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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS JANITIZED
Soviet Options in Afghanistan
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
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SOVIET OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
KEY JUDGMENTS
Moscow probably views the situation in Afghanistan as even more unstable after the fall of TaraJci. While the Soviets may have previously decided to implement newmeasures to support Taraki against the rebels, the uncertain tenure of Prime Minister Aroin's regime makes it HKely that Moscow is deferring major new initiatives to expand the counterinsurgency effortecision as to whether Amin can consolidate his position.
The Soviets, however,
Vlmay fear
that this coup might fragment the Afghan Anfiyand lead to
a breakdown of control in Kabul. In this event, they wouldiv eJy,t? deploy one or more Soviet airborne divisions to the Kabul vicinity to protect soviet citizens already there as well as to ensure continuance of some pro-Soviet regime in the capital. Although we might not receive prior warning, we believe it likely that we would promptlyeployment of Soviet forces on this scale once it began. We do not believe that Moscow would intend such afor use in fighting against the Muslim insurgency,once in Afghanistan, such Soviet airborne forces could eventually be drawn into such fighting. We have not seen indications that the Soviets are at the momentground forces for large-scale military intervention in Afghanistan.
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for USSR and Eastern Europe. National Foreign Assessment Center. It was coordinated within the CentralAgency; with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,of State; with the Defense Intelligence Agency; with the National Security Agency; and with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. available through9 was used in theof this memorandum.
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Moscow^^ing combat operations.
tried and failed to indurr-Soviet= have apparently tion oft0 halt Che "eteriora-
Amin's seizure of sole power within the Khalqistin mid-September has further complicated these Soviet problems in dealing with both the regime and the insurgency-we believe that the Soviets probably did not instigate or foresee this move by Amin. hey probably also evaluated it as rendering the counterinsurgency task more difficult, at least in the short tern, because it further narrowed the regime's base of support, and, in fact,to divide the ruling party itself.
If Moscow, within the next few weeks, concludes that Amin has consolidated his position and that no effective challenge from within the regime and the Army is likely, we believe the Soviets will probably increase their counter-insurgency role over the next few months, albeitrather than dramatically. In this case, Moscow may further increase the number of Soviet advisers and expand their combat activities, and may gradually bring in additional special battalions or regiments to providein key cities. In addition, Moscow could bolster the counterinsurgency effort by providing Soviet-manned combat support and combat service support units, such as attack helicopter, logistic, and maintenance units, to enhance Afghan combat reach and effectiveness.
* The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency believes that there is insufficient evidence lo determine thc role or function of the Soviet unit deployed at Bagran Air Force Base. There is no evidence that this unit is equipped with crew-seivcd weapons.
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Wc believe the introduction into Afghanistan ofSoviet battalion- or regiment-size units for security purposes, like tlie forces already at Dag ran, could be accomplished without immediate detection if this were done gradually, along with the ongoing airlift of materiel. Our ability to detect promptly the incremental introduction of Soviet combat support and combat service support units is similarly limited, although time would increase theof our learning that such units had entered Afghanistan
The Soviets are probably well aware of the open-ended military and political difficulties that could flow if such limited intervention were allowed to growarger and more visible commitment. They are also aware of the adverse political consequences this vould entail for them in South Asia and the Middle East. On the other hand, it is clear that thc Soviets' sense of their interests in Afghanistan is now more ambitious than it was before the advent of the Marxist regime They secarxist state in Afghanistan as important to their strategic and political interests in the region. Thishas increasingly supplanted the Soviets' earlier and less ambitious goal of simplyriendly buffer state on their southern border. If they do decide to provide some additional military support to Amin, they are likely to do so in the hope of bolstering the anti-insurgent struggle sufficiently to avoidecision as to whether to use Soviet combat unitsarge scale.
In the event that Amin does not consolidate hisbut that an acceptable and viable Marxist alternative emerges, the Soviets are likely to shift their political and military support accordingly. If no such viablealternative appears, and the Khalqi regime fragments, the Soviets would promote installationore moderate regime willing to deal with them, rather than accept the political costs and risksassive Soviet invasion to fight the insurgency. Nevertheless, we can foreseeunder which the chances of large-scale and long-term Soviet intervention would become substantially greater:
Prolonged political chaos.
The prospect of advent of an anti-Soviet regime.oreign military intervention.
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1. The threat raised by the Muslim insurgency to the survival of the Marxist government in Afghanistan appears more serious now than at any time since the governmentpower in During the pastonths, the government has become increasingly dependent on Sovietmilitary, economic, and technical help. The Soviets have been generous but the Afghans remain unsatisfied. the declining fortunes of the Khalqist* regime probably have caused Moscow to reassess what level of assistance would be needed to keep the Khalqis in power and at what point thc risks and burdens associated with such assistance wouldthe benefits of preserving thc Taraki-Aminnow the Amin regime.
2. airly important garrison recentlyto the rebels, the various insurgent groups do not yet pose an immediate military threat to government control of the major cities, and can only intermittently interdict key communications routes. But the Afghan armed forces are increasingly stretched thin in their efforts to deal with the insurgents, and their willingness to support thehas been continuously eroding.
Soviet Interests in Afghanistan
3. Until last year's Marxist coup, Moscow's interest in Afghanistan seemed to be focused on ensuring the continued primacy of Soviet influencetate on the southernof the USSR. Before last year, Soviet interests in Afghanistan were guaranteed by two treatiesreaty1 Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggres-sion which prohibited Afghan territory from being used for actions inimical to the USSR) and by the USSR's role as chief economic and military aid donor. To be sure,foreign policy was nonaligned and Moscow's ability to influence Afghan internal affairs was limited, but the Soviets seemed satisfied with their level of influence there, and regularly cited Afglianistanodel of how two states with differing social systems could peacefully coexist.
Thc dominant faction of the People's Democratic Party (PDPA).
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4. We have no convincing evidence to confirm reports that the Soviets were behind the coup which brought theto power. The USSR undoubtedly had been thc chiefforce and financial source of support for the Afghan Cornmunist movement since its establishment in the. But the Soviets were always worried about thc impact which support for the Afghan Communists would have on their relations with thc Afghan Government and were extremely circumspect in their direct dealings with them. Indaed, Moscow tzz never officially scknowiedged the existence of an Afghan Cornmunist party, or permitted any Afghan Communists to attend international partyeven incognito.
5. The successful seizure of power by the Afghanhowever, dramatically changed their status in Moscow. Both the USSR's envoy in Kabul, Ambassador Puzanov, who is reported to be an ideologue with important connections in the Soviet party Central Committee, and thc Soviet military, who are likely to have seen an opportunity to enhance the Soviet strategic position, probably urged Soviet leaders to take advantage of the political windfall and to create yet another Communist regime on Soviet borders. In the Soviet leadership probably thought that theof Marxist rule could take place gradually and be manageday that would not jeopardize more important Soviet foreign policy interests.
6. It is clear that the Soviets' sense of theirin Afghanistan is now more ambitious than it was before the advent of the Marxist regime They see the maintenancearxist state in Afghanistan as being important to their strategic and political interests in the region. This perception has increasingly supplanted thc Soviets' earlier and less ambitious goal of simplyriendly buffer state on their southern border.
Evolution of Soviet Involvement
J Mindful of the narrowness of the new regime's
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base of support, and anxious to help it consolidate its position, the USSR also began increasing its militarypresence, which at the time of the coup numbered anersons. Inoscow0 million military aid agreement with the new regime.
opposition to the government increased last
fall and winter, the Soviets continued to augment theiradvisory presence. By early this yciir, theirhad grown to at least five Soviet generals and an7S0'military advisers. These Soviets were initially stationed in the Kabul area, assisting newly promoted officers in running the Ministry of Defense and training Afghan recruits. As conditions in the countryside deteriorated, an increasing number of Soviet advisers were sent to the provinces to assist in the government's anti-insurgent effort.
The uprising in Herat last March and the subsequent visit to Kabul by the Soviet military's top political officer, General Yepishev, in early April ledurther augmentation of the Soviet military presence. Inoscow deployed eighto Afghanistan to assist the government in transporting men and materiel to the various battlefronts. We now estimate that there are atoviet military personnel in Afghanistan.*
are Soviet advisers attached to every major Afghan Army command, as well as to at least some regiment- and battalion-level units. They appear to be heavily involved in guiding Afghan combatas well as in Afghan Army logistics and .
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* This figure does not include updditional troops which, according to unconfirmed reports, have recently been moved int6
11. In addition, there are some reports which are not confirmed, but which we regard as fairly credible, alleging that Soviets have piloted helicopters together with Afghan pilots in strikes against insurgent positions, and have on occasion furnished tank personnel for combat operations.
these latter reports are accurate, the Soviets,
in addition to guiding Afghan combat operations, arealready participating in combatmall scale and in certain limited ways. In general, however, they are not organized in cohesive combat units intended to conductoperations.
13. Soviet personnel also appear to bc stationednumbers at Bagram Air Force Base north ofthey apparently service thc airlift from thc In addition to the aircraft service andat Bagram, anpparently been at the airbase since earlyunit is lightly equipped and probably has beenBagram to provide security. We have no evidence thatbeen used in combat operations against the Afghan.
The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency believes that there is insufficient evidence to cJeteraune the role or fiinction of the Soviet unit deployed at Bagram Air Force Base. There is no evidence that this unit is equi|>ped vith crev-served weapons.
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14. Soviet civilian involvement in Afghanistan has also grown appreciably since the coup. By the ende estimated that the number of civilian advisers had nearly doubled to, as the Soviets assumed top managerial and planning jobs in the government's economic ministries and became involved in changing the government's educational system. The Soviets, however, have not promised the Afghans any significant new economic assistance beyond additional debt relief (the USSR is by far Afghanistan's largest creditor)ons of wheat. This is because the Afghan capability to absorb substantial increases in foreign economic assistance is limited and because there is still0 million in unallocated credits from the SI.3extended to previous regimes. Theconomic aid agreements that were signed last year allocated0 million of0 million in credits outstanding at the time of the8 coup. Nonetheless, the Afghans are said to be dissatisfied over the level of Sovietassistance actually being provided, and annoyed over their unsuccessful attempts to join the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) in hopes of loosening Soviet purse strings.
political commitment to the newsymbolized by its willingness in8 toanother friendship treaty with the Afghantreaty is similar to others signed with Thirdin that it said nothing about thecharacter of the new regime, paid lipserviceprofessed foreign policy of nonalignment,no explicit mutual defense commitment. of the Treaty, however, presumably could be invoked
to justify Soviet combat intervention on behalf of the It calls for the two sides to "consult with each other and take by mutual agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity" of the two states.
the prospects of the Khalqist group forits rule have declined. Moscow has becomeconcerned that Afghanistan's neighbors,Iran, might be tempted toahan insurgents.
To deter such support, the Soviets have kept up heavy diplomatic and propaganda pressure on Pakistan and somewhat lesser pressure on Iran. They have also repeatedly accused thc United States, China, and Egypt of training Afghan insurgents.
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Recent Soviet Behavior
addition to increasing their militaryin the government's anti-insurgent effort, theurged Taraki and Amin to seek political means forsituation. They convinced the government to abandon
its land reform program. But they were not able to reverse some of the other social and economic reforms introducedTaraki and Amin that have alienated deeply religious Afghanho refuse to be wrenched from their near-feudal way of life.
the Soviets have apparently hadin persuading the Afghan regime to modify itsposture toward Pakistan in the interest ofto minimize support for the Afghan insurgents,
^ Bi9C lack of harmony between the Soviet and Afghan leaderships lent support to the numerousthat Moscow throughout the summer9 was seeking alternatives to the Taraki-Amin regime. We have received reports that the Soviets encouraged leaders of the rival Parcham faction of the People's Democratic Party, in exile in Europe, to believe that the USSR would back their return to power and, alternatively, that the Soviets wereilitary coup. Jailed members of the Parchaio taction in Kabul, who were released at Soviet urging in early"arrested in August after they beaan circulating
20. Moscow's desire to enlarge the Afghan ruling
circle apparently was discussed directly with Taraki and
Amin Ambassador Safronchuk, the Soviets' special envoy
. -unt: Lcyime to uring new people
overnment. By mid-July the East German Ambassador in Kabul was claiming that the Soviets were going to replace Taraki and Amin by force if necessary. In late July, the public comments of Taraki and Amin made it clear that they were aware of the Soviet machinations and that they would
to Kabul told the US Charge onune that Moscow had
not yet been able to persuade the regime to bring newanvornmrtnt- e
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resist. Amin pointedly reminded Moscow that the prerequisite for continued close tics was Soviet "respect for our national sovereignty and independence." In thc same period, there as evidence suggesting that Amin had taken steps tothe power of the Minister of Defenseey figure in any putative Soviet effort to induce the Afghan military to depose Amin and Taraki. Onuly, Am in assumed effective control of the Defense Ministry and appointed Watanjar as Interior Minister.
Events during the latter half of August suggest that despite the difficulties in its dealings with the regime, Moscow was not prepared to halt the growth of itsto the Khalqis. Onugust Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin sent'-an unusually warm message to the Afghan leaders in connection with Afghan independence day.- ew daysarge high-ranking Soviet military delegation led by the Commander of Soviet Cround Forces, Ceneral Pavlovskiy, had arrived in Kabul secretly toengthyof Afghan military needs.
mid-September, Amin's seizure of soleboth Watanjar and Taraki from thecomplicated the Soviet problems in dealingthe regime and thc insurgency. The Sovietsthe Amin coup as rendering the counterinsurgencydifficult, at least in the short term, becausenarrowed the regime's base of support and into divide the Khalqi party itself.
Military Options
the eve of the Amin coup, in the apparentviable political alternatives, the Soviets seem toby late August to renew their commitment to theas it was' then constituted, and to focus onand character of military support needed tocorrunitraent. The size and rank of the Pavlovskiy plus the long duration of its visit, stronglythat it was tasked to make that assessment ofneeds. If Moscow chose to provide additional its options could be divided into four categories,
as discussed below.
7A. Equipment and Advisers- The most obvious option is to supply more equipment and to increase thc number of Soviet advisers. Becausehortage of trained Afghan
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manpower, such an increase might necessitate allowing Sovietore extensive role in combat and air support-activities and in ferrying men and materiel within Afghanistan. The Soviets, for example, could assign more personnel to fly and maintain tactical ground support aircraft andgunships for operations against the insurgents.
of Combat Support and CombatUnits. Another option,igher level ofvould be to provide the Afghan Army withsupport and combat service supporthelicopter and additional logistic andenhance the Afghan combat reach andsupport and combat service support units couldto areas of the USSR adjacent to Afghanistan andintroducederiod of weeks withoutthe Soviet transport system. Our ability to detectmovements and intrusions promptly is limited,would increase the probability of our learning thathad entered Afghanistan.
Intervention With Soviet Combat Units.
The Soviets might considerimited number of their own units to provide security or operate in combat as separate entities. The Soviets would have to weigh whether their increased combat presence would alienate rather than bolster the Afghan forces that are now loyal to the regime. of this uncertainty the introduction of Soviet combat units probably would be accomplished incrementally. It might begin, for example,ew battalions up to and including an airborne division or two to help stiffen Afghan Army resolve or provide security for key cities or critical points. As noted earlier, we believe one such battalion has already been introduced to provide security for Bagram airfield since early July.
most likely airborne division to be calledthe one nearest Afghanistan, located at Fergana inMilitary District (MD). it could be brought upoperational strength ofenew hours.
28. The airlift of an airborne division into Afghanistan could be accomplisheday or so if the transport, and airborne forces were previously alerted and prepared. The Fergana division is situatedautical miles from Kabul, and the flight time between the two locations
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is only about onealf hours. With the shortinvolved, the Soviets would probably elect toan air shuttle and deliver the division in several rcginent-size increments, each requiringircraft sorties. dditional sorties would be required for the division's support equipment. An airlift of this nature would be well within thc capabilities of the Soviettransport fleet.
Tho Soviets could also airlift tc Afghanistan in-.fantry elements up to regimental size from divisions in the Turkestan MD. Without their heavy equipment, these units would not have the firepower or mobility of airborne units but could be used for point defense or, with the commitment of substantial helicopter lift and support units, tocommunication lines or conduct anti-insurgent
of these limited deployments could befighter aircraft from the three tactical air forcethe Turkestan MD. f thefighters at these basesrimary role ofbut other aircraft could readily be deployedairfields if necessary. The closest combatunit is in the Transcaucasusiles
from the Afghan border, and other units are farther away in the Carpathian and Transbaikal MDs. Soviet transport helicopter units are located throughout the western and southwestern military districts. The Soviets probably would not consider that airstrikes by themselves woulda deteriorating military situation, but they might use such strikes to support Soviet combat units if they were introduced.
Soviet Military Intervention. securing Kabul" or some other key cityewpoints would require tlie commitment of large numbers
of regular ground forcesotentially open-ended An overland move towith the possibility of Afghan Army andultidivisional operation exhausting the resources of thc Turkestan MD. An operation of this magnitude would therefore require the redeployment of forces--and their supportingwestern and central militaryin addition to those near the Soviet-Afghan border.
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ground forces closest to Afghanistanin theen in fourmotorized rifle divisions, an artillery brigade,MD-levcl support units. All of these forcesconsiderably below their intendedeek0 reservists could befill out the Turkestan units and an additionalbe moved in from the Central Asian MD.
Six other Central Asian Military District divisions would also be available for operations but wouldew weeks or longer to mobilize reservists and move to the Afghan border. The' Soviets probably would be reluctant to move any substantial portion of their Central Asian forces into Afghanistan, however, for fear of weakening theiropposite China.
The Soviets havether divisions located welliles from Afghanistan in the Volga, Ural, and North Caucasus MDs from which they could draw intervention forces. These units are also manned at low levels inand wouldew weeks to fill out and move to the Afghan border.
The terrain and lackodem transportation network in Afghanistan are hampering the Afghan Government's military effort against the insurgents and would seriously complicate large-scale Soviet military operations. Most
of the country is hilly orthat would limit the use of transport and logistic vehicles. Into controlling the mountainous areas, the insurgents could disrupt Soviet movement by cutting the roadways that lead from the border area to several key cities as well as those roads between major urban areas.
Prospects
prospectuccessful CommunistAfghanistan is important to Moscow for ideologicala government would provide substance tothat world "socialism" will eventually emergeSoviets feel obligated to support such revolutionswhen they fail. The outcome assumes anwhen the revolution occursountry onborder. In addition, it is conceivable thatplanners have welcomed the advent of such ain Afghanistan on strategic grounds, arguing that if
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this revolutionary regime could be consolidated in power at acceptable cost, it could open the way for the eventual expansion of Soviet influence southward.
37. For these reasons Moscow has been determined to make the Khalqi seizure of power blossomorkable government, and has been frustrated by the steady decline of the regime's fortunes. We have seen that as the insurgency has worsened-and the regime's needs have grown, the Soviets" have stesdily 'expanded the flow of militaryto the regime to the limits of its ability to absorb them. hey have gradually increased the number and expanded the counterinsurgency role of Soviet advisers in the country. They haveattalion at Bagram airfield to provide security for the airlift. As these measures have proved inadequate to halt the deterioration of the regime's position, the Soviets have explored the option ofroader based Afghan leadership but, even be'fore the Amin coup, had clearly failed in their efforts to create athat might attract greater popular support whilethe government's continued pro-Soviet orientation.
38. Under these circumstances, the Soviets are likely to have begun more serious consideration of the spectrum of possibilities for direct combat intervention. Thethat the Soviets had been weighing the military options discussed earlier was enhanced by the arrival in mid-August of General Pavlovskiy. The delegation led by the commander of the Soviet Ground Forces was specificallyto be preparing, among otheretailedon the Afghan insurgency and the Afghan military.
39. We cannot rule out the possibility that Pavlovskiy's visitecision already made by Moscow toat one of the levels discussed earlier, and that Pavlovskiy's task involved working out the modalities. One clandestine source in early September alleged that thehad already movedoviet combat troops into Kabul, with the purpose of protecting Soviet citizens and facilities. The Soviets might have consideredove into Kabul prudent in view of the uprisings that havein Kabul this year and the continuing possibility of violence in the capital. Sizable numbers of such troops without heavy equipment could have been brought into the city
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from the USSR undetected by us intelligence if this had been done gradually and incrementally as part of the ongoingof materiel for Afghanistan. We have been unable to verify this report, however, by other intelligence means.
40. It appears reasonable to conclude that the Soviet leadership has wished to avoid allowing the situation to deteriorateoint where only large-scale intervention by Soviet troops could save the Afghan regime. Moscow vould then have to calculate whether Khalqi survival- was worth commitment to the grave and open-ended military task of holding down an Afghan insurgency in rugged terrain. The Soviets would also have to consider the likely prospect that they would be contending with an increasingly hostile and anti-Soviet population. The USSR would then have to consider the likelihood of an adverse reaction in the West, as well as further complications with Iran, India, and Pakistan. Moscow would also have to weigh the negative effectsin the Muslim worldassive Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Soviet-Iraqi relations, for example, have already soured because of Baghdad's suspicion about Soviet intentions in the Middle East following the upheavals in Iran and Afghanistan. onspicuous use of Soviet military force against an Asian population would also provide the Chinese considerable political capital.
41. On the other hand, if worse came to worst, and the Soviets chose to abandon the Khalqis rather than accept the political costs and risksoviet invasion, the effects would again be damaging to the USSR. But whatever criticism the Soviets might suffer for notuddingmovement to the end could be deflected by reminding detractors that the USSR had provided Kabul with large amounts of assistance and had warned Taraki and Amin that they were mismanaging the revolution. Moscow's unwillingness tothe Afghan regime publiclyommunist government has suggested that the Soviets have wished to leaveine of propaganda retreat in case the Khalqis collapse.
42. To avoid being confronted with an all-or-nothing decision, however, the Soviets seemed prepared before the Amin coup in mid-September to provide the regime withmilitary assistance that could include some combat help but would, for the time being, probably be well short
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ajor intervention (which we have definedulti-division ground force operation.) in short, the Soviets seemed likely to act initially on the smallest and least conspicuous scale consistent with Pavlovskiy's estimate of the regime's needs.
43. As noted earlier, Amin's seizure of sole power
k 5u utherhe Soviet problems in dealing with both the regime and the insurgency. We believe that the Soviets probably did not instigate or foresee this'move by Amin, which in fact may conceivably havereemptive step tooviet plot-to have Taraki'remove him.
believe it likely that Moscow views theKabul as extremely unstable since Taraki's fall, and
that the Soviets see the uncertain tenure of Amin's regime as requiring atrief deferral of new Sovietinitiatives against the insurgencyecision as to whether Amin can consolidate his position.
the same time, the Soviets have seemedact decisively to preserve security in Kabul ifsituation there should rapidly deteriorate. (_
The Soviets may fear Oiat Amin's coup might provoke fighting within the Afghan Armyreakdown of control in Kabul. In this event, the Soviets are probably prepared to deploy one or more Soviet airborne divisions to the Kabul vicinity to protect Soviets already there as well as to ensure continuancero-Soviet regime in the capital. We believe it likely that we would promptlya deployment of Soviet forces on this scale. We do not believe that the Soviets would intendeployment for use in fighting against the Muslim insurgency, although it is not impossible that, once in Afghanistan, such Soviet airborne forces could eventually be drawn into fighting.
46. If, on the other hand, the Soviets within the next few weeks conclude that Amin has consolidated his position and that no effective challenge from within the regime and the Army is likely, we believe the Soviets will probably increase their counterinsurgency role in the next few months, albeit incrementally rather than dramatically.
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Any moderate increase in the sovietexpansion .COm5at aftlvitles of advisees, providing some combat support and.combat service support elements, and perhaps initially airlifting in additional airborne or liqhtly equipped battalions or regiments to provide security in keybe primarily intended to buy time. the biggest immediate threat to the prospects for a
holding action" of this type is the loyalty of the Small-scale defections occur almost daily and,iM5er Mutinies in the past seven-noitths. itsallegiance is highly
Mit-il'rmy completely unravels, therefore, additional Soviet advisersimited sprinkling of Soviet combat units would improve, but not guarantee, the staying power of the Khalqis. in expanding incrementally the level of their own involvement, however, thereanger that the Soviets will increase their own stake in tne ultimate outcome, making it increasingly likely that they will raise the level of their participation still another notch if the situation continues to deteriorate.
^-j In the event Amin does not consolidate his posi-the%ov^a2e Marxist alternative emerges, ol !leCs ar? Hkely t0 fihxft Cneic Political and militaryo such viable leftist alternative'egime fragments, the Soviets would
nOCe modecate "gi^ willingthan accept the political costs and
risksassive soviet invasion to fight the insurgency. Nevertheless, we can foresee contingencies under which the chances of large-scale and long-term Soviet intervention would become substantially greater:
Prolonged political chaos.
The prospect of advent of an anti-Soviet regime.
Foreign military intervention.
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ANNEX
Warning Considerations
is difficult to assess warning time fordefined military options such as we canAfghanistan. In Europe, for example, we know theof the "threat" forces and there is an extensive
body of good evidence indicating how they intend, inemploy these forces against NATO. In Afghanistan,we have no evidence on soviet military objectivesthe forces that the Soviets would consider necessarythem. Moreover, in estimating warning timewe have evidence of what the Sovietsinimum force necessary toeliberateand have predicated our minimum warning time onnecessary for thc Warsaw Pact to prepare, and fordetect, such an attack. In an intervention intohowever, the Soviets do not faceon their frontier to be overcome in an initial Therefore, even the largest intervention,take weeks to fully prepare if undertaken as aassault, could be undertaken piecemeal,airborne or ground forces near the border. Suchcould be initiateday or so, withno warning, as follow-on forces were being mobilized.
The options available at the lower end of the scale provide the least warning but also would likely have the least military impact. Soviet airborne troops or small ground forces units probably could be readied foray and it would take about that long tothe air transport to move them into Afghanistaningle lift. We could not be confident that we would detect the increase in troop readiness early on, but the concurrent marshaling of transport aircraftajor airlift probably would become apparentay. In addition, Soviet airborne and airlifted troops could be introduced with no warning at all if they were moved in piecemeal.
The larger intervention options offer moretime, depending on the level of the Soviet commitment. Multidivisional operations toew lines ofinto Afghanistan, for example, could be initiated, probably ineek using the four divisions in the Turkestan Military District; it would takeew days to
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mobnization and movement of these forces. Op-
face of Afghan Army resistance or effortsareas of the country probably wouldf^om areas beyond the Turkestan Militaryf l2 take up Co aweeks to Prepare. Wette ^bilization and-movement
hese areasew dayseek.
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