National Foreign Assessment Center
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: V)
Impact of Iranian and Afghan Events on South Asia
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Nntional Foreign ASSesStoenl Center
Impact of Iranian and Afghan Events on South Asi
Intelligence Assessment
Research for this report was completed
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Impact of Iranian and Afghan Events on South Asia!
KeySoviet inlervenuon in Afghanistan is the latestcries of events that
have caused deep concern in neighboring Souih Asiann combination, the initial Marxist coup in Afghanistan inhe establishment of Ayatullah Khomeini's fundamentalist Islamic state in Iran, and the overt movement of the Soviets into Afghanistan have brought about major changes in intergovernmental relations and heightened fears both of internal disturbances and of great-power intentions.
The coup in Kabul in8 was unwelcome throughout the region, altering, as it did. bilateral relations that had evolvederiod of years into well-established palicrns. Pakistan and Iran were notably disturbed, viewing the event as an expansion of Soviet influence into an area from which attempts at subverting tribesmen within their own countries mighl be launched. The Afghan coup led ton massive influx of refugees into Pakistanecision by Islamabad to provide some military assistance lo the Afghan insurgents. The Shah's hostility toward ihe Marxists in Kabul has been surpassed by lhal of Khomeini, who views the sirugglc in Afghanistan as between Islam and the "atheists."
The installation of an Islamic republic in Iran has had an effect throughout South Asia. Khomeini's influence extends far beyond the minority Shiile communities, and his controversy with Washington has found general support from both Muslims and others in an area where latent ami-Americanism has been growing for some time. Although the occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran has been criticized privately by most senior officials throughout South Asia, there have been no strong public statements of condemnation. This reluctance to comment publicly is based on both political and economic factors,esire nol to intervene in support of the United Slates when it is in confrontationhird World nation.
The recent coup in Kabul and the Soviet invasion haveevere shock in all neighboring states. The initial reaction from Iran has been hostile and may presage an increase in aid to the Afghan insurgents. Pakistan, with Soviet troops moving upts border for the first time, finds itselfarticularly vulnerable position. Islamabadcidc totrong anti-Sovietreaction has beenor purposes ol this report. "South Asia" includes Iran. Afghantstan. Paki>un. India. Bangladesh. Sri Lanka.and Nepal.
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could choose to seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Much will depend on the willingness of Pakistan's friends and allies to provide adequate assistance to confront the Soviets. India, meanwhile, finds itselfarticularly vexingto any direct great powerin South Asia, where India has aspiration ofegional power, but deeply concerned over possible new arms aid to its traditional foe, Pakistan.
For the United States, the chaos and the fear lhal have been generated in South Asia would appear to present only limited prospeeis for gaining new friends or allies. Our relations with Iran and Afghanistan are at their lowest ebb, while India is highly suspicious of new US assistance to Islamabad. Bangladesh and the small nations in the region are determined to avoid involvementotential great-power crisis. The Pakistanis, who recall past disappoint men is in relations with Washington, have yet lo make up ihcir minds.
Impact of Iranian and Afghan Events on South Asia
in Iran and Afghanistan over the pastonths haveignificant and crowing impact on relations among and between the various nattons of South Asra. The coup d'etat of8 thatartin government in Kabul set off shock waves throughout the region. The Islamic revolution in Iran that toppled Ihc Pahlavis increased concern in the area. The recent Soviet-backed coup in Afghanistan, combined with the arrival of Soviet combat troops in thai nation, has caused still greater anxiety over possible further instability in adjacent areas and an eventual great-power confrontaifon in the
Prior to the coup that ousted the essen'.iallyoi President Mohammad Daoud inrelations among states in Southairly stable pattern, althoughindications that fundamental changes might beoffing. Iran and Pakistan were closely allied inTreaty Organization. Afghanistan andwere in dispute over their common border, andregarded the Shahotentialto exert his influence over ihcir backwardnation. Pakistan and India hadat odds over Kashmirumber ofwith Islamabad continually fearful ofto establish both political and militaryover the subcontinent. More or less on thean enemy's enemyriend, the Indianscooperate with the authorities in Krbul. Theof SouthSri Lanka,not directly involved in theto the west of them, but all regardedneighbor. India, with undisguisedlhat New Delhi would seek to
Slight changes had begun to appear in these relations8 dawned. The Indian Government under Prime Minister Moraji Desaiorepolicy toward its neighbors, and despite occasional interruptions, ihe policy had begun lo pay off in terms of improved tics wiih Pakistan as well as with
Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. India's relations with the Soviel Union, which had been excellent while Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister, remained good but nol as close as before, while relations with ihe United States improved slightly. Iran, meanwhile, had set about improving relations withthe concern of Pakistan. Islamabad, which found itself at odds with the United States, moved closer to Chinn while cautiously examining improved relations withBoth Iran and Pakistan incrc-eingly found ihc Ceniral Treaty Organidation irrelevant and anto joining the nonaligned movement. There were also hints of foreign policy changes in Kabul in :hc weeks immediately preceding ihe coup, wiih Daoud appearing eager to improve relations with Tehran and work out some accommodation with Pakistan over the
The Marxist Coup in Afidianitlan
Installationarxist government in Kabulled to fears in Pakisian and Iran lhal the new government, with Soviet support, would rcignitc the border dispute with Pakistan and, also with Soviet help, might attempt to spur tribal dissatisfaction into Open insurgency in lhe provinces borderingIl is an article of faith in both nations that Moscow.operatingompliant gcvernmcnl in Kabul, iniends eventually to secure access to the Indian Ocean through Iranian and/or Pakistani Baluchistan. The Shah alio viewed (he coupuccessful Soviet penetration of an area of vital concern lo Iran. Officials in New Delhi viewed thepril coup in Kabul with less concern, bul were frank to admit ihcy were uneasy over the direct influence Moscow could now exert in Afghanistan. In Indian eyes, any action that tends to increaseinfluence or presence in the South Asian region is undesirable. Government leaders in Bangladesh. Nepal, and Sri Lankainrivatcly expressed anxiety over lhe changes in^
As months passed, ihe unstable situation in Afghani-Slan, whichvolved into open insurgency acainst the central government, caused addedin the various capitals, most directly in Islamabad, secondarily in Tehran. Thousands oftoday numbering more, fled across the border into Pakistan as the government in Kabul attempted to put down the tribal rebellion. Guerrilla leaders, based in Pakistan's Northwest Frontierorganized their forces and plotted campaigns against the Marxist regime in Kabul. Islamabad provided the refugees with food and other necessities and gave some logistic support to the insurgents.^
In Iran, the Shah's government prepared to grant assistance to the tribal guerrillas. The fall of the Shah and the installation of Ayatollah Khomeini's regime only intensified the criticism of Kabul and increased direct assistance to ihe Afghan insurgents. Khomeini, like ihe Afghan rebels, viewed the government in Kabul as atheistic and"tool" of the Russians. There is good evidence that Iranian religious leaders, if not the government, established refugee cl' -nps in which to train the Afghan insurgents and sent arms and supplies across ihe border. The recipients of this aid. however, were limited prhnari'y to ihe small Shine minority in Afghan
Khomeini's appeal, however, extends far beyond ihe Shiites. His success in establishing an Islamic republic and his denunciations of the regime in Kabul as "infidels" have received an enthusiastic response from Ihe Sunnt tribesmen fighting in various parts of Afghanistan!
Many students and the lower economic classes in the cuies. however, appear lo have been favorablywith Iran'sevival of interest in and dedication to traditional Islamic values (both Sunni and Shia) had been growing in both Pakistan and Bangladesh in recent years. In many instances this movement has increasingly combinedejection of Western social, economic, and
Khomeini's success in Iran has had its most direct impact on Pakistan. Since assuming direct powerilitary coup inresident Zia-ul-Haq has attempted toepublic based on Islamic principles. He has been moderately successful in introducing Islamic laws over both public and private life, but has been unsuccessful intable civilian government lo succeed hit martial law regime. He is believed lo have only limited popular support and remains in power largely al ibe tolerance of his fellow generals. He is notosition, in short, where bold initiatives in either domestic or foreign policies can be expected from tum.flflft
The sudden eruption of anti-American demonstrations in Pakistanielsewhere in South Asia- onovember followed Khomeini's charges lhat the United Slates was involved in the attack on the grand mosque in Mecca. Thisatent bulexplosive ami-Americanism lhat exists in many parts of South Asia and which Ihe Iranian leader has been able lo exploit. This reservoir of ill will toward the United States existed prior lo Khomeini, however, and rs based on accumulated frustrations, envy,ind of extreme nationalism lo which has now beeniolent form of religious fanattcisr
Victory
The victory of Khomeini in Iran, the subsequent reprisals against the Shah's followers, and attempts toew theocratic government in accordance with the doctrines ofShiile Islam stirred mixed feelings within Iran's eastern neighbors. Many members of the upper and middle classes and the Westernizedin Pakistan and Bangladesh viewed attempts toundamentalist Islamic slate wilh disdain.
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Subsidiary to ihe above but important is theissue lhat finds not only the Muslim governments and peoples of South Asia at odds with Washington, but is reflected as well in the statements of non-Muslim governments that sec thenited States-versus-Third-WorldGovernment propaganda has alsoole in the growth of anti-American feeling. In Pakistan, the government-controlled press has repeatedly and stridently denounced Washington's attitude toward Pakistan's nuclear aspirations, its request for debt rescheduling, and its pleasore liberal arms supply policy^^WW
The attack on ihc US Embassy in Islamabad may have been planned and initiated by Iranian and Palestinian students, but the mob was recruited in the streets of (slanubad and neighboring Rawalpindi. Khomeini's influence in Pakistan is considerable, and Zia, nottrong political position, would be most reluctant to cross him. This has become clear during the crisis following the occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran. At US request, Ziarivate appeal to Khomeini asking for release of the hostages. He has taken no further action, however, and the government press has become increasingly critical of recent US moves in the crisis
Indian officials have been privately critical of Khomeini and his followers since (he occupation of the US Embassy, but publicly have issuedrief and highly legalistic statement calling for compliance with international law and practice. There are several factors at work on the Indian Government that have caused New Delhi to be cautious in commenting on events in Iran. The present caretaker government will be replaced now that national elections have been completed Additionally. India's Muslim minority of someillion, while traditionally apatheticand overwhelmingly Sunni in composition, may be receptive to the propaganda emanating from Iranian religious leaders. Moreover, India hasitizens resident in Iran, hopes for continuation of Iranian participation in Indian development plans, and relics on Iran for significant quantities ofFinally, India's traditional aversionhe introduction of superpower military force in the region makes officials in New Delht critical of both lhe
deployment of US naval vessels to the arcaand
warnings of possible US military action. (
i he other nations ir. there less directly affected by recent events in Iran. Bangladesh is overwhelmingly Muslim, mostly Sunni. and its officials have been critical of Khomeini in private but silent in public. Unlike Pakistan, however. Bangladesh appeared ready to handle any violence against US facilities in late November. The demonstrations in Bangladesh were far smaller than (hose in Pakistan, however, and thus more easily controlled. Bangladesh,ember of the Security Council, has not been particularly helpful to US efforts at the UN to gain the release of the hostages.1
The small Hindu kingdom of Nepal, withandful of Muslims in the population, has, like its neighbors, been privately supportive of the US position on the hoslagcs. but has made no public statement on (he issue The youth organization of (lie opposition Nepali Congress Parly, however, has issued one of lhe strongest condemnations of the Iranian students' actionome cut of South Asia. The government of the largely Buddhist island republic of Sri Lanka has also been privately critical of Iran on the hostage issue. Two (rips by lhe Foreignuslim, lo Tehran, oslensibly to gain release of (he hostages, have been unproductive and appear lo have beenission lo enhance the Foreign Minister's prestigeerious effort toolution lo the problem.
Soviet Intervention
The recent direct Soviel intervention in Afghanistan has shocked the other nations of the region. Statements by leading Iranian officials denouncing lhe Soviet invasion as an attack on Muslims everywhere probablyrelude to sieppcd-up assistance lo lhe Afghanajor Soviet presence in Afghanistan is viewed wiih particular concern due lo Iran's own problems with its minorities. The Soviet Union borders on or is close to the areas where potential separatistKurds, Arerbaijanis. andlive. With the arrival of Soviel troops and officials in Afghanistan. Moscow will have easy access io yet another dissatisfiedBaluchis Khomeini, despite his opposition lo the latest Soviet move, has been able to lie it inio his overriding anii< Americanism by accusing lhe two great powers of colluding in the Soviet invasion as another part of the lamer "superpower plot" against (he world's Muslims.
Pakistan is most directly affected by the Soviet invasion, as the move could, for the firsl (ime. bring Soviel troops to ihe borders of Pakistan. Like ihe Iranians, the Pakistanis will fear Soviet-inspiredal subverting the tribes along (he border withthe frequently discontemed Baluchis of Pakistan, some of whom have been involvedmoldering insurrection against lhe central government since (he creation of the nation in
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Another fear that undoubtedly has surfaced in Islamabad is the recurrent visiongndian axis bent on the partition of prcscnt-dey Pakistan. This concern will be given further impetus now that Indira Gandhi has been returned toia's position within Pakistan may have beenstrengthened by Soviet intervention, as the otherfacederious new crisis, will tend to rally around theleast temporarily
Surrounded by new and dangerous circumstances, the Pakistanis would appear to have twocan seek assurances and assistance from their allies or they can attempt to reach an accommodation with Moscow. While the government in Islamabad has been pleased by strong statements of support from Washington, it has remained cautious of becoming too closelywith US foreign policy in the area until satisfied that significant military assistance will bewithout strings attacheduch vital issues as the Pakistan nuclear program. Zia recognizes lhal he probably has some time to examine US intentions, as the new government in Kabul can be expected to seek good relations with Islamabad at least until it has established control throughout Afghanistan. Rapidly improving tics with the United Slates could cause complications in Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union, Afghanistan. India, and possibly Iran. The Pakistanis presumably will seek reassurances and increased aid from their other great power ally. China.
e two allies of Pakistan fail to reassurethey can and will protect Pakislan againstthreal, Zia or his successors could seekwith Moscow. This option hasin the past byredecessors andto be an attractive alternative tohopelessly wedged between anby massiveSoviel combat forces and an
One of ihe immediate problems facing ihe govcrnmeni in Islamabad is how to deal with the Afghan insurgents in lighl of the changed situation in Kabul. Soviet officials have picviously been highly critical of
catling i
stan's support to the guerrillas and have sought to have the assistance terminated. With combat troops now operating closehe Pakistani border. Moscow would appear to have the means to apply increased pressure for compliance with its demand. The Pakistaniin regard to future aid io the rebels will dependonsiderable cxlcnt on Islamabad's rcadytft of the support it is likely to get from its allies.'
The Soviet invasion has caused an ambivalent reaction in India where the acting Prime Minister expressed his "deep concern" at the news, bul coupled this with an expression of "grave concern" over possible new US arms deliveries to Pakistan. The next prime minister. Indira Gandhi, has been even less critical of the Soviet action. No senior Indian leader has ever condoned great power involvement in South Asia, however, and the presence of Soviet troops along ihe Pakbiani border will give little satisfaction io the Indian Government. Moscow will be blamed, at leastforituation in which Pakistan may be given new military assistance by iu allies. The Indian press has already started warning thai new US military aid lo Pakistan will fuel an arms race on ihe
Conclusion
By the endwo of the nations of South Asia. Iran and Afghanistan, were in ferment, abecoming more deeply involved, and all the rest were increasingly concerned about ihe sudden and dramatic changes thai were taking place within ihe region. Two revolutions arc taking place in an area of extreme poverty, population pressures, andbilateral disputes. Khomeini's callesurgent Muslim fundamentalism and increased Islamicpower has had dramatic impact in those stales with sizable MuslimPakistan, Bangladesh, and India. Al the same lime. Ihe new leaders of Afghanistan are attempting to recast traditional society and politics in lhat nation. The Afghans seek to eradicate feudalism and ioarxist stale closely lied to the Soviet Union J
Pressures from both revolutions have been fell throughout the area, further complicating an already unstable political environment. Because of the(hat Khomeini wields among the Muslimof Pakistan and Bangladesh, the leaders of those two countries would be under intense domesticto give at least lipservice to any future call by the Iranian leaderoly war against cither the United States or the Soviet Union. The problem is somewhat different in the case of India. Muslim resurgence in nations around India could inflame communal passions in that country and lead to increased support for militant Hinduobvious danger
The most serious danger to South Asia from ihe Afghan situation stems not from the export of the Marxist revolution itself, but from the presence of Soviet combat troops and the intentions of the Soviet Government toward Afghanistan's neighbors.and Iran. Although all of the governments in Ihe region deplore, -it least privately, the arrival of Soviet tnops in their area, there will not necessarily be an increase in receptivityreater role for the United Stales. Pakistan presumably will want to buy arms from the United Slates, bul probably will not enterew defense arrangement or agree to any widespread open cooperation with the United Slates at the expense of the Soviet UnionJJ
The universal concern lhat was aroused throughout the region by the hint of the use of US military force against Iran over the hostage Lsue is indicative of the determination to keep both superpowers out of the area, thereby reducing the chancesonfrontation between them. To many leaders in South Asia, the most unfortunate aspect of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the return ofdirect great-powerin tbe affairs of the region. This is viewedetrograde step that is both feared and resented, particularly by India whicMiasregional powerof its own inr.i| ^
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