'
Soviet Optiens in Afghanistan
interagency intelligence Memorand
SOVIET OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
probably as even more unstable Soviets may have prev tary measures to supp uncertain tenureikely that Hoscow is expand the countering to whether Aaiin can c
KZY JUDGMENTS
views the situation in Afghanistan after the fall of Taraki. While the iously decided to implement new mili-ort Taraki against the rebels, the rime Minister Amin's regime makes it deferring major new initiatives to urgency effortecision as cnsolidate his position.
"fear
cne ftignan Army and lead to
a breakdown of control in Kabul. In this event, theylikely to deploy one or more Soviet airbornethe Kabul vicinity to protect Soviet citizensas well as to ensure continuance of somein the capital. Although wet receivewe believe it likely that we would promptlydeployment, of Soviet forces on this scale once itdo not believe that Moscow would intend such afor use in fighting against the Muslim insurgency,once in Afghanistan, such Soviet airborneeventually be drawn into such fighting. We haveindications that the Soviets are at the momentground forces forlarge-scale military intervention in ft**)
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for USSR and Eastern Europe, National Foreign Assessment Center. It was coordinated within the Central Intel' ligence Agency; with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,of State; with the Defense Intelligence agency; with the National Securitynd with the intelligence organizations of the Departments ofay, the Navy, and the Air Force. available through9 was used in theof this memorandum.
In the months before the coup, as the insurgency in Afghanistan intensified and spread, the Soviets increased the numbers and expanded the counterinsurgency role there of what now are atf their military personnel, who are heavily involved in guiding combat operations. Moscow may also have permitted direct participation of Soviet helicopter pilots, and possibly some tankin combat alongside the Afghans. In addition, we believe that one lightly equipped Soviet airborne battalion has been quietly deployed in Afghanistan since early July to provide security at Bagram Air Force Base." Meanwhile, also during the summer the Soviets have apparently tried and failed to induce the regime to admit otherelements to the government to broaden its base. All these measures have proved inadequate to halt theof the regime's position.
Amin's seizure of sole power within the Khalqistin mid-September has further complicated thesein dealing with both the regime and the insurgency. .believe that the Soviets probably did not instigate or this move by Amin. Moreover, they probably also Iit as rendering the counterinsurgency task more at least in the short term, because itthe regime's base of support, and, cn,to divide the ruling party
If Moscow, within the next few weeks, concludes that Amin has consolidated his position and that no effective challenge from within the regime and the Army is likely, we believe the Soviets will probably increase their counter-insurgency role over the next few months, albeitrather than dramatically. In this case, Moscow may further increase the number of Soviet advisers and expand their combat activities, and may gradually bring in additional special battalions or regiments to providein key cities. In addition, Moscow could bolster the counterinsurgency effort by providing Soviet-manned combat support and combat service support units, such as attack helicopter, logistic, and maintenance units, to enhance Afghan combat reach and effectiveness.
Is nteU.^nce Agency believes that there Sov^ri^^Eietermine the role or function oft Bagram Air Force Base. There is no evidence that this unit is equxpped with crew-served weapcr.s
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We believe the introduction into Afghanistan ofSoviet battalion- ot regiment-size units for security purposes, like the forces already at Bagram, coi be accomplished without immediate detection if this were done gradually, along with the ongoing airlift of materiel. Our ability to detect promptly the incremental introduction of Soviet combat support and combat service support units is similarly limited, although time would increase thef our learning that such units had entered Afghanis
Soviets are probably well aware of the open-ended military and political difficulties that could flow if such limited intervention were allowed to growarger and more visible commitment. They are also aware of the adverse political consequences this would entail for them .in South Asia and the Middle East. On the other hand, it is clear that the Soviets' sense of their interests in Afghanistan is now mere ambitious than it was before the advent of the Marxist regime They seearxist state in Afghanistan as important to their strategic and political interests in the region. Thishas increasingly supplanted the Soviets' earlier and less ambitious goal of simplyriendly buffer state on their southern border. If they do decide to provide some additional military support to Amin, they are likely to do so in the hope of bolstering the anti-insurgent sttuggle sufficiently to avoidecision as to whether to use Soviet combat unitsarge scale.
In the event that Amin does not consolidate hisbut that an acceptable and viable Marxist alternative emerges, the Soviets are likely to shift their political and military support accordingly. If no such viablealternative appears, and the Khalqi regime fragments, the Soviets would promote installationore moderate regime willing to deal with them, rather than accept the political costs and risksassive soviet invasion to fight the insurgency. Nevertheless, we can foreseeunder which the chances of large-scale and long-term Soviet intervention would become substantially greater:
Prolonged political chaos.
The prospect of advent of an anti-Soviet regime.oreign military intervention.
CONTRACT-ORCON
DISCUSSION
1. The threat raised by the Muslim insurgency to the survival of the Marxist government in Afghanistan appears more serious now than at any time since the governmentpower in During the pastonths, the government has become increasingly dependent on Sovietmilitary, economic, and technical help. The Soviets have been generous but the Afghans remain unsatisfied. the declining fortunes of the Khalqiat* regime probably have caused Moscow to reassess what level of assistance would be needed to Keep the Khalqis in power and at what point the risks and burdens associated with such assistance wouldthe benefits of preserving the Taraki-Amin regime--and now the Amin regime.
2. airly important garrison recentlyto the rebels, the various insurgent groups do not yet pose an immediate military threat to government control of the major cities, and can only intermittently interdict key communications routes. But the Afghan armed forces are increasingly stretched thin in their efforts to deal with the insurgents, and their willingness to support thehas been continuously eroding,
Soviet Interests in Afghanistan
3. Until last year's Marxist coup, Moscow's interest in Afghanistan seemed to be focused on ensuring the continued primacy of Soviet influencetate on the southernof the USSR. Before last year, Soviet interests in Afghanistan were guaranteed by two treatiesreaty1 Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggres-sion which prohibited Afghan territory from being used for actions inimical to the USSR) and by the USSR's role as chief economic and military aid donor. To be sure,foreign policy was nonaligned and Moscow's ability to influence Afghan internal affairs was limited, but the Soviets seemed satisfied with their level of influence there, and regularly cited Afghanistanodel of how two states with differing social systems could peacefully coexist. 4gM4Vr'
* The dominant faction of the People'. Democratic Party (PDPA,).
th*rc convincing evidence to confirm reports that the Soviets were behind the coup which brought the Marx-ists to power. The USSR undoubtedly had been the chiefCe andource of suppor? for Le efrWnits establishment iS thT. But the Soviets were always worried about
havPOrtthe Afghan Communists would have on their relations with the Afghan Government and
heir directem. Indeed, Moscow has never officially acknowledged
n;nnrean/fghan conununist party, orS- >fteadpSrty
I' Jhe successful seizure of power by the AfghaniSST' oxamatically changedfnmbassador Puzanov, who connections in
whoommittea' *nd the SovietX- eeQ anto enhance
obablvSoviet leaders )
vetlrl^ indfall and to create munist regime on Soviet borders. In addi- WW/tProbably thought that theaif2arxisVule could take place gradually and
terests inhat oviets' sense of theirfghanistan is now more ambitious than it was th! mtiJS Marxist regime They seenJKstate in Afghanistan asea?onWstratf?ic and political interests in hehl?.PercePtion has Increasingly supplantedi?C3 and less ambitious goal of simply Sf* friendlr buffer state on their southern
SoViXhat WOuld noC ^opardize moreforeign policy interests. /g
Evolution of soviet Involvement
Mindful of the^
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Top^icrer.
base of support, and anxious to help itre position, the USSR also beganiliKrv L
8. As opposition to the government increased last fall and winter, the Soviets continued to augment theiradvisory presence. By early this year, theirhad grown to at least five Soviet generals andilitary advisers. These Soviets were initially stationed in the Kabul area, assisting newly promoted officers in running the Ministry of Defense and training Afghan recruits. As conditions in the countryside deteriorated, an increasing number of Soviet advisers were sent to the provinces to assist in the government's anti-insurgent effort.
9.
visit to
to Aignanistan to assist the government in transporting men and materiel to the various battlefronts. We now estimate that there are atoviet military personnel in Afghanistan.*
10.
every major Afghan Army command, as well as to at least some regiment- and battalion-level units. They appear to be heavily involved in guiding Afghan combat op-erations, as well as in Afghan Army logistics and administra-
^KIT?igure does not include updditional troops. unconfirmed reports, have recently been movedKabul to safeguard facilities there. See
5
mnn HIaddjtion' there are some reports which areed' bu5 wluch va regard as fairly credible. allacSa Mots^^sl^rkUcc-ptar, together wirhS^i rst insurgent positions, and have on rnished tank personnel for combat operations.
latter reports are accurate, the Soviets,
are thea-
tlclPatiag In combatmall scaleIn general, however, they are" "nSuct uni-
lao aP?ear to be stationed in nunbers at 3agram Air Force Base north cfservice the airlift from the Soviet
In addition to the aircraft service and supcortat Ba9cam' ar.Sfr"ly fceen acirbase since early Julv. tol*tTj equipped and probably has been deployed to Bagram to provide security. We have no evidence that it gentsnbatagainst the Afghan insur-
"believe, that there
t0 aetermine the role or function of the
Zk4 dm Air Force Base. There ii no evidence tnat thls unit is equipped with crew-served weapons. 0
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14- Soviet civilian involvement in Afghanistangrown appreciably since the coup. By the end ofestimated that the number of civilian advisers hadto, as the Soviets assumed topplanning jobs in the government's economicbecame involved in changing the government's The Soviets, however, have not promised thesignificant new economic assistance beyondrelief (the USSR is by farons of wheat. This is becausecapability to absorb substantial increases inassistance is limited and because thereillion in unallocated credits fromxtended to previous regimes. Theconomicthat were signed last year allocated onlyof0 million in credits outstanding atof the8 coup. Nonetheless, thesaid to be dissatisfied over the level of Sovietassistance actually being provided, and annoyedunsuccessful attempts to join the Soviet
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) in hopes ofSoviet purse strings.
15. Moscow's political commitment to the new regime was symbolized by its willingness in8 toanother friendship treaty with the Afghan Government. The treaty is similar to others signed with Third World countries, in that it said nothing about the Marxist-Leninist character of the new regime, paid lipservice to Afghanistan's professed foreign policy of nonalignment, and contained no explicit mutual defense commitment. Article Four of the Treaty, however, presumably could be invoked to justify Soviet combat intervention on behalf of the It calls for the two sides to "consult with each other and take by mutual agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity" of the two states. Jt&P
16. As the prospects of the Khalgist group forits rule have declined, Moscow has becomeconcerned that Afghanistan's neighbors, Pakistaninsurgents,
the Soviets have kept up heavy diplomatic and propaganda pressure on Pakistan and somewhat lesser pressure on Iran. They have also repeatedly accused the United States, China, and Egypt of training Afghan insurgents. '
8
Tooj.tfe^et
Recent Soviet Behavior
17. In addition to increasing their militaryin the government's anti-insurgent effort, the Soviets have urged Taraki and Amin to seek political means for easing the situation. They convinced the government to abandon its land reform program. But they were not able to reverse some of the other social and economic reforms introduced by Taraki and Amin that have alienated deeply religious Afghan tribes who refuse to be wrenched from their near-feudal way of life. Tj>
18. Similarly, the Soviets have apparently had
ciircoSfnrSeJSUadJn? AfghanitsPakistan in the interest cf
19. The apparent lack of harmony between the So viend Afghan leaderships lent support to the numerousthat Moscow-throughout the summer9 was seeking alternatives to the Taraki-Amin regime. We have received reports that the Soviets encouraged leaders of the rival Parcham faction of the People's Democratic Party, in exile in-Europe, to believe that the USSR would back their return to power and, alternatively, that the Soviets wereilitary coup. Jailed members of the Parcham faction in Kabul, who were released at Soviet urging in early July, were rearrested in August after they began circulating anti-Amin and anti-Taraki documents. E^iiS*OC)
20. Moscow's desire to enlarge the Afghan ruling circle apparently was discussed directly with Taraki and Amin. Ambassador Safronchuk, the Soviets' special envoy to Kabul, told the US Charge onune that Moscow had not yet been able to persuade the regime to bring new people into government. By mid-July the East German Ambassador in Kabul was claiming that the Soviets were going to replace Taraki and Amin by force if necessary. In late July, the public comments of Taraki and Amin made it clear that they were aware of the Soviet machinations and that they would
9
eminded Moscow that the prerequisite for continued close ties was Soviet "respect for ourovereignty and independence." in the same period there"
h9n had taken 8CePs to circum-kvfitPT f Miniscer of Defense Watanjar,
Afghan military to depose tain and Taraki. Onuly.
)
ann^flVwf?CtlVe COntro1 ?f
ana appointed rfatanjar as Interior Minister. MC-
uring the latter half of August sugqestn its dealings with thlreg- meSared t0 ha^ the growth of itsto the Khalqis. Onugust Soviet leaders Brezhnev
K?rtS?9ianu8uallvmessage to the Afghan
onnection with Afghan independence day. Aahigh-ranking Sovietndefoviet Gcound forces. Generaln^V" Kab^ 8eccetlv toengthy
ment of Afghan military needs. fc^Ofcoc)
nAmin's seizure of sole Dover oth Watanjar and Taraki from the
comPjicated the Soviet problems in dealinginsurgency. The Soviets probably
ering the counterinsurgency task ?nr?hf^fficult. at least in the short term, because it
Military Options
rhrSrl! "dime's base of support and in fact threatened to divide the Khalqi party itself.
oflflJfr.1T *auBhe apparent absenceical alternatives, the Soviets seem toif^ Kby Iat* Aucust to renew their commitment to the AfghanP n constituted, and to focus on theharacter of military support needed to support
0fflmJtment. The size and rank of the Pavlovskiyduration of its visit, stronglyai* tasked to make thaC assessment of ?; "oscow chose to provide additionalbe divldedf0Ur "tegories7
i.. ulpment and The nost obvious option
ncrease the numbe? of Soviet advisers. Becausehortage of trained Afghan
25. Introduction of Co-abac SupportotrhatUnits. Another option,igher levelwould be to provide the Afghan Army with Soviet-manned support and combat service support
attack helicopter and additional logistic and maintenance enhance the Afghan combat reach andsupport and combat service support units couldto areas of the USSR adjacent to Afghanistan andintroducederiod of weeks withoutthe Soviet transport system. Our ability to detectmovements and intrusions promptly is limited,would increase the probability of our learning thathad entered
26. Limited Intervention With Soviet Combat Units. The Soviets might considerimited number of their own units to provide security or operate in combat as separate entities. The Soviets would have to weigh whether their increased combat presence would alienate rather than bolster the Afghan forces that are now loyal to the regime. of this uncertainty the introduction of Soviet combat units probably would be accomplished incrementally. It might begin, for example,ew battalions up to and including an airborne division or two to help stiffen Afghan Army resolve or provide security for key cities or critical points. As noted earlier, we believe one such battalion has already been introduced to provide security for Bagram airfield since early July.
The most likely airborne division to be called in is the one nearest Afghanistan, located at Fergana in the Turkestan Military District (MD). It could be brought up to its operational strength ofenew hours.
The airlift of an airborne division into Afghanistan could be accomplisheday or so if the transport
and airborne forces were previously alerted and prepared. The Fergana division is situatedautical miles from Kabul, and the flight time between the two locations
11
r about onealf hours, with the short dis- ance involved, the Soviets would probably elect to estab-lish an air shuttle and deliver the division in several regiment-size increments, each requiringircraft sorties. dditional sorties would be required for the division's support equipment. An airlift of this nature would be well within the capabilities of the Soviettransport fleet. m
29- The Soviets could also airlift to Afghanistanelements up to regimental size from divisions in the Turkestan MD. Without their heavy equipment, these units would not have the firepower cr mobility of airborne units but could be used for point defense or, with the commitment of substantial helicopter lift and support units, tocommunication lines or conduct anti-insurgent ^pF)
30. All of these limited deployments could be supported by fighter aircraft from the three tactical air force bases in the Turkestan MD. onlyf thefighters at these basesrimary role of ground attack, but other aircraft could readily be deployed to border airfields if necessary. The closest combat assault helicopter unit is in the Transcaucasusiles from the Afghan border, and other units are farther away in the Carpathian and Transbaikal MDs. Soviet transport helicopter units are located throughout the western and southwestern military districts. The Soviets probably would not consider that airstrikes by themselves woulda deteriorating military situation, but they might use such strikes to support Soviet combat units if they were introduced.
31. Massive Soviet Military Intervention. Anything beyond securing Kabul or some other key cityewpoints would require the commitment of large numbers of regular ground forcesotentially open-ended An overland move towith the possibility of Afghan Army andultidivisional operation exhausting the resources of the Turkestan MD. An operation of this magnitude would therefore require the redeployment oftheir supportingwestern and central militaryin addition to those near the Soviet-Afghan border.
ONTRACT-ORCON
nd forcesto Afghanistan are located in the0 men in fourlevel motorized rifle divisions, an artillerV briaade ilV various MD-level support units. nesl tree's krt manned considerably below their intended wartime stre-qlhs
ut^ecouldould Lunits and an additional division could be moved in from the Central Asian HD. tS-tfPi
ther Central Asian Military Districtoperations but would retire a
Afahln?hCmoblUze reservists and move to the Afghan border. The Soviets probably would be reluctant to
intoenCral *SS
eCSL? oCher div^ion3 locatedfrom Afghamstan in the Volga, Ural ard
"orces tSese
!5 are also nanned aC low levels in peace
c of weakening their posi-
errain and lackodern transportation
ng the Afghan GovernaeSf StSHaLyg* gainst the insurgents and would seriously complicate large-scale Soviet military operations Moat
lUyno^tainoui-?erraJn tiat would limit the use of transport and logistic vehicles In Iaa?
mountainous areas ^hefromX STi" Boveoflt bv cuttinghe border area to several key cities as wellroads between major urbanas
Prospects
infospectuccessful Communist9hdnlscan is important to Moscow forfo^e. substance to det^ini"*sIvuJs VU1 evencually emergeIhll ?Siv9? n,fupport such "volutions hen they fail. The outcome assumes anoccursountry^on rie
n Edition it is conceivable that some tion inP;JSS aVC welc0Ded the advent of such ain Afghanistan on strategic grounds, arguing that if
this revolutionary regime could be consolidated in power at acceptable cost, it could open the way for the eventual expansion of Soviet influence southward. ^>
37. For these reasons Moscow has been determined to make the Khalqi seizure of power blossomorkable government, and has been frustrated by the steady decline of the regime's fortunes. We have seen that as the insurgency has worsened and the regime's needs have grown, the Soviets have steadily expanded the flow of militaryto the regime to the limits of its ability to absorb them. Similarly, they have gradually increased the number and expanded the counterinsurgency role of Soviet advisers in the country. They haveattalion at Bagram airfield to provide security for the airlift. As these measures have proved inadequate to halt the deterioration of the regime's position, the Soviets have explored the option ofroader based Afghan leadership but, even before the Amin coup, had clearly failed in their efforts to create athat might attract greater popular support whilethe government's continued pro-Soviet orientation.
33. Under these circumstances, the Soviets are likely to have begun more serious consideration of the spectrum of possibilities for direct combat intervention- Thethat the Soviets had been weighing the military options discussed earlier was enhanced by the arrival in mid-August of General Pavlovskiy. The delegation led by the Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces was specificallyto be preparing, among otheretailedon the Afghan insurgency and the Afghan military.
39. we cannot rule out the possibility that Pavlovskiy's visitecision already made by Moscow toat one of the levels discussed earlier, and that Pavlovskiy's task involved working out the modalities. One clandestine source in early September alleged that thehad already movedoviet combat troops into Kabul, with the purpose of protecting Soviet citizens and facilities. The Soviets might have consideredove into Kabul prudent in view of the uprisings that havein Kabul this year and the continuing possibility of violence in the capital. Sizable numbers of such troops without heavy equipment could have been brought into the city
pSfaf!^rfasonabieinclude that the Soviet leacecship has wished to avoid allowing the situation to
as further complications with Iran, India, and Pakistan Moscow would also have to weigh the negative effJcU Jlie-
P-es"ncemiUtary1"
i" Af9han**tan. Soviet-Iraqi relations, for
SOUredof Baghdad's suspicion
nEast following the , )
fShani*tan. onspicuous ule of jvl Vso" gainst an Asian population* the Chinese considerable political capital
USS* BSrwhJtiv^^riticism
might auffer for notudding revolu-
ItJc?eDeed,COuld be snooteding of aJsisCnS L hSSR ha5 Provided Kabul with large amounts
SS-23
Une^fnropaganda retreat in case the Khalqis collapse
ri#vi.?Lavoid bains confronted with an all-or-nothing AanthC !oviets seemed prepared beforeide the regime with ad!
help bulat could inciude soae coobat
aeip out would, for the time being, probably be well short
et
XBtJ"entl<'B <uhich have defined as In Shoct' they on the smallest and least
Pavlovskiy's estimate of
sarlier, Amin's seizure of sole power
Sdlems in dealing with ootn tne regime and the insurgency. We believe
MS ^chVf*lor^serthi^movf
W* beUevf ic likely that Moscow views the situation Jw^X c unstable since Taraki's fall, enure of Amin's regime
ay CORceivably havereemptive JjJSr? ovieC plot t0 have Taraki remove hii.
trite) .
uUX>)
mJt 1 ame tiae* the Soviets have seemed ready
in Kabul if the
there snould ranidetei
wptPL1 vlclnity to protect Soviets already there as canir*? VnKUfC continuancero-Soviet regime in the tact^ikely that we would promptly de-Sgideployment of soviet forces on this scale. We do not um Swft&S* Soyiets would intendeployment for
is no?n;t rgency, although it
that, once in Afghanistan, such Soviet ^rbji^forces could eventually be drawn into fighting
fi: and' the Soviets within the
oosiVtnn WeJk!fcC2aclud5*tha^ AaiQ has consolidated his
o.eff^tive challenge from within thethe Army is likely, we believe the Soviets will few ^iVh^nCCfa".their oounterinsurgency role in the next few months, albeit incrementally rather than dramatically;
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Any moderate increase in the Sovietexpansion of the combat activities of advisers, providing some combat support and combat service support elements, and perhaps initially airlifting in additional airborne or lightly equipped battalions or regiments to provide security in keybe primarily intended to buy time. the biggest immediate threat to the prospectsholding action" of this type is the loyalty of the Afghan Army, small-scale defections occur almost daily and, with four major mutinies in the past seven months, its continued allegiance is highly suspect. :
47. Unless the Army completely unravels, therefore, additional Soviet advisersimited sprinkling of Soviet combat units would improve, but not guarantee, the staying power of the Khalqis. In expanding incrementally c1 the level of their own involvement, however, there is a danger that the Soviets will increase their own stake in he ultimate outcome, making it increasingly likely that they will raise the level of their participation still another notch if the situation continues to deteriorate.
48. In the event Amin does not consolidate hisbut an acceptable and viable Marxist alternative emerges, the Soviets are likely to shift their political and military supportIf no such viable leftist alternative appears, and the Khalqi regime fragments, the Soviets would promote installationore moderate regime willing to deal with them, rather than accept the political costs and risksassive Soviet invasion to fight the insurgency. Nevertheless, we can foresee contingencies under which the chances of large-scale and long-term Sovietould become substantially greater:
Prolonged political chaos.
The prospect of advent of an anti-Soviet regime.oreign military intervention.
17
Toc-afft^St
JCONTRACT-ORCON
ANNEX
Warning Conaiderat.i^
It is difficult to assess warning time fordefined military options such as we canAfghanistan. In Europe, for example, we know theof the "threat" forces and there is anof good evidence indicating how they intend, inemploy these forces against NATO. In Afghanistan, we have no evidence on Soviet military ob)ectivesthe forces that the Soviets would consider necessarythem. Moreover, in estimating warning timewe have evidence of what the Sovietsinimum force necessary toeliberateand have predicated our minimum warning time onnecessary for the Warsaw Pact to prepare, and fordetect, such an attack. In an intervention intohowever, the Soviets do not faceon their frontier to be overcome in an initial Therefore, even the largest intervention, which take weeks to fully prepare if undertaken as aassault, could be undertaken piecemeal,airborne or ground forces near the border. Suchcould be initiateday or so, withno warning, as follow-on forces were being mobilized.
o TSeintervention options offer more warn-Tu-kestan Military District; it would takeew days to
2. The options available at the lower end of the scale provide the least warning but also would likely have the least military impact. Soviet airborne troops or small ground forces units probably could be readied foray and it would take about that long tothe air transport to move them into Afghanistaningle lift. We could not be confident that we would detect the increase in troop readiness early on, but the concurrent marshaling of transport aircraftajor airlift probably would become apparentay. In addition, Soviet airborne and airlifted troops could bearning at all if they were moved in piecemeal.imi
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detect the mobilization and movement of these forces. in the face of Afghan Army resistance or efforts to pacify substantial areas of the country probably wouldforces from areas beyond the Turkestan Militaryand would take upew weeks to prepare. We probably would be able to detect the mobilization and movement of divisions in these areasew dayseek.
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Original document.
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