GROWTH AND PROSPECTS OF LEFTIST EXTREMISTS IN EL SALVADOR -- INTERAGENCY INTELL

Created: 1/21/1980

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

GROWTH AND PROSPECTS OF LEFTIST EXTREMISTS IN EL SALVADOR

The continued rapid growth of leftist extremists in El Salvadorharply increasing threat to political stability and portends the outbreak of large-scale revolutionary warfareover the nextpossibly over the next several months BBfJ

The extreme left appears determined to seize power in El Salvador, although its timetable and tactics may not yet be fixed. It has been expanding its numbers of trained, armed guerrillas and of political activists and organizers. At the same time, it has made significant strides ition and coordination on both the military and political fronts

The extreme left is very well funded (throught has expanded its military capabilities through training in El Salvador and in Nicaragua and Cuba and through increasingly sophisticated hit-and-run raids both on government security posts and on rural and urban "soft" targets On the political front, it seems to be well led. and its propaganda and other activities are MrTruiirig:support from educated and unsophisticated Salvadorans ahlei^H

Leftist extremists are Increasing the size and sophistication of their

t!

border.}

left has not yetapacity for extended combat against government forces, and the firmness of support for its cause among the masses is open to question. Nonetheless, in view of the lack of unity and indecisiveness of the government and of the forces in the poUtical center and on the right generally, the potential of the left lo control the course of events in El Salvador is formidable

DISCUSSION

Growth

Tbe rise of ihe left in El Sabador it reflected in theof membership in militant organzalions. In the sne. frequency, and sophistication of operations, and in the armaments utilized ovet the bit two yean. Hardcorrj insurgents have grownonnd to moreodayountry that bad been free? of any sustained guerrilla activity two teats earlier faced three principal insurgent groups whose revenues from kidruping in two yean" limeillion, ransom*9 alone yielded anillion. We now estimate the terroristcheat, aftermtth "pemlilures. to Iota!

Teyrorist-incited violence surgedndof that year was one of the moil active periods of Insurgency Ofr-ciiritv-rebled Incidents thai month.ere clearly terrorist initiated, aJtliouch they resultedotal of only eight dead9 wisoened more than double the number of tuchr-iits. however, and ledead andounded. Hba89

first siieaths

Insurgent boldness and the ability lo field Linger groups of men reflect similar growth. Inerror ids carried out coordinatedn three poJace posts, but the lamest group of attackers numberedozen men and they were lightiiear later, six National Guardsomewhat tougheracked in one week, withuerrillas involved in the largesthese were combined operations by the two largest guerrilla groups, who employed automatices and in oneaiookaman terrorist units, such as those thai temporarily seized outlying towns io9 are no longer uncommon

Front Group Activities.

Membership in El Sahador's estremist'controlled front groups likely0 The FPL iPojwbr LiberationheueiTilb organization, has eHectively controlled and utiliied iU ftont groups, and,maller scale, the other guerrilla groups have had similar successilitant groupstrikes, andcausederoblems lor the govern menu in power Frequently confronted with eatreme demands, the administrations have alternated between militaryart inevilabJs bloody aftermath lhalleftistdrawn-out negotia-bona lhattended to undercut and weaken their gaj

Theradual takeover of the Largest front organization, the BPR (Popular Revolutionary Bloc) has inleruifled the government's problem. The BPR.00 members, grew outloodyonfrontation between students and security forces, with university groups, some peasant organ iia-tions, and the militant teachers union forming the original coalition. Like thai of the FPL, tbe dramatic Kdf.

eslast Decern Jonnallye Revolutionaryo assist in widening its labor influcn

In short, lh* dirtirvction between parent guerrilla groups and their front organizations Is beginning to blur The asMssination campaign underrj: lower-level officials is inin effort by the two largest front fjoops The secood largest guerrillaResistanceitsUnited Popular Actiona pattern similar to tbe FPLBPR merger The from has stock-piled large Quantities of armsalvador and has increased military (lainiotj for iu members, both at home and In Cuba. Even Ihe 'i. softllne Communisl Party and iB front group have turned to more auiesslve tactics

Unification

The tactical alliance lomed this month by the two lea di rig terrorist groups and the CommunistrssraDeled by the merger of their frontibe Salvadoran cilrrrnisu' rttosl surniftcan' effort arDespite ideological and perioral differences, several of the Salvadoran groups have been inclined toward tactical cooperation le* several yean As earlyome of ihe groups developed an informal liaison,8hey jointly engineered several kidnaping* and shared safehouses and arms By

November of last year, all of the leftist organiiatioca. were seriously exploring lactical unification]

The uneven history of guerrilla cooperation tn Ce.itr.il America suggests that the new alliance mas be troubled, but the SaKadorans have evidenced raoie cooperative tendencies than other Central American groups Moreover, theythe added impetus of the Satsdintsta success in Nicaragua that followed the unification of rival facihcns Recent Cuban urging' toward unity and the prospect of additional eiteiraal support from Havana are further inducemenu. On balance, greater tacticalmoreantigovemmentin ihe offirtg in El Salvador

Arm* ond Exterrvol Support

Just as more sophisticaledasource ofa critical role in the N'icaraguan struggle, so (oo will these factors be pivotal in FJ Salvador. An increased arrru flow to Salvadoran insurgents strsceas boosted guerrilla csmft-dence and affected strategic planning0 Last August, the guerrJlas assessed their weapons stocks as inadequate for Urge-scale or prolonged operaut the gioupsbudgeted more funds and have bad incicased success in lapping sources of arms supply

both In Latin America and the Buddie .

certainly of Cuban ipped through Honduras to El Salvador. Anns, including antitank weapons and tub-maehinegTjris, have also been received from Sandinista clerocot* in Nicaragua and from Guatemalan guerrilla

scnnel to Cuba; the tempo increased

o Havana bi0 jnd plain to send ^rlore. The Cubans haved an important broken' role, both in organizing increased cooperation between Salvadoran* and Honduran Communists and in facililatine Salvadoranwith Mir

i-,.

The Salvadoram* needuaranteed armi supply and other support, however, will have to be solved closer loCuba via Nicaragua. Honduras. Panama, and Costa Rica. Governments or leftisl group* in each of these countries hold out the of greater help foe the Salvadoran insurgent-

Fidel Castfipersonal intervention and call (or unityavana meeting with Salvadoran leftist leaden in December parallels his role in fostering an alliance among rival Nicaraguan Sandinista factions last year and ursderscores hb belief that EJ Salvador is thetjrnlsti Amenta |

yjiv-.iiii! i/iji!

to blocs: any real reform, the arguments of the more aarspessiyc clement* in Castro's circle may gain strength gggg^f

DrawMikhe success of the regional strategy that channelo support to the Sartdirsistas. Castro bopea to use neighboring leftistthe Honduran Communistupport at The transshipment in9

i was apparently

majo* Honduran operation on behalf of theunduraiu also have

i to mtjbf.sri 'jieruvrruonduras tor Salvadoran group* In addtboo. the Cubans last year arranged for indirect purchasemall Costa Rican airline that they are planning to use for covert arms shipments to the Sal vadorarts,anner similar to that which they used to ship some of

VJU.OOO tons ol arms lunrtcinJ tolfensive against the Somoza gMtf^ff aaw

Allnoughandinista letccrs remainirds--committed to their revolutionarybut concerned that their involvement might seop-ardiir the badly needed (low of economic assistance from the Cniled States and olhei Westernbelieve they are willing lo lend some assistance now and to give mere extensive aid if the otuaboc should become critical Therovided some training for Salvadoran insurgents after the overthrow-of Somora, and (he Salvadoram have received arms from Nicaraguan sources Tlie LVcernbet airns deliv-

transited Nicaraguaearend meeting inSalvadoran leftist* reportedly reachedboth the Cubans and Nxaraguans (orof

Panama is keeping its options open, fosteringwith both Salvadoran CovtrriQeesst authorities and irssurgeot groups, and olfering advice to both side* But, while Ctneral Tornjos claims toediator with no brief for either side, he views the riseorces InAirseritM.bijbcaii desirable and Inevitable, andeat likely to support 11

Tbe Costa Rican Cora mi minor suj

maaoralis also reportedlyommimicatiofu post io San loseadio oetwork linked with stations in El Salvador!

Strategy and Prospects

Ir. the final quartethe strategy of the Sahadoran insurgents began toattern of plansotal offensive within the next month oroutgrowth of their increasing strength and perceptionak* diyided government. Thisof predicted "final offensives" Is likely lo persist0 and translates into gradually increasingand front-group activities aimedlashpoint when the combination of violence, economiedisnip-tion, and political divisivem-^ mW

he Salvadoran left can remain taciically united, it will decrease the chances for success of anycivilian-military junta, because It would frustrate dialogue wilh elements of the eslrcme left andcivilian-mililari frictions over repressive tactics Through intimidation and political pressure, it could prevent much of the center left from coopeuting any government initiati

The estreme left, increasingly better equippedin larger scale actions, baa developedto directly challenge the Sahadoranalthough much still depends onIn the absence of external aid thatthe military-government structure, theits own external support grows atitr the0 to topple the government formedIf external support for the insurgents iswhat it was in Nicaragua, the esOetriistsctter-than-even chance to seiaeanarchy and violence they vrifl

Original document.

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