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Soviet Military Theory: Structure and Significance
A Research Paper
Soviet Military Theory: Structure and Significance
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paper describes ho* members of the Sovici parly and military
establishments formulaic what the Soviets consider the two components of militarydoctrine and military science. It includes an examination of the political context in which military theory is formulated and the conceptual structure the Soviets have developed to classify it. It also highlights the importance the Soviets assign to testing the resulting theoretical propositions and how this testing is accomplished.
Military theory is discussed in publications written by Soviet military officers. These writings discuss tactical and operational questions and provide guidance to the armed forces. The Soviet political leaders,apparently have the final word on militaryavoided public identification with any of these discussions at thelevel. This leaves open the question of how these guidelines would be implemented in (he eventrisis. *
On the other hand, recent evidence clearly indicates that Soviet military doctrine is reviewed periodically and updated as necessary to provide the justification for military policies and programs. It is important, therefore, that doctrine be viewed wilh an understanding of the political and military context in which it was formulated.
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Soviet Military Theory: Structure and Significance
writings on mililaryihosc on military doc-
three principal purposes:
They provide the moral and political justification forarge, well-equipped combat-ready defense establishment.
They provide operational guidance to the armed forces.
They serve as an officially approved rationale for Soviet military policies and programs, including the defense portion of the Five-Year Economic Plan ' t
In addition, unclassified military publications are probably designed to influence foreign audiences, particularly those assessing Soviet defense posture.
The political leadership appears to have the final word oh military doctrine and the capability to exert political control over the entire process. The current leadership, nevertheless, has avoided publicly identifying itself with any but the most commonplace doctrinal propositions
The role of Communist Parly bodies such as congresses in the creation of military doctrine appears to be highly exaggerated in the Soviet press. Although military issues may be discussed in parly sessions, iley are held mainly to ratify and disseminate decisions previously made by Soviet leaders. The Defense Council probably is the forum in which doctrinal issues arc decided, subject to ratification by the Politburo
The professional military, directed by the General Staff, develops the purely mililary aspects of Soviet doctrine and evaluates theories through centrally controlled exercises. Research results are broadly distributed bi-forc conclusions are adopted for general use in the armed forces
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Soviet Military Theory: Structure and Significance
Political Basis ot Doctrine
Soviet! define military doctrine as "the Marxisi-Leninist-bssed view accepted by the government on the nature of war. (he use of armed forces in conflict, and the preparationsountry and its armed forces forhus, Soviet military doctrine contains both political and military-technological aspects, with po-litkal coemdenuons paramount. The SovieUlassical expression ot the relationship Its-ecu these two aspects of doctrine in the Ctausewit/ian dictum that war is the continuation of politics. Accordingin, the "Marxists have always considered this axiom as the theoretical foundation for the meaning of every war."
Recent evidence strongly suggests that mililaryserves to rationalize the defense effort in terms of the threat, the probable natureuture war, the role of the armed forces, and the preparation of the country for war. This evidcoce has strengthened ourthat what appears publicly as "military doctrine" is based on sensitive documents which are periodically revised
Selected portions of doctrine appear in Soviet military and political literature. These writings are notto provide information on subjects such as defense appropriations, the rationale for certain weapon systems, or the deployment of military forces. Rather, the party intends to demonstrate lo the armed forces and citizenry ihc legitimacy ofarge, well-equipped defense establishment. Theselling in which (he doctrineocied to be operative is defined in terms ofcniniM principles, wilh the ultimateic triumph of the socialist over the capitalist system J
on military superiority and nuclear first-strike capability, would appear soon and contributerational discussion of SALT II in the Unitedhrough this and similar literature the Soviets have tried to convince foreign audiences, particularly those concerned with defense analyses, of the political support behind and the intellectual soundness of Soviet defense policies.
Military-Technological Basis of Doclrlne Structurt
Military science Ls defined by the Sovietsystematic study of Ihc laws and nature of armed struggle, as well as the military preparations by the couniry and the armed forces for war. The Sonets divide military science into different categories. The most important is military art, which is concerned withar ii fought
Military art is divided into;
which entails planning the conduct of war. training the armed forces, and providing support for
* combat operations.
Operational an. which Hconcerncd with theconduci of operations by large groups of forces
Tactics, which involves ihe preparation for and conductailie.
The Soviets rank components of military ad in terms Of their importance to doctrine Strategy is considered most significant, and operational art ranki above
tactics-
Soviet political leaders also recognize thatcan be influenced bynfor exam-
ple, were recently informed by Soviet senior polilical-military analystsew and authoritative book on Soviet military strategy, which included Soviet views
.SeeTfl
art. which is the connecting link bdwccn iiraiegy and tactics, became an accented pan of Soviel mililary thought in (hefter experience during Worldemonstrated tbat dividing military art into strategy and tactics alone was inadequate. Soviet theoristsewbecause they anticipated thatuture war involving the USSR, the geographic length of the front would be longer and the number of Soviet troops engaged would be larger than for any other country. Tactic* could be applied to the battlefield activities of oorpt-titc and smaller units. The term "operational an" was chosen for the army and froet echelons even though it was recognized that the term would be confuting became of the frequent use of the word "operational" in the military lexicon
r Conical of Military Science
Although all Soviet theorists agree that mililary art is the moat important component of military science, they often disagree over whether such categories as history, geography, administration, and technology should be included in mililary ait. This dialogue is evident in recent editions of Mililaryot example, in an6 article. Lt. Gen. M. A. Gareyev. chief of the Mililary Science Directorate of the General Siaff. divtded military science into general theory, military art. organi2ational development, training and indoctrinaiion. and military economics GareyeVi cUasincatioa system wascvrticles which appeared in the7 edition of the same publication. Some authors disagreed with his categorization as well as his decision to exclude military historyategory. One write* argued thai ihc hisiory of military art provided ihe nucleus of military science
The significance of these discussions is that they may indicate deeper bureaucratic disputes within the Soviet defense establishment. In his decision noinclude military historyeparate component of mililary science, Gareyev may have been warning Ihe military Ihal ihey were giving too much attention to past experiences- specifically World Wartheof doctrine
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nclusion of military economicsompo ncnt appeared to be more controversial than his exclusion of military history. He included il because of the "increased significance of mttitaiy economics in the area of support of armede wrote that military economics is the study of demands made on the economy for preparing and conduciing war as well as the effective allocation of resources among the aimed forces.
Ihe theory of military economics and how it relates to military science has been discussed in several Mililary Thought articles. One writer argued tbat since civilian specialist* "do not consider it their duly to investigate general milliary-economiche training of military economists should be improved and their number* at military academies increased. Others wrote, however, that military economics should not be directly related to military science. The debate may indicatehere is discussion within the bureaucracy concerning the allocation of resources toertain officers may be hoping lo cspund the military role in the economic planning process;here arc probably some who have atlcmpicd to defend or upgrade the status of professional economists in the military. Since we have notefinitive articleilitary journal on ihe status of military economicsomponent of military science, we assume the debate has not been closed
r'ofMtatic* of Military Theory
PolilitalMiliiary Rtlaiioms The Soviets claim that the level toation develop* mililary theoryajor factor in determin-ing it* combat effectiveness. They hive devoted considerable resources and attention toighly structured classification of militaryan effort that differs from the more ad hoc UShis elaborate structure offers insight* into the process that is used to develop Soviet mililury doctrine and science
'Such Icrnuat BJilonalsecurity. imMary docUinc. and nuliliryoc HO precise, official definition) in the United Sutu andused iiHercnjneeablyl >oi dorn-aatrd by ibe to Wary Other US to-eminent it itencwi. the academic ccanmuaity. research MiMair*.domoiic preuur* *toapj are adncty umhed ia ihe (Hur of delm
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appears to be an understanding between the political leaders and the military about how these two groups should interact when shaping the content of military theory. The party leaders have the final word on doctrine and can exert political control over the entire process. Although the military claims primacy in the formulation of military science, militaryis conducted under the watchful eyes of officers of the Main Political Directorate (MPD) of the Soviet Army andhus, accordingecent Soviet publication, "military doctrine it developed by the political leadership of the country with theof the highest military organs."
Mililary Docirinr
Party Authority: Myth and Reality. Soviet military writers invariably indicate that militaryormulated on the basis of Communist Party directives. For example, theierr's Handbook states that:
All questions of the defense of the socialist fatherland, of military development, of military theory and practice, today as in the put. are decided in precise conformity with the ideology and policy of the party, on the basis of the directives and instructions formulated in the resolutions of congresses, ol plenums of the Central Committee, and of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Although Soviet wi iters repeat the official claim that the Central Committee and the paity congiessesajor responsibility in the policymaking process, ibis exaggerates the role of the political party forums Party congresses arc too large and unmanageable to effectively debate and decide defense matters. Whereas military issues may be discussed at these sessions, it appears that they are held primarily to ratify and dissemin-'c decisions previously made by the Soviet leaders
' The MM) ii ftar-nt-Mt lo. thepun* ot (be collet SoriM military eaUbtiihtacnl la addition lo nam "ho htccbmilenil for tecum yevery mifor rrdiury publication luffodilitary officer whtoco controlralher lhaa lockillcnae mriicnoo technical (round*
As the ultimate decisionmaking body in the Soviet Union, the Politburo makes the final decisions on Soviet military doctrine. Centralization and control are key characteristics of the Soviet decisionmaking process, and Ihe formulation of doctrine is no exception
The Defense Council appears to be the single most important body in Ihc USSR dealing exclusively with mililaryhaired by the General Secretary, it is composed of top mililary and political leaders. Major decisions concerning the formulation of Soviet military doctrine probably are discussed and approved in the Defense Council, with the Politburo usually accepting proposals made by the Council. Among its most imporlanl functions are presumed to be Cheapproval, and supervision of five-year defense plans.
Role of Political leaders. We do not know how extensively Soviet political leaders become involved in Ihe actual formation of military dektrine. Although the party leaders provide guidelines through decrees and instructions issued in the name of Ihc Central(be directives cited in Soviet military literature available to us seem vague. For example, mililary officers are told to "increase ihc combat readiness" of the armed forces and "to raise the level of mililary scienceor certain military projects itimportant, however, ihe Politburo is likely to 'give specific, classified directives. In any case, the current leaders, principally General Secretaryhave avoided being publicly identified with the details of mililary doctrine
In the past, party leaders were more openly associated with particular developments in Soviet militaryWhen Statin was alive, Soviet doctrine was based on his "permanently operatingof theorale of the army, quantity and quality of divisions, army weaponry, and organizational and leadership qualities of the command. Soviet military writers were restricted in their consideration of such
f1invito- wait* ikil UK Defray Coastal Hby ihe rvtuwan of the Supremelt*oeJy (wbttdy ideaiifrcd member a! ihe Or feme Coaacii a
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rear area K> ptoride the final -ilh Infnlic Mppurt ,
key doctrinal issues as (he impact of nuclear weapons in war. In every article Ihey were com pel led to frame the disenssion in Stalinist terms. This tight crip ever the process of formulating doctrine was criticized by the military after Stalin's death and was described asegative impact on military thinking.
When Khrushchev was First Secretary, he apparently attempted to identify himself with tbe planning of Soviet military strategy and force structure. During his famous speech to the Supreme Soviet ine declared that nuclear weapons would be decisiveuture war and that conventional forces were becoming obsolete. Khrushchev claimed he discussed his proposal with the General Staff, but his decision to downgrade tbe role of conventional forces met with direct resistance from conservative elements of Ihe Soviet military establishment. Although the military deferred lo Khrushchev's authority as party leader, after his departure4 it was openly critical of his involvement in the formulation of doctrine and strategy
Tbe Soviet political leadership has changed its style under Brezhnev. Although Brezhnev has commented on defense-reiated topics- expressing Soviet support for arms control and detente, warning anyof the consequencesuclear attack, and questioning ihe political utility of nuclearand other top political leaders have slopped short of direct comment on Soviet mililary doctrine .
The decision by Brezhnev and other political leaders not to be publicly identified with substantive military issues has advantages for the Soviets. Their refusal to be openly commitlcd to any one particular course of action allows them greater flexibility duringcrises and increases the uncertainly in the West concerning how ihe Soviet leaders would respondrisis. ,
The Soviet pohlical leaden also may have determined that warlike statements have an undesirable impact on tbe West. They know that Khrushchev's "nussile-rattling" created apprehension among ihe NATO allies and helpedtimulate US missile production in tbe. Ihe top leaders may hivedecaded Western analysts arc less alarmed by doctrinalmenu made by the military, since the analysts
would assume that Soviet military leaders would be more bellicose in their statements than civilian rulers.
Mililary Seiemet
Key last ituiionv Although we know that military science provides the basis of Soviet doctrine and is the responsibility of the military, it is not clear how. and by whom, the military findings become accepted as inputs to Soviet doctrine. The Soviet military literature notes only that the core of doctrine is derived from mililary science judgments concerning the probable nature and conduct of armed conflict.*
The key organizations engaged in formulating military science arc the General Staff, the military academies, and the editorial staffs of the military journals. These organizations work directly with field commands (military districts, groups of forces, andhey are responsible for analysis of military scienceas well as for publishing their findings
The General Staff apparently orchestrates the process, with its Military Science Directorate playing the key rote in coordinating tbe inputs of tbe variousThe Directorate performs the managerialof developing and assigning military science research topics, defining the research and analysis performed by subordinate organizations, andthe dissemination of the final product
Tbe Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff, the main staffs of the services,e military academies propose research topics selected frommonographs, and disscitiirions to the Military Science Directorate. The officer* ol the Military Science Directorate also study und react lo topics imposed by Ihc Minister of Defense and, possibly, the Defense Council. The directorate then assigns research topics to the appropriate military districts, fleets, academies, and institutes'
' Arliclea and books oa Sonet mil.ui, toracc arcn> auiiuryanaraiartedcqarralcMa DWi mi bury aoeaor
are probably foraWated bv1 lima tevoakiu. altjuaua aaaawriuiive article*iliary unaofna Miacd by auliuiy
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Most frequently mentioned in military literature as being involved in these studies >re the Academy of the General Staff and the Frunze Academy. The faculties of these schools arc expected to study the assigned theoretical problems and to coordinate their efforts with the staffs of military districts and fleets. Soviet authors indicate that propositions arc tint tested with the use of computers, utilizing mathematical models and other techniques. Exercises' are then designed to evaluate proposals in the field.'
Value of Exercises. According to one military author, "to enrich theory with the accomplishments ofs the paramount methodological problem of Soviet militaryhe Soviets stress that doctrine relies on integrating theory with practice, rather than "speculative discussions" of military is-sues. This emphasis dates back to Marx, who strongly believed that an idea must move from the realm of pure thought into practice.
The Soviet effort to combine theory with practice appears to focus on military ex erases' These arc designed to evaluate the theoretical findings ofin military academies and major staffs, verify existing operational plans, and test the latest military equipment and weapons. As expressed by one officer, "Exercises serve as the major criterion fordecisions pertaining to troop organisationaland new problems of military
Exercises are used to solve problems such as planning and implementing front offensive operations War games conducted at one major military academy
helped the officer* to explore problems associatedront offensiveuclear war and the degree of enemv desliuclion in particular operation!.
Besides testing new theories, exercises arc used lo check principles in field manualsand oiher instructions lo ensure that operational plans arc nol based on obsolete techniques L
'Soviet military eiei cue*buit fuaciiooi nnn mininginline military ictcncc piiacmlc. The etciciiciin ilil. pipeiihme dciicnctl to lew Iheereticil (inline
Exercises also contribute to development of new weapon systems. Soviet writings indicate that military science research is always coordinated with theof new combat equipment andpecific example was the use of exercises at one academy to improve the survivability of tanks in combat.'
Special Research Teams. Soviet military literature emphasizes the importance of good organization in preparing, conducting, and synthesizing the results of exercises. In preparing the exercise, the planners drawchedule, indicate their goals, and project the results and possible areas of their application. While the exercise is being conducted, the officer* are directed to collect data on their activities The final stage entails analysis of major findings
To fulfill these requirements, special research teams are formed to serve throughout the exercise These teams are selected from personnel of militaryparticularly the General Staff Academy and the Frunze Academy. They probably arc responsible for evaluating the specific problems and for synthesizing thepparently ihe accumulated data from ma ny exercises over several years are carefullyand analyzed in reports
Scientific Conferences. Reports on exercises arcat military science conferences. Militarymies sponsor these conferences in coordination with the headquarters of various military echelons from the army level up to the ministry level Their conferences bring together key personnel from the operational and administrative sides of the defense establishment. They appear structured along the themeeynote address, normally deliveredigh-ranking military officerhe Chief of the General Staff This address may be the primarv means for reviewing and analyzing icccnt exercises
According lo one author. "This keynote address or report should be based oa the results of the latest research on theories and practical operational combat training It should not be weighed down with well known statements from guideline documents, works on military theory, andfrom the military periodical press'
Mililary science conferences arc impoiUnl vehicles for disseminating (he results of the military exercises throughout the armed forces. The presentations arc given not only for the benefit of the representatives at the conference but are also published as ankles and books by mililary newspapers, journals, and publishing houses for circulation throughout the armed forces. The proceedings of the conferences arc then used as the basis for field manuals, military regulaiiom. teaching manuals, and other official documents
Once the results of theoretical research, exercises, and scientific conferences have been disseminated, ihey arc lo be adopted for use by the armed forces. In Ihe words of One military officer, "Without the promptof scientific research results to theand without their practical adoption, no investigation, however high iis theoretical level, can be considered complete, it loses its practical value and risks being an addition lo that fund of literature in the archives which is in no demandmplementing the findings of research projects becomes the final stage in integrating ihcory and practice in the formulation of Soviet mililary doctrine and science
Mililary science, the technological basis of doctrine, is developedysternatk and controlled manner by full-time mililary specialists, schooled in Iheoffering advanced degrees in rnilitary science. They arc required to master and contribute to the discussion of the importance of military art, hisiory, economics, and other categories of militaryimited amount of debate over the significance of these categories is allowed, indicating occasional tension within the defense bureaucracy.
The major goal of this sysicmalic approach is to provide the armed forcesound guide to action in the event of war. The guiding Marxist Leniniit principle is (he integration of theory and practice. This is accomplished through (be use of exercises which test hypothesis, operational plans, and rnilitary equipment and weapons
Conclusions
Many questions remain about the development of Soviet military doctrine and science We haveeneral Idea of ihe specific functions of the key institutions involved in the process, especially the interaclion between ihe Politburo, Defense Council, and General Staff. We know that there arc disputes tn the USSR over doctrinal nsues, but we lick clear evidence as to hcrw they arc resolved.
We believe Ihai the parly leaders, who conjidci themselves the guardians of (he ideological purity of the socialist movement, define military doctrine in terms of the Marxist-Leninist class struggle and that they have Ihe final word on the development of Soviet mililary doctrine.
Appendix A
iniiid
Soviet Mililary Theory
Influence
The Soviets attribute their lupcrpower status not only to ihc quantity and quality of ihcir weapons but alsouperior military doctrine based on tbe priricjplesof Marxism-leninism, tbe foundaiion of Communist ideology. As defined by Lenin. Ibe principal objective of Marxist theory was lo instill belief in the eventual victory o( socialism over capitalism This coal would be realized only through the constant review andof hypotheses in light of practical experience i
The influence ofitinitm is pervasive throughout Soviet military writings. All authors must pay their respects lo the works of Lenin and the dictims of Ihe party. Adherence to the established ideological goal of the triumph of socialismonstant theme in Soviet military literature. At the same lime, military research is conducted pragmatically, integrating theory and practice
Dialectical aad Historical Materialism
Marxist-Leninist ideology, which shapes the world outlook of Soviet military and political leaders, is based on dialectical and historical materialism. Dialectical materialism holds that nature istale ofmovement and change. Lenin believed that the core of the dialectic was the "unity ofeaning that the basis of all development is the divisionnit into opposing elements and the clash between them. Historical materialism is the dialectic applied to social conditions, describing the conflict between capitalism and socialism Concerningpolitics, historical materialism presumesviolence, and the inevitable destruction of capitalism. Although accommodation withstates" could be justifiedemporary basis, Lenin argued that ultimately the capitalist system could be overthrown only by violent means
The nuclear age. however, lias made the use of force as advocated by Lenin less attractiveolicy option: controversy in the USSR regarding the dangers or nuclear war was especially evident during the
Khrushchev regime. Ath Parly Congresshrushchev announced that war was no longer "fatalistically inevitable" and that "peacefulwould prevail as Soviet policy. Thisajor revision of (he traditional Communist dogmaar to the finish between the socialist and capitalist systems would eventually take place. Khrushchev also implied that tbe tenet of inevitable Communist victory was no longer relevant in an age when war might mean mutual annihilation.*
Khrushchev's successors continue to claim that the Soviet Union promotes peaceful coexistence andsrith ihc West. They no longer argue, however, lhal all wars, including wars of national liberation, could lead to the destruction of civilization. In fact, Soviet leaders and writers have openly stated that the USSR has an obligation to support wars of national
In the view of Soviet political and military writers, capitalist countries may be temporarily constrained by internal problems, bul the nature of Westernhas not changed. Soviet leaders, including Defense Minister Ustinov, have warned that there arecircles" in the United States who hope to obtain military superiority over the USSR. As stated2 in Ihe Soviet book, Mililary Force and International Relations, "During the postwar period the United States constantly pursued the goal ofilitary superiority over the Soviet Union that would enable it to achieve success in opposing it and in restraining the international revolutionary andliberationhis world view has caused the Soviet Union to engageteady buildup of
these icvniont of marii it-leninist theory on war were btiteily attacked by ihe chinese Coram artists in ihe. the chinese rejected the thesis thai ihe itttiibility o'escalationuclear age trade limited war loo dangerous. they accused ihe soviet) ot dwelling too muck on the horrors of noctear wars and neglecting to rapport their allies in wan of rational liberation the chinese insisted thai evenocal coroict escalatedow war, ihcales would
rectal soviet activities ia africa show ir.it ihecarrent teerme is preparedovequickly loexptoil local conlhcl* the chinese.used to mlick ihc soviet) fc* refusingupportait,denounce them foi doing so with apparent impunity ,
conventional and strategicgrowth guided by Ihe continued development of Soviet
Methodology
In Soviet ideology, dialectical materialismethodology for observing and captaining natural and social processes. It cancientific effort to use existing knowledge in undemanding processes and in predictingenin viewed this approach as applicable to every field In importance to military science was discussed recently in an article attributed togarkov. chief of the Soviet General Stuff According to the article, the dialectical methodeliable compass in the study of the many phenomena associated with the perfection of the defense of the stale.""
Adherence of the Soviets to dialectical materialism is relevant to our understanding of how they formulaic military doctrine. The dialectical method holds thai no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself. Thus, each wai must be considered in light of the political and economic conditions surrounding it as well as the military factors
Dialectical materialism callsontinuous review of military affairs.unity cd* epposites" theory presumes that change in weapons technology will lead to major changes ine most prominent example of an important change in doctrine after an intensive debate was acceptance by Soviet political and military leaders of the revolutionary impact of nuclear weapons.
uttii iftubriiia mdcrtie atl phenomena
" In Ibc Wat. ibr Morn of Mtiiat phikaonh' notice tMl ihe dannditpenutilt gmtfenterroeeiws have been critmml II hai bernaiiucd lhal Iht of tie dialectic are rurhi-ei ihe id ml count ofil il al-ayt pouiblr loeile ibe mailt at illmtittrteialectical chaner
The dialectical method presumes there will be clashes between writers advocating different positions and strategics. This concept is discussed by Marshal Ogarkov:
The law of conflict and unity of opposilesbasic idea of the dialectical understandingdevelopment of military affairs and,mililary science. The conflict ofis the source, the motive force ofof all the diverse phenomenaconflict and warhole
Armed conflict is by its essence contradictory. The contradictions of armed conflict arc first of all the contradictions between opposhes: between strategic goals, offense and defense, theof forces and means in limited spaces, Ihe establishment of superiority on the axes of strikes and the possibility of their defeat by fire, the demands of the armed forces for expensive weapons, and the economic capabilities of the state...
Appendix B
Institutes Under USSR Academy of Sciences
Intitule of the USA and Canada (IUSAC) and the Institute of the World Economy and International Relationsoth under the direction of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, arc lesponsible for analyzing American domestic and foreign policies. One of their functions appears to be interpreting mililary developments in the United Stales and other Western countries for Soviet 'political leaders. i
Within the IUSAC. thereepartment which studies the military dimension of American foreign policy. This unit, staffed by retired General StafT officers, evaluates the political significance ofweapons and strategic policy. Their publications, which primarily depend on information from the Western press, reflect few details of Soviet defense issues, indicating that the institutes do not have access to classified information or are enjoined from using
There is no evidence to suggest that Agencies such as IUSAC or IMEMO compete with militaryin the formulation of Soviet military science. Moreover, the functions of these institutes arc shared with other institutions, such as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) andmerican Deparimcnt of the Committee for Slate Securityhich probably have mote influence with Polilburo members.
A. Arbatov. director of the IUSAC. is an adviser lo Brezhnev. Ilia responsibilities probably includeon the political climate within the United States concerning arms control and detente Another likely responsibihty is to project the response of US policymakers to Soviet military activities
Arbatov's role is valuable lo the ealeni he is able to keep Politburo members informed on political-mililary events in ihe United Stales. Many Wesieiners believe that Arbatov and others in the Academy's research institutes have offered the Soviet politicalore sophisticated world ouiiookiew of detente may also influence the outlook of Brezhnev and other important officials, and this could impacton Ihe political content of Soviel doctrine
" Accordingne tcpon. ike aeilisu wti did no) have accrai lo classified inielliienoc infmnaiion aiof .j
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