YUGOSLAVIA: POST-TITO OUTLOOK

Created: 1/19/1980

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

YUGOSLAVIA: Post-Tito Outlook

If President Tito dies oithin tht next feu cs-js or oaeka, ye believe there DMcZdsooth transfer of pewroIlegioI leadarahip. Arpreksxsion about the Sovietbu theofserve to holdugoslavtogether during the firs: feu rmths. He also believe that the Soviets will not intervene ailitarilu in tha iesms&icSS post-Titr period, ind thai other fonzs of Soviet meddling op pressure during thia period vould only reinforce Yugoslav tetity, We are leea aon-guina about the prospect of TjgoalavSovietover t'ne Icruger

Should Tito die or -emain incapacitated, his duties as party chief would revert to the chairman of the party Presidium, Stevan Doronjski,erb. In the stateTito's successor would be the Vice President ol the collective Presidency, Lazar Kolisevski, who is a Neither of the two has much independent political support, and they will hold their posts only until their current one-year terms end. This collective approach to the succession was created personally by Tito--perhap> because he did not want his own authority diluted.

Defense Minister Ljubicic and the armed forces are likely to play an important rolo inmooth succession. "Tito brought the tightly disciplined Army into close political collaboration with party loaders. We would expect the military, which is responsible (orto tighten controls during the transition and to move decisively against any threat to national unity, f

Foreign Policy

In general, Yugoslavia will continue Tito's policy of trying toalance in relations between the East and West, whileole in the Third Horld. The Soviets, however, are widely regarded as the main threat

to thc country'sin the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan, which Belgrade had

Thus, during the first two months following Tito's departure, we would expect the collective leadership to:

to the West inthe US in par-

specific signs of support such

as new credits and trade concessions; purchases

of Western arms might also be stopped up.

closer ties with Romania and with Western

Communist parties that have publicly rejected the Soviet move into Afghanistan.

defensewas done after the

Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in'an eye toward both modernizing tha Army and improving thobility to engage ir. guerrilla warfare, j

The view From Moscow

The Soviets thus far have not tried to exert overt pressure on Yugoslavia. Although they have shown in Afghanistan that they are prepared to use military force outside tho Warsaw Pact, we believe that they will not intervene militarily In Yugoslavia in the nearunless thereomplete leadership breakdownharp policy shift toward the West. The Soviets know /hat thoy would face determined military and guerrilla opposition in Yugoslavia, and that military intervention there would totally undercut their efforts to continue detente with west European countries.

Soviet covert action or pressure tactics aimed at influencing events in Belgrade cannot be ruled out. The Soviets, however, realize that any moves they make towardin the wake of their intervention inbe closely scrutinized in the West

and the Third World. Nonetheless, if there ereof Soviet meddling, the effect almost certainly would be to strengthen Yugoslav unity and determination ton independent foreign policy.

The Longer Run

Over the longer run, Yugoslav unity will come under increasing strain. Powerful party barons will begin working within the collegial system to further their own ambitions. Once Yugoslav leaders begin jockeying for position and become involved in political intrigues, the jets may see increased opportunities to exert influence.

Events in Afghanistan may well have importanttional implications for Yugoslavia in tho longer run. Belgrade is closely watching the US reaction toas an indicator of US willingness to oppose Soviet expansion.

Original document.

---

---