introduced
ifnto ourl estimate8 by the acquisition of
Some ambiguous proouction information.
we elected
estimate but to await further evidence.
uncertainty was resolved Inith the acquisition
onal
continue to
3.
of additional
These data were in accord witn our estimate, inus we stimatp that the rate of Backfire productionbouter year.
iopy_
DERIVATIVE CL
TnniMnDA rAitMA
ents on article
I Intelligence by Robert F. Ellsworth and Kenneth L. Adelman in Foreign Policy9
Quotation froa articlei
i i 1K
. intelligence alsoross error by underestimating the overall Soviet military effort.6 the CIA suddenly and retroactively doubled the percentage of gross national product it figured the Soviets had been and
i' II
I t| : | i
wore devotingercent (only
r g 'I
slightly higher than. level) to betweenndercent (up to nearly three times. level).
Comment!
!
:he CIA published an estimate of Soviet ruble
M| ip | 1.
spending for defense which was about twice as high as the estimate made two years earlier. Also, the estimate of the ,share of GNP absorbed in the USSR by defense was revised to
toercent, approximately doublo the previous
II1!'
I) I >
iestimate.
The principal reason for the change was new information indicating that ruble prices of Soviet military hardware
Ml' ;! . 2
j! were substantially higher than had previously been thought.
1 A !
| The increase in the ruble estimate of total defense spending
i]|dkd| not change the! CIA's estimates of the physical size of
||Soviet military forces, Soviet military capabilities, or the
dollar cost of Soviet defense activities. Rather, the higher
ruble prices were Tan indication that Soviet defense industry
was less efficient in its use of resources than we had
1j
believed. hi j
Tbe higher estimate also suggested that thempact of Soviet defense activities and the committment of
oviet leaders to the military effort were greater than we
Hi:'P' '
jhad thought. Even-before the estimate was revised, however,
I I'l 1I 1' Ij1 . I ^
I we; had cautioned our consumers that the true economic burden
'
of Soviet military programs was substantially greater than
in. - i 'i I i ' iv.
jithat impliedimple calculation of the share of GNP
L I'l a ' I
Midevoted to
I I'll I
This explanation of the change in the ruble estimate
was provided along with the new estimate Itself in our
nclassified report oft was also briefed toEllsworth at the time.Ml
jfl = I "' :-
Quotation from articlei
-1L {'! j
uch tremors constitute an early warning signal of
II" ;'
! sliding American technological supremacy. For the Soviet
ii
Union is charging ahead both in terms of military production {it now spends three times as much as the United States on
I IiVj3
" V
strategic forces and one-third more on general purpose
forces) and in terms of military infrastructure, upon which
future arms programs are to be mounted (where it spends 80
i*.
'Mtjcent'Bore .than|jj^e'|Uf|ited States).:
* *
lthough the authors disparage the CIA estimates of Soviet defense costs, it is interesting to note that in thisthey are apparently using figures from our comparison of the dollar costs. and Soviet defense efforts. The references are made in such an imprecise way,
!
however, that we cannot easily comment on their correspondence with our published estimates.
ET
9
CIA's Study of Nort> Korean Ground Forcea During the Seventies
The authors err in charging that the Intelligence
! . I
Community overlooked North Korea's development of the
11 (ll' i
world's fifth largest army, but thoy*re right in claiming
that we underestimated the size of that country's infantry
il ' 1 :
jforce. That is, wo did in fact give warningorth
Korean buildup, but becausoombination of facte peculiar expense and difficulty of ground force order-of-battle analysis (especially in Northome false
or mis-read policy signals from Kim Il-sung, and an unfor-
'h 1
tunate over-emphasis on tho indications and warning
we failed to give timely notice of the full size of the
iL'l " j?
infantry portion of that buildup.
Research on ground force, order-of-battleurky and labor-intensive operation, compounded in the case of
North Korea by tha North Korean propensity for deploying
'II."* ' Ii * 1
8
divisions and brigadesragmentedin installations accommodating units no largerajor, integrated study is required to assess the full
ize oforce.
He madetudynd our aaBessraenta
to bo accurate. Thereafter, howover, tho North's declared goal of building up its guerrilla-type forces and
SECRET
pur .lack of olear-out evidence for tha expansion of ground 'force units made 'j us falsely complacent, despite the growth we observed in the North's naval, air, and air defense forces early injthe decade. Byowever, we noted significant Increases in ground force firepowor and mobility that prompted us to begin reevaluating the threat from the North and, alarmed by what we found, ve subsequently turned ,our attention to1 the indications and warning We
1
] became sufficiently disturbed by the changes in the North
I 'i ii^' il *
alert tho President and.other senior officials, and wo
reported in August
and again inMarch
hat wo bolioved that tho North
had achieved an across-the-board advantage in capabilities.
Despite indications of contlnuod growth in the armor
lend artillery forces, wa Btill had little direct ovidonce
I j i
lOf widespread expansion of the infantry. Tho special studies
r jj: ; | | ;
done within the Community in7 and M. I
North Korean armor and artillery, however, raised the die-Mi 1 '! !
: jjtinct possibility that the North had additional infantry to go along with its added tanks and guns. It was only whan theby the Army Inscominpring8 the massive study to reevaluate tho North's
-2-
I | .i
SECRET,
ground forces by exhaustive all-source analysis thatearned the true magnitude of North Korea's programs to ljimprove and expand its ground forces.
r
1" MM-
if.
-3-
* Attachment F
i * dp:;- 1
' ' Enclosed are:
Foolish Intelligence" by Robert Ellsworth and Kenneth L. Adelman, Foreign Policy,nd
b. Washington Post {UPI} Summary of the above.
FOREIGN 1'OLICY9
FOOLISH; 'INTELLIGENCE
by Robert F. Ellsworth and Kenntth L. Adelman
intelligence community should brace itselfew wave of cassation that widens its past sea of! woes. The looming .storm will arise from accusations that it inadequately warned the United States of Soviet military capabilities and technological breakthroughs duringnd. These inevitable accusations,from the center-right, will diffuse throughout the body politic and will focus on the competence of American intelligence analysis. For the Central Intelligence Agencyin the Operationshas catered foro America's foreign policy establishment view that the biggest game in town is at least collaboration andost condominium with Russia. Thisedrocess of discounting data thatray the Soviet Unionenuine threat rather thanotentialast hubris has brought onis. The CIA's (and militaryttempts at political assassinations, covert shenanigans, illegal spying on Americanand free-wheeling operations have reaped their reprisals. The now recedingoriginating from the center-leer, focused on these intelligence excesses.esult, the reins of the covert operators were pulled in. as the five-year-oldnd presidential Executive Otders scaled down the CIA's activities.
The limitations were perhaps, overdue, though tbe fanfare was overblown. The CIA was never as nefarious as strident critics con-
KOSERT F. FLtWVORTir. loemtt deputy inrttaiy ol c'/hrif. it inehthr at. tht Sthoot olnternational Siut'in ot TheJalirtOHCMAS'. lornrre auiiuni c.i7l. dtlrnte, iti -i'iititrtiit tt ihe S'letegieirrrr ol SRI Inttrnatio-xt.
. and few of its members indulged in offensive deportment. Even if every official invtstigKed for illegal practices were found guilty, the culprits would still add upiny percentage of all intelligence personnel. Executive and congressionalhave highlighted theheof the more significant.
President Carter aimed at the .ightperformance rather thanArmisticehen he firedandwritten memo to his top security advisers. It opened pungcntly.'m not satisfied with tbe qualityhe president wasdistraught by the crumbling of the shah's reign in Iran. He resented thatintelligence officers, long stationed in Tehran, bad failed to tell him what Gtneral Ludendorff told the kaiserrief visit with the Austrian army on the eve of World War I: "We are alliedorpse."
The much routrdfailure inwas dueassive failure ofSimilar human frailty ltd the British ambassidor in Berlin, two days before the onset of World War I. to report lhat war was out of the question. The syndrome alioed American Iradcrs on the ere of Pearl Harbor. Stalin at the outset of Oprration Barbarossanvasion ofand the Israelis immediately beforei Yon Kippurthree mostintelligence failures of recentur no such failure of imagination can account for staggering CIA error;,overn estimating Soviet forces and intentions i- sreate-ic weaponry and overall military effort. Beginning in, th? CIA embarkedonsistent Underestimation of the Soviet ICBMmissing tbe mark by wide mjrjins: its estimates became progressively worse, on the low side. In thehe fotelitgaKt community underestimated ihr srale and effectiveness of the Soviets' mulripl;targctablc reentry vehicle (MIHV)ven more imporranr. Soviet war-
head accuracies tbatjlhav* already beenthat haveeen estimated by Americanence to be unattainable by Moscowhe.
|. intelligence alsorror by underestimating the overall Soviet6 the CIA suddenly and retroactively doubled the percentage ofational product it figured the Soviet*een and were devotinget cent (onlyigher than. level) to betweennder cent (up to nearly three times.uch flawed CIA estimates helped form national security policy for the past] years. In thehe United States beganstrategic stall,bjuring new strategic initiatives. It was then that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara informed the public that "the Sovietsecided thatave lost thetraugic arms race and "are not seekingngage us in thatest the pointissed, he added, "There is nohat the Soviets are seeking totrategic nuclear force as large as ours.
'[ Ltgceu of Failures ".
T he same American errors inhe Soviet strategic build-up linger on. The JJatesc flaws can be gleaned simply byeries of charts measuring therelative strategic, capabilities. The charts published in the fiscal0 'J annual report byecretary of defense.whstveoCTpared to those of lasthow.i'worseains forecast of the strategic situationin tha. Instead of enjoying an edge owe the Soviets, as predicted only last.year, it now seems the Unittd States willubstantially inferior untilneur the scheduled expiration oft. This means the United States willegotiating SALT liteak position.
Thechange in estimates89 is not due to American revisions offorce posture. Rather, the changes in the
charts,s corrections underestimation of the drive and momentum of Soviet strategic improvements.. intelligence last year did not imagine the scope of recent Soviet improvements in frac-lionization or number of warheads peraccuracy (which gaveer cent improvement over the current generation of Soviet intercontinental ballisticnd overall force reliability (the percentage of times their missileshenlso, estimates of Soviet Backfire bomber production rates had been too low.
9 AFTER WS. RETALIATION
w
U.S. POET ATUCX
35
57
END HSCAlTfAfl .
SOVIET POST
. COUHTERFOaCE
*
- LEGEND
U
73
I I I f- I I I I I I I I I
SDO2433 EMO FISCAL YEAR *
; Tli? same problem has^igence at ihe regional level.arold Drown informed tbe Coiaebruary that the Soviets* "ability toheir fotees speedily into position for ann Europestimated jtoreater" than wasear ago. At about the same time, the intelligence com-munity found previous estimates oforea's military might palpably low. There- j; Uoti. thcand others suddenly had tooose their estimates of Pyongyang'sorces by someercent, even. estimates of the North's tanks hadjbeen increased by nearly one-third. Again,othing much had actually occurred on that jj jlTolatile peninsula; North Korea'shas beenteadyI.. intelligence failednpte that North Korea had amassed theargest ground army in the world.ajor conflict involving the Unitedbe more likely there than anywhere else. |jjThis string of recent intelligencen the low sideecutrentithin liberal circles that the Pentagonbe CIA are in cahoots to overestimateussians for their owndogical motivations. The fact that thef such failures reaches back overnd four presidents likewiseurrent notion within conservative circles that Jthe recent underestimates of Soviet power can j' be'ascribed solely to the Carterio'n's infatuation with arms control.
IjThe real source of the problem liesithin the bowels of the intelligenceitself. American intelligence haseen stultified by the dominationlique, j as suffered from in encrustation of j leadership as its directors over virtually all I of lits history have beenshared j: experience, psychological {inclination, andthe CIA's Operationsrate (which is responsible for"covert This link began: under;dnovan in the World War II Office of Strategic Services and was carried forward
by CA Director Allen Dulles, who came
of World War ll thrilled by his covert
tional successc in Swit7erland. His
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,
cording to former CIA official Kermit
vch, was "licking his chops" to rerun
dazzling eovert operation in Iran
had3 reinstalled the shah) in
cattered throughout the Third World.
t >'*
Firestorm of Criticiun
Thc Operations Directorate reigned su-prexe even after thc Dulles era: Two-thirds of the highest CIA executive positions were filled by officers whose careers hadn covert activities, and for years after the Dullescs departed, the covert side stillumed more than half the agencyhe clandestine clan planned and executed the reckless Bay of Pigs invasion whileintelligence analysts in the dark. President Kennedy was thus denied the opportunityetached evaluation of the scheme. Covert operations arc spectacular when they succeed but hideous when they do not; the Bay of Pigs did not. as intelligence analysts could have forecast had they beenhance. In another show of strength, the Directorate handled much of the CfA's liaison with State. Di-fense. andey agencies until th;. thus spreading irsperspective beyond CIA headquarters.
Stansfield Turner, the current' director of central intelligence,i:es:orm of criticism forn fact, he has simply zc-i relented the :ask begun under predecessorsJamn Schlesinger. Willian Colby, and George Bush to pare down ;he overstaffedbut powerful Operations Di..'ctdr3:e. The CIA is nor synonymous withOperations Directorate, though the Dir-vfans contend otherwise. Turner has taken care not to stack thc top with old clandestine hands. Just the opposite, in fatr. sine* he ic surrounded by individuals who. generally lack experienceional intelligenceor users.
Though Turner has trimmed Operation*'
i sails, he has yet tooost the capabilities of th: National
'Foreign Assessment i! Center, the agency's analysis side. In tlic past, it has focused far too much on current intelligence and has been contentack of professionalism on the part of country* and regional specialists. This became clear in thefter th:Security Council ordered theCIA to ad*
, deess an age-old topic: Yugoslavia after Tito. The report was more superficial than those
.written in German and Swiss daily news-papers. It tutncd out that the agency analysts
jwho wrote it averaged less than two years* experience with the country and had not tapped outside expertise.
Covert operations nreaoular when lliey succeed but hideous when tliey do not.
i Nor dors Turner have control over allof tbe Operations crew. Twofor instance, the leadership of thebranch of the CIA realized that itachieve from within tlic neededin breadth of expertise and perspectivearTairs. They sought roayaccess to the best minds in the nationin analyzing intelligence information.was developed to find and focusof people from academia.research groups, and others toagency and to be available as aselected agency analysts on V'l. - 1 !
But the effort was soon sabotaged by those inside the agency who stood to losethe Operations crew and their alumni within the administration, the inspectorate general, and current intelligence tcporting offices. They recognized that outside help, however well intentioned in trying to build up rather thandown th* intelligence capability, would weaken their hold by forcing other opinions to be considered or even incorpo-
hey figured, to nip ihehreat. So lliey objected to tl* outsiders'ess to classified material and chargedial fal>ifi;aiion of govcrnmrnt accountsloppy management of specifichose standing accused heard thennuendos but were not permitted to see the specific allegations.rotracted struggle ensued until those organizing tit: new initia-live were voir. down, and it wis abandoned.
Poor Pretoetctptions
Intelligence forecasts fot Iran were also victims of this infighting. At the closeongressional intelligence committeeutl briefing on the situation in lean. The CIA responded by sending itsitswho. of course, testified from their own limitedThey lacked tlie irruginition to seeassive, popular counterrevolution had been launched against the shah'srevolution. These covert officers had treasures within Iran, not only the shah on the Peacock Throne, but alto ihr now-famous listening posts on tbe Soviet border. These men swayed the entire intelligence community to report that tht shah'swere numerically insignificant and politically impotent.. ' he prominence ofd-daggeritionalistshadow beyondcountry ot regional reports. Theirffects strategic issues and can be relatedhe dangeroushemilitarysagtoup. these members of the CA have longto anoptimistic world new. First, theytimeH that smooth superpowerritical to America'sd welfare,hat ihe United States and th* Soviet Unktn are winding thrir wayodicumooperation, if norhey felttheir vocation twi to work out the rules of the gloSil game for the new era. Dedication ro this vocation led to projection of similar purposes upon the essentialSo- ictif that projection also led j
lo screening out data th.it clearly suggested other viuon of thefutrr*. If Second, tbey assumed that the Third World lads the wit and wherewithal toderisively the great game of world politics. Tfcey cherithed the developing worldlayground for covert operations, norartieipaat in world affairs worthy ofand sustained analysis. Thus, the OAhocking failure of3 when it explicitly discountedYom Ktppu war (although the head of the State Department's Bureau of "intelligence and Research wrote in3 that warWas highly likely there before the year'she Arab oQ embargo, and the oil pricejThton ists' preconceptionsidely shared among academics, journalists, and even government officials. Yet in Langley these precorKcpiions have screened outhat. if properly quested and digested, should hare prerented strategic intelligence failures. Such prrspaclivcs havechariorover the pastears and helped ease the Soviet Unionelatively more assertive role on the world stage. Thisisky trend, one that has increased theof superpower confrontation. Itbe fostered by Soviet cockiness over what Moscow? .perceives to be strategic and historic ^Jy-irnperatieesflowing as much.hissre-rness is from Soviet military prowess. ^Zr^rTroVfUniied Siatel desperately-needs to-.know jiot what the Soviets-have done-or art'dote j. but what they wilt beearscow. Most weapons systems take sorrWwhereretween two andears torarchanddtvrlop andifespan of five lT""toears-Thus, today's defenseust be bafd on estimatesarv.-tiw> adversary capabilities. Even ifarmseootroragreements hold down ori.si-capons-rncw effectively thannd ir. I e United Sutcs wilt nonetheless have to an-'I 'tj .iKtpawtiie^rtndi in weaponst. at lowed under their terms, jj odoso.thc traditionalmethods must yield to (Ik advanced
technique of signals intelligenceistorically, human espionage has reaped bountiful harvests for world powers,an image of might andEmpire betweennd the close ofineteenth century, and the United Statessveen World War II and the KennedyBut such luster has now dimmed. Besides, human espionage is of lim'.tdn trying tolosed,society like the Soviet Union. It can occasionally confirm data, but can rarelyreliable original information.
Anyxeeiciff the UnansuJeecbte
The deficiencies of human espionage must be compensated for by SICINT, which can best help the United States learn and predict what the Soviets are up to in terms of weaponsand development. Viis was potently demonstrated by the furor over the loss of two listening posts in northern Iran by which the United States learned the results of Soviet missile tests. Turner publicly bristled over their loss, particularly since the grcen-eyc-shadc types in thc OfTuc of Management and Budge: (omb) had made savage cuts lastin funds for SICtNT in favor of othrrintelligence accounts. Espionage received its
share, but'OMB lavished fundsoday's most'enchanting intelligenceequipment.
error was grave and was made all thcr'skifrbythe fact thatuperiority in weaponry Is swiftly fading.
S-agape last May. for in-
tar.rc. when the Sovietsowered submarine that steamsnots) and dives deeper (moreeet) than anything the United States has.
uchan early warning signal'of sliding. American'technological su-
* premacy. For the Soviet Union is charging ahead both in terms of military production (if' now' spen'Js three'times as much asnited States on strategic forces and one-third more on general purpose forces) and in terms of military infrastructure, upon which
; * '
uture arms programs ar* to bewhere it spends SO per cent more than theUnitedccording to the Defense! partmenr. tbe Soviet military is increasing its jjmirt of highly skilled: labor, even1 though
B
ore than half its research and development fcntists and engineers are already thought to j; 'be working on military projects. Theie im-j| pressiveefforu. marsbalirig increasingly scarce Ij roubles,ish to persist tn acquiring larger and more capable military forces. Such activities also propel the; Soviet society and economy into additional [militaty endeavors, thereby seeding arms-related institutions and [pawning military-oriented activitieser time,omentum of their own.
| Advanced signals and photographicare now able to monitor every major construction activity in the Soviet Union and virtually every major Soviet weapons test. The verification debate that is building up oyer the SALT II agreement will make many Americans realize. security depends as much upon sttategic intelligence as it does upon the sire and nature. offensive
E
iratcgic weapons. The Carter adminiitra-ibn will be explaining each of the provisions
SALT II in terms of specific American stra-
reconnaissanceut even strategic reconnaissance,lising as it now seems./annot provide the
answer. intelligence needs.liy. presidents have turned to their advisersanswer thesingular
erplexing problem or thettVf analysis of anyoodcow
wasextrcmein degree; though charteris:ic in kind, when commanding his advis-
ten aboard the Gtorgt Washinpton on-ay to Versailles: "Tell me what's right
n the vain hope ofresident J right tontelligence was cen- |
I'tralizcd by the National Security Acthe new intelligence system thereby became different from that of Britain,as at leasteparate Organizationsfor intelligence; France.-whuh has foue;
mi
and West Germany svith three. In contrast, th: American structure, headedirector -of central intelligenceaseritable array ofoperations, technological collection, military order-of-battle estimates, andand economiconeframework. This consolidationthe entire intelligence community to the same political and cultural pressures, andthe tendency of all elements to sway together with the mood of the moment. It hasype of "groupthink" whereressures for unanimity override individual mentalanalogous to what occursury room.
U.S. technological superiority in weaponry is swiftly fading.
This problem could be relieved7 act in order to promote fiercely independent, keenly competitive centers of intelligence collection and analysis. Carter's ExeeutivcO.-dcrofS, moved in quite the opposite direction.laid on the DCI were specified to include: acting as chief of the CIA itself; exercising full and exclusive authority for approving the CIA's budget.well as those '
of all intelligence units in the departments of
Defense. State. Treasury, and Energy,TBI and Drug Enforcementand shouldering responsibility forand value of all iniellig.-nceThe Carter Executive Order has alsodual roles to the CIA's ownAssessment Center and
The twonationalin terms of both budget and esti-mates, and operating chief of thej should be separated.ove, whichnly be made by Congress, wouldonsiderable confusion. Far moret would improve the caliber of reportingivorcing America's main intelligence chief I
from concerns for th* immediate agency and ill activities. Tlic new. liberated DCI tould coordinate all intelligence programs without special responsibility for any one segment. In caseonflict between theense ofintelligence needs and the desires of one agency, the presumption would be that the natioiial perspective would prevail.
Nonetheless, the new DCI should stay clear of the traditional sand trap and not try to coordinate intelligence estimates or analyses. Tbe president should be presented with the conflicting evidence and opposing views that well up from the newly dispersed intelligence network, and tbe DCI should avoidistinctive stamp on the product Themust grapple with alternativeof events and the risks and costs of adopting one policy view over another.
The Congress, meanwhile, wrestles vith the question of an overall charter forintelligence. If enacted,harter would giveet of responsibilities roughly commensurate with its traditional privileges of ex post facto criticism ofMore important, it would cloak the sundry components of theobe of congressional and even constitutional legitimacy they presently lack and. in this way. help redeem and justify the intclligcr:ce agencies to the public. If sagacious enough tblear separationtjtc head, of the CIA and the DCI. the charter wouldong way toward impror-;
"ing the quality. information oneignactivitiesand intentions.
'^ritiiVrrn* tc} reissue Shakespeare's "warn- !
ngs anti-portents of evilssas prescriptions to avoid trem. What the na-
- tion requires is national intelligence lhat it so
."tough; shrewd, jrrd ruthless that no trend orfashion will ever again screen data or warp perception. What is required is such realistic .and icily penetrating national int-lli^erKc
j that no degree ofthe pressor with acidemia'or with politicalwill force such blunders in the future. It it, a
'.'tall order.
Former Pentagon Officials Accuse CM. Of underestimating Soviet Arms Effort
Central Intelligence Agency In thehas. security by prosilySoviet military strength andaccording to two former Defensej !
The CIA's biggest mistake during that timeestimating the Sovlrt Union's nuclearand Its overall military effort Robertand Kenneth L. Adelman said la theof Foreign Policy ;
JnjaddlUon, the CIA "assumed the Third World lacks the wit and wherewithal to Influencejib* great game of worldhusthe Yarn Klppurthe Arab oiland oil price bike, and the revolution against the shah of Iran, Ellsworth and Adelman said.
ormer deputy secretary ofnow at the School of AdvancedJohns Hopkins University. Adelman,assistant to the secretary of defense.political scientist at the Strategicof Stanford Research Institute<
"Beginning In, the CIA embarkedoniisient underestimation of the Soviet ICBM
-buildup, missing the mark by wide margins; Its estimates became progressively worse, on the lowhe two said.
Also. Ellsworth and Adelman, Intellt gence failed te note that North Korea hffdhe fifth largest ground army in the world and the US. Navy was shocked In May when the Sovietsuclear-powered submarine "lhat steams faster and dives deeper than anything the United States
The two men said tha source of the problem lies within the CIA's OperaUoos Directorate, svhlehlhat "the United States and the Soviet Union are winding their wayodicum ofIf notn order to support this vision, they tout, the directorate screened out data that suggested otherwise.
The. Intelligence system hasmany responsibilities intoypo of "groupthlnk.-said. They sugjested that Congresstwo functions of lhe director, ol tbe CIA.between 'the operating chief andol national intelligence foe budjet and.
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