Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia
PROSPECTS FOR POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA
he Estimate
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
foitowing intelligence orgomzationt participated in the preparation of tho
The Central In-efcowxehaon.iohoot ol If*of SaaM ond Oetw, ond Ms.tvrriy Aoency.
Ako Participating:
Th. Assntortt Chiefffy
cto- of Naval Inttfcgrrx, DapoMriont ol the Novy
Th. Assistantf Stofl,lptrtlllllll ol th. Ait Fore.
The Diretle- ofi. Moriis. Corps
CONTENTS
Page
Historical Achievement*
and Prcrccdural Flaws in Tito's
C Economic Strains
D. Regional and Communal Tensions
E Soviet Pressures
PROSPECTS
Stable
FOR THE WEST
SrjREI
SE
INTRODUCTION
I. Tlirill probablyime of troubles in Yugoslavia The precipitant will be the incapacitation or death of President fosip Broz Tito, whose role in tlie creation and preservation ofYugcnlavia has been so Urge that one cannot be confident it will prove dispensable
2 On balance, our confidence on this score rs lower now lhan it was at the time of our latt estimateuring lite past several years, und especially since lhe8 Yugoslav Party Coniuess. aof developments which had seemed conduciveelatively smooth and orderly posl-Tlto succession have lost momentum.umber ot countervailing devx'lopmenti have ensued.t ilut son* li ration of an effective central policymaking process has virtually stopped, while economic "stagflation" has persisted, and Yusoslav-Soviel relations have further deterloralcd.
c remain fairly confident thai Tito's passing, in and of Itself, wilt not during the first six months or sohreat to the integrity or independence of lhe Yugoslav stale It will, however, reduce Ihebility lo manage domestic and foreign challenges, which are likely lo be rnore severe in the post-Tile, period than ibey have been inoreover, the high degree of internal political solidarity that will probably characterize Ihe immediate post Titois unlikely lo persist. In consequence, lhe country willeriod, probably prolonged, of great uncertainly and potential instability.
4 The range of plausible contingencies lhal will shape and reshape lhe sequence of events is very brge and includes Ihe distinct possibility lhat Yugoslavia will not weatherith Us integtily and Independence inlaci Of crucial Importance is lhc interplayumber of central variables, of which lhe most critical will be (lie nature of Soviet Initiatives and reactions, tlse efficacy of Weslernand. above all. the cohesion and adaptability of Tito's successors While these variables are potentially too volatile to permit any confident tudgrnent about Yugoslavia's future in, lhc odds are al least marginally in lavor of Yugoslavia's continuing as an integral independent state. Internal instability and vulnerability to eiternal pressuresrolonged transition period, however, could make evenecurring source of international tension
II. SUCCESSION CONTEXTS
A. Tilo's Historical Achicvemcnlt
5 At the ageresident Tito remains the unchallenged leaderegime that he founded overean ago Under his leadership. Yugoslavia has not only survived severe domestic and foreign challenges but has undergone remarkable transformations
Economically, Yugoslavia has changedommandarket-socialist syslem, while rapidly industrial)ring and steadily upgrading lhe standard of hving of its peoplendustry's share in the gross national product has risen fromoerceni. while real per capita annual income has climbed0 to slightly. and automobiles,washing machines, and other consumerare no longer seaice luxury items.
Politically. Yugoslavia has movedighly centralized and repressive Soviet-style dictatorshipelative's open systemonsiderable amount of authentic individual participation In local affairs.the league of Communists is still the country's only poliiical iMity, other public organl rations arc no longer subiect lo itrict party conlrol, and Ihere have been experimental in nil (candidate elections for local public offices. Similarly, while public political dissent is still severely punished, literary publications arc no longer subletted lo precensorsrHp. and rank-and-file citizens arr free to travel and live
MilujmIs- the guerrilla partisans of wartimehave been transformed into conventional armed forces, backederritorial reserve defense force, designed lo conduct prolonged unconventional warfare The regime has simultaneously fosteredof the Armyuarantor of national unity and as an integrative institution in the country's domestic political life
On (lie international plane. Y'ugoslavia has moved from ncai isolation to intense multilateral involvernenl nnd far-teaching ideological influence, and has achieved political prestige disproportionate to its size Its stains lias changed from heretical outcast to thatecognized variant within the Communist world In the West, it has gradually won acceptance not onlyourageous breakaway Soviet satellite but as an active intetlocutor in East-VVejt and North-South exchanges And in lhe Third World It has established Itself noi onlyymbolic European ally buteaning force within tho nonaligned movement
5
ond Procedural Flaw* in
hese are all iransformalions loi which Tito can claim substantial personal ctedll They aie alioin which lame numbers of Yugoslavs take understandable pride In consequence. Tito can be reasonably confident that hii successors will not follow Soviet and Chinese precedents andmoccsi ofn tbe contrary, he can probably rdy on his successors both lo profess and tot roost loyalty lo most of the basic tenets of Titoism. However, he has recently introduced newprocedures thai will make il estremelyfor Ihis loyalty lo find eipension in effective leadership
n particular, the emergence ol such leadership will be strongly unpeded bv the strictly collegia! policy ma king procedutc* that Tito has prescribed both for the nine-man collective Slateor the much moican Presidium of thc league ofo long as Tito is alive and well, these procedures do not have decisive significance Once Tito leaves the scene, however, his successor* will lie left to iry to make timely and coherentarge collegiums with shorl-lerm rotating chairmen and tules of conduct that require so much consultation and coordination that ihey almostaialyring iiberum veto Such an enterprise would be highly problematical under the best ofalone the tryingthat will confront Tito* successor*
Slroins
IS Weakened cenlial leadership will make it more difficult for the pott-Tito legime to manage what areany case likely lo be increased economic problem*inimum. Iheii lack ol charismatic authority will deprive Tito's successor* of an asset that has helped to prevent economic erisi* during, when the effects of high inflation (averagingercent peraige deficits In the balance of payments, growing legional economic disparities, andin growth of consumption, associated with wide swings in overall growth rales..have threatened to eet out of hand Moreover, the regional pressure* behind inflation and eiirrnal deficits will be intensified by a
'deiiiled diieunion ol run* inaitutlonel trends aod evolving polieymBliine irnnaemenuikely effete on ihe succession, see volume II. innei* laujrueof Communitli-
ncw decentralization ptogram that is giving thea greater say in national economic derisions.
uring. Yugoslavia is likely to face persistent foreign Irade deltells as well as continued high domestic inflation and iiriern ploy ment. Western demand for Yugoslav ci ports will probably remain slack, while competition in Western hard-currency markets will increase. Domestic energy supplies will tighten, and rumps in world oil prices (Yugoslavia currently importsercent of iu energy andercent of its ml) will boost cilernel deficits and domestic prices sharply
uch strain* wdl increase Yugoslav reliance on Western financing Belgrade can probably continue lo count on substantial support Irom official Western lenders- At present, however, over hall of lhe SIO billion Yugoslav debl is held by private Western banks Their loans have periodically fallen short of Yugoslav needs and could be consideiably affected bypolitical uncertainlyime without Tito. If private foreign lendingurtailedengthy period and lhe difference is not covered from official Western sources, post-Tito Yugoslavia could notignificant economic slowdown. This, in turn, would aggtavate llie endemic cyclical pattern of growlh and seriously increase the level ofwhich currently amount* toercent of the nalional work lorce and aboulercent of Ihe urban work force in some of the country's lessregions If the leadership proves incapable of designing and enforcing an austerity programto such ciieumuanees. there could be aeconomic crisis with potentially disruptive political ramifications1
D. RegionoJ ond Communal Tensions
conomic stiingencie* seem certain lo lead lo sharper conflicts of inteiesl among Yugoslavia'srepublics and provinces' Such conflicts, in lurn, could escalate inlo militant confronlahons among Ihe already antagonistic etbnonalional communities whose "homelands" ate competing for scarce material and financial resources. Such confrontations haveecurrent feature of post win Yugoslav history and have periodically forced even Tito onto the defensive.
1 Finmore diluted lueumcnt of YuKmbvIieconomic cm-Otttt and the econanic ubjrs Itnl will cunfrvnt Tao'iseeII. aimei It. "Tin; Kewwmr "
'For an inaivsi* ol the rale of elhnie doUkiiu in Yujmliv polities, ice volume tl. mitci C. "IVitUvuIitm and ilrjioniitrin"
oi example, there were large riots by lbc country's Albanians, who contended thai tlieirthe province ol Kosovo, was an economic and poliiical colony of lhc Serbs And.8erbs and Croats engagedrolongedduring which tens ol thousand* ol citizens joined outspokenly nationalist organizations and participated in nationalist demonstrations, and almost the entire Croatian parly leadership evinced "nationalproclivities
espite thc relative tranquillity that has reigned on nationality issues since Use so-called Croatian crisis, lhe perceptions and passions that fueled theseoutbursts have not disappeared. Because of their self-replenishing and mutually reinforcing religious, cultural, and linguistic roots, these perceptions and passions could easily be reactivated not only byeconomic stringencies buiost of other stimuli. With Tito's departure, moreover, lhe regime wil) lose most of lhc protection that it has cnyoyedesult of his unimpeachable reputation as an ethnic nonpartisan None of his likely successors haveemotely comparable reputation. And some have such close and exclusive ties svilh "their Own" particular republics that almost any policy lhat they initiate or support is likely lo be challenged as ethnocentric.
E. 5oviel Pressures
The Kremlin will not necessarily attempt tomooth and orderly Yugoslav succession. Under certain circumstances Moscusv wouldtable, viable Yugoslavia. In any case, the USSR is likely toestrained policy in lhe immediate post-Tilo period Although il probablyesire lo reincorporate Yugoslavia into ils East European empire. Moscow couldands-oil or even supportivehe Immediate post-Tito period.olicy could persist for some lime should Belgrade become more responsive to Soviet policies and more rlistant from the West While not impossible, however,ong-term change inpolicy is unlikely.
Even if developments in Yugoslavia prove less favorable to Soviet interests. Moscow is unlikely to subject Yugoslaviairect militaryoviel resort to force will remain improbable so long as it continues lo entail serious risksustained Yugoslav resistance and possible Western political and military support.ctv sharp escalation ol centrifugal tendencies within Yugoslavia might be
seen by the Sovicls as significantly reducing Ihose risks, particularly if it were perceived as bothtbe Yugoslav will lo resist and discouraging Western readiness lo respond
f the temptations created byerception of Yugoslav and Western weakness were combined with sufficient dangeradical growth of Weslern influence in partsisintegrating Yugoslavia, thc otherwise strong Soviel inhibilions against military intervention in Yugoslavia might be overcome. Inase, the Soviets would be enticed by tbe chance lo reestablish Iheir direct presence on lhe Adriatic and toramatic pro-Soviet shift in thc regional and international correlation of forces.
ul even ifombination ofdoes nut arise, und Tito's successors do not have to contenderious threat of Soviel military intervention, ihey are likely lo be suWccted toSoviet pressure As in lhe past, the Kremlin will attempt to secure freer Soviet access lo Yugoslav naval facilities and regularized Soviet overflight rights Along with these miliiary objectives, it will also press for reduced Yugoslav support for Romanian and other efforts to establish national autonomy within the Soviet bloc, less active Yugoslav encouragement of Eurocommunism, diminished Yugoslav criticism of Soviet foreign policy, and less vigoroushina connection
In pursuing these goals, the Soviets may initially place heavier reliance on incentives than on pressures -or sanctions Furthermore, in contemplating sanctions, the Kremlin svill doubtless take account of lhethat "overkill" could prove counterproductive and drive Yugoslavia toward the West. In lhe face of prolonged Tiln-likc resistance, however, lhe Kremlin will probably exert stronger pressure on Tito'sthan it dared to exert on Tito, with his long record of defiance arid demonstrated abilily to rally domestic and foreign support. Thus, il will be less hesitant to prutesl slrongly and, if necessary, to follow its protests with measured "retaliation" tn the form of stronger Bulgarian demarches on the Macedonian question, larger and more frequent Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Yugoslavia's frontiers, and more active and supportive contacts svilh anttiegiiiic nationalist and pro-Soviet "Cominfocmisl" groups both within andide Yugoslavia
Such pressures or Sanctums would be even more likely if Tito's successors were to display what thc
remlin viewed as excessively Westernizing tenden-
example, bv obstrucling major Soviclinitialivcs. bv tolerating the public expression o( anli-Sovicl views, or bv sanctioning political pluralism within Yugoslavia. In lact. if it were reasonablythat the West svos unwilling ur unable lothe Kremlin would probablyprepared lo retaliate against such tendencies by withholding or curtailing scheduled deliveries of arms, petroleum, and other items of which the Soviet Unionajor Yugoslav supplier.
III. SUCCESSION PROSPECTS
o cope with the combined effects of Increased economic stringencies, heightened cthnonationaland intensified Soviet pressures, Tito's successors will have to overcome thc constraints on effective and timely decisionmaking that inheretrictlyleadership system Initially. Ihey will probably not encounter inordinate difficulties The great bulk of the population will react to Tito's departure by rallying around the regime, and the ruling elite willigh degree of collective solidarity. Before long,these shock effects can be expected lo dissipate. Public support for the regime will then become much more contingent on policy outputs and outcomes, and Tito's successors will find it much harder to submerge their internal differences Although the preceding period will not necessarily be free of significant challenges, this will be die point at which theto thc post-Tito era really begins and Tito's achievements undergo their first really strenuouslest of endurance
A. Breakdown Possibilities
he chances of passing this test have been diminished by tlse recenteath of Edvard Kardch, who was tlie one Tito aide who enjoyed broad popular respect and lhc general trust and deference of his colleagues Withoutan to seive as arbiter and peacemaker. Tito's successors will find it extremely difficult to compromise their policy differences and rise above their personal and factional antagonisms and animosities Inil is easy toost-Tito recurrence of the political degeneration which look place during thend, when Tito allowed bis thenairly free hand in domestic policy
y lhe lime Tilo belatedly terminated this experiment inirtually the entire domestic policy process had succumbed lo paralysis, and per-
sonal and factional relations within Ihe ruling elite had deteriorated lo thc poinl where Yugoslavia faced incipient violence. To restore polilical efficacy and order, moreover, Tito had to draw on every ounce of his immense personal authority And, when itthat even ihis would not suffice, he took the extreme step of threatenine to call in Ihe military.
n the eventimilar impasse among Tito's heirs, the military might well intervene on ils own initiative if it were not invited to do so by elements svitlun the leadership. Tito's designation of the armed forces as the ultimate guarantor of Yugoslav unity could bc cited as justification of such an intervention and could rniligale reluctance in the officer corps lo interfere in political matters.
ith Iheir considerable internal discipline and cohesion and close connection with theecurity forces, thc armed forces could probablya degree of stability in an otherwise shaky situation In the process, they would probably tend toreater reliance on administrative andmethods of controlubstantial increase in the discretionary authority of party professionals
owever, the Yugoslav military is noi political-Iv monolithic,olilical demarche or coup would almost certainly deepen its internal divisions.any expansion in the military's political role would undoubtedly alienate Croats, Slovenes,and other non-Serbs. Although the regime has made substantial cflorts to dilute llie historic Serbian dominance of lhe officer corps, non-Serbs still view the miliiaryredominantly Serbian institutionentralist bias that threatens Iheir national interests and identities.'
ccordingly,ilitary intervention might temporarilyrisis situation, thc longer lerm prospect would remain one of potentialand unrest, wiih an appreciable chance of ultimate civil war
B. More Stable Allernolives
his readily apparent prospect of such aoutcome provides lhe best hope lhat Tito's successors will do everything possible to averl It This hope is sircngthcncd by thc fact that all of Tito's present top lieutenants played important supportive
dtuuion of the Yucosliv miliiary eslabliihment iml rlimit aiiiiiiiin Inward role, see volume II. inner D. "The
umlnv Mililirv
roles in rhe eventual resolution of thc leadership deadlock. Furthermore, some of thend factional antagonism* lhat hive arhen(he tMcsenl paitv Presidium are likely to lie muled by fuiure chance* in membership,umber of changes that are scheduled for the immediate future and others lhat could well occur before Titos departure In coriwquence. itpossible that the post-Tito Presidium will adopt less strictly collegia! decisionmaking procedures andatonty of its members can be organizedore or less stable ruling coalition
31 In broad letms. two such coalitions, withoverlappingeem feasible in tbe light of current and emergent Yugoslav politicalOne. morehe event of an early uieces-sion. might be headed by old Titmsts such as Vladimir Bakaric. Mllos Minic, and Nikola IJubicic. and would be characterizedtrong commitmenl lo the perpetuation of live status quo ante II would do everything possible lo preserve the present distribution of authniity between lhe center and the0self-managing" socialist-markel economy, to foster the growth of independent Communis! and nonaligned forces in worldnd to guard against looill in Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy The olher grouping, more likely in the eventelayed succession, would include more recently appointed members of the preseni Presidium (such as Stane Dolarsc) as well as lop republic party bureaucrats fiom whose ranks replacement* forold Titoists are likely to be drawn
Allhough Ti trust in crucialoalition of the latter sort would be far less status quo oriented than ils old Tiinot counterpart and might be read* toignificant amount of incremental change. With respecl lo Ihe division ol authority between Ihe center and the republics, for ciample. it might be not only willing but eager toeturn to Ihe more decentralized pattern lhal obtained during the, especially in mutteis of dav-lo-day odminitliation and management At the same lime. In intra republic matter* ir might be ready to sacrificeeature* of workers' telf management and self-government in lhe interest of managerialand political discipline.
Along with tlsese changes in domesticoalition in which old Titoistsess dominant role mighl lie prepared to curtail Yugoslavia's rots in an increasingly fragmented nonaligned movement In
addition,oalition mighl be Iras cwrtceruiallyus of Soviet intentionsoalition dorm nated by men with more vivid personal memories of the original Tilo-Stahn split. Nunelhcless. nilslrusi ol the Soviet Union will remain endemic and aFattward till in Yugoslav policy rs unlikely unless Soviet pressures on flelgrade fail lo elicit effective Western support. In fad,oalition might eventually be more willing than its old Titolst counter,j iirjduj! WestwardueosUv policy in return for economic benefits and credible secuiity reassurances
ven Ihe transformations ol one of thesecos hi mmore or less Stable ruling group would not guarantee the sort of pod-Tito leadership thai mighl be needed lo dealevere crisis. Hoivevci. it would ensure ateasure of leadership and would provide some safeguards against the kinds of erratic or diluted policy choices that could inadvertently invite foreign encroachments and wholesale withdrawals of domestic support And it svould make it possible and worthwhile for interested foreign governments lo support Titos successor* in tL.ii efforts lo preserveritegrilv and independence
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR TME WEST
The amounts and kinds of support lhat Tilo't successors request from the West will vary with time and ciicuinstances Ktcept under great duress, even a. West wa id-inclined posl-Tito leadership iso request esplicitly or to welcome crsrtsptcuous "pro-changes in Western security policy During the immediate transit mn. the chief inter rial tonal concern of Tito's successor* will be to deprive Moscow of am plausible eicuse to intervene in Yugoslav affair* In consequence, they will probably desire and espeel nothing morerompt declaration of continiied US and West European interest in lhe preservation of Yugoslavia's independence and inlegrily. coupled wiih every possible effort to preventeaon of boslde emigre activities Although there i* little reason In suppose that emigre activities alrsneeal threat to the regime. Tito's successor* view ihem as such and will certainly eaageeralc iheir potential impact and lre.il Western bebavmr toward themivi ol Western intention*
If they are faced with escalating Soviet pressure. Tito's successors could request and/or welcome Wesl-erp repieseillations to Moscow on iheir behalf. Within
I
relatively short order, moreover, thev are likely tohelp in preserving and extending theirwith thc West, Including not onlybut relations with Ihe Common Market.they could turn In Ihe Wesl forof arms, especially in areas of highAnd. under extreme Soviet pressure, thevto thc United States and NATO toand political pressure on Moscow, toaleit lhe 6th Fleet and other forces onflank, and. if need be, to provide
'ore extensive discussion ol Titos foi ram policy legacy and then which poxi-Tjiotoward East and Wen miy Interact, wcII.E. 'Foreign
o amount or kind of Western suppori can stop Tito's succossors from engagingelf-destructive succession struggle or prevent Yugoslavia's constituent natiorsalilies from embarkingivil war, if they are delermined to do SO However, skillfully timed and carefully designed and orchestrated Western support couldery large difference to theand survivalotentially viable post-Tito leadership and thereby to the preservationstable regional, continental, and global balance of power
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