THAI - KAMPUCHEAN BORDER

Created: 12/6/1979

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL

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ALERT

A oonbinaticm of factor* could load to rapid do tern oration of tho situation along tho Thai^Xampvohoanhen Vietnam exerts even greater military preeaurehoe*ietanoe init plan* to do later thi* month--fighting could ooovrhe Thai-Karepuohean border to euoh an extent that th* Thai armed

uculd be unable to cope. In addition, the government '

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be faced with an intolerable refugee burden and

increased political aritiaiem, possibly leading to a

reversal of Thai policy toward Vietnam. Should the Thai*

seeurity imperiled byilitary operation*m

they wouldppeal far US aid, poesibly under the

term* of th* Manila Poet. Thailand would probably also seek

upport.

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Vietnamese leaders nay cone to believe that they'cannot eliminate resistance as long as Kaapucheans continue to enjoy supposed sanctuary and resupply In Thailand. Inasa. attacksln-

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Thailand assumed to be supply depots can be expected. In ato farcereversal of what the Vietnamese clearly feel Ispolicy of aiding and abetting, the enemy, Vietnamese troopsseek to engage Thai forces In order to deal theedefeat.

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Vietnamese, withroopsampuchea,eliminate all anti-Vietnamese resistancen offensive plannedthis month. The major effort will occuresterno this end, the Vietnamese have been reinforcing tha_

overstrength divisions already deployed along the border there. Associated logistic preparations have also been noted, as have air and air defense easures. Vietnamese cross-border shelling and cross-border forays have occurred from time to tlrac, and Thai artillery has responded. To data, troops of both sides have attempted to avoid contact, though there have been minor clashes. The quantitative and qualitative military strength available to the Vietnamese is such that .they couldrippling blow to local Thai militaryopposite Vietnamesetoeinforced

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If, by accident orignificant engagement occurred between Thai and Vietnamese forces, and the former did not acquit themselves well, the situation would take on an even graver character. He cannot foresee

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how events would unfold, and what the major players would do. ajor Thai defeat, however, could constitute sufficient reason for China to teachson. Besides the threat of wider International military Involvement, there are domestic implications for Thailand as well. At this point. Prime Minister Krlangsak seem toairly secure hold on power and to enjoy tbe confidence of Defense Minister and Thai Army Commander General Pram, the power behind the Prime Minister.ajor Thai military reverse, however, could embolden Krlangsak's civilian and military critics. In particular, they might try to topple the government by exploiting such issues as the alleged Thai support for Kempuchean resistance forces, especially if such support were regardedrovocationietnamese attack. Faced with political destruction, Krlangsak might be prompted to call upon tho Unitedmuch to keep himself In power as to provide military assistance against an external threat. Likely principalsew Thai Government would probably not alter Internal policies significantly,uccessor to the current Prime Minister would be freer toek1ng an accoaaaodatlon with Vietnam. Tbe long-term political consequences ofhift mayerious challenge to the credibility of miliary govenveent.

The continuing massive Influx of refugees, which the Vietnamese offensive will certainly aggravate, could alone have serious consequences for Krlangsak. The Thai Government and international aid agencies are

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already struggling to aid the more than one-half million Kampuchean refugees in Thailand. Although Thailand's present humanitarian policy of admitting refugees has public support, the refugee issue has aroused domestic opposition in the past, particularly whenppeared that Thailand was being forced to assume too much of the burden. The area of Vietnamese operations harbors large numbers of refugees. Some quarter Billion are reported encampedampuchea withinilometers of the border town of Poipet alone, and the Vietnamese might decide that the more it can push out of the country, the easier Its Job ofbrill be. The Thais fear that there may be as manyillion more

potential refugeesestern Kampuchea. If the refugee

deteriorates and the International community, particularly the United States, does not respond promptly with Increased assistance and

cooperation, Krlangsak's political opponents wouldOdywade

Issue to exploit.

The pressures outlined above are beyond the capabilities of the Thais to control adequately on their own. Should fighting spread across the borderajorbring withost of ancillaryThais will face an array of military and political Issues that could force them to seek outside assistance, first from the United States, but also from China. If the Thais should believe that sufficient support is not forthcoming from either quarter, they might find It necessary to acquiesce to Vietnamese control of Kampuchea. tfS

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Original document.

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