Sc^itb Korea: Sborl-Terni Political
The Rciuni to Normalcy Tbe maintenance of national security remains the top priority of the
holdover Cabinet aad Martial Law Command in charge in South Korea following Ihc assassinatioQ of President Park Chung Hcc onctober, but this actingaboul its handling of Ibe immediateis turning its attention increasingly to planning for the future. Its ability to do so has been aided by Washington's rapid reaffirmation of support for South Korea. Pyongyang's cautious response to the death of -Park, and the calm way in which (he public has actederiod of crisis |
Even though martial law remains in effect, the Army officer* responsible for maintaining order have lifted most of tbe restrictions imposed onctober. All of iheniversities are now back in session, and curfew restrictions have returned to normal. The National Assembly reconvened onovember lo take up the budget, the normal item of business al this time of year. The opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) Is now in attendance,olitical standoff that had begun in early October when all of its members submitted their resignations in protest of ihe government opelling Kim Yang-urn.'the party president, from Ibe assembly^ j
The acting government has also moved rapidly toense of political unity bylan for the orderly transfer of poweruccessor government and acknowledging popular demands for political liberalisation. Onovember, acting President Choc Kyu-ha announced that:
electoral college vote by ihc National Conference for Unification (NUC) willew president in accordance with currentlaw.
- The successor will not complcie Park's term, which extendsut will serve just long enough to oversee revision of the unpopular Yushia Constitution.
electionermanent successor will come after an amended constitution provides new rules for choosing Korea's head-of-slate, (u)
As long as be holds office as interim president, the carcuker successor will be operating under Ibe Yashin Contiiiution and will have at his disposal the full range of powers that the constitution gr.re|
Concessionscommitting itself to constitutional revision, ihc acting government
addressed popular demands for reform with symbolic acts of liberaliza-
tion. Il has already lifted the house arresi of former president Yunwho for many years has been ihe administration's most stridentprobably will lift the house arrest of former NDP president Kim Tae-chung nexl month. Acting President Choe has ordered Ihc Justice and Education Ministries to prepare for ihc early release or all political prisoners. The involvement of the Education Ministry in this reviewpecial effort to build bridges to the academic community by reinstating students who by virtue if past political activism had lost their places in the university
steps, however, have done little more thaneneralized commitmentiberalization. Theactlng government has not bound itselfeadline for constitutional revision, catalogued what features of the constitution might be changed, or designated the National Assembly as the primary actor in enacting legal change. After the interim President is selected in December, these issues will likely become the focus of heated |
Whether Korea scraps ihe Yushin Constitution2 or only amends it, the greatest pressure for change will fall on two elements of the document which had come to symbolize ihe authoritarian nature of the Park government. These are the clauses providing for:
election of tbe president by the NUC, an electoral college whose members are in effect appointed by the president, thereby premitting him to remain in office in perpetuity.
appointment of the Yuchonghoe (National Revitaliiationhich comprises one-third of ihe National Assembly membership.
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Reform without concessions on these points would beoken nod to liberalization and as such unacceptable to political and social groups agitating for change. Few in tbe government will regret doing away with the Yuchonghoe. Although civilian and military officials will have more mixed sentiments on direct presidential elections, here too they probably will bow to public opinion^ i
Aacting governmentde clear its micnlice. loide spectrvm
Tointerest groups tats ihe reform process, and il has already demonstrated
unusual sensitivity in seeking out public opinion. Constitutional revision could take up to two years, however, and more than expressions of good
intention* will be neededrevent opposition and dissident leaders u
t
the rovernmenl loo hard an* taking their case to the stree
If tbe NDP believes tbe eovernmenl commitment to liberalization tolhaa superficial, il should be willing to cooperate as long as it retainsin the reform process. Among the party'slhat Ihe Nalional Assembly be Ihe major forum tor
debating coniulutiooal revision and that ihe government consu^tadlb the NDP before making or announcing major political docisions^^
Il is already apparent from its response to the planned succession by Choc next month ibai the NDP, in order to maintain its orjpotilioo party eredcniiab, cannot be relied on at all critical stages to endorse toveramcnt _action*"f
prcrnmcnfin ihe NDP.|
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The iwoeovtrnmcnt DRP will bring pressuresomewhat differeni nature to bear on tbe reform process. Tbe party asd Kim Cbong-pil. tbe former Prime Minister who has just resumed the part> presidency, are preparingresidential bid under thenewconstiuitionr^
The new Cabinet that Choe will name once heinaugurated in December should not differ demonstrably in attitude from the Cabinet inherited frog
ilted in the near lutureVtbe Interim government will carefully solicit tbe view* of the mililary before it makes major political
k if moval of Park has dissipated some of tbe tension thai hadbuilt IrTrecenl months, but tbe political and eccewmc grievances that spurred tbe demonstrations in Pusan and Masan ia October have not
disappeared. No one In Korea doubli thai the students will return lo Ihe iliecls if llwir cupcclaliotii of rrfoim arc not subtianiially
On Ihe oiher hand, neither (he Cabinet headed by Choe nor ihe Martialunder General Chong is prepared lo allow liberalizationstability as the nation's top priority. There is little doubt thatsacrifice reform on Ihe altar of sccuritj^if dissidentto disrupt domestic
One group that has nol accepted the succession by Choc and Ihe acting government's planperate under the Yushin Constitution during the interim transition is thai of Korea's militant dissidents. Few in number, loosely organized, and al present lacking mass appeal,they have noncthclew
From the govern meal's perspective, the mitiiant dissidents pose two particular problems. First, they are tbe group most likely to provide the ideological inspiration for any sizable antigovcrnment movement on the campuses. Second, they have not proved in the past to be amenable to manipulation by tbe government, and there are no current indications of their being willing to meet Ihe government halfway^ I
NIJP can*3idateim came close to defeating! Korea's last direct presidential election, but out of parliameoUry politicse probacy no longer has sufficient support to claim the parly Icadershir
e interim government has so farood example, bending
when necessary and reestablishing channels of ccmmuiiicjlKwi with varied social and politicaloops. It has benefued in these early weeksre to heal old wounds, but the honeymoon could end when Choc moves from being an acting president loan interim one. If at lhat point the government fails toimetable for reform and to work wilh the ORP and NOP in maintaining the momentum of change, the limited appeal that Ihe milium dissidents now have could broaden into potentially destabilizing protest activity
The recent protest activity in Seoulangju indicates the willingness of (he hardline dissidents to attack the government even before it hashance to prove its commitment to reform. In arresting some of the protestors involved, meanwhile, the Marlial Law Command has displayed ils dciermij^Mojno^eiain^veto^over ihe types of political activity allowed.
Original document.
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